U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–691PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

NORTH KOREA’S DIPLOMATIC GAMBIT:

WILL HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 11, 2018

Serial No. 115–146

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Sung-Yoon Lee, Ph.D., Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor in Korean studies and assistant professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

Tufts University ................................................................................................... 9

Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser and Korea chair, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies ........................................................................................... 21

The Honorable Christopher R. Hill (former Assistant Secretary for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Former U.S. Ambassador 

to South Korea) .................................................................................................... 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Sung-Yoon Lee, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 12

Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 23

The Honorable Christopher R. Hill: Prepared statement .................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 52

The Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Questions submitted for the record ............................................... 54

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Questions submitted for the record ............................................. 56

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NORTH KOREA’S DIPLOMATIC GAMBIT:

WILL HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF? 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. The hearing will come to order. Good afternoon and 

thank you for being here today and taking your time. 

In a speech on New Year’s Day, North Korea’s dynastic, totalitarian dictator, Kim Jong-un, laid the groundwork for a charm offensive at the Winter Olympics which has led to proposed summits 

with President Moon Jae-in and President Trump. In March, Kim 

also undertook a surprise visit to Beijing, underscoring China’s continued influence over the Kim regime. 

Earlier this week, the press reported that the North Korean officials confirmed to U.S. diplomats that denuclearization would be on 

the table for the upcoming summit between President Trump and 

Kim Jong-un. Previously, the U.S. public only had this information 

secondhand from South Korean and Chinese interactions with the 

North. 

Just yesterday, Kim Jong-un acknowledged for the first time that 

he is willing to sit across from President Trump and discuss his nuclear program. The confirmation puts to rest a small part of the uncertainties surrounding these talks, but more significant risks and 

uncertainties remain. At this stage, all we know is that these talks 

will be an inflection point. History will decide whether they are 

best seen as an opportunity or a trap. The talks could very well 

lead to an improvement of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, but they also could be the catalyst for a violent eruption 

of the security crisis that has been building for decades, either because the talks devolve or even if the talks succeed, but the free 

world buckles and empowers Kim by giving up too much. 

We still don’t know Kim’s true motivations. It may well be that 

his entire charm offensive is simply a daring gambit to ease the 

pain of the unprecedented pressure campaign. Even if Kim approaches negotiations in good faith and not just carrying out a cynical ploy, there is still risk. Like any negotiator, Kim intends to 

walk away with everything he wants while giving away as little as 

possible as we have seen in the past. 

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The likeliest scenario is that Kim wants concessions that the 

United States will find completely unacceptable. Kim wants the 

United States to lift sanctions to empower his regime further and 

desert our South Korean allies by withdrawing U.S. forces and our 

nuclear umbrella. 

It is worth noting that North Koreans have only said they are 

willing to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, not 

the denuclearization of North Korea specifically. As Dr. Lee and 

Dr. Cha point out in their commentary and testimonies, this distinction does not get the attention it deserves given the unique implication of both, and that is why it is so important that you are 

here today to put a highlight on that. 

Other creative negotiating outcomes might involve transferring 

goods or currency which has been done before with disastrous results. North Korea has time and again failed to show the world 

that it is willing to negotiate in good faith. On the other hand, we 

have many examples of North Korea using diplomatic gambits to 

get paid, dodge sanctions, and advance its nuclear weapons program. 

American resolve is the key to mitigating many of these risks. 

Easing the maximum pressure campaign prematurely would give 

Kim the easy victory he desires. It would also weaken the multilateral coalition that follows our lead which the administration has 

painstakingly built over the last year. Kim’s promises are worth 

nothing and nothing is what we should trade for empty words. 

It is said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing 

over and over again and expecting a different result. With such 

high stakes we can’t afford to repeat ourselves and the United 

States must do things differently than we have before. We must 

learn how and why previous rounds of dialogue broke down and 

apply those lessons going forward to best empower our negotiators. 

Fortunately, our panel today includes three of the people who are 

best qualified to make recommendations on how to accomplish this. 

And with that, members present will be permitted to submit 

written statements to be included in the official hearing record and, 

without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material 

for the record subject to length limitation in the rules and the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing record. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today and turn to the ranking member for any remarks. 

And, Mr. Bera, do you want to take that mantle right now? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

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Mr. BERA. And the ranking member is walking in right now, so 

I will relinquish——

Mr. YOHO. There he is right there. But I think—well, we will just 

wait a minute here. I think it is important as you guys realize that, 

that you are here today to talk about what is going on in North 

Korea and how we can do recommendations to the administration 

to the State Department on how we move forward and we want to 

hear your testimonies on what denuclearization means to us and 

what it means to the Kim regime. 

And if the ranking member is ready for opening remarks, I am 

going to turn to you, sir, thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank you for being here. We have had a long 

history and we look forward to learning from that history. I think 

the success we will have in negotiations will be dependent upon us 

having a reasonable bargaining position. I remember when the 

North Koreans were seeking a nonaggression pact and the position 

chiefly of then Vice President Cheney was we can’t do that, we 

want to invade. 

But another part of our success will depend upon how tough we 

are with sanctions. We have U.N. sanctions that are considerably 

better than anything we have had in the past. We need, however, 

to cut off North Korea from the banking system, and this may not 

be achievable just by sanctioning those Chinese banks that do business with North Korea because there will always be a few small 

banks in China willing to do business with North Korea. It may be 

necessary to have sanctions on the entire Chinese banking systems 

until the Government of China turns off the financial flow to North 

Korea. 

I would also point out that the U.N. resolution allows a 2-year 

period for these ‘‘guest workers’’ that are one of North Korea’s 

major exports to continue to operate and to remit money to the 

North Korean regime. It is more than a little vexing that Poland 

and other countries who depend on the United States for their defense have chosen to make use of this 2-year grace period. It is vexing that they have North Korean workers there to begin with and 

I think the United States has to be more forceful in getting certainly our allies to do more than minimal adherence to the U.N. 

resolution. 

In the 115th Congress I have joined with colleagues in introducing five bills that condemn and sanction North Korea. We need 

to strengthen, to redouble of course our alliance with South Korea. 

In the agreement to have talks with Kim Jong-un, we have made 

substantial concessions that I don’t think are highlighted. We have, 

in effect, conveyed the opportunity to meet face-to-face with a 

President of the United States, a dream of this regime. But second, 

it puts us in a position where we can’t ratchet up the sanctions on 

the eve of the talks. 

So North Korea buys itself some time when we are not ratcheting 

up the sanctions and in return they have not stopped creating 

fissile material, engineering nuclear weapons, or doing the engineering on their intercontinental ballistic missiles. They just pause 

in testing which may be fully consistent with an all-out effort to 

develop the program, since you go through an engineering phase, 

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a prototype building phase and then a testing phase and they had 

just completed many of their tests. 

So, finally, we have to discuss the risk that North Korea will sell 

its nuclear weapons. This has already occurred to one degree. In 

2007, Israel destroyed in Syria a nuclear weapons plant in creation. 

What was underpublicized at the time is that all the technology—

the kits, the equipment—came from North Korea. So North Korea 

has already sold a kit to make nuclear weapons at a time when it, 

itself, did not have more fissile material than it thought it needed 

for its own defense. 

I think, perhaps the number one goal of our negotiations has got 

to be the kind of monitoring that would assure us that North Korea 

is not selling fissile material or completed nuclear weapons, because as dangerous as North Korea is those who would want to buy 

nuclear weapons from North Korea may be more dangerous. With 

that I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. The chair will now recognize Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want 

to thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

The global community has watched carefully as the President 

has dramatically changed our engagement strategy with North 

Korea and after recent sanctions Kim Jong-un now wants come to 

the negotiating table. And I would say President Trump to his 

credit along with this Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, 

have been ratcheting up sanctions on North Korea for the better 

part of a year now and North Korea is starting to feel the pain. 

Unfortunately, 90 percent of the North Korean people live a horrific life under any circumstances and are on the verge of starving 

with or without sanctions. But the sanctions are apparently making it tougher for Kim to figure out how he is going to continue to 

pay his bloated military forces and the regime flunkies who keep 

him in power. 

So it is we have almost an historic occurrence that will be coming 

up soon with this meeting. Whether it is the sanctions or whether 

it is the President’s threats to Kim Jong-un, whatever the motivation, it is my view that a face-to-face is far preferable to war. And 

it seemed that military action was the direction we were headed 

without some intervening event and this could very well be that intervening event. 

My advice to the President would be the following, and that is 

to take Ronald Reagan, who my colleague to my left, your right, 

worked for those years as a speechwriter of his, I would take his 

attitude when he was dealing with the Russians and maybe take 

it a step further. Reagan said trust, but verify. I would advise distrust and verify. 

This is not the North Koreans’ first rodeo. They have negotiated 

previous deals with previous American administrations accompanied by our allies and the Russians and Chinese and then broken those deals time and time again. The deals have typically been 

along the lines of we give them food and oil in return for a promise 

and their nuclear program and they take our offerings and then 

cheat and continue their rogue program in secret and eventually 

out in public when they think it is to their advantage to use that 

to threaten us. 

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So, President Trump, I would also advise him to review with 

specificity the history of previous negotiations with the North Koreans and learn from those encounters. True, Kim’s father was in 

charge in those days, but this rotten apple didn’t fall far from that 

rotten apple tree or from the rotten grandfather’s for that matter. 

So these are important times and I look forward, I think we all do, 

to working with the administration to make sure that it goes in a 

direction that benefits us, our allies, and world peace. So thank you 

very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

Next, we will go to Dr. Ami Bera from California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you Mr. Chairman and to the ranking member. 

I think the issue of stability on the Korean Peninsula and certainly how we approach North Korea has been a pretty bipartisan 

issue in this committee and certainly in Congress and our strategy 

of isolation of North Korea, maximum pressure, and certainly the 

U.N. Security Council has been helpful, secondary sanctions to look 

at the Chinese banks and Chinese commerce to try to put pressure 

on his currency reserves, et cetera, all with the goal of opening the 

door of diplomacy and opening dialogue certainly has been the 

right strategy, separate the errant tweet occasionally that, you 

know, we prefer not necessarily happen. 

I look forward to hearing from the experts on this panel on a couple things. One, with that desire to create some insecurity with the 

North Korean ruling elite, to create some insecurity with his military particularly with his generals, the assessment of what life in 

North Korea is like and have we had any impact, with the underlying broader question of what is different this time in how we approach these negotiations or how our allies in the Republic of 

Korea as they engage in initial conversations. You know, as President Moon has said, they will go in with eyes wide open as should 

we in engaging in this with eyes wide open. 

So it is a distinguished panel. I look forward to what the panel 

has to say, and again obviously a very timely hearing. So I will 

yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

I will next go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, and look forward to hearing the witnesses today. I was here 25 years ago when we made a deal under 

President Clinton that provided millions and millions of dollars’ 

worth of oil that we just gave to the North Korean Government in 

exchange for not having a nuclear program. All those, I think it 

was $150 million, I believe, I am not sure of the exact number. You 

folks probably know what that number was. But my my, how about 

that, we gave them $150 million and they went ahead and built a 

nuclear weapon anyway. 

Sometimes we are such fools and it is distressing to think that 

American leaders at that level were that stupid to be dealing, to 

be giving money to that ilk. What we had at that time was a regime that was dedicated to Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. They 

were fanatic Marxists and Communists and you cannot buy a way, 

that type of commitment. You just can’t do that. They don’t appreciate that. That is not what they, how you can make a deal with 

that kind of person. 

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Today it is different, isn’t it? Today, Kim Jong-un is not his father and I think that is the most important thing that we have to 

understand. This is not like it was 25 years ago and we do not have 

someone who was raised among Marxist-Leninist dogma. We have 

instead a young man leading that country who was raised at an 

elitist school in Switzerland, totally aware of what is going on in 

the Western world, thus he has a different perspective than the 

Marxist-Leninists, his father and his father’s father. So perhaps 

that means we have an opportunity now to do something that we 

didn’t have before and we should be very careful about that. 

Now I saw Ronald Reagan in a very similar spot. I worked with 

Reagan for 7, 71⁄2 years. When he became President you had some 

very hardcore Communists. Andropov ended up being one of the 

leaders there of Russia, but then Gorbachev came to power and he 

realized that Gorbachev was not someone dedicated to MarxismLeninism, he was a man who wanted to make Russia, do something good about Russia. 

Reagan handled it superbly and when they had their first meeting and Reagan made an offer and Gorbachev wouldn’t go along 

with what one of the bottom lines was he walked away from it. But 

then he with one hand he was like this, we were helping the 

mujahideen fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but the 

other hand Ronald Reagan held out like this, let’s make a deal. 

Well, we now have a President who now also knows how to make 

a deal and we will be dealing with someone who is not a hardcore 

Marxist-Leninist but maybe just maybe wants to do something for 

his people. So I see what is going on in Korea as today there is a 

great opportunity for a President like President Trump who just 

takes great pride that he knows how to make a deal that will work 

for both parties. 

So with that Mr. Chairman I am very anxious to hear from our 

witnesses on what they think that deal could be. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next, we will go to Ms. Ann Wagner from Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a brief few 

words for organizing this very timely hearing. I had the opportunity to visit the DMZ last August and I saw firsthand the palpable tension in the region. Japan and South Korea, some of our 

strongest allies, are finding themselves in the crosshairs of North 

Korea’s dangerous game of nuclear brinkmanship. The Kim regime’s reckless belligerence and inclination to escalate crises pose 

an immediate threat to global stability. Although I worry full 

denuclearization is not possible under the Kim regime, I applaud 

the administration and our President for seizing an opportunity to 

pursue a more permanent, peaceful solution. 

With that Mr. Chairman I yield back and I look forward to our 

line of questioning. 

Mr. YOHO. And I thank you for your comments. 

And what I want to turn our attention now to is our witnesses, 

but before we go there we know what didn’t work in the past. You 

know, we have seen 25 years of failed policies that were stop and 

go and in that interim we saw North Korea get stronger and 

stronger in their technology. And if we look at, and I don’t want 

to take your thunder away, Dr. Cha, but in 1994 to 2008, between 

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those years North Korea conducted 17 missile tests and one nuclear test; from January 2009 through the end of the two terms of 

the Obama administration this number increased to 65 missile 

tests and four nuclear tests; and during the first year of this President, President Trump, we have seen 20 missile tests and one hydrogen test. 

And so we know the narrative is they are going to continue to 

grow and I want to know what has changed as you talk. And I read 

your testimonies and what I would like for you to do is go beyond 

that in recommendations of policies. I can tell you this administration does listen. We have sent stuff to them before. They have 

taken it in, some of it they have used. And so this is a chance that 

we can direct those negotiations. I know the administration is probably listening, but I also know North Korea is probably listening 

and so let this be a prelude of what is to come. 

And let me get my notes here. We are thankful to be joined today 

by Dr. Sung-Yoon Lee, the Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor in 

Korean Studies and assistant professor at the Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Thank you for being here. 

Next is Dr. Victor Cha, senior adviser and Korea chair at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Honorable 

Christopher R. Hill, former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs at the U.S. State Department and former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea. We thank you for being here. We thank 

you for your time and look forward to your testimony. 

And Dr. Lee, I think you all know how it works. You have to hit 

the speaker button in front of you. You have 5 minutes and then 

we will go into questions when you all get done. Thank you. 

Dr. Lee? 

STATEMENT OF SUNG-YOON LEE, PH.D., KIM KOO-KOREA 

FOUNDATION PROFESSOR IN KOREAN STUDIES AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. LEE. Thank you, Chairman Yoho and distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, for this rare opportunity. Allow me, please, to 

make five brief points. First, address the basic internal dynamics 

in the Korean Peninsula in order to underscore the fact that North 

Korea will probably never give up its nukes and ICBMs unless presented with the specter of regime collapse. Second, argue that 

North Korean behavior both in its calculated provocations and post 

provocation, fake peace ploys as we are witnessing today, these actions are approximately predictable. There are patterns to these behaviors. 

Third, argue that history already is repeating itself. Kim Jongun is taking a page or two or three from his daddy’s year 2000 

playbook and his playbook from the early 2000s, able to line up the 

leaders of the biggest powers in the world, get them eager to meet 

with Kim Jong-un thereby legitimate him and come across, Kim 

coming across as a reasonable person with whom the outside world 

can do business. Fourth, try to assess Kim’s intentions. And, finally, fifth, make some recommendations on how best to address 

this latest post provocation, fake peace ploy. 

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In the Korean Peninsula, as we know, we have a two-state formulation, South Korea vs. North Korea. Both states are engaged 

in a life and death existential contest for pan-Korean legitimacy. 

When you consider the conventional indices of measuring state 

power, political attractiveness, soft power, economic power, size of 

your territory, population, and military power, except for military 

power we know North Korea lags far behind the richer, the freer, 

far more legitimate South. 

So for the North Korean regime contending with and catching up 

with and perhaps one day prevailing over the South Korean state 

is a nonnegotiable proposition to assume, to presume that we can, 

through artful diplomacy and for the right price, get North Korea 

to give it up, give up its nukes, is a bit misplaced, in my view. No 

person, I would think, would entertain that presumption with respect to the eight other nuclear states that we can get them 

through conventional diplomacy to give it up. 

But we have entertained that hope because North Korea is so 

backward and so dependent on outside aid. For the very same reasons, precisely the very same reasons because North Korea has 

nothing else, I think one has to admit that North Korea is most 

unlikely to give it up. And President Trump during his address to 

the ROK National Assembly on November 7th last year laid out 

the basic internal dynamic very aptly when he said, ‘‘The very existence of the thriving South Korean Republic threatens the very 

survival of the North Korean dictatorship.’’

When pundits opine that North Korea is unpredictable, I think 

what they really mean is it is unconventional. Just by looking at 

the calendar we can sort of approximately predict when the next 

big weapons test is coming. They like to do these things on a major 

holiday, both theirs as well as American, and occasionally Chinese. 

Likewise, their post provocation peace ploys are also predictable, I 

would say. 

In 2000, after having established his credibility, Kim Jong-il, for 

example, firing a missile over Japan for the first time on Sunday, 

August 31st, 1998, and the next year instigating a naval skirmish 

vis-a-vis South Korea, softened up the South with a course for the 

first ever summit meeting. And 2 weeks before his meeting with 

the South Korean leader, Kim Jong-il made his very first visit to 

China in late May and met with the Chinese leader and then he 

pocketed $500 million from the South and then turned his gaze on 

the U.S. for the first time, sent a special envoy to President Bill 

Clinton and invited President Clinton to come to Pyongyang. Next 

year he met with Putin in August 2001, the following year Japan 

got nervous and Prime Minister Koizumi paid Kim Jong-il a visit 

in Pyongyang in September 2002, and made a repeat visit 2 years 

later. 

So we can see his pattern play out. Kim Jong-un made his very 

first visit to China after assuming power 6 years ago, just as his 

own father did in 2000, 6 years after assuming power. What are 

Kim’s intentions? Well, to draw out open-ended, never-ending negotiation process on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

We don’t say North Korea for some strange reason, Korean Peninsula. And that means in North Korean parlance dislodging the 

United States extending nuclear deterrents from the region. 

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I would advise the Trump administration to think hard on the 

basic logic, the following question. At which point between February 9th when Vice President Pence attending the opening ceremony of the Pyeongchang games called North Korea’s outreach to 

the South a charade and Kim Jong-un’s invitation for a summit 

meeting conveyed by the South Korean’s envoys a month later on 

March 8th, at what point did Kim’s intentions turn from fake to 

not fake? 

They have been planning for this for years now and there are 

many, many traps strewn on the path to Pyongyang. So I would 

advise President Trump basically to call for some action. Release 

foreign detainees, unlawfully detained Canadian, American, South 

Korean; allow separated families across the DMZ and across the 

Pacific, American families, the basic freedom of communication, exchange of letters, making telephone calls before and after regulated, routinized family meetings; make sure not to prematurely 

relax sanctions of the terms for gradual suspension and ultimate 

termination of sanctions are codified into law, Sections 401 and 402 

of the 2016 sanctions law; and lastly, don’t be mesmerized by Kim 

Jong-un. 

Outsiders, intellectuals, statesmen, and journalists have variously been stunned when meeting with one of the Kims in the 

first, second, third and they come across as worldly, knowledgeable, 

have a sense of humor even, and they say strangely pleasing things 

like, we understand that the U.S. troops in the South play a stabilizing role so we are not eager for their immediate withdrawal. 

They come across as reasonable and the outsider comes away 

thinking through by virtue of his own charisma, intelligence, and 

empathy that he has gained some deep understanding of North 

Korea. No, don’t underestimate North Korea. They are very crafty 

at this game of using both the carrot and stick. 

I have gone beyond my time. Forgive me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Dr. Lee, thank you. 

Dr. Cha? 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Chairman Yoho and Ranking Member 

Sherman and subcommittee members. 

So I guess the first question is whether this summit is a good 

or a bad thing and I think generally summits are good things. They 

allow us to use an action-forcing event to bring to conclusion 

months long or years long of negotiations. But what you generally 

want is a careful and deliberate negotiation process with the promise of a summit at the end. What we have today is the promise of 

a summit within weeks without enough time for substantive negotiation. That leaves two possible outcomes. 

The first is failure. Lack of preparation and pre-negotiations 

could lead to a failure, and the danger of a failed summit is that 

it could actually take us a step closer to armed conflict because 

there is no diplomacy left after a summit. Or we could have limited 

success where the two leaders might agree to some broad principles 

about denuclearization, about peace, about normalization, and then 

leave it to a team of negotiators to work out the details over the 

course of months or years. The point is that a summit without adequate preparation has a greater chance of failing and without such 

preparation delaying it might be a good thing. 

Second, a summit is not a strategy and a summit without a 

strategy can be dangerous. There must be a strategy for diplomacy 

that would be relevant whether the summit succeeds or fails and 

I think there are four elements of such a strategy. The first is 

compellence. The United States must continue the application of 

sanctions or maximum pressure as a way to compel the North Korean regime to realize that its nuclear path does more harm than 

good to the regime. This must include sanction of Chinese entities 

and individuals which the administration has already started, who 

do not comply with U.N. sanctions. 

The second element is counter-proliferation. North Korea presents a serious horizontal proliferation threat as the chairman 

noted. This is unacceptable to U.S. security. A comprehensive strategy to stop this must start with our allies but expand to U.N. member states to stop any transfer of WMD from North Korea. 

The third element relates to deterrence. The United States must 

meet the threat from North Korea by substantially upgrading our 

alliance capabilities and countering North Korea’s strategy to decouple alliance commitments to defend South Korea. Up-gunning 

our alliances includes military exercising, information sharing, 

ASW, missile defense, and counterstrike. This will not only deal 

with North Korea, it will also make our alliances and the U.S. position in Asia stronger for the next generation. 

The fourth element relates to diplomacy. I do not know whether 

the current path will be meaningful, but I think we all want it to 

succeed for the sake of peace. But let me offer a couple of observations about the path forward. 

22

First, a useful metric of North Korea’s intentions on 

denuclearization would be to seek reaffirmation of a formulation 

that they agreed to in writing in 2005 when they said that they 

would ‘‘abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.’’ I believe there would be no disagreement from China, Russia, Japan, or South Korea to having North Korea reaffirm this 

more specific commitment. 

Second, what may make the diplomatic round different from the 

past is North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles may be an area 

focus in addition to the nuclear weapons. This is the case because 

of the rapid development of these weapons and because President 

Trump has said himself it is never going to happen in terms of 

North Korea having these capabilities. This raises an important 

principle of any negotiation. We must protect alliance equities in 

any negotiation with North Korea. Our North Korea policy should 

start with our allies and should not be at the expense of our allies. 

Third, the summit offers a unique opportunity for the leaders to 

discuss a comprehensive settlement. For the United States this 

must include human rights abuses in North Korea. The addressing 

of these human rights abuses would be an important metric of 

North Korea’s true intention to reform and join the community of 

nations. 

Finally, a number of core questions need to be answered in advance of negotiations. For example, what is the price we are willing 

to pay for denuclearization? What would warrant the lifting of 

sanctions? What is the risk we are willing to accept if we can succeed in negotiations and what is the cost we will accept of a military solution? 

Let me close with a few words about military force. I believe the 

United States should always be prepared to use force to defend 

against a North Korean attack, to retaliate against North Korean 

proliferation, and to preempt an imminent attack by North Korea. 

The prospect of a preventive unilateral attack by the United States 

on North Korea is more difficult and controversial for reasons outlined in my written testimony. Such an action would have to take 

sober account of a threat to 350,000 Americans who live in Japan 

and South Korea and that decision would have to be made by this 

body in conjunction with the executive branch. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]

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Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your statement. 

And Ambassador Hill, and thank you for your service in your 

long service to our country. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. HILL 

(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; FORMER U.S. 

AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA) 

Ambassador HILL. Thank you very much Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman and members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today and 

discuss the situation in North Korea and the prospects going forward. I think there is no question a growing North Korean threat 

and I think that on that basis this is a very timely hearing. 

The threat posed by ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons has 

been with us for many decades, but at no time has it required more 

urgent attention than today. And in this regard, I believe President 

Trump’s decision to meet with the North Korean leader is in my 

judgment correct, but nonetheless fraught with considerable uncertainty and risk. A meeting with the leader of North Korea needs 

to be meticulously planned and frankly the outcome of the meeting 

should be understood at its outset. 

This is not a meeting where you go in with no idea of how you 

go out. It needs to be understood at the outset. The willingness to 

meet, I think, is a courageous gesture by President Trump, but it 

is going to be up to his staff to make it a success for him, for our 

country, and for partners and allies. There is no question past negotiations with the North Koreans have not been successful, but I 

think there is much we can learn from some of those efforts. 

It has often been suggested that the North Koreans have used 

past negotiations to advance their weapons programs, but in fact 

North Korea has used the time in between negotiations to even better effect. This was the case when I took over as the U.S. Representative to the Six-Party Talks process that got underway in 

earnest in 2005. Frankly, when we looked at the amount of plutonium produced by the Yongbyon reactor during the time that there 

was no agreement on the shutdown of that reactor, that is, between 

December 2002 and July 2007, that reactor produced some 40 kilograms of plutonium, which depending on their bomb design could 

be enough for five to ten weapons. 

It is believed that most of this fissile material that they have 

today was produced when they did not have a negotiating process 

and I think we need to keep in mind the fact that when you don’t 

negotiate there are consequences to that as well. This of course 

does not suggest that if we only kept talking to them things would 

go well. It is often stated that North Korea’s interest in nuclear 

weapons has to do with their survival as a regime. And in fact to 

test this proposition, the 2005 Joint Statement included from the 

U.S. side security guarantees not to attack North Korea, our preparedness to have cross-recognition of states in the region, as well 

as our willingness to conclude a peace agreement to provide for a 

more durable instrument to replace the armistice that ended the 

Korean War. 

32

North Korea ultimately chose to walk away from this package of 

security provisions, all provisions that they said they required. 

They also walked away from energy and economic assistance and 

claiming that they simply could not accept what was, from our vantage point and the vantage point of South Korea, China, Japan, 

and Russia, minimally credible verification protocols. 

I think it is important to understand that North Korean behavior 

since then and throughout has led me to the conclusion that they 

may claim that the purpose of their nuclear programs is to defend 

against security threats posed by the U.S., the real purpose of their 

arsenal is to cause the U.S. to decouple its security relationship 

from South Korea. It aims to oppose a new calculus for a U.S. 

President whether this President or a future President. 

Does the U.S. treaty obligation to help defend South Korea expose the U.S. to the threat of nuclear attack? Each nuclear test, 

each missile test, every demonstration of its ability to hit the U.S., 

every threat to send missiles toward the U.S. territories’ people is 

designed to corrode faith in the U.S.-ROK alliance. In short, North 

Korea’s nuclear program is far more offensive in nature than it is 

defensive. 

While President Trump is correct to respond positively to the invitation to meet Kim Jong-un, he should be guided by the need to 

avoid making any concessions that would suggest a weakening of 

the U.S. alliance commitment to South Korea such as withdrawal 

of U.S. conventional troops or a reduction in the pace and schedule 

of annual military exercises. The North Koreans always ask for 

such a reduction of exercises and we have always refused and we 

should continue to do so. 

Quite to the contrary, President Trump should reaffirm our commitment to our allies, work closely with China and others in the 

region, especially our other brave ally Japan, so that North Korea 

does not miscalculate our resolve and so that other allies in the region and around the world are reaffirmed in their confidence in the 

U.S. The stronger sanctions that the Trump administration has 

succeeded in having adopted in the U.N. Security Council have 

been made possible by precisely the willingness to negotiate that 

the President has professed on several occasions. 

So as we go forward there are a number of things we need to 

keep in mind. First of all, work with those allies and have those 

allies work with each other. This is not always easy. Secondly, we 

need to work with China. The idea that we are going to solve this 

and then look back and see that China was somehow against us 

throughout this, I don’t think so. I think we are going to have to 

figure out a common language with China, especially, and this is 

a third point, to keep those U.N. sanctions strong and robust and 

even stronger in the future. We need to continue to look for ways 

to slow up their program whether interdicting international supply 

chains or whatever it takes, but we need to look for ways to deal 

with that. 

And, finally, we need to keep the door open to diplomacy. This 

is the way we reach and cooperate with our allies and this is the 

way that we need to stay engaged until we achieve the ultimate 

end which must be nothing less than the denuclearization of North 

Korea. Thank you. 

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[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hill follows:]


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Mr. YOHO. I thank you for that and look forward to going into 

the questions. 

And, Dr. Lee, you looked at this from an academic side, studying 

it and writing about this. Dr. Cha and Ambassador Hill, you both 

have been at the Six-Party Talks and you got, you know, right involved in that. And if we look back at the chronological timeline 

that I have talked about in the very beginning, and we saw the escalation of either ICBMs or nuclear weapons going on for the last 

25 years and we have been through three attempts at having a resolution to this and we have been through three administrations 

and we are where we are at today having these talks today. So we 

know what doesn’t work. 

And what we have seen is North Korea has become more advanced in their weaponry, their ICBMs along with the nuclear 

weapons with the last one looking like it was a hydrogen bomb, 

and they have become more emboldened. And so as I said earlier, 

we are where we are at today. And then keep in mind, people say, 

well, as you brought up, Kim Jong-un is out like, well, okay, now 

we are going to play nice. You know, people say he is really a good 

guy. He is joking around and all that. 

But we need to keep in mind who he is. He is the guy that has 

killed over 140 people that were close to him including his uncle 

with anti-tank guns, his half-brother with chemical weapons. So 

this is who we are dealing with. And then we see the condition of 

the people in North Korea and then we have heard that there are 

no-go zones for the government in the rural areas because they 

know they are not safe out there. 

And I think the best thing to do is that as you brought up, Dr. 

Lee, is the only way they are going to denuclearize is if there is 

a regime change. And of course going into nuclear talks on the continent it is historic, but if Kim Jong-un knows that that is the only 

way this is going to happen or we know that, I don’t want to impede that. There has got to be a good solution, a win-win situation. 

And I know one of the things that comes up is the unification of 

the Korean Peninsula. And I told the South Koreans that our goal 

is to facilitate that situation and of course we are going to talk 

more about that after these talks start and we have those talks 

and this is so timely because the talks with Moon Jae-in will be 

this month and hopefully with President Trump next month. 

But if unification comes up is that possible on the Korean Peninsula, Dr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. Under the current circumstances unification on an equitable merger type of harmonious unification is impossible. You just 

cannot have two states, one which is 50 times richer than the 

other, agree to a joint venture of one body, one government. It is 

implausible. What is different today is that Kim Jong-un of course 

North Korea stands on the verge of complete nuclear breakout. Its 

capabilities are far stronger than at any time in history in terms 

of his growing lethality, his credible, constant credible nuclear 

threat to the U.S. mainland. Furthermore, North Korea now has 

for the first time a softer, kinder, feminine face to the very unattractive state that North Korea is. The royal sister, were she to 

make a trans-Pacific visit to the United States as a special envoy, 

for example, she is reported to be pregnant, were she to make that 

38

long arduous journey looking visibly pregnant, well-wishers the 

world over will say——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. LEE [continuing]. The hardworking, self-sacrificing, peaceseeking young lady is doing so much, the administration has to 

yield and give some concessions. What is also different today is it 

is unlikely that the United States despite North Korea’s unconventional campaign of fundraising through provocations will give 

North Korea the kind of generous aid as in the past. 

Congressman Rohrabacher, may I respectfully point out the United States gave North Korea about $500 million more than the 

sum that you cited, an excess of $650 million in fuel aid and about 

the same in food aid, in excess of $1.3 billion between 1995 and 

2008. 

Mr. YOHO. I am going to cut you off there because I will let you 

talk to him about that. I want to get your ideas because you guys 

were there when the sanctions or when they were de-listed as a 

state sponsor of terrorism. We worked hard to get them back on 

that list and this is something that North Korea needs to understand that I see no relinquishing of any of the sanctions. That we 

worked hard to get those sanctions working with China and putting pressure through our Treasury Department out of this committee to do those things, and our goal is to make sure that the 

sanctions aren’t backed off, they are not de-listed as a state sponsor 

of terrorism. 

And what are your thoughts on that? Just stay strong, do not relinquish until they bring something to the table that says this is 

a good faith gesture? Ambassador Hill, do you want to take that? 

And then what I will do is we are going to go to the ranking member. 

Ambassador HILL. I think the reality of the situation is that in 

laying out a suite of sanctions there needs to be some corresponding actions that the North Koreans would take and we can 

look at what each action can be and what it is worth in terms of 

sanctions relinquishment. I must say with respect to U.N. sanctions, if you talk about the difficulty of putting sanctions on there, 

it is great difficulty in getting anything through the U.N. Security 

Council especially when you have members such as China and Russia who have a very different view. I would be very reluctant to 

relax any of those U.N. sanctions because of the great difficulty of 

putting them back on. 

With respect to bilateral sanctions, I think it is quite another picture. I think with respect to issues such as state sponsor of terrorism that was a sanction that was taken off but it could have 

been put on a lot earlier and, frankly speaking, I was surprised 

that it took so long. North Korea had long since withdrawn its signature, in effect, from the six-party agreement back in 2005. They 

did that in 2009 and I think we should have slapped those sanctions on immediately and we could have. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree with you. And we asked Secretary Tillerson 

right in the beginning of his tenure to put those back on and they 

said they were studying it. So the goal is to keep them on until we 

get, you know, accurate information that they are really wanting 

to change. 

39

Next, we will go to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador Hill, you point out that summits may 

be a good thing, but I will point out you wage war and peace with 

the President you have, not the President you wish you had, and 

how these turn out so we will have to see. 

I agree with you that we cannot allow the Security Council to 

pass a resolution withdrawing sanctions. We could, however, agree 

to a 6-month suspension of those sanctions that would automatically go back into force unless there is another resolution. We could 

always veto a resolution. If we sanction North Korea without negotiating they are going to keep making fissile material and missiles. 

And if we negotiate without sanctioning them then we get to have 

talks with them, but they are going to keep making fissile material 

and missiles. 

I have a couple questions for the record I would like all three 

witnesses to respond to. The first is, assuming we are not successful in rolling back very, very significantly the North Korean program in the next year, how likely is it that Japan will develop its 

own nuclear weapons and how important is it to China that Japan 

not develop its own nuclear weapons? 

The second question for the record is what could be done—the 

U.N. sanctions seem pretty strong—and not what do you do to convince others to agree to strengthen them, but if you were the Security Council what would you do to strengthen them other than 

shorten the phase-in periods and add financial sanctions? Now, Dr. 

Lee, you correctly point out I think that the North Korean Government doesn’t want to give up its nuclear program unless they face 

regime-threatening sanctions and it is pretty difficult to put those 

in place and of course that China doesn’t want the regime threatened. 

So my question is—and there is another reason for that in as 

Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program, Saddam gave up his nuclear 

program—they are both dead. So I will agree with you it is going 

to be very hard to get them to give up their nuclear weapons. The 

question is what level of pressure is necessary to get them to agree 

to limit those weapons in number, agree to a strict monitoring of 

those weapons, and freeze their missile program? If we were aiming for that level of control would we have to have the regime teetering on destruction or would they give us that even if they were 

in less dire straits? 

Mr. LEE. Some may take the view that the reason Kim Jong-un 

changed his behavior as of New Year’s Day is due to growing fear 

from tough sanctions enforcement by the United States. And credit 

is due where it is due, President Trump is the first U.S. leader to, 

in a meaningful way, enforce sanctions against North Korea. At the 

same time, I don’t think Kim Jong-un is so fearful of an imminent 

coup that he has changed his tune from molto agitato to placido. 

When President Trump spoke all fire and fury in early August, 

for example, Kim Jong-un was quiet for about 25 days and many 

people opined maybe he is fearful. But then on August 29th he 

fired a missile over Japan and that day is known in Korea, both 

in North and South, as National Humiliation Day for it was on 

that date in 1910 that Korea was colonized by Japan and just 5 

days later North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. And when 

40

President Trump on September 19th at the U.N. General Assembly 

spoke of Rocketman and total destruction, undeterred Kim Jong-un 

fired off that devastating ICBM in late November. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Lee, I am going to have to interrupt because 

I have a question for Dr. Cha. 

You have spoken, obviously we need tougher banking sanctions. 

We need to prevent North Korea from being able to borrow money 

and undertake large transactions. You spoke of sanctioning individual Chinese banks, but it occurs to me that if you are the 100th 

largest Chinese bank and you happen to be based in northern 

China you might very well decide, well, I don’t want to do business 

with the United States. After all, there are 99 bigger institutions 

that will be signed on an American bank. I just do business with 

North Korea instead. 

So the question is can we achieve what we are trying to achieve 

by sanctioning individual entities in China or do we have to sanction all of the Chinese economy until Beijing knocks on the door 

of some bank that doesn’t want to do business in the United States 

and says you are a Chinese bank, you can’t do business with North 

Korea? Do we need entity sanctions or country sanctions? 

Mr. CHA. It is a great question. I think a decision to sanction the 

entire Chinese banking system would entail equities that go far beyond North Korea and it would be hard, as someone who——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am suggesting threatening it rather than actually doing it, but go ahead. 

Mr. CHA. From what I have seen in terms of what this administration has done so far although they haven’t spoken about it publicly a lot, as you know well the secondary sanctioning of China is 

well underway. I mean they have sanctioned scores of entities and 

individuals. Now you are absolutely right that most——

Mr. SHERMAN. Little ones that don’t do business with the U.S. 

anyway. 

Mr. CHA. Right, right. And that is why they are not a problem 

in U.S.-China relations. That is why the Chinese Government 

doesn’t care. Sanctioning the entire Chinese banking system would, 

I don’t know if we would even necessarily solve our North Korea 

problem because they are not transacting through the Bank of 

China or other places, they are transacting through these smaller 

ones that you talked about. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does Beijing lack the capacity to control what 

goes on by banks on its own territory? Is this some sort of failed 

state? 

Mr. CHA. I would say that they probably have less control than 

we think they do over all of these——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, we are able to tell small banks in Nebraska 

not to do business with terrorists. I assume that Beijing has at 

least as much control over there. IC, Independent Community 

Bankers association, we do, and I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. Next, we will go to Mr. Rohrabacher from 

California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we know 

now that Kim Jong-un killed his uncle, murdered his uncle and 

also murdered his half-brother among other things that he has 

done. And were these killings an indication that he was a hardcore 

41

Communist who basically felt that those people were undermining 

his efforts, or was it an indication that they were hardcore Communists and he wanted to take things in another direction that 

they would oppose? Which one of those and maybe just right down 

the line, what you think. 

Mr. Ambassador, start with you. 

Ambassador HILL. I think the murder of his uncle, Jang Songthaek, who was in a Communist Party meeting and was essentially 

perp-walked out of the meeting and then killed the next day, I 

think the Chinese took that as an attack on the China relationship. 

And I think Kim Jong-un was kind of making an important statement there because he was essentially saying the Chinese thwarted 

my father in realizing his goal of being nuclear, I am not going to 

let that happen. So it was the kind of statement that he is kind 

of keeping the Chinese at bay. The Chinese took it as an insult to 

them and that is one of the reasons that he was never invited to 

China until just a few weeks ago. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thanks for that analysis. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. CHA. Yes, I would agree with that. I mean I don’t think it 

was about ideology. I think it was all about power. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. CHA. And whether it was power that the uncle was having 

in terms of——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it wasn’t a power about, it wasn’t a conflict over whether we should have a reform type movement, but it 

was all just maybe what gang we are going to associate with, 

China or Russia or whatever. Do you agree with that Dr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. Jang Song-thaek was the de facto number two man. He 

was recognized as such for over a decade. And usually in a totalitarian system the life of the number two man is short and precarious. It was almost preordained. With respect to the half-brother he 

was a marked man the day he gave a live TV interview to a major 

Japanese broadcaster coming out against a third father-to-son hereditary succession. 

North Korea operates like a giant criminal syndicate. It as a 

matter of state policy produces and sells drugs, fake pharmaceuticals, fake famous brand U.S. cigarettes, counterfeits U.S. currency, and it is business not personal in that kind of system. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand. But we go into details about 

the cars that they import or the amount of whiskey they import, 

but yes, like a criminal enterprise. What should we seek, Ambassador Hill, what would be the minimum that we should seek to get 

out of the meeting between our President and the Korean leader? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, I would agree with what Dr. Cha said 

which is the absolute minimum needs to be a reaffirmation of their 

commitment to the goal of denuclearization which was to bring 

them back into compliance with the international treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And they have already made some statements yesterday, I believe, was that indicated that they might go 

in that direction; is that correct? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes. But I think that has to be memorialized 

in writing and I think it needs to be very clear. What I would like 

42

to see, actually, is the way summits are usually done, which is you 

take the national security advisor and put that person on a plane 

and that person should be talking to his counterpart and they 

should have an agreed joint statement on what the two leaders are 

going to come out with. So I think the national security advisor 

should be on a plane by now rather than being in the White House 

and he should be trying to make sure this is a success. And I would 

judge the minimum success would be a North Korean commitment 

to their early denuclearization and rejoining the Non-proliferation 

Treaty as a nonnuclear state. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I think that is great advice for our 

President and I know that John Bolton would love to do that for 

his new boss. And we wish John Bolton the success in what he is 

doing and I hope he gets the opportunity to do the kind of things 

you just outlined. 

Ambassador HILL. I wish I could give him a restaurant suggestion in North Korea, but I couldn’t think of any. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Next, we will go to Mr. Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just got that image 

of John Bolton dining in Pyongyang. I can’t get that out of my 

head. I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this panel, a 

wonderful panel, really a very thoughtful discussion. 

Ambassador Hill, we met in Korea and Japan and I read your 

book. You gave us a copy of your book, thank you, and Dr. Cha and 

Dr. Lee, really wonderful comments. Dr. Lee, you talked about Humiliation Day back in 1910. Were you saying that Kim Jong-un deliberately picked that day to make a message to the Korean people 

about his missile development program? 

Mr. LEE. To stick it to Japan. He said so afterwards this was a 

message for Japan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. It wasn’t an accidental date. 

Mr. LEE. No. And as he said in the wake of his first ICBM test 

ever on American Independence Day last year, this is my gift package to the American imperialists and there will be more packages 

coming your way. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Cha said the danger of a failed summit is 

that it brings us closer to war. No diplomacy after a summit and 

a summit without adequate preparation has a greater chance of 

failure, your comment on that? 

Mr. LEE. I completely agree with that assessment. Even a summit meeting between among allies, months at least weeks of preparation go into it, all the wrinkles need to be ironed out. Unlike a 

blind date, there needs to be no spontaneity, no surprises. So I 

think impulsively to accept Kim Jong-un’s proposition was probably 

a mistake, but the U.S. surely can recover from that mistake. 

If President Trump is able to look at Kim Jong-un straight in the 

eye and tells him in public, Mr. Kim, tear down the walls of your 

horrific gulags that may mark at least a powerful symbolic moment 

in U.S.-North Korea relations even if denuclearization in the short 

term is not possible. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So this is, you know, first time an American 

President has met with the leader of North Korea. Don’t we need 

to be careful about setting expectations? I mean tearing down all 

43

your gulags, denuclearizing, meaning you roll it back and set it in 

some closet somewhere else, can you promise you will join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and you will never use nuclear 

weapons ever again, and by the way while you are at it you are 

going to respect human rights and go to church on Sunday or Temple, I mean are those realistic expectations for the first summit between the President of the United States and the head of the North 

Korean regime? 

Mr. LEE. I fear many people are still caught up in the drama of 

the day when President Nixon visited China in February 1972, but 

that summit was preceded by Henry Kissinger’s visit in July the 

previous year which, in turn, was preceded by some 18 months of 

secret negotiations. And the agenda was of course the common 

threat, perceived threat of the Soviet Union, and for the United 

States creating the excitement of winning China back as the U.S. 

was losing Indochina, and for Mao and Zhou they had their own 

agenda too to win Taiwan’s seat in the U.N. Security Council. We 

don’t see that kind of convergence of interests. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Here, that is right. 

Dr. Cha, I quoted your testimony. Help us understand, you know, 

the upside we can all speculate about on a summit. What is the 

downside? Because I look at it and think, gee, this is awfully risky 

from a diplomatic point of view. The stature of the United States 

presidency which is something that Kim Jong-un would more than 

welcome and if Kim Jong-un spurns President Trump at that summit he gets everything we get nothing. We are humiliated. We lose 

face. Our diplomacy is set back and Kim Jong-un laughs all the 

way to the nuclear repository. I am simplifying it, but I really 

think those are kind of the risks and stakes. 

But I would like to hear you enumerate what could go wrong 

with a summit. You obviously had something in mind when you 

made that statement. 

Mr. CHA. Right. So I mean, I think there are a couple of things. 

The first is as you described, Kim may just want the meeting in 

and of itself as a nuclear weapons state, the handshake, the picture, and that is all he wants. I mean the other is, and I think 

Chairman Yoho raised this early, the heightened expectations on 

our side that we expect a lot more to come out of this meeting than 

the President and the President will be quite disappointed by that. 

The other thing as I mentioned in the testimony is our allies. I 

mean there are things that for example one thing that is different 

from the time that we were involved in negotiations is the longrange ballistic missile threat and I think there would be focus on 

that by any negotiating team. But there are other alliance equities 

that are involved when we talk about things lower than the longrange missile. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. CHA. The medium-range threat, the short-range ballistic 

missile threat, so like I said we always want our policy going into 

these negotiations to be something that is benefiting all of us in the 

region, the allies, and not something that we do with North Korea 

that separates us from our allies. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, would you allow Ambassador Hill 

to answer the same question, and then I am done. 

44

Mr. YOHO. Yes, sir. Go ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Ambassador HILL. I think the worst outcome would be the situation where the President somehow walks out and it is seen as a 

failure. I think the concern of course is when you start with heads 

of state rather than assistant secretaries there is kind of nowhere 

to go and so there is a sense that if it is unsuccessful the diplomatic track has kind of reached the end and I think that would 

bring back in great strength the idea that you might have to look 

more carefully at military solutions. 

I would like to emphasize, you know, I approached the whole 

issue having been Ambassador in South Korea and seeing the terrible damage that was being done to our relationship with South 

Korea back in 2003, 2004 when there was no sense of any negotiation going on and the sense among the Korean people saying it is 

easy for you living in Washington not to worry about negotiation 

but we are right here, and so I think it is very important that any 

U.S. negotiator whether it is a President or a lowly assistant secretary needs to understand that the South Korean people are why 

we are there. They are the ally. 

And if we create a circumstance where we have set the thing up 

for failure or otherwise had no progress made where the track will 

inevitably shift over back to the military, I think we will have created problems in an alliance that we really need to be very close 

and strong. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for that. 

Next, we will go to Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen, for your 

attendance. And I have been listening pretty carefully to the conversation and I just need to, I feel like I need to offer an alternative view. 

While I respect your opinions and you are certainly, I think, 

much more learned than I am and let me just say that up front, 

but let me also say that it seems to me that all these notions of 

it has got to go through this step and this person and this amount 

of time and these protocols—and I get that the South Korean people are wonderful. I have been there and they are just wonderful 

folks and I understand that they have much more at stake than we 

do and when you say, Ambassador, that we are there for them, but 

we are not only there for them. And with all due respect, all these 

other protocols that have been discussed, where have they gotten 

us? 

So I would suggest to you that we are where we are because we 

are in the precipice of a dramatic shift in the calculus where this 

nation under this ruler has the ability to deliver nuclear weapons 

anywhere in the world and I think that changes the calculation exponentially. And I would also remind everybody that while the protocols were different under Nixon and Kissinger and China, look at 

where we are now with China. I mean yes, we talk and we, you 

know, 25 percent of their market is the United States and so on 

and so forth, but for the bulk of my lifetime economically they have 

been increasing in their aggressive and in their capabilities vis-avis us. 

45

So I just think that there is another paradigm and quite honestly 

I think it is refreshing and I think the stakes are high, but I would 

just say that it seems to me that doing everything that we have 

been used to doing has gotten us to this point without any success 

whatsoever. So let me ask you this. The relationship, and I understand that the Koreans see this very differently than the United 

States does, that reunification is something that they long for, 

there is family connections, there are nationality connections and 

pride and so on and so forth, but does the relationship between 

President Moon and Kim Jong-un, does that and has that recent 

rekindling of that relationship, has that enfeebled the United 

States’ position? 

Anybody? 

Ambassador HILL. I think it reflects some of the complex decision 

making that President Moon Jae-in has within his own political 

party among his people and managing the relationship with the 

United States. I don’t think there are too many Koreans who would 

say that the relationship with the United States is not of central 

importance to them, and I think they have done much to keep this 

alliance strong including fielding one of the best militaries in the 

world. I think that you compare the South Korean military to any 

military in NATO, it is very strong. 

There is a terrible problem with North Korea but it is a problem 

that South Koreans have to deal with, grapple with every day. And 

by no means am I suggesting that we are informed entirely by 

their issues because with these intercontinental ballistic missiles 

this comes right to our equities as well, but if we wanted to ignore 

that and somehow allow North Korea—I said earlier in my testimony that I think what North Korea’s goal here is not so-called regime survival, their goal here is to decouple us from the Korean Peninsula. 

Mr. PERRY. And I agree with you about that for sure. 

Ambassador HILL. That is brutal stuff. And if we give in to that 

we have a problem with alliances all over the world. We are, if you 

will, a sort of island power that needs those overseas alliances. We 

need to have these important allies out there and I think what goes 

on in Korea can inform what can go on in other parts of the world. 

So we have to handle it——

Mr. PERRY. But in a broader sense, Moon’s kind of relationship 

so to speak recently, is it more of a political calculation for his own 

purposes as the leader of Korea and becoming, and aspiring to be 

the leader of South Korea, or is it strategic and does it, is it a force 

multiplier for us, because I don’t necessarily see it as assisting in 

our efforts to denuclearize them while North Korea is specifically 

working to decouple the relationship with the United States. 

Ambassador HILL. I will defer to the opinions of others, but my 

opinion is that Moon understands the North Korean threat as well 

as every other Korean leader has and understands the importance 

of the U.S. relationship, but he believes that they will have more 

room to maneuver if there is dialogue with the North Koreans. And 

I think this started as an effort to create a safer environment for 

the Olympics but it has gone beyond that and I think it is in our 

interest to stay very close to Mr. Moon. And I might add that PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:57 Aug 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\041118\29691 SHIRL
46

dent Moon has the reputation for saying the same thing to different people which is quite refreshing. 

Mr. CHA. The only thing I will add is that I think that a lot of 

the diplomacy that we are seeing now was generated by the South 

Koreans, you know, again using the Olympics initially. And I mean 

that is a good thing in the sense that in December of last year we 

all thought we would be, you know, possibly, certainly in a crisis, 

but possibly close to armed conflict by April. So in that sense it is 

a good thing. However, at the same time there is the danger of 

raising expectations and overselling what the North Koreans may 

be interested in. And I worry about that quite a bit because the 

last thing we want is for the President to walk into this meeting 

and say this is not what I expected. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, I don’t know who is raising expectations. From 

my standpoint, anybody that has watched North Korea over the 

course of their lifetime knows that they are very, they are completely duplicitous so they are not to be trusted whatsoever. I have 

almost zero expectations. I am glad for the diplomacy. I much prefer it to anything else that as far as the options that are before us, 

but I have very low expectations. 

But once again I don’t think it takes us any less further than we 

are at the present time or where we were—look, it is great that 

whether the Olympics were just the opening, the entree, and then 

great things happen from there and we can continue or whether it 

is just another ruse by the North Koreans, I think we have to take 

the shot. So I am all for that. 

Let me just ask you one last question with the chairman’s indulgence. What are the tangible indications of denuclearization? Let’s 

just say, let’s not raise any expectations, right, let’s not. But if it 

were to happen, other than, Ambassador Hill, I think you said commit in writing, with all due respect I think they would crumple the 

paper up that that is written on as soon as they walk away from 

writing it if that is what they so desire and they don’t care about 

it. 

But what are the tangible indications of denuclearization and 

what is the time frame that America should look for if North Korea 

is indeed sincere? 

Ambassador HILL. I will just say that the purpose of committing 

in writing is not necessarily to have denuclearization. It is to say 

to the other countries involved in the Security Council process that 

the U.S. has gone further than, has tried as hard as it could and 

the North Koreans have, if they crumple up this piece of paper, 

prevaricated once again and that we need to move further on sanctions. 

So I consider getting them on the record a key factor in getting 

even stronger sanctions which it may require. After all, this is a 

country that can produce nuclear weapons but cannot produce gasoline. And so the capacity to sanction gasoline, the capacity to 

make sure sanctions are fully enforced even in the ship-to-ship efforts that we have seen lately, if we can do that I think North 

Korea will be more in a mindset to consider their future and the 

fact that their future may be better without nuclear weapons. 

47

But in answer to your question, I do not see a tangible indication 

from the North Koreans that they are prepared to denuclearize. I 

haven’t seen that for several years. 

Mr. CHA. Also your question was what would we want to see in 

terms of tangible, so I would point to three things very broadly. 

The first is movement in terms of things beyond the plutonium program because in the past they have sold the plutonium program to 

us and when the real concern was this newer, more modern program. 

The second thing is ICBMs. That is the thing that is different 

today from the last three times we did this negotiation, this ability 

to reach out and touch the United States with something they did 

not have before. So those would be two of the priorities, I think. 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. YOHO. No, I appreciate your question and I appreciate you 

all hanging in there. And I think this is an important thing and 

the expectation level yet would be great to be very optimistic about 

that we would love to get, you know, something not just in writing. 

I think writing is worthless. It is the actions that go with that. 

And this again the Foreign Affairs Committee has been so good 

at the different bills and letters we have written out. H.R. 1771 

was the sanctions act, H.R. 757 North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

Enhancement Act, thank you there, H.R. 3364, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, letters to the administration on secondary sanctions, we also sent them to the Treasury Department asking why haven’t these secondary entities in China 

been sanctioned and we were happy to see those things did follow 

through. And then H.R. 3898, the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions Act which passed the House, I think it was 415 to 

2 and it is waiting for work in the Senate which is probably one 

of the strongest sanctions against North Korea. 

But here we are and we look at an isolated state, North Korea, 

when the rest of the world is progressing and we have China that 

has the biggest hand as far as trade with North Korea knowing 

they do 90 percent of the trade with them, China, I would think, 

would want a resolution to this as much if not more than South 

Korea. South Korea is right there, they are very vested. We are 

very vested. We have roughly 48,000 military people, 200,000 support people with them and families so it is very serious for us too. 

But if you look at the trade difference between South Korea and 

China and North Korea and China, the trade between South Korea 

and China is multiple folds of what it is to North Korea. 

And eventually after all wars it seems we focus on trade, so I 

would think China would come to the table to put the pressure 

more so on North Korea to be sincere about really getting rid of 

the nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons is going to box Kim 

Jong-un into a further corner of isolation and then what you have 

is the threat of Japan maybe developing nuclear weapons which 

China won’t like, and it just, it starts a cascade, a catch-22 situation where we don’t become safer in the world, we become less safe. 

And so this is something let’s hope these talks go well. 

And as far as unification, I was over there talking to the people 

of South Korea, I said can you explain to me how that would work? 

Does that mean North Korea would become more like South Korea? 

48

And they said no, and I said well, does that mean South Korea has 

to become more like North Korea? And it was kind of quiet in the 

room. 

And it is just a tough situation and let’s just hope through the 

diplomacy, through the continued sanctions that we have going on 

that I, for one, will recommend these will not be backed off and if 

anything else they will be tightened up until, you know, you are 

earnest in what you are saying you are going to do and then we 

have the verification of that and then welcome North Korea into 

the 21st century. I don’t think anybody is trying to invade North 

Korea. I think that is pretty well established. And let them know 

that, you know, we welcome you into the world with the rest of us 

on an even playing field. 

So with that I thank you for your time. A lot of good recommendations came out of here. We look forward to passing those 

on to the administration and I just thank you for your expertise 

and your time being here. The meeting is adjourned, thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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