IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATHAN SALVATORE, : Civil No. 4:14-CV-1848

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Kane)

:

v. :

 : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MICROBILT CORPORATION, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

This case involves a claim brought by a consumer against a credit agency under

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction

Act (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. §1681. The plaintiff’s complaint, which was initially filed

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County on May 9, 2014, makes two

claims under these federal consumer credit laws. First, it is alleged that the defendant

violated 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(1)(A), by failing to redact the plaintiff’s social security

number from correspondence sent to the plaintiff, despite a request by the plaintiff for

redaction of this information. The plaintiff’s complaint then goes on to allege that the

defendant also violated the FCRA and FACTA by failing to provide the plaintiff as

a consumer with a copy of a summary of the consumer’s rights, as required by 15

U.S.C. §1681g(c)(2), which states that: “A consumer reporting agency shall provide

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to a consumer, with each written disclosure by the agency to the consumer under this

section– [a] summary of rights. . . .” Id. As a remedy for these alleged violations of

these federal consumer protection laws, the plaintiff seeks statutory and punitive

damages, along with attorney’s fees and injunctive relief. 

Microbilt has now moved to stay this litigation, (Doc. 15), observing that the

question of the scope of recoverable damages in an action under 15 U.S.C. §1681 is

currently before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Spokeo, Inc. v.

Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2015). Arguing that the Supreme Court’s

ruling in Spokeo may well control with respect to the scope of damages which may

be recovered in this case, Microbilt seeks a stay pending the Court’s decision in

Spokeo. The plaintiff has not opposed this motion, and therefore is deemed not to

oppose the stay request. See Local Rule 7.6. We also conclude that a stay of this case

is appropriate for the reasons set forth below, and will grant this motion for stay.

In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the United States Supreme Court has granted a

petition for writ of certiorari to address the following question:

 “Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who

suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke

the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action

based on a bare violation of a federal statute.” Question Presented,

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015),

http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01339qp.pdf. (Doc. 103.) 

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This question also lies at the heart of the instant case. Therefore, a ruling on the

question before the Supreme Court will likely guide the course and outcome of this

lawsuit. In these circumstances, a stay is fitting and proper.

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every

court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and

effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,

254 (1936). “Central to this power is a court’s ability to ‘hold one lawsuit in abeyance

to abide the outcome of another which may substantially affect it or be dispositive of

the issues.’” Resco Products, Inc. v. Bosai Minerals Grp. Co., No. Civ. A. 06-235,

2010 WL 2331069, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2010) (quoting Bechtel Corp. v. Local

215, Laborers’ Int’l Union, 544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976)). Although federal

courts are vested with such authority under Landis, a stay is an extraordinary measure

that is only justified in “exceptional circumstances.” Colorado River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). See also United States

v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 893 (3d Cir. 1994). 

In determining whether to stay proceedings, courts are to balance the competing

interests at stake. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55; Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607,

608 (3d Cir. 1967). In doing so, courts consider four factors, including (1) the length

of the requested stay; (2) the hardship that the moving party would face if the stay

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were not granted; (3) the injury that a stay would cause to the non-movant; and (4)

whether granting a stay would streamline the proceedings by simplifying issues and

promoting judicial economy. See Vasvari v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 09-CV-2069, 2010

WL 3328210, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254). In

considering these factors, we find that they weigh heavily in favor of granting a stay.

First, we find that the parties face potential hardship if the stay were denied and

the parties were required to expend time and resources engaging in fact and expert

discovery over the course of the next year while Spokeo remains pending, since a

decision in that case will likely have an impact the viability of this lawsuit. See

Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass’n v. Pawlowski, No. 1:09-CV-1748, 2011 9114, at

*1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2011) (“[I]t is of no benefit to either party to incur substantial

costs litigating an issue that the Supreme Court may well determine is not actionable

in the course of these proceedings.”); Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. Civ. 2:10-

2373 WBS, 2010 WL 5092971, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (observing that if the

motion to stay were denied pending a decision by the Supreme Court, “[d]efendant

will incur significant costs relating to fact and expert discovery, motion practice, and

trial preparation to defend this action.”); Vasvari, 2010 WL 3328210, at *2 (finding

stay warranted where the movant would have had to engage “in discovery with a

putative, statewide class action [which] will require expenditure of a great amount of

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resources that may indeed be futile depending upon the guidance provided by the

Third Circuit.”)

Second, and relatedly, a stay is likely to promote a more orderly course of

justice, and judicial economy, by allowing the court and the parties to await the

Supreme Court’s guidance before proceeding further, as other courts have found in

similar circumstances. See Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass’n, 2011 WL 9114 at *1

(“[A] brief delay will provide this litigation with welcome certainty on a difficult

question”); Vasvari, 2010 WL 3328210, at *3 (“[W]e find that a temporary stay of

proceedings will streamline the proceedings in this Court”).

Third, a stay pending resolution of Spokeo is by definition not indefinite, since

briefing in that case concludes this summer and a decision is expected by the end of

June 2016, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s customary practice. Further, we

do not find that the plaintiff will suffer any real harm here, and any harm that the

plaintiff may arguably face is substantially outweighed by the importance that a

decision in Spokeo likely will have on this litigation, and the benefits to be realized

by placing the litigation on hold while that case is decided. 

Finally, we note that, unlike a decision dismissing a petition as unexhausted,

“motions to stay litigation ..., are non-dispositive motions under Rule 72(a). See, e.g.,

Gonzalez v. GE Group Adm'rs, Inc., 321 F.Supp.2d 165, 166 (D.Mass.2004);

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Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 862, 865 (D.Or.2002); All Saint's

Brands, Inc. v. Brewery Group Den., A/S, 57 F.Supp.2d 825, 833 (D.Minn.1999);

Herko v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 978 F.Supp. 141, 142 n. 1 (W.D.N.Y.1997).”

PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.2010). Therefore, the

decision to grant, deny or lift a stay rests within the jurisdiction and sound discretion

of a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), subject to appeal

to the district court for an abuse of that discretion. Touton, S.A. v. M.V. Rizcun

Trader, 30 F.Supp.2d 508, 510 (E.D.Pa.1998) (“[T]he Court finds that neither the

grant of the stay of proceedings ..., nor the lift of said stay, constituted ‘injunctive

relief’ in excess of the Magistrate Judge's authority under § 636(b)(1)(A).”).

Accordingly, upon consideration of the Motion Stay the Action Pending a

Decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, and for

the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is

GRANTED and the action is hereby STAYED pending a decision in Spokeo.

So ordered this 20th day of August, 2015

/s/ Martin C. Carlson 

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

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