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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46480

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEON THOMAS CAZIER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: February 20, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for felony domestic battery, affirmed.

Fyffe Law; Robyn A. Fyffe, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

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HUSKEY, Chief Judge

Leon Thomas Cazier appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction after a jury 

found him guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence of a child. Cazier alleges three errors 

on appeal: (1) the district court violated Cazier’s right to an impartial jury when it denied 

Cazier’s request to voir dire the jury during trial; (2) the State committed misconduct in its 

closing argument; and (3) the jury failed to identify and unanimously agree on the acts that 

constituted the offense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s judgment 

of conviction.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After his wife was hospitalized, Cazier was charged with felony domestic battery in the 

presence of a child, Idaho Code §§ 18-903, 18-918(2)(a), 18-918(4).1 The case proceeded to 

trial. During trial, Cazier notified the district court of an article published in the local newspaper 

that was related to the case. Cazier explained the article was not an accurate representation of 

the case and he was worried the jurors might have seen the article or spoken to someone about 

the article. For those reasons, Cazier requested the opportunity to question the jurors about 

whether they received information outside the trial relating to the case and whether anyone 

attempted to speak to them about the trial. The district court denied Cazier’s request to voir dire 

the jury.

During closing argument, the State played portions of a video interview. Cazier objected 

and argued the playing of the video was cumulative, and the district court overruled the 

objection. Cazier objected several more times to the playing of other video and audio recordings

during the State’s closing on the basis that the evidence was cumulative. The additional 

objections were also overruled. 

The jury was instructed that in order to find Cazier guilty of felony domestic battery, the

State must prove Cazier committed a battery upon his wife in one of four potential ways.2 The 

jury was also instructed it must unanimously agree on the mechanism of injury and the 

defendant’s guilt.3 The jury found Cazier guilty of domestic battery in the presence of a child.

 1 In the original information, the State also charged Cazier with attempted strangulation, 

Idaho Code § 18-923. The State later amended the information and dismissed this charge. 

2 Instruction No. 12 instructed the jury, in part, the State must prove: 

[T]he defendant LEON THOMAS CAZIER committed a battery upon [wife] by 

covering her mouth and/or nose which obtructed [sic] her breathing; and/or by 

placing his hand(s) around her neck and squeezing or in another manner 

strangling her; and/or by sitting on her torso; and/or by causing water to enter her 

nose and/or mouth.

3 Instruction No. 17 stated: 

You are instructed that when the evidence indicates that more than one

criminal act or incident, separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance 

from any other similar act or incident, may have been committed by the 

defendant, and the defendant is formally charged with a single count of criminal 

conduct, jury unanimity as to a single agreed upon act or incident is required. The 
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The district court sentenced Cazier to a unified sentence of twenty years, with fifteen years 

determinate. Cazier timely appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Cazier’s Request to Voir Dire the 

Jury

Cazier argues the district court abused its discretion when it did not allow Cazier to 

conduct a voir dire regarding the news coverage during trial. According to Cazier, the district 

court’s ruling violated Cazier’s right to an impartial jury as provided by the Idaho and United 

States Constitutions. 

The determination whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict is directed to the 

sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of 

discretion. State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 863, 332 P.3d 767, 775 (2014). Similarly, when 

reviewing the limitations a district court placed on voir dire, this Court applies the abuse of 

discretion standard. Id. Here, because a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on 

appeal, this Court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: 

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such 

discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 

270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

Cazier argued to the district court that he was concerned about “the possibility of a juror 

having seen the article, or in the alternative, having had someone spoken to them about the 

article.” Cazier asked the district court to voir dire every juror about whether they received any 

information outside of trial and whether anyone had attempted to speak with them about the trial.

The State objected, arguing the jury had been instructed numerous times not to consider or pay 

attention to anything occurring outside the courtroom that related to the trial. The district court 

 

charge against the defendant must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Therefore, in order for you to find the defendant guilty of Domestic Battery as 

charged, you are instructed that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying 

criminal act or incident has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that the 

same underlying traumatic injury has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Whether any criminal act or incident has been committed is for you to decide.
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declined Cazier’s request to voir dire the jury about the newspaper article. Cazier argues the 

district court abused its discretion because it did not reach its decision to deny voir dire by an 

exercise of reason. The error, according to Cazier, resulted in potentially tainted jurors 

remaining on the jury.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cazier’s request to voir dire 

the jury regarding the newspaper article. The district court considered Cazier’s request and 

agreed an article recently published in the newspaper did not adequately or accurately describe 

what was happening in the courtroom. Nonetheless, the district court did not find it necessary to 

question the jury regarding the article because the jury had already been adequately instructed to 

not consider outside information. Additionally, no jurors had approached the bailiff or informed 

the court that they read the newspaper article or had been spoken to by anyone regarding the 

trial. The district court presumed the jurors were following the instructions they were given due 

to the absence of information to the contrary. 

Cazier has not demonstrated the district court erred. First, the jury instructions in this 

case confirm the district court’s finding that the jury had been properly instructed. The district 

court instructed the jury not to discuss the case with anyone or to conduct a personal 

investigation into the case. See Instruction No. 1.

4 The jury was also instructed not to read or 

listen to any news reports about the case. See Instruction No. 8.5 Second, the district court is 

 4 Instruction No. 1 stated:

During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are 

instructed that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone 

else, including any use of email, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, electronic 

bulletin boards, or any other form of communication, electronic or otherwise. Do 

not conduct any personal investigation or look up any information from any 

source, including the Internet. Do not form an opinion as to the merits of the case 

until after the case has been submitted to you for your determination.

5 Instruction No. 8 stated, in part:

It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the

following instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for

recesses of the court during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home 

at night.

Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the 

attorneys, parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. “No 

discussion” also means no emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting 
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correct to presume the jury followed the instructions it was given. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 

747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 

451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). Third, Cazier provides no evidence that any jurors read the newspaper 

article at issue, were approached by someone about the case, or disregarded the instructions 

provided by the district court. At most, Cazier claims the jurors were “potentially tainted,”

which is not enough to show error. Thus, no constitutional violation occurred, and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cazier’s request to voir dire the jury about a 

newspaper article.

B. The State Did Not Violate Cazier’s Constitutional Rights During Closing Argument

Cazier asserts the State committed misconduct in its closing argument. Cazier claims the 

State’s use of media during closing argument, over Cazier’s objections, was misconduct which 

violated Cazier’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The State responds that Cazier failed to 

preserve this issue for appeal, and even if he did, the State did not commit misconduct in closing 

argument and any error was harmless.

Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of 

fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). 

Its purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. 

Id.; State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). Both sides 

have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are 

entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 

drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); Phillips, 144 

Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Appeals to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through the 

use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588; see 

also State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Pecor, 132 

Idaho 359, 367, 972 P.2d 737, 745 (Ct. App. 1998). 

The State played portions of audio and video exhibits during closing argument. Cazier 

objected to the use of the exhibits on several occasions and argued they were cumulative because 

the jury already heard the recordings and would be able to play them during deliberation. After 

 

to electronic bulletin boards, and any other form of communication, electronic or 

otherwise.
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the first objection, the district court agreed the jury had the ability to review the exhibits at any 

time during deliberation, but allowed the State to proceed. After a standing objection by Cazier, 

the district court further explained that closing argument is to help the jury understand the 

evidence, not to replay the evidence. The district court nonetheless allowed the State to proceed. 

During the State’s rebuttal, Cazier objected for a third time when the State began playing an 

audio exhibit. After the district court expressed additional concern about the State’s use of 

exhibits during the closing argument, the State agreed to move on. The State introduced another 

audio recording, to which Cazier also objected. The State responded that it wanted to play just a 

small portion of the 9-1-1 call, which the district court allowed. Finally, during the last audio 

exhibit, Cazier renewed his objection, and the district court explained that it has discretionary 

control over the time allowed for closing argument, and the court requested the State finish its 

argument.

Cazier has not shown the State’s closing argument constituted misconduct. A party may 

utilize admitted evidence during closing argument. State v. Baker, 161 Idaho 289, 300, 385 P.3d 

467, 478 (Ct. App. 2016). Here, the State did not err when it utilized admitted evidence during 

its closing argument because the evidence had been previously admitted and the State was not 

urging the jury to render a verdict on factors other than the evidence. See State v. Erickson, 148 

Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 (Ct. App. 2010). Similarly, Cazier has not shown how the 

district court’s evidentiary rulings during closing argument were error. Although the district 

court expressed concern with the State replaying recordings, it correctly overruled Cazier’s 

objections. Thus, Cazier has failed to show how his constitutional right to a fair trial was 

violated.

C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Instructed the Jury and Sentenced Cazier

Cazier claims the jury failed to identify and unanimously agree on the act that constituted 

the verdict in the case. Thus, according to Cazier, the district court improperly sentenced Cazier 

under the assumption Cazier was guilty of the most serious battery offense on the charging 

document. 

Cazier presents several arguments on this issue. Cazier first claims the jury was required 

to find the mechanism of injury. While this is true, the record demonstrates the jury was 

instructed in Instruction No. 17 that it had to be unanimous “as to a single agreed upon act or 
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incident.” We presume the jury followed the instructions and there is no indication otherwise. 

See Kilby, 130 Idaho at 751, 947 P.2d at 424. 

Next, Cazier argues he was accused of distinct offenses, and thus, had a right for the jury 

to determine each element of the offense. However, Cazier was charged with only one crime in 

this case--domestic battery. While it is true that the charged crime could have been committed in 

different ways, the jury was properly instructed that it must determine each element of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.6

 Also, to the extent Cazier cites to Blakely v. Washington, 

542 U.S. 296 (2004) for support of his arguments, Blakely is inapplicable to Idaho’s sentencing 

scheme. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931, 104 P.3d 969, 973 (2005). 

In addition, Cazier asserts the district court improperly sentenced him under the 

assumption Cazier was guilty of the most serious battery offense on the charging document

because the verdict form did not indicate the unanimous mechanism of injury. The district court, 

according to Cazier, imposed a harsh sentence which may have been for a different crime than 

what the jury determined. An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion 

standard. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a 

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a 

clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A 

sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the 

facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of 

confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to 

accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related 

goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 

Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the 

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of 

the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 

protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. 

App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire 

sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

Here, Cazier has not shown that the district court abused its discretion during sentencing. 

Courts have broad latitude in sentencing and consider a wide scope of relevant information. The 

 6 See Instruction Nos. 17 and 25. 
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district court in this case could consider the injuries sustained by the victim in crafting an 

appropriate sentence. There is no evidence the sentence imposed on Cazier was illegal or outside 

the statutory guidelines. Furthermore, the district court did not consider a crime for which 

Cazier might have been acquitted because Cazier was convicted of the only crime with which he 

was charged--domestic battery. There is no evidence the district court considered inappropriate 

or unconstitutional information when it imposed the sentence, and a harsh sentence is not, by 

itself, evidence that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Cazier therefore has 

failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.