IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0310-23

EX PARTE JOHN MORGAN STAFFORD, Appellant

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

COLLIN COUNTY

MCCLURE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY,

RICHARDSON, NEWELL, WALKER and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined. KELLER, P.J., 

filed a concurring opinion in which RICHARDSON, NEWELL, and SLAUGHTER, 

JJ., joined. KEEL, J., concurred. YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

OPINION

The State of Texas has an interest in regulating campaign elections to protect the rights 

of Texans to cast a meaningful vote. One such effort made by the Texas Legislature has 

been to adopt laws requiring disclosure to be made in political advertisements. Under 

Election Code § 255.004(b), a person commits an offense if, “with intent to injure a 

candidate or influence the result of an election, the person knowingly represents in a 
STAFFORD — 2 

campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its 

true source.” We granted the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review to determine 

whether § 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code, also known as the True Source of 

Communications statute, or True Source Statute, passes constitutional muster. We hold that 

it does not. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Appellant, who identifies himself as a Democratic Party Activist and former candidate 

for Plano City Council, was accused of sending text messages with the appearance of 

coming from a Republican or conservative campaign with the intent to injure a candidate 

or influence an election. More specifically, Appellant sent out a text message identifying 

the Republicans in local nonpartisan races. Ultimately, Appellant was indicted for violating

Section 255.004(b) of the Texas Election Code, which prohibits knowingly representing in 

a campaign communication that the communication emanates from a source other than its 

true source. The indictment alleged that Appellant: 

then and there, with intent to injure a candidate or inuence [sic] the 

result of an election, namely candidates Lily Bao, and Anthony 

Ricciardelli, and Justin Adcock, and Howard Smith, and Lynn Walling, 

and Joyce Loughrayi, the defendant knowingly represents in a 

campaign communication that the communication emanates from a 

source other than its true source, to wit, sending text messages with the 

appearance of coming from a Republican or conservative campaign. 

In response to the indictment, Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas 

corpus, contending that § 255.004(b) was unconstitutional because it sought to regulate 

core political speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.
STAFFORD — 3 

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion at which Appellant and the State 

presented arguments. After the hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying the 

application. 

II. DIRECT APPEAL

Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because the statute abridged the 

First Amendment right to free speech because: (1) it is not narrowly tailored to serve 

compelling state interests, (2) it is unconstitutionally vague, and (3) it places an undue 

burden on the right to anonymous speech. The Court of Appeals agreed that the statute was 

not narrowly tailored so it did not survive strict scrutiny. Ex parte Stafford, 667 S.W.3d 

517 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023). In particular, the appellate court found that the statutory 

restrictions are not limited to communications that are false, and its “expansive reach” is 

problematic and “demonstrates less than precise tailoring to achieve the state’s objectives.” 

Id. at 527. It held the statute unconstitutional and ordered the trial court to dismiss the 

indictment. 

III. STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

We granted the State’s petition for review. The State argues that § 255.004(b) is 

narrowly drafted and survives strict scrutiny. It says the Court of Appeals misread the 

statute to require identification of a source when the plain language merely prohibits 

identifying a false source. The State contends the appellate court erred by (1) 

misidentifying the State’s interest, (2) determining that another statute achieved that 
STAFFORD — 4 

interest, (3) conflating facial unconstitutionality with overbreadth, and (4) relying on an 

inadequate less-restrictive means.

IV. ANALYSIS 

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law that we review de 

novo. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A facial 

challenge attacks the statute itself rather than the statute’s application to the 

defendant. Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). To mount a 

successful facial constitutional challenge, the challenger must establish that no set of

circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid or that the statute lacks any 

plainly legitimate sweep. Id.; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472, 130 S. 

Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010).1 

When the constitutionality of a statute is attacked, we usually begin with the 

presumption that the statute is valid, and that the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or 

arbitrarily. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Generally, a 

person challenging a statute has the burden to establish its unconstitutionality. Id. But 

when the government seeks to restrict and punish speech based on its content, the usual 

1

 A challenger may also bring a “substantial overbreadth” challenge to a state statute. Under such

a challenge, a statute may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications 

are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” Stevens, 559 U.S. 

at 473; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 

403 (2002) (overbreadth doctrine prohibits government from banning unprotected speech if

substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in process). The instant case is a 

traditional facial challenge, not an overbreadth challenge.
STAFFORD — 5 

presumption of constitutionality is reversed. Ex parte Nyabwa, 366 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet ref’d) (citing United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 

Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1999)). 

A law is “content-based” if it distinguishes between favored and disfavored speech

based on the views expressed or if it is necessary to review the content of the speech to

determine whether the speaker violated the law. Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 345 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A content-based regulation that distinguishes favored from 

disfavored speech based on the views expressed is presumptively invalid, and the 

government bears the burden to rebut that presumption. Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 15 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013). We apply the “most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, 

disadvantage, or impose different burdens on speech because of its content.” Id. 

To satisfy such a strict scrutiny review, a statute that regulates speech must be necessary 

to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn. Id. To be considered narrowly 

drawn, a law must employ the least restrictive means to achieve its goal and a close nexus 

must exist between the state’s compelling interest and the restriction. Id. The statute does 

not survive strict scrutiny review if there is a less restrictive means of meeting the state’s 

compelling interest that would be at least as effective as the statute under review. Id. at 15-

16. The parties agree that § 255.004(b) burdens core political speech. The Supreme Court 

has recognized that speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to 

hold officials accountable to the people. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) 

(“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to 
STAFFORD — 6 

the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution”); see also

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) 

(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, (1971)) (holding that the First 

Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a 

campaign for political office.”). 

Therefore, laws that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” which 

requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is 

narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club 

PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. 721, 734 (2011) (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin 

Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (observing that restrictions constituted “ban 

on speech” and that bans on political speech are subject to strict scrutiny). 

2. APPLICATION 

Because section 255.004(b) is a content-based restriction on protected speech, it is 

subject to strict-scrutiny review to determine if the State has overcome the presumption of 

invalidity. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 at 813 (“a content-based speech 

restriction” may stand “only if it satisfies strict scrutiny”). The strict scrutiny analysis 

requires the State to identify “an actual problem in need of solving,” and to show that the 

measure be employed only where it is necessary to serve the compelling issue to justify 

suppressing speech. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799, 131 S. Ct. 

2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 

I. Section 255.004(b) cannot survive strict scrutiny. 
STAFFORD — 7 

a. Analysis of Texas Election Code § 255.004(b) 

To satisfy strict scrutiny, a law that regulates speech must be necessary to serve a 

compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn. Sable Communications of 

California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Using the statute’s plain language and 

legislative history as an aid, the State argues the § 255.004(b)’s (“True Source statute”) 

specific purpose within the Act was to “outlaw” what the Legislature identified as “dirty 

tricks relating to campaign communications.”2 Therefore, according to the State, the 

Legislature identified the government’s interest as preventing certain dishonest conduct 

that is harmful to the democratic elections process. The State contends the court of appeals 

wrongly focused its inquiry on whether the statute was “narrowly tailored to prevent false 

speech or misrepresentations” which was a broader and more general goal than the 

government interest which the True Source statute serves. Instead, so argues the State, the 

statute neither attempts to prevent “false speech,” nor general “misrepresentations,” but 

instead targets a specific type of misrepresentation that harms the democratic elections 

process. The State concludes that by analyzing whether the statute was narrowly tailored 

to an erroneously broad government interest, the court of appeals gave itself no choice but 

to determine that other less restrictive means were available. 

2 In the trial court the State articulated the following as compelling interests: to deter fraud in elections, to 

ensure “accurate sourcing of information” so “voters receive accurate information about who is speaking,” 

to ensure “that votes are cast free[] from misinformation of this kind,” to “prevent voter suppression,” to 

deter “fake news,” and, to ensure that “when people are told something that they know that they can rely 

on that communication.” 
STAFFORD — 8 

Here, the State has identified the government’s interest as protecting the elections 

process from a specific type of deception that harms elections. We agree with the court 

below that the State has a compelling interest in preventing certain dishonest conduct that 

is harmful to the democratic process. See Ex parte Stafford, 667 S.W.3d. at 525. But the 

analysis does not end here. It is not enough that the governmental ends are compelling, the 

means to achieve those ends must be narrowly drawn to achieve those ends. Ex parte Lo, 

424 S.W.3d at 19 (citing Sable Communications of California, Inc., 492 U.S. 126). To 

reach this conclusion we must turn to the “narrow tailoring” prong of the analysis. 

In the context of a First Amendment challenge, a statute is narrowly drawn if it “uses 

the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.” See Ex parte Thompson, 

442 S.W.3d 325, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Because it burdens core political speech, the 

True Source statute is subject to exacting scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is narrowly 

tailored to serve an overriding state interest. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 

334, 347 (1995). While the government may have legitimate aims in passing a statute, they 

are almost never sufficient to overcome “the practically universal agreement that the major 

purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 

affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 

Although the State has a compelling interest in fair and honest elections and preventing 

fraud on the electorate, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.

Determining whether a statute is narrowly tailored or “reaches too far” starts with an 

analysis of what the statute covers. See Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 902 (Tex. Crim. 
STAFFORD — 9 

App. 2016). Courts reviewing a statute must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute’s 

language unless that language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results 

that the Legislature could not have intended. Id. 

The True Source statute states: 

A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a candidate or influence 

the result of an election, the person knowingly represents in a campaign 

communication that the communication emanates from a source other than 

its true source. 

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 255.004(b). 

When interpreting statutes, Texas courts focus on the statute’s literal text. Watkins 

v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 271-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Courts do not focus solely upon 

a discrete provision, but rather look at other statutory provisions as well to harmonize text 

and avoid conflicts. Id. at 272. Courts read words and phrases in context and construe them 

according to rules of grammar. Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014). Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably 

possible. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

The State argues the court of appeals disregarded the statute’s plain language and 

erroneously read a duty to cite a source into the statute. Specifically, the State argues that 

the statute’s plain language does not require identification of the true source, nor does it 

compel speech. Instead, it prohibits identifying a false source. The State construes this 

statute to say that a person commits an offense only if they affirmatively and explicitly lie 

about who is making the communication. 
STAFFORD — 10 

The State directs us to the text of the statute and argues all the statute requires is: 

(1) a party must knowingly lie about the source of a campaign communication; (2) the lie 

must be made within the communication itself; and (3) the party must intend to influence 

an election or harm a candidate by lying about that source. The State notes that, on its face, 

it imposes no identification requirement. 

To achieve that end, according to the State, the True Source statute imposes only a 

simple restriction: do not distribute campaign communications pretending to originate from 

someone else with intent to harm. We do not disagree that the government’s interest in 

protecting the election process may be of sufficient importance to outweigh possible 

infringement on constitutional rights, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-7, 46 L. Ed. 2d 

659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), however we must also analyze whether the burden placed on the 

right to freedom of speech under the True Source statute is sufficiently narrow and imposes 

as few restrictions as possible to meet the state’s goals. 

While the government’s interest to protect voters from confusion, fraud, and undue 

influence by preventing misleading communications is certainly compelling, we agree with 

the court of appeals that 255.004(b) encompasses communications that are not arguably 

false or misleading and it is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interests advanced by the 

State. 

There are four clauses of the True Source Statute that cause the statute to not be 

narrowly tailored: (i) intent “to injure a candidate or influence the result of an election;” 

(ii) “represents”; (iii) “in a campaign communication;” and (iv) “true source.” 
STAFFORD — 11

i. Intent to “injure a candidate or influence the result of an election.” 

Speech prohibited by the True Source statute must be expressed with the intent to “injure 

a candidate or influence the result of an election.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 255.004(b). The 

government may have legitimate aims in passing a statute, but they are almost never 

sufficient to overcome “the practically universal agreement that the major purpose of [the 

First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. 

Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). The arena of governmental affairs “includes 

discussions of candidates, structures, and forms of government, the manner in which 

government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political 

processes.” Id. at 218-19. Given that influencing elections is the essence of political speech, 

it is difficult to imagine what speech would not be included under the statute including 

neutral statements (i.e., “Vote in the primary election this Saturday!”) and true statements

(i.e., “If you are wondering whether or not you should vote in the Presidential Election, the 

State of California has more registered voters than any other state.”). And while false 

statements or parody (i.e., any Babylon Bee headline) are not exempt from this statute, 

those statements are probably protected under the First Amendment. See Hustler Magazine, 

Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding the First Amendment protects even false 

statements damaging to public figures). This language is too broad and encompasses too 

many statements that have the potential to influence the democratic process. A citizen 

should not have to rely on the sense of humor, kindness, or leniency of prosecutors when 

discussing or sharing opinions and messages regarding governmental affairs. 
STAFFORD — 12 

ii. “Represents” and “in a campaign communication.” 

A person violating the True Source Statute “knowingly represents . . . that the 

communication emanates from a source other than its true source.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 

255.004(b). The code does not define the word “represents.” Speech prohibited by the True 

Source statute must be conveyed via a “campaign communication.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 

255.004(b). This is defined in the statute as a “written or oral communication relating to a 

campaign.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 501(17) (emphasis added). This definition is problematic 

because the statement does not even need to explicitly reference a campaign, it only needs 

to “relate” to one. And whether a statement relates to a campaign is determined by the 

recipient’s interpretation of the message. And once again, someone making an innocuous 

statement that is interpreted by another as a campaign communication should not be 

beholden to the sense of humor, kindness, or leniency of the local prosecutor. 

iii. “True Source” 

Speech prohibited by the True Source statute must be represented to emanate from 

a source other than its “true source.” Because this phrase is not defined, the Fifth Court of 

Appeals asked: 

Is a “true source” the original source? Is it an accurate communication made 

by one other than the original source that is in accord with facts and reality? 

According to the State, the determination of a true source is a fact-specific 

inquiry. But relying on ad hoc factual inquiry to determine whether speech 

is prohibited simply underscores the extent to which the expansive scope of 

the statute captures significant amounts of protected speech far beyond the 

interests the state seeks to advance. 
STAFFORD — 13 

Stafford, 667 S.W.3d at 531. While the State argues that identifying a “true source” will 

prevent the speaker from affirmatively and explicitly lying about who makes the 

communication, correctly identifying a source does not make a statement more or less 

dishonest. See Stafford, 667 S.W.3d at 528 (“Of course, the identity of a source can be 

helpful in evaluating ideas. But the State cannot reasonably argue that providing this 

additional information makes a fraudulent or untrue statement any less so. A false 

statement is still false even if the source is disclosed. And it is well-established that “if 

authority is to be reconciled with freedom,” the remedy for speech that is false is speech 

that is true. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 

(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).). 

If the State’s primary interest is about dishonest conduct in elections and campaigns, 

the Misrepresentation of Identity statute already covers that. That statute states: 

A person commits an offense if, with intent to injure a candidate or influence 

the result of an election, the person misrepresents the person’s identity or, if 

acting or purporting to act as an agent, misrepresents the identity of the 

agent’s principal, in political advertising or a campaign communication. 

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 255.005. This statute specifically targets a “dirty trick” of 

dishonesty in the source of a campaign communication because there must be an overt (i.e., 

affirmative and/or explicit) misrepresentation. But the True Source statute does not serve 

that same purpose. It contains no language limiting its application to false statements. Nor 

does it prevent misrepresentations and false statements. While the State tries to justify the 

statute as a means of preventing dirty tricks, the statute here criminalizes protected 

anonymous and truthful political speech and has the chilling effect of impermissibly 
STAFFORD — 14 

restricting engagement in political discourse. Therefore, because there are narrower means 

of achieving the State interests, one of which being § 255.005, this statute is 

unconstitutional. 

The court of appeals reasoned that Election Code § 255.005 (the Misrepresentation of 

Identity statute) already served the State’s interest by prohibiting misleading statements in 

a political campaign. Stafford, 667 S.W.3d at 527. The court of appeals further reasoned 

that the Misrepresentation of Identity statute was more specific than the True Source statute 

because “[§ 255].005 prohibits misrepresentations, while [the True Source statute] 

prohibits representations of all types.” Id. (emphasis added). The State argues this failing 

of the intermediate court to understand the difference between the True Source statute and 

the Misrepresentation of Identity statute resulted in the intermediate court giving itself no 

choice but to erroneously determine that a less restrictive means was available in the form 

of the Misrepresentation of Identity statute. The State continues that these two statutes 

actually “work in concert with each other to prohibit the two specific ‘dirty tricks’” 

(misrepresenting his/her own identity and misrepresenting the source of the 

communication itself) which can confuse voters and harm the elections process. We 

disagree. 

The analysis conducted by the intermediate court is not dissimilar to the Supreme 

Court’s analysis in McIntyre. In McIntyre, the Supreme Court analyzed and declared 

unconstitutional an Ohio statute that prohibited anonymous communications about 

political issues. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A)). 
STAFFORD — 15

Similar to the State in this case, Ohio cited two state interests supporting passage of the 

statute: (i) its “interest in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements” and (ii) its 

“interest in providing the electorate with relevant information.” Id. at 348. 

The McIntyre Court agreed that the State of Ohio had a legitimate interest in preventing 

fraudulent and libelous statements. Id. at 349. However, the Court noted that Ohio had 

other statutes already addressing fraud prevention that did not target political speech. Id. 

The State’s “assuredly legitimate” interest nevertheless failed to justify the statute’s 

“extremely broad prohibition.” Id. at 351. The Court continued: 

Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, 

fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. 

Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies 

the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in 

particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas 

from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society. The right to remain 

anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political 

speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in 

general, our society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than 

to the dangers of its misuse. Ohio has not shown that its interest in preventing 

the misuse of anonymous election-related speech justified a prohibition of all 

uses of that speech. The State may, and does, punish fraud directly. But it 

cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a 

category of speech, based on its content, with no necessary relationship to 

the danger sought to be prevented. 

Id. at 357 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Turning to the True Source statute, if the State’s interest is in preventing certain 

dishonest conduct that is harmful to the democratic elections process, we fail to see how 

the True Source statute serves that interest. First, as discussed supra, this statute is not 

directed at dishonest conduct and, in fact, criminalizes truthful political messages. The 
STAFFORD — 16 

State cannot justify this broad prohibition on forms of legitimate political speech created 

by the True Source Statute. Second, while the State attempts to construe this statute to say 

that a person commits an offense only if he or she affirmatively or explicitly lies about who 

is making the communication, this is not accurate. By its own admission, the State claims 

that that the True Source statute does not require identification of a source. Therefore, this 

statute not only criminalizes anonymous3 speech, but also criminalizes assumed names and 

omissions such as an author deciding not to disclose his or her identity for fear of retaliation 

or privacy concerns. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (holding “an author’s decision to 

remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content 

of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”).

II. The appellate court did not incorrectly rely on an inadequate less-restrictive 

means. 

Finally, the State argues the court of appeals erred by determining that the State did not

“dispel the generally accepted proposition that counter speech may provide a less 

restrictive means of advancing the State’s interests.” Stafford, 667 S.W.3d at 528. 

According to the State, “when a party makes certain fraudulent representations bordering 

on identity theft, the damage is done once the message is relayed. More speech will not 

necessarily undo the damage, particularly in the time sensitive environment of a political 

campaign.” 

3 The definition of “anonymous” is “not named or identified.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 

88 (1983). Arguably, this definition could include unsigned communications or the use of a false or fictious 

name.
STAFFORD — 17 

We acknowledge that “the remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.” See 

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality op.) 

(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 

(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the 

falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be

applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”)). However, counter speech as applied to the 

True Source statute might not be a less restrictive means of advancing the State’s interest. 

The State’s argument highlights the fatal flaw with this statute: the True Source statute 

encompasses communications that are not arguably false or misleading and it is not 

narrowly tailored to achieve the interests advanced by the State because there is no 

requirement of materiality. It criminalizes anonymous, un-signed, and factually accurate

political communications. There is no exception for social media reposts. The statute also 

lends itself to prosecuting anonymous communications and even imitation, impersonation, 

sarcasm, parody, surrogacy, or pen names because it is subject to an individual’s perception 

of the communication. But the State would still have the prosecutorial discretion under the 

True Source statute to indict under these facts. 

CONCLUSION 

We hold that § 255.004(b) on its face, violates the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and affirm the Fifth Court of Appeals’ opinion reversing the trial 

court’s order. 
STAFFORD — 18

Delivered: September 4, 2024

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