IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAEBELLE POINDEXTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 1:09-cv-107-SJM

v. )

)

JERRY MILLER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., District J.,

This civil action was filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Venango County,

Pennsylvania by the Plaintiff, Maebelle Poindexter, who is proceeding pro se. Plaintiff

is the widow of one Daniel Poindexter, who was formerly employed at Joy

Manufacturing/ Technologies in Franklin, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that human

resources personnel at Joy Manufacturing negligently accepted and processed a

falsified spousal consent form which affected the manner in which benefits would be

distributed under her husband’s pension plan, known as “The Joy Global Pension

Plan.” The Defendant, Jerry Miller, is the Human Resources Director of the Joy

Manufacturing plant in Franklin, Pennsylvania, where Plaintiff’s husband was employed. 

Defendant filed a notice of removal on May 11, 2009, claiming that the complaint is

properly construed as asserting a claim under Section 502(a) of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), and that this Court

therefore has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446.

Presently pending before me is a motion by the Defendant to dismiss the

putative ERISA claim for legal insufficiency. Because I conclude that this Court lacks

proper removal jurisdiction over the matter, I will dismiss this action and remand it to

state court.

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I. DISCUSSION

A. Removal

This case was removed from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which

states that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant” to the

appropriate division of the United States District Court “embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Subsection (b) of the statute provides that

“[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim

or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be

removable without regard to citizenship or residence of the parties.” Id. at § 1441(b). 

B. Jurisdictional Standard of Review

Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we have an obligation to

address the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Meritcare v. St. Paul

Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) (a district court may “address the

question of jurisdiction even if the parties do not raise th issue”); Sopak v. Highmark,

Inc., No. Civ. A. 01-1750, 2002 WL 1271366 at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2002). A

defendant has the right to remove a case to federal court when federal jurisdiction

exists and the removal procedure is properly followed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. However,

removal jurisdiction is construed narrowly, Dawson v. Bakare, No. 4:09-CV-0036, 2009

WL 2038146 at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 6, 2009), and therefore any doubts as to jurisdiction

are resolved in favor of the non-removing party. Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913

F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1990). Moreover, the removing defendant bears the burden of

proving that removal was proper. Boyer, supra, at 111; Gatti v. Western Pennsylvania

Teamsters & Employers Welfare Fund, Civil Action No. 07-1178, 2007 WL 3072264 at

*1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2007). Where a court determines that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction – as where, e.g., removal was improper – the court is required to remand

the case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 2 of 11
3

appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be

remanded.”).

C. ERISA and Preemption

Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, federal question jurisdiction exists only

when an issue of federal law appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. 

Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2001). The mere

anticipation that a federal defense may be raised is insufficient to confer federal

question jurisdiction. Id.

However, there is an exception to the “well-pleaded complaint rule”: the doctrine

of “complete preemption” provides that where Congress has so substantially

predominated a particular area as to displace any state cause of action, any suit

brought in that area is deemed federal in character and, accordingly, satisfies the

“arising under federal law” requirement. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d

350, 354 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)).

In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that state law claims

falling within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA are completely preempted by that statute

and removable to federal court. See Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 271 (citing Metropolitan

Life, 481 U.S. at 66).

Section § 502(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a participant or beneficiary of

an ERISA-regulated plan may bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under

the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his

rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Thus,

“[u]nder § 502(a), a beneficiary may obtain accrued benefits due, a declaratory

judgment about entitlements of benefits, or an injunction to require the administrator to

pay benefits.” Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 272. Section § 502(a)(3) allows for civil actions

“by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates

any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 3 of 11
4

appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions

of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” It follows that, if Plaintiff’s claim falls within

the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) or (a)(3), it is completely preempted.

As our Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, however, “[i]t is important to

distinguish complete preemption under section 502(a) of ERISA, which is used in this

sense as a jurisdictional concept, from express preemption under section 514(a) of

ERISA, which is a substantive concept governing the applicable law.” In re U.S.

Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In Joyce v. RJR Nabisco

Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 171-72 (3d Cir.1997). Section 514(a) provides that

ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter

relate to any employee benefit plan....” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). State-law claims that are

subject to this “express preemption” are displaced and thus subject to dismissal, see

id., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), but they are

not subject to removal. See Joyce v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 171

(3d Cir.1997) (“ERISA preemption under § 514(a), standing alone, does not ... create

federal removal jurisdiction over a claim pled under state law in state court.”) 

Thus, state law claims that fall outside the scope of § 502, even if they would

otherwise be preempted by § 514(a), “are still governed by the well-pleaded complaint

rule, and therefore, are not removable under the complete preemption principles ....” Id.

at 172. See also Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 275 (anticipated defense of express

preemption under § 514(a) cannot be the basis for removal). Moreover, where the

claim falls outside the scope of § 502, the district court cannot rule upon an issue of

express preemption under § 514. See Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 275 (“[W]hen the

doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff’s state claim is

arguably preempted under § 514(a), the district court, being without removal

jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute regarding preemption.”) (quoting Dukes v. U.S.

Healthcare, 57 F.3d at 355).

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5

D. The Plaintiff’s Claims

The upshot of the foregoing discussion is this: if the Plaintiff’s claim is, as

Defendant contends, covered by the scope of § 502(a)’s civil enforcement provision,

then it is completely preempted by ERISA, removable to this Court, and subject to

adjudication on its merits under the applicable provisions of ERISA. If, on the other

hand, Plaintiff’s claim does not fall within the scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement

provision, then it is not completely preempted and removal jurisdiction does not exist.

As I have noted, § 502(a)(1)(B) permits a plan beneficiary “to recover benefits

due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,

or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Thus, claims pertaining to the administration or the eligibility of

benefits fall within the scope of § 502(a). Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273. To state it

differently, claims that contend benefits due under the plan were erroneously withheld

or which seek to enforce a beneficiary’s rights under the plan or clarify the beneficiary’s

rights to future benefits are subject to complete preemption. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,

193 F.3d at 161-62. The Supreme Court has recently stated that, “if an individual, at

some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and

where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's

actions, then the individual's cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA

§ 502(a)(1)(B).” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). “Likewise, Section 502(a)(1)(B) preempts a state law

cause of action when interpretation of the terms of plaintiff’s benefit plan forms an

essential part of plaintiff’s state law claims.” Alloca v. Wachovia, 2005 WL 2972845 at

*3 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2005).

The dispute giving rise to this lawsuit has to do with a spousal consent form

which essentially waived the Plaintiff’s right to survivor benefits under her late

husband’s pension plan. In order for the decedent to have elected a lifetime annuity in

lieu of survivor benefits, the Plaintiff was required to execute the spousal consent form

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 5 of 11
6

in question. The subject form was ostensibly executed by the Plaintiff on December 4,

1997 and bears the seal of a notary public. However, Plaintiff contends that there are

obvious inaccuracies and errors on the face of the form which evidence the fact that her

signature was forged and improperly notarized. She alleges that the Defendant should

have discovered and acknowledged the forgery. 

The Defendant contends that the complaint, in substance, asserts a claim under

§ 502(a)(1)(B) because Plaintiff is seeking to clarify her rights to future benefits insofar

as she alleges that the Defendants arbitrarily determined the amount her husband

received in pension payments and the amount of survivor benefits to which she is

entitled. I find this assertion unpersuasive. 

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the subject consent form was falsified,

administered improperly and did not adhere to Notary Public standards – to wit, her

signature was forged and there is not a notary seal present. (Complaint [1-2] at ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff claims that Joy Manufacturing personnel were aware of these discrepancies but

ignored them and accepted the form as part of the Plan. (Id. at ¶ 7.) She further claims

that her survivor benefits are in question as a result of the foregoing (id. at ¶ 9) and that

“[c]onclusion[s] made ... pertaining to the amount Mr. Poindexter would have received in

pension payments is without merit and arbitrarily determined by the employer without

any input from the spouse.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Yet a reading of the complaint shows that Plaintiff is not, in this action, seeking

survivor benefits under the Plan, nor is she seeking to clarify or enforce rights under the

Plan. (In fact, the Plaintiff alleges that the company is already “cooperating to

compensate [her] for accepting a forged spousal consent form...” (Complaint ¶ 13),

which presumably equates to some form of compensation for her lost survivor benefits.) 

Rather, the complaint alleges that corporate human resources personnel were negligent

in allowing a defective document to become a part of the Plan and that the Defendant

should therefore be liable for the “collateral damages incurred” as a result of her

foregone survivor benefits. (Complaint ¶¶ 4, 13.) According to the complaint, these

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 6 of 11
 The Complaint contains some mis-numbered paragraphs. The cited paragraph 1

should be numbered “14.”)

7

“collateral damages” include the loss of her home and car, moving expenses, legal

expenses, costs incurred in connection with securing a forensic examiner, and pain and

suffering over a three year period. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also seeks equitable relief

requiring the Defendant “to explain what quality control measures are in place to

prevent such mistakes.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s response to the pending motion to 1

dismiss clarifies that her allegations do not pertain to the manner in which the Plan was

administered; instead, they pertain to allegedly negligent actions by corporate

personnel in allowing an invalid spousal consent form to become part of the Plan. 

Simply put, “Maebelle Poindexter argues that losses incurred were not a result of the

pension plan but the result of Joy Administration processing an invalid document which

could not be part of the plan.” (Pl.’s Response to Motion to Dismiss [10].)

As the foregoing demonstrates, Plaintiff is not presently challenging the

administration of benefits under the terms of the Plan or her eligibility to receive survivor

benefits. She does not claim that survivor benefits were erroneously withheld by the

Plan Administrator or that she should be entitled to such benefits from the Plan in the

future. In fact, the right which Plaintiff is presently seeking to vindicate is not one that

arises under ERISA, nor could it be enforced pursuant to § 501(a)(1)(B). Nor is this a

situation where interpretation of the Plan terms forms an essential part of the Plaintiff’s

state law claim. Consequently, I conclude that the Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not

subject to complete preemption by § 501(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.

Defendant also contends that the complaint asserts a claim under § 502(a)(3)

because the Plaintiff, in substance, is alleging that the Defendant is a fiduciary and that

he breached his fiduciary duty by imprudently accepting the allegedly forged spousal

consent form. I find this theory also to be a misreading of the complaint. Defendant is

not the Plan Administrator and Plaintiff does not aver that he owed her – or breached –

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 7 of 11
8

a fiduciary duty. Rather, the duty which she claims was breached is one of ordinary

care, as pertains in any garden variety negligence action. Her theory appears to be that

“[p]roper quality control measures should have been in place to insure the validity of all

documents.” (Pl.’s Response to Mot. to Dismiss [10].) This is not a situation where the

Plaintiff is attempting to redress the alleged violation of a specific ERISA provision or a

term of the subject Plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (providing a cause of action to,

inter alia, beneficiaries who seek to enjoin or obtain other appropriate equitable redress

of an alleged violation of ERISA Subchapter 1 or the terms of the plan). Instead, the

theory seems to be that the Plaintiff lost out on certain benefits under the Plan to which

she otherwise would have been entitled – and this in turn resulted in additional

consequential or “collateral” damages – due to an act of corporate negligence on the

part of the Defendant in allowing a defective document to become part of the Plan. 

Such alleged misconduct violates neither the Plan itself nor any provision of ERISA.

Although the Defendant characterizes Plaintiff’s claim as one asserting a breach

of fiduciary duty (thus, a putative ERISA violation), the complaint suggests otherwise. 

For purposes of ERISA, a “fiduciary” is defined to include “a person ... [who] (i) ...

exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of

such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of

its assets ... or (iii) ... has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the

administration of such plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A). As the Defendant himself

acknowledges in his motion to dismiss the complaint, “[Plaintiff] has not alleged any

facts suggesting that Miller is a Plan fiduciary.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss the Complaint [6] at p. 4.) 

Defendant nonetheless insists that the Plaintiff is attempting to allege a fiduciary

duty on his part because, as the Defendant sees it, Plaintiff is contending “that

Defendant breached his alleged fiduciary duty owed to her, by imprudently accepting

the allegedly forged spousal consent form.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at

p. 2.) As support for this proposition, Defendant cites Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 8 of 11
9

complaint. But these paragraphs merely aver that:

4. Joy Human Resources was negligent by not insuring this [spousal

consent] form was valid[.]

5. ... Said document specifically required a Notary Public or Employer

Representative as a witness. Said document was falsified,

administered improperly and did not adhere to Notary Public

standards. The signature of Maebelle Poindexter had been forged

and there is not a notary seal present.

(Complaint [1-2] at ¶¶ 4-5.) I find nothing in these averment which requires that they be

construed as an alleged breach of fiduciary duty as opposed to ordinary negligence.

The Defendant cites two cases which supposedly demonstrate that “[o]ther

courts have recognized that ERISA claims like those asserted in the Complaint are

properly removable.” (Notice of Removal [1] at ¶ 7.) In Dunlap v. Ormet Corp., No.

5:08-cv-65, 2009 WL 763382, the plaintiff, a plan beneficiary, asserted among other

things, that certain corporate defendants had negligently accepted a change of

beneficiary form (which removed the plaintiff as the named beneficiary) without

investigating its validity. The court found this claim to be completely preempted by

ERISA and prosecutable as a federal cause of action. Although such a claim is very

similar to the one being asserted here, I am not persuaded that the result reached in

Dunlap pertains in this case. For one, the Dunlap court found (somewhat summarily)

that the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted a “breach[ ] of ERISA’s core fiduciary

standards of loyalty and care,” Dunlap, supra, at * 5, a conclusion which I am unwilling

to reach here for the reasons previously stated. Second, the Dunlap court went on to

say that, ”to the extent ... the claims against the corporate defendants are not construed

as arising under § 502(a)(2) or § 502(a)(3), the plaintiff nonetheless seeks to recover

benefits due to her under the terms of the benefits plan. Therefore, her claims

conceivably implicate § 502(a)(1).” Id. As I have already explained, that is not the case

here, as Plaintiff is not stating a claim for benefits due her under the Joy Global Pension

Plan.

Case 1:09-cv-00107-SJM Document 11 Filed 03/16/10 Page 9 of 11
Of course, in remanding the case, the Court renders no opinion on the ultimate

2

merits or legal viability of Plaintiff’s claims.

10

Defendant also refers me to Gatti v. W. Penn Teamsters & Employers Welfare

Fund, No. 07-1178, 2007 WL 3072264 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2007), which I find to be

readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Gatti, the court stated:

It does not require a deep reading of the Complaint to determine that

Plaintiff's claims fall squarely within the provisions of section 502(a). 

Plaintiff seeks to recover the $1800 in accident benefits that he alleges

were wrongfully denied him under the terms of the Plan. He also seeks a

declaratory judgment interpreting the Plan's terms with respect to

subrogation for accident benefits. These allegations facially state a claim

falling under the purview of section 502(a).

Gatti, supra, at *3. As I have already discussed, the Plaintiff is not presently suing to

recover survivor benefits, nor does she contend that such benefits were wrongly denied

her based on the terms of the Plan. Instead, as I understand the complaint, Plaintiff is

alleging that the Defendant was negligent in allowing a defective spousal consent form

to become part of the Plan, thereby altering her rights under the Plan. Such allegations

render Gatti inapposite to the present case.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously discussed, I find that the Plaintiff’s state law

negligence claim is not completely preempted by ERISA and, thus, not subject to

removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Having determined that this Court lacks removal

jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claim, I am statutorily required to remand the case to

state court inasmuch as the parties are not diverse and there is no other apparent basis

upon which to assert federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

2

Accordingly, an appropriate order follows.

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11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAEBELLE POINDEXTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 1:09-cv-107-SJM

v. )

)

JERRY MILLER, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, to wit, this 16 day of March, 2010, for the reasons set forth in the th

accompanying Memorandum Opinion,

IT IS ORDERED that the above-captioned civil action be, and hereby is,

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed

to remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas for Venango County,

Pennsylvania.

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin 

SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record.

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