NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MADELINE CECILIA ROMERO ALAS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 22-280

Agency No.

A206-679-393

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 14, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Madeline Cecilia Romero Alas is a native and citizen of El 

Salvador. She petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

(“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order

denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 18 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-280

U.S.C. § 1252, and we review factual findings by the BIA or IJ for substantial 

evidence. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022).

We deny the petition for review.

As to the withholding claim, substantial evidence supports the finding

that Petitioner has not demonstrated a nexus between her past persecution and

any particular social group.

1 Even assuming one of Petitioner’s proposed

particular social groups is cognizable, see Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 

(9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “the family remains the quintessential particular 

social group” (citation omitted)), the record does not show that Petitioner’s

membership in such a group was “a reason” for her persecution, see BarajasRomero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358–60 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the 

withholding statute uses only “a reason” in contrast to the asylum statute, which 

uses “one central reason”).

2 Petitioner testified that she believes the gang

targeted her for extortion “[b]ecause they knew that [she] worked” and because

her commute gave her a predictable schedule. And although Petitioner’s uncle

1 Although “past persecution triggers a rebuttable presumption of a wellfounded fear of future persecution,” Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 

1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), Petitioner has also not 

demonstrated a nexus to a protected category in the context of a well-founded 

fear of future persecution. See Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (denying relief where petitioner had demonstrated past persecution 

but not a nexus to a particular social group or to political opinion).

2 As Petitioner has not met the more lenient nexus standard for withholding of 

removal, she necessarily has not met the stricter nexus standard for asylum: that 

membership in any particular social group was “at least one central reason for” 

her persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
3 22-280

was murdered by gang members, there is no evidence connecting this murder to

the gang’s extortion of Petitioner. As the IJ identified, Petitioner’s extortion

was “attenuated by both time and space to [the] murder, which is strong

circumstantial evidence that they are unrelated.” See Deloso v. Ashcroft, 393 

F.3d 858, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2005) (assessing circumstantial evidence of

persecutor’s motives).

Petitioner has also not established eligibility for relief under CAT. The 

record evidence does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not

that she would suffer harm rising to the level of torture by government officials 

or private actors with government acquiescence if she were returned to El

Salvador. The harm Petitioner experienced when threatened by gang members

did not rise to the level of torture, and she has not demonstrated a likelihood of

future torture. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Torture is 

‘more severe than persecution.’” (citation omitted)); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)

(defining torture).

Finally, Petitioner’s claim that IJ did not have subject matter jurisdiction 

because her Notice to Appear lacked the time and place of proceedings is 

unexhausted, and the government has properly raised that it is unexhausted. See 

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2023) (holding the 

exhaustion requirement is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule); Fort Bend 

County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (explaining that a court must 

enforce a claims-processing rule “if a party ‘properly raise[s]’ it” (alteration in 
4 22-280

original) (citation omitted)). And even had Petitioner raised her claim to the

BIA, the claim is foreclosed by United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 

1187, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

DENIED.