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i 

80–191 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–21] 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: 

WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS 

FOR A STRONG DETERRENT IN AN 

ERA OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 19, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 19, 2013, The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester? ....................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 19, 2013 ........................................................................................ 27 

TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2013 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS 

FOR A STRONG DETERRENT IN AN ERA OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER? 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Blair, Dr. Bruce G., President, World Security Institute ..................................... 6 

Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr., President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ................................................................................................ 4 

Payne, Dr. Keith B., Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense 

and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University ............................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Blair, Dr. Bruce G. ........................................................................................... 69 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 34 

Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr. ...................................................................... 49 

Payne, Dr. Keith B. .......................................................................................... 35 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture,’’ a 

May 2012 Report by the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission 

(Gen (Ret.) James E. Cartwright, Chair; Amb. Richard Burt; Sen. 

Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering; Gen (Ret.) Jack Sheehan; and 

Dr. Bruce Blair, Study Director) .................................................................. 85 

‘‘Senior Military and Defense Officials Who Disagree with Global Zero,’’ 

a Subcommittee Staff Paper ........................................................................ 126 

Testimony of Gen (Ret.) James E. Cartwright ............................................... 111 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 147 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 131 
(1) 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A STRONG DETERRENT IN AN ERA 

OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 19, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:09 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. The House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. This rescheduled 

hearing has been delayed a week, but I do appreciate the patience 

of our panelists for the storm that didn’t happen, but we tried. 

It is on an important topic, ‘‘The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What 

Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense 

Sequester?’’ And we have a distinguished group of experts to help 

us consider the subject. They are Dr. Keith Payne, Professor and 

Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; Dr. Andrew Krepinevich—did I say that 

correctly—President, Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments; 

and Dr. Bruce Blair, Co-founder of Global Zero. 

This Nation has some key decisions ahead of it. We find ourselves in the position of having to recapitalize our entire deterrent 

at exactly the time that every other nation is growing or modernizing its nuclear forces, but we have absorbed reductions in our defense budget of $487 billion and we are now 18 days into President 

Obama’s defense sequester that will take another half-trillion dollars out of our defense budget over the next decade. 

Our nuclear deterrent is the most cost-effective and proven 

means of promoting peace for the American people and their allies, 

but we have not been investing in it in a responsible way. Our real 

and potential adversaries and competitors understand this. Russia, 

for instance, has tested three new ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 

missiles] during the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty entered into force 2 years ago. The People’s Republic of 

China is preparing to put to sea a ballistic missile submarine and 

sea-launched ballistic missile and it appears to be readying three 

new long-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United 

States. I note that Russia’s Vladimir Putin tells his people that, 

‘‘nuclear weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia’s sov-
2 

ereignty and its territorial integrity. It plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and balance.’’ 

President Obama, however, says in the State of the Union Address last week or last month that, ‘‘we will engage Russia to seek 

further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our ability 

to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.’’ 

Are they both right? I think General Welch, former Strategic Air 

Command commander and former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air 

Force, had it right when he said, ‘‘the only basis for the idea that 

drastically reducing the number of nukes we had would magically 

make us safer and help eliminate other nuclear weapons is hope, 

but hope is not a plan and hope is not a basis for security. Hope 

does not defend us. Leading the world to zero nuclear weapons is 

at best a fairy tale.’’ 

There is a rising consensus from General Scowcroft, Secretaries 

Perry, Schlesinger, Shultz, and Senator Nunn that the one-time 

frenzy of a world without nuclear weapons is little more than a 

fantasy, and a dangerous one at that. For example, the so-called 

Gang of 4’s recent Wall Street Journal piece is a dramatic shift 

from the original 2007 piece. This is welcome. We are at a crisis 

point where we must focus on eminent threats from North Korea 

and Iran. 

So, I look forward to examining these matters today. They are 

important to the Nation’s security and they are important matters 

as we will tackle in our markup of the Fiscal Year 2014 National 

Defense Authorization, and with that, I yield to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement that 

he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the distinguished witnesses. What we have here today is like a battle of the 

Ph.D.s, so I look forward to the different testimonies. 

Mr. Chairman, I, too, saw the article in the Wall Street Journal 

from Secretary Shultz, Secretary Perry, Foreign Secretary Kissinger, and Former Senator Sam Nunn, and I had a little more 

positive interpretation of it. First of all, I saw four very distinguished Americans who were agreeing on a bipartisan basis that 

we should at least look at reductions, and these, granted, need to 

be done in a balanced and responsible way, but I thought overall 

they were very bullish on the prospect that we could lead the world 

to a better place, and I look forward to hearing the expert testimony of the witnesses on this subject. 

Mr. Chairman, with your consent, I would like to insert my 

statement for the record as well as the testimony of General Cartwright, who is unable to be with us today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in 

the Appendix on page 111.] 
3 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Other members of the committee are advised that they can offer 

their opening statement for the record, and with that, we will go 

to Dr. Keith Payne for his opening statement that will be summarized in five minutes. Dr. Payne. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND HEAD, 

GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC 

STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Chairman Rodgers and Ranking Member 

Cooper. It is a pleasure and honor to be here. I need to start out 

by saying I am speaking as an individual and not for any of the 

institutions with which I am associated. 

Let me start by noting that there are numerous proposals for 

deep U.S. nuclear reductions. They typically are based on an approach to deterrence known as minimum deterrence, and the basic 

contemporary argument is that a small number of U.S. nuclear 

weapons is adequate for deterrence because nuclear threats from 

China and Russia no longer are plausible and because nuclear 

weapons are irrelevant to the priority threat we face; that is, nuclear terrorism. 

Consequently, so the argument goes, the U.S. can, with little or 

no risk, undertake deep nuclear reductions that will reduce nuclear 

dangers, advance U.S. nonproliferation goals, and save many billions of dollars. 

My examination of these and other minimum deterrence claims 

suggests that they are dubious at best. For example, the claim that 

nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to terrorism is false. Terrorists can 

be deterred in some circumstances, including by deterring their 

state sponsors, and nuclear deterrence certainly may help in that 

regard. 

In addition, the promise of substantial savings from nuclear reductions is again false. In fact, the minimum deterrence recommendation that the U.S. deter with conventional forces in place 

of nuclear would likely require a net increase in spending. 

Similarly, the claim that U.S. nuclear weapons are of little relevance to U.S. relations with Russia and China misses the facts 

that Russia and China both point to us as enemy number one, 

make explicit threats against close U.S. allies and emphasize the 

great military and political value that they place on nuclear weapons. They are not following our antinuclear lead. 

It also is impossible to claim with any credibility that deterrence 

will work reliably at low nuclear force levels, nor that U.S. conventional threats can substitute reliably for nuclear weapons. No one 

knows if the first of these claims is true, and all evidence suggests 

the second claim is false. 

Further, deep U.S. nuclear reductions would encourage some of 

our allies to go nuclear themselves. While emphasizing our advanced conventional forces leads some opponents to emphasize 

more the great need that they see for nuclear weapons. Consequently, my conclusion is that minimum deterrence is likely to 

promote nuclear proliferation coming and going. And the claim that 

nuclear reductions will reduce the prospect for nuclear accidents is 

contrary to the abundant available evidence, over five decades, that 
4 

there is no historic correlation between the number of weapons and 

the number of accidents. 

Finally, deep U.S. nuclear reductions would degrade those U.S. 

force characteristics likely to be most important for deterrence. 

Those characteristics are the force flexibility, diversity, and resilience. 

The ability of our force to adapt as necessary for deterrence 

across many plausible scenarios and surprising threats depends on 

their flexibility and their diversity. Moving to a much reduced nuclear arsenal that degrades those qualities is precisely the wrong 

way to go for deterrence. 

In short, the deep reductions recommended by minimum deterrence would not likely lead to the promised benefits but instead 

would degrade our capability to adapt our deterrence to new and 

future threats, encourage some opponents towards nuclear arms 

buildups and to challenge our deterrence strategies and encourage 

some allies to acquire their own nuclear deterrence and thereby potentially inspire a possible cascade of nuclear proliferation. 

The same evidence that demonstrates the serious flaws of minimum deterrence suggests three contemporary and I believe more 

realistic guidelines. One, U.S. nuclear forces must be of sufficient 

size and diversity to provide the flexibility and resilience necessary 

for deterrence across a wide and shifting array of threats. Two, this 

flexibility and diversity and resilience of U.S. forces is threatened 

as the nuclear arsenal becomes ever smaller. Along these lines, 

former STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] Commander General Chilton said in 2010 that to preserve flexibility, we should not 

move below the 1,550 deployed warhead ceiling of the New START 

Treaty. And three, assuring our allies is as important as deterring 

our foes and depends again on our possession of the diverse and 

flexible nuclear capabilities that many allies deem necessary for 

their assurance. 

Let me conclude by noting that my emphasis on the need for a 

U.S. nuclear arsenal that is large enough and diverse enough to 

provide flexibility and resilience is completely consistent with the 

conclusions of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission that was headed by Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, a commission that was created with help of the House Armed Services 

Committee. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Dr. Krepinevich. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on the subject of U.S. nuclear requirements. First, 

let me applaud the subcommittee. This issue, to me, is extremely 

important. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is a strategic asset of the 

United States. It has been a strategic asset for nearly 70 years 
5 

now, and any decision to make major changes in the size or composition of that arsenal merits thorough consideration and study. 

From my perspective, the requirements in terms of looking at reductions to the arsenal, they should be examined in terms of our 

security objectives, which I view as two overarching objectives. One 

is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in general, and specifically, against ourselves and our allies and partners, and also to 

prevent the use of nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion, 

sometimes referred to as nuclear blackmail. 

And second, in the event that this fails and that nuclear weapons 

are used, to terminate the use of such weapons as quickly as possible in a manner that best serves U.S. interests. 

Now, both the Obama administration and a number of experts, 

as you have mentioned, have made the point that these objectives 

can best be achieved by significant reductions beyond those to 

which we are committed in the New START Treaty. Based on the 

analysis I have seen, my belief is that this assertion is open to 

question, and my testimony examines two overriding questions 

with respect to this issue. First, I am skeptical that a reduction in 

U.S. nuclear forces will lead other nuclear powers to reduce their 

arsenals or aspiring nuclear powers to forego acquiring nuclear 

weapons, and I would cite four observations. 

First, so far, there hasn’t been a phenomenon of follow-the-leader. Both United States and Russia dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, and as Dr. Payne 

pointed out, many nuclear powers are modernizing and/or expanding their nuclear arsenals. 

Second, to the extent that we reduce our nuclear forces, the issue 

of extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella comes into question, which is to say to what extent can allies and partners rely on 

a diminishing U.S. nuclear arsenal to provide the kind of protection 

in terms of deterrence and also protection against coercion? 

Third, we, as my colleagues have pointed out, have an enormous 

advantage in conventional forces, something we didn’t have during 

the Cold War, and of course we took the lead in the 1950s and relied on nuclear weapons to help offset that conventional inferiority. 

Well, now, others are following the leader in a different way. We 

have the Russians and the Pakistanis, in particular, increasing 

their emphasis, increasing their reliance on nuclear forces, not just 

for deterrence but for warfighting purposes as well. 

And finally, the problem of unintended consequences. You know, 

there is a question that, you know, at what point in terms of force 

reductions do we go, and the issue is, do we at some point encourage others to follow us and is that a good thing, or do we encourage 

others to build up to our level and create a more complicated situation than the one we have right now. 

The second issue is, is would a reduction in U.S. nuclear forces 

discourage the use of nuclear weapons, and I cite an observation 

by a former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Ve ́drine, who says 

the country that possesses the bomb does not use it and automatically enters the system of deterrence and doesn’t take absurd risks. 

I have four observations with respect to this issue, which is to 

say a reduction in U.S. nuclear forces would discourage the use of 

nuclear weapons. 
6 

As I mentioned first, other countries see a use in nuclear weapons beyond deterrence, and specifically, the cases are Russia and 

Pakistan, which have integrated nuclear use into their doctrines. 

Second, not all decisionmakers who control nuclear weapons are, 

I think, what we would consider to be rational or necessarily rational, and in my testimony I cite a number of instances ranging 

from Adolf Hitler to Saddam Hussein, Fidel Casto, Nikita Khrushchev, where their behavior would not quite equate to what I 

think we would consider to be mature, rational behavior that was 

not prone to taking absurd risks. 

Third, there is the issue of structural instability, and I will just 

briefly mention here, the point that there are some areas in proliferation where even if both sides desire to avoid nuclear use, they 

risk, quite frankly, a very unstable situation, crisis and stability, 

and finally, an end-player competition. The lower we go to the extent that we bring others along with us, we have a competition 

among many states, and in that situation, we have to rethink the 

dynamics given that during the Cold War we had a two-state competition. 

So, very briefly, it seems to me that while there is general agreement on the basic security objectives that we ought to be pursuing, 

the devil is in the details, and there is a great divergence of opinion 

as to how best to achieve these objectives, and what I see is a remarkable lack of thinking about prospective real-world situations. 

A lot of abstract thinking, very little real-world thinking, what I 

would call thinking that is associated with what the Defense Department would call it an assessment, and it is this kind of thinking, I think, that is really needed before we take big steps in terms 

of altering the size and structure of our nuclear forces. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Krepinevich. 

Dr. Blair is recognized 5 minutes to summarize his opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE G. BLAIR, PRESIDENT, WORLD 

SECURITY INSTITUTE 

Dr. BLAIR. Thank you, Congressman Rogers and Congressman 

Cooper, and other distinguished members, for inviting me here 

today. I am very honored and pleased to testify before you. 

My bottom line judgment is that continuing U.S. nuclear reductions would produce substantial benefits and carry no risks. 

The Global Zero Commission report issued last year by General 

Cartwright and others, including Senator Hagel, recommended a 

force of 900 total nuclear weapons, an 80-percent reduction from 

the current stockpile, and assessed that force to be more than adequate to meet strategic requirements. As General Cartwright put 

it, ‘‘this would not be a small nor humble force designed for minimal deterrence. It would hold at risk all of the major categories of 

facilities in all countries considered to pose a potential WMD 

[Weapon of Mass Destruction] threat to the United States.’’ 

Nine hundred total weapons is not a small arsenal. Sometimes 

we lose perspective on these things. Nine hundred weapons possess 
7 

enormous destructive power, far more than necessary to impress 

any potential rational foe. For the irrational foes, such as fanatical 

terrorists, the level of American nuclear armaments would make 

little or no difference at all. 

So why are these deep cuts possible and what are the benefits? 

First and foremost, obviously, the Cold War ended 20 years ago. 

The requirements of deterrence are obviously much lower between 

countries that are no longer enemies and that no longer believe either side intends to attack the other. 

The decline of mutual threat in our primary relationship over the 

last 25 years has enabled our two countries to achieve unprecedented levels of cooperation and mutual benefits in a multitude of 

areas, including cutting their nuclear stockpiles by 75 percent since 

the end of the Cold War, but these legacy arsenals remain still very 

large and there is ample room for further cuts. 

Second, reducing the nuclear stockpiles feeds on itself in a positive way. As both sides reduce their nuclear arms, nuclear-related 

targets go away along with the need to hold them at risk, so this 

is a dynamic that has resulted in massive reductions in weapons 

and targets and greatly undercut the rationale for new weapons. 

Gentlemen, we have literally reversed the arms race. 

Third, smart targeting has made further nuclear possible cuts 

without sacrificing any coverage. I will give you just one example. 

Not very long ago, our nuclear targeteers were planning to lay 

down 10 weapons on one very high value command and control target, command post. Today, they have, as a result of an intelligence 

breakthrough, managed to figure out how to target that facility 

with two weapons. 

As it was noted, we also have conventional superiority that has 

reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons. They have given us useable options, much more useable than nuclear weapons, increasing 

our credibility in dealing with threats that previously required a 

nuclear response and created yet more room for further reductions. 

Fourth, this conventional rebalancing has really strengthened 

the credibility of our extended deterrence to allies such as South 

Korea. Remember, South Korea, up until the 1980s, needed help 

from U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to deal with the North’s artillery threat. Today, South Korea has conventional superiority over 

the North, and the need for U.S. nukes for warfighting on the Peninsula has essentially gone by the boards. 

The North’s fledgling threat has, of course, revised somewhat the 

need to wave our nuclear umbrella over the allies, but don’t forget, 

we just possess overwhelming nuclear superiority over the North, 

and even after deep cuts, that will remain. 

Fifth, the continuing reduction presents opportunities for reconfiguring our strategic forces and our posture in ways that really 

strengthen stability. Let me give you an example. A key benefit is 

that cyber warfare threats, which are growing, can be mitigated as 

a result. By eliminating forces that have to be maintained on once 

ready alert, like the Minuteman [LGM–30 intercontinental ballistic 

missile] forces, and by eliminating our reliance on launch on warning to protect those forces, we can completely eliminate the danger 

that exists today that unauthorized actors could trigger a launch 
8 

that was not intended or block the execution of a legitimate launch 

ordered from the President. 

Six, continuing reductions, even deep cuts, are not expected to 

stimulate China or other countries to rush to parity. That is, I 

think, the prevailing assessment of the intelligence community. In 

the case of China, General Kehler recently testified that, ‘‘I do not 

see, nor has the intelligence community reported to me that China 

is seeking to have some kind of numeric parity with the United 

States or with Russia.’’ 

Of course, you know, an effort to rush to parity is possible, 

though very unlikely. In such an event, it would be easily detectable, would take many years, and we could adjust accordingly. 

It would be extremely beneficial if continuing reductions in the 

U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals bring China and the other nuclear weapons countries to the negotiating table. That is an important goal for this country. A multilateral negotiations must be initiated soon to address the multitude of nuclear dangers that exist 

outside the U.S.-Russia relation in places like South Asia. 

Seventh, and I am coming to the end here, continuing U.S. nuclear arms reductions would affirm the U.S. support for the NonProliferation Treaty, which continues to be, in my view, an indispensable tool in the international community’s effort to prevent 

and roll back proliferation. 

The days of U.S. and Russian lip service to the disarmament 

clause of the treaty are over if they hope to preserve and strengthen this treaty in the face of growing proliferation pressures around 

the world. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Blair, you need to wind it down. You have gone 

about 2 minutes over. 

Dr. BLAIR. Okay. Thank you. I just have one paragraph. 

Last, this hearing seeks to set priorities for the U.S. program 

under sequestration. I would argue that the size of the U.S.—that 

we have plenty of time and margin here, that the size of the U.S. 

arsenal and scale of its reduction or modernization are less important than the operational postures today of the forces and the cohesion of the system of command and control. 

My first priority would be to ensure a full-scale, thorough review 

of cyber security of all nuclear networks to identify and remove 

cyber warfare threats that could compromise the integrity of these 

networks, that is my first priority. It is essential not to sacrifice 

this on the altar of sequestration. 

And lastly, my second priority under sequestration would be to 

secure and dispose of excess surplus, weapons-grade nuclear materials around the world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Blair can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Dr. Blair. 

We now turn to questions. Each member will be allowed 5 minutes, and I will start with the questions myself. 

Dr. Blair, you just made reference to General Kehler’s testimony 

in which he said that China was not, based on his exposure to intelligence, ‘‘rushing’’ to parity with the United States. Would you 
9 

acknowledge that China is expending a larger percentage of their 

GDP in missile system technology than we are? 

Dr. BLAIR. I don’t know. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you acknowledge that their volume of tactical regional weapons far exceeds our capacity? 

Dr. BLAIR. Yes—— 

Mr. ROGERS. China’s. 

Dr. BLAIR [continuing]. I would dispute that. I think the total 

size of the Chinese arsenal is in the range of—there is a debate on 

this, I think, but the debate is whether the total arsenal is—— 

Mr. ROGERS. How about Russia’s? 

Dr. BLAIR [continuing]. Low hundreds or mid hundreds. 

Mr. ROGERS. How about Russia’s? 

Dr. BLAIR. 150. So we have 700 tactical nuclear weapons. China 

has far fewer than that. 

Mr. ROGERS. What about Russia’s? 

Dr. BLAIR. Russia probably has on the range of 1,500 to 

2,000—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Compared to ours. 

Dr. BLAIR [continuing]. Deployed tactical nuclear weapons compared to our 700. We have a comparable advantage in reserve strategic weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you agree that Russia is spending a larger 

percent of their GDP on missile system technology than we are, capability? 

Dr. BLAIR. I would question that. 

Mr. ROGERS. The answer is ‘‘yes.’’ The answer is ‘‘yes’’ on China 

and answer is ‘‘yes’’ on Russia. 

Dr. BLAIR. I still would question that. I would have to go back 

and study that. Let me make a point about that. The United States 

spends more on intelligence alone every year than the entire Russian defense budget. 

Mr. ROGERS. My point in talking about the percentage of GDP 

spent on missile capability—— 

Dr. BLAIR. But, sir—— 

Mr. ROGERS [continuing]. Is certainly an indicator of their intent 

and their seriousness about the technology. 

Dr. BLAIR. I don’t think that is very good indication. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Blair, your report that you made reference in 

your testimony, you say, was based on considerable detailed analysis. Would you make this detailed analysis available to this committee? 

Dr. BLAIR. Sorry, detailed analysis of? 

Mr. ROGERS. For your report that you referenced in your testimony. You say it is based on considerable detailed analysis. Would 

you make that analysis available to this committee? 

Dr. BLAIR. I think the report itself, which is 22 pages long, is 

fairly detailed. 

Mr. ROGERS. So that is the analysis you are making reference to. 

You say in the report itself it is based on analysis. I would assume 

that means a body of evidence. 

Dr. BLAIR. The report is based on analysis and the deliberation 

of a distinguished group of authors, including former head of strategic command, including Senator Hagel now Secretary of Defense. 
10 

Mr. ROGERS. The reason why I am asking is because when I look 

at your report, about half the footnotes are footnotes referencing 

your own writings. Why is that? 

Dr. BLAIR. Because I have done the most analytical and scholarly 

work in this area. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there other experts that you relied on? 

Dr. BLAIR. Well, those footnotes refer to many, many other experts’ analyses. 

Mr. ROGERS. That supported your views, the other experts? 

Dr. BLAIR. Some do, some don’t. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Dr. Blair, general officers from the current 

Commander of STRATCOM, General Kehler, to the former Commander of STRATCOM, General Kevin Chilton, Lieutenant General Kowalski to retired Major General Chambers and many others 

who are recently part of the senior leadership of the Department 

of Defense have rejected Global Zero’s recommendations, and I will 

insert a staff paper into the record on that point without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 126.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you know about the subject matter that 

these general officers don’t know? 

Dr. BLAIR. I think the argument stands on its face, Congressman. 

You can read through it. I just gave my testimony. If you find that 

the logic and the arguments and the points don’t stand up to your 

scrutiny or anyone else’s, I am happy to have that debate, but I 

made the case for why, and General Cartwright and others subscribe to this, why a 900-nuclear-weapons force is not a small minimal deterrent force. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne, would you care to comment as to why 

you believe those commanding generals differ with the findings of 

the report? 

Dr. PAYNE. Well, because I believe that they are in consensus 

that they need to protect the flexibility, the resilience, the adaptability of the nuclear arsenal, and going down to very low numbers, 

such as is recommended in that report, has a number of casualties, 

but one of the casualties of going down to very low numbers tends 

to be exactly the flexibility and the resilience of the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal. And even if one can claim rightly that the U.S. nuclear arsenal can deter today at some set number, even if you grant that, 

the question is whether you can deter next year, the year after 

that, and 10 years from now. And the need for flexibility and resilience in the arsenal comes exactly from that. We need to be able 

to deter over the next two decades, and those characteristics of the 

arsenal are directly related to its size and its diversity. So I believe 

that the commanders of STRATCOM are interested in preserving 

the diversity of the U.S. arsenal so that we can safeguard our ability to deter war. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Krepinevich, do you care to comment as to why 

those commanding generals would differ with their findings of the 

report? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know why they 

would. On the other hand, I would like to think that perhaps their 

logic included considerations along the lines of it is probably a lot 

easier to reduce the size of nuclear forces than to build them back 
11 

up again. I think there will be a real prejudice against that, particularly given our financial situation right now and the fact that 

it is not likely to be resolved anytime soon. 

Second, as Dr. Payne said, I think you have to look long-term. 

We don’t make changes in our nuclear arsenal overnight, and when 

you are thinking about what kind of a nuclear force you need, 5 

or 10 years out into the future is not a long way to look. 

And I would say the third has to do with what kind of contingencies do we see our nuclear forces being brought to bear, and we 

are so far away from the Cold War, and you know, during the Cold 

War, we eventually got to the point where it was us and the Soviets and it was Armageddon, and you know, once it started, there 

wasn’t, you know, much sense thinking about a world after or a 

day after. 

Now, I think you can look at a range of plausible contingencies, 

and certainly that’s been my experience in talking with senior military leaders and senior officials both in this Administration and 

the last administration. There is a—there are a range of contingencies, and it is not Armageddon, it is not us and the Russians, 

and until you think through those contingencies and until you 

think through the fact that, as Dr. Blair, I think, pointed out in 

his study, there is some—I wouldn’t go as far as he would, but 

there is some potential substitutability of precision conventional 

weapons and cyber weapons for targets that we used to reserve for 

nuclear weapons. Missile defenses are much more capable now 

than they were a generation ago. 

We have things like directed energy where remarkable progress 

is being made, and until you really think through those contingencies and look at the dynamics, the steady state dynamics, the 

crisis dynamics, and even the warfighting dynamics, because there 

can be conflicts between other countries, think India-Pakistan, God 

forbid, Israel and Iran, where we would have to look at that as a 

third party and try and determine how to keep maybe a crisis from 

getting out of control, and if it does, how to stop the bleeding, and 

also, quite frankly, what the world looks like the day after. 

So, I would like to think, having talked most recently to General 

Kehler about these kinds of scenarios, that, you know, that is 

where the effort is right now, and if so, then I applaud it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes 

the ranking member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that this subcommittee, as currently constituted, is in its early days, but I am 

somewhat disappointed in the adversarial tone that I heard in your 

comments so far in this hearing. I hope this is not an indication 

of forthcoming behavior because I know we are both from the same 

region, we know what good manners are like, and all of these witnesses have been kind enough to come, some on short notice, and 

there was a rescheduling involved as well, so I hope that we can 

approach these vitally important national issues with an air of civility and calm as we approach some very serious decisions here. 

I am curious because I think this Global Zero cause has been 

misnamed. It sounds like it should have been called like Global 

900, and the cause on the other side should perhaps be called, I 

don’t know, what Global 30,000 or Global 20,000 or Global 10,000, 
12 

you know, some much larger number. The number we are at right 

now, given the curious counting rule, seems to be 1,550, and surely 

no one thinks that is a perfect number. 

So, as Dr. Krepinevich just mentioned with the advances in conventional, cyber and missile defense technologies, we need to continually revise the effectiveness of what arsenal we have, and he 

also noted, I thought quite wisely, that whatever arsenal we have, 

maybe we should pay for. So, our adversaries are not unaware of 

that defense sequestration or inability to pay for even the recent 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So, I think a comprehensive and calm look at this would indicate 

that let’s figure out whether 900 or 1,000 or 1,100 or some number 

like that is an appropriate number. And it is a little bit awkward 

to have these hearings in an open setting, but I am kind of curious, 

I thought Dr. Blair gave an excellent list of possible uses for the 

weapons we have got, and I would like to ask Dr. Payne and Dr. 

Krepinevich which targets, in addition to those that Dr. Blair mentioned, are essential to be targeted and unable to be targeted with 

an arsenal of 900 weapons. 

Dr. Payne, do you want to go first? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yeah, let me start off by saying that the counter or 

the opposite poll of 900 weapons certainly doesn’t need to be 10,000 

or 30,000. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, what number do you propose? 

Dr. PAYNE. Well, when I was in the Pentagon, the range that we 

reached, following a good bit of analysis, was 1,700–2,200, which 

became the basis for the Moscow treaty. 

Mr. COOPER. Was there any opposition to that reduction when 

you made that recommendation? 

Dr. PAYNE. It became a formal treaty and received—— 

Mr. COOPER. But there was some opposition to it. 

Dr. PAYNE. The opposition was not great, let’s put it that way. 

So that the distinction between those who are favorable towards 

nuclear zero and those who are skeptical isn’t the difference between 900 weapons and 10- or 30,000 weapons. 

Mr. COOPER. Why don’t we call it Nuclear 900 at least during my 

questioning? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. And let me also add that General Chilton 

in 2010 gave a number that he said he would be more comfortable 

with to preserve flexibility of the U.S. arsenal and that was 1,550, 

so those are the ranges that folks are talking about at this point, 

sir. 

And then you asked the question about what kind of capability 

might the United States need for deterrence purposes. 

Mr. COOPER. I said what additional targets. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yeah. Well, in a sense, the answer to that question 

is, it depends on what kind of threat is necessary to deter opponents, and those kind of threats, that kind of information can 

change over time. Harold Brown, back during the Cold War, said 

the kind of capabilities we need to deter the Soviet Union happened to be political leadership, military capabilities. Those included very deeply buried targets. So the kind of weapons that 

were necessary to threaten in those days had to be able to threaten 

those kind of targets. In the future there may be any number of 
13 

different types of targets that need to be threatened for deterrence 

purposes. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Krepinevich, do you have a more specific answer? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I am not a nuclear targeteer, Congressman, 

but what I would say, and I think this is where Dr. Blair has been 

trying to help, is I am reminded of a quote from a British admiral, 

Jackie Fisher, who once said a lot of folks want to know how big 

the British Navy ought to be and what kind of ships we ought to 

have in it. He said the first thing you have to do is make up your 

mind how you are going to fight. He said, how many of us have 

made up our mind how we are going to fight? And then he said, 

how many of us even have minds? So he was being pretty sarcastic 

at the moment. But the point here is how are you going to deter, 

and if deterrence fails, how are you going to fight? 

And Dr. Payne points out that deterrence lies in the eye of the 

beholder, so on the one hand you have to—and we devoted an enormous amount of effort and thinking during the Cold War to understanding how the Soviet leadership calculated cost and benefit and 

risk. In fact, Kissinger in the late ’60s and early ’70s, when he was 

the NSC [National Security Council] advisor, the thing that he was 

most interested in getting from the intelligence community were 

the psychological profiles of the Soviet leadership. So that is point 

number one. 

And do we, you know, do we have that understanding, and you 

know, if you have the understanding of China in 2009, well, there 

is a new leadership in today, and as we know from our own leadership, you know, every leader is different, so have we a good understanding of how other nuclear powers calculate cost, benefit, and 

risk so we have a good idea of what is required to deter them, first. 

Second, if you look at Dr. Blair’s report and the targeting list, 

again, I would be interested to know is that the target list for 

March 2013, because if we look at China, for example, China may 

have 100 nuclear weapons, they may have 500. The former commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, General Yesin, 

says he thinks they have 750 but maybe over 1,000. So how confident are we that we know how many targets there are in China 

that we need to hold at risk, and how easy is it to hold a Chinese 

mobile missile launcher at risk? We played that game at close 

range in the first Gulf War and didn’t have much success, so there 

is that issue. 

There is the issue of breakout. We used to worry a lot about 

breakout during the Cold War, which is why the SALT [Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks] treaties limited launchers because we 

knew we couldn’t count the warheads. Well, the Chinese have not 

only a lot of launchers but a lot of missiles that now carry—or are 

armed with conventional warheads. Do we worry about whether 

they can swap those out in place of nuclear warheads and in effect 

what during the Cold War we describe as breakout? 

So, again, I really do think, you know, it is a case of really sitting 

down and trying to think through the problem in a very careful 

way, given the stakes that are involved, not only in terms of security, but as you point out, Congressman, in terms of resources that 

are increasingly scarce before we decide, even within a ballpark fig-
14 

ure, you know, what kind of nuclear posture we want and of course 

what kind of risk we are willing to take that is associated with that 

posture. 

Mr. COOPER. My time is limited. The chairman has already been 

very indulgent, but Dr. Kissinger said, I think, that even paranoids 

sometimes have real enemies, but he just joint-authored this article 

which said that Washington—this is a quote, ‘‘Washington should 

carefully examine going below New START levels of warheads and 

launchers.’’ So that sounds like an indication that we should carefully examine this issue. The perfect number isn’t determined yet, 

but here is Dr. Kissinger on record with George Shultz saying we 

should seriously consider this, so that is what this subcommittee 

is trying to do, and I think the more specific answers we can get 

on targeting and capabilities the better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. Gentleman, Mr. Nugent, is 

recognized for 5 minutes for any questions he may have. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I thank 

the panel for being here. It is always good to hear divergent ideas. 

It is not a bad thing for all of us. But to Dr. Blair, I know that 

you mentioned in your report, particularly as it relates to Senator 

Hagel, then-Senator Hagel, and in particular with regards to the 

presidential directives negotiated in another round of bilateral 

arms reduction talks were implemented unilaterally, and Secretary 

of Defense, then Senator Hagel stated during his confirmation 

hearing, ‘‘I don’t agree with any recommendation that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear warheads 

and our capability. Every option we must look at, a reaction we 

must take to reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral and 

should be verifiable and negotiated.’’ 

Do you agree with that? 

Dr. BLAIR. I do, and as a matter of fact, the analysis that we 

went through, which by the way, involved Tom Pickering, who was 

ambassador to Russia who knows a fair amount about the Russian 

leadership and the scene in Russia, that analysis proceeded on the 

assumption that we really needed to tighten up our treaty process 

to include all nuclear weapons so that some of these unknowns 

that are floating out there, tactical weapons owned by China or by 

Russia that have completely escaped previous regulation are now 

put in the basket, negotiated, verified, and monitored. You know, 

all these dramatic reductions that we have achieved since Ronald 

Reagan started the process in the 1980s have dropped from 70,000 

weapons between us and the Soviets, down to about 16,000 between us today, have all been—the vast bulk of those reductions 

have been achieved unilaterally. There has never been any arms 

control agreement that has regulated the total stockpile of weapons 

in any country. 

Mr. NUGENT. If I could—— 

Dr. BLAIR. So these dramatic reductions have been based on 

unilateralism. What we are trying to do in this report is say let’s 

put all the weapons into a basket—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, if I could claim my time. 

Dr. BLAIR [continuing]. And all the rest, and negotiate their reductions and closely verify and monitor them. 
15 

Mr. NUGENT. That is the key, verification. Are we in fact 

verifying our last treaty with Russia? 

Dr. BLAIR. Of course. 

Mr. NUGENT. There has been no slip on verification. 

Dr. BLAIR. The last testimony I heard from authorities in this 

area, including General Kehler and Rose Gottemoeller who negotiated the treaty have been that there have not been—there have 

been intensive verification and no—and no significant lapses—— 

Mr. NUGENT. You cite presidential nuclear initiatives several 

times as an example of how further reductions and actions like dealerting could be affected or effectuated, but you know, Russia is 

not in compliance with those initiatives. So, if they are not in compliance, are they cheating? 

Dr. BLAIR. Are you telling me that they are cheating on the New 

START agreement? 

Mr. NUGENT. I am asking you are they cheating. 

Dr. BLAIR. You have more access to the authoritative answer to 

that question than I do. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, I would like to direct that—if you don’t have 

an answer, I would like to direct that to Dr. Payne. 

Dr. BLAIR. As I said, recent testimony by authorities said no, 

they have not. 

Mr. NUGENT. Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. The Russians, by their own statements, are 

in violation of the presidential nuclear initiatives of 1990 and 1991, 

which includes continued Blackjack [Tupolev Tu–160 strategic 

bomber] production which is in violation of the PNI [Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives]. It includes retained battlefield nuclear weapons, atomic demolition mines in violation, it includes deployment of 

their Iskander [NATO designation SS–26 Stone] missile as a nuclear capable weapon by Russian statements, includes nuclear artillery by Russian statements, it includes routine deployment of nuclear weapons on naval ships other than SSBNs [ballistic missile 

submarines]. These are all open Russian statements claiming that 

they are in fact doing this. These are all violations of the PNI. So 

when I hear this is a model of how we should go in the future, I 

think, you know, maybe we ought to fix this one first before we decide to take this up as a model in the future. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I think verification, obviously, is—and Dr. 

Blair, you agree that verification is the important component in all 

this, no matter what you agree to, if we can’t verify and—— 

Dr. BLAIR. The Global Zero report did not recommend following 

the route of PNI. 

Mr. NUGENT. By Dr. Payne’s testimony and by Russia’s own admissions in regards to what they have and what they have in their 

stockpile, they are clearly not in compliance. 

Dr. BLAIR. I thought you were asking about compliance with New 

START. 

Mr. NUGENT. I am sorry that I am out of time and I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman yielding back, and the Chair 

now recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes for any questions he 

may have. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let’s finish this last conversation. It seems as 

though the discussion between Mr. Blair and Mr. Payne, were deal-
16 

ing with two different treaties and understandings, so let’s get a 

clarification here. 

Dr. BLAIR. That is correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Payne, you were talking about a 1990, 1991. 

Could you quickly explain that? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I was talking about the PNI agreements of 

1990 and 1991. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, maybe somebody will be listening to the 

rest of this conversation then. And Dr. Blair, you were talking 

about? 

Dr. BLAIR. The New START Treaty. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So, I think we pretty much know what 

New START is, so let’s talk about what the 1990, 1991 and why 

it is relevant to the question that was asked. 

Dr. PAYNE. Sure. The PNI, as I recall, were intended to be reciprocal agreements between the United States and Russia to draw 

down nonstrategic nuclear forces. It wasn’t a treaty. It didn’t have 

a verification package, but it was an attempt to, essentially, provide those kind of reductions outside of a negotiated treaty with a 

verification package, and so given the fact that that is an approach 

that is talked about a good bit today, I think it is useful to go back 

and look at the PNIs and see how the Russians now are doing with 

regard to compliance to that, and what we know now by the Russians’ own statements in their own press, they are in fairly substantial violation of it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The PNI were agreements, mutual agreements 

between the United States and Russia? 

Dr. PAYNE. These are political agreements between the United 

States and Russia, correct, sir. 

Dr. BLAIR. They were tacit agreements. They were not stipulated 

in any kind of written agreement between the two countries. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we need to be really, really careful because this kind of a discussion gets out there and used for an argument, but its relevancy to the formal treaty structures is somewhat 

removed. 

Now, there may have been an understanding, but I will guarantee you that what was said here is going to find its way outside 

the door, and bingo, the Russians are not in compliance with treaties, when that is not the case at all. Is that correct, Mr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sir, the PNIs are outside of the formal ratified treaty 

process. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Now, I would like to take this a little different direction. What kind of weapons do we need going forward? Do we need three different weapons? Do we need one different weapon? This is in part targeting but it is also targeting 

with what? Any one of you gentlemen want to talk about this? 

Dr. BLAIR. Well, the Global Zero report developed an option that 

was based on a dyad of nuclear submarines and of B–2 [Spirit] 

bombers and made the case that there are serious liabilities with 

the current Minuteman nuclear force and that that was a force 

that could and should be closely examined for potential elimination. Reasons for that had to do with the lack of flexibility of the 

Minuteman forces, the fact that they have to fly over Russia and 

China to attack the current contemporary real adversaries of the 
17 

United States, such as North Korea; whereas, the flexibility of the 

submarines and the bombers were much greater in their ability to 

carry out a range of missions, nuclear missions. 

So, we based the 900-warhead arsenal that I presented in my 

testimony on a dyad of submarines and B–2 bombers. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Comments. 

Dr. PAYNE. Sure. My thoughts on that are the priority of maintaining a U.S. triad of nuclear forces. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why? 

Dr. PAYNE. Because the triad provides the United States enormous level of flexibility and resilience to deter threats in the future 

that we may not be able to identify now. It allows us to adapt to 

threats as they come along. That is the great brilliance of the triad, 

and if we are going to maintain a triad, then we need to look at 

what are the steps that need to be taken now. 

Just for example, life extension program for the Minuteman missile, I think, is very important. Going ahead with a new bomber 

would strike me as very important to help maintain the triad so 

we don’t move down to a dyad or a monad and then getting on—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me. I am almost out of time. In fact, I 

am out of time, but before you get to all of that, you have got to 

come back to the initial question of why a triad is necessary. You 

quickly blew through. You didn’t have enough time to really get 

into it, but we really need in this committee, it seems to me, to 

really get down into the details of why or why not a triad. It is an 

enormous amount of money. The reconditioning of those, all three 

elements is extraordinarily expensive. Is it essential, and that is 

the subject matter. 

I am out of time, and I thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for 5 minutes for any questions he may have. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you 

for being here today. Dr. Blair, I will start with you. I was over 

in North Korea and South Korea here some time ago and I agreed 

with your premise that we have gained, at least South Korea has 

gained a qualitative advantage in conventional weapons. Did I understand your testimony that you had said something along the 

lines that now that that is gained, the nuclear deterrence or the 

nuclear capability on the part of South Korea or the United States 

supporting forces was no longer as necessary? 

Dr. BLAIR. For tactical warfighting purposes we no longer have 

to rely on short tactical nuclear weapons to suppress the North Korea’s artillery threat to the South. We do, obviously, want to continue to project a strategic threat at North Korea. 

Mr. FRANKS. I wanted to make sure about that. 

Dr. Krepinevich—I am sorry. Krepinevich. I got it right, didn’t I, 

Krepinevich? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Close. It is Krepinevich. 

Mr. FRANKS. Krepinevich. Boy, I tell you, I know that never happens to you. I was impressed with your comments related to deterrent itself. It is in the minds of the beholder, and you know, it occurs to me that this discussion should always be predicated on how 

people perceive our deterrent. 
18 

I remember years ago that the discussion about a nuclear freeze 

or something along those lines, and William F. Buckley put it so 

well. He said, you know, the idea is not to freeze it, being able to 

only destroy each other a few times. The idea is to prevent someone 

from proceeding. And so I wanted to ask you, Dr. Blair, based on 

that, because I assume that you believe in deterrence in some of 

the comments you made, it sounds. Who would be more deterred? 

Who, as far as a potential enemy of the United States, Iran or 

China or anyone, who would be more deterred by our reduction in 

our strategic capability? Who would that deter more? 

Dr. BLAIR. I don’t think the reductions matters. It is what is left 

over at the end. Remember—— 

Mr. FRANKS. No. My question is, would there be anybody that 

would be deterred more by a reduction in our strategic capabilities? 

Dr. BLAIR. If we have a 900—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Is that a ‘‘yes’’ or a ‘‘no.’’ 

Dr. BLAIR [continuing]. We have the ability—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I am going to move on then. Who would reduce 

their nuclear weapons based on us—I say put Russia aside for a 

moment. Who else would reduce their nuclear weapons arsenal or 

existing arsenals following our potential reduction? 

Dr. BLAIR. Well, I don’t think anyone would. I think we need 

to—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I think that is the right answer. 

Dr. BLAIR. I think we need to assert leadership to bring other 

countries into the—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Is there a number too low, from your perspective, 

that we should go? In other words, what would be too low from 

your perspective? 

Dr. BLAIR. We need to bring all the nuclear weapons countries 

into a negotiation. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. And if we did that, would there be a number too low? 

Dr. BLAIR. The goal of Global Zero is through phased verifiable 

proportional reductions that in due course—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Hence Global Zero, I got you. All right. I just wanted to know where you were coming from. 

Dr. BLAIR. And most people, I think, these days in the mainstream believe that the United States would be more secure living 

in a world without nuclear weapons than it is living in the world 

today. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, we might all feel more secure if we just lived 

on some distant fairyland planet, too. I mean, you know, the notion 

is unfortunately other people don’t always do what we would like 

for them to do. It is a dangerous world. 

Dr. BLAIR. In the 1980s, no one would have guessed that we 

would be—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me ask you another question. I am asking the 

questions here today, Dr. Blair. 

Dr. BLAIR. Sorry? 

Mr. FRANKS. I am asking you questions here today. I guess my 

question to you then—— 

Dr. BLAIR. I am trying to answer your question, sir. You are not 

giving me an opportunity. 
19 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. You have answered them so far. Given 

your conviction for steep nuclear reductions, would you then advocate significant increases in expenditures for conventional warfare, 

conventional weapons capability and missile defense? 

Dr. BLAIR. Yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. That’s an answer. 

Dr. Krepinevich, if you could suggest to us, as a committee, what 

is the one thing that we could do in our nuclear doctrine that 

would increase ultimately the safety and protection of American 

men, women, and children and posit the course, the pursuit of freedom in a safer capacity? What is the one thing you think that we 

should do that would make this country safer and give us less 

chance of having a nuclear exchange of some kind? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think the most important thing that we can 

do right now is to understand our nuclear rivals, understand how 

they calculate cost, benefit, and risk. If we are going to—if the ultimate goal is to prevent the use of these weapons and ultimately 

we are trying to deter them from using these weapons, then I think 

we have to understand how they go about calculating cost, benefit, 

and risk. And there has been a lot of advances over the last 10 

years in the cognitive sciences, in the psychological sciences that 

really have highlighted some of the fundamental differences between cultures, Western cultures and other cultures as to how 

these factors are calculated. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Dr. Payne has done a great job of highlighting 

some of the history of just how leaders, other leaders have undertaken what we would consider highly irrational acts that are within their framework rational. So again I think if that is the ultimate 

goal, understanding, sort of thinking this through before we start 

committing huge sums of money one way or the other would be 

greatly to our benefit. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Carson for 5 minutes for any questions he may have. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Krepinevich, in the event that our nuclear stockpile was significantly reduced, to what degree do you believe our nonnuclear 

conventional capabilities would ever provide a deterrent? Do you 

believe that any level of investment in these capabilities could ever 

create a deterrent to rival our current nuclear deterrent? If not, 

how close could we get? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think, and this goes back to conversations I 

had with leaders of our Strategic Command after the first Gulf 

War, even then people like General Horner, General Habiger 

thought there was a small but significant substitution effect. In 

other words there were some targets that we could use precision 

guided weapons for in lieu of nuclear weapons. So again I think 

there is some substitutability effect there. 

On the other hand, the competition isn’t static, it’s dynamic, and 

so have you rivals dispersing their assets, they go deep underground, they put them in mountains, and it is this back-and-forth 

game. So while I think there is some possible substitution there, 

I don’t think it is widespread. 
20 

Second, I think that when you are looking at this question, nuclear weapons offer prompt catastrophic destruction, cyber weapons 

don’t, biological weapons don’t. Nuclear weapons are in a class all 

on their own, and for that purpose they are unique. Now to what 

extent do you need that capability? I think you need it in a lot of 

ways for deterrence, it is the ultimate threat. 

One of the things I think that is becoming worrisome from my 

point of view is the blurring of this distinction between nuclear 

weapons and nonnuclear weapons. We now have things like the 

mother of all bombs, highly destructive conventional weapons, still 

nothing like a large-yield nuclear weapon. The Russians on the 

other hand are producing nuclear weapons of extremely small yield 

again to offset their conventional inferiority. To the extent that you 

got conventional weapons that in some cases can substitute for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons that rivals consider to be usable because they are low yield, I think there is a real risk area 

there. I am not sure I am answering your question, but I do think 

this is one area that concerns me greatly. 

Mr. CARSON. Dr. Krepinevich, thank you, sir. 

Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. Same question? 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

Dr. PAYNE. Great. I believe that there is role for advanced conventional forces to complement deterrence. I have thought that for 

a good long time. But that is a different point than saying they can 

substitute for nuclear weapons for deterrence. We know that conventional deterrence fails catastrophically on occasion. We have 

been to the nuclear-free mountaintop, and what we saw last time 

is we had 110 million casualties in just over 10 years of warfare. 

That was the nuclear-zero mountaintop we were at last time. And 

so I am real careful about saying conventional forces can substitute 

for nuclear forces for deterrence because we have been there and 

we have seen what happens and it was pretty ugly. But I think 

they can complement nuclear weapons for deterrence by making 

our arsenal more flexible and giving us more options which with 

to deter. 

Dr. BLAIR. I would answer the question by saying there has been 

a massive substitution over the last 30 years of conventional for 

nuclear forces. We have relieved ourselves of the need to rely on 

nuclear weapons for almost all of the missions that we have today. 

That is one of the reasons why our numbers have gone so dramatically down over the last 25 years. 

When I worked at Strategic Command in Omaha for a man who 

became the vice commander, he put together in 1984 a plan that 

would have substituted conventional air launch cruise missiles, 

launched by B–52 [Stratofortress] bombers, to cover all of the soft 

targets in the Soviet Union to the east of the Ural Mountains. That 

was shot down by—at the Pentagon because it infringed on the 

roles and missions of the tactical U.S. Air Force with its conventional missions. But since 1980 and the beginning of cruise missiles 

and precision guided munitions and now with the advent of amazing information processing and collection, we have basically been in 

the process of shutting down the nuclear enterprise and replacing 

it with missile defenses and now with cyber, but also special ops, 
21 

drones, all of the things that we at one time in our history would 

have had to rely on a nuclear weapon to carry out a mission now 

we have conventional options in our kit bag. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson from South Carolina for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you all for 

being here today. And I certainly agree with Sheriff Nugent that 

I appreciate the very candid comments from each of you on very 

important issues to our country. 

Dr. Payne, the National Nuclear Security Administration is currently constructing the mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility at the 

Savannah River site. This facility once complete will dispose of excess plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons as provided by 

the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement by 

the United States and the Russian Federation. There is speculation 

about reducing or even halting the funding for the project. What 

is your opinion as to the Russian reaction? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sir, I know I know enough to say when I don’t know 

enough to give you an informed answer. On this particular subject 

I will tell you I don’t know enough to give you a very informed answer on the subject. 

Mr. WILSON. Again, I said this is candid, you are. So thank you. 

And Dr. Blair, given the Administration’s goal of reducing our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile it is clear that the National Nuclear Security Administration will need a pathway for plutonium 

disposition. In fact you referenced this. Do you believe it would be 

better to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium by turning it into 

mixed oxide fuel for commercial power generation or do you support indefinite storage of the pits at Pantex and the Savannah 

River site? 

Dr. BLAIR. I don’t believe those are the only options. Unfortunately, I think the MOX [mixed oxide nuclear fuel] option is really 

interesting, but unfortunately that MOX facility is 10 years behind 

schedule, and over $10 billion over budget, and it is looking less 

and less like a viable idea. I think that facility could be and should 

be used probably to dispose of the plutonium pits through mixing 

it with waste, all kinds of different plutonium disposition techniques that you know wouldn’t involve your facilities that would 

glassify, vitrify, mix with waste, et cetera, and then move it out 

and store it in the New Mexico repository probably is the most sensible way to go at this point I am afraid. 

Mr. WILSON. And I do need to let you know there is dispute over 

the numbers you used and also the timeline. 

Dr. Krepinevich, you have written a book that sounds intriguing 

and that is 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War 

in the 21st Century. As the author could you just briefly tell us 

what the top three scenarios you believe are most likely as what 

you call real-world likely? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, after writing the book the ones that certainly bothered me the most, one had to do with Pakistan coming 

apart at the seams and breaking into factions, competing factions, 
22 

and you had the issue of loose nuclear weapons to consider. So that 

was one. 

Second had to do with nuclear weapons that were sold on the 

Russian black market that were smuggled into the United States, 

and it wasn’t one weapon, it was a number of weapons. You had 

a weapon go off and there was—it presented rather unique problems for the political leadership of the country as well as technical 

problems, and that was the second scenario. 

The third had to do with a nuclear-armed Israel and Iran, and 

the inherent instability of exceedingly short warning times and the 

willingness of Iran now that it had nuclear weapons to be very aggressive in its pursuit of proxy warfare against Israel. 

Mr. WILSON. And with these scenarios has there been any indication of former Soviet nuclear materials coming into the United 

States? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. No, no, no, there is no bombs, not to my knowledge, being smuggled into the United States. But again looking at 

the issue of Soviet nuclear security, Soviet organized crime, terrorist operatives in that part of the world and so on, and the funding of certain terrorist groups, that formed the basis for the event 

that triggered the scenario. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again I appreciate you raising these issues 

and I in particular in regard to Pakistan I had the privilege and 

opportunity of actually having breakfast 4 weeks and a day with 

Benazir Bhutto before she was assassinated, so the possible dissolution of Pakistan certainly is of great concern. 

Thank you very much. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Just very quickly to mention, it turned out 

Secretary Gates read the book at the time and asked me to come 

in and write a number of scenarios that they actually wargamed 

out. So there was some I guess public policy payoff of the book. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, congratulations on your recognition. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen for yielding back. 

I want to go back and revisit a dialogue that Mr. Nugent and Mr. 

Garamendi were having a little earlier about the difference between the New START Treaty and the PNIs. I think there was 

some clouding there. Dr. Payne emphasized that the Russians had 

in his opinion not been complying with the PNIs that preceded the 

New START Treaty. And my question, Dr. Blair, is do you dispute 

that the Russians have not been in compliance with the PNIs that 

preceded New START Treaty. 

Dr. BLAIR. No, I wouldn’t dispute that. I don’t think they have 

fully strictly complied with the understandings of what we thought 

they were supposed to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. That was my understanding. 

Dr. BLAIR. That is one of the reasons why the Global Zero Commission really wants to go the bilateral negotiated verifiable route 

to reductions in nuclear weapons and not have this fuzzy process 

out there of unilateral reductions or unilateral understandings of 

the other person’s obligations, et cetera. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am in complete agreement with that. I think that 

we need to have verifiable treaties that go through the Senate, the 

regular order process. I do note on page 1 of your report it says 
23 

that in talking about getting to 900 it says, ‘‘These steps could be 

taken with Russia in unison through reciprocal Presidential directives negotiated in another round of bilateral arms reduction talks 

or implemented unilaterally.’’ So—— 

Dr. BLAIR. We looked at all the options. You could do X, Y, or 

Z but we came down in the end the consensus, unanimous consensus was that the bilateral negotiated treaty approach was the 

way to go. 

Mr. ROGERS. And, that’s in the report too? 

Dr. BLAIR. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. Thank you. I also want to mention I have 

had distributed to all of you a chart that was drafted, put together 

by Admiral Richard Mies and it looks at the global fatalities from 

major wars around the world over the last 400 years. And you see 

that approximately 2 percent of the world’s population was dying 

in these wars from 1600 to 1800, then it fell down to about 1 percent. And then we saw in the 1900s, World War I and World War 

II saw a spike. But right after that with the advent of nuclear 

weapons we see that for the last 50 years or so the percentage of 

global fatalities from war has dropped to less than one-tenth of 1 

percent. My question is, wouldn’t this be hard objective quantifiable data that in fact nuclear weapons do have a chilling effect on 

warfare as opposed to escalating the probability of major wars? 

And I would open that up to anybody who wants to respond. 

Dr. BLAIR. I think you should survey the landscape of conflict 

around the world today from Mali to anywhere you want to look, 

Russia, Georgia, et cetera, Chechnya. And ask yourself the question do nuclear weapons play a role in the 21st century in resolving 

those conflicts? And I think whatever role they played after the end 

of World War II and during the Cold War in preserving the peace 

and preventing great war that’s changed, it is a different world. 

Mr. ROGERS. I completely agree. Those minor conflicts and relatively to the global population, those are minor, have always existed along with these major wars. And my question is since, this 

chart lends credibility to the argument that nuclear weapons in 

fact—— 

Dr. BLAIR. On the face of it but it is just a correlation that you 

have to dig deeper into. I mean, I don’t think any of us here would 

want the whole world to go nuclear on the strength of that 

premise, that nuclear weapons keep the peace. By that logic we 

would have 198 countries with nuclear weapons and it would be a 

much more dangerous world obviously. India and Pakistan today, 

would we prefer that they eliminate their nuclear weapons or keep 

them on the hope that they preserve the peace between the two 

countries? You know, as far as I am concerned, I think we are all 

better off with fewer nuclear weapons in any part of the world. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I appreciate and respect that is your view. I 

have a polar opposite and it is because of this chart that I believe 

the opposite’s true. 

Dr. Payne, would like to comment on Admiral Mies’ chart? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sure. There is enough historical evidence to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that nuclear weapons add 

usefully to deterrence. This chart aggregates that over 4 centuries, 

there are also individual case studies in more recent history where 
24 

you can go and we understand what was going on with the two 

parties to know that nuclear deterrence helped prevent war or 

helped prevent the escalation to war. We know that beyond any 

reasonable doubt, which is why I am so interested in not focusing 

on the notion that fewer is better, fewer might be better, fewer 

might also be worse. The question is do we have the kind of nuclear arsenal that maximizes our ability to deter war and to deter 

escalation? That is the key question, not whether the number is 

fewer or more. The question is it the kind of arsenal that contributes most effectively to deterrence because as this chart recognizes 

nuclear deterrence is a very, very important product. And for us to 

back away from it, and for example, going towards nuclear zero, 

what we are risking is getting back to the world we saw there at 

World War II in a nonnuclear world where nuclear deterrence 

wasn’t operating and we had enormous number of casualties because deterrence failed catastrophically. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The last question I will ask, because I 

will submit the rest of mine for the record,the last question I ask 

goes back to a topic raised by Mr. Garamendi which is a very important topic which is the triad. He is right, it is a very costly approach. However, having said that General Kehler, who is the commander, U.S. security forces, recently said, ‘‘The Triad of SSBNs, 

ICBMs, and nuclear capability heavy bombers all with their associated support elements offer a mutually reinforcing strategic package that provides a credible deterrent to our adversaries, assurance 

to our allies and partners, and flexibility for the President.’’ 

What do you all think, I mean that‘s General Kehler saying that 

we really need it for all of those reasons for our allies and our 

President’s flexibility. Is it worth the investment that we are making? And I will start with Dr. Krepinevich and then go to Dr. Blair 

and then Dr. Payne and that will be my time. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, one of the virtues of the triad is that 

each element has advantages that the other doesn’t so they help 

cover for one another’s weaknesses. I would say in the case of 

bombers, as we have seen in multiple conflicts, bombers have proven useful for conventional deterrence and in conventional 

warfighting. 

Mr. ROGERS. Go back to my point, I don’t want to wear out my 

welcome here with time. Is it worth the investment or not? It is 

kind of a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ thing. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I can’t give it to you ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ Mr. Chairman. You really need to sit down and look at real world problems 

I think and how you are going to address them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Blair. 

Dr. BLAIR. No, it is not worth the investment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Payne. 

Dr. PAYNE. It certainly is in the bipartisan congressional strategic posture commission. 

Mr. ROGERS. We get one ‘‘yes,’’ one ‘‘no,’’ and one ‘‘I can’t say.’’ 

With that I yield back. The Chair now recognizes the ranking 

member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the patience and courtesy of the witnesses here as we explore these important issues. It almost seems to me that we need to have a cou-
25 

ple of closed-session hearings so that we can talk about some 

things that cannot be aired in public. I thought the chairman’s 

chart was very interesting here. I look forward to reading Admiral 

Mies’ book. I do worry though, I think Dr. Blair put it very well, 

there is a difference between correlation and causation, a big drop 

in casualties here but after 1800 you wonder like if the repeating 

rifle can be credited with that advance or perhaps rifle to barrels 

or something. I think what this chart fails to show is that if we 

were to make mistakes now with nuclear weapons the casualty 

rates would not only go off the chart, it would probably bust 

through the ceiling of this building and I mean the top floor, because that is the risk with nuclear weapons. Certainly a massive 

exchange could be extinction of the planet. So I also thought Dr. 

Blair phrased it very well except for a few powers nuclear weapons 

really don’t play any role at all with a lot of the asymmetric warfare we are seeing around the world in smaller conflicts. 

I hope that as these hearings progress we can have fewer arguments about straw men because I think there are so many false 

impressions that people have. I am very much glad the New 

START/PNI confusion was cleared up, but I think if we are careful 

about this we can figure out what an appropriate number is and 

not really make this political at all. I think it is the first Bush administration that is credited with the greatest percentage reduction 

in nuclear weapons that we had from 1989 to 1994, but there have 

been substantial cuts under both administrations. And I think most 

people agree now that it was probably for the good. So let’s see 

what is feasible based on current information and proceed on that 

basis. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for their patience and expertise. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen. Mr. Garamendi, do you have 

any questions? You are the swan song. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, about a thousand questions. Just a couple 

of things very quickly. I really agree with the necessity for confidential hearings on this and to really get into the details for all 

kinds of reasons. 

One of the straw men that has been going on here is the issue 

between zero and some other number. I don’t think in my career 

here which I hope is a good long time I will see zero, but I would 

hope to see a reduction to a point where there is deterrence, but 

there is no more than that. So we ought to in my view try to identify what that is. 

With regard to the triad, very complex, but very, very important 

for all the reasons some of which have been discussed here and 

many, many more. 

I just want to cover something that Mr. Wilson brought up and 

that is the issue of the plutonium pits that are in the United States 

and in Russia. These are ready-made weapons. This is not something to be—it is something to be really serious about. And the security of those is questionable. The committee has had hearings 

about that. And if it is questionable it certainly ought to be dealt 

with. There happens to be a solution, Mr. Blair, and that is to take 

the pits and to turn them into a metal fuel, which could be done 

easily and quickly and that fuel could be set aside for some later 
26 

use in an integral fast reactor. It is very viable and it does not create the same problems that the MOX facility has. That is an issue 

for another day and another hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, I am just going to let it go at this. These gentlemen have an extraordinary amount of knowledge, they obviously— 

and I thank you for bringing both sides to the table. We really need 

to get into this in much, much more detail. It is extremely important for the security of this Nation and beyond. Mr. Cooper made 

the point that I wanted to make and he made it very well, is that 

all well and good with this chart, but if—and this is Mr. 

Krepinevich’s book—the first issue he raised the most likely scenario was India-Pakistan, and the potential instability in Pakistan. 

And should that happen then the nuclear weapon may very well 

become a conventional use of it or a terrorist use, in which case the 

numbers here would go way off the chart. And so anything we can 

do to remove such potential, that is to remove the number of weapons here, there, anywhere, is to our benefit. We understand deterrence and the necessity for that, but that doesn’t mean we can’t 

move forward with a reduction in numbers and the delivery mechanisms both by terrorists and by traditional military means. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlemen and I also want to take time 

to thank all the witnesses for taking their time not only to be here 

but for the time it takes to prepare for this. I know it takes a lot 

of effort, and energy, and time and you ought to be commended. 

Mr. Garamendi is right, you are all very knowledgeable experts 

and we appreciate your opinions, whatever the opinions are. It is 

important for us to hear all sides. 

To that end, as you know this hearing came at the end of the 

last series of votes for the day and members went different directions and they weren’t all here. So you may have some additional 

members who have questions for the record. We will ask that the 

record remain open for 10 days, any members who come in and 

want to submit questions to you all. I ask that you reply to those 

in writing. 

And with that, thank you for attendance and this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 19, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 19, 2013 

(31) 

Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements 

for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester? 

March 19, 2013 

Our hearing today is on an important topic: ‘‘The U.S. Nuclear 

Deterrent: What Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in 

an Era of Defense Sequester?’’ And, we have a distinguished group 

of experts to help us consider this subject. They are: 

• Dr. Keith B. Payne, Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; 

• Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and 

• Dr. Bruce Blair, Co-founder, Global Zero. 

This Nation has some key decisions ahead of it. We find ourselves in the position of having to recapitalize our entire deterrent 

at exactly the time that every other nation is growing or modernizing its nuclear forces, but, we have absorbed reductions in our defense budget of $487 billion and we’re now 18 days into President 

Obama’s defense sequester that will take another half a trillion 

dollars out of our defense budget over the next decade. If we can’t 

fix this problem, we will do what Secretary Panetta described as 

cuts that would ‘‘decimate our defense. It would cripple us in terms 

of our ability to protect this country.’’ 

I am encouraged that, at least in the short term, DOD understands the importance of the nuclear deterrent and will act to protect it and the central role it plays in the Nation’s security. For example, Deputy Secretary Carter, when testifying before the full 

committee 2 weeks ago, said that: 

‘‘ nuclear deterrence is pretty important. So it’s the last thing 

that you want to do serious damage to. So I would imagine 

that the Department of Energy, and the leadership there, 

and certainly we in the Department of Defense, will try to 

protect our nuclear capabilities to the maximum extent possible.’’ 

But, I worry that in the long term, this situation will allow the 

President to further walk back on his commitments to modernize 

and maintain the deterrent. And these are his commitments he 

made during the New START treaty. They are his Section 1251 

plan he promised to the Senate; this is his Nuclear Posture Review. 
32 

As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, the United States 

is in the position of having to modernize and replace its entire nuclear triad in the very near future. For example, our sea-based deterrent leg was first commissioned in 1981; our land-based deterrent has been deployed and on-alert since 1970; and, the mainstay 

of our airborne deterrent has been performing the strategic deterrent mission since 1955. Our nuclear deterrent is the most cost-effective and proven means of promoting peace for the American people and their allies, but we have not been investing in it in a responsible way. Our real and potential adversaries and competitors 

understand this. Russia, for instance, has tested three new ICBMs 

since the New START treaty entered into force 2 years ago. The 

People’s Republic of China is preparing to put to sea a ballistic missile submarine and sea-launched ballistic missile and it appears to 

be readying three new long-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States. 

If President Obama is right, and there is peace and security in 

a world without nuclear weapons, it seems every other country 

with nuclear weapons—or, like Iran, the aspiration to develop 

them—has missed the memo. I will add to the record a document 

derived from open sources that lists summaries of just a few open 

source articles of what other nuclear weapons states are undertaking today. I note that Russia’s Vladimir Putin tells his people 

that, ‘‘[n]uclear weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia’s 

sovereignty and its territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and balance.’’ 

President Obama, however, said at the State of the Union address last week that, ‘‘we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our ability to influence 

others depends on our willingness to lead.’’ 

Are they both right? I think General Welch, former Strategic Air 

Command Commander and former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air 

Force, had it right when he said that, 

‘‘ The only basis for the idea that drastically reducing the 

number of nukes we have would magically make us safer 

and help eliminate other nuclear dangers is hope. But hope 

is not a plan, and hope is not a basis for security. Hope does 

not defend us. I would ask who would be willing to rely on 

hope for the safety and security of their family? . . . Leading 

the world to zero nuclear weapons is, at best, a fairy tale.’’ 

(emphasis added) 

There is a rising consensus from General Scowcroft, Secretaries 

Perry, Kissinger, Shultz, and Senator Nunn that the one-time frenzy of a world without nuclear weapons is little more than a fantasy, and a dangerous one. For example, the so-called Gang of 4’s 

recent Wall Street Journal op-ed piece is a dramatic shift from the 

original 2007 piece. I think you’ll find that the requirements in the 

March 2013 piece are precisely those Republican Senators and 

House Members would insist upon: 

‘‘ Washington should carefully examine going below New Start 

levels of warheads and launchers, including the possibility of 

coordinated mutual actions. Such a course has the following 

prerequisites: a) strict reciprocity; b) demonstrable 
33 

verification; and c) providing adequate and stable funding for 

the long-term investments required to maintain high confidence in our nuclear arsenal.’’ 

Indeed, Secretary Kissinger and General Scowcroft warned in 

April 2012 that: ‘‘[s]trategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead to a 

situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable.’’ 

This shift by the distinguished elder statesmen is welcome. It 

may not make the Washington, DC, arms control community 

happy, because these requirements shut the door on the idea of 

evading the treaty clause or endorsing the ‘‘Global Zero’’ vision, but 

they are smart policy. We are at a crisis point where we must focus 

on the imminent threats of North Korea and Iran. 

So, I look forward to examining these matters today. They are 

important to the Nation’s security and they are matters we will 

tackle in our markup of the FY14 National Defense Authorization 

Act. 
34 

Statement of Hon. Jim Cooper 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements 

for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester? 

March 19, 2013 

I would like to join Chairman Rogers in welcoming Dr. Payne, 

Dr. Krepinevich, and Dr. Blair to this hearing on the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent. 

A recent edition of the Wall Street Journal contained the latest 

opinion piece by four of America’s most distinguished defense and 

foreign policy experts: George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger, 

and Sam Nunn. Their article is entitled: ‘‘Next Steps in Reducing 

Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn’t 

Match the Urgency of the Threat.’’ Their article is perfectly timed 

for today’s hearing, and contains several valuable lessons for this 

subcommittee. 

First, the article is bipartisan. Two top Republicans and two 

Democrats have joined together to advocate for a better, safer 

world. They have set aside their differences for the common good. 

The House of Representatives should learn from their example. 

Second, the article is balanced. The authors think that ‘‘Washington should carefully examine going below New Start levels of 

warheads and launchers,’’ but are quick to cite the need for reciprocity, verification, and stable funding. Instead of sloganeering, 

they seem to be offering a responsible path to reducing America’s 

warheads from 1,550 to a lower number. 

Third, they are bullish on the prospect that today’s leaders can 

act promptly and responsibly in order to reduce nuclear risk in the 

world. They believe that today’s leaders can and will do a better 

job of securing nuclear materials, changing deployments and hairtrigger launch protocols, and engaging in global and regional dialogues. This optimism is not from starry-eyed idealists but from 

hard-nosed realists. 

What worthier challenge could this subcommittee, or this Congress, have than to do what we can in the legislative branch to promote a safer, saner world? Perhaps our goal should be, mindful of 

our limitations, to do no harm. We should not treat any of these 

issues as political footballs, or stand in the way of responsible efforts to reduce nuclear risk. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
35 

United States House of Representatives 

House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

March 19,2013 

Testimony Prepared By: 

Dr. Keith B. Payne 

Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies 

Missouri State University 

Fonner Commissioner, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 
36 

Testimony Prepared By 

Dr. Keith B. Payne 

Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies 

Missouri State University 

Former Commissioner, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 

for the past four decades there have been periodic proposals within the US for deep reductions in 

the US nuclear arsenal. These proposals almost always promote an approach to deterrence and 

US force sizing that has come to be known over the years as Minimum Deterrence. 

The basic Minimum Deterrence argument is that nuclear weapons are so lethal that a small 

number is adequate Jor deterrence, and will be so in the future. Consequently, the fundamental 

Minimum Deterrence claim is that we can make deep nuclear reductions without jeopardizing 

deterrence. 

The number of deployed nuclear weapons typically recommended in Minimum Deterrence 

proposals ranges trom 100 to 1000. The Global Nuclear Zero Commission's report, for example, 

recommends 450 deployed weapons now, and fewer in the future. 1 

Minimum Deterrence proposals typically claim that deep reductions are a requirement of the 

1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), will reduce nuclear dangers, advance US arms control and 

nonproliferation goals, and save billions of d()llars~all without jeopardizing detelTence. 

These Minimum Deterrence claims typically are predicated on the following series of nine 

intelTclated propositions: 

I. Russia and China are not serious security threats; nuclear deterrence considerations 

pertinent to a peer nuclear opponent no longer are salient in US security planning. 

2. Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to today's most pressing security threat~weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) terrorism----therefore, few nuclear weapons are needed for 

deterrence. 

3. US conventional forces can substitute in many cases for nuclear forces to meet pertinent 

US deterrence goals. 

4. Deterrence will function reliably and predictably at low US nuclear force 

numbers, now and in the future. 

5. Deterrence considerations alone detelTIline the size and composition of the nuclear force. 

1 James Cmiwright, et aI., Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Poli()/ Commission Report: A10dernizing U.S. Nuclear 

Strategy. Force Structure and Posture (May 2012), pp. 6, 17. 
37 

6. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) will remain invulnerable for 30 to 50 years. So, a 

small SSBN fleet can provide most or all of the nuclear capability needed for US 

deterrence needs, now amI in the fi.lture, 

7. The number of nuclear weapons and the risk of accidents and crises are directly 

correlated (more nuclear weapons means increased risk. while a decrease in their number 

reduces the risk). 

8. US nuclear force reductions are essential to strengthen nonproliferation efforts; the N PT 

requires US movement toward nuclear disarmament. 

9. A small number of nuclear weapons is adequate for deterrence, thus US defense spending 

can be reduced considerably by reducing nuclear forces. 

When these core Minimum Deterrence propositions are examined against available evidence. it 

is apparent that they are demonstrably false. questionable-to-highly dubious. or selfcontradictory. These flaws make recommendations derived n'om Minimum Deterrence equally 

dubious. 

I can give a few examples that illustrate how the elements of Minimum Deterrence are false, 

dubious or self~contradictory. 

Examples of claims that are false: 

First, the claim that the NPT requires that the United States now move toward nuclear 

disarmament places the force of binding treaty obligation behind deep nuclear reductions. Yet. 

this claim is false: the NPT contains no such obligation. In fact, when Spurgeon Keeny of the 

NSC explained NPT provisions to Henry Kissinger in 1969, he stated that the reference to 

nuclear disarmament was "essentially hortatory.,·2 

Next, the Minimum Deterrence claim that nuclear deten'cnce, as a rule. is ilTelevant to 

countering terrorism also is false. We know that telTorists can be deterred in some 

circumstances. and there is no reason to dismiss the potential for US nuclear capabilities to 

contribute by helping to deter their state sponsors. 

Third, Minimum Deterrence also promises substantial savings via nuclear reductions 3 This 

claim too is demonstrably false because there arc not substantial savings in reduced force 

numbers. As Dr. Don Cook of the National Nuclear Security Administration said in recent 

testimony, "There arc not substantial additional costs in going small, but there are not substantial 

savings either:' 4 And, Minimum Deterrence recommendations that the United States substitute 

, Spurgeon Keeny, "Provisions of the NPT and Associated Problems," memorandum to Henry Kissinger, January 

24, 1969, [declassified]. p. 5, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/ripaiho/frus/nixon/e2/83203.htm. 

J See for example, Kingston Reif, "Nuclear Myths (and Realities)," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 

2013, at http://www.thebulletin.org/node/9547. 

'Testimony before the House Appropriates Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Water, February 14,2013. 

2 
38 

conventional threats lor nuclear would likely lead to a net increase in US defense spending. For 

example, one advanced conventional strategic capability recommended in the Global Zero report 

alone might cost $5-$20 billion to reach initial operational capability, 5 and many additional 

conventional force improvements would be necessary. 

These three key Minimum Deterrence propositions are false. There is ample evidence that each 

of the six remaining propositions is questionable at best. 

For example. it is impossible to predict credibly that US relations with Russia and China. now 

and in the iltlure. will be benign with regard to nuclear deterrence. That prediction is 

inconsistent with considerable current evidence that points to worsening relations with each. 

Regardless of how we would like to view Russia and China, their open-source discussions of 

threats and strategy point both to the United States as enemy number one and to the great 

relevance they attribute to their nuclear weapons6 

In addition, it is impossible to claim with any level of credibility that deterrence will work 

reliably allow force levels, now or in the fi.tture. 7 The workings of deterrence simply are not 

predictable with such confidence. 

Similarly, no one can claim credibly that US conventional threats can substitute for nuclear 

threats for deterrence. The increasing lethality of conventional forces may mean much or nothing 

for deterrence purposes, depending on many other key factors. 

Likewise, the prediction of SSBN invulnerability for half a century more may prove prescient. 

but lhe many possibilities for rapid technological advancement and surprise should discipline any 

such promisess 

Finally, promises that US nuclear reductions will strengthen nonproliferation and reduce nuclear 

accidents and theft are all contrary to available historical evidence. There is no such correlation 

5 National Research Council, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability. [/8. Conventional 

Prompt Global Strike: 200N and Beyond (Washington. DC: National Academies Press. 2008). p. 40. 

available at .htm!. 

(, Sec for example, ''The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine orthe Russian Federation and the People's Republic of 

China," October 14.2011. Testimony Prepared By: Dr. Mark B. Schneider. available at. 

http://armedservices.house. gOY / index. cfm/hearings-display?C ontentRecord id--798a4a 17-2a63,4 5b 7 -ae 79, 

4629c32dt(ld7 &Statelllent .. id=c9fe3c83,cd34,42I c,b98c-ac29bdca094b& c\lt1tcntTypc id~ 14f1195b9,dta5-407a9d35-56cc7I 52a7cd&Group _ id"'41 030bc2-0d05-4 I 38-84 J f-oObOfbaaOf88&MonthDisplaY'-1 0& YearDisplay~20 II. 

I Even now, for example. Russiall experts say that Russiall defenses in the future would reduce Russian damage 

expectancy to 10% if the US follows Minimum Deterrence recommendations. No one knows ifsuch a threat will 

prove adequate to deter in the (hture. See, Sergey Rogov. Viktor Yesin, Pavel Zolotarev, Valentin Kuznetsov. 

"Russia: Experts on Why US. Russia Are Unable to Agree on Missile Defense," Nezavisimo}/e Voyennoye 

Ohozrenire, Online. September 22. 2012, OSC Translated Text. 

S For an examination of possible surprises, see Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition. Technology. 

and Logistics, Rcport olthe Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Swdy on Capahilitv Surprise, Vol. I: Main 

Report. September 2009. 

-, 
39 

to date between the number of nuclear weapons and accidents, and lllliher US nuclear reductions 

very likely will increase some allied interest in independent nuclear capahilities-defeating US 

nonproliferation goals. Some key allied voices already are expressing such concerns openly. In 

South Korea, for example. a large majority of the population now favors an independent South 

Korean nuclear capability.9 

Key Minimum Deterrence claims that are self-contradictory: 

Minimum Deterrence claims that a few hundred nuclear weapons are so lethal that they pose a 

deterrence threat of "catastrophic" dimensions. If true, it cannot also be true that reducing an 

opponent's deployed weapons from say 2000 to 1000, or even 500. will provide any great direct 

benefit for US public safety in the event of an attack: even a few hundred remaining weapons 

would still cause "catastrophic" destruction. 

Similarly, it cannot be true both that Russia is now a friend of the United States and will remain 

so in the future. and that arms control agreements with Russia will provide great direct security 

benefit for the United States. If there is no pertinent Russian threat, now or in the future, there 

can be no direct security benefit to whittling down Moscow's numbers. The United States 

typically is unconcerned about the number of French or British nuclear weapons---presumably 

for the understandable reason that those particular weapons pose no threat to the United States. [f 

Russia similarly is of no security concern, now or in the future. there similarly is no direct 

security value in focusing obsessively on negotiations to reduce incrementally the number of its 

nuclear weapons. Yet, tacilitating such negotiations is said to be one of the great benefits of 

Minimum Deterrence. 

Also, Minimum Deterrence claims that maintaining elJective deterrence is a priority goal. Yet. 

its nuclear reductions would degrade the US force characteristics that may nO\v be most 

important for deterrence, i.e., flexibility. resilience and adaptability. These qualities are linked to 

the size and diversity of the US nuclear arsenal. Consequently. some Minimum Deterrence 

advocacy of US deep force reductions now actually argues against US force flexibility and 

resilience,lo and thereby threatens to degrade deterrence. In 2010. Gen. Kevin Chilton, 

Commander of Strategic Command, stated in testimony before the Senate that the 1550 deployed 

warhead ceiling of the New START Treaty was the lowest level he could endorse given this need 

for flexibility. II There has been no apparent great benign transformation of international 

9 See Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff; Chungky Kang, "The Fallout: South Korean Public Opinion Following North 

Korea's Third Nuclear Test," The Asian lnstitute f(,r Policy Studies. Issue Brief, No. 46 (February 25.2013). pp. 7-

8. See also, Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun. "As North Korea Blusters. South Flirts with Talk of Nuclear 

Arms," New York Times, March 11,1013. 

10 Tom Nichols. "Time to Change America's Atomic Arsenal:' The Dip/omat. March 14.2003. at 

http://thcd ip lomatcom!20 13/03/14/time-to-changc-americas-atom ic-arscnal/. 

4 
40 

relations since these estimates to suggest that f1exibility is now less important for deterrence or 

that lower torce levels are now adequate for this purpose. 

In addition, if ample deterrence is easily secured at very low force numbers, then it must be true 

that the United States itself is vulnerable to dcterrencc by states ,vith small survivable nuclear 

arsenals. prospectively including North Korea and Iran. If so, the advantages of possessing even 

a small nuclear force are likely to appear exceedingly attractive to such countries and US 

reduction of its nuclear arsenal hardly can be expected to have a beneficial nonproliferation 

cffect on these states. Rather. validating Minimum Deterrence may help inspire them and others 

to seek nuclear capabilities all the more by lowering the bar for securing a nuclear 

deterrent/coercive capability against the United States. 

Finally, Minimum Detcncnce recommends that the United States exploit its conventional force 

advantages to reduce its own reI ianee on nuclear weapons and thus lead others to reduce their 

aspirations for nuclear weapons. However, available evidence demonstrates that some states. 

particularly including Russia, China and North Korea. place greater emphasis on their nuclear 

weapons in response to US conventional advantages. Consequently. the US pursuit of advanced 

conventional capabilities as recommended by Minimum Deterrence is very likely to lead these 

countries to emphasize nuclear forces. not follow the US lead toward nuclear disarmament. 

The Potential Degradation of Deterrence and Assurance at Very Low US Force Numbers 

The problem with Minimum Deterrence is not only that it rests on false, dubious or self .. 

contradictory claims. More importantly is the thct that because it does so. its advocacy for deep 

force reductions, no "new" US nuclear capabi lities .. and the application of US nuclear deten-ence 

only to opponents' nuclear threats ("sole purpose") are likely to undermine the US capacity to 

deter opponents and assure allies. These policies would: 

Offer fewer choices among warheads and delivery modes and restrict the US capability to 

adapt to new threats in the future-thereby limiting US flexibility and the prospective 

etTectiveness of US deterrence strategies; 

Inevitably move US deterrence strategies toward threats against civilian-based targets 

and/or threats against a very small set of military targets: such threats may well be 

inadequate and/or incredible 1,)1' some deterrence purposes and purposefully targeting 

civilian centers violates long-standing moral norms; 

Ease the technical/strategic challenges tll!' opponents who might seek to counter our 

detcITcnce strategies and static nuclear capabilities, now or in the future; 

11 General Kevin Chilton, Commander, u.s. Strategic Comrnand, Hearing 

Cornmittee; Subject: The Control 

Pentagon. Federal News Service. June 16. 18 .. 19. 

Foreign Relations 

Treaf)J.· Views From the 
41 

Encourage rather than deter some opponents from arms competition and challenges to 

Ollr deterrence strategies: 

Threaten the US capability to assure allies fmd thereby encollrage some to acquire their 

own nuclear deterrents-and a possible "cascade" of nuclear proliferation: 

Render US deterrence forces more vulnerable to opponent covert deployments or 

cheating on arms control agreements in the absence of significant US hedging measures 

and/or wholly unprecedented and intrusive verification measures: and 

Leave some severe threats by opponents free of any caution imposed by US nuclear 

deterrence, such as biological, chcmical, and cybcr threats, This could increase the 

prospects for such attacks on the United States and allies. For example, the 2013 Defense 

Science Board report on cyber threats concludes "that a survivable nuclear triad ... is 

required" to anchor US deterrence capabilities against the cyber threat. 12 

Guidelines That Do Fit Available Evidence 

The same evidence that demonstrates Minimum Deterrence claims to be false, dubious, or selfcontradictory also suggests a better sct of guidelines given contemporary realities. I should note 

that the six guidelines below arc fully in line with the conclusions of the bipartisan 

Congressional Strategic Posture Commission's 2009 report. 13 

• Promises that neither Russia nor China will pose threats in the future that involve nuclear 

deterrence are completely incredible and at variance with considerable contemporary 

evidence. IJS policy makers must take into account that IJS nuclear deterrence strategies 

need to be applicable to great nuclear powers, peers, regional opponents, and state 

sponsors of terror who might otherwise enable terrorist organizations to acquire weapons 

of mass destruction. 

• Confident predictions ahout the future functioning of detelTence in a highly dynamic 

environment arc particularly incredible. In such an environment, informed estimates of 

US deterrence requirements must be based on an understanding of opponents' likely 

decision making in plausible threat contexts. 

• In a highly-dynamic environment, deterrence requirements will be as varied and shilling 

as are opponents and contexts. One approach will not fit all with regard to US deterrence 

planning and forces. It is logical and reasonable in such an environment to expect that 

US detelTcnce forces with flexibility and resilience can help US deterrence strategies 

adapt to shifting requirements and be as etTective as is possible. These key detelTence 

12 Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Resilient A4ili/{lIJ? S.:vstems and the Advanced ()her Threat, 

January 2013, pp. 15,42. 

n See William Perry and James Schlesinger, et. ai., Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States, America 's 5~~lralegic POSlllre (Washington, D.C.: U.S, Institute of Peace, 2009). 

6 
42 

qualities are linked to the size and diversity of the US arsenal and their preservation 

should be a high priority in the calculation of US force adequacy. [t is for this reason that 

the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission emphasized the preservation of the US 

nuclear Triad; it offers considerable inherent f1exibility, diversity and resilience. 14 

• Given the need lor effective deterrence and the corresponding value of force Ilexibility. 

resilience. the United States should be most careful to avoid arms control and other 

restrictive measures that would lock in an undiversified and inf1exible arsenal~whether 

done by treaty. executive agreement or unilaterally. Minimum Deterrence proposals for 

very low force numbers. the elimination of the Triad. and a standing policy of no "new" 

US capabilities are particularly dangerous in this regard: the potential degradation of 

deterrence would be a high-risk trade-off for its tragile promises of benefit. In contrast, 

the great value of the Triad in this regard is why viitually no one outside of Minimum 

Deterrence favor its elimination. 

• The integrity of US alliances and preservation ofl.JS nonproliteration goals likely depend 

on the credible US assurance of allies. including nuclear assurances. Given these priority 

goals, the United States must understand the unique security challenges and tears of 

allies. and size and structure US forces with the unique requirements of assurance in 

consideration. Deterrence and assurance are separate functions and their requirements 

will f1'cquently differ. Here too we should be most careful to avoid arms control and 

other restrictive measures that would lock in an arsenal that is too narrow and inllexible 

to support the assurance of allies. Again. Minimum Deterrence proposals for deep force 

reductions, the elimination of the Triad, the removal of dual capable aircraft from Europe. 

and a standing policy of no "nev,;" capabilities are pruticularly risky in this regard. 

• The functioning of deterrence is not predictable and in some plausible cases. it will not 

work. This reality suggests the potentially great value of US defensive capabilities. 

including missile defense. to provide protection for US society in the event deterrence 

fails. This goal. too, should be a factor in US force-sizing calculations. The emergence 

of new nuclear powers with modest arsenals and extreme hostility lor the United States 

suggests the growing value and practicality of such defenses. The recent severe nuclear 

missile threats to the United States announced by North Korea. and the Obama 

administration's rhetorical emphasis on US national missile defense in response, are a 

reminder of that value. 15 Downplaying the need for national defenses against at least 

limited threats in favor of fragile Minimum Deterrence promises would be another highrisk trade-off 

" Ibid .• pp. 25-26, 29. 

15 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, March 7, 2013. 
43 

A Modern-Day Ten Year Rule 

Minimum Deterrence is a contemporary version of the famous British Ten Year Rule. In 

August 1919. Britain. exhausted by World War I. established the Ten Year Rule. British 

armed forces were instructed to estimate their requirements and budget "on the assnmption 

that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years .. •

16 

This rule was to be in effect "on a daily moving basis" until such time as it was expressly 

removed. 17 Based on this hopeful prediction of a benign future and comparable high hopes 

ft)]" naval disarmament negotiations. British naval allocations were cut by 85 percent between 

1919 and 1923. 18 The British government did not rescind the Ten Year Rule until 1932. and 

even then admonished that this did not mean the end of austere budgets. or course. Britain 

began the struggle for its existence with a resurgent Germany seven years later and was illprepared for such a struggle. in paJi as a result of this rolling Ten Year Rule that codified the 

optimistic hope for a benign future and deferred prudent military preparation. 

The Ten Year Rnle was premised on a view of the international environment that fit the 

hopes and desires of an exhausted. war-weary Britain; but those hopes became increasingly 

surreal through the 1920s and early 1930s. 

Today. in the United States. Minimum Deterrence is very much akin to the Ten Year Rule, 

except that its recommendations would lock in "legally binding" US reductions and make 

recovery and adjustment very diHicult. lengthy and costly in the event of a darker future than 

predicted. And. it would do so at a time when Russia and China are modernizing their 

nuclear capabilities while explicitly threatening US allies and naming the United States as the 

primary opponent. and rogue states are moving forward on nucleaJ' weapons and multiple 

means of delivery while also threatening the United States and allies. 

Britain tinally abandoned the Ten Year Rule in 1932 after developments in Europe and Asia 

demonstrated that its premise did not reflect reality. Minimum Deterrence proponents have 

yet to reconsider their hoped-based predictions. despite abundant evidence that they are 

wrong. questionable or self-contradictory. 

During the period that the Ten Year Rule was in effect. Britain and the United States 

promoted various disarmament negotiations. The late celebrated US diplomat and historian. 

George Kennan. offered the following indictment of these efforts: ·'A ... line of utopian 

endeavor that preoccnpied AmericaJ1 statesmanship over long periods of time was the attempt 

to arrive at multilateral arrangements for disarmament...at the very time this mountainous 

labor was in progress. Weimar Germany was disintegrating miserably into the illness of 

16 See Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall o/British Naval Maste!y (New York: Humanity Books, 1998). p. 273. 

17 Ibid .• p. 279. 

18 Ibid., p. 274. 

8 
44 

National Socialism, and new political realities were being created which were to sweep all 

this labor from the scene ... The evil of these utopian enthusiasms was not only, or even 

primarily. the wasted time. the misplaced emphasis, the encouragement of false hopes. The 

evil lay primarily in the fact that these enthusiasms distracted our gaze from the real things 

that were happening ... The cultivation of these utopian schemes. Hattering to our own image 

of ourselves. took place at the expense of our feeling for reality. And when the rude facts of 

the power cont1ict finally did intrude themselves directly upon us. in the form of enemies 

against whom we were forced to fight in the two World Wars. we j(lUnd it difficult to 

perceive the relation between them and the historical logic or our epoch. because we 

understood the latter so poorly.,,19 

The same can be said of Minimum Deterrence proposals today. 

19 George F. Kennan. Realities o/Ameriwn Foreignl'oliq(Loncion: Oxford University Press. 1954), pp. 20-23. 

9 
45 

Dr. Keith B. Payne 

Keith Payne is President and co-founder of the Nationallnstitnte for Public Policy, a 

nonprofit research center located in Fairfax, Virginia. Dr. Payne also is Professor and 

Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. Missouri State 

University (Washington Campus). 

Dr. Payne served in the Depmiment of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Forces Policy. He received the Distinguished Public Service Medal and the 

Forces Policy office Dr. Payne led received a Joint Meritorious Unit Award. In this 

position, Dr. Payne was the head of U.S. delegation in numerous allied consultations and 

in "Working Group Two" negotiations on BMD cooperation with the Russian Federation. 

In 2005 he was awarded the Vicennial Medal for his many years of graduate teaching at 

Georgetown University. 

Dr. Payne is the Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Command's Senior Advisory Group, 

Strategy and Policy Panel, editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy: An International 

Journal, and co-chair of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum. He served on the bipartisan 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Secretary of 

State's International Security Advisory Board. as co-chairman of the Department of 

Defense's Deterrence Concepts Advisory Group, and also as a participant or leader of 

numerous governmental and private studies. including White House studies of U.S.-

Russian cooperation. Dclense Science Board Studies, and Defense Department studies of 

missile defense, arms controL and proliferation. He also has served as a consultant to the 

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency, and participated in the 1998 "RumsfCld Study" of missile 

proliferation. 

Dr. Payne has lectured on defense and foreign policy issues at numerous colleges and 

universities in NOlih America, Europe, and Asia. He is the author, co-author. or editor of 

over one hundred and twenty published articles and seventeen books and monographs, 

some of which have been translated into German, Russian, Chinese or Japanese. His 

most recent book is entitled, Understanding Deterrenee (2013). Dr. Payne's articles have 

appeared in many major U.S., European and Japanese protessional journals and 

newspapers. 

Dr. Payne received an A.B. (honors) in political science from the University of California 

at Berkeley in 1976, studied in Heidelberg, Gennany, and in 1981 received a Ph.D. (with 

distinction) in international relations from the University of Southern California. 
46 

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3 
49 

March 6, 2013 

U.S. NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS 

IN AN ERA OF DEFENSE AUSTERITY 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOllSE ARMEl) SERVIO:S COMMITTEE 

SllBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

By Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. 

President 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessm(~nts 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you foJ' your invitation testify this afternoon on the subject of U.S. nuclear 

requirements. My addresses the risks and benefits that may accrue 

should the United States pursue significant in its nuclear forces beyond those 

called lor in the New START agreement. 

Background to the Current Situation 

Post-Cold War Drawdowl1 

After amassing large nuclear arsenals during the Cold War. both the United 

States and Russia have made deep reductions in these since the fa!! of the Berlin 

Wall in 1989. These reductions were enabled by the subsiding tensions between the two 

countries that began in the late 19805 and that continued through the collapse of the 

Soviet state in Decemher 1991. They were further enabled by the corresponding decline 

in the size and effectiveness of Russia's conventional forces, which left the U.S. military 

in a position of unchallenged conventional reality demonstrated by the 

decisive over the Iraqi military in the time there were no other 

comparable pO\vers, ,>,'hieh also facilitated the remarkable drawc!O\vn of U.S. and 

Russian nuclear forces. 

By 2010 the United States nuclear arsenal comprised 5,1 13 active and inactive warheads, 

including both strategic and non-strategic weapons. 2 This represents an 84 percent 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

ThillkillK Smarter About De/elise 

1667 K Street NW, Suite 900, Washington DC 20006 

www.CSBAonline.org 1202-331-7990! Fax 202-331-8019 
50 

reduction trom the U.S. nuclear arsenal's peak of 31,255 warheads in 1967, and a 77 

percent reduction from the 22,217 total in 1989. The sharpest decline in the U.S. nuclear 

stockpile took place from 1989 to 1994, during which it was reduced by half. The 

Soviet/Russian nuclear stockpile also underwent similarly large reductions during this 

timeframe. Unclassified sources indicate that the Soviet stockpile peaked at over 40.000 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in the mid-I 980s. 3 Recent Congressional 

testimony by U.S. Department of Defense (000) officials indicates that Russia's current 

stockpile is between 4,000 and 6,500 nuclear weapons, of which 2,000 to 2,500 are 

considered strategic weapons. 4 Russia's nuclear stockpile has therefore undergone a 

reduction of 84 to 90 percent since its peak during the mid-I 980s. The reduction to date 

since 1989 is 82 to 89 percent.' The most rapid decline in Russian nuclear weapons took 

place from 1989 to 1996, during which it was cut by over 60 percent. 

New START 

The 2011 New START Treaty entered into by the United States and Russia is the latest in 

a series of agreements intended to reduce the two countries' nuclear forces. That being 

said, neither U.S. nor Russian officials have been completely forthcoming regarding their 

existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The figures both countries have recently made 

public under New START reporting requirements are for strategic warheads on deployed 

ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bomhers. As of September 2012, the United States reported 

1.722 strategic warheads on 806 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, while 

the Russians reported 1,499 warheads on 491 deployed strategic launchers. I> These 

numbers, however, do not capture all the nuclear weapons pennitted under the treaty. 

New START's counting rule for heavy bombers counts only one warhead for each 

nuclear-capable heavy bomber against the deployed warhead limit of 1.550. 7 Yet 

maximum loads for the 76 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s allow over 1,700 U.S. nuclear bomber 

weapons to go "lmcounted." Similarly, maximum loads for Russia's 63 Tu-95 and 13 Tu160 bombers would enable the Russians to deploy at least another 760 weapons over the 

1,550-warhead limit.s Thus, while a cursory look at the New START agreement may give 

the impression that both the United States and Russian Federation are limited to 1.550 

] Natural Resourees Defense Council (NRDC), "Table of USSR/Russian Nuckar Warheads:' available at 

mULU~l'cJ:i·~uru&_Q'.lgLUmK'!LUl!]<'lW".;tUll1HLl!1i1. aceessed on November 29. 2012: amI William .I. Perry and 

(Washington. DC: United States Institute or Peace Press. 

,1 James N. Miller, Slatcment before the House Committee on Armed Services, November 2. 201 I. p. I; and 

Madelyn Crecdon and Andre"v Weber. Joint Statement for the Record, Strategic Forces Suhcommittee, 

Committee on Armed Services. U.S. Senate. March 28. 2012, p. 2. 

5 The NRDC's database on USSR/Russian warheads estimates that in 1989 the USSR had 12.177 strategic 

and 23.700 non-strategic "arheads t(lI' a total or 35,817. NRDC. "Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear 

Warheads." 

(, State Department. "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic OfTensive Anns:' Fact Sheet. 

October 3, 2012~ When the lirst New START data exchange occurred in February 2011. the United States 

reported 1.800 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs. and heavy bombers: Russia reported 1.537. Thus. 

from February 2011 to September 2012. Russia's deployed strategic warheads increased, whereas the United 

States' decreased. 

7 "Treatv hetween the United States of American and the Russian Federation for the Further Reduction and 

Limitatron of Strategic Oftensive Anns," Article Ill. paragraph I.(e). 

g If the load-out for the Tu-95MS Bear is limited to six Kh-55 cruise missiles carried internally to maximize 

range, then till.! Russian bomber force would only add 396 uncounted nuclear \vcapons. 

2 
51 

deployed strategic warheads each, for a combined total of 3, 100, the counting rules 

relating to bombers permit as many as another 2,500 warheads to go uncounted. New 

START also allows both parties to maintain 100 non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and 

heavy bombers over and above the 700 permitted to each side by the treaty. Moreover, 

any strategic warheads stockpiled for these launchers are not counted. [n short, New 

START has some significant loopholes. While it constrains launchers, its 1,550-warhead 

limit by no means constrains the United States and Russia to a combined total of 3, 100 

warheads. Ignoring stockpiled warheads-whose numbers could be considerable, the 

United States could have nearly 3,330 strategic weapons and Russian over 2,300 within 

the 1,550 limit on deployed weapons. 

Then there are the "non-strategic" or "tactical" nuclear warheads, many of which have 

yields greater than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. New START does 

not address these weapons, much less limit them. A study by the Federation of American 

Scientists (FAS) published in May 2012 estimated that the United States has some 760 of 

these non-strategic nuclear weapons while Russia has over 2,0009 Adding these figures 

for U.S. and Russian non-strategic warheads to the maximum totals allowed under New 

START brings the active U.S. stockpile to over 4,000 nuclear weapons and Russia's 

stockpile to at least 4,700. However, Defense Depmtment estimates of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons range from 2,000 to 4,000 weapons, which means the active 

Russian stockpile could be as high as 6,500 weapons. IO Based on the U.S. stockpile 

figure for 2009 of 5,113 weapons (reported in 2010) and the roughly 90 fewer strategic 

warheads the United States reported in September 2012 under New START, a reasonable 

estimate for the active U.S. stockpile would appear to be roughly 5,000 nuclear 

weapons. I I 

Further Reductions:' 

The Obama administration has committed itself to the eventual elimination of the world's 

nuclear weapons. This etfort is often referred to as "Global Zero." By far the most 

influential presentation of this view has been advanced by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, 

William Perry and George Shultz, highly regarded senior statesmen from both political 

parties. 12 The "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," as they have been called, argue that 

q According to this study, the United States' non-strategic inventory consists of around 500 B61 hombs plus 

some 260 W80-0 warheads (in storage for the TLAIVf-N): the Russian non-strategic i[ncntory includes 

nuclear bombs, torpedoes. depth warheads for the SS-21 Tochka and SS-26 Iskandcr short-range 

ballistic missiles. and warheads for A- 135 and S-300 antiballistic missile systems. Hans M. Kristenst:n. 

"Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons:' Federation Scientists. Special Report No.3, May 2012, pp. 

14. 53-54. A more recent study estimates the numher of operationally assigned Russian non-strategic 

nuclear warheads to be 860 to 1.040. See Sutyagin, "Atomic Accounting: /\ Nc\\ Estimate of Russia's 

Non-Strategy Nuclear Forces," Ro.ra/ instifu{ejor Occasional 

Paper. November 20 12. pp. 2-3. However. Kristensen's higher total on loadings plus 

weapons in storage or awaiting dismantlement. Sutyagin's estimate only includl!s ·-those that have heen 

assigned to available delivery systems." Ihid .. p. I. 

l(l Hans M. Kristensen. "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," Federation q{Amrrican 5;cientists. Special Report 

No.3. May 2012. p. 50, 

II The discussion of the U.S. and Russian post-Cold War nuclear forces is drawn from Barry D. 

Watts. Firebreaks and the ""udear Taboo (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgctal)' Assessments, forthcoming in 2013). 

"George P. Shultz. William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. "A World Free of Nuclear 

Weapons:' ilie Wall Stree/Journal. January 5. 2007: and P. Shultz, William J. Perry. 11enry A. 

Kissinger and Sam Nunn. "Toward a Nuclear-Free World." The January 15,2008. 

3 
52 

the world is at a "nuclear tipping point" in which "nuclear weapons [are] more widely 

available, [and] deterrence decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous." The result 

is that "the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most 

alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear 

weaponry is increasing.,,1J This stems from fears that the instability that plagues several 

existing and prospective nuclear states could lead to the collapse or overthrow of their 

governments. Should that occur. the security of their nuclear weapons could be 

jeopardized, and the likelihood of a nuclear weapon or fissile material finding its way 

into the hands of terrorist groups would increase substantially. Moreover. it is not 

inconceivable that. in the event of a more proliferated world. radical nuclear-armed states 

might transfer nuclear anTIS or fissile material to radical nonstate entities. 

Nuclear abolitionists generally admit that the path to achieving their ultimate goal is 

likely to be long and difficult, and so they advocate taking a series of interim steps to 

generate momentum. For them. New START represents one of these small steps. 

The Obama administration appears to be planning to take another such step. Since the 

New START treaty entered into force in February 2011, the administration has signaled 

that it will seek further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 14 Along these lines, a 2012 

report chaired by the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James 

Cartwright. argued that by 2022 the United States could reduce its strategic arsenal to 

500-900 warheads, eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons, and shift to a dyad of B-2 

bombers and fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), eliminating nuclear ICBMs, the 

third leg of America's nuclear triad. 15 Moreover, the report insisted, these steps could be 

taken either in unison with Russia or unilaterally. Perhaps most important. however. is 

that the new secretary of defense. Chuck HageL served on the commission and put his 

name to the report. 16 

I) George P. Shullz. William J. Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunl1. "A World Frce of Nuelcar 

Weapons:' 7h" 5.2007: and P. Shultz. William J. Perry. Henry A. 

Kissinger and Sam Nunn. "Toward a Nuclear-Free World." The January J 5.2008. For a 

discussion of the dangL:fS associated wilh nuclear terrorism. see Graham '1', All bOll. iVuclear Terrorism (Ne\v 

York: Owl Books. 20(4): and Andrew L Krepinevieh. 7 Deadlv Scenarios (New York: Bantam Books. 

2(09). 63-l)O. and 238-241. Sec also Evan Braden Y"clear Terrorism: Assessing the 

Threat. uc'veU}pulg a Jlesponse (Washington. DC: CSBA. 

1·1 David E. Sanger. "Obama to Rene\v Drive for Cuts in Nuclear Arms." file New York Times. February 10. 

2013. available 

comment: is possible that our goals can be achievc:d 1vith 

\vould reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Ollr arsenal as \vclJ as their role in security." 

Department of Defense. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities I(l!' 21" Century Defense." January 

2012. p. 5. 

'·Mod",,,,;·,;,,,, U.S. Nucie'lr Strategy. Force Structure. and POSlure:' Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy 

May 2012. Pl'. 1,6-8. and 20. The report is available at 

!.illjl.'.Cl"-''-''''=='L,"="",,"ll.!S'''-1~,",-llil!'''-'"!.L...i''''l=~''''ll!!!!''''!!'-WQ.'!llh1lill. accessed May 20. 2012. 

16 Others whose names appear as members of the commission are Ambassador Richard Burl. Ambassador 

Thomas Pickering. and General (Retired) Jack Sheehan. General (Retired) .lames Canwright served as the 

commission's chair, and Bruce Blair as the study director. 

4 
53 

How to Think About Further Reductions 

Would it make sense for the United States to pursue significant additional reductions in 

its nuclear forces and, if so, under what conditions? This is a very complicated issue, and 

it pertains to a capability that has represented a major U.S. strategic asset for nearly 70 

years. Given the stakes involved, a thorough assessment of the situation is merited. How 

would one structure such an assessment? What issues would need to be addressed to 

assist the administration and Congress in coming to a decision? I offer the following 

framework, along with some preliminary analysis. 

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration declared that so "long as 

nuclear weapons exist, the United States must sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal-to maintain strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential 

adversaries, and reassure our allies and partners of our security commitments to them."I? 

This statement by the administration otfers a sound hasis tor considering the purposes 

served by our nuclear torces, which can be summarized as follows: 

• Precluding the use of lluclear weapolls against the United States, to include our 

territory and our military forces overseas through whatever means necessary, to 

include deterrence, dissuasion, and preventive or preemptive actioll. 

• Deterring other forms of aggression or coercion against ourselves and our 

security partners; and 

• Supporting efforts to arrest the use of nuclear weapons promptly should they be 

used by another party. 

• Discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in part by dissuading treaty 

allies and partners from acquiring nuclear weapons by providing nuclear 

guarantees----extended deterrence---that relieves them of the need to acquire their 

own nuclear forces. 

In these ways nuclear forces support the United States' overriding objective of extending 

the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Arguably with the U.S. military'S 

considerable advantage in conventional military capability, extending this tradition has 

acquired even greater value over the past two decades. 

Might these ob.iectives be enhanced or compromised through further significaut 

reductions in the U.S. uuclear arsenal? 

Would a reduction ill U.S. fluclear forces lead other nuclear powers to reduce their 

arsenals, or aspiring fluclear powers to forego acquiring fluclear weapons. or botil? 

(Not) Following the Leader 

Some of those who advocate further significant reduction in U.S. nuclear forces state that 

leading by example will stimulate other nuclear powers to follow suit and/or prospective 

17 Department ol'Defense. "Nudear Posture Review Report:' April 2010. p. i. 

5 
54 

nuclear powers to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Should this occur, they 

believe, it would also reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. 

The evidence to date does not appear to bear this out. Both the United States and Russia 

have drastically reduced their lIuclear arsenals sillce the end of the Cold War, yet the 

states of greatest concern-those that are hostile to the United States or who have 

authoritarian regimes-have not followed suit. Over the past twenty years the world has 

added three new nuclear powers: India, North Korea and Pakistan. Iraq might be a 

nuclear power today if not for U.S. military action in 1991, and an Israeli military strike 

ten years earlier. Iran is almost certainly pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and Syria 

appeared to be seeking one as well prior to a 2007 Israeli strike on a nuclear reactor it had 

under construction. 

In brief, there is no conclusive evidence that other states have reduced their nuclear 

arsenals or curbed their nuclear ambitions because of the example set by the United 

States and Russia. 

The Nuclear Umbrella and" Friend(y" Proliferation 

In fact, the opposite may be true. Reductions in the U.S. nuclear forces, either in concert 

with Russia or unilaterally, may undermine the credibility of Washington's nuclear 

guarantees to allies and key security partners. Unlike Russia, the United States extends a 

nuclear umbrella over many coulltries, particularly in Europe and East Asia. Depending 

on how large any further reductions to the U.S. nuclear forces are, those states sheltering 

under this umbrella may come to doubt its worth, even to the point where they decide to 

pursue their own nuclear capabilities. The United States currently maintains such 

commitments to a number of non-nuclear powers, including its NATO allies (in 

particular a non-nuclear Germany), Japan, and South Korea, states that could quickly 

acquire a nuclear capability if they chose to do so. Even if they do not pursue the path of 

proliferation, some may decide to loosen their security relationship with the United States 

in favor of arrangements with other states, some of whom may not be on friendly terms 

with Washington. This would hardly seem to enhance U.S. security or result in fewer 

fingers on the nuclear trigger. 

Complicating matters further, should efforts to prevent Iran from aequIrlng a nuclear 

capability faiL the Obama administration has advanced the possibility that U.S. nuclear 

guarantees might be extended to countries in the Middle East. 18 Thus the commitment of 

U.S. nuclear weapons to the defense of other states would be increasing while the United 

States' arsenal is decreasing. The implied assumption here is that the United States has a 

large surplus of nuclear weapons, and that it can readily meet its expanding nuclear 

commitments with a substantially smaller arsenal than called for under New START. 

Does such a surplus exist? The answer to this question resides in the minds of those under 

the U.S. lllIclear umbrella and those who would threaten them with nuclear attack or use 

" In July 2009. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advanced the idea of extending U.S. nuclear guarantees to 

countries in the region: "We \vant Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the United States 

extends a defense umbrella over the region. if we do even more to snpport the military capacity of those in 

the Gul( it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or sater because they won't be ahle to intimidate and 

dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon. Quoted in James 1\. RusselL 

"Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic Policy Conundrums in the 

(inl!:" Sirategic Insights. December 2009. 

6 
55 

nuclear weapons as a means of coercion. Do we have some sense of how they view the 

situation? How they calculatc cost, benefit and risk? 

u.s. Conventional Forces and the Great Equalizer 

The large advantagc the U.S. military enjoys in conventional military capabilitics 

strongly suggests that further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces are unlikely to stimulate 

similar actions by the nuclear powers Washington worries about most or to retard the 

efforts of those seeking to acquire a nuclear capability. As India's defense minister 

observed after the U.S. military's stunning dismantlement of Iraq's military in the First 

Gulf War, "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."I" His advice 

appears to have been taken to heart by states long hostile toward the United States, 

including Iran, Libya. North Korea and Syria, all of which have sought to acquire their 

own nuclear weapons. These states, who cannot hope to match the U.S. military's 

conventional capabilities, would clearly understand the logic behind Josef Stalin's 

injunction to nuclear physicist Igor Kurchatov at the end of World War II: "Build the 

bomb-it will remove a great danger from US.,,20 

Both Russia and Pakistan cite their inferiority in conventional forces relative to those of 

their prospective enemies as reasons for maintaining-and modernizing-their nuclear 

forces. Russia currently has plans for tripling its production of nuclear missiles, including 

new SLBMs and a heavy ICBM capable of carrying 10-15 warheads. Tests are being 

performed to enhance the reliability of Russia's new generation of very-low-yield tactical 

nuclear weapons. 21 President Vladimir Putin has stated Russia plans to add 400 new 

ICBMs and SLBMs to Russia's strategic forces in the coming decaden 

For its part Pakistan is constructing a series of plutonium production nuclear reactors that 

could increase its nuclear weapons production capability from 7-14 weapons per year to 

between 20 and 25 weapons.23 In addition to expanding weapons production, Pakistan 

may also want the additional plutonium to enhance the quality of its arsenal and to 

facilitate efforts to build a new generation of lighter yet more powerful warheads24 

19 Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington. "Thc Clash of Civilizations:' Foreign.·/ffairs. Summcr 1993. p. 48. 

Accessed at hli!2;i~:~_\~.Jili..'i&I&~r~_fotfll~",,:J~g"bLiJ}}.ikQttjllU1~L.bl!ll. on March t. 2013. 

Mark Schneider. "The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the People's Rcpublie of 

China." prepared statement U.s. House of Representatives. Armed Services Committee. Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces. October 14. 201 t. pp. 2-3. 

Vladimir Putin, "Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia:' Ross(t\,,/caya Ga::eta. Fchruary 

28,2012. English translation available at http://www.voltairenel.onr!m1iclcI72934.html.aecessedon 

December 12. 2012: and "Strategic Rocket Forces:' as of April 12, ZOll. available at 

Jl.tIL:_:.>:m'2lfilllilL<;';,','!Ul"Llll':;';;l.l<;,ic.acccsscd on December 12,2012. The original Russian is availahle at 

David Albright and Paul Brannan. "Pakistan Doubling Rate of Making Nuclear Weapons: Time for 

Pakistan to Reverse Course:' [nstitutelor Science ami International Security, May 16. 20 II. Pakistan had 

one heavy water reactor at its Kl1ushab nuclear site at the time of its nuclear tests in 1998. Between 2000 and 

2002 it began construction of a secoud heavy water reactor at Khushab. followed by the initiation of 

construction of yet another reactor in 2006. Construction is apparently now undenvay on a f(Hn1h reactor. 

also at Khushab. 

24 David Albright and Paul Brannml. "Pakistan Doubling Rate of Making Nuclear Weapons: Time Illf 

Pakistan to Reverse Course." fnstitllteji:JrScience and International S'ecuri(F. May 16.201 L 

7 
56 

For these countries nuclear weapons are the "great equalizer" that offset their interiority 

in conventional military power relative to current or prospective rivals. To the extent this 

perspective prevails, the size of other nuclear arsenals,25 to include the U.S. nuclear 

arsenal, is at best a secondary consideration. for Pakistan and Russia, reducing their 

nuclear forces would be tantamount to compromising their security. 

Unintended Consequences: Lowering the Emrv Barrier 

At some point, undertaking substantial additional nuclear force reductions beyond those 

called for in New START may tempt existing and prospective nuclear powers to create 

arsenals on a par with the United States and Russia. It is not possible to state precisely at 

what point such reductions will stimulate this behavior. Different competitors will almost 

certainly have different thresholds. It would make sense to try and identify what these 

thresholds are lest efforts to reduce the global stock of nuclear weapons actually produce 

the opposite effect. 

Summary 

In briet: based on the evidence of U.S. and Russian nuclear force reductions over the past 

twenty-odd years, there appears to be little correlation between these reductions and 

similar reductions by other states, or for non-nuclear powers to forego acquiring a nuclear 

capability. In some cases reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal may actually stimulate 

nuclear armaments. 

Would a reductioll ill U.S. Iluclear forces serve to discourage the use of !luclear 

weapons? 

When asked about the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, Hubert Vedrine, France's 

Foreign Minister from 1997-2002, declared: 

Jacques Chirac said things that lIlany experts arc saying around the world, even 

in the United States. That is to say, that a eounlry Ihal possesses the bomb does 

1101 use it and aulomatically enters Ihe system of" deterrence and doesn't take 

absurd risks. 26 [Emphasis addedJ 

Vedrine's view is a reassuring one. It implies that nuclear weapons are good for 

deterrence, and deterrence only, and that this logic is universal: once a state acquires 

nuclear weapons it enters a "deterrence system" which appears to be quite stable, as none 

of its members take "absurd risks:' His view seems to suggest that the nlllnber of nuclear 

weapons a state possesses is not particularly important, either in terms of enabling 

deterrence or promoting rational behavior (i.e., avoiding "absurd risks"). 

If Vedrine's view is correct, then it may be possible to effect suhstantia! reductions in 

U.S. nuclear forces beyond those called for in New START. Regrettably, this perspective 

does not pass close inspection, for the following reasons. 

Russia·s concerns appcarto bc concentrated on N;\],O (the US specifically) and China. while Pakistan 

must account for India's advantage in conventional forces. 

26 Elaine Sciolino. "Chirae's Iran GalTe Reveals a Strategv: Containment:' /\'ew York Times. Fehruarv 3 2007. p. A8. •. ~ .. 
57 

Nuclear weapons have lItiliry heyond deterrence o/nuclear lise 

Several states that view nuclear weapons as a means of offsetting their conventional 

inferiority have adopted military doctrines calling for the use of nuclear weapons under 

circumstances other than in response to a nuclear attack on their homeland. Two of 

particular note are Pakistan and Russia. 

Russia's military doctrine calls upon nuclear weapons to support two objectives. One 

involves employing nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack on the homeland through 

the threat of a devastating retaliatory strike upon the aggressor. The second centers on the 

limited emplovment of nuclear weapons, both to demonstrate resolve and to terminate a 

conventional \~ar in which the balance has shifted against Russia. ~8 

Russia is backing up its words with action. Since 1999, the Russians have "employed" 

very-low-yield nuclear weapons in large-scale military exercises. 29 In their Zapad-I 999 

(West-1999) exercise the Russian military. in responding to a NATO attack on the 

Kaliningrad oblast, conducted limited nuclear strikes with four air-launched cruise 

missiles30 More recently, in Vostok-2010 (East-2010) in eastern Russia-the largest 

military exercise in post-Soviet history-two live launches of nuclear-capable Tochka-U 

(SS-21) missiles were executed against the command post of a "hypothetical opponent."}! 

The Russians apparently believe that their large strategic nuclear forces will deter the 

opponent from responding in kind. and seek to employ "tactical" nuclear weapons if 

necessary to terminate a conflict on conditions acceptable to Moscow. 

With respect to Pakistan.}~ the principal roles of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal have been to 

deter the use of nuclear weapons against its territory, deter a military invasion by India's 

superior conventional forces, and ensure that any conventional conflict that does occur 

does not result in a ruinous defeat. B To enhance deterrence Islamabad has resisted any 

I am indebted to my colleague. BaIT)' D. \Vatts. for these ohservations regarding Russia's nuclear doctrine 

and associated fkdd exercises. 

28 Dima Adamsky. "Russian Regional Nuclear Dcvdopments." Long Term Group (LTSG), 

September 2010. p. 20 (italics in the original). Sec also Mark Schneider. "The Forces and Doctrine 

of the Russian Federatinn:' National Institule Press. publication No. 0003. 2006: and Stephen.l. Blank. cd .. 

Russian Nuclear H'(?apnns,· Pasf, Present, and Future (Carlisle, P!\: Strategic Studies Institute. November 

2011). 

29 Miriam John and 

Boardrrhreat Reduction Committee, June 

Effects National Emerprisc." Defense Science 

8-9. 

Nikolai N. Sokov"The Role of Nuclear in Russia's Sccurity Policy." in Cristinia 

f~'nR(lging China on /'/ucleor f);sarmamenl (Monterey. CA; 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies. April 2009). p. 7g~ and (Junnar Arhman and Charles Thornton, "Russia's 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I: Background and Policy Issues:' FOI-R~I057~SE. November 2003. pp. 

29-30. 

II Roger McDermott. "Refleetions on Vostok 2010: Selling an Image:' Eurasia Daily :\lonitor. 7. Issue 134. 

July 13.2010. available at 

This disclission of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is drawn I)'om the research oftv .. '·o of my (,SBA colleagues. 

Ambassador Eric Edelman and Dr. Evan Braden iv1ontgomcry . 

.l3 Peter Lavoy, "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation," in ffenry D. Sokolski. cd .. 

Pakistan's Nllclear Flilure: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute. 2008). p. 134: and 

9 
58 

declaration of its nuclear "redlines." Moreover, it has also refused to join India in a "nofirst-use" pledge. 

The best elaboration of Pakistani nuclear policy and doctrine may have come trom 

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai, head of the Pakistani military's Strategic Plans 

Division-the organization responsible for overseeing, coordinating, and protecting the 

nation's nuclear arsenal. LTG Kidwai declared that Pakistan would resort to nuclear 

weapons use under four conditions: (I) if India conquered a large portion of Pakistan's 

territory; (2) if India destroyed a large portion of Pakistan's air or ground forces; (3) if 

India attempted to econom ically strangle Pakistan, for instance by implementing a 

maritime blockade of its key ports at Gwadar and Karachi; and (4) if India destabilized 

Pakistan politically or was responsible for instigating a large-scale domestic uprising.'4 

The general might have included a fifth circumstance: Indian attacks on Pakistan's 

nuclear forces. 

Pakistan has also left considerable ambiguity with regard to how it would employ its 

nuclear weapons.'5 It appears, however, that Pakistan is lowering the barriers to nuclear 

usc. The prospect that its conventional forces might be overrun quickly is placing 

considerable pressure on Islamabad to use its nuclear weapons shOlily after a conflict 

breaks out. As Scott Sagan explains 

The strategic logic of Pakistan's weaker conventional balance and subsequent 

tirst-llse doctrine would lead one to predict that limited nuclear war options exist 

both to provide a more credible deterrent threat against Indian conventional 

operations and to provide less than massive, and some would say suicidal, 

options to the Pakistani leadership in the event of a major conventional war 

Pakistan is losing. 

In summary, at least two major nuclear powers have military doctrines that call for the 

use of nucleai' weapons against conventional aggression. Given the objectives outlined 

above for the U.S. nuclear deterrent, one would want to know how it might playa role in 

deterring such use, or in arresting it should it occur. Until problems like this have been 

thoroughly vetted it is difficult to say whether substantial further reductions in the U.S. 

arsenal represent a wise course of action. 

Peter Lavoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine," in Ratiq Dossani and Henry S. Rmven. Prospects/or Peace in 

South ,Isia (Stant()rd: Stanford University Press, 2(05). p. 28-1 . 

.14 Paolo Cotta~Ramusino and Maurizio MartcllinL "Nuclear 

Pakistan." Landalt .Vetwork -Centro ""olla (January 2(02). "",,).0 W", W.c, •• " .. "u"". pakistan~'o20Janllray~/o2()1002.pdr. 

') Some analysts. for instance. maintain that Pakistan \vould strike a mixture of Indian civilian and military 

targets. Others assert that Pakistani nuclear strikes would be limited solely to counter-value targets. Peter 

Lavoy, "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation." in Henry D. Sokolski. ed .. 

Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle. PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 200R). p. 139: 

Zafar Iqbal Cheema. "'Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control;' in Planning tht? 

Unthinkable. How Sew Powers will Use 'vue/ear, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca. NY: Comell 

University Press. 20(0). p. 179: Gregory S. Jones. 'Minimum Deterrent' Nuckar Foree 

Requirements," in Pakistan's Suelear Future. pp. 90-91: and "A.II. Nayyar and Zia Mian. "The Limited 

Military Utility of Pakistan's Battle-Field Usc ot'Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large-Scale Indian 

Conventional Attack." Pak;stan Security Research Cnit. Brief No. 61. 

")6 Scott O. Sagan. "The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine." in Sagan. ed .. lnside A'ltc/ear 

South Asia (Stanf'lfd: Stanford University Press. 20(9), p. 234. 

10 
59 

Not all decision-makers ·who control nuclear weapons may be rational, or rational 

according to the ways we calculate cost, benefit and risk 

M. Vedrine argues that no rational person would consciously decide to employ nuclear 

weapons because (one assumes) of the potential horrific consequences that might ensue. 

The problem with his assertion is that there are leaders who are not rational- at least not 

in the way that leaders of nuclear-armed, Western, democratic states are rational. 

The history of the last century is replete with examples of leaders taking what many 

considered to be "absurd risks," but which might better be termed examples of the leaders 

of rival states failing to assess the intentions of one another correctly. [n the period 

leading up to World War II, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed his 

counterpart, German dictator Adolf Hitler, could be negotiated with in good faith over 

Czechoslovakia. Hitler's threat to go to war over Czechoslovakia was considered so great 

a risk that his generals plotted a coup against him in the event he gave the order to go 

forward.)) For his part, Hitler apparently believed that neither Great Britain nor France 

would go to war over his invasion of Poland in September 193938 Both assumptions 

proved wrong, with enormous consequences for the world. Latcr, dcspite being at war 

with the British Empire, in a period of less than six months in 1941 Hitler took the 

"absurd risk" of going to war against both the Soviet Union and the United States, the 

world's two emerging superpowers-decisions that ultimately led to his demise. Toward 

the end of the war Hitler went so far as to order the destruction orhis own countrv.)9 

During thc Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro took the suicidal risk of 

urging his Soviet counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, to attack the United States with nuclear 

weapons if U.S. conventional forces attacked Cuba, even though Cuba was certain to be 

obliterated in a U.S. nuclear counterstrike. Castro clearly viewed the world very 

differently in this respect than his rival in the White House, President John Kennedy or, 

thankfully, Khrushchev. According to those who knew him, Castro "had the messianic 

ambition of a man selected by history for a unique mission" one who valued national 

dignidud ("dignity, or "honor") above survival. A Cuban newspapcr editor who observed 

Castro during his early days in power felt that "Fidel gets his kicks trom war and high 

tension. ,,40 

For their patt the Americans were totally surprised by Khrushchev's gambit. Even as the 

Soviet deployment was underway a CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded 

"the establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used 

against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it." 

Indeed, Khrushchev took what Vedrine might term an "absurd risk" in the first place by 

covertly deploying nuclear weapons to Cuba, less than 100 miles from the United States. 

Fortunately for Hitler. but not for humanity. the \vestcrn pov,:crs caved in to Germany's demands at the 

Munich Conference in September 1938, 

Alan Buliock.lfitlerandStalin(New York, Alfred A, Knopf; 1992). p. 631. 

39 On March 19.1945. Hitler issued a directive ordering the destruction of all ofGermany's industrial. 

transportation and communications infrastructure. as well as all food stores. Germany was to be made one 

vast wasteland. William L. Shirer. 71w Rise and Fall of the Iliird Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster. 

1959), pp. 1104-05, Fortunately. Hitler', order required the cooperation of many more people than would 

havc been needed if he had had nuclear weapons at his disposal, Fortunately key German leaders did not 

carry out the order. and the German nation was spared even greater misery. 

'0 Michael Dobhs, One Minute to Midnight (New York: Alfred A. Knope 2008). pp. 76.103. 

11 
60 

Expecting the Soviet leader who, according to a close colleague, had "enough emotion 

for ten people-at least" to respect U.S. warnings against deploying Soviet offensive 

weapons in Cuba, Kennedy concluded his rival acted outside the bounds of acceptable 

diplomatic behavior, like "an immoral gangster ... not a statesman. not as a person with 

a sense of responsibility." Kennedy also began questioning his own credibility-whether 

Khrushchev really understood him either, and concluded the Soviet leader thought, "I'm 

inexperienced. Probably thinks I'm stupid. Maybe most important, he thinks that I had no 

gutS.,,41 

For his part, Khrushchev's views of the situation varied widely, at times from moment to 

moment. When Kennedy ordered U.S. forces to DEFON_2.42 a Soviet deputy foreign 

minister told colleagues that Khrushchev "s--t in his pants." Yet at another point 

Khrushchev believed 

the Americans have chickened out. It seems that Kennedy went to sleep with a 

wooden knife .... They say that when someone goes bear hunting for the first 

time, he takes a wooden knife with him, so it is easier to clean his pants:] 

Khrushchev's calculation of costs, benefits and risks appears to have been changing. 

perhaps dramatically, from one moment to the next along with his moods. 

There are, alas, many examples of leaders taking "absurd risks:' or not acting in a way 

American leaders would expect them to-perhaps because they believe Americans would 

not act that way. There is still bewilderment over Saddam Hussein's decision to take on a 

U.S.-led military coalition not once, but twice44 At the same time. Saddam Hussein's 

perception of the United States and its leaders was deeply flawed. According to Major 

General Wafiq al Sammarai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, 

Saddam [before the 1991 Gulf War] thought any reprisals would be limited and 

would tail off with time. He thought that America's involvement in Vietnam had 

badly damaged its willingness to llse military power. Vietnam had been an 

outright defeat. militarily and politically."' 

41 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 2008), pp. 7-8, 33. 123. Andrei 

Gromyko. the Soviet foreign minister, is the close colleague who remarked on Khrushchev's personality. 

Kennedy's initial response to the situation shows how temporal f~lctors can greatly inf1uence dccision~ 

making. Although the president eventually negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet missiles, his initial inclination 

\vas "We're going to take out those missiles:' 

42 A defense readiness condition (DEFCON) is an aleli posture used hy the United States armed forces. 

ranging from peacetime readiness (DEFCON·5) to general war (DEFCON-I). The tirst and only time U,S. 

i()fces were raised to DEFCON-2 was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. U.S. forces have been called to 

DEFCON·3 on only two occasions, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and during the September 2011 

terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Joint Chiefs of Start: Joint Publication 1-02. Department 

Defense Dictionary o(Military and Associated Terms (Washington. DC: US Joint Chiel\ ofStatl 

8.20 I 0). as amended through December 31, 2010. p. 100, 

43 Khntshehev's point was that lirst-time bear hunters were more afraid of the bear than the bear was of them. 

Thus upon seeing a bear. they would soil their pants, which could be morc easily "cleaned" with a dull 

wooden. as opposed to a sharp mctaL knite. Dobbs, One /\4inute to .Hidnight. p. 112. 

44 See Keith 13. Payne, Tlte Fallacies o(Co/d War Deterrence (l.exington. KY: The University Press of 

Kentucky, 200 I ). 

4' Quoted in "Frontline: The Gulf War," Frontline Show #1407T. PBS. Air Date: January 28.1997. 

1n.1,(211). \'\'n'Y.J1b.~Q.Cg(\V ~hh:J2.~.Lg£"'iLCtillltJ.l.!h.~':gulE~IlnUlllun 1 

12 
61 

In summary, history suggests that, given the stakes involved when it comes to nuclear 

weapons American political leaders should not assume that leaders of other nucleararmed states will avoid taking what are perceived as "absurd risks." That is to say, we 

should not assume that they will view the world in the same way that we do, or that they 

will ealculate costs, benefits and risks in the same way that we do, or that they will act 

"rationally." These cautions were well understood during the Cold War: consequently, a 

great deal of talent and resources was devoted to understand how nuclear-armed states 

and their leaders calculated cost, benefit and risk with respect to the military balance in 

general and nuclear weapons in paliicular. 

Structural instahility 

There may be instances where two nuclear rivals very much desire to avoid the use of 

nuclear weapons, where both do not want to take such "absurd risks." We might assume 

that, under such circumstanees, the use of nuclear weapons would not occur. Yet history 

suggests that the risks of nuclear use, even under these circumstances, cannot only be 

present, but uncomfortably high. 

Consider the case of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We 

now know that both countries came frighteningly close to the precipice on several 

occasions, despite the desire of leaders on both sides to avoid nuclear use. The most 

famous case, of course, is the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The other case 

occurred in the early 1980s. 

At that time changes in U.S. nuelear strike options were made to target Soviet leaders 

themselves. Washington's objective was to enhance deterrence by convincing the 

Kremlin that its regime could not survive a Iluclear exchange with the United States. The 

United States was also planning to deploy Pershing II nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to 

Europe in response to the Soviet Union's decision to field comparable SS-20 missiles. 

Collectively the change in U.S. nuclear targeting, the Pershing lis' short fiight times and 

the Soviet Union's problematic early warning system led the Kremlin leaders to believe 

they might be subjected to a surprise U.S. nuclear "decapitation" attack. Soviet leaders 

feared that a surprise U.S. tlrst strike would destroy the radio and cable systems used to 

transmit orders to their nuclear forces, either directly or indirectly through the use of 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. 

Consequently they considered an option, known as the Dead Hand, that would enable a 

nuclear retaliatory strike in the event that all senior political decision makers and the 

military command structure were incapacitated. Dead Hand envisioned computers 

receiving nuclear attack warning data, riding out any attack and then, if they failed to 

receive any instructions, ordering an automated nuclear retaliatory strike:16 The concept 

shared much with the "'Doomsday Machine" depicted in the motion picture "Dr. 

Strangelove.,,47 Fortunately "only" a modified version of the system was fielded in which 

46 David E. Hotlinan. The Dead /land. (New York: Anchor. 20 I 0). p. 152. 

471lerman Kahn reportedly outlined the idea ora "Doomsday Machine" in the 1950s. The machine would 

have a computer linked to an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the event of a nuclear attack. sensors would pass 

the information to the computer. which would be programmed to order all the doomsday weapons to 

detonate. irradiating the planet in a lethal radioactive nuckar fallout shroud that would extinguish all human 

life. The doomsday machine could be seen as the ultimate deterrent to an attack, since the computer would 

automatically issue the order to detonate without human intervention. efTectively discouraging elT0I1s hy an 

13 
62 

the decision to launch would be made by a small cadre of officers in a deep underground 

command center. 

That system, known as Perimeter, was tested in November 1984 and became operational 

a few months later. Soviet policy called for ballistic missiles placed in super-hardened 

silos to be launched quickly upon alert of an attack by staff officers in a deeply buried 

military command center. These missiles wonld give the order to all remaining Soviet 

missiles to launch their attack on the United States. Oddly enough, the Soviets never 

informed the Americans about Perimeter, even though its purpose was primarily to deter 

a U.S. nuclear attack.~j8 

A similar situation could occur if/ran acquires a nuclear capability. 

Considering its inability to absorb even a limited nuclear attack of a half dozen or so 

warheads and the limitations of ballistic missile defenses, Israel can be expected to 

attempt to maintain the option of executing a decisive, nuclear pre-emptive attack against 

Iran's nuclear arsenal if it believes an attack is imminent. Israeli leaders recognize that a 

first strike against Iran would likely be met with universal condemnation from the 

international community. However, Israel has weathered such criticism before. 

Moreover, given the stakes involved in failing to preempt-the survival of the state of 

Israel-the costs of failing to order a first strike would likely be viewed as far exceeding 

the benefits of exercising restraint. Accordingly, Israeli decision makers will have strong 

incentives to pursue a counterforce capability in addition to a countervalue ("assured 

destruction") capability. Yet Iran's mobile missile launchers would very likely present 

significant challenges to Israeli efforts at cOllnterforce targeting. As Iran's missile forces 

continue to grow, and its nuclear arsenal increases, Israel's problem will only become 

more difficult.49 

Another worrisome consequence of this competitive dynamic is the short warning times 

each will have in the event of a ballistic missile attack, similar to the problem faced by 

Soviet leaders when confronted with U.S. deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe. 

This will almost certainly pressure both sides to adopt a heightened alert status-Israel to 

preserve the option of launching a decisive first strike, and Iran to avoid becoming the 

victim of sueh an attack. Yet the cost of fielding early warning and command and control 

systems that would be required will be very costly, perhaps prohibitively so. To the 

extent that either side seeks to resolve the problem by placing its forces on hair-trigger 

alert or extending nuclear release authority to lower commands, such a posture would not 

only be costly but also potentially destabilizing, as the risk of accidental launch or 

miscalculation would inevitably increase, especially during crises. 

Over time geographic proximity, growing nuclear arsenals and related advances in 

technolog/o that enable disarming first strikes against a rival"s nuclear forces could 

enemy to launch a sneak attack to destroy the opposing country's nuclear forces helr)re they could retaliate. 

48 David E. Hoffman. The Dead Hand. (New York: Anchor. 2(10). pp. 124. 149. 153-54. Ironically. the 

Soviets in --Dr. Strange love" also failed to infonn the Americans of their --Doomsday Machine." 

.J.Z) C ordesman and Seitz~ Iranian 

(Washington. DC: Center for 

o.lAfass Destruction: Doctrine, Policy and Command 

and International Studies. January 12. 20(9). p. 314. 

'0 As occurred during the Cold \Var. certain advances in military technology-fbr example. the 

miniaturization of nuclear warheads that enahled them to be deployed on ballistic missiles. major 

improvements in missile guidance, etc.~enablcd the side possessing them to seriously contemplate 

14 
63 

create a highly unstable nuclear balance between Israel and Iran. Under such 

circumstances-the very way in which the nuclear competition is structured-even 

leaders who desire to avoid "absurd risks" could find themselves compelled to take them. 

An "N-Player" Competition 

Depending on the size of additional reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the United 

States will find itself in a multipolar nuclear world. This will occur either because its 

arsenal has been reduced to a size comparable to countries like China, Pakistan and 

others, or because U.S. levels are sufficiently low as to encourage minor nuclear powers 

to expand their arsenals to achieve "great nuclear power" status. While a great deal of 

thought was given during the Cold War by some of the world's best strategic thinkers as 

to the character of a competition between two nuclear-armed states, comparatively little 

thought has been given to the characteristics of an "n-player" nuclear competition. 

Some who advocate major further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal asseli that other 

countries could be drawn into negotiations that would find all nuclear powers paring 

down their arsenals until these weapons are eliminated ti'om the earth. This raises the 

question as to whether a world comprising a half dozen or so nuclear powers. all 

possessing an equal number of nuclear weapons, is likely to reduce the chances of 

nuclear weapons use and serve U.S. security interests more broadly. 

In a multipolar nuclear world. many of the conditions that contributed to "stability" 

during the bipolar U.S.-Soviet Cold War nuclear competition would no longer obtain. For 

example, in contrast with the nuclear competition during the Cold War, "parity"-having 

a comparable nuclear capability with that of your existing or prospective rival(s)--is not 

an option for each state engaged in an n-player competition. It is also difficult to see how 

all players would have the resources to establish an "assured destruction" capability. 

another Cold War desideratum. Consider a thought experiment. Five nuclear-armed 

regional powers each possess 200 nuclear weapons as they travel along the road to 

nuclear weapons elimination. If these five powers arc all allies or partners, the situation is 

likely to be stable. Such a condition would also be exceedingly rare, in that history offers 

very few examples of five comparable powers all existing in harmony. 

Let us assume, therefore, that the historical norm prevails, and that there is some level of 

competition among these states, such that there are some formal and informal alignments. 

as there were in late 19th and early 20th century Europe. Then France and Russia were 

aligned with one another, as were Germany and Austria-Hungary. Britain leaned toward 

the former powers while the Ottoman Empire tilted toward the latter. Italy was aligned on 

paper with Germany and Austria-Hungary. but ended up siding with France and Russia. 

disarming its rival's nuclear forces in a nrst-strikc counterforce attack. These military technologies have long 

since been mastered hy a number of states and could destabilize the halance het\vcen emerging nuclear 

powers, such as India and Pakistan. 

51 See. for example, Gcn. (Ret.) Jamcs Cartwright. Amb. Richard Burt, Sen. Chuck Hagel. Amb. Thomas 

Pickering. Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan. and Dr. Bruce l3Iair (Study Director). "Modernizing U.S. Nudear 

Strategy. Force Stmcture and Posture." Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission. 20 I 2, PI'. 3-4. Thomas 

Schelling has addressed the issue oCwhethcr the "abolition" of nuclear weapons throughout the globe would 

actually reduce the odds of their use. and I cannot upon his work in my testimony. Thomas C. 

Schelling, "J\ World Without Nuclear Weapons':" Fall 2009. 

15 
64 

[n brief, the system was neither highly dynamic nor rigidly static-the predominant 

characteristic of the international system in the modern (post-Treaty of Westphalia) era. 

For our purposes, let's say the five powers are the United States, Russia, China, India and 

Pakistan. Again, each has 200 weapons. The only strongly democratic states in the group 

are the United States and India. Pakistan is a "wild card." While it has recently had strong 

ties to the United States, one could easily imagine it drifting closer to China (a key 

sponsor of its nuclear program). It is plausible that the United States would have to rely 

on its nuclear force of 200 weapons to account for between 400 and 600 weapons of 

China, Russia and Pakistan, to include extending a nuclear umbrella of extended 

deterrence to other countries such as Japan and Germany, concerned over the sma lIer 

nuclear forces of North Korea and Iran, respectively. Would the United States and the 

countries to which it has extended nuclear security guarantees be more secure under such 

an arrangement than they are today?52 

Summary 

The theme of my testimony is that while there appears to be general agreement on basic 

U.S. security objectives when it comes to nuclear weapons, there is considerable 

divergence of opinion with regard to how best to achieve these ohjectives. As to the issue 

of undertaking substantial further reductions, it appears there are a number of impoltant 

issues that have yet to be addressed before we can confidently conclude that the benefits 

of such a course of action outweigh the risks. I have tried to identify some of them in my 

testimony. 

As we move into what some have described as a Second Nuclear Age53 it would be wise 

to follow the examples set by administrations early in the "First Nuclear Age"--the 

Truman and Eisenhower administrations, in particular. These administrations engaged 

some of our nation's finest strategic thinkers to ensure that they had thought through, as 

best they could, the enormous consequences of making the right decisions regarding our 

nuclear force posture. 

Some have argued that the United States can rely upon its prccision~guided weaponry. which they assert 

can "hold at risk nearly the entire spectrum of potentia! targets" no\\/ reserved for nuclear weapons, See. for 

example. Gen. (Ret.) James CUl1wright. Amb. Richard Burt Sen. Chuck Hagel. Amb. Thomas Pickering, 

Gen. (Ret.) .lack Sheehan. and Dr. Bruce Blair (Study Director). "Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy. Force 

Strncture and Posture," Global Zero U.S Nuclear Polin' CommLl'sion, 2012. p. 2.This seems dubious. 

Consider, i(lr example. hardened land-based missile shelters. or deep underground facilities. Rivals 

confronted with the prospeet of having to address only the threat n'om conventional munitions, no matter how 

accurate. will look to offsets their value by pursuing counters such as these. There is also the matter of yield. 

While in theory enormous numbers ofpreeision-guided munitions would be able to produce an equivalent 

level of prompt destruction on a city. in practice the cost of doing so would be enormous. both in terms of the 

weapons and the delivery systems. 

53 See, lor example. Fred Charles Iklc, "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age." Foreign AfJairs, 

January/February 1996: and Palll Bracken. "The Second Nuclear Age." January/February 

2000: and Paul Bracken. 71,C Second Nuclear Age: Slmlegv. {langeI'. and Ihe Polilics (New 

York: Henry Holt. 2(12). 

16 
65 

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich . .Ir. is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments. He assumed this position in 1993, following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army. 

Dr. Krepinevich's has served in the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment and on 

the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He has also served as a member of the National 

Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on .Ioint Experimentation, the Joint Forces 

Command Advisory Board. and the Defense Policy Board. He currently serves on the Chief of 

Naval Operations' (CNO's) Advisory Board and on the Army Special Operations Command's 

Advisory Board. 

Dr. Krepinevich frequently contributes to print and broadcast media. He has lectured betore a 

wide range of professional and academic audiences. and has served as a consultant on military 

affairs for mauy senior government officials. including several secretmies of defense. the CIA's 

National Intelligence Council, and all four military services. He has testified frequently before 

Congress. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point. George Mason University, 

10hns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. and Georgetown 

University. 

Dr. Krepinevich's most recent book is 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Militmy Futurist Explores War in 

the 21st Century. His other recent works include Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the 

Pentagon Should FocliS on Assuring Access;The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran; and The Pentagon's 

Wasting /lssets. published in Foreign AfTairs; and CSBA monographs: (yber Warthr/!: A 

"Nuclear Option "'; Strategy in Allsterily; AirSea Battle: A Poinl-oj:Departure Operational 

Concept (co-author); and The Road Ahead (co-author). Dr. Krepinevich received the 1987 

Furniss Award tor his book. The Army and Vietnam. 

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an M.P.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. 

He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 
66 

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69 

BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CONTlNlJING U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS 

Dr. Bruce G. Blair 

Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittec on Stratcgic Forccs 

March 19.2013 

Congressman Rogers, Congressman Cooper and other distinguished 

members, it's an honor and a pleasure to present testimony before this committee. 

Thanl, you fOl' inviting me. 

For purposes of transparency on the matter of conflict of interest, I want to 

report that in all my professional life outside of U.S. govemment employment, I 

have never accepted any govemment or corporate funding for any of my research, 

analysis, or publications. 

My bottom-line judgment is that continuing lJ.S. nuclear reductions, even 

cuts deeper than expected in the next phase, would produce substantial benefits and 

carry no risks. 

In the May 2012 Global Zero Commission report issued by Gen. (ret.) James 

Cartwright and others including Senator Chuck Hagel, a force consisting of 900 

total U.S. nuclear weapons in ten years down the road - an 80 percent reduction 
70 

from the current U.S. stockpile -- was deemed more than adequate to meet strategic 

requirements. l 

A force of this size could support extensive counterforce as well as 

countervaluc operations. As Gen. (ret.) Cartwright puts it: "It would not be a small 

nor humble force designed for minimal deterrence, it would not entail a radical shift 

in targeting philosophy away from military targets to population centers, and it is 

not a city-husting strategy. On the contrary, it would hold at risk all the major 

categories of facilities in all countries of interest to include the diverse sets of 

nuclearlWMD forces and facilities, top military and political leadership, and warsupporting industry. It would fulfill reasonable requirements of deterrence vis-a-vis 

every country considered to pose a potential WMD threat to the United States." 

If this 900-weapon arsenal were assigned targets according to Cold War 

targeting principles, the following illustrative categories of targets and warhead 

assignments would be possible: Russia: WMD (325 warheads including 2-on-1 

strikes against every missile silo), leadership command posts (110 warheads), warsupporting industry (136 warheads). Moscow alone would be covered by eighty (80) 

warheads. China: WMD (85 warheads including 2-on-l strikes against every missile 

silo), leadership command posts (33 warhcads), war-supporting industry (136 

warheads). North Korea, Iran, and Syria: Each country would be covered by forty 

(40) warheads. 

These numbers substantially exceed the self-reported number of nuclear 

explosions on urban centers and high-level command posts that would effectively 

deter the only nations (Russia and China) possessing nuclear arsenals that 

technically pose existential threats to the United States. According to a former 

senior general in the Russian strategic forces, U.S. nuclear retaliation against only a 

handful of Russian cities would cross the threshold of unacceptable damage in the 

1 Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernbllf!; Us. Nuclear Strategy. Force Structure. 

and Posture, May 2012. http' I1lc·; nllclear l'cpc1rt.pdf 
71 

view of Russia's top political and military leadership. U.S. retaliatory capability 

would be orders of magnitudc greater than this. He also reported that a U.S. strike 

by 110 warheads on the major Russian command posts would pose a decapitation 

threat that would effectivcly undenvrite detcrrence from a military standpoint. 

Also, an arsenal of 900 U.S. weapons would vastly excecd the size of the 

nuclear arsenals fielded by America's actual contcmpora'1' adversaries (namely, 

North Korea with less than 12 weapons; Iran with zero; Syria with zero). 

In short, although an arsenal of900 total weapons would represent a 

whopping eighty (80) percent reduction from today's level, it would still possess 

enormous destructivc power, far more than necessary to impress any potential 

rational foe. For the irrational foe, such as fanatical terrorists, the level of American 

nuclear armaments would make no difference at all. Our tool of choice to deal with 

suicidal terrorists is special operations forces, not nukes. 

Why are such deep cuts possible, and what are the benefits? 

First and foremost, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the need 

for large nuclear arsenals has greatly diminished. Mntual assured destruction 

(MAD) is no longer the cornerstone of U.S.-Russian geo-strategic and political 

rclations. The requirements of deterrence arc obviously much lower between 

countries that are no longer enemies and that no longer believe either side intends to 

attack the other. 

The two sides continue to target each other in the comprehensive technical 

manner described earlier, but the dccline of mutual nuclear threat in our primary 

relationship has enabled our two countries to achieve unprecedented levels of 

cooperation and mutual benefits in a multitude of areas ranging from sanctioning 

Iran and North Korea for their nuclear transgressions, to securing 'loose nukes' in 

Russia, to enabling NATO supplies to travel overland through Russia to 

3 
72 

Afghanistan. It has also enabled the former nuelear adversaries to cut their nuelear 

stockpiles by seventy-five (75) percent since the Cold War's end. However, the 

legacy arsenals are still very large and redundant. There cxists ample room for 

further cuts. 

Second, reducing nuclear stockpiles feeds on itself in a positive way. As both 

sides reduce their nuclear arms, nuclear-related targets go away along with the nced 

to hold them at risk. Weapons previously aimed at thosc targets lose theil' mission 

and retire, and once these weapons are de-commissioned the weapons aimed at them 

by the other side lose their reason for existence. 

This positive, self-amplifying feedback loop has resulted in massive 

reductions in weapons and targets and greatly undercut the rationale for new 

weapons. In the mid-1980s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had some 65,000 nuclear 

weapons between them, and the U.S. strategic war plan consisted of 16,000 targets 

in the Soviet bloc, mostly nuclear-related targets.2 Today we and the Russians have 

about 16,000 weapons between us, some 3,000 of which are actively deployed. 

estimate that U.S. strategic forces are aimed at about 1,000 Russian (and 500 

Chinese) targets. In other words, we and the Russians have reduced our stockpiles 

by about 75 percent, and the U.S. has reduced its nuclear targets by about 90 

percent. This is no coincidenee. It represents the result of a mutually reinforcing 

dynamic interaction that has reversed the nuclear arms race, saved both sides a big 

bundle of money, and put us on the path of Global Zero, which at some point down 

the road could potentially save the United States the $30 billion annual tab we spend 

on nukes. Cuts down to 900 total weapons on both the U.S. and Russian side by the 

year 2022 could save us about $120 billion over the next 15-20 years. 

2 The dubious wisdom of this scale of nuclear profligacy, not to mention the hair-trigger posture adopted, 

the failure to provide for survivable nuclear command-control-communications, and the extensive predelegation of nuclear release authority distributed to U.S. military commanders during the Cold War, belies 

any notion that the First Nuclear Age was wisely guided by the nation's finest strategic thinkers. 

4 
73 

Third, 'smart targeting' using fewer nuclear weapons supplemented by 

'smart' eonventional forces has made further nuclear cuts possible without 

sacrificing any target coverage. As a result of revolutionary advances in 

information collection and processing, global targeting has become more smart and 

efficient. For example, a few years ago our targeteers planned to expend ten (10) 

nuclear weapons on one high-value command post, but recent intelligence 

breakthroughs have enabled them to reduce that number to two (2). A few years 

ago they had to waste nukes on barraging vast expanses in which mobile missiles 

operate, but today they ean pinpoint their locations and thus greatly shrink the 

barrage area. 

At the same time, our conventional superiority has reduced our reliance on 

nukes and given the President more flexibility in responding to threats of all kinds, 

nuclear and non-nuclear alike. As the head of STRATCOM recently said in 

testimony to Congress: our "conventional forces do, in fact, make a difference in 

terms that we are no longer in a position where we have to threaten nuclear use in 

order to overcome a conventional deficiency ... ovenvhelming, conventional power 

projection that we can bring to 

bear around the world has made a difference in the role of our nuclear 

deterrent .... we have been able to narrow the role of that nuclear deterrent, 

accordingly."] 

This 'smart targeting' with nuclear or conventional forces, together with 

dramatic increases in special operations capabilities and cyber warfare, and to a 

lesser extent missilc defenses, has allowed the United States to re-balance its 

deterrence and defensc strategy to reduce reliance on nukes and shift to tools that 

are far more useable in conflict. This re-balancing adds more feasible options to the 

President's kitbag of tools, increases onr credibility in dealing with threats that 

previously required a nuclear response, and creates more room for further 

reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. 

3 Testimony of General Kehler, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. March 13.2013. 

5 
74 

Fourth, this re-balancing has also strengthened the credibility of extending 

deterrence to America's allies such as South Korea and Japan, whose military 

contributions to our alliances have also grown. For instance, South Korea needed 

help from U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to deal with North Korean artillery threats 

into the 1980s, but such use posed a serious danger of exposing ,Japan as well as 

South Korea to deadly radioactive fallout, and thus undermined the credibility of 

the nuclear option. Today, South Korea with U.S. support has conventional 

superiority over the North and the need for U.S. nukes for war-fighting on the 

Peninsula has greatly diminished. 

The North's flcdgling nuclear threat does revive somewhat the need to 

extend the IJ.S. nuclear umbrella over our aIlies in the region. However, our joint 

conventional general purpose forces combined with special operations, missile 

defenses, and cyber warfare also go a long way toward deterring and suppressing 

this emerging threat. Our alliance's kitbag is full of new non-nuclear tools. At any 

rate, the very low numbers of North Korean nuclear weapons do not alter the fact 

that America's vastly larger arsenal confers overwhelming nuclear superiority in 

America's favor, and even deep future cuts in the U.S. stockpile will not measurably 

erode that superiority. The same story goes for Iran and Syria, neither of which 

have any nuclear forces. 

Fifth, the continuing reduction of U.S. nuclear arms presents opportunitics 

for re-configuring thc U.S. force structure, posture, and strategy in order to 

strengthcn strategic stability and eliminate obsolete forces. The Global Zero report 

issued by Gen. (ret.) Cartwright calls eliminating the land-based U.S. Minuteman 

force and eliminating launch on warning from both sides day-to-day alert posture. 

In the view of the report's authors, these smaller and off-alert arsenals would 

reduce vulnerabilities and risks of accidental, mistaken, and unauthorized launch. 

6 
75 

A key benefit of smart reduetions is that cyber warfare threats can be 

mitigated. By eliminating forces that must be maintained on launch-ready alert for 

technical reasons - for instance, Minuteman forees would break down if they did 

not continuously operate their navigation gyroscopes in peacetime and by 

eliminating reliance on 'prompt launch' to ensure the survivability of such forces, 

we can remove the danger that unauthorized actors could compromise commandcontrol-communications and early warning networks and trigger a launch that was 

not intended, or block the execution of a Icgitimate order from the President. These 

kinds of cyber warfare threats are little understood, which is all the more reason to 

take nuclear missiles off of launch-ready alert. An early example was the discovery 

in the 1990s of an electronic back door to the Naval Broadcast network that could 

have becn exploited by outside hackers to inject a launch order into the VLF (Very 

Low Frequency) radio network used to transmit launch directives from the 

Pentagon to Trident ballistic missile submarines on launch patrol. Needless to say, 

a control failure caused by cyber intrusion potentially could have catastrophic 

consequences. 

Sixth, continuing reductions, even deep cuts, are not expected to stimulate 

China or other countries to 'rush to parity' with the United States. On the contrary, 

U.S.-Russian cuts would have the opposite effect insofar as they help draw China 

and others into a multilateral process that works to cap, freeze, proportionally 

reduce or otherwise constrain their nuclear arsenals. 

In the case of China, Senator Lee in a recent hearing recently asked the head 

of STRATCOM "whether you believe that China will continue to increase its -- the 

number of weapons in its arsenal, and whether it's going to try to seek a level of 

equivalency with the United States and Russia in terms of nuclear weapons? 

General Kehler's answered that "1 do not see, nor has the intelligence community 

reported to me that they are seeking to have some kind of numeric parity with the 

United States or with Russia.,,4 

'Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. March 13.2013. 

7 
76 

The Global Zero report issued by Gen. (ret.) Cartwright judges that China's 

current small arsenal of approximately 150 total nuclear weapons reflects China's 

traditional policy of 'minimal dcterrence'. This policy harks back to Mao Zedong's 

guidance a half century ago to deploy only a small nuclear arsenal. The Chinese 

military has adhered strictly to this time-honored doctrine. Based on extensive 

engagement with Chinese military and foreign policy officials and experts, I believe 

General Kehler's statement is firmly grounded. The Global Zero report authors 

projected modest growth in the Chinese arsenal- to perhaps 200-250 total weapons 

over the next ten years, and no more than 250-300 in the worst case. A mueh larger 

effort to 'rush to parity' with the United States appears to be very unlikely. In any 

event, such an effort would take many years, would bc detectable, and would allow 

the U.S. to tailor or curtail further U.S. reductions as needed. 

More importantly, the Global Zero report emphasizes the importance of 

China's future participation in nuclear arms control. The historical bilateral 

framework served its purpose but multilateralnnclear negotiations must be 

initiated soon to address effectively the multitude of nuclear risks and threats that 

lie outside the U.S.-Russian relationship. Most of these risks reside in South Asia, 

the Middle East, and Northeast Asia rather than on the arc between Russia and the 

United States. 

It would be extremely benetlcial if continuing reductions in the U.S. and 

Russian nucleal· arsenals help bring China and the other nuclear weapons countries, 

including those outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the negotiating table. 

There are reasons to believe that China and some others would in fact join such 

multilateral talks, although there are some internal interests in these countries that 

oppose entering into a nuclear disarmament process. Thus we should not assume 

but rather test their willingness to join the process. 

8 
77 

The Global Zero commissioners considered, and did not reject, the idea of 

linking deep cuts in U.S. and Russian arsenals to China's commitment to consh'ain 

its arsenal. The corollary benefit of such a commitment is of course that U.S. and 

Russia reductions could go even farther down the path of Global Zcro - as long as 

the commitment can be codified and verified. 

Seventh, continuing U.S. nuclear arms reductions, especially those taken in 

conjunction with Russia and other countries, would affirm U.S. support for the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which continues to bc an indispensable tool in the 

international community's effort to pnvent and roll back proliferation. The Article 

6 obligation to pursue good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament may have 

been "essentially hortatory" at one time, but today it is and must be taken seriously. 

Through nuclear arms reductions, thc United Statcs shows rcspect for the nuclear 

disarmament agenda endorsed by the vast majority of thc treaty's 189 signatories, 

and in return the United States can cxpect them to stiffen thcir resolve in enforcing 

the NPT. The days of U.S. and Russian lip-service to the disarmament clause of the 

treaty are over if they hope to preserve and strengthen it in the face of growing 

proliferation pressures around the world. And the more the nuclear weapons 

countries reduce their nuclear stockpiles, the more determined to crack down on 

NPT violators they and the rest of the world will become. 

Last, this hearing seeks to set priorities for the U.S. nuclear program under 

sequestration. Today, the size of thc U.S. stockpile and the scale of its reduction are 

less important than the operational posture of the nuclear forces and the cohesion of 

its system of command, control, communications and early warning. This has 

always been true. Cohesive and invulnerable nuclear command systcms that 

increase warning and decision time for presidential deliberations in a crisis are 

critical to ensuring strategic stability and to preventing the accidental, mistaken, 

and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, a full-scale thorough review 

of the cybersecurity of all nuclear networks to identify and remove cyber warfare 

threats that could compromise the integrity of these networks is essential and must 

9 
78 

not be sacrificed on the altar of sequestration. We cannot afford a lapse of vigilance 

in this arena that may result if the civilian workforce assigned to this mission at the 

National Security Agency, STRATCOM, U.S. Cybcr Command, and elsewhere 

become casualties of a crude budgetary axe. 

END 

10 
79 

DR. BRUCE BLAIR 

Bruce is the president of the World Security Institute, a 

nonprofit organization that he founded to promote 

independent research and journalism on global affairs. He 

is the Co-Founder of Global Zero, an international 

movement seeking the universal elimination of nuclear 

weapons, and is an executive producer of Countdown to 

Zero, a feature film about nuclear danger. Bruce is a 

member of the Secretary of State's International Security 

Advisory Board. 

Bruce is an expert on nuclear weapons who has frequently 

testified before Congress. He has taught security studies as 

a visiting professor at Yale and Princeton universities. In 

1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his 

work and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. Blair 

was a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at 

the Brookings Institution from 1987 to 2000. In previous 

positions, he served as a project director at the 

Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and as a 

Minuteman launch control officer. He holds a Ph.D. in 

Operations Research from Yale University. 
80 

mSCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AN\) GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the 113'h Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the cun-ent and two previous 

tlscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing hel(lre the I louse Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements. with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone numher) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: \)r. Bruce G. Blair 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

_Representati vc 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

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contracts grant 

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contracts grant 

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81 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

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contracts grant 

0 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on AImed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with thc federal government: 

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Current liscal year (2013) _______________ ~ ________________ ~ 

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List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing. software design, force structure consultant. architecture & engineering 

services. etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013):_ 

Fiscal year 2012 - _______________ ~ _____ ~ __ ~ _______________ ~ 

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2 
82 

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provide the following information: 

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Current liscal year (201 

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3 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 19, 2013 

(85) 
86 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY 

COMMISSION REPORT 

Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 

Force Structure and Posture 

GLOBAL 

ZERO 

A WORLD WITHOUT 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Copyright © 2012 by Global Zero 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system, 

or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 

otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. 

Global Zero assumes full responsibility for the analysis and recommendations contained 

in this report. 

www.globalzero.org 
87 

GtOBAt ZEHO u.s. NUCtEAH POUCY COMMISSION HEPOHT 

MODEHNIZING U.S. NUCtEAH STHATEGY, FOHCE STHUCTUHE AND POSTUHE 

GLOBAL ZERO 

U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION 

GEN. (RET.) JAMES CARTWRIGHT, CHAIR 

AMB. RICHARD BURT 

SEN. CHUCK HAGEL 

AMB. THOMAS PICKERING 

GEN. (RET.) JACK SHEEHAN 

DR. BRUCE BLAIR, STUDY DIRECTOR 

GLOBAL ZERO is the international movement for the elimination of all nuc!earweapons. It has grown 

to 300 leaders and morc than 450,000 citizens worldwide, developed a step-by-step plan to eliminate nuclear weapons, built an international student movement with 100 campus chapters in ten countries, and 

produced an acclaimed documentary film, Countdown to Zero. President Burack Obama, President Dmitry 

Medvedcv, Prime Minister David Cameron, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 

and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have endorsed Global Zero, with Obama declaring, "Global Zero will 

always have a partner in me and my administration." Leading newspapers have backed Global Zero's plan, 

the Financial Times concluding that. "Global Zero's plan has shown the direction to be travelled; the world's 

leaders must now start moving." 

CO-FOUNDEHS: DH. BHUCE BLAlH AND MR, MATT BHOWN 

PHlNCIPAL SPONSOR: IlH. JENNIFEH AUEN SIMONS AND THE SIMONS FOUNDATION 

ii 
88 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY 

COMMISSION REPORT 

Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 

Force Structure and Posture 

his report defines an illustrative U.S. 

nudear force structure, strategy and 

posture that ret1ect an alternative 

deterrence construct for the 21" century. The 

20th century world of bipolar power and U.S.-

Soviet confrontation has rather suddenly 

changed into a multipolar world with 

numerous emerging bases of geopolitical, 

economic and military power. For the United 

States, deterring and defeating aggression 

in today's world depends a great deal less 

on projecting nuclear offensive threat and a 

great deal more on the skilled exercise of all 

the instruments of power, both "soft" and 

"hard." Security, previously organized around 

bilateral confrontation, increasingly depends 

upon multilateral cooperation. 

As a part of this profound shift, the United 

States will reduce its reliance on nuclear 

weapons and consequently will seek to 

negotiate further reductions in the U.S. 

and Russian nuclear arsenals following the 

ratification of the New START Treaty of 2011. 

In our illustrative plan, the United States over 

the next ten (10) years reduces its arsenal to 

a maximum of 900 total nuclear weapons' 

and increases the warning and decision 

time over its smaller arsenal.' These steps 

could be taken with Russia in unison through 

reciprocal presidential directives, negotiated 

in another round of bilateral arms reduction 

talks, or implemented unilaterally. In parallel, 

these two powers possessing the lion's share 

of the world's nuclear weapons would also 

work together to bring all the nudearweapons 

countries to the negotiating table for the first 

in history multilateral negotiations to limit 

nuclear arms. 

These illustrative next steps are possible and 

desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual 

nuclear deterrence based on the threat of 

nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a 

cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security 

relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, 

not a physical condition, and mutual assured 

destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a 

central psychological or political space in the 

U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there 

remains a physical-technical side of MAD in 

1 By "total" we mean all categories of weapons in the 

active inventory - strategic and non-strategic ("tactical"), and deployed and reserve. 

, See also Global Zem Action Plan, Feb. 2010. 
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GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

our relations, but it is iucreasingly peripheral. 

Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear 

conflict between our countries, driven largely 

by inertia and vested interests left over from 

the Cold War, functions on the margins using 

outdated scenarios that arc implausible 

today. There is no conceivable situation in 

the contemporary world in which it would be 

in either country's natioual security interest 

to iuitiate a nuclear attack against the other 

side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 

nuclear weapons each in their active deployed 

and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is 

needed to satisfY reasonable requirements of 

deterrence between the two countries as well 

as vis-a.-vis third countries whose nuclear 

arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively. 

Second, the actual existing threats to our two 

countries (and the globe) cannot be resolved 

by using our nnclear arsenals. No sensible 

argument has been put forward for using 

nuclear weapons to solve any of the major 

21" century problems we face ~ threats posed 

by rogue states, failed states, proliferation, 

regional conflicts, terrorisln, cybcr warfare, 

organized crime, drug trafficking, conf1ictdriven mass migration of refugees, epidemics 

or climate change. A large standing Cold 

War-like nuclear arsenal cannot productively 

address any of these dangers - for instance, 

it is unable to reliably deter or defeat 

terrorists with no return address, and its 

impact on proliferation may be largely 

counterprodnctive. In fact, nuclear weapons 

have on balance arguably become more a 

part of the problem than any solution. For 

instance, our large nuclear stoclrpiles and 

infrastructures run risks of theft by non-state 

2 

actors. Minimizing these risks costs billions 

of dollars each year and still they remain of 

deep concern; heads of state meet annually 

to muster stronger efforts to seCllre nuclear 

materials. 

While Ollr nuclear arsenals may be perceived 

by somc as playing a role in deterring a 

nuclear-armed state like North Korea from 

attacking us or our allies, outsizcd arsenals 

are unnecessary for this purpose. We surely 

do not need thousands of modern nuclear 

weapons to play this role vis-a.-vis a country 

with a handful of primitive nuclear devices. 

Tn fact, strong conventional forces and 

missile defenses may offer a far superior 

option for deterring and defeating a regional 

aggressor. Non-nuclear forces are also far 

more credible instruments for providing 21" 

ceutury reassurance to allies whose comfort 

zone in the 20'h century resided under the 

U.S. nnclear umbrella. Precision-guided 

conventional munitions hold at risk nearly 

the cntire spectrum of potential targets, and 

they are useable. \ 

The dramatic shift in the threat environment 

from the 20,h to the 21" century is underscored 

by last year's survey of several hundred 

experts by the Council on Foreign Relations." 

Russia is not even mentioned among the 

top twenty (20) contingencies that in their 

I For a rigorous analytical assessment of the capabilities of modern conventional weapons to perform 

missions once assigned to nuclear forces, see ConlIentional Forces for Et:tended Deterrence, Global Zero 

Technical Report, forthcoming. 

·1 Preventative Priorities Sun!cy: 2012, Council on Foreign Relations, Dec. 8,2011. 
90 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

view directly threaten the U.S. homeland 

or countries of strategic importance to the 

United States. Far more worrisome to them 

are such specters as a massive cybcr attack 

on U.S. electric power grids, severe internal 

instability in Pakistan shaking loose nuclear 

weapons that fall into terrorist bauds, drugtrafficking violence in Mexico spilling over the 

border, political instability in Saudi Arabia 

threatening global oil supplies and a collapse 

of the euro that plunges the U.S. economy 

into deep recession. 

Another compelling way to illustrate this 

tectonic shift is to describe the threat context 

of the last three times that the United States 

put its nuclear forces on high alert during a 

crisis that threatened U.S. national security. 

These alerts involved taking serious steps 

to increase U.S. readiness to undertake 

nuclear operations steps like strategic 

missile crews retrieving launch keys and 

launch authentication codes from safes in 

their underground firing posts and strapping 

into their chairs to brace themselves against 

anticipated nuclear blasts from incoming 

warheads. The first time this happened was the 

Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The second time 

was the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Both cases 

featured 20·h century nuclear brinks mans hip 

between the United States and the Soviet Union 

- Cold War-style nuclear escalation, coercion 

and risk manipnlation. But the third and last 

case was totally different. It happened on 

September n, 2001.A powerful nuclear arsenal 

proved utterly powerless. It failed to deter the 

9-n terrorism and proved completely useless 

in responding to the multi-pronged attack. 

In fact, the Minnteman missile launch crews 

feared they themselves might he terrorist 

targets. The eventual U.S. response of course 

took an entirely conventional course - routing 

the Talihan and occupying Afghanistan. 

9-11 cxposed the lack of efficacy indeed, 

the irrelevance of nuclear forces in dealing 

with 21" century threats. The last episode of 

nuclear brinksmanship between Americans 

and Rnssians too k place nearly forty (40) years 

ago. Since then their nuclear weapons have 

increasingly become liabilities, not assets. 

Third, the recommendation to makc nuclear 

arms reductions a multilateral enterprise 

would remedy a basic deficiency in the 

framework of ongoing nuclear arms talks: the 

exclusion of everyone except for Americans 

and Russians. Many of the most serious 

nuclear risks in the world today thus lie 

outside the scope of redress through the 

extant forum for negotiated regulation. By 

limiting participation to the United States 

and Russia in a bilateral forum, a long and 

growing list of cmerging nuclear dangers 

- such as Pakistan's unconstrained effort 

to produce fissile materials and expand its 

nuclear arsenal at a breakneck pace that may 

well propel it into third place in the pecking 

order of arsenal size gets short shrift. A 21" 

century fraught with new nuclear threats 

like this one calls for comprehensive nuclear 

dialogue and negotiations involving all of 

the world's nuclear-armed states as well as 

key non-nuclear nations. The goal should 

be to cap, freeze, proportionately reduce or 

otherwise rein in nuclear weapons programs 
91 

GLOBAL ZEBO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

across the board, not just the U.S. and Russian 

programs. 

It will be challenging to get everyone to the 

table at the very beginning. The effort will 

probably only succeed by starting with a 

dialogue with China and others on matters of 

transparency and verification in particular. 

Sharing information on numbers, types and 

locations of nuclear stocks is a critical first 

step in laying the groundwork for formal 

arms control talks.' A concerted effort by 

the United States and Russia could gradually 

transform such a dialogue into formal 

negotiations involving the non-NPT nucleararmed countries (India, Pakistan, Israel) as 

well as China and the rest of the P-s states 

(United States, United Kingdom, France, 

Russia), U.S. and Russian leadership in this 

arena would be bolstered by further deep cuts 

in their arsenals down to a maximum ofl,ooo 

total weapons. Stockpiles of 500-1,000 total 

weapons on each side are roughly the level at 

which China could be drawn into the process. 

As more countries join, it will become harder 

for the rest to remain on the sidelines. It is 

essential to begin this effort right away in 

order to make nnclear arms control universal 

and relevant to 21" centUlY nuclear dangers. 

~ The monitoring and verification challenges of the 

proposals in this report include further strengthening of on-site inspections and developing new technical methods for lllOuitoring individual warheads 

without revealing sensitive information about their 

design. We judge the current and expected increases 

in monit.oring capabilities to be sufficient to ensure 

the parties' ability to verify compliance with the multilateral reductions and de-alerting proposals herein. 

4 

The fourth reason for undertaking these 

illustrative next steps of bilateral and 

multilateral arms control is that the world 

is spending vast sums on producing and 

maintaining nuclear arms and on mitigating 

their environmental and health consequences. 

In Global Zero's estimation, this sum will 

exceed $1 trillion over the next decade.' At a 

time of global economic stagnation and acute 

bndgetary pressure on governments, the 

world can ill afford to lavish scarce resources 

on nuclear forces. The United States and 

Russia annually spend about $60 billion and 

$15 billion, respectively on them, inclusive 

of costs (actual or deferred) for health and 

environmental remediation of radioactive 

contaminated sites (or $30 and $10 billion, 

respectively, for their core operations). 

Fnrthermore, both are embarking on 

expensive modernization programs to 

replace their aging forces and infrastructure. 

Stimulated largely by each other's strategic 

programs, the cost to Russia is estimated 

to run upwards of $70 billion over the next 

decade and to the United States npwards 

of $200 billion over the next twenty years. 

These huge investments are being driven by 

outmoded logic the Cold War logic of tbe 

20" century. They are dubious investments in 

excessive numbers of unusable weapons at the 

expense of needed and useable conventional 

weapons. For example, the replacement of the 

6 Bruce G. Blair and Matthew A. Brown, Nuclear Weapons Cost Study, Global Zero Technical Report, June 

2011. 
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GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE AND POSTURE 

current U.S. Trident submarine fleet would 

consume three-fourths of the U.S. Navy's 

ship-huilding budget for many years. Similar 

extreme trade-offs confront many other 

countries, such as the U.K., which arc facing 

replacement decisions for their geriatric 

nuclear forces. 

The fifth and last reason for pursuing the 

illustrative steps is that the launch-ready 

nuclear postures of Russia and the United 

States present unnecessary risk. The technical 

situation today is a dangerous throwback to 

the Cold War, with warning and decision time 

in commanding and controlling hundreds of 

nuclear-armed missiles measured in minutes 

and seconds. Tbe timeliues and deadlines 

for existential decisions ou both sides can 

be exceedingly short. U.S. teams in early 

warning centers responsible for assessing 

whether missile attack indications are real or 

false, a situation that happens daily, may be 

allowed only three (3) minutes to report their 

findings. In au emergency, seuior U.S. uuclear 

commauders couvened by phone to brief the 

President on his nuclear strike options and 

their consequences may be allowed as little 

as thirty (30) secouds to give the briefing. 

The President, if led to believe the attack 

indications are real, would have at most 

twelve (12) minutes to decide whether and 

how to respond with nuclear weapons or else 

risk nuclear command-control decapitation 

and the decimation of U.S. retaliatory forces. 

Upon receipt of a launch order sent witbout 

prior warning and preparation, U.S. missile 

lauuch crews in underground command 

posts and submarines would be allowed only 

5 

two (2) and twelve (12) minutes, respectively, 

to get their missiles out of their silos and 

tubes ou their thirty (30) miuute or shorter 

flights to targets on the other side of the 

planet. The missiles in peacetime are always 

ready to fly silo-based missiles are armed, 

fueled, targeted and will launch instantly 

upon receipt of a short stream of computer 

signals from their launch crews. Submarinebased missiles are nearly as ready. Russia's 

alert posture is comparably poised for equally 

rapid operations. 

The risl{S, while low, still exist for missiles 

to be fired by accident, miscalculation, 

mistake, false warning, bad judgmeut or 

unauthorized actiou.' The results would be 

catastrophic. Given the end of the Cold War, 

it makes sense to end the Cold War practice 

of prepariug to fight a large-scale nuclear 

war on a moment's notice. The launch-ready 

postures would be stood down and aligned 

with the current political realities of the U.S.-

Russian relationship. Warning and decisiou 

time would be increased to days iustead of 

minutes for strategic forces, and to days and 

weeks iustead of hours for tactical forces. 

'We judge unauthorized launch to be the least likely 

of these risk,. It is extremely improbable given existing safeguards on U.S. and Russian forces, although 

the risk would grow in the event of a crisis dispersion of nuclear weapons, particularly Russian tactical 

nuclear weapons. Unauthorized use is also a major 

concern for scenarios involving terrorist capture of 

nuclear weapons, and for scenarios involving third 

countries such as Pakistan whose organizational and 

technical safeguards may be inadequate. 
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U.S. security requires a strategy that deals 

with the changing nature of global threats 

and the new security priorities that are 

emerging as a consequence. The risk of 

nuclear confrontation between the United 

States and either Russia or China belongs 

to the past, not the future, while nuclear 

proliferation and nudear terrorism present 

real and growing ris\{s whose prevention or 

defeat demands global cooperation among 

the former adversaries. 

Making the shift to a new strategy requires 

basic change along a multitude of vectors 

shifting emphasis from nuclear deterrence to 

general deterrence of the array of tools at the 

disposal of hostile governments; from nuclear 

to conventional; from offense to defense (active 

and passive); from global to theater, regional 

and even local; from small to deep nuclear 

stockpile reductions; from high to low nuclear 

launch readiness; from an institutionalized 

threat-based relationship with Russia and 

China to a pattern of systematic cooperation 

and even operational coordination; from 

individual to collective approaches to dealing 

with emerging regional and local threats; from 

projecting a global threat of sudden nudear 

strike that compresses decision-making, to 

removing this threat and increasing warning 

and decision time; from positive control 

enabling rapid nuclear release to negative 

control working to prevent the accidental or 

unauthorized release of nuclear weapons and 

prevent their seizure or capture by terrorists. 

6 

A U.S. nuclear force that satisfies the evolving 

requirements of this transition and that helps 

thwart nuclear proliferation and terrorism 

would have several characteristic features: (1) 

a suhstantially decreased stockpile of nuclear 

weapons and delivery vehicles on a path 

of reductions that lead in verifiable stages 

with an objective of their total elimination 

("Glohal Zero"), (2) a dc-alerted operational 

posture requiring 24-72 hours to generate the 

capacity for offensive uuclear strikes, thereby 

relieving the intense pressure on nuclear 

decision-making that currently exists, (3) a 

more secure, consolidated and "locked down" 

nuclear weapons stockpile that reduces the 

day-to-day risks of theft or unintended use, 

(4) a stood-up alert missile defense and 

conventional force capability that is prompt 

and global, and that can function sufficiently 

well for 24-72 hours that a regional adversary 

would be deterred or defeated during an initial 

period of conflict prior to the generation of 

nuclear offensive forces and (5) a command, 

control, communications and carly warning 

system that could endure and maintain 

coherence for a protracted time period and 

manage an effective transition from negative 

to positive control over nudear forces during 

the initial stage of conflict. 

An illustrative nuclear force that possesses 

these characteristics would consist of an 

arsenal of 900 total strategiC nuclear weapons 

on modified alert that could be put in place 

within ten (10) years (2022). One-half of this 
94 

GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAH POLlCY COMMISSION HEPOHT 

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force would be deployed, with the remainder 

kept in reserve. 8 The deployed forces of 450 

warheads would be de-alerted and require 

a small number of days (24-72 hours) to 

become launch ready. Most of the 450 reserve 

warheads could be taken from storage and 

loaded on delivery vehicles within weeks to 

months. 

Trident SSBNs and B-2 Bomhers 

This notional force would consist of ten (10) 

Trident ballistic missile submarines armed 

with 720 strategic missile warheads (360 

deployed; 360 reserve) and eighteen (,8) B-2 

bombers armed with ]80 gravity bombs (90 

deployed; 90 reserve). The submarine force 

would offer a high degree of survivability 

for many decades - no peer competitor 

currently has any effective anti-submarine 

warfare capability against U.S. SSBNs at sea 

and technological breakthroughs that could 

threaten this survivability are several decades 

away.? Both submarines and bombers would 

offer a high degree of flexibility for reasons 

explained below. 

H The current ratio of deployed to reSClve warheads 

is approximately I to 2.25. We estimate that by 2022 

it will be possible to achieve a I:l ratio. Further progress in increasing warhead interoperability in the 

out-years would further reduce the need for reserve 

warheads to back up the deployed arsenal and hedge 

against a systemic defect in any warhead types. 

<) There are potential threats on the distant horizon 

(30-50 years in future) that could dramatically alter 

this prognosis. Foremost among them is the prospect 

that sophisticated sensors coupled to supercomputing with advanced data filtering could strip away 

enough of the ocean's masking characteristics to expose the submerged boats. 

7 

Nuclear ICBMs and Tactical Weapons 

Eliminated 

The Minuteman land-based ICBM force 

would be eliminated. ICBMs can only support 

nuclear wartime operations against Russia 

because current-generation ICBMs flred 

from the existing three (3) bases (shown on 

the map below) on their minimum energy 

trajectories have to overfly Russia and China 

to reach targets in potentially adversarial 

third countries (e.g., Iran, North Korea), and 

fly dangerously close to Russia to reach Syria. 

U.S. ICBMs would also have to overfly Russia 

to reach targets in China. 

So the latitude for U.S. ICBM wartime 

operations is extremely circumscribed by 

orhital constraints. (Basic orbital mechanics 

are unclassified.) Since direct wartime 

nuclear operations against Russia alone, or 

Russia-China in combination, were Cold 

War scenarios that are no longer plausible, 

and since overflying Russia en route to more 

southerly targets (in China, North Korea, Iran) 
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risks confusing Russia with ambiguous attack 

indications and triggering nuclear retaliation, 

the U.S. ICBM forcc has lost its central utility. 

By contrast, U.S. Trident submarines and 

B-2 strategic bombers can deliver nuclear 

weapons to virtually any point on the earth on 

flight paths that avoid undesirable territorial 

incursions that violate national sovereignty 

and risk inducing nuclear responses. 

Also, ICBMs in fixed silos are inherently 

targetable and depend heavily upon launch 

on warning for survival under some scenarios 

of enemy attack. Warning and decision time, 

as described earlier, is measured in minutes 

and seconds. While providing for "prompt" 

launch, they arc too "prompt" and exacerbate 

risks of launch on false warning. Since only 

Russian nuclear missiles could physically 

decimate the U.S. ICBM force, and since the 

Cold War is over, this is largely a technical risk 

divorced from political realities. Nevertheless, 

the U.S. ICBM rapid reaction posture remains 

in operation and runs a real risk of accidental 

or mistaken launch. 

By contrast, U.S. SSBNs at sea do not depend 

on rapid firing for their survival and thus 

work to increase decision time in a nuclear 

crisis. Although their communications links 

to higher authority are not as resilient and 

reliable as ICBM commnnications, the SSBNs 

on alert patrol normally maintain continuons 

VLF (very low frequency) communications 

and they may be promptly launched at 

the direction of the national command 

8 

authorities. '" SSBNs on launch patrol can 

be fired in twelve (12) minutes compared 

to two (2) minutes for the ICBMs. There are 

no effective defenses against submarine 

launched ballistic missile warheads. 

Strategic bombers fall between these stools. 

Although they would need to be loaded with 

nuclear bombs and generated to strip alert 

status in a crisis (a 24-48 hour generation 

timeline) and then flushed quickly on warning 

of incoming strikes in order to survive, 

strategic bombers are highly flexible in their 

flight paths to targets anywhere around 

the globe. They are also recallable in many 

scenarios involving third countries and they 

may also carry lethal conventional weapons 

along with nuclear weapons to provide 

greater flexibility and usability. However, 

they have disadvantages. They are slow to 

reach their targets (many hours at minimum), 

require refueling for long-range missions 

and may have difficulty penetrating defenses 

compared to SLBM or ICBM warheads. 

All U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would be 

eliminated over the next ten years. Their 

military utility is practically nil. n They do 

10 Rapid advances in new higher-frequency communications modes involving special buoys dispersed on 

the surface of the oceans to link submerged SSBNs 

to higher authority are greatly increasing the reliability of launch order transmissions to SSBNs in all 

environments. The past clear-cut superiority ofICBM 

over SSBN communications for wartime dissemination of emergency action messages no longer exists. 

"See Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission Report, 

Feb.20l2. 
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not havc assigned missions as part of any 

war plan and remained deployed today 

only for political reasons within the NATO 

alliance. The obligation to assure U.S. allies 

in Europe and Asia of American commitment 

to their defense and to extend deterrence to 

them would fall to U.S. strategic nuclear and 

conventional forces, which are amply capable 

offnlfilling it. 

In,rr'lti,onalPosture and Nuclear 

A lO-boat fleet of Trident SSBNs would 

assign seven (7) to the Pacific and three (3) 

to the Atlantic basins. Assuming two (2) boats 

are normally in overhaul and the U.S. Navy 

maintains its historical at-sea rate of seventy 

(70) percent for the remainder, there would 

normally be fonr (4) and two (2) SSBNs at 

sea in the Pacitlc and Atlantic, respectively, 

carrying a total of 270 warheads. This day-today force would be survivable nnder worstcase conditions and versatile in providing 

prodigious target coverage of all prospective 

nuclear-armed aggressors. But a 270-warhead 

force would uot pose a first-strike threat to 

Russia.'" Also, this force would operate on 

modified alert outside the normal launch 

stations and require 24-72 hours to generate 

immediate offensive strike capability, in 

order to increase the amount of time available 

to leaders on all sides. This would prevent a 

12 According to Russian professional military sources 

in private communications with this Commission in 

Feb. 20U, their calculated threshold for the United 

States posing a decapitation first-strike threat against 

Russia is 300 U.S. warheads. 

9 

rushed launch decision by one's own leaders 

and remove the threat of sudden surprise 

attack that could otherwise trigger a rapid 

mistaken lannch by an opposing force. 

In an emergency, an additional two (2) 

Pacific boats in port armed with ninety (90) 

additional warheads could be flushed to sea 

within hours and the fleet of eighteen (18) 

B-2 bombers could be loaded with ninety 

(90) warheads and put OIl strip alert status 

within 24-48 hours. After 24-72 hours of force 

generation, the total number of survivable 

U.S. warheads would thus grow to 450. 

A protracted nuclear crisis or severe 

deterioration of geostrategic relations 

between the United States and either Russia 

or China both remote possibilities at this 

time - lasting for weeks or months would 

allow time for a large fraction of the U.S. 

arsenal of reserve warheads to be uploaded 

on SSBNs and B-2 bombers over the course 

of that period. By six (6) months into this 

period, the U.S. strategic arsenal could grow 

to upwards of 90() deliverable warheads. 

The capacity to deliver 900 warheads would 

project a threat of draconian dimensions 

at any prospective aggressor country. A 

force of this size could support extensive 

counterforce against opposing nuclear 

forces, countervalue against war-supporting 

industries and operations against command 

centers of the opponent's top political and 

military leadership. 
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GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

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Russia and China are not enemies of the 

United States. If they were, and nuclear 

planners allocated this 900-weapon arsenal 

according to Cold War targeting principles, 

the following (strictly) illustrative categories 

of targets and warhead assignments would be 

possible: 

Russia: WMD (325 warheads 

including 2-on-1 strilies against every 

missile silo), leadership command 

posts (110 warheads), war-supporting 

industry (136 warheads). Moscow 

alone would be covered hy eighty 

(80) warheads. 

China: WMD (8S warheads iucluding 

2-on-1 strikes against every missile 

silo), leadership command posts (33 

warheads), war-supporting industry 

(136 warheads). 

North Korea, Iran, Syria: Each 

country would be covered by forty 

(40) warheads. 

technically pose existential threats to the 

United States. According to a former senior 

general in the Russian strategic forces, U.S. 

nuclear retaliation against only a handful of 

Russian cities would cross the threshold of 

unacceptable damage in the view of Russia's 

top political and military leadership." U.S. 

['etaliatory capahility would he orders of 

magnitude greater than this. Also, an arsenal 

of 900 U.S. weapons would vastly exceed 

the size of the nuclear arsenals flelded by 

America's actual contemporary adversaries 

(namely, North Korea with less than 12 

weapons; Iran with zero; Syria with zero). 

In short, although an arsenal of 900 total 

weapons would represent a whopping eighty 

(80) percent reduction from today's level, 

it would still possess enormous destructive 

power, far more than necessary to impress 

any potential rational foe. For the irrational 

foe, such as fanatical terrorists, the level of 

American nuclear armaments would make no 

difference at all. 

Missile 

The capability in peacetime or crisis Augmentation 

circumstances to deliver many hundreds of 

uuclearwarheads to targets in any prospective To mitigate the putative risk incurred by 

aggressor country in retaliation to a nuclear this sizable downsizing of thc U.S. strategic 

attack satisfy reasonable requirements of arsenal, to partially offset the decrease in 

nuclear deterrence even nnder worst-case target coverage and to provide acushionduriug 

Cold War-like conditious. These numbers au initial 24-72 hours of conflict when U.S. 

substantially exceed the self-reported number offensive nuclear forces are being generated 

of nuclear explosions on urban centers to combat alert status, the United States and 

and high-level command posts that would its allies would seek protection from vigilant 

effectively deter the only nations (Russia 

and China) possessing nuclear arsenals that 

10 

'1 Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin (personal communication, Dec. 16, 2011). 
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GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

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missile defenses and conventional forces kept 

on constant alert. 

Missile defenses augmented by passive 

defenses (e.g., hardening, sheltering) could 

provide especially effective tools in deterring 

or defeating a regional adversary such as Iran 

or North Korea, and terrorists, for a 24-72 

hour period. Such a time-Iimitcd requirement 

would ease the burden on missile defenses 

to intercepting the maximum number of 

offensive missiles that an adversary could 

launch during this period defined as the 

total number of launchers times the number 

of reloads per launcher during a 24-72 hour 

period. Missile defenses would not have 

to handle every missile in the adversary's 

stockpile only those that could be fired 

during this initial phase of conflict. 

This reduced burden would allow a theater 

missile defense program such as the adaptive 

system for protecting Europe from Iran to be 

scaled down by ten (10) to fifty (50) percent. 

This downsizing, coupled with U.S.-Russiau 

cooperation in this arena and confidencebuilding measures, such as establishiug lOOmile exclusion zones for U.S. missile defense 

deployments adjacent to Russian territory, 

would reassure Russia that its strategic missile 

force would not be put in jeopardy. To provide 

further reassurance, the operational status of 

U.S. missile defenses would be tailored to the 

actual threat in the region. These defenses 

would only stand up on full alert if and when 

a commensurate Iranian or North Korean 

threat materialized. Russia aud China would 

receive full notification if the alert status of 

11 

U.S. missile defenses were raised. 

This theater strategy would be bolstered 

by advanced U.S. conventional arms whose 

accuracy of delivelY allows them to reduce the 

role of nuclear weapous in covering the target 

base. The rapid increase in the lethality of 

conventional forces achieved in recent years 

allows conventional forces to threaten the 

destruction of very hard targets (inclnding 

missile silos protected up to 1,000 pounds 

per square inch (p.s.i.). This technological 

progress translates into the capability of using 

conventional forces to cover practically onehundred (lOO) percent of the North Korean, 

Iranian and Syrian target bases previously 

covered by nuclear forces." A prompt 

conventional pounding of an adversary's 

missile installations (e.g., in Iran or North 

{{orca) could severely degrade its capacity 

and ease the work of U.S. missile defenses. 

For many such scenarios, U.S. conventional 

forces may well suffice to defeat a regional 

adversary without needing to generate any 

U.S. nuclear forces at all. 

q Regarding Russia and China, large-scale conflict 

with the United States is implausible. Tbeoretically, 

however, we estimate that U.S. conventional forces 

could cover between ten (10) and thirty (30) percent 

of an expansive Russian target base previously covered by U.S. nuclear forces. If Russia's planned $150 

billion investment in {lair-space defense" over the 

ncxt ten (10) years is productive then the target coverage figure would be lean toward the lower end of 

the range. Concerning China, we estimate that U.S. 

conventional forces could cover between thirty (30) 

and fifty (50) percent of the Chinese target base s previously covered by U.S. nuclear forces. The Chinese 

target set is roughly one-half the size of the Russian 

target set. 
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GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COMMISSION REPORT 

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This lo-year illustrative agenda aimed at 

reducing the number of U.S. nuclear weapons 

to 900 total warheads has basic implications 

for the nuclear complex, force structure 

and posture development and nuelear arms 

negotiations. If adopted, this agenda would 

reduce U.S. spending on nuelear weapons 

programs by as much as $100 hillion over the 

next decade. 

Downsized 

The illustrative nuclear forcc would deploy 

only four types of nuclear weapons - W-76 and 

W-88 on Trident. SSBNs, and the B61 (mods 

7 and n) and B83 on B-2 bombers. The need 

for warhead refurbishment. would be vastly 

decreased. The B61-ll recently completed a 

Life Extension Program (LEP); the W-76 LEI' 

has already completed a sufficient number of 

these warheads to meet future requirements 

under this plan; and the W-88 aud B83 are 

relatively new weapons whose LEI' needs are 

far into the future. Only t.he B61-7 needs LEP 

work in the near future (to convert it to a B61-

]2), and the number of them needed for the 

bomber force is relatively small. 

As a consequence, thousands of warheads in 

the LEP pipeline could be retired instead of 

refurbished. Also, the costly modernization 

of the nuclear complex currcntly underway 

particularly the PF-4 and t.he CMRR-NF 

plutonium facilities at Los Alamos and the 

UPF uranium facility at Y-]2 Oak Ridge cau 

12 

be restructured and downsized, depending 

on the balance of warhead refurbishment, 

reuse and/or replacement that emerges 

from a future review by the National Nuclear 

Security Agency (NNSA) and the U.S. Strategic 

Command.'s These agencies would need 

to consider eighty (80) percent cuts in the 

stockpile and determine an optimal strategy 

for improving surety, reliability, adaptability 

and maintenance at greatly reduced numbers 

of weapons. 

Nuclear Force Structure and Posture 

The follow-on uuclear ICBM program on 

the drawing boards would be cancelled, the 

plans for a fleet of next-generation bombers 

altered" and the Trident follow-on program 

1', In February 2012, President Obama deferred construction for five years on the $6 billion CMRR facility. 

The need for such a facility would decrease substantially if the active U.S. stockpile shrinks to 500-900 total warheads as we recommend. Its primary purpose 

is to manufacture plutonium pits. Given the 50-year 

minimum normal lifespan of a plutonium pit, only 

two (2) percent of the stockpile would normally need 

new plutonium pits on an annual basis -10-18 pits for 

500-900 weapons. The current pit capacity of Los Alamos is roughly twenty (20) pits per year. In the event of a systemic defect in a warhead type that required a 

crash I'c-building of the warheads, the manufacturing 

rate might need to be several times greater than the 

current capacity if rapidly replenishing the stockpile 

was deemed critical to deterrence. 

," The U.S. Air Force currently plans to design and 

build 100-IS0 advanced hombers to replace the current fleet ofB-528 and B-2s at a rough eost estimated 

to be $550 million per plane. These current and future aircraft may perform long-range strategic missions and they are also interchangeable with tactical 

carriers on the battlefield and thus are replacing the 

older category of dual-purpose (nnclear-conventional) tactical platforms such as U.S. fighter-bombers 

stationed with B-61 nuclear arms in NATO Europe. 

Under our illustrative plan, the number of next-generation bombers configured to perfOlw strategic or 
100 

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delayed. All existing ICBM facilities and 

delivery vehicles, and all B -52 bombers, 

would be dismantled or converted to carry 

only conventional munitions over the course 

of the next decade. 

Conventional ICBM. A conventional-armed 

extended-range ICBM some variant of the 

Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) 

should he designed and developed to provide 

a l-hour global strike capability hy 2022." 

With a total of twelve (12) to twenty (20) such 

vehicles based in California, the Great Lakes 

region and/or Alaska Cco-Iocated with missile 

defense bases), this ICBM would have the 

down- and cross-range agility and reach to 

span continents flying within the stratosphere 

and promptly hit virtually any target around 

the world (such as North Korean or Iranian 

missile installations) without overflying 

Russia or China. 1il 

This program would not be designed or 

deployed against Russia, and although it 

would possess an ability to destroy very hard 

tactical nuclear missions would be limited to 30-50 

aircraft. The B-2 Heet would retire as the new bombers are fielded. 30-50 planes would allow for deployment and crew training to more than one physical 

location. (The current B -52 Heet is based at two locations, and the B -28 at a third base.) 

'7 Russia started developing au HTV before the Uuited 

States initiated its program, and President Putin attaches high priority to the program. Both programs 

are making progress, and both face major challenges 

- achieving aerodynamic stability in tbe Russian case, 

and overcoming heat shielding problems in the U.S. 

case. Russia recently experienced its second test fail w 

ure of the developmental ,),stem. 

lfi Such a capability would require a downrange of 

9,000 luiles and a cross range of 3,000 miles. 

13 

targets including missile silos, the small 

number of vehicles built and deployed would 

allay Russian concern about their impact on 

Russia's nuclear deterrent capability.'" 

A conventional and versatile long-range ICBM 

would overcome the drawbacks of other 

conventional delivery means for instance, 

the range and speed constraints of Tomahawk 

IV missiles on ships and submarines, and 

the strategic conventional (dual nuclear 

and conventional capable) bomber's lack 

of timeliness and in some cases difficulty of 

penetrating air defenses. Combined with other 

conventional forces and alert missile defenses 

keyed to 24-72 hour effective operations, 

a versatile non-nuclear ICBM force would 

provide a timely strike option to buy time 

for nuclear force generation and leadership 

deliberation if the conventional phase of the 

conflict did not end decisively in favor of the 

United States. It would also provide a means 

of promptly hitting terrorist targets anywhere 

on the globe, greatly augmenting existing 

Predator drones and other tools. 

A Phased, Consultative Approach to IncreasinH 

WarninH and Decision Time. The strategy, 

force structure and posture outlined in this 

report work to create additional warning and 

decision time as they are implemented over 

1<) It appears realistic to achieve an accuracy of 3 meters with a payload of 1,000 lbs. We calculate that this 

performance translates into roughly a fitty (50) percent chance of destroying a missile silo hardened to 

1,000 Ibs. per square inch (p.s.i.). Twenty (20) singlewarhead HTVs would technically possess the capacity to destroy with high confidence only about six (6) 

missile silos. 
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the lo-year period. During the initial phase 

of a rehalancing of offense and defense, and 

of nuclear and conventional components, 

defensive systems would he put on higher 

alert as growing numhers of nuclear offensive 

forces were taken off of launch-ready alert 

("de-alerted"). As the burden of deterrence 

shifted from MAD based on nuclear offensive 

operations to flexible response based on 

conventional forces (air, sea and land) with 

a prompt glohal strike component and on 

defensive operations (notably early warning, 

missile defense and cyber security), new 

opportnnities will emerge for cooperation 

with allies and other countries with common 

security interests. 

We envision cooperation progressing 

through stages beginning with heightened 

transparency and monitoring on a global 

basis. The United States and Rnssia would 

lead in providing to the rest of the world a 

comprehensive data stream on the statns 

of maritime and airspace traffic and space 

objects. Angmenting this heightened 

global awareness of the earth and heavens, 

information wonld be provided on the status 

of U.S. and Russian (and eventually other 

nations') missile defenses as well as all 

offensive nuclear and conventional forces. 

Cyber security centers would provide near 

real-time information on the global cyber 

threat and cooperate in mitigating it. 

In a second stage, early warning information 

would be shared in near real-time with 

all participating conn tries. This would 

'4 

strengthen global cooperation in monitoring 

missile and other weapons tests, assessing 

proliferation threats and tracking military 

operations inclnding hostile air-, sea- and 

space-actions during peacetime and conflict. 

By the end of the lo-year period, international 

cooperation in the missile defense arena 

could be achieved. Active missile defense 

cooperation would complete the transition 

from MAD to mutual awareness, warning 

and defense. And the fnll transition would 

increase warning and decision time by hours, 

days, weeks and months. 

De-Alerting to Increase Warning and Decision 

Time. De-alerting is a key element in achieving 

this goal. Any follow-on strategic nuclear 

forces including a Trident replacement 

submarine should be designed to enable 

thc delivery systems and the warheads to 

be kept separated during normal peacetime 

operations and easily re-mated during an 

emergency. Existing forces were not designed 

for such a de-mated configuration. They 

were optimized for rapid reaction; de-mating 

warheads and missiles and re-mating them in 

an emergency are cumbersome, suboptimal 

operations. The goal of a new force posture 

is to keep all warheads and means of delivery 

separated in peacetime, in order to increase 

decision time, strengthen safety and security 

and prevent mistaken or unauthorized 

launches. 

During the next ten (10) years, de-alerting 

can still be instituted with existing forces, 

however. We should close the books on the 
102 

GLOBAL ZEBO U.S. NUCLEAR POLlCY COMMISSION REPORT 

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Cold War and immediately put the nuclear 

arsenals into strategic reserve status on 

"modified alert." This single stroke would 

greatly reduce nuclear risks while deepening 

U.S.-Russian cooperation and strengthening 

mutual stability. It would also have salutary 

effects on their relations with China and other 

countries currently threatened by the hypervigilant launch-ready postures of the nuclear 

superpowers. 

Under this illustrative "modified alert" 

posture, SSBNs at sea would no longer patrol 

at their Cold War launch stations ready to 

fire witbin fifteen (15) minutes of receiving 

the order. The current strict requirements of 

speed, depth, navigation and communications 

would be relaxed. For example, the Cold War 

requirement for alert submarines to maintain 

continuous receive communications and 

readiness to fire almost instantly (within 12 

minutes of receiving the order to fire) would 

be relaxed to 24-72 hours - providing greater 

freedom to train and exercise at sea as an 

additional benefit. Other measures, such 

as the renl0val of "inverters" on subInarine 

missile tubes, would help ensure that 24-72 

hours would be needed to fully re-alert the 

weapons onboard. 

Similarly, land-based ICBMs would no 

longer be poised for full-scale launches on 

a moment's notice. Instead, they would be 

"pinned and safed" in their silos, an existing 

safety measure (the reversal of which requires 

maintenance crews to re-enter the silos 

and remove the pins), thus precluding their 

launch during normal peacetime conditions 

15 

and reql1lrmg many hours to reverse. (The 

Chinese nuclear forces reportedly already 

meet this standard; indeed, they are in an 

even less threatening posture with warheads 

kept off their means of delivery.) As an interim 

measure during a transition to a wholesale 

strategic reserve status, a portion of the 

ICBM force - perhaps one of the nine current 

50-missile squadrons - could be kept on 

launch-ready status on a monthly rotational 

basis. Eventually, however, all of the ICBMs 

wonld be dismantled according to the 10-

year plan outlined here and their alert status 

would become moot. 

Additional related measures should also be 

considered as part of this mutual, coordinated 

shift away from Cold War postures, to include 

removing all of the existing wartime targets 

from the ballistic missile submarine eSSBN) 

databases and the land-based missile (ICBM) 

computers. Fully restoring this data would 

take a number of days, thus building in a 

larger firebreak 24-72 hours between the 

onset of a crisis or conflict and the capacity to 

initiate nuclear strike operations. 

Rigorous analyses have proven that dealerting, if done properly and verifiably, 

would remove the threat of a sudden firststrike or decapitation strike and thus remove 

the incentive to maintain strategic forces 

poised to launch out from under a surprise 

enemy attack. Both sides conld relax their 

postures while eliminating any incentives for 

re-alerting and launching a preemptive attacl{ 

during a crisis. A well-designed posture can 
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eliminate any advantage to re-alerting, bolster can be adequately verified.'" 

the survivability of second-strike forces, 

substantially increase decision and warning Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the 

time and stabilize mutual deterrence.'" recommendations of the Global Zero NATOThis new posture wonld represent a large 

improvement over the current one. The 

United States and Russia currently maintain 

about one-third of their forces on high alert; 

the other two-thirds require 24-72 hours 

to generate to launch-ready status. Their 

current postures are ill-designed for stability. 

They are actually quite unstable prone to 

competitively rapid force generation and 

to launch on warning and need to be reRussia Commission Report put forward by 

American, European and Russian security 

leaders and experts make sense. They call 

for the United States and Russia to remove 

their tactical weapons from European combat 

bases and relocate them to national storage 

sites. We euvision that this relocation would 

happen in the context of broader negotiations 

aimed at cutting their uuclear stockpiles 

down to 1,000 total weapons on each side. 

designed to remove the re-alerting incentives This simple redeployment would increase 

behind this instability. Stndies have shown warning and decision times for employing 

that, if properly configured, all the strategic hnndreds of these non-strategic weapons on 

nnclear forces on both sides could be stood each side from the current "hours" to a period 

down from high alert and still achieve a much of "days to weeks." The absence of nuclear 

greater degree of stability than presently warheads at combat bases could be reliably 

exists."' Force survivability can be ensured confirmed by on-site inspections, and any 

even in the face ofre-alertingby an adversary, large-scale covert effort to move warheads 

and the key dc-alerting measures such as from national storage sites back to the combat 

separating warheads from delivery vehicles bases would be readily detectable by space 

'0 The leading studies that validatc this assessment 

include Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, 

ValeryYarynich and Pavel Zolotarev, (1) "Smaller and 

Safer," Foreign Alfairs, Vol. 89, NO.5, September/October 2010; pp. 9-16 and (2) "One Hundred Nuclear 

Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States 

and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert 

in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses," Science 

and Global Security, VoL19, 2011, pp. 167-194; Bruce 

G. Blair, "De-Alerting Strategic :Forces," in George P. 

Shultz et. aI., Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a ~Vurld 

Free o/Nuclear Weapons, Hoover Institution, 2008, pp. 

47-105. 

"Ibid. 

surveillance and other national technical 

means. 

Bilateral Nli'.c!c,ar 

The reductions and de-alerting proposed 

under this illustrative plan could be carried 

out in unison by the United States and Russia 

through reciprocal presidential directives, 

negotiated in another round of bilateral arms 

reduction talks, or implemented unilaterally. 

J.).. Blair~ "De-alerting Strategic Forces," op.cit. 
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In any case, these cuts would lead to yet 

another round of talks that would reduce 

the nuclear arsenals on each side to 500 

total weapons.') These cuts to 500-900 total 

weapons apiece should be sufficient to bring 

China and other nuclear weapons countries 

to the table to begin multilateral negotiations 

for further cuts on the path to global zero. '-I 

..!-.l The consensus of former Russian senior military 

officers in Global Zero, led by Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor 

Esin who once served as Chief of Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces and now consnlts to the SRF 

Commander, is that a 90o-warhead Russian arsenal 

should consist of: 450 deployed strategic warheads; 

150 reserve strategic warheads, and 300 reserve tactical warheads. The strategic warheads would be deployed in either of these confif,,'l1rations: (a) 150 single-warhead ICBMs (50 silo-based and 100 mobile) 

and 8 "Borey" class SSBNs with 300 total warheads, 

OR (b) 300 single-warhead ICBMs (100 silo-based 

and 200 mobile) and 4 "Borey" class SSBNs with 150 

total warheads. Dr. Bruce Blair and Col. Gen. Vict.or 

E8in (personal communications, February 20l2). 

'-' Some observers argne that. deep cuts by t.he United 

States and Russia would tempt China to ramp up its 

nuclear weapons production to exploit the opportunity to achieve parity or even supremacy. This "race 

to parity or supremacy" argument is not based on 

any solid evidence. All the publicly available evidence 

supports the opposite view that deeps cuts would 

draw the Chinese into a multilateral arms control 

regime that would lead to phased reductions. China 

bas historically stayed out of the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race, content to deploy a very small nuclear 

force in the service of "minimum deterrence." Its program is qUite insensitive and detached from the U.S. 

and Russian programs, though its current modernization program seeks to ensure a minimum survivable deterrent in the face of external t.hreats. China 

has historically advocated for nuclear disarmament 

on a universal basis, and in 1982 its Foreign Minister 

Huang Hua presented a blueprint for disarmament. 

at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in 

which it committed to join multilateral negotiations if 

and when the nuclear superpowers cut their arsenals 

in half, stopped testing and building them, and otherwise exercised restraint. Global Zero discussions with 

high-level Chinese government officials, milit.ary officers and experts indicate strongly that China remains 

comlnitted to this course. China would not ''race to 

parity or supremacy" tmd in fact would take the opThese strategic cuts and de-alerting, coupled 

with constrained U.S. missile defenses 

tailored to actual regional missile threats, 

should also go a long way toward breaking 

the current bilateral arms talks impasse with 

Russia, which is hung up on the potential 

technical capability of the United States 

to deliver a one-two punch of offensive 

and defensive operations against Russia's 

strategic nuclear missile forces once U.S. 

phase-four adaptive missile defenses (SM3-

2R missile systems) become operational in 

ten (10) years (2022). Russia has sought a 

formal guarantee from the United States that 

its advanced missile defense system in phase 

four will not be aimed at Russia and will not 

undermine Russia's strategic deterrent forces. 

The United States has not met this demand 

nor provided other satisfactory assnrances. 

As a result, Russia anticipates a continuing 

evolution of the U.S. program into increasingly 

threatening variants (including space-based 

strike systems in phases five and six) that 

become more difficult for Rnssia to offset with 

inexpensive countermeasures. The bilateral 

nuclear arms control process and even the 

broader U.S.-Russian relationship has stalled 

over this one technical complication. 

posite position to join an arms reduction process if 

the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to 

low numbers. Sec Maj.-Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, "China's 

Nuclear Strategy in a Changing World Strategic Situation," Unblocking the Road to Zero: China and India, Dr. 

Blechman, ed., March 

: lit$!lJilfiH . 20nit2fJ . 1jCiltiIr)l ,(Dr. Bruce 

Blair, "The Global Zero Movement and China," Global 

Nuclear Posture Re1/iew 20lohon, ed. Teng Jianqun 

(Beijing, 2011), and Bruce G. Blair, "Chinese Nuclear 

Preemption," China Security, Autumn 2005, No.1, pp. 

15-22. 
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The illustrative plan outlined above offers a 

solution. Under it, Russia (and China) would 

no longer be targeted in set piece war plans 

of the kind embodied in the longstanding 

plans that grew out of the Cold War faceotI, and the de-alerting of U.s. strategic 

forces wonld preclnde a sudden offensive 

strike. By removing the technical threat of a 

surprise U.S. nuclear first strike, the United 

States conld no longer theoretically decimate 

the bulk of Russia's strategic forces, and the 

specter of U.S. missile defenses mopping up 

a small number of surviving Russian missiles 

after the strike would evaporate. 

During the 24-72 hour time period needed for 

the United States technically to generate its 

otlensive strike capability, Russian strategic 

forces could be flushed to secure locations. 

Mobile ICBMs and in-port SSBNs could be 

simultaneously dispersed to hidden locations 

to reduce theirvu lnerability and provide for an 

overwhelming Russian retaliatory capability. 

(The current Russian modernization program 

is concentrating on new mobile ICBM and 

SSBN production.) As a result, U.S. missile 

defense deployment would not pose nearly as 

great a technical threat to Russia, improving 

the prospects for a new round of fruitful U.S.-

Russian nuclear arms negotiations. 

The less good approach would be to adopt 

this agenda unilaterally. A strong case 

can nevertheless be made that unilateral 

U.S. deep cuts and de-alerting coupled 

with strengthened missile defenses and 

conventional capabilities would not weaken 

deterrence in practical terms vis-it-vis Russia, 

China or any of the more plausible nationstate challengers that America may confront 

in the years ahead. While preserving effective 

deterrence against all but non-state actors, 

unilateral steps would lay the groundwork for 

increasing security cooperation among the 

former Cold War adversaries and encourage 

them to consider comparable unilateral 

actions. If unilateral U.S. de-alerting of its 

strategic offensive forces would cause Russia 

to follow suit, it would buy a large margin 

of safety against the accidental or mistaken 

lannch of Russian missiles on hair-trigger 

alert aimed at the United States. 

More broadly, this illustrative agenda with 

its deep cuts and de-alerting would strongly 

validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and 

help preserve it in the face of challenges by 

North Korea, Iran and other prospective 

proliferators. In strengthening the NPT, 

inhibiting the spread of nudear weapons and 

setting the stage for multilateral negotiations 

among the nuclear weapons countries 

to reduce and eventually eliminate their 

nuclear arsenals, this initiative would go far 

toward building a new security architecture 

embodying the vision of Global Zero a world 

without nuclear weapons. 

A 21" century security plan meant to reduce 

reliance on offensive nuclear weapons and 

shift toward a more global, transparent and 

defense-oriented architecture designed to 

address the real threats facing the world 

today would be greatly strengthened through 
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broad cooperation along two dimensions. 

First, in rcplacing the blunt instrument 

of nuclear offensive threat with versatilc, 

tunable and integrated power projection 

using modern high-tech components cutting 

across the spectrum of offense-defense and 

conventional-nuclear, there is a growing need 

for nations in the same security boat to share 

costs and operational responsibilities. No 

single nation can afford any longer to shonlder 

the full burden alone. Great mntnal benefit 

accrues to nations with common interests 

who cooperate. The phased adaptive approach 

to missile defense in Europe is only possible 

through a division of labor and burden 

sharing within the NATO alliance. Japan is 

an essential partner of the United States in 

developing the !,>uidauce and warhead for 

SM3-2A/B missile defense interceptors that 

will become the backbone of phased missile 

defenses for America's Asian allies. Stretching 

this envelope of cooperation even further, it 

is a newly deployed radar in Israel supported 

by U.S. command-control-communications 

networks that enables Saudi Arabia's Patriot 

missile batteries to work effectively. 

Second, as the last example suggests, the 

changing world is creating common interests 

among nations not previously aligned and 

often at loggerheads, and creating incentives 

for them to cooperate in the security arena. 

They often fail to exploit the opportunities 

as evidenced by, for instance, the duplicative, 

inefficient deployment of three separate 

global space-based navigation systems. 

But economic forces and mutnal security 

incentives are driving nations haltingly but 

surely toward security globalization in the 

areas of monitoring, early warning and active 

defenses. Future cooperation will take the 

form of generating global ontput on maritime, 

aircraft and space activities that increase 

worldwide real-time monitoring of the seas, 

skies and heavens - an unprecedented level 

of situational awareness of the earth. It will 

take the form of shared early warning of 

missile launches and other potential threats 

through joint warning centers manned by 

Russians, Americans, Chinese and many other 

nationalities, and through joint technological 

ventures such as U.S.-Russian early warning 

satellite deployments with the outpnt widely 

shared with other nations. Over time, this 

increasingly global cooperation will extend 

into the area of active missile defenses. 

These trends appear to us to be deeply 

embedded in a globalizing world of growing 

economic and informational interaction and 

interdependence. They are not preordained, 

however, and we must therefore be prepared 

if our predictions for the next decade or 

so are wrong and the world becomes more 

confrontational in nuclear terms. It seems 

increasingly improbable that U.S. relations 

with Russia or China would deteriorate so 

severely during the time frame of this report's 

plan (2012-2022) that the nuclear balance 

among them wonld become a salient factor in 

their security relationships and cause them to 

suspend the nuclear arms reductions process 

and possibly even resume a nuclear arms race. 

However, this specter cannot be ruled out; if 

it happens, then the United States, despite 

possessing a stockpile of 500-900 nuclear 
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weapons, may feel more secure if it possesses 

the capacity to build up its nuclear forces in 

quantitative or qualitative respects. 

We believe that the illnstrative force structure 

and posture outlined in this report, augmented 

by contingency plans to regenerate the u.s. 

nuclear infrastructure, provide an ample 

margin of safety in the event of unanticipated 

developments that increase the nuclear 

threat to our nation over the next ten years 

or so. The trends described toward growing 

global transparency and security integration 

increase our ability to adapt if all these trends 

reverse course unexpectedly. But given the 

long lead times required to re-engineer our 

nuclear plans and programs in response 

to a marked increase in nuclear threat, our 

nuclear infrastructure must be resilient in the 

face of the unforeseen. 

An urgent and transformational change in 

U.S. nuclear force structure, strategy and 

posture is needed to squarely address the 

security threats facing the nation in the 21" 

century. The strategy inherited from the 

Cold War which remains in place artificially 

sustains nuclear stockpiles that are much 

larger than required for deterrence today and 

that have scant efficacy in dealing with the 

main contemporary threats to U.S. and global 

security nuclcar proliferation, terrorism, 

cyberwarfare and a multitude of other threats 

stemming from the diffusion of power in 

the world today. Cnrrent u.s. nuclear policy 

focuses too narrowly on threats rooted in 

20 

Cold War thinking, incurring excessive costs 

to prepare for an implausiblc contingency 

of nuclear war with Russia when there 

is no conceivable circumstance in which 

either country's interest wonld be scrved by 

deliberately initiating sneh a conflict. Current 

U.S. nuclear policy also unnecessarily incurs 

risks of unintentionally initiating a nuclear 

conflict. By maintaining launch-ready nuclear 

postures just as they did during the Cold War, 

the United States and Russia run risks of 

nuclear mistakes that could have catastrophic 

consequences. 

The u.S. and Russian arsenals have been 

steadily shrinking since the end of the Cold 

War. These rednctions should continue. 

Steep bilateral reductions in all categories 

of weapons in their stockpiles are warranted 

and should be pursued in the next round of 

U.S.-Russian negotiations. An arsenal of 500-

900 total weapons on each side would easily 

meet reasonable requirements of deterrence 

and would set the stage to initiate multilateral 

nuclear arms reductions involving all 

countries with nuclear weapons. The United 

States should seek to achieve such reductions 

in ten (10) years and plan to base its arsenal 

on a dyad of nuclear delivery vehicles. The 

optimal mix of carriers would consist of ten 

(10) Trident ballistic missile submarines and 

eighteen (18) B-2 bombers. Under normal 

conditions, one-half of the warhead stockpile 

would be deployed on these carriers; the 

other half would be kept in reserve except 

during a national emergency. All land-based 

intercontinental missiles armed with nuclear 

payloads would be retired along with the 
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carriers of non-strategic nuclear warheads, 

all of which would be eliminated from the 

stockpile. B-52 heavy bombers would be 

completely dismantled or converted to carry 

only conventional weapons. 

The United States and Russia should devise 

ways to increase warning and decision time 

in the command and control of their smaller 

arsenals. The current postures of launchready nuclear forces that provide miuutes 

and seconds of warning and decision time 

should be replaced by postures that allow 

24-72 hours on which to assess threats 

and exercise national direction over the 

employment of nuclear forces. This change 

would greatly reduce the risks of mistaken, 

ill-considered and accidental launch. It 

would also strengthen strategie stability by 

removing the threat of sudden, surprise first 

strikes. Any move by one side to massively 

generate nuclear forces to launch-ready 

status would provide ample warning for the 

other side to disperse its nuclear forces to 

invulnerable positions. By increasing warning 

time through de-alerting, the new postures 

would actually increase force survivability 

and diminish the adverse impact of missile 

defenses in the equation. Missile defenses 

would be less threatening to the other side's 

conventional forces in an integrated new 

strategy. These non-nuclear forces in a real 

sense would replace nuclear forces. Their 

role in deterring and defeating a 21" century 

adversary, and in reassuring U.S. allies of 

our commitment to their defense, would 

be especially important during the 24-72 

hour period prior to the possible generation 

of offensive nuclear capability. This timelimited role, however, would reduce the 

requirements imposed on missile defenses 

and conventional forces. Missile defense 

architecture in particular could be scaled 

down. 

It is critical to broaden the agenda of nuclear 

arms regulation to include all categories of 

weapons in all nuclear weapons countries. 

Only a broad multilateral approach can 

effectively address the multitude of serious 

nuclear dangers found in other parts of the 

world. While pursuing bilateral negotiations 

to reduce the U.S. and Russian stockpiles 

to much lower levels, the two sides should 

initiate a multilateral process that would seek 

to cap, freeze, reduce and otherwise constrain 

the arsenals of third countries. Nuclear arms 

regulation must become comprehensive and 

universal. 

larger retaliatory force and less undermining This multilateralism should be extended 

of the other side's confidence in its ability to beyond nuclear arms reductions into the 

carry out effective retaliation. realm of multilateral security cooperation. 

21" century threats demand heightened 

In the context of such reduced reliance on 

offensive nuclear weapons on launch-ready 

alert, the United States would increase its 

reliance on missile defenses and advanced 

21 

cooperation among longstanding friends and 

former foes alike. No single nation can any 

longer afford to go it alone in developing and 

deploying systems that strengthen its security. 
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Powerful economic forces and mutual security 

incentives are increasingly driving nations 

toward security globalization, particularly 

in the arcas of' monitoring, early warning 

and active defenses. Future cooperation will 

take the form of generating global real-time 

output that provides for an unprecedented 

level of situational awareness of the earth. It 

will take the form of shared early warning of 

missile launches and other potential threats 

through joint warning centers manned hy 

Russians, Americans, Chinese and many other 

nationalities, and throngh joint technologieal 

ventures such as U.S.-Russian early warning 

satellite deployments with the output widely 

shared with other nations. Over time, this 

increasingly global cooperation will extend 

into the area of active missile defenses. 

The illustrative strategy, force structure and 

posture outlined in this report, augmented 

by contingency plans to regenerate the u.s. 

nnclear infrastructure if the trends toward 

global security cooperation and multilateral 

arms regulation unexpectedly reverse course, 

provide a roadmap for strengthening u.s. 

security in the 21" centnry. It allows the United 

States to continue to rednee its reliance on 

nuclear weapons, to reduce nuclear dangers 

around the world and to move toward a world 

without nuclear weapons. 

22 
110 
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MODERNIZING U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY, FORCES AND POSTURE 

FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 

Introduction 

General (ret.) James E. Cartwright 

Testimony to the House Armed Service Committee 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

March 6, 2013 

Congressman Rogers, Congressman Cooper and other distinguished members, it's 

an honor and a pleasure to present testimony before this committee. Thank you for 

inviting me. Much of my tcstimony and this statement are based on the my contributions 

to the commission report (Modernizing u.s. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and 

Posture, May 2012) and the soon to bc rcleased (Building Mutual Security in the EuroAtlantic Region) report, chaired by Sam Nunn, Desmond Brown, Wolfgang Ischinger, 

and Igor Ivanov. 

Aims and Purposes 

The goal of these efforts was simple: conceive and articulate a nuclear strategy, 

force structure and posture that address the national security challenges our country faces 

in the 21 st century. We first considered present and future threats, across the spectrum of 
112 

possibilities, ranging from deliberate or accidental nuclear attack by a nation state to 

terrorist nuclear attack, and everything in between. Then, we assessed the role of U.S. 

nuclear weapons in diminishing these dangers through deterrence or war-fighting, and 

weighed the potential for missile defenses, conventional forces, alliance cooperation, and 

diplomacy to offer non-nuclear tools to our kitbag for dealing with these threats. Next, 

we perfonned a net assessment of both the benefits and risks of further nuclear anns 

reductions and lowered launch readiness (,de-alerting'). Finally, wc fonnulated a new 

construct for a 21 st century nuclear strategy. 

Of special interest was the paramount goal of broadening the scope of nuclear 

arms reductions to include all countries and all types of weapons in their possession. The 

nearly half-century of arms negotiations with the Russians has been an exclusively twosided affair that has excluded some important players. These negotiations need to be 

extended to China and other nations whose nuclear arsenals pose serious dangers to 

international security. The major risks of nuclear weapons' use, proliferation and arms 

race instability in fact mostly lie outside the U.S.-Russian arena, particularly in Northeast 

Asia, South Asia and in the Middle East. It is essential to begin a multilateral process 

that brings the rest of the nuclear-armed world to the negotiating table to begin to cap, 

freeze, reduce and otherwise constrain these third-country nuclear arms programs. I 

believe that U.S. and Russian arsenals could be downsized substantially - 900 or fewer 

total weapons on each side - in order to draw these third-countries into the process. 

2 
113 

A 2022 U.S. Nuclear Force 

Our net assessment concluded that the current U.S. nuclear force remains sized 

and organized operationally for fighting the "last war" - the Cold War - even though 

threats from that era posed by the Soviet Union and China have greatly diminished and 

changed in character. Russia and China are not mortal enemies of the United States. 

Our geopolitical relations with our former Cold War adversaries have fundamentally 

changed for the better. 

Ample latitude exists for further nuclcar cuts. The extent of such cuts, the 

composition of the reduced arsenals, and the number of weapons held in reserve as a 

geopolitical hedge against a downturn in relations are matters worthy of public debate 

and of congressional hearings. There are a number of alternative force structures that 

would well serve to maintain a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent and advance other national 

security interests. 

One such illustrative nuclear force would be composed of900 total strategic 

weapons - total deployed and reserve -- on a dyad of ballistic missile submarines and 

strategic bombers. This would represent a reduction from the current U.S. nuclear 

arsenal. It would not be a small nor humble force designed for minimal deterrence, it 

would not entail a radical shift in targeting philosophy away from military targets to 

population centers, and it is not a city-busting strategy. On the contrary, it would hold at 

risk the major categories of facilities in all countries of interest to include the diverse sets 

ofnuciear/WMD forces and facilities, top military and political leadership, and warsupporting industry. It would fulfill reasonable requirements of deterrence vis-a-vis 

every country considered to pose a potential WMD threat to the United States. 

3 
114 

Strengthening Universal Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 

At the same time, an arsenal shrunk to 900 total U.S. weapons matched by 

comparable Russian reductions, would represent a dramatic cut that should work to draw 

the other nuclear countries into a multilateral process culminating in formal arms 

reduction negotiations among all nations with nuclear arms. 

It should also demonstrate a serious U.S. and Russian commitment to fulfilling 

their disarmament obligations under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 

thereby help rally the anti-proliferation community to greater efforts to thwart would-be 

proliferators. The idea is not that virtuous U.S. and Russian behavior in the form of 

nuclear arms reductions could do much to inspire proliferators to abandon their quests for 

large arsenals. There are reasons to believe that such behavior could however inspire our 

anti-proliferation partners to get tougher with recalcitrant states seeking the bomb. 

Reducing U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms through Negotiations 

Reductions to 900 total nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals should 

be the aim of the next round of bilateral New START follow-on negotiations. Unlike 

previous negotiations we should strive to reach a comprehensive. verifiable agreement 

that provides for equal reductions by both. This agreement should count all types of 

strategic and non-strategic weapons - with "freedom to mix" on both sides - and count 

every individual warhead or bomb whether deployed or held in reserve. 

This is not a call for unilateral cuts by the United States. The only valid and useful 

approach should be to negotiate an agreement with the Russians. However, there may 

well be other ways to advance the goal of deep reductions. Some unilateral steps, or 

4 
115 

parallel reciprocal steps along the lines of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, could 

facilitate the effort. 

Russia has already dropped below its allowed ceiling of 1,550 deployed strategic 

forces stipulated by the New START agreement. It may behoove the United States to 

follow in Russia's footsteps and take advantage of Russia's unilateral reductions to 

reduce U.S. forces below the allowed level. This approach would be designed to remove 

the incentive for Russia to build its forces back up while allowing it to take advantage of 

the benefits, set out further in this presentation, of additional reductions. This would 

serve to lower the ceiling on deployments and maintain momentum for further 

reductions. It would match US and Russian forces, take advantage of Russian unilateral 

needs to restrict its force size, maintain stability, and serve as a further reinforcement of 

the process of mutual reductions. There is no reason why the present verification systems 

could not be used or adapted for use for these kinds of steps. In short, there is some scope 

for parallel, reciprocal steps to advance the cause of bilateral arms cuts but we should 

pursue the cuts through direct negotiations with the Russians then, seek to add the other 

nuclear weapons countries to this formal process. 

I also believe it is time to make a fundamental shift in negotiated warhead ceiling 

construct that would allow for the combination of both the tactical and strategic weapons 

to be considered together. This would allow each side to enjoy substantial latitude to 

choose the composition of their own forces, according to their perceived security needs, 

within the total negotiated warhead ceiling. This potential variation in the composition of 

forces is another reason to characterize the proposed U.S. force structure as "illustrative". 

5 
116 

Experts differ on the relative merits of bombers, submarines, and land-based 

missiles, and also debate whether it is necessary to maintain three different types of 

nuclear delivery vehicles in the U.S. arsenal. I strongly support an open debate on the 

appropriate make-up of U.S. nuclear forces and acknowledge that honest differences of 

opinion exist. 

From TRIAD to DYAD: Eliminating the Land-Based Missile Component 

After evaluating the vulnerability, flexibility, and other key characteristics of the 

different delivery systems, a dyad of sea- and air-based strategic weapons, regional 

missile defense, global strike, Special Operations Forces, and General Purpose Forces 

would meet the post-Cold War requirements of deterring a WMD attack on the United 

States. The Minuteman land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) would be 

eliminated in this scheme. The elimination of Minuteman stems from the fact that 

Minuteman is vulnerable and inflexible from a targeting standpoint. 

Minuteman is vulnerable to sudden decimation unless it is launched promptly 

upon tactical warning of an incoming Russian missile strike. The ability to launch the 

Minuteman force promptly (within a few minutes) is often touted as a virtue, but in 

reality it is a liability. In the (admittedly extremely improbable) event ofa large-scale 

Russian nuclear missile strike against the U.S. Minuteman fields, enormolls pressure 

would rapidly be exerted upon the National Command Authority to authorize the 

immediate firing of the force en masse -- the deadline for a presidential (or successor) 

execution decision would be 12 minutes at most in this scenario. Moreover, the 

unleashing of Minuteman forces would necessitate unleashing other strategic missiles --

6 
117 

notably Trident submarine missiles, because of the integrated operational nature of major 

attack options to assure full coverage of all intended targets. 

The second severe deficiency of Minuteman is its targeting inflexibility. It is 

suitable for the most unlikely scenario -- large-scale nuclear war with Russia -- but is 

unsuitable for nuclear conflict with North Korea or Iran because it would have to over fly 

both Russia and possibly China to reach either of them. This could create a situation that 

would add to the fog of conflict and the opportunity for unintended perceptions on the 

part of Russia or China. Put differently, the Minuteman force is suitable only for Russia 

contingencies. 

Neither U.S. strategic submarine missiles nor strategic bombers are constrained 

by these rigid flight trajectories. They are more versatile platforms that offer highly 

flexible directions for attack against practically any target on the globe. Although a 

prompt global strike by Minuteman could be carried out with a single warhead. a Trident 

missile could perform the same mission (if a small number would be downloaded to carry 

a single warhead instead of the multiple warheads now carried) without risk of causing 

Russia to think it is under nuclear missile attack and ordering a nuclear 'counter-strike' in 

retaliation. Moreover. ballistic missile submarines, on alert patrol. can be fired almost as 

quickly as Minuteman missiles if necessary (15 minutes versus 2 minutes).). 

Strategic Force Alert Posture 

The day-to-day high alert posture of the United States today also represents a 

threat to Russia that has untoward, unanticipated consequences for the United States. By 

dint of possessing the ability to fire U.S. strategic missiles promptly on warning ("launch7 
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under-attack" in the operating vernacular), the United States eoncurrently possesses the 

ability to initiate a sudden massive strike against Russia (or any other country). This 

surprise attack option technically threatens the survival of almost all Russian nuclear 

forces in their day-to-day configuration unless, like the United States, Russia launches 

these forces out from under the attack, upon warning. When coupled with U.S. missile 

defenses designed against Russia's strategic retaliatory forces a current Russian fear 

despite American assurances that Russia is not a target of such defenses - this first-strike 

threat puts Russia on even greater vigilanee and launch readiness. 

The upshot is that both U.S. and Russian forces are kept on quick-Iauneh alert 

because the other side does the same. This entwines the two eountries in a proverbial 

"hair-trigger" dynamic that increases the risks of accidental, mistaken, inadvertent, 

misinformed, or unauthorized launch with devastating consequences. Launch on false 

warning is doubly worrisome in light of the chronic deficiencies in Russian early warning 

that are not going away anytime soon. This is a serious risk not to be undertaken without 

the greatest care to avoid it and I believe that can bc donc with thcsc proposals while still 

protecting the essential seeurity interests of the nation. 

These postures also set a terrible example for the other nuclear armed nations, 

who for various reasons have not yet adopted launch-ready postures for their own forces. 

As a rule, their warheads and bombs are kept separate from their means of delivery, a 

safe practice that greatly reduces the danger of an unintended nuclear exchange. We can 

imagine a multitude of grave dangers that would emerge if this practice is abandoned in 

favor of increasing the launch readiness of nuclear forces. Acute instability would arise 

if Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea adopted a quick-launch posture requiring 

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execution decisions to be made within minutes and seconds on the basis of attack early 

warning indications from satellite infrared or ground radar sensors. The risks of 

unauthorized launch, or the terrorist capture of dispersed assembled weapons, would also 

grow significantly. 

In short, the current launch-ready postures of the United States and Russia are 

major sources of instability. They not only generate pressure on leaders to make a premature decision on the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis, but they also run a risk of 

unintentional strikes. The postures pose an existential threat to the very survival of the 

United States, and Russia perceives no less cause for concern. 

A negotiated agreement that cuts the Gordian knot and allows both sides to stand 

down their forces would well serve their vital security and safety interests. In a similar 

vcin, I support a negotiation path that reduces both nations' day-to-day alert posture 

below a level that represents the ability to conduct a decapitating first strike option. In 

the illustrative 900 warhead option, the United States would deploy only 270 U.S. seabased strategic warheads on day-to-day patrol, a number that is below the approximate 

threshold of 300 warheads that constitute a first-strike decapitation threat to Russia. This 

reduced deployment level would further allay Russian concern over its vulnerability and 

encourage it to pull back from its dangerous "hair-trigger" launch posture. 

If the U.S. strategic arsenal required 24 to 72 hours to generate the ability to fire 

and the Russians followed suit, the world would be far safer and a norm would be forged 

to encourage other countries to maintain their current practice of keeping weapons 

separated from their bombers, submarines, and land-based rockets. This is not a unilateral 

step but a reciprocal one, beginning with Russia then followed by others. It would be 

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insured by the levels of reliability we have achieved thus far and can achieve through 

further work on the verification systems and procedures through which we have already 

engaged in our nuclear arrangements with Russia. 

Prompt Launch Constrains Presidential Decision-making 

While some observers may view this 24-72 hour generation requirement as a 

constraint that would hobble a U.S. president in a crisis, the commissions found that the 

current posture, which exerts pressure on the president to make a nuclear choice rapidly, 

is a far greater constraint. Launch-under-attack pressure severely hobbles presidential 

decision-making. It deprives our leaders of the time necessary for deliberation and of the 

tools needed to direct U.S. power to coherent national purpose. 

New Strategy and Tools to Support Presidential Conflict Deliberation and Choice 

Given the diversity and lethality of21 st Century threats, considering nuclear 

forces in isolation is no longer appropriate. We must use all tools available to both 

relieve the pressure on our leaders and reduce our reliance on nuclear only options as a 

primary or unique choice in the face of aggression. 

The growing role for missile defenses and conventional forces include a new 

ICBM (HTV-2) with a conventional warhead and sufficient range to reach practically any 

target in the world from home bases on U.S. soil without traversing Russian territory 

during flight. Its range and accuracy would provide an unprecedented tool for 

destroying critical targets globally within one hour. At present, the only tool available to 

the president for such a global quick strike is a nuclear warhead atop a land- or sea-based 

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missile. Special Operations Forces also have a role in the ever increasing threat of 

terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. They must have the tools to detect, 

track and neutralize this emergent threat; a threat that is not reasonably addressed by 

strategic nuclear forces. 

Missile defenses and conventional offensive forces as well as other kinetic and 

non-kinetic (cyber) tools of warfare, and various 'soft power' tools would be designed to 

buy time for a day or two and exert non-nuclear leverage to resolve a dispute before it 

could escalate to nuclear dimensions. This strategy would empower a president, not 

hobble him by extending the deadline for a nuclear decision thus providing some stability 

during a crisis. Again, it is the paucity of non-nuclear options and the time pressure to 

resort to nuclear options that represents the fundamental problem for presidential choice 

Downsizing the Nuclear Complex; Risks and Cost Savings 

The number of different types of nuclear weapons in the U.S. active inventory can 

be decreased from seven types today to four by 2022. The need to re-furbish weapons 

remaining in the stockpile would greatly diminish as almost all weapons previously 

requiring refurbishment could be eliminated from the active inventory. This curtailing of 

the life extension programs for thousands of weapons currently in the pipeline would 

save at least $10 billion. 

The existing plutonium pit facility at Los Alamos should be evaluated for its 

ability to service the regular pit manufacturing demands of a 900-warhead arsenal. 

Assuming a 50-year pit shelflife, only 2 percent of the active stockpile, or 18 warheads, 

would need to be re-manufactured each year. The facility has a normal throughput 

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capacity of about 20 per year with the possible option to add extra staff shifts in order to 

raise capacity to 40 pits per year. With the addition of extra equipment (5-6 years to 

install), the capacity could be increased to perhaps as high as 80 per year. 

This number would grow higher still if old pits could be re-used and if pits with 

sensitive, conventional high explosives could be re-fitted with insensitive high explosives 

to improve safety. Current studies underway at the U.S. national laboratories, to be 

completed within the next couple of years, should detennine the feasibility of these 

options. Preliminary analyses suggest that upwards of 50 percent of plutonium pits in the 

stockpile could be swapped out in these processes, allowing for a much faster rate of pit 

replacement. 

In an emergency in which a systemic detect in one of the four warhead types 

warranted a crash effort to replace those warheads, it appears feasible that upwards of 

120 defective weapons per year could be remedied through a combination of pit 

manufacturing and pit re-use. Such a systemic defect is a low-probability event, but 

assuming 225 defective warheads (notionally one-fourth of the 900-warhead total) 

needed to be repaired, it would take approximately two years of full-capacity work to 

finish the job. 

In short, the current plutonium facility with some new equipment and working 

overtime with other partners such as the Pantex facility could probably handle an unusual 

emergency to replace a big chunk of the arsenal. The risk of reduced stockpile reliability 

must be acknowledged, if we shrink the variety of warhead types from seven to four, and 

the margin of comfort for replacing an entire category of weapons in the event of a 

systemic defect is not large. On balance, these risks seem to be manageable however, I 

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strongly recommend a full-scope survey by the pertinent agencies (National Nuclear 

Security Agency --NNSA, the national laboratories, and Strategic Command) to 

determine an optimal infrastructure in support ofthe 900-warhead arsenal outlined in the 

commission report. 

Downsizing the Nuclear Force Structure; Risks and Cost Savings 

Unforeseen Nuclear Challengers? 

One concern is whether our illustrative force would be stretched thin and fall 

short if an unanticipated threat of major proportions emerged from an unexpected source 

- perhaps an unfriendly state that unexpectedly breaks out a substantial nuclear arsenal, 

or an existing state such as China that greatly expands its nuclear arsenal. (In China's 

case, its recent nuclear modernization created an infrastructure capable of substantially 

increasing its existing small arsenal if it chose to do so.) 

The answer to this has three parts. First, this is an intelligence challenge that 

wan'ants an intelligence estimate as to the likelihood of such break-out or rapid expansion 

scenarios over the next 10 years. A Chinese surge is unlikely to yield an arsenal much 

larger than 250-300 warheads. A Russian surge appears both financially and technically 

implausible. Although Russia has begun a strategic modernization program with 

upwards of$70 billion earmarked for this purpose over the next ten years (an amount far 

less than the planned U.S. strategic modernization budget over the same period), the 

ability of its military-industrial infrastructure to deliver the goods has proven to be quite 

impaired. Pakistan, currently an unfriendly ally of the United States, is rapidly growing 

its arsenal but its focus is India. Other candidates for such a surge are unclear. In short, 

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while I do not claim clairvoyance, the prospect that any aspiring proliferator or existing 

nuclear-armed nation will undertake a crash build-up on a large scale is remote. 

Second, it is highly doubtful that any of the hypothetical possibilities could unfold 

without being detected. Since the beginning of the nuclear age, no nation has ever 

produced enough nuclear weapons material to build a bomb without first being detected 

by foreign intelligence. (This applies even to the super-secret U.S. Manhattan project in 

the mid-1940s before the advent of satellite survei Ilance or on-site inspections.) It strains 

credulity to project a breakout of such a magnitude over the next ten years that the United 

States would wake up one morning and find itself "out-gunned". 

Third, in any case the proposed U.S. arsenal is sufficient to project a draconian 

threat of retaliation against any and all possible nuclear newcomers or late-bloomers over 

the next decade and beyond. It is sufficient to deter reliably any conceivable threat on the 

horizon. 

Cost Savings 

A significant cost savings would accrue if the illustrative force structure is 

implemented. A force reduction that includes the elimination of all Minuteman missiles 

(and cancellation of its replacement), removal of all B-52 nuclear bomber configurations 

and all tactical nuclear forces in the U.S. inventory, combined with a scaling back of 

future strategic submarine construction from 12 to 10 boats and of the strategic bomber 

replacement aircraft to a minimum number of nuclear-capable aircraft (c.g. 30), would 

save an estimated $100 billion over the next 15 years. As notcd earlier, the illustrative 

force would also impose lighter dcmands on the nuclear complex, saving an additional 

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(est.) $20 billion during this period. The total savings for our proposed nuclear 

architecture is roughly estimated to be $120 billion over the next 15 years. 

Conclusion 

The nuclear strategy, force structure and posture proposal is not necessarily the 

Holy Grail for the next phase of our nation's pursuit of security in the 21 st century. The 

recommendations, however, are designed to more squarely and effectively address the 

real threats that our nation will be facing over the next decade than current U.S. nuclear 

policy promises. A fundamental transformation of our nuclear architecture and policy is 

needed to maintain a credible U.S. deterrent against classical risks of nuclear aggression 

by other nations while preserving strategic stability and protecting the nation against 

nuclear proliferation, terrorism, cyber warfare, failed states, organized crime, regional 

conflict and other threats the 21 st century has wrought. I appreciate the opportunity to 

present these findings and join the debate. 

15 
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Tim Morrison, 20130303 

Senior Military and Defense Officials Who Disagree with Global Zero 

Global Zero Position 

(Pages 12 and 13) The follow-on nuclear ICBM program on the drawing boards would be 

cancelled, the plans for a fleet of next-generation bombers altered and the Trident follow-on 

program delayed. All existing ICBM facilities and delivery vehicles, and all B-52 bombers, 

would be dismantled or converted to carry only conventional munitions over the course of the 

next decade. 

(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this illustrative plan could be carried 

out in unison by the United States and Russia through reciprocal presidential directives, 

negotiated in another round of bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented unilaterally. 

Counterpoint: the U.S, Military's view 

President Barack Obama: "I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear 

delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air- launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM:,] 

Presidenl Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review: Retaining all three Triad legs will best 

maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems 

or vulnerabilities. 

Senator Chuck Hagel, Nominee to be Secretary of Defense: "I don't -- I do not agree with any 

recommendation that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear warheads 

and our capability ... Every -- every option that we must look at, every action we must take to 

reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be 

negotiated. ,,2 

Secretary of the Air Force. Michael Donley: "I think, as, our nuclear force structure potentially 

gets smaller in the context of START, it's all the more important that we maintain a balanced 

triad going forward ... In the cootext of rising nuclear capabilities elsewhere in the world, it's even 

more important that we have the flexibility across land and air-based and sea-based legs of the 

triad. We have flexibility of basing those, in targeting methods and other aspects of this mission 

that give us confidence that we can continue to deter potential nuclear ambitions of others and 

that we have the flexibility to respond if necessary through various means."} 

Gen. C. Rohert Kehler. USAF Commander, US. Strategic Command: "The Triad ofSSBNs, 

ICBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, all with their associated support elements-offers a 

mutually reinforcing strategic package that provides a credible deterrent to our adversaries, 

assurance to our allies and partners, and flexibility for the President.,,4 

I Message from the President on the New START Treaty to the Senate of the United States. February 02, 2011. 

2 Senate Armed Services Committee, Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Former Nebraska Republican 

Senator Chuck Hagel to be Secretary of Defense. Jan. 31,2013. 

3 John Reed, Foreign Policy.com. July 25, 2012. 

" Prepared Statement, General C. Robert Kehler, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Testimony before 

the House Armed Services Committee. March 5, 2013. 
127 

Tim Morrison. 20130303 

Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command: "1 do not support what 

former vice chairman [Cartwright has said], although he and 1 are friends, and I certainly respect 

his opinion, I respect his intellectual horsepower on these kinds of issues ... But 1 do not think that 

we are in the place that he suggests now, nor do I see that particular place any time soon," he 

said, referring to a world where nuclear forces can be cut beyond current planned reductions. 

Regarding the Global Zero report, in my view we have the force size, force structure, and force 

posture today that we need for our national security needs."; 

General Kevin Chilton, USAF, then-Commander, U.S'. STRA TCOM: "The arsenal that we have is 

exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. ,,6 

Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, USAF Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command: "The world 

we live in today is not a world that is ready for zero nuclear weapons ... So what do we need to 

think about? [there is a1 temptation that lower numbers might be offering other nations to 

expand their arsenals and to join us at the high end of nuclear capability.,,7 

Major General William Chambers, USAF Assistant Chief ofStaO/or Strategic Deterrence and 

Nuclear Integration -

Detailed analysis done for the Nuclear Posture Review explored a range of force 

structures and determined we should retain the three delivery systems. In our Post-Cold 

War era, the triad continues to provide the best blend of capabilities to guarantee a safe, 

secure and effective nuclear deterrent. 

In times of tight budgets, some claim we can no longer afford the triad and should 

eliminate one leg. Such an argument contains two fallacies. The first is that budget 

pressure should drive us to eliminate the ICBM. On the contrary, an enduring ICBM is an 

existential security requirement, true in flush times and lean, The second is that no future 

enemy would consider nuclear use or coercion. The existence of our credible nuclear 

deterrent is the very thing that turns that hope into reality8 

5 Bill Gertz, "No to Nuke Zero." The Washington Free Beacon. August 9, 2012. 

6 General Kevin Chilton, USAF. Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START Treaty. 

2010. 

7 Elaine Grossman, "U.S. Nuclear Commander Warns Against Rushing Fmther Arms Cuts." Global Security 

Newswire, September 14, 2012, 

8 Major General William Chambers, USAF. "Keep Triad 'Best Blend' OflCBMs. Boomers. Bombers; 'We Can 

Afford Them'." AOL Defense. November I. 2012. 
128 

Tim Morrison, 20130303 

Jim Kowalski (il. 

Deter & Assure. Triad of subs, ICBMs, bombers affordable/effective guarantee of national 

sovreignty in uncertain world. 

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroji. USAF (ret.): "given the clear risks and the elusive benefits inherent in 

additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate such reductions to 

demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance U.S. security. Absent such a 

demonstration, we should not pursue additional cuts in the mistaken belief that fewer is ipso 

facto better:·9 

General Larry Welch, USAF (ret.): 

"The only basis for the idea that drastically reducing the number of nukes we have would 

magically make us safer and help eliminate other nuclear dangers is hope. But hope is not 

a plan, and hope is not a basis for security. Hope does not defend us. I would ask who 

would be willing to rely on hope for the safety and security of their family? No one 

would do that. The answer is nobody. Then why would anyone then rely on hope for the 

safety and security of this country and of more than 30 countries that depend on our 

extended deterrent? Leading the world to zero nuclear weapons is, at best, a fairy tale:' 

"my belief that adequate strength in each leg of the triad is even more important today 

than it was at the height of the Cold War. Doing away with one of these legs does 

violence to one or more of essential four characteristics of an adequate deterrent force. To 

do so would increase risk." 10 

9 Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, "Which nuke policy"" Washington Times. Washington, D.C.: Mar 24. 1997. 

pg. A.IS. 

10 Remarks by General Larry Welch, USAF (ret.). May 2S, 2012. 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 19, 2013 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. 1) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the material in the questions submitted to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated that: 

‘‘(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this illustrative plan 

could be carried out in unison by the United States and Russia through reciprocal 

presidential directives, negotiated in another round of bilateral arms reduction 

talks, or implemented unilaterally.’’ 

In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-Senator Hagel stated: 

‘‘I don’t—I do not agree with any recommendation that would unilaterally take any 

action to further reduce our nuclear warheads and our capability . . . Every—every 

option that we must look at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary Hagel? 

b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent for verification 

that isn’t treaty based? 

c. Is verification important because we have to know if there’s cheating? 

d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) several times as 

an example of how further reductions, and actions like de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in compliance with those Initiatives, in 

other words, it is cheating? Does that change your endorsement of that approach? 

Dr. PAYNE. The authors of the Global Zero report, including Dr. Blair, state specifically (on pages 1, 16 and 18) that unilateral U.S. reductions should be considered 

an acceptable course of action. 

As noted in the question, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) often are 

cited as examples of unilateral reductions. The PNIs were commitments by U.S. and 

Russian leaderships to extensive limits on their tactical nuclear weapons. According 

to considerable official Russian information, Russia is in violation of these commitments and has been so for years. A robust verification regime and vigorous U.S. response to Russian cheating that is discovered are essential to the integrity of any 

arms control process involving Russian strategic and tactical forces. In the absence 

of verification and compliance enforcement, Russia will violate such arms control 

agreements at its convenience. This has been the historical experience. 

Mr. ROGERS. 2) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments would you have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report that ‘‘mutual assured destruction 

(MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.’’ On the other hand, Vladimir Putin tells his people that ‘‘[n]uclear 

weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and balance’’. 

Sir, which of you is right? 

Dr. PAYNE. Russia places more emphasis on nuclear deterrence now than it did 

during the Cold War. The Russian political and military leadership is absolutely 

clear in its public statements that nuclear deterrence remains its highest priority 

and that the United States and allies are Russia’s number one enemy. Russia’s vigorous nuclear modernization programs reflect these views. 

Mr. ROGERS. 3) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments do you have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that ‘‘the obligation to assure U.S. 

allies in Europe and Asia of American commitment to their defense and to extend 

deterrence to them would fall to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, 

which are amply capable of fulfilling it.’’ Sir, why, in your estimate has NATO 

asked, three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear weapons—a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons—in Europe? 

Dr. PAYNE. NATO members have emphasized in the most recent open NATO consensus documents that nuclear deterrence is essential to NATO security and that 

the existing arrangement of U.S. nuclear weapons and Dual Capable Aircraft located in Europe are an essential element of NATO’s deterrence posture. Several key 
132 

NATO allies have openly expressed considerable concern over suggestions that the 

U.S. would withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe. 

Mr. ROGERS. 4) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we could partly offset our nuclear 

force with ‘‘a stood-up alert missile defense and conventional force capability that 

is prompt and global, and that can function sufficiently well for 24–72 hours.’’ 

Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these capabilities, and the 

Senate has traditionally been hostile to conventional prompt global strike, can you 

state how much it would cost to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do we need, for example, to counter Iran’s thousands of short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles? 

a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need to defend 

Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all three combined? 

b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you describe? 

c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we wouldn’t in fact 

save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear capability? 

Dr. PAYNE. Missile defense and conventional prompt global strike can add to U.S. 

deterrence capabilities. However, no one, including the authors of the Global Zero 

report, know if or to what degree nonnuclear forces can offset U.S. nuclear forces 

for deterrence. No one, including the authors of the Global Zero report, can predict 

the future functioning of deterrence in such detail. Available evidence suggests 

strongly that in some cases, U.S. nuclear weapons have been essential both for the 

deterrence of opponents and the assurance of allies. There is no evidence to suggest 

that the value of nuclear weapons for these purposes has declined. Indeed, contemporary statements of key allies demonstrate the continuing assurance requirement 

for U.S. nuclear forces. In addition, serious programs attempting to substitute conventional forces for nuclear deterrence purposes would likely entail greater costs 

than would be saved via the nuclear force reductions recommended in the Global 

Zero report. 

Mr. ROGERS. 5) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes into a great deal of detail on 

U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels. Can you please describe how it helps to deal 

with the threat of instability in Pakistan’s nuclear program? Why have you invested 

so much time in dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like Pakistan’s nuclear program? 

Dr. PAYNE. Placing strategic arms control negotiations with Russia as the central 

focus of U.S. nuclear policy and attention is an inheritance of the Cold War and an 

obsolete practice in the contemporary threat environment. More important are efforts to address Russian tactical nuclear weapons, Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities, and the Iranian nuclear program. To date, there is no apparent 

success in any of these, and the 2010 New START Treaty with Russia did not require any Russian deployed warhead or launcher reductions and has provided no 

apparent improvement in efforts to secure nonproliferation goals vis-a`-vis North 

Korea, Iran or elsewhere. 

Mr. ROGERS. 6) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: do you wish to comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for increased reliance on missile defenses 

and ‘‘passive hardening’’ to deter or defeat a regional adversary for 24 to 72 hours. 

Yet, you try to have it both ways by capping missile defenses to not agitate Russia 

and China. 

a. Please explain what you mean by ‘‘hardening’’ and ‘‘sheltering’’? How expensive 

would bomb shelters to ride out North Korean or Iranian missile defenses be? 

b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out 24 to 72 

hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea? 

c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense program by 

10 to 50 percent? 

d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ‘‘100 exclusion zones,’’ as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile defenses? How do you expect our 

Eastern European NATO allies would feel about that? 

Dr. PAYNE. The programs identified in the Global Zero report, including hardening and sheltering, missile defense, and advanced conventional weapons, if undertaken to provide an alternative to nuclear forces for deterrence, would likely cost 

far more than the savings that could be realized by the deep reduction in U.S. nuclear forces. The Nuclear Zero report gives only one side of the cost implications of 

its proposal by identifying only the potential saving from nuclear reductions. It does 

not provide any net assessment that includes the additional unavoidable costs of its 
133 

missile defense and conventional force recommendations—thus it misleadingly 

points only to great cost savings. The notion of pushing ‘‘100 exclusion zones’’ within 

NATO is fanciful and would likely further degrade the U.S. ability to assure several 

key allies who already are wary of recent U.S. policy initiatives that appear to them 

to disadvantage their security. 

Mr. ROGERS. 7) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, why is a ‘‘no first use’’ policy a bad 

idea? Why have we never had one? 

Dr. PAYNE. A ‘‘no first use’’ policy would tell opponents that they need not fear 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent if they use chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction against the United States or allies. It also would tell U.S. allies that the 

U.S. nuclear umbrella is not available to protect them from chemical or biological 

weapons, or from attacks by an opponent with overwhelming conventional capabilities. As such, a U.S. ‘‘no first use’’ policy should degrade the U.S. capability to deter 

chemical and biological weapons threats, and it would cause enormous concern 

among at least some key allies about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

In addition, it is far from clear what practical benefit this declaratory policy would 

provide. There is, for example, no evidence to suggest that it would contribute to 

U.S. nonproliferation goals or inspire others to ‘‘follow the U.S. lead.’’ 

Mr. ROGERS. 8) Would you please describe China’s so-called ‘‘no first use’’ policy? 

Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why does that matter? 

Dr. PAYNE. China’s ‘‘no first use’’ policy is highly ambiguous with regard to its 

actual meaning. This is not by accident. Chinese officials state that maintaining 

strategic ambiguity regarding China’s nuclear policies and forces is done intentionally. Even as stated openly by the Chinese, there are numerous conditions and 

caveats pertaining to the ‘‘no first use’’ policy. No one should expect this declaratory 

policy to affect China’s actual planning for the use of nuclear weapons. This is important because U.S. planning should take into account the potential for China’s 

first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a severe military crisis in Asia, particularly if the crisis involves Taiwan. 

Mr. ROGERS. 9) Please describe China’s nuclear program, China’s aspirations as 

a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero recommendations in 

terms of extended deterrence in that region? 

Dr. PAYNE. According to open reports, China has vigorous nuclear force modernization programs. China’s aspiration is for a nuclear capability that is at least 

adequate to deter the United States from responding forcefully to Chinese political 

and military initiatives in Asia. For example, China has most recently disputed Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa. These initiatives could easily lead to crisis confrontations with the United States and U.S. allies. The Global Zero report’s stated 

presumption that nuclear deterrence is not, and will not be pertinent to U.S. relations with China is a hope expressed as a truth. The report’s recommendations 

threaten to undermine the U.S. capability to deter China and the U.S. capability 

to assure allies who feel threatened by China. Against these potential risks, there 

are no plausible benefits for U.S. extended deterrence likely to be realized from its 

recommended policies. 

Mr. ROGERS. 10) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Would you care to respond to any 

of the questions noted below? 

Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and 

Posture, states that ‘‘Precision-guided conventional munitions hold at risk nearly 

the entire spectrum of potential targets, and they are useable.’’ (p.2) 

Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ‘‘nearly the entire 

spectrum of potential targets’’ addressed by nuclear weapons, it seems reasonable 

to assume that such weapons should become part of nuclear arms control negotiations. 

a. Do you agree? If not, why not? 

b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ‘‘nearly the entire spectrum 

of potential targets’’ at risk? How much would that cost and when could we deploy 

them? 

c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been particularly 

willing to fund conventional prompt global strike capabilities. How does our inability 

to develop and deploy them affect your illustrated reduction scenario? 

Dr. PAYNE. According to the Global Zero report, U.S. advanced conventional weapons can hold at risk only a fraction of the targets traditionally assigned to U.S. nuclear forces (page 11). And, given the prospective cost of these systems and the cost 

of the support infrastructure necessary for these systems, any plan to substitute 

them for nuclear deterrence forces is almost certain to cost more than the savings 

possible via their substitution. 

Advanced conventional forces can, nevertheless, contribute to deterrence by expanding the threat options available to a president; they should not be captured by 
134 

arms control agreements. Unfortunately, the administration’s New START Treaty 

already places limits on these systems. Moreover, Russia insists on further restrictions on advanced conventional strike capabilities as a condition for follow-on negotiations on reducing nuclear arms. 

Mr. ROGERS. 11) Dr. Payne: Why do you say that the flexibility and resilience of 

the U.S. arsenal may be key for deterrence? 

Dr. PAYNE. The flexibility and resilience of the U.S. nuclear arsenal may be key 

to U.S. deterrence effectiveness because the contemporary threat environment is diverse and shifting in terms of threats, opposing leaderships, contexts, and stakes. 

Requirements for deterrence effectiveness, correspondingly, are likely to vary greatly; one size and type of nuclear deterrent is unlikely to provide the type of credible 

deterrent effect needed to address a wide spectrum of plausible severe threats. Consequently, the U.S. arsenal must be sufficiently flexible and resilient to adopt U.S. 

deterrence capabilities to an extremely diverse threat environment. In short, the 

flexibility and resilience of the U.S. arsenal is likely to be a key to U.S. deterrence 

effectiveness. Those qualities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are related directly to its 

size and diversity and would be threatened by the recommendations of the Global 

Zero report. 

Mr. ROGERS. 12) Dr. Payne: How is it that these deterrence qualities (flexibility 

and resilience) are linked to the size and diversity of U.S. forces? 

Dr. PAYNE. The flexibility and resilience of U.S. deterrence forces are linked directly to the size and diversity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The spectrum of possible 

U.S. nuclear threat options will depend on the variety of weapons and weapon platforms available. And, a large, diverse arsenal simply permits a wider array of deterrence threat options. Similarly, a large, diverse arsenal provides a greater variety 

of weapons and platforms with which to adopt to the shifting deterrence requirements of an ever-changing threat environment. If the future were fixed and benign, 

perhaps a small, fixed nuclear arsenal could be known to be adequate. But the future is not fixed and the emerging threat environment hardly appears to be benign. 

Consequently, flexibility and resilience are likely key ingredients to effective deterrence, and directly related to the size and diversity of the U.S. arsenal. 

Mr. ROGERS. 13) Dr. Payne: Do you have any recommendations regarding the 

number of U.S. forces needed for the requisite level of force flexibility and resilience? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. There are three benchmarks. First, the U.S. nuclear triad of 

launchers—bombers, ICBMs, and submarine-launched missiles—is a source of great 

flexibility and resilience for the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This is why the bipartisan 

Congressional Strategic Posture Commission emphasized the need to sustain the 

triad in its 2009 consensus report. 

Second, following considerable analysis of the question, the 2001 NPR identified 

a range of 1700–2200 operationally deployed weapons and preservation of the triad 

as adequate for the needed flexibility and resilience. 

Similarly, in 2010, Gen. Kevin Chilton said in open testimony that given this need 

for flexibility, he could accept no lower ceiling on U.S. deployed strategic nuclear 

forces than that of the 2010 New START Treaty, i.e., 1550. In doing so, he added 

elsewhere that the Treaty’s bomber counting rules actually allowed a greater number of weapons than 1550, and that this factor was important in his acceptance of 

the ceiling. 

The threat environment has only become more complex and dangerous since those 

numbers were identified. There has been no apparent basis for concluding that flexibility and resilience are now somehow less important or available with fewer weapons and launchers. In fact, the threat environment appears to be heading in darker 

directions. 

Mr. ROGERS. 14) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear reductions 

could degrade the deterrence of opponents? 

Dr. PAYNE. First, deep U.S. nuclear reductions will pressure the U.S. to move its 

deterrence threats to targets that are vulnerable and relatively few in number. Consequently, most proponents of deep nuclear reductions identify an opponent’s soft 

civilian targets as the basis for the U.S. minimal deterrent threat. However, given 

the well-known U.S. desire to minimize civilian casualties, some opponents are likely to see such a U.S. deterrent threat as incredible for most all plausible contingencies. Some opponents have expressed this view openly. In addition, if the opponent is armed with a nuclear or biological arsenal, it may be particularly incredible 

for the U.S. to threaten to respond against that opponent’s soft civilian targets given 

the opponent’s likely capability to counter reply against U.S. vulnerable civilian targets. The deterrent threat that the U.S. would engage in a mutual process of destroying civilian targets may simply be an incredible U.S. deterrent as perceived by 
135 

at least some opponents, and thus an ineffective deterrent. It is not a prospect that 

should be encouraged by U.S. policy. 

Second, deep nuclear reductions would likely reduce the flexibility and resilience 

of the U.S. arsenal, particularly if it led to elimination of the triad, as is likely. This 

would increase the prospects for deterrence failure because the U.S. might not have 

the number and/or diversity of nuclear forces necessary for deterrence purposes on 

those occasions when nuclear deterrence would be necessary to preserve peace or 

limit escalation. 

Third, a very small U.S. nuclear arsenal almost certainly would be more vulnerable to attack by an opponent’s covertly or overtly deployed forces. An effective U.S. 

deterrent force is one that does not invite attack upon itself by appearing vulnerable 

to enemy attack. Such a condition could encourage an opponent to strike first in a 

crisis when it otherwise would not consider such a strategy, and thereby degrade 

deterrence. Small U.S. numbers would, in this sense, be ‘‘destabilizing.’’ 

Fourth, a very small and thus more vulnerable U.S. nuclear arsenal could inspire 

nuclear arms competition by lowering the bar for opponents to acquire a capability 

to threaten the survivability of the U.S. deterrent. The U.S. forces recommended in 

the Global Zero report, for example, would leave the bulk of U.S. deployed strategic 

nuclear forces vulnerable to a very small number of enemy nuclear weapons. Such 

a U.S. arsenal could encourage opponents to move toward covert deployments and/ 

or noncompliance with arms control measures for the same reason. 

Mr. ROGERS. 15) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear reductions 

could degrade the assurance of allies? 

Dr. PAYNE. Several U.S. allies, notably South Korea and Japan, already are deeply concerned that the U.S. drive to denuclearize is not reciprocated by the neighboring countries that pose nuclear-armed threats to them. They fear that further 

U.S. nuclear reductions simply will further degrade the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent that is key to their security. As a consequence, some senior leaders 

in these allied countries now question the continued reliability of the U.S. ‘‘nuclear 

umbrella’’ as never before. They see the robustness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and 

declared U.S. deterrence policy as critical to their own security, and thus are particularly disturbed by U.S. moves to denuclearize without corresponding movement 

that reduces the threats they face. The blatant fact that U.S. denuclearization appears to have no moderating effect on North Korean, Chinese, Iranian or Russian 

nuclear programs has led to the degradation of the important U.S. strategic goal of 

providing security assurance to some allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. 16) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep reductions could actually promote nuclear proliferation? 

Dr. PAYNE. Further deep U.S. nuclear reductions will deepen the concern already 

apparent among some key allies that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is losing credibility. 

Further U.S. deep nuclear reductions will compel some of these key allies to reconsider their commitment to their current nonnuclear status. This is not speculation; 

some allied political leaders already are expressing precisely these views. Consequently, further U.S. deep nuclear reductions could easily provoke, not prevent, 

further nuclear proliferation. 

Mr. ROGERS. 17) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear reductions 

could actually lead to a need to increase U.S. defense spending? 

Dr. PAYNE. The savings that would be available via even deep reductions in the 

number of U.S. nuclear weapons would not be substantial, as was most recently observed in open testimony by Dr. Don Cook, a senior official at NNSA. This is so because the costs of nuclear weapons generally are not driven directly by the number 

of nuclear weapons: a substantial reduction in warhead numbers would not yield 

similarly substantial savings. The potential for savings would come largely from 

abandonment of one or more legs of the triad. However, deep nuclear reductions in 

forces and launchers would necessitate a substantial expansion of U.S. advanced 

conventional weapons and improvement or replacement of some key enabling systems. The cost of doing so would almost certainly be more than the savings that 

could be realized by moving to a nuclear dyad, as recommended in the Global Zero 

report. 

Mr. ROGERS. 18) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that nuclear deterrence could 

contribute to countering terrorism? 

Dr. PAYNE. Historical evidence shows with no doubt that some terrorists organizations can be deterred indirectly on at least some occasions by deterring state sponsors of terror from providing support to their terrorist clients. There is no reason 

whatsoever to conclude that these state sponsors of terrorism, such as North Korea 

and Iran, are immune to U.S. nuclear deterrence threats. Consequently, the assertion that U.S. nuclear capabilities are irrelevant to terrorism is common but contrary to evidence and logic. 
136 

Mr. ROGERS. 19) Dr. Payne: Why do you doubt that U.S. advanced conventional 

forces can substitute for nuclear forces for deterrence and assurance purposes? 

Dr. PAYNE. Advanced U.S. conventional forces and missile defense can contribute 

to deterrence. However, historical and anthropological studies indicate that nuclear 

weapons can provide unique deterrence effect because opponents perceive them as 

promising incalculable and unpredictable punishment for aggression against the 

U.S. and allies. Also, the percentage of casualties (of the global population) due to 

warfare calculated over centuries shows a dramatic and unprecedented drop following the introduction of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. This reflects the 

historical fact that conventional deterrence fails catastrophically with some regularity. This has not been the case for nuclear deterrence, perhaps because nuclear 

weapons uniquely present would-be aggressors with incalculable, unpredictable punishment. The assertion that conventional weapons will substitute reliably for nuclear forces for deterrence purposes is a hope/wish that does not reflect available 

evidence. 

Mr. ROGERS. 20) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

The President said at the State of the Union address last month that, ‘‘we will 

engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our 

ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following the President’s 

leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral reductions under the New START 

treaty, who has followed us in reducing? As you know, Russia was already below 

two of the three ‘‘central limits’’ of the New START treaty upon entry into force of 

the treaty. 

Dr. PAYNE. There is little or no evidence that U.S. denuclearization has any positive impact on nuclear nonproliferation efforts or more formal arms control negotiations. No country appears to be following the U.S. lead in this regard—quite the 

contrary. In addition, there is available evidence that suggests that further deep 

U.S. nuclear reductions will motivate some allies and friends in the direction of nuclear proliferation. The linkage suggested by President Obama is common expression of hope unsupported by available evidence. 

Mr. ROGERS. 21) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was stated that ‘‘this illustrative 

agenda with its deep cuts and de-alerting would strongly validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help preserve it in the face of challenges by North Korea, Iran and 

other prospective proliferators.’’ 

a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further nuclear reductions 

by the United States and Russia (if Russia is interested) will strengthen the NonProliferation Treaty and deal with the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? 

Specifically, what will other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the 

spread of nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further. 

Dr. PAYNE. There is little or no evidence suggesting the validity of this linkage 

claimed in the Global Zero report. Instead, considerable evidence suggests that further deep U.S. nuclear reductions could hasten the collapse of the NPT by motivating U.S. friends and allies to move toward their own independent nuclear capabilities. In addition, the frequent assertion that the NPT mandates U.S. deep nuclear reductions independent of global movement toward general and complete disarmament is false. 

Mr. ROGERS. 22) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that 

‘‘fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years— 

including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries—enable us to 

fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced 

reliance on nuclear weapons’’? 

a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this calculus? 

Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we can’t sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President’s sequester. Doesn’t this mean, if the logic of the NPR 

holds true, that, the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and 

conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered? 

Dr. PAYNE. First, available historical evidence suggests strongly that conventional 

weapons can contribute to deterrence, but not that they can replace nuclear weapons for the needed deterrent effect on at least some occasions. In some cases, it is 
137 

implausible to expect conventional forces to provide the necessary lethality or psychological effect needed for deterrence purposes. 

Second, if U.S. policy, nevertheless, is to rely on conventional forces for deterrence, the number and types of conventional forces necessary, and the necessary 

supporting infrastructure, would likely be far more expensive than modernization 

of the triad and the nuclear weapons infrastructure. In any event, there is little evidence to suggest that the U.S. will invest in these conventional force programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. 23) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the material in the questions submitted to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated that: 

‘‘(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this illustrative plan 

could be carried out in unison by the United States and Russia through reciprocal 

presidential directives, negotiated in another round of bilateral arms reduction 

talks, or implemented unilaterally.’’ 

In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-Senator Hagel stated: 

‘‘I don’t—I do not agree with any recommendation that would unilaterally take any 

action to further reduce our nuclear warheads and our capability . . . Every—every 

option that we must look at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary Hagel? 

b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent for verification 

that isn’t treaty based? 

c. Is verification important because we have to know if there’s cheating? 

d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) several times as 

an example of how further reductions, and actions like de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in compliance with those Initiatives, in 

other words, it is cheating? Does that change your endorsement of that approach? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have no additional comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 24) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments would you have 

regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report that ‘‘mutual assured destruction 

(MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.’’ On the other hand, Vladimir Putin tells his people that ‘‘[n]uclear 

weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and balance’’. 

Sir, which of you is right? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have no additional comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 25) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments do you have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that ‘‘the obligation to assure U.S. 

allies in Europe and Asia of American commitment to their defense and to extend 

deterrence to them would fall to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, 

which are amply capable of fulfilling it.’’ Sir, why, in your estimate has NATO 

asked, three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear weapons—a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons—in Europe? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. It is not possible to know for certain why European leaders 

have repeatedly requested that the United States maintain tactical nuclear weapons 

on their territory. Nevertheless, it is likely that three factors in explain this point 

of view. First, forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons have traditionally underpinned extended deterrence by providing limited nuclear options that could be exercised in response to conventional or nuclear aggression. During the Cold War, for 

example, Western conventional military forces were considered insufficient on their 

own to deter or counter an assault by the Warsaw Pact, because the Soviets and 

their satellites enjoyed a sizeable quantitative advantage. At the same time, U.S. 

strategic nuclear forces were not considered a credible deterrent to an invasion, because their use would trigger a reprisal against American targets by Soviet strategic 

forces. Second, although the Cold War is long-since over, these weapons continue to 

provide an important hedge against the prospect that relations between NATO and 

the Russian Federation could deteriorate in the future. Moreover, once withdrawn, 

it could be extremely difficult to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe given 

a confluence of fiscal, political, and operational-military considerations. Third, if the 

United States further reduces its conventional military presence in Europe, and if 

European nations fail to increase their own defense spending, then forward-deployed 

tactical nuclear weapons would arguably become the most important element of the 

alliance, and the key factor that ensures the security of America’s NATO partners— 

even in the absence of a near-term threat from Russia. 
138 

Mr. ROGERS. 26) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we could partly offset our nuclear 

force with ‘‘a stood-up alert missile defense and conventional force capability that 

is prompt and global, and that can function sufficiently well for 24–72 hours.’’ 

Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these capabilities, and the 

Senate has traditionally been hostile to conventional prompt global strike, can you 

state how much it would cost to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do we need, for example, to counter Iran’s thousands of short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles? 

a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need to defend 

Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all three combined? 

b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you describe? 

c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we wouldn’t in fact 

save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear capability? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have no additional comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 27) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes into a great deal of detail on 

U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels. Can you please describe how it helps to deal 

with the threat of instability in Pakistan’s nuclear program? Why have you invested 

so much time in dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like Pakistan’s nuclear program? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have no additional comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 28) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: do you wish to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for increased reliance on missile defenses 

and ‘‘passive hardening’’ to deter or defeat a regional adversary for 24 to 72 hours. 

Yet, you try to have it both ways by capping missile defenses to not agitate Russia 

and China. 

a. Please explain what you mean by ‘‘hardening’’ and ‘‘sheltering’’? How expensive 

would bomb shelters to ride out North Korean or Iranian missile defenses be? 

b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out 24 to 72 

hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea? 

c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense program by 

10 to 50 percent? 

d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ‘‘100 exclusion zones,’’ as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile defenses? How do you expect our 

Eastern European NATO allies would feel about that? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I have no additional comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. 29) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, why is a ‘‘no first use’’ policy a bad 

idea? Why have we never had one? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The United States has traditionally preserved the option of 

being the first side to use nuclear weapons during a crisis or conflict for several reasons: to deter or defeat a conventional military attack that overwhelmed U.S. and 

allied forces, namely a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe; to launch a damage-limiting first strike in response to unambiguous warning of an impending nuclear attack; and to deter or retaliate for an attack with chemical or biological weapons. Although Washington’s decision to forgo a ‘‘no first use’’ pledge was a product 

of the Cold War, and although the threat of a massive conventional assault that 

could only be stopped by using nuclear weapons has receded over the past two decades, there are still reasons to preserve existing policy. For example, the possibility 

of a biological or chemical attack, particularly by a rogue nation, still remains—and 

could increase in the years ahead. The United States also requires the ability to 

hold at risk hardened or deeply buried targets that cannot be reliably destroyed by 

conventional munitions. As a result, publicly adopting a no first use policy could 

weaken deterrence, undermine extended deterrence commitments to frontline U.S. 

allies, and remove options for countering hostile regional powers. 

Mr. ROGERS. 30) Would you please describe China’s so-called ‘‘no first use’’ policy? 

Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why does that matter? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. China has long pledged that it would not be the first nation 

to use nuclear weapons in a crisis or conflict. Nevertheless, there has been speculation that its definition of ‘‘no first use’’ might be different and considerably narrower 

than an American one. According to most recent report on China’s military power 

released by the Department of Defense, ‘‘there is some ambiguity over the conditions 

under which China’s NFU [No First Use] policy would apply, including whether 

strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or highaltitude bursts would constitute first use.’’ Likewise, there has been recurring specu-
139 

lation over the past several years that China might adapt or abandon this pledge 

in the future. More generally, there are reasons to doubt that commitments made 

during peacetime would be upheld in the event of war. Gaining greater insight into 

this issue is critical, therefore, because American actions in a future crisis with 

China would undoubtedly be shaped by Washington’s assessment of the likelihood 

of escalation. 

Mr. ROGERS. 31) Please describe China’s nuclear program, China’s aspirations as 

a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero recommendations in 

terms of extended deterrence in that region? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. According to publicly available sources, China’s nuclear arsenal 

consists of approximately 240 warheads and 140 silo-based and road-mobile ballistic 

missiles—including intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles. There has 

been speculation, however, that the size of its arsenal might be larger, perhaps over 

a thousand weapons. What is certain is that Beijing is modernizing its nuclear capabilities, to include fielding new road mobile ICBMs, several ballistic missile submarines, and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile. Collectively, these steps 

will enable Beijing to field a much more survivable nuclear arsenal. Because China 

appears more intent on making qualitative improvements to its arsenal than engaging in a major quantitative buildup, any effort to eliminate nuclear weapons would 

almost certainly require large unilateral or bilateral reductions by the United States 

and Russia before China would be willing to cap or reduce its own nuclear capabilities. In short, approximate parity between these three powers would be a prerequisite for any agreement among them—a position that the Global Zero organization explicitly acknowledges and accepts. An issue that merits further analysis, 

therefore, is whether and to what extent American extended deterrence commitments to its allies in East Asia will remain viable if the relative gap between U.S. 

and Chinese nuclear forces were to shrink considerably. Furthermore, in a world in 

which China, Russia and the United States each had the same number of nuclear 

weapons, it would not be possible for the United States to maintain parity against 

the other two powers. It would therefore be important to understand the dynamics 

of a nuclear competition in which the United States could find itself confronting an 

alliance of China and Russia. 

Mr. ROGERS. 32) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Would you care to respond to any 

of the questions noted below? 

Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and 

Posture, states that ‘‘Precision-guided conventional munitions hold at risk nearly 

the entire spectrum of potential targets, and they are useable.’’ (p.2) 

Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ‘‘nearly the entire 

spectrum of potential targets’’ addressed by nuclear weapons, it seems reasonable 

to assume that such weapons should become part of nuclear arms control negotiations. 

a. Do you agree? If not, why not? 

b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ‘‘nearly the entire spectrum 

of potential targets’’ at risk? How much would that cost and when could we deploy 

them? 

c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been particularly 

willing to fund conventional prompt global strike capabilities. How does our inability 

to develop and deploy them affect your illustrated reduction scenario? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. If conventional precision-strike weapons were indeed a functional substitute for nuclear weapons, than this would suggest that the former 

should be included in future arms control negotiations over the latter—an outcome 

that could disproportionately favor other nations given the United States’ advantage 

in conventional precision-strike munitions. It is far from clear, however, that conventional weapons can actually perform the identical functions as nuclear weapons. 

Despite their virtues, conventional weapons do not possess the same ability to hold 

at risk wide area, hardened, or deeply buried targets. This suggests that the United 

States cannot rely upon conventional weapons alone for deterrence and extended deterrence, and should avoid efforts to conflate conventional and nuclear forces in any 

future arms control negotiations. 

Mr. ROGERS. 33) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

The President said at the State of the Union address last month that, ‘‘we will 

engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our 

ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following the President’s 

leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral reductions under the New START 

treaty, who has followed us in reducing? As you know, Russia was already below 
140 

two of the three ‘‘central limits’’ of the New START treaty upon entry into force of 

the treaty. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The evidence to date provides grounds for skepticism that other 

nations will follow the U.S. lead if Washington engages in further nuclear reductions. Both the United States and Russia have made deep cuts in the size of their 

nuclear arsenals over the past two decades. Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation has 

continued: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have joined the nuclear ‘‘club;’’ Syria 

and Iran have pursued the technical capabilities necessary to build nuclear weapons; all existing nuclear powers are modernizing their capabilities; and Pakistan 

and Russia appear to be lowering the barriers to nuclear use. In all likelihood, this 

can be explained by a simple observation: other nations’ nuclear programs are not 

primarily a response to the size and shape of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but rather 

to local rivalries, domestic political considerations, and U.S. conventional military 

superiority. 

Mr. ROGERS. 34) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was stated that ‘‘this illustrative 

agenda with its deep cuts and de-alerting would strongly validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help preserve it in the face of challenges by North Korea, Iran and 

other prospective proliferators.’’ 

a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further nuclear reductions 

by the United States and Russia (if Russia is interested) will strengthen the NonProliferation Treaty and deal with the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? 

Specifically, what will other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the 

spread of nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I respectfully refer back to my answer to question no. 33. 

Mr. ROGERS. 35) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: would you care to comment on the 

questions to Dr. Blair noted below? 

Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that 

‘‘fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years— 

including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries—enable us to 

fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced 

reliance on nuclear weapons’’? 

a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this calculus? 

Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we can’t sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President’s sequester. Doesn’t this mean, if the logic of the NPR 

holds true, that, the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and 

conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The (questionable) assumption that conventional capabilities 

can substitute for nuclear weapons will be challenged by two trends that are already 

taking place. The first trend is the proliferation of conventional precision-strike systems, and in particular anti-access/area denial systems, which could make it increasingly difficult for the United States to project and sustain military power 

abroad. Put simply, arguments that the United States can decrease its reliance on 

nuclear weapons thanks to the growing sophistication of its conventional capabilities 

implicitly assume that the U.S. will maintain the near monopoly in conventional 

precision strike that it has enjoyed over the past two decades. But this advantage 

is waning, and conventional deterrence will likely erode as a result. The second 

trend now taking place is the changing fiscal environment, especially growing constraints on the U.S. defense budget highlighted by the Budget Control Act. Importantly, this development could limit Washington’s ability to develop and field the 

types of capabilities that might be necessary to maintain (or regain) its conventional 

military advantage, from new long-range strike platforms, to additional nuclearpowered submarines, to more advanced missile defenses. In sum, the view that the 

United States can continue to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons thanks to its 

conventional military superiority appears likely to be seriously tested in the years 

ahead. 

Mr. ROGERS. 36) Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated that: 

‘‘(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this illustrative plan 

could be carried out in unison by the United States and Russia through reciprocal 

presidential directives, negotiated in another round of bilateral arms reduction 

talks, or implemented unilaterally.’’ 

In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-Senator Hagel stated: 

‘‘I don’t—I do not agree with any recommendation that would unilaterally take any 

action to further reduce our nuclear warheads and our capability . . . Every—every 
141 

option that we must look at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary Hagel? 

b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent for verification 

that isn’t treaty based? 

c. Is verification important because we have to know if there’s cheating? 

d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) several times as 

an example of how further reductions, and actions like de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in compliance with those Initiatives, in 

other words, it is cheating? Does that change your endorsement of that approach? 

Dr. BLAIR. 36a) The Global Zero report (May 2012) chaired by Gen. (ret.) James 

Cartwright and co-authored by him, then-Sen. Chuck Hagel, Amb. Thomas Pickering, Amb. Richard Burt and Gen. (ret.) Jack Sheehan considered a wide range of 

approaches to implementing the report’s recommendations. The unanimous consensus of these commissioners was that the reductions and de-alerting should be negotiated with the Russians and should be verifiable. I quote Gen. (ret.) Cartwright 

and Amb. Pickerings’ on-the-record words in clarifying this endorsement by the 

Global Zero commission: 

‘‘ The commissioners agreed that cuts to 900 total nuclear weapons in the U.S. 

and Russian arsenals should be the aim of the next round of bilateral New 

START follow-on negotiations. We call upon them to reach a comprehensive, 

verifiable agreement that provides for equal reductions by both sides down to 

a total force of 900 weapons that counts all types of strategic and nonstrategic 

weapons—with ‘‘freedom to mix’’ on both sides—and that counts every individual warhead or bomb whether deployed or held in reserve. We wish to emphasize that the commission does not call for unilateral cuts by the United 

States. Our view is that the only valid and useful approach should be to negotiate an agreement with the Russians.’’ 

Thus, the Global Zero report and the testimony of then-Sen. Hagel in his confirmation hearing to become Secretary of Defense are in complete agreement. 

36b) Verification is important to ensure compliance with nuclear arms reductions 

agreements, and thereby to help preserve strategic stability and build confidence in 

the dependability of the parties in future arms agreements. As the U.S. and Russian 

nuclear weapons stockpiles decrease, the importance of verification grows. As the 

answer to 36a) question above indicates, the Global Zero report calls for counting 

and verifying every individual warhead and bomb of all types, whether deployed or 

held in reserve. This represents a higher standard of verification than has been 

adopted in the past. Previously, no agreement has regulated the total size of our 

stockpiles, and the deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles made during the past two 

decades have thus been essentially unilateral in nature. 

Regarding the question whether there is any precedent for verification that is not 

treaty based, I would note two of them: First, no provisions for verification of the 

Moscow Treaty under President George W. Bush were explicitly provided for, 

though they were implicitly provided for by the previous START I Treaty that remained in force along with its extensive verification arrangements. 

Second, verification of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991 is not 

treaty based, but rather relies on U.S. ‘national technical means of verification.’ The 

36d) question below asserts that Russia is not in compliance with these PNIs. Apparently, verification is possible in this case without treaty-based verification provisions in place. 

36c) Verification is important to determine whether a party is cheating intentionally; clarify whether there are other explanations for noncompliance such as different interpretations of treaty obligations; and rectify the situation. 

Also, verification is important to enable a party in full compliance with its treaty 

obligations to demonstrate its fidelity to the treaty and thereby boost the confidence 

of its treaty partners in its reliability. This confidence-building aspect, rather than 

the detection of cheating aspect, is the hallmark of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. It is similarly an important aspect of all nuclear arms reduction agreements. 

36d) While I believe that PNIs could offer an alternative approach to carrying out 

nuclear arms reductions or steps such as de-alerting, I generally do not endorse this 

approach over a treaty-based approach with adequate verification provided for by 

the treaty. However, in the specific case of the 1991 PNIs the purpose was not so 

much to facilitate an reduction in nuclear arms as it was to enable President Gorbachev to return to Russia and secure the thousands of Russian weapons dispersed 

in other countries that could have fallen into the hands of those countries or of unauthorized actors including terrorists or organized crime groups. Time was of the 

essence, and the PNIs were adopted and carried out in months instead of the many 

years that a formal arms negotiation would have taken to complete and implement. 
142 

As I recall, no American leader was worried about exact compliance with these voluntary actions, while many Americans were concerned with the security of the 

weapons. 

As far as my awareness of Russian compliance with the PNIs of 1991, my own 

research based upon public sources suggests that Russia’s pledges were largely kept 

but that the exceptions in which they were not kept are significant. I have not thoroughly assessed based on classified information the extent of compliance and noncompliance with these PNIs. I understand that the lack of verification provisions associated with the PNIs hampers our ability to determine exactly how compliant Russia is, but at the same time there is apparently sufficient independent verification 

on which to ground accusations of cheating. 

Mr. ROGERS. 37) Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report that ‘‘mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space 

in the U.S.-Russian relationship.’’ On the other hand, Vladimir Putin tells his people 

that ‘‘[n]uclear weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and its 

territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability 

and balance’’. Sir, which of you is right? 

Dr. BLAIR. MAD remains a major technical factor in the security strategies of 

Russia as well as the United States, and nuclear deterrence is an especially important element in Russian security strategy vis-a`-vis NATO, the United States, and 

China. However, the U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear arsenals have little or no 

utility in addressing the main threats facing these countries—nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and cyber warfare. The relevance of MAD after the end of the 

Cold War has declined precipitously as a technical matter, and moreover the perceived threat of nuclear aggression by any of these parties against any of the others 

is very much lower today compared to the Cold War period. Politically and psychologically, MAD no longer animates our relationships. 

Mr. ROGERS. 38) Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that ‘‘the obligation 

to assure U.S. allies in Europe and Asia of American commitment to their defense 

and to extend deterrence to them would fall to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, which are amply capable of fulfilling it.’’ Sir, why, in your estimate 

has NATO asked, three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear weapons—a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons—in Europe? 

Dr. BLAIR. NATO countries’ positions on whether to keep U.S. tactical nuclear 

bombs forward deployed in Europe vary widely. Most of the leading countries of the 

alliance, e.g., Germany, support withdrawing (unilaterally if necessary) these weapons back to U.S. territory. Others, particularly the Baltic members of NATO, favor 

keeping them or, alternatively, getting U.S. military troops to be stationed on their 

territories as a tripwire for U.S. engagement in their defense in the event of a Russian incursion. In short, NATO is divided on the issue, and since NATO operates 

by consensus requiring unanimous support for any major policy change, the default 

position of NATO is that the tactical weapons remain in Europe. Since the U.S. tactical nukes (B–61 air-dropped bombs) have scant military utility, their main purpose 

is ‘alliance cohesion.’ They primarily serve political purposes. Also, officially, NATO 

takes the position that as long as nuclear weapons remain in the world, NATO will 

remain a nuclear-armed alliance. (Of course the U.K. and France as well as the 

United States have strategic nuclear forces that ensure NATO will remain a nuclear 

alliance even if tactical weapons are removed from Europe.) 

Mr. ROGERS. 39) Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we could partly offset our nuclear force with ‘‘a stood-up alert missile defense and conventional force 

capability that is prompt and global, and that can function sufficiently well for 24– 

72 hours.’’ 

Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these capabilities, and the 

Senate has traditionally been hostile to conventional prompt global strike, can you 

state how much it would cost to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do we need, for example, to counter Iran’s thousands of short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles? 

a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need to defend 

Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all three combined? 

b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you describe? 

c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we wouldn’t in fact 

save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear capability? 

Dr. BLAIR. The report only goes so far as to say that these nonnuclear defenses 

and global strike systems could partly offset U.S. nuclear forces. Calculating the 

exact number and costs of these systems needed to perform various missions such 

as defending allies in the Middle East was beyond the scope of the Global Zero 

study. 
143 

It is certainly possible that the costs of developing and deploying these capabilities could exceed the costs of maintaining nuclear forces for these missions. However, the primary goal of this substitution is to extend the amount of time available 

to terminate a conflict before having to resort to nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. 40) Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes into a great 

deal of detail on U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels. Can you please describe how 

it helps to deal with the threat of instability in Pakistan’s nuclear program? Why 

have you invested so much time in dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. 

and Russian nuclear forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like Pakistan’s 

nuclear program? 

Dr. BLAIR. The subject of the Global Zero report is U.S. nuclear force structure, 

posture and modernization. These matters are largely driven by Russia’s forces, posture and modernization. Therefore the report focused on the U.S.-Russia nuclear 

policies and force levels. Also, the report’s purpose was to illustrate an alternative 

U.S. force structure and posture on the assumption that further deep cuts in U.S. 

and Russian forces would be taken in the next round of nuclear arms reductions. 

As for Pakistan and other countries, the report emphasizes their importance and 

the urgent need to broaden nuclear arms control beyond the U.S.-Russian bilateral 

process. The report underlines the fact that indeed the more serious risks of instability and nuclear weapons use, intentionally or accidentally, lie in South Asia and 

other regions. It is critical to bring these countries into a multilateral process to regulate their arsenals and prevent the outbreak of nuclear conflict and the acquisition 

of nuclear materials by terrorists. The deep bilateral cuts proposed by the report 

were designed to encourage China to join a multilateral process, which in turn 

would increase pressures and incentives for India and Pakistan to join. I certainly 

agree with the view expressed in this question to me that Pakistan poses unprecedented nuclear danger that demands our full attention. 

Mr. ROGERS. 41) Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for increased reliance on 

missile defenses and ‘‘passive hardening’’ to deter or defeat a regional adversary for 

24 to 72 hours. Yet, you try to have it both ways by capping missile defenses to 

not agitate Russia and China. 

a. Please explain what you mean by ‘‘hardening’’ and ‘‘sheltering’’? How expensive 

would bomb shelters to ride out North Korean or Iranian missile defenses be? 

b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out 24 to 72 

hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea? 

c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense program by 

10 to 50 percent? 

d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ‘‘100 exclusion zones,’’ as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile defenses? How do you expect our 

Eastern European NATO allies would feel about that? 

Dr. BLAIR. These important questions lie within the expertise of the Global Zero 

commission, particularly Gen. (ret.) Cartwright, but it is not an area that I can 

knowledgeably address without consulting with the commissioners and conducting 

further research. 

Mr. ROGERS. 42) Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that we can ‘‘remove the technical threat of a surprise U.S. nuclear first strike,’’ correct? 

a. Is this another way of calling for a ‘‘no first use’’ policy? 

Dr. BLAIR. The Global Zero report does not reject the first use of nuclear weapons. 

Rather, it calls for reducing the number of strategic weapons that could be fired in 

a sudden, surprise first strike. It merely thwarts the potential for a surprise first 

use of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. 43) Would you please describe China’s so-called ‘‘no first use’’ policy? 

Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why does that matter? 

Dr. BLAIR. China’s long-standing policy is that its nuclear forces would only be 

employed in retaliation to a nuclear attack against China. It would not resort to 

their use in a conventional conflict as long as its adversary refrains from using nuclear weapons. 

China’s force levels and posture reflect a commitment to ‘minimum deterrence’ requiring a small number of nuclear forces capable of riding out a nuclear attack and 

striking back in retaliation against the aggressor. It’s rejection of first use is evident 

in the historical record in which China does not marry up its nuclear weapons to 

its delivery vehicles during confrontations. It does not plan to prepare to employ nuclear forces in a conventional conflict even if it is losing on the battlefield. 

The importance of this policy is that it bolsters nuclear stability during a crisis 

or conventional war. If China is observed keeping its nuclear weapons out of the 

fray, and not increasing launch readiness, any adversary will be less tempted to preemptively or preventively attack China’s nuclear forces. 
144 

This policy historically has been very solid. The last time any senior official or 

general raised the possibility of Chinese nuclear first use was in 2005. This view 

was immediately quashed by the Chinese leadership and no-first-use was reiterated 

as China’s firm position. 

There is scant evident of any cracks developing in this position but as China’s nuclear forces are modernized and as their capabilities to rapidly increase launch readiness of these forces improves, the Chinese may be tempted to expand their options 

beyond the current minimal deterrence policy. This is one of the reasons why the 

Global Zero report seeks the inclusion of China in a multilateral process of arms 

reduction negotiations. 

Mr. ROGERS. 44) Please describe China’s nuclear program, China’s aspirations as 

a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero recommendations in 

terms of extended deterrence in that region? 

Dr. BLAIR. My answer above alludes to an across-the-board Chinese nuclear modernization program designed primarily to ensure a survivable deterrent force. China 

has a fleet of five new strategic submarines in various stages of construction and 

deployment, and a serious effort to deploy modern and capable mobile (truck-based) 

intercontinental rockets. Both programs serve to improve China’s second-strike retaliatory capabilities. 

China is also strengthening its safeguards against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, a newfound confidence that may lead to increasing launch readiness 

in peacetime. 

On balance, however, China’s military priorities lie in the conventional and space 

arenas with a view to ‘area denial’ of U.S. conventional forces, e.g. aircraft carriers, 

which play a critical role in the defense of Taiwan. Global Zero’s focus is less on 

the question of countering China’s nuclear programs with countervailing U.S. nuclear forces than on maintaining U.S. conventional superiority in region. The Global 

Zero report emphasizes the enormous capability of the United States to provide extended deterrence using conventional forces alone, but also notes the need to invest 

in new conventional capabilities such as a conventional ICBM in order to offset Chinese conventional and space modernization. 

Mr. ROGERS. 45) Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force 

Structure and Posture, states that ‘‘Precision-guided conventional munitions hold at 

risk nearly the entire spectrum of potential targets, and they are useable.’’ (p.2) 

Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ‘‘nearly the entire 

spectrum of potential targets’’ addressed by nuclear weapons, it seems reasonable 

to assume that such weapons should become part of nuclear arms control negotiations. 

a. Do you agree? If not, why not? 

b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ‘‘nearly the entire spectrum 

of potential targets’’ at risk? How much would that cost and when could we deploy 

them? 

c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been particularly 

willing to fund conventional prompt global strike capabilities. How does our inability 

to develop and deploy them affect your illustrated reduction scenario? 

Dr. BLAIR. 45a) In principle, if precision-guided munitions or other conventional 

forces (or missile defenses) impact the nuclear balance and strategic stability, then 

one could argue that they should be included in some form of arms negotiations, 

either separately from, parallel to, or integral to nuclear arms control negotiations. 

In practice, PGMs in particular do not lend themselves to such constraints inasmuch as their capabilities stem primarily from information and intelligence processing, which cannot be meaningfully limited. Quantitative limits on the number of 

specific weapons can be envisioned, as can geographic deployment constraints. The 

achievement of U.S. conventional superiority is not something to be bargained away, 

however, if it lowers the nuclear threshold at which the U.S. would resort to nuclear 

weapons to compensate for losing conventional options. 

45b) The United States has already massively substituted conventional for nuclear weapons such that we can presently hold practically the entire spectrum of 

key military targets at risk in potentially hostile nations. Conventional forces now 

carry out missions that only nuclear forces previously could perform. For example, 

as my formal testimony asserted, U.S. tactical nuclear forces are no longer needed 

to suppress North Korea’s artillery threat to Seoul. The cost of additional key capabilities such as conventional ICBMs requires further analysis. 

45c) The inability to deploy a conventional ICBM for the purpose of prompt global 

strike would mean that certain targets, e.g. Chinese ASAT facilities, will grow increasingly invulnerable to available U.S. conventional-armed forces, e.g. B–2 bombers. This means that disabling such facilities will require increasing numbers of 

U.S. bomber sorties at growing risk to their crews. This would also mean that the 
145 

nuclear threshold would be lowered; in principle, the U.S. would need to resort to 

a strategic nuclear missile to disable critical targets if conventional forces cannot 

perform the mission. 

Mr. ROGERS. 46) Dr. Blair: Your Global Zero report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear 

Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, states that with respect to making nuclear 

arms reductions a ‘‘multilateral enterprise’’ involving states other than the United 

States and Russia, ‘‘the effort will probably only succeed by starting with a dialogue 

with China and others on matters of transparency and verification in particular. 

Sharing information on numbers, types and locations of nuclear stocks is a critical 

first step in laying the groundwork for formal arms control talks.’’ (pp. 3–4) 

a. Since you assert that this is a ‘‘critical first step,’’ what assurances can you 

offer that: 1) China and Russia will provide accurate information? And, 2) that we 

have, in President Reagan’s famous phrase, the means not only to ‘‘trust, but verify’’ 

this information? 

Dr. BLAIR. 46a1) I cannot personally guarantee that China and Russia would provide accurate information, but presumably they would opt to refuse to provide information in the first instance if the alternative is to provide false information and risk 

getting caught. 

46a2) If the falsification of information is extensive, then U.S. national technical 

means of verification offer a reliable means of detecting that fact. Moreover, although our ability to detect a particular falsehood cannot be assured, a party contemplating submitting false declarations and disclosures could not be certain of its 

ability to elude detection by the other parties at the table. In general, the goal in 

the initial phase of discussions is to begin to define a baseline of nuclear stocks that 

can then be gradually investigated through intensified monitoring including onsite 

inspection with a view to shrinking the band of uncertainty surrounding the voluntarily submitted information. 

Mr. ROGERS. 47) Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force 

Structure and Posture, states that ‘‘Stockpiles of 500–1,000 total weapons on each 

[U.S. and Russia] side are roughly the level at which China could be drawn into 

the process. As more countries join, it will become harder for the rest to remain on 

the sidelines.’’ (p. 4) 

a. Has the Chinese Government committed to being ‘‘drawn into the process’’ if 

we reduce our nuclear forces to these levels? If they have not why should we assume 

that they will? Indeed, if this were the case it would seem their government would 

very much want to make such a statement as a way of incentivizing the Russians 

and ourselves to undertake further reductions—don’t you agree? 

b. And, if what you assert regarding the ability of precision-guided weaponry to 

substitute for nuclear weapons, wouldn’t the United States also need to unilaterally 

drawn down its advantage in this area as well in order to have China join in the 

process? 

Dr. BLAIR. 47a) The Chinese recognize that the Global Zero movement coupled to 

further sharp reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals will increase pressure on China to join a multilateral arms reduction negotiation. Their historical position on participation in such a forum goes back to the early 1980s when the Chinese foreign minister addressed the United Nations General Assembly and laid out 

the conditions for joining such a negotiation—including preconditions such as 50 

percent reductions by the United States and Russia. Those conditions have in fact 

already been essentially met. However, the Global Zero commissioners have proposed that the next round of deep bilateral reductions by the U.S. and Russia be 

linked to China’s acceptance of certain constraints on its nuclear arsenal—e.g. accepting a cap of 300 total weapons in 2022—which by the way is the maximum size 

of the Chinese arsenal projected out by a decade. (It currently stands at fewer than 

200.) 

47b) The conventional balance between China and the U.S. and U.S. allies in the 

region is relevant to the nuclear balance and to the prospects of bringing China into 

multilateral nuclear arms negotiations. Negotiations may well have to be extended 

into the nonnuclear arena. The exact forum and approach to this set of issues needs 

to be carefully considered. It’s uncharted territory that calls for creative thinking. 

Mr. ROGERS. 48) Dr. Blair: Is there any evidence either now or in our historical 

experience to assume that when a country or group of countries engages in unilateral disarming that other countries find it ‘‘harder to remain on the sidelines?’’ 

Dr. BLAIR. Global Zero commissioners are not so naı ̈ve as to believe that either 

unilateral or negotiated reductions will lead other countries to follow suit. Each nation’s assessment of its strategic interest in acquiring, or divesting, nuclear weapons 

is complex and unique. The example set by others may have little or no influence 

on a particular nation’s calculation of the purposes served by possessing nuclear 

weapons, or its determination of the desired size of its arsenal. 
146 

However, the massive unilateral stockpile reductions made by the United States 

and Russia over the past two decades and negotiated deep reductions proposed by 

Global Zero for the next decade strengthen their hands in trying to persuade China 

and others—including key nonnuclear states—to become stakeholders in nuclear 

arms control. It assists diplomats in making the case for, and exerting pressure on, 

the hold-outs to join the process. The historical disarmers—South Africa and the 

four former Soviet republics that surrendered them—along with major nations that 

abandoned their nuclear weapons programs such as Brazil and Argentina—reinforce 

this pressure. 

Mr. ROGERS. 49) Dr. Blair, have you had any conversations with the White House 

about the so-called Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study? a. When? b. 

What have you been told? c. Are you aware of what options they have been considering? Can you enlighten this subcommittee? We have been completely shut out of 

this process. 

Dr. BLAIR. 49a,b,c) I have not had any direct conversations with the White House 

about any details of the NPR Implementation Study. My understanding is that several reduction options under consideration ranged from a high of 1,000–1,100 deployed strategic weapons to be implemented over a period of 5 years, to a mid-range 

of 700–800 such weapons over a 10-year drawdown, to a low of 300–400 such weapons within 15 years. These cuts and other reductions of nondeployed nuclear warheads would constitute an overall cut of 50 percent of the overall stockpile. The dealerting options included one that would reduce the launch-readiness of U.S. strategic forces and require 48 hours to bring them to immediate launch-ready status. 

One idea put forward in the internal process would have all of these options 

linked together in a time-phased reduction over a 15-year period, and to incorporate 

the phased reductions into the forthcoming Presidential Decision Directive (i.e., 

Presidential Nuclear Guidance) so that future cuts would be pursued by succeeding 

presidents unless a new Nuclear Posture Review were conducted and new presidential nuclear guidance issued to halt the drawdown. I expect that otherwise the 

forthcoming PDD on nuclear forces will not depart significantly from past guidance 

in terms of targeting and related force posture matters. I expect it to endorse the 

Triad, the launch on warning option, the first-use option, the requirement to be able 

to conduct full-scale nuclear operations against Russia and China simultaneously, 

and holding at risk WMD forces, leadership, and war-supporting industries in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. I expect it will end the targeting of chemical facilities in Russia and China, though perhaps not such facilities in Syria. I also 

expect that it may assign missile defenses the task of defeating limited nuclear missile strikes by Russia or China. 

Mr. ROGERS. 50) The President said at the State of the Union address last month 

that, ‘‘we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . 

because our ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead.’’ 

a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following the President’s 

leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral reductions under the New START 

treaty, who has followed us in reducing? As you know, Russia was already below 

two of the three ‘‘central limits’’ of the New START treaty upon entry into force of 

the treaty. 

Dr. BLAIR. This statement from the State of the Union address reflects the historical reality that the United States has been the strong leader in the instigating nuclear arms reduction negotiations and other nuclear security efforts such as the 

Nunn-Lugar program. Regarding the New START Treaty, President Obama took 

the lead in starting those negotiations with former President Medvedev and he now 

is enlisting President Putin’s support for starting the next round. Within the context 

of the New START reductions schedule, Russia has taken the lead in the sense that 

it is ahead of the required drawdown schedule, and the United States is following 

this lead. 

Mr. ROGERS. 51) Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was stated that 

‘‘this illustrative agenda with its deep cuts and de-alerting would strongly validate 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help preserve it in the face of challenges by North 

Korea, Iran and other prospective proliferators.’’ 

a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further nuclear reductions 

by the United States and Russia (if Russia is interested) will strengthen the NonProliferation Treaty and deal with the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? 

Specifically, what will other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the 

spread of nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further. 

Dr. BLAIR. By ratifying the NPT, the United States and Russia assumed a legal 

obligation to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arms—the disarmament 

pillar of the Treaty. It is an obligation under international law that cannot be ignored. The nonnuclear weapons signatories of the NPT also expect the nuclear 
147 

weapons states to undertake other steps related to nuclear disarmament such as 

ratifying the CTBT and lowering the launch readiness of nuclear forces. 

To the extent that the United States, Russia and other nuclear weapons states 

demonstrate their commitment to the NPT disarmament agenda through deep cuts 

and de-alerting and other steps, the greater the onus on the nonnuclear weapons 

states to remain nonnuclear and the greater their commitment to the enforcement 

of the NPT—e.g., preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and rolling back 

North Korea’s weapons capabilities. Without this backing from the nonnuclear 

weapons countries, the risks of proliferation will grow. 

Mr. ROGERS. 52) Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that ‘‘fundamental changes in the international security environment 

in recent years—including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries—enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels 

and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons’’? 

a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this calculus? 

Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we can’t sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President’s sequester. Doesn’t this mean, if the logic of the NPR 

holds true, that, the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and 

conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered? 

Dr. BLAIR. The defense budget cuts under the sequester affect both nuclear and 

conventional forces to a degree that is difficult to gauge at this time. If U.S. conventional capabilities erode significantly as a result, then U.S. reliance on nuclear options could well grow somewhat. The major determinant of this reliance, however, 

will likely be the international security environment and U.S. security relations 

with Russia and China. If these relations continue to improve, leading for instance 

to stronger regional security and peace in Asia, then the United States will require 

less conventional and nuclear capabilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. 53) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching targets 

changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of nuclear weapons 

required? 

Dr. PAYNE. I cannot comment on U.S. plans for nuclear targeting. It is however, 

a mistake to believe that weapon requirements to meet targeting plans are the same 

as the requirements necessary for deterrence. U.S. targeting plans and the weapons 

required to support those plans can be revised by the appropriate U.S. process. But, 

deterrence requirements are determined by the opponent’s calculations and the composition of the opponent’s most highly valued assets. The number, lethality and diversity of U.S. weapons necessary to threaten those assets set the requirements for 

deterrence. These requirements may or may not be reflected in U.S. targeting plans. 

For deterrence purposes, U.S. targeting plans must be determined by the composition of opponents’ most highly valued assets and the forces necessary to hold them 

at risk, not the number of weapons preferred by the political leadership for other 

purposes. 

Mr. COOPER. 54) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis? 

Dr. PAYNE. We can reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis by having, prior 

to a crisis, the most realistic, clear-eyed understanding possible of the opponent and 

context and multiple channels of communication with the opponent. In the midst 

of a crisis, reliable communication and mutual understanding between contending 

parties is unlikely, but may be aided by a solid foundation of long-standing mutual 

understanding and communication prior to the crisis. Achieving such a level of understanding and communication demands a long-term, multidisciplinary intelligence 

and diplomatic undertaking vis-a`-vis each prospective antagonist. In addition, strategic defenses may help to protect against miscalculation and the possible failure 

of deterrence by providing a defensive response to apparent threats rather than offensive actions. The role of U.S. missile defense in the context of recent North Korean nuclear missile launches and threats is an example of this benefit. 

Mr. COOPER. 55) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert? 

Dr. PAYNE. The benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert include giving the President as much time as possible to assess an evolving crisis and to use that time prudently before making a decision in a high stress situation. In addition, no potentially provocative and time-consuming realerting steps are required that an adversary might observe and take as a sign of an imminent attack by the United States. 

Keeping the ICBM force on high alert, which is relatively inexpensive, avoids the 
148 

need to increase force readiness during a crisis and the danger that a de-alerted 

force could tempt an enemy’s first strike strategy by presenting a target set that 

is easier to strike than would otherwise be the case. Also, the current number of 

ICBM silos and alert rate may help afford the option of launch under attack rather 

than a launch on warning strategy, which I consider to be dangerous. In general, 

alert ICBMs are ‘‘stabilizing.’’ 

In addition, an alert ICBM force contributes to the assurance of allies, while a 

de-alerted force would be a source of allied concern. This concern is understandable: 

allies, who rely on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for their protection against 

nuclear or biological attack are unlikely to find great assurance in a U.S. deterrent 

threat that is unable to respond to a horrific attack for 72 or more hours. Telling 

U.S. allies under nuclear or other WMD attack that they would need to wait three 

days for the U.S. deterrent is unlikely to inspire allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This situation would likely encourage some allies to seek their own 

independent deterrent capabilities. 

As to the risk, reported safeguards in the command and control for ICBMs—the 

use of authorization codes, the two-person rule, and dual phenomenology for tactical 

attack warning, for example—reduce the risk of unauthorized or accidental missile 

launches. I agree with former USSTRATCOM Commander, Adm. Richard Mies on 

this issue. In the spring of 2012, he wrote ‘‘ . . . the oft-cited characterization that 

our strategic forces are on ’hair trigger’ alert is a scare tactic routinely used to justify proposals to lessen the potential responsiveness of our strategic forces. In fact, 

multiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against 

accidental or unauthorized launch and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command and control.’’ (ref: Undersea Warfare, 

Spring 2012, p. 17) 

Mr. COOPER. 56) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe we should 

have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure today, rather than relying 

on legacy force structure? 

Dr. PAYNE. To support U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence purposes, the 

U.S. nuclear force structure should be survivable, flexible, diverse and resilient, and 

thus adaptable to a wide spectrum of prospective deterrence contexts and requirements. As such, it should enable the President to adjust U.S. declared deterrence 

threats to the specific types and numbers of targets demanded by a diverse and 

shifting line up of opponents and contexts. It also should provide the President with 

numerous types of limited threat options to help minimize any prospective use of 

force should deterrence fail initially. A great advantage of the traditional U.S. nuclear triad is that it helps to provide this type of survivable, flexible and diverse 

force structure, as can multiple warhead types capable of holding at risk a wide 

spectrum of prospective targets. The force structure also should be highly survivable 

to help preclude any opponent from seeing possible advantage in striking at U.S. 

deterrent forces. 

The U.S. strategic force structure also should include active and passive defensive 

capabilities to help reduce U.S. casualties and limit damage in the event deterrence 

fails. 

To support U.S. assurance goals, the force structure should possess the lethality, 

quantity, and qualities that provide assurance to key allies. Some allies have identified these characteristics from their unique perspective, including: • An arsenal that is at least capable in size and scope to Russia’s strategic and 

tactical nuclear arsenal; 

• Nuclear forces that are deployed permanently to their region or on their territory; 

• Nuclear forces that are rapidly deployable to their region; 

• Forces that can be deployed discreetly or with great visibility, as best fits the 

deterrence occasion; and, 

• Warhead designs that include very low-yield and earth-penetrating options. 

Finally, U.S. forces should be well-protected and under positive and enduring political control to help ensure no theft or unauthorized use. Similarly, it should help 

provide the President with the maximum amount of decision time possible to help 

preclude any pressure toward a rush to employment. 

Mr. COOPER. 57) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United States has 

pursued ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? What are the risks and benefits of the Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to pursue reciprocal reductions? 

Dr. PAYNE. The Obama administration recently unilaterally eliminated U.S. 

TLAM–N (nuclear-armed cruise missiles) systems, despite concerns expressed by a 

key ally, without any apparent reciprocation by Russia. Russia committed to the 

1990–1991 PNIs. These include specific restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons. 
149 

However, Russia, according to its own official statements, is in violation of its PNI 

commitments. 

The primary risk of such attempted reciprocal reductions is that the U.S. will consider such reductions to be prudent on the mistaken presumption that Russia would 

agree to them and abide by its commitment. Russia may agree to reciprocal reductions, but not abide by that commitment. This is the result already seen with the 

earlier PNIs. 

Mr. COOPER. 58) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective alternatives for 

U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies of the U.S. strong commitment 

to nuclear umbrella, given the $8–10 billion cost for the life extension program of 

the B–61 nuclear bomb? Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries 

on potential cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended deterrence? 

Dr. PAYNE. There certainly is value in continuing dialogue within the NATO alliance regarding the requirements for deterrence and assurance. The recent consensus NATO document on the subject publicly endorsed continuation of the dual 

capable aircraft (DCA)/B–61 posture and committed the alliance to consensus decisions on this matter. It certainly is reasonable to demand that the B–61 LEP cost 

be reduced to the extent feasible. However, given the established alliance infrastructure for this system, and its general acceptance with the alliance, I do not know 

of any plausible alternative posture that would obviously be less costly and also 

meet alliance-wide deterrence and assurance requirements. Identifying alternatives 

to the DCA/B–61 posture is not a challenge. But identifying alternative postures 

that could satisfy NATO deterrence and assurance requirements, and do so more 

cost-effectively, is the material question. 

Mr. COOPER. 59) Dr. Payne: You noted in your disclosure form that you were appearing in an individual capacity and thus did not provide any information on Federal grant contracts (the other witnesses provided this information with Dr. 

Krepinevich listing his organization’s grant contracts, and Dr. Blair noting he did 

not receive any). Please list the Federal grant contract information sought on the 

disclosure form (Federal grants for FY2011–2013 and Federal contract information, 

including number of contracts with the Federal Government, Federal agencies with 

which the contracts are held, list of subjects of the contracts, and aggregate dollar 

value of these contracts), relating to the National Institute for Policy and Public Policy (of which you serve as President and co-founder). 

Dr. PAYNE. As noted in the question, I appeared in an individual capacity. Indeed, 

in my opening remarks I stated specifically that the views I presented were my own 

and not those of any institution with which I am affiliated. As such, I will reply 

as did Dr. Blair and report that I have no Federal grants or contracts and had none 

in FY 2011 or FY 2012. 

Mr. COOPER. 60) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching targets 

changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of nuclear weapons 

required? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The answer to this question depends on classified information— 

in particular information on our existing nuclear capabilities and targeting strategies, as well as the capabilities and strategies of potential adversaries. What can 

be said, however, is that advances in accuracy generally contribute to increased 

counterforce capabilities, or the ability to target enemy military forces and infrastructure. Nevertheless, improved accuracy can be offset in several ways by a determined adversary; for instance by increasing the mobility of potential targets, hardening potential targets, or fielding ‘‘active’’ defenses such as counter-air and antiballistic missile systems. In short, improved accuracy can have an important but not 

necessarily an enduring effect on force structure requirements and strategy. There 

will always be a dynamic competition under way between the U.S.’s ability to hold 

at risk targets that an opponent values and efforts by opponents to better defend 

those targets from attack. 

Mr. COOPER. 61) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. In general, the likelihood of miscalculation during a crisis is influenced by several factors: first, how accurately a nation understands its rival’s decision calculus, namely how that rival calculates cost, benefit, and risk; second, the 

ability to communicate threats, demands, and promises clearly; and third, the nation’s ‘‘track record,’’ or its reputation for upholding its past commitments. To the 

extent that the United States can reduce the risks of miscalculation, therefore, it 

should make a dedicated effort to better understand potential opponents, take steps 

to ensure that clear lines of communication are available even during periods of 

heightened tension; and make good on its threats to take action when an adversary 

crosses its ‘‘red lines.’’ 
150 

Mr. COOPER. 62) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. According to open-sources, the United States maintains the 

overwhelming majority of its ICBMs on high-alert status, meaning they can be 

launched almost immediately after (or upon unambiguous warning of) an attack. 

Traditionally, the prompt response capability of the ICBM force has contributed to 

deterrence by providing added certainty that an aggressor would suffer an immediate and devastating retaliation. Today, however, the prospect of a massive ‘‘bolt 

from the blue’’ attack appears remote, which has led some to argue that ICBMs 

should be ‘‘de-alerted.’’ Proponents of changing the alert status of the ICBM force 

also maintain that the dangers of unauthorized use and miscalculation are far too 

high; namely, missiles might be launched absent orders from the national command 

authority (NCA), or the NCA might be compelled to launch an immediate reprisal 

in response to ambiguous indicators and warnings, respectively. There are, however, 

several reasons to be skeptical about the virtues of de-alerting. First, multiple procedures are in place to guard against unauthorized use. Most importantly, launching 

ICBMs requires authenticating launch codes that can only be authorized by the 

NCA. Second, the miscalculation argument essentially suggests that because the 

United States can launch its ICBMs in a matter of minutes, it might do so. It is 

far more likely, however, that the United States would adopt a retaliatory (rather 

than launch on warning) posture, except in response to a massive and unambiguous 

nuclear attack. In sum, de-alerting ICBMs would likely have a minimal impact on 

strategic stability, and could have a negative impact on deterrence. 

Mr. COOPER. 63) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe we should 

have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure today, rather than relying 

on legacy force structure? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Despite the fact that today’s nuclear force structure is a legacy 

of the Cold War, in many ways it remains well suited to meeting current and prospective security challenges. In particular, even if it were possible to design a new 

force structure from scratch, the triad of strategic delivery systems that has underpinned nuclear deterrence for half a century is still highly relevant given the unique 

attributes of each leg. The ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet, for example, 

provides an extremely survivable and responsive retaliatory capability; the bomber 

force offers a high degree of visibility and flexibility; and the ICBM force creates 

a targeting problem for any potential opponents contemplating a first strike, because they would have to expend a large number of nuclear weapons to neutralize 

a relatively small portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. To the extent that planned 

modernization initiatives proceed, therefore (most importantly fielding a new longrange bomber, developing a successor to the Ohio class SSBN, and continuing lifeextension programs to maintain the viability of the Minuteman III ICBM), the 

United States can retain a highly capable nuclear arsenal well into the future. 

Mr. COOPER. 64) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United States has 

pursued ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? What are the risks and benefits of the Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to pursue reciprocal reductions? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The unilateral nuclear reductions announced by President 

George H.W. Bush in 1991, aimed at reducing the U.S. arsenal of forward-deployed 

tactical nuclear weapons, symbolized the dramatic change that had taken place in 

U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War. Although Mikhail Gorbachev (and 

subsequently Boris Yeltsin) pledged to respond in kind, there are reports that Moscow has not upheld its commitment to destroy certain classes of tactical nuclear 

warheads. To what extent, then, might these unilateral initiatives provide a basis 

for reciprocal U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions in the future? In general, two observations are worth making. First, there is an inherent dilemma in unilateral reductions of any kind. On the one hand, small, symbolic reductions intended to demonstrate good faith and encourage reciprocity are rarely meaningful in a military 

sense, and therefore may not lead others to follow suit. On the other hand, the 

large, meaningful reductions that might be necessary to encourage reciprocity can 

be quite dangerous if others choose not to respond in kind. This dilemma makes the 

notion of unilateral, reciprocal reductions a difficult model for informal arms control. 

Second, unilateral reductions—particularly unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear 

weapons that do not have large signatures—can be difficult to monitor and verify, 

because they lack the enforcement provisions contained in formal arms control 

agreements. 

Mr. COOPER. 65) How can further nuclear weapons reductions beyond New 

START strengthen national and security? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Perhaps the only way that further nuclear reductions beyond 

the levels outlined in New START would unambiguously strengthen U.S. national 

security is if they were multilateral in scope (i.e., if all existing and prospective nuclear powers participated), made in such as way as to preserve the United States’ 
151 

existing quantitative and qualitative advantages relative to other nuclear powers 

(e.g., through proportional reductions), and rigorously verifiable. Beyond this extremely unlikely set of conditions, any future reductions are likely to be so small 

that their impact on U.S national security (for better or worse) would be marginal, 

or so large that they would raise legitimate concerns that U.S. national security 

would be harmed more than helped. 

Mr. COOPER. 66) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective alternatives for 

U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies of the U.S. strong commitment 

to nuclear umbrella, given the $8–10 billion cost for the life extension program of 

the B–61 nuclear bomb? Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries 

on potential cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended deterrence? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Although the cost of the B–61 life extension program is substantial, it is important to note that the purpose of this effort is not solely to preserve our nuclear guarantees to NATO partners. Specifically, this program seeks to 

modernize tactical nuclear weapons delivered by dual-capable combat aircraft 

(which underpin extended nuclear deterrence in Europe) and strategic nuclear 

weapons delivered by dual-capable bombers. 

Mr. COOPER. 67) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching targets 

changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of nuclear weapons 

required? 

Dr. BLAIR. Improvements in the accuracy of U.S. nuclear weapons have increased 

their lethality and enabled U.S. planners to decrease the yield of the weapons and 

the number of weapons aimed at the same target. However, the dominant factor 

today in reducing the number of U.S. warheads required to cover the target set— 

apart from the steady reduction in the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, which 

shrinks the target set—is the revolutionary improvement in surveillance and intelligence collection. For instance, better intelligence on the target set such as on the 

entryways to hardened command bunkers has reduced the number of aimpoints and 

reduced the number of U.S. weapons assigned to strike such targets. Similarly, to 

the extent that the location of mobile missiles in the field (out of garrison) in Russia 

and China can be pinpointed through real-time surveillance, then the fewer weapons required to barrage the area to offset the ‘position location uncertainty’ of the 

mobile targets. 

One of the other main factors today in setting requirements and allocating warheads is the reliability of the U.S. strategic missile force. For instance, U.S. planners are generally forced to assign two warheads to attack each opposing nuclear 

missile silo in order to ensure that one of them arrives on target if the other one 

proves unreliable. 

Mr. COOPER. 68) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis? 

Dr. BLAIR. The best way to reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis is to improve warning and intelligence, and above all to increase the amount of warning 

and decision time. Under the current U.S. nuclear posture, which depends on launch 

on warning in the event of a large-scale Russian attack, the time allowed for information processing and decisionmaking from the top to the bottom of the chain of 

nuclear command would be measured in minutes and seconds. Emergency war order 

(EWO) decisionmaking and execution are driven by checklists and such short deadlines that the process is aptly characterized as the enactment of a prepared script. 

The risks of premature intentional launch, launch on false warning, mistaken 

launch based on erroneous intelligence and warning, and unauthorized launch remain very real today. 

The Global Zero report chaired by Gen. (ret.) Cartwright and co-authored by thenSenator Hagel addressed this issue by recommending that U.S. and Russian missiles be taken off of launch-ready alert. De-alerting steps would be adopted that require 24–72 hours to reverse. The amount of warning and decision time would thus 

be increased from minutes to days. 

Mr. COOPER. 69) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert? 

Dr. BLAIR. The risks of having ICBMs on high-alert are numerous. First, they create ‘use or lose’ pressures on the national command authorities on both sides because neither U.S. nor Russian missiles (in silos, in garrison garages, or hiding in 

the field in the case of dispersed mobile ICBMs) could survive an attack by the opposing side unless they are launched on warning of incoming warheads minutes before the warheads arrive. The pressures exerted on the President and the rest of 

the chain of command would be severe and would increase the risks of an inadvertent nuclear exchange. In projecting a crippling first strike threat at each other, 

these forces inject instability into a crisis. 
152 

ICBM launch circuits may also be vulnerable to cyber warfare. ICBMs on high 

alert are ready to fire in seconds and only need to receive a short stream of computer signals to cock their warheads, ignite their rocket motors, and blast out of 

their silos. Keeping them on hair-trigger alert in an era of sophisticated cyber warfare invites catastrophe. The Russian rockets are also kept at instant launch readiness. At a recent Senate hearing, the current head of Strategic Command was asked 

whether cyber hackers could trigger a Russian rocket launch, whose aimpoint might 

be New York City. His answer: I don’t know. With the help of insiders in possession 

of passwords and other codes, it is likely that the firewalls sealing off the launch 

circuits of both countries’ nuclear missiles could be breached. 

ICBMs and their launch centers and crews are themselves sitting targets for terrorists or others to attack or infiltrate. Launch crews routinely ignore a cardinal nuclear safety and security rule: the multiton blast door protecting the underground 

center may not be opened by a crew member when the other is sleeping. That rule 

is fudged when, for instance, a crew member calls topside for a thermos of coffee 

to stay awake while his or her crewmate snoozes during the 24-hour alert stint. 

This transgression might help enable outsiders to gain access to the launch center, and to its super-secret codes, the result of which would be an increase in the 

risk of unauthorized launch or of compromising critical codes whose wholesale invalidation might become necessary to prevent unauthorized launches. Such invalidation might effectively neutralize for an extended period of time the entire U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and the President’s ability to launch strategic forces while the 

Pentagon scrambles to reissue new codes. 

As for the benefits of keeping ICBMs on high-alert, one may be their responsiveness and potential ability to be fired so quickly than an adversary could not be confident in delivering a knock-out punch to the opponent’s ICBM force. However, as 

noted above, the flip side of the ‘benefit’ are the liabilities associated with having 

to fire these forces quickly by necessity lest incoming warheads destroy them on the 

ground. All these scenarios apply to a U.S.-Russian exchange only, which is the 

least plausible scenario today. U.S. ICBMs would have to fly over Russia to reach 

targets in other countries—China, Iran, North Korea. These polar routes are to be 

avoided. Thus the ICBMs high launch readiness offers scant benefit in confrontations with any other country besides Russia. 

Mr. COOPER. 70) Dr. Blair: You noted in your testimony the discovery in the 1990s 

of an electronic back door to the Naval Broadcast network that could have been exploited by outside hackers to inject a launch order into the VLF (Very Low Frequency) radio network used to transmit launch directives from the Pentagon to Trident ballistic missile submarines on launch patrol. How was this discovered and 

what is the risk and consequence of adversaries finding and using a vulnerability 

of the command and control system? 

Dr. BLAIR. The discovery of an electronic back door to the Trident force was discovered during an intensive investigation in the mid-1990s by a nuclear fail-safe 

commission headed by the late Amb. Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Dozens of deficiencies that 

increased the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were discovered by this 

commission, leading to significant strengthening of safeguards—e.g. new locks installed on Trident launching components, and new protocols for Trident crews to authenticate launch orders. 

The risks and consequences of adversaries exploiting deficiencies in nuclear command and control systems essentially boil down to two general dangers. First, an 

unauthorized actor—a state or even a group or individual—could inject false missile 

attack warning information or a launch order itself into the communications network and trick commanders into ordering or carrying out a launch. Second, the penetration of the nuclear command control system could compromise the codes used 

to arm and fire nuclear weapons, and the resulting invalidation of the codes could 

thwart the ability of the President to command the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Both of 

these general dangers would be significantly aggravated if a corrupt ‘insider’ assisted outsiders in breaching the command, control, communications, and early 

warning networks. 

Mr. COOPER. 71) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe we should 

have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure today, rather than relying 

on legacy force structure? 

Dr. BLAIR. The Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission report ‘‘Modernizing U.S. 

Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture’’ (May 2012) outlines a nearly optimal nuclear force structure and posture for the next decade. The force structure 

would consist of 900 total weapons. It utilizes legacy forces such as Trident SSBNs 

and B–2 strategic bombers that would contribute to U.S. national security and to 

strategic stability, and it eliminates legacy forces such as Minuteman ICBMs, B– 

52 strategic nuclear bombers and tactical nuclear weapons that contribute less. The 
153 

commission also recommends diversifying the U.S. deterrent forces to include missile defenses and a conventional ICBM. The ideal force structure would improve 

upon some of the features of retained legacy forces, but mainly it would provide for 

much longer warning and decision time, and would greatly reduce the risks of inadvertent launch stemming from today’s extremely short warning and decision times. 

Security and stability in the nuclear arena stem more from strong command and 

control systems than from the size and technical characteristics of the forces. 

Mr. COOPER. 72) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United States has 

pursued ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? What are the risks and benefits of the Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to pursue reciprocal reductions? 

Dr. BLAIR. It is important to remember that the vast majority of nuclear cuts during the nuclear era—75 percent reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles since 

their peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid-1980s—were made unilaterally by both 

sides. No arms agreements ever regulated the size of their total stockpiles. START 

agreements have only covered one category of weapon—deployed strategic—which 

represented a fraction of the total stockpiles. So both countries pursued unilateral 

stockpile reductions in parallel, without verification provisions for the most part, 

and this informal reversal of the nuclear arms race should be recognized as having 

contributed hugely to the vast reductions on both sides. 

PNIs were a part of this informal process though they were more specific in the 

sense that the parties pledged to eliminate and reduce some specific categories of 

weapons. They contributed to a dramatic reduction in overall stockpile sizes even 

though some weapons that the Russians pledged to eliminate did apparently remain 

in their arsenal. This discrepancy has generated accusations of Russian cheating 

that has spoiled the otherwise positive effects of these parallel reciprocal measures. 

Without a ‘contract’ agreement between the parties and verification provisions, PNIs 

are susceptible to misinterpretation, ambiguous compliance, and political strains. 

One of the great benefits of the 1991 PNIs was the speed with which they were 

informally adopted and carried out. It took months rather than many years to 

downsize the arsenals under the PNIs. It is important to keep in mind that the 

main purpose of the 1991 PNIs was to improve the security of Russian nuclear 

weapons by giving President Gorbachev an excuse to return Russia’s far-flung tactical weapons to Russia, and to consolidate them at storage locations that strengthened security over them. The goal was not to slash the size of the arsenals so much 

as to prevent them from falling into the hands of neighboring states or terrorists. 

Mr. COOPER. 73) How can further nuclear weapons reductions beyond New 

START strengthen national and security? 

Dr. BLAIR. Further nuclear arms reductions beyond New START can serve U.S. 

national security interests in innumerable ways, beginning with the fact that fewer 

weapons in Russia mean fewer possibilities for inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear 

strikes against the United States and potentially less damage if such strikes occurred. More importantly, further reductions that draw China and other nuclear 

weapons states such as Pakistan and India into negotiations to cap, reduce, or otherwise constrain their arsenals would bring stability and regulation to dangerous regions of the world, and help thwart further proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It 

is critical to bring these other states to the negotiating table. The alternative is further proliferation, growing arsenals, new nuclear arms races, and growing risks of 

an intentional or unintentional outbreak of nuclear violence. It is manifestly in the 

U.S. national interest to prevent such outcomes, and multilateral cooperation involving all the nuclear weapons states including those outside of the NPT (Pakistan, 

India, and Israel) in constraining nuclear arms is critical to preventing a nuclear 

catastrophe that deeply undermines U.S. and international security. 

Mr. COOPER. 74) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective alternatives for 

U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies of the U.S. strong commitment 

to nuclear umbrella, given the $8–10 billion cost for the life extension program of 

the B–61 nuclear bomb? Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries 

on potential cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended deterrence? 

Dr. BLAIR. I doubt whether America’s allies’ perception of the U.S. commitment 

to their defense depends at all on the status of the B–61 life extension program. 

Our NATO allies have the guarantee of NATO-wide protection led by the United 

States and her overwhelming conventional superiority backed up by a strategic nuclear capability capable of deterring any rational leader. Reallocating the $10 billion 

earmarked for B–61 LEP to shoring up U.S–NATO conventional capabilities during 
154 

a time of defense budget austerity might do more to reassure the allies. This is an 

important topic for dialogue with America’s allies. 

Æ