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AMERICAN NGOS UNDER ATTACK IN

MORSI’S EGYPT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 12, 2013

Serial No. 113–40

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Lorne W. Craner, president, International Republican Institute (former Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) . 4

Mr. Charles W. Dunne, director, Middle East and North Africa, Freedom 

House .................................................................................................................... 13

Ms. Joyce Barnathan, president, International Center for Journalists .............. 28

Mr. Kenneth Wollack, president, National Democratic Institute ........................ 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Lorne W. Craner: Prepared statement ........................................ 7

Mr. Charles W. Dunne: 

Except from Presiding Judge Makram Awad as reported in Shorouk Newspaper, June 5, 2013 .......................................................................................... 14

Statement of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies ........................... 17

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 22

Ms. Joyce Barnathan: Prepared statement ........................................................... 30

Mr. Kenneth Wollack: Prepared statement ........................................................... 35

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 40

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Material submitted for the record ....................... 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly: Prepared statement ..................................... 65

(1)

AMERICAN NGOS UNDER ATTACK IN

MORSI’S EGYPT 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Mr. Connolly for 5 minutes each for our 

opening statements, we will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute each. We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for being here. And, 

without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made 

a part of the record. Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitation 

in the rules. The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Over 2 years ago, the improbable happened. Millions of Egyptians filled Tahrir Square and streets all across Egypt, demanding 

the end of the Hosni Mubarak regime and ushering in a new democratic era: An era free of government corruption, free of police brutality; an era that would allow all Egyptians to exercise their freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, and religion. But, as we all 

know, the transition to a true democracy is often an arduous task 

that takes time and commitment, and it must be responsive to the 

goals and aspirations of those who facilitated the change. 

The Egyptian transitional government’s treatment of pro-democracy groups, like Freedom House, IRI, NDI, and groups that promote a free, independent press, like ICFJ, was in direct contradiction with the principles of democracy and with the goals of the revolution. 

It is clear by last week’s verdict, Morsi’s refusal to drop the 

charges and the new NGO law, that the freedom for these groups 

to work will only be further restricted under the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. These institutions and their employees all 

believed in the cause of freedom and democracy. They believed in 

the aspirations of millions of Egyptians who wish to cast off the oppressive yoke of totalitarianism and establish a free and open society. But the Egyptian Government feared that the people might 

soon turn against the government in the people’s pursuit to end 

corruption and bring real democratic reforms. So the Egyptian auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061213\81509 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

thorities ransacked the offices of these NGOs, arrested their employees, seized their assets, and shut down their operations. 

It was hoped that the Egyptian officials would soon see the error 

of their ways and drop the charges and allow the NGOs to continue 

their work. However, last week all 43 defendants were convicted 

and sentenced in a case that had no basis in the rule of law. This 

verdict was politically driven and not just an attack on these American NGOs, German NGO Konrad Adenauer Foundation or their 

employees who come from countries like the U.S.A., Germany, Serbia, Norway, Lebanon, Romania, and many other places. This verdict was an indictment on the Morsi regime’s assault on freedom, 

on human rights, on democracy, and the Egyptian people themselves. We must stand in solidarity with those who continue to 

seek the ideals of the revolution. It is no longer acceptable to send 

unconditional aid to a regime that persecutes, prosecutes, and convicts those who seek to aid Egyptians seeking freedom and true democracy for all of Egypt. 

To seek further reforms, I have introduced H.R. 4016, the Egypt 

Accountability and Democracy Promotion Act. This bill would condition our economic assistance to Egypt in order to advance U.S. 

national security interests by ensuring that Egypt protects freedom, protects human rights, the rule of law, civil society organizations, and upholds the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty because if 

we don’t condition our aid, we risk sending the wrong message yet 

again to countries in the region and around the world that the 

United States will not only tolerate this unabashed attack on 

democratic values, but we will not hold these violators accountable 

for their repressive actions. 

When I was chair of the full Foreign Affairs Committee, the administration wanted to send over $500 million in taxpayer money, 

American taxpayer money, to Morsi. I placed a hold on this because 

of the repressive actions of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government and because of its crackdown on civil society and the rule of 

law. 

I was disappointed to hear Secretary Kerry announce earlier this 

year in Cairo that the United States would provide an additional 

$250 million in assistance to Morsi in Economic Support Funds. We 

cannot afford to send a mixed message at this delicate juncture. We 

must send a strong unified signal if we are to see Egypt realize the 

goals of the revolution. 

The United States must call on Morsi to immediately pardon all 

43 individuals and allow the NGOs to reopen without further harassment from government authorities. We must also impress upon 

him the importance of abandoning his proposed NGO law that 

would restrict the operations of NGO groups across Egypt even further, allowing for the possibility of even more of these sham trials 

to occur. And we must insist that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government implement real democratic reforms or risk losing U.S. assistance. The choice is clear. 

With that, I am proud to call upon Mr. Connolly for his opening 

statement. Thank you, Gerry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, Madam 

Chairman. And let me join with you in the expression of sentiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061213\81509 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

ments of grave concern, if not disgust, at the recent developments 

in Cairo. 

The issue of the NGOs is not only a test for Egypt. It is actually 

a test for the United States. Will we support institutions we have 

helped create to promote democratization in emergent societies, not 

just the American employees of those NGOs but the Egyptian employees as well who are at great risk. They must know from the 

halls of Congress to the Executive Branch that they are not being 

abandoned and that we are as concerned about their fate as we are 

or would be for an American on trial. 

I was in Egypt last May, almost exactly a year ago. At the time, 

Field Marshal Tantawi was still in office. And we had had a meeting with the Egyptian employees of the NGOs represented at this 

table. I was struck, Madam Chairman, with how highly educated 

and highly motivated these people were. They cared about their 

country. They cared about its future. They cared about trying to 

contribute to the democratization of institutions that were just 

emerging in the post-Mubarak era. 

And, frankly, what has happened, what was happening then and 

what has happened now, were some officials, including the official 

at the time, Fayza Aboul Naga, a demagogue of the first order, a 

woman tried to prove that her previous association with the previous regime somehow had been cleansed at the expense of these 

NGO workers. 

Our delegation, led by our former colleague David Dreier, made 

it very clear to General Tantawi at the time that this issue would 

be a major sticking point in bilateral relations if not resolved. He 

was surprised that it was elevated to that level of concern. And 

every member of our delegation, Republican and Democrat, reiterated that position. Here we are 1 year later, and we now have the 

guilty verdicts. 

I have long believed that the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, as I 

know you do, too, Madam Chairman, is a critical one in the Middle 

East, critical as a cornerstone, obviously, in the Camp David Accords, critical in the evolution of the so-called Arab Spring. Egypt 

is the largest Arab country. Outcomes there matter. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is struggling with how to emerge as a 

democratic force in civil society. And I understand that. And some 

patience is going to be required. But these verdicts are a huge impediment in our relationship, in our ability to partner with the 

Egyptian Government, whatever it is going to be. And I have to say 

it is very important for those listening in Cairo and, for that matter, in the halls of our State Department to understand that the 

tolerance for this here in the United States Congress on a bipartisan basis is next to nil and that there will be strong reactions 

here on both the military and economic front and in every aspect 

of our bilateral relationship until and unless this issue is addressed 

forthrightly by the Morsi government and reversed. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

And, seeing no further requests for recognition, we welcome our 

panelists here today. First, we will hear from Mr. Lorne Craner, no 

stranger to our committee, president of the International Republican Institute. Prior to this position, Mr. Craner has had a long 

4

and distinguished career in public service, having previously served 

as Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

for former Sectary of State Colin Powell, a position for which he received the Distinguished Service Award from Secretary Powell. He 

also served at the National Security Council from ’92 to ’93 and as 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under 

James Baker. Welcome, Lorne. 

Next we welcome Mr. Charles Dunne, the director of the Middle 

East and North Africa Program at Freedom House. Prior to joining 

Freedom House, he spent 24 years in the Foreign Service, serving 

all across the world, including in Cairo and Jerusalem. Mr. Dunne 

has had a distinguished career in public service, serving as Director for Iraq at the National Security Council, as a foreign policy adviser at the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, and as a member of the 

Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, where he contributed to 

the development of initiatives to advance democracy in the Middle 

East and North Africa. Welcome, Charles. 

And we welcome Ms. Joyce Barnathan, who is the president of 

the International Center for Journalists. Prior to joining ICFJ, Ms. 

Barnathan had a long and impressive career as an international 

journalist, having covered assignments in Asia and Russia for 

Businessweek and Newsweek. She is the winner of five overseas 

Press Club awards as well as the National Headliner Award and 

currently serves on the Steering Committee of the Global Forum 

for Media Development. Welcome. 

Finally, we welcome Mr. Kenneth Wollack, the president of National Democratic Institute, where he has served in that capacity 

since 1993. Before joining NDI, Mr. Wollack co-edited the Middle 

East Policy Survey and wrote regularly for the Los Angeles Times. 

He has served on task forces sponsored by various organizations, 

including the Brookings Institute, the United States Institute of 

Peace, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Wollack currently 

is a member of the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid 

and has served as a chairman for the U.S. Committee for the 

United Nations Development Program. And our kids are somehow 

intertwined. That is a real claim to fame. 

So thank you to our excellent set of panelists. Lorne, we will 

begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORNE W. CRANER, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND LABOR) 

Mr. CRANER. Well, Chairman, members of the committee, I want 

to first thank you for your continued focus on the Middle East and 

for the unwavering interest and support you have shown to all of 

us at this table. 

I wish today’s hearing was a progress report on Egypt, but it is 

not. The Egyptian transition at this point can only be described as 

a mess. And it is moving in an ever more negative direction. You 

have focused this hearing on ‘‘American NGOs Under Attack in 

Morsi’s Egypt.’’ So let me begin by describing how Morsi’s Egypt is 

doing compared to other countries. 

5

Political transitions in the Middle East will take time, as they 

have in other regions. While we must, as Mr. Connolly said, have 

a long-term outlook, it is also true that key milestones along the 

way impact the pace and bad decisions along the way can fundamentally alter the direction of the transition. One need only 

think of the contrast between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia in the mid-1990s. 

Comparisons between the speed and scale of reform in Tunisia 

and Egypt—their revolutions occurred almost simultaneously—are, 

likewise, fair. It is true that Tunisia started with a smaller, more 

homogeneous, more educated population and that Ben Ali, like Mubarak, an authoritarian, left his country with less poverty and a 

better economy. But those differences cannot account for Egypt’s 

failure to keep up with the pace or scope of change in Tunisia on 

issues I detail in my written testimony, from Cairo’s failure to safeguard the rights of women and minorities to placing the executive 

above judicial review to significantly less freedom of expression, to 

the government advocating a harshly restrictive civil society law, 

to attacks on domestic and, yes, foreign NGOs. 

Not all Arab Spring transitions have gone as poorly as Egypt. 

There are worse transitions. Syria comes to mind. But certainly the 

transitions in Tunisia and, I would argue, even Libya are going 

better than Egypt’s. The shrinking political space we see in Egypt 

is not a common feature among Arab Spring countries. Going after 

domestic and foreign NGOs is not a common feature among Arab 

Spring countries. This brings me to our issue: The Egyptian court’s 

trial and guilty verdicts. 

I will not detail the saga of the last 18 months. We all know that 

quite well. You will recall that the charges against us were that we 

were not registered organizations in Egypt, despite our effort since 

2006 to do so, and that we did not use the type of bank account 

available to registered organizations. 

When we last appeared before you, we related the testimony of 

the person who, as you know, started this sad saga, Egyptian Minister of Development Fayza Aboul Naga, that we were engaged in 

a neo-colonial plot at the behest of Israel to divide Egypt. This nonsense became an integral part of the prosecution’s case in court. 

Our respective attorneys presented a defense based on the merits 

of the charges against us entering evidence and witness testimony 

about the true nature of our work, demonstrating that the Egyptian Government had full knowledge of it and that we had made 

extensive efforts to become registered since 2006. 

A report completed by Egypt’s own Shura Council in 2012 placed 

the onus of the international registration process on mismanagement by the Egyptian Government. 

And yet, despite an abundance of objective information confirming the weakness of the charges, the trial court on June 4th 

in disjointed verdicts found all 43 defendants to be in violation of 

Egyptian law and imposed harsh penalties from 1 to 5 years in jail 

with hard labor and ordered that our organizations be closed in 

Egypt. These verdicts obviously have a direct negative impact on 

our organizations and staff. 

Moreover, the verdict is part of a broader trend in Egypt. It did 

not occur in isolation. It is a parallel issue to the current draft 

6

NGO law and other discouraging developments I referred to earlier. 

For our partnership with Egypt to endure, we must have a willing partner. We all understand Egypt is in the early stages of transition and mistakes will be made. And, yet, it is difficult to ignore 

the consistent failure by Egypt to make the positive steps toward 

building a democracy that we see in places like Tunisia or Libya. 

To overlook the current assault on democracy would send the 

wrong message. Instead, the U.S. must strongly and consistently 

support popular demands for transparency, accountability, and 

freedom at this critical Middle East crossroads. This means a clear 

continued commitment by the administration and the U.S. Congress to those working under increasing duress for a democratic 

Egypt. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]

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TESTIMONY OF LORNE W. CRANER 

PRESIDENT 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

JUNE 12,2013 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Members of the Committee, it has been nearly sixteen months since I 

testified before you on events in the Middle East and, specifically, on Egypt. I want to thank you 

for your continued focus on the region, and Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, I want to thank you 

personally for the unwavering interest and support you have shown to us and our colleagues at 

this table. 

I wish today's hearing was a report on progress Egypt has made in its transition, but regrettably it 

is not. The Egyptian transition at this point can only be described as a mess, and it is moving in 

an ever more negative direction. You've generously focused this hearing on "American NGOs 

under attack in Morsi's Egypt," so let me begin by describing how Morsi's Egypt is turning out. 

EGYPT'S TRANSITION 

T said in my last testimony that democratization comes many ways - slow and fast, civic and 

political, revolutionary and evolutionary - and that precise trajectories are difficult to predict. I 

think all of us in the democracy and governance assistance community share the view that 

political transitions in the Middle East will take time. Egypt is not different from other countries 

when we say the transition is a decade or decades-long project. That is not so different from 

transitions that occurred in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world regarding timeframes; as I 

often note, countries as varied as Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia took many years after the fall 

of the Soviet Union to finally break with their authoritarian past. While we are in agreement that 

we must have a long-term outlook, it is also true that key milestones along the way impact the 

course of the transition, and bad decisions along the way could fundamentally alter the direction 

countries in the Middle East are headed. Tn Egypt, it appears that it is headed in the wrong 

direction. And, in Egypt, both the new non-governmental organization (NGO) law under 

discussion and, tangentially, our case and the issue of international NGOs working in Egypt, 

constitute negative milestones in the country's course of transition that should not be overlooked. 

One of the benefits of multiple transitions occurring simultaneously is that we have some points 

for comparison that can and should be utilized to set a general frame of reference for how well 

countries are doing. Egypt and Tunisia are different countries. Compared to Egypt, Tunisia 

started with a more homogeneous population that is smaller and better educated. Tunisia has less 

poverty and in years past, was often pointed to as a model of economic success. Yet both are 

Arab countries that share a similar recent history of having autocratic rulers overthrown by 

citizen revolts driven by a demand for more accountable rule. Tn both countries, judging by first 

elections, Islamist political parties are the ascendant political forces. Both have had to tackle the 

questions of new constitutions, freedom of association and NGO laws. It is appropriate eighteen 

months after the region's revolutions began, to look at the two in comparison today. I am here to 
8


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tell you we should be modestly optimistic about Tunisia's current course and very concerned 

about an Egyptian drift backwards toward authoritarianism. 

Tunisia's interim government has faced notable crises, including the assassination of a secular 

opposition politician earlier this year. In its current iteration however, an interim government led 

by both lslamist and secular political parties has endured. The country's National Constituent 

Assembly has been slow in fulfilling its mandate to write a new constitution and is now on its 

fourth draft. With each episode of crisis though, a new consensus seems to emerge and at 

present there is reason to believe the fourth constitutional draft will be voted on. 

In stark contrast, Egypt held a constitutional referendum that made select changes and held 

parliamentary elections beginning in late 2011 Previous quotas in the electoral law for women 

and minorities were removed. Few women or minorities were elected to the new parliament. 

Parliament was later disbanded based on a ruling from Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court 

(SCC) that judged an interpretation made by Egypt's electoral commission to be 

unconstitutional. 

Elections for a new Egyptian president were held in 2012. Tn response to the SCC ruling, 

Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi issued a constitutional declaration placing legislative 

powers in his hands until a new constitution was adopted and elections for a new parliament 

held. He also declared his decrees above judicial review. 

Unlike Tunisia, Egypt's lslamist party, Freedom and Justice (FJP), won a majority of seats in 

parliamentary elections for the later disbanded parliament and also won elections for president 

and for the Shoura Council. FJP initially indicated it would not compete for a majority of seats 

in parliament only to later reverse this decision. FJP likewise indicated it would not field a 

presidential candidate but ultimately fielded two, the second after its initial candidate was 

deemed ineligible. Tn Egypt, a constituent assembly formed by the parliament was decried for 

being stacked with lslamists. This assembly was later deemed void as part of the disbanding of 

parliament but Morsi ordered the body back to work. Tn a second iteration of the assembly, a 

more balanced composition of political and societal forces was included only to be undone 

during the final drafting stages when secular members of the assembly walked out in protest due 

to what they characterized as intransigence by the FJP and Salafist majority. Morsi's response 

was to accelerate the timeframe for holding a referendum on the constitution, which was 

conducted in December 2012 amid widespread social unrest. The new constitution was passed 

by a popular referendum where only 32 percent of eligible Egyptians turned out to vote. This 

participation rate continues an alarming trend in post-Arab Spring Egypt where each successive 

election has produced lower voter participation. 

Freedom of expression thus far presents the most striking study in contrast between the Tunisian 

and Egyptian political transitions. Tunisia entered its revolution as one of the most tightly 

controlled, and thought to be one of the most efficient, police states in the world. Despite issues, 

it can presently be counted as among the more free of countries in the Arab world on freedom of 

expression. 

- 2-
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In contrast, a return of the types of strictures on freedom of expression witnessed under the 

Mubarak regime presents an alarming picture in Egypt. Beyond the high profile arrest of an 

Egyptian satirist for insulting Morsi, more Egyptian journalists have faced legal action during the 

Morsi presidency than during Mubarak's entire 28-year reign. Editors and television producers 

have been routinely removed from their posts and replaced with individuals more friendly to the 

Muslim Brotherhood. 

Regarding the draft NGO law, the Morsi government is taking the same narrow, restrictive 

approach to civil society as the former regime. The most recent NGO law draft advocated by the 

Morsi government mandates that foreign funding be approved by a "Coordinating Committee" 

likely stacked with state security and intelligence representatives as well as representatives from 

the types of ministries that withheld lRl's registration and that of other international NGOs for 

over six years. This Committee replaces the current law's minister which was Fayza Aboul 

Naga during the Mubarak era. In the current draft law, international NGOs cannot conduct 

activities without prior approval and the Committee has broad powers to refuse a license to 

international NGOs. The current draft restricts the ability of Egyptian civil society organizations 

to receive foreign funding without prior Committee approval. Equally as troubling, the current 

draft also requires approval by the Coordinating Committee for Egyptian NGOs to engage in 

domestic fundraising activities. The combination of membership and physical presence 

requirements for Egyptian NGOs along with restrictions on funding and onerous reporting on 

internal decision-making fundamentally undermines the growth of an independent civil society 

in post-Mubarak Egypt. 

NGO TRIAL 

This brings me to our issue, the trial and guilty verdicts against the staff of the organizations 

represented here today. To recap briefly, the International Republican Institute (lRI), and our 

counterparts had our offices raided by Egyptian authorities on December 29, 2011, just days 

before the third phase of Egypt's parliamentary elections that both lRI and the National 

Democratic Institute (NUl) had been officially invited by Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 

observe. The raids stemmed from a secretive "fact-finding" committee, launched with the 

prodding of Mubarak hold-over Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Aboul Naga 

sometime in 2011, to investigate the influences of "foreign funding." A long-time Mubarak 

appointee, Aboul Naga had pursued a strategy of demonizing our respective organizations based 

on her narrow parochial interest goal to control U.S. foreign assistance funding and to have it 

channeled through her ministry. Along with powerful interests in the Egyptian state security 

apparatus, she was responsible for halting lRl's registration efforts even though we submitted 

paperwork to operate legally in Egypt in 2006. 

At the time the raids occurred, seventeen IRI expatriate and Egyptian staff had already been 

called into Egypt's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) for "interviews" by investigating judges (with 

some of those interrogations going on for four hours or more and with at least three staff called 

back for follow-up inquiries). In the initial aftermath of the raids and reactions by the US. 

Government, assurances from Egypt's then military rulers were provided but came to naught and 

instead the situation escalated on January 21, 2012 when TRT's country director Sam LaHood 

was prevented from exiting Egypt on a routine trip out of the country. It was only then that IRI 
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81509a-4.eps

and other organizations learned that a number of American citizens and other international staff 

had been placed on a "travel ban," effectively detaining them in Egypt pending the outcome of 

the MOJ investigation. 

A flurry of diplomatic activity again provided assurances from Egypt's military leadership that a 

resolution was at hand. But on February 6, 2012, MOJ investigating judges in a highly unusual 

press conference announced fonnal charges against 43 American, Egyptian and third-country 

employees of lRl, ND1, Freedom House, International Center for Journalists (1CFJ) and 

Gennany's Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Specifically, the staff was charged with two primary 

offenses: operating without a license (a misdemeanor offense with a possible fine penalty) and 

receiving unauthorized foreign funds to conduct those operations (a felony offense with penalties 

of up to five years imprisonment). This is despite the fact that we have been seeking registration 

since 2006 and received approved U.S. Government funding (which incidentally the Government 

of Egypt has willingly accepted directly at a rate of $1.5 billion annually). 

A circus-like atmosphere followed with the first court session flooded by Egyptian media and 

frivolous civil suits demanding monetary damages for alleged offenses to Egyptian sovereignty. 

Some demanded the death penalty for the organizations' respective employees. We and our 

counterparts endured a relentless flurry of attacks in the Egyptian media that sought to brand the 

organizations as nefarious foreign entities seeking to sow chaos in Egypt. Our Egyptian staff 

was named in the press as foreign spies, their families harassed. 

A change of the court's venue and judges briefly seemed to improve the atmosphere but in each 

session, our Egyptian employees were subjected to state prosecutors and their witnesses 

repeating the same unsubstantiated and politically charged attacks, suggesting that they were 

subversives attempting to undermine Egyptian national security. And then, on September 9, 

2012, Aboul Naga testified. She repeated outlandish and offensive lies from her sworn statement 

to the investigating judges which suggested democracy promotion was a neo-colonial design 

linked to Israeli interests. This nonsense was made an integral part of the prosecution's case and 

in its closing argument, Egyptian prosecutors again suggested the international NGOs were 

intent on undermining Egyptian national security and conducting espionage-like activities meant 

to foment chaos, absurd accusations that have absolutely nothing to do with the specific charges 

at hand. 

For our part, our respective Egyptian attorneys attempted to present a defense based on the 

merits of the charges against us, entering into our defense evidence and witness testimony 

revealing the true nature of our work, which included helping Egyptian groups advocate for 

persons with disabilities to be part of the elections process and sharing information about 

constructive engagement in democratic processes like electoral campaigning. Evidence 

demonstrating that the Egyptian government had full knowledge of the organizations' programs 

based on correspondence between the U.S. State Department and Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs - along with the extensive efforts IRI had undertaken to become registered since 2006 -

were likewise presented to the court, as was a report completed by Egypt's own Shoura Council 

in 2012 which placed the onus of the international NGO registration process on mismanagement 

by the Egyptian government. 

- 4-
11


81509a-5.eps

And yet, despite an abundance of objective information confinning the weakness of the charges 

against IRI, NDI, Freedom House, ICFJ and Konrad Adenauer - charges that were spurious and 

politically motivated - the trial court on June 4, in harsh and disjointed verdicts found all 43 

defendants to be in violation of Egyptian law and imposed penalties ranging from one to five 

years in an Egyptian jail with hard labor. The verdicts obviously have a direct negative impact 

on our organization and the 14 IRI staff convicted. Beyond this, as we said in our statement 

issued June 4, the verdicts "will have a chilling effect on Egyptian civil society and, taken with 

other recent developments, raises serious questions about Egypt's commitment to the democratic 

transition that so many people demanded when they took to the streets in early 2011." 

The work that IRI undertook in Eh'Ypt from the immediate aftermath of the January 2011 Arab 

Spring up until the time of the raids on our otlices is no ditTerent trom the efforts our 

organization has undertaken in numerous countries around the world and in transitions dating to 

the 1980s. It is not ditTerent trom programs that have been accepted and appreciated by 

countries as diverse as Georgia, Indonesia and Poland and no different trom the type of work we 

are doing in Tunisia now. It is the work of helping build the underpinnings of democratic 

institutions and practices, supporting the grow1h of civil society and fair elections, building 

consensus among political stakeholders of all types, and ensuring women, minorities and persons 

with disabilities have a voice in the democratic process. I am proud of IRI' s work and proud of 

IRI stat1~ especially the 14 defendants, who have worked to help Egyptians build a democracy. 

Along with our board of directors, I am committed to supporting our statT and keeping them out 

of Egyptian prison. 

In fairness, this unacceptable situation began long before the current Morsi government and 

before Egypt's revolution. Having said that, the direction Egypt is headed under the Morsi 

government cannot be isolated from the recent NGO trial ruling. Our organization along with 

others in this hearing have attempted to promote universal values for democratic development in 

the new NGO draft law and other key factors in Egypt's political transition. But, in fact, the 

current verdict on our respective organizations is occurring within a broader dynamic in Egypt's 

transition. The judges' ordered closure of our respective organizations in Egypt represents a 

serious blow to the fundamental notion of a vibrant civil society. It is a parallel issue to the 

current draft NGO law, and both are milestones that will help determine whether Egypt heads in 

the right direction versus towards a new authoritarianism dominated by the Morsi government. 

CONCLUSION 

My immediate concern at this time is our 14 lRl defendant staff and keeping them out of harm's 

way should Egypt attempt to issue new international arrest warrants for these individuals. Many 

have worked in countries around the world to help build democracies. Their freedom is my 

prime concern. 

In my last testimony, I said that the United States and Egypt have enjoyed a longstanding 

strategic partnership that has benefitted both countries for more than three decades. 1 also said 

that for the US.-Egyptian partnership to endure, the United States must have a willing partner in 

Egypt. Events of the last year involving our organizations and Egypt's transition more broadly 

make it ditlicult to tell whether or not the Egyptian government seeks the same type of 

partnership we do. 

- 5-
12


81509a-6.eps

I also said in my last testimony that to overlook the current assault on democracy in the interest 

of maintaining relations with the Egyptian government would send a wrong-minded message. 

We are now two years into this transition. We are now a more than a year into a politically 

motivated NGO trial, with verdicts including prison sentences. We understand that Egypt is still 

in the early stages of its transition and that mistakes will be made by people attempting to steer 

the country from an autocratic to an open society. And yet, it is difficult at this point to see 

Egypt making the positive strides toward building its society that we see in Tunisia. 

The United States must strongly and consistently support popular demands for transparency, 

accountability and freedom at this critical crossroads in the new Middle East. This means a 

continued commitment to civil society and speaking clearly with respect to ongoing attacks 

against international NGOs attempting to help Egypt become a democracy. The Administration 

and U.S. Congress should be steadfast in supporting an enabling environment for political parties 

and civil society to build a democratic Egypt. 

Thank you. 

- 6-
13

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. That is very depressing. 

Mr. Dunne? 

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank 

you to the members of the subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES W. DUNNE, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE 

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. DUNNE. It is an honor to appear before you here today. Our 

president, David Kramer, would be here. He expresses his regrets, 

but we have a board of trustees meeting at the same time and 

hopes you understand. 

As you possibly know, I am personally affected by the NGO case 

in Egypt. For the last year and a half, I was defendant number 30 

in the case against Egypt and U.S. NGOs. We work in the field of 

democracy promotion and human rights. Today, I stand convicted, 

sentenced to 5 years in prison and with a fine. Freedom House’s 

office in Cairo has been shut. 

This comes as a shock to me. As you noted, Madam Chair, I 

spent 24 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, three of them as a diplomat in Cairo, where I worked very closely with the Egyptian military. As long as this sentence stands, my ability to travel freely 

and work in my chosen field anywhere in the world stands in question. Six of my Freedom House colleagues have also been convicted 

in this case. And I stand here today in solidarity with them and 

hope that the views that I express will reflect their views and their 

situation as well. 

Now, we had no doubt from the beginning that the raids and the 

trials were politically motivated. This was contained in the explanation from the judges in the case that was reported in the Egyptian press. In this decision, they leaned heavily on worn-out nationalist conspiracy theories with a heavy dose of anti-Israel sentiment 

thrown in. The explanation said,—and I quote, ‘‘Funding has become a new form of control and domination, a soft imperialism pursued by donors to destabilize beneficiary countries and to serve 

American and Israeli interests.’’

With your permission, Madam Chair, I would like that statement 

entered into the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

14


81509e-1.eps

Excerpt from Presiding Jndge Makram Awad's Rationale for the Verdict in the NGO 

Case, as Reported in Shorouk Newspaper, June 5, 2013 

(Trauslation: Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council) 

Funding has become one of the global mechanisms that constitute the framework of international 

relations between donor and beneficiary. It has become a new fonn of control and domination, a 

soft imperialism -less costly in terms of loss and resistance than military might - pursued by 

donors to destabilize, weaken, and dismantle beneficiary countries 

Under the fonner regime that diminished Egypt's regional and international standing and 

prostrated before America's will to normalize relations between Egypt and Israel, foreign 

funding for civil society organizations emerged as a manifestation of this normalization policy. It 

produced calls for foreign assistance, dialogue with the Other, democracy promotion, 

governance, human rights, and other synonyms that hide in its shadow. They emptied these tenns 

of any true substance and imprinted upon it their greed and ambition to breach Egypt's national 

security. They aimed to undennine and dismantle state institutions, leading to the division and 

disintegration of society. They aimed to restructure its national fabric, its sectarian and political 

map, to serve American and Israeli interests which surpassed those of the Egyptian people and 

their country under the fonner regime. 

The degraded political and social conditions in Egypt, a sense of weariness by its people, and a 

lax, disintegrating state that left its fate in the hands of political groups (a gang) governed by 

special interests - not by loyalty to the homeland -brought forth a true popular revolt on January 

25,2011, to brush aside this rubble trom the shoulders of the Egyptian people. It broke the 

chains of domination, subordination, and dependence on Israel that bloodied the wrist of every 

Egyptian, and reclaimed the freedom, human dignity, and social justice, long absent in Egypt. It 

overthrew the existing power and paved the way toward building a modern ci vii democratic 

state 

The United States, and supporters of the Zionist entity, felt fear and horror. The United States 

reacted by throwing all its weight against this change, but its old tactics could not suppress it 

The issue of US funding took on new dimensions in an attempt to contain the revolution, to twist 

its path and direct it to serving its own interests and the interests oflsrael. One manifestation was 

to establish Egyptian branches offoreign organizations that lie outside the legal framework to 

take on activities of a political nature (which would never be authorized) to breach the principle 

of "sovereignty," a known principle in international law, and punishable in all countries of the 

world including the United States 

The Gennans, through the headquarters of Konrad Adenauer, funded its employees to manage 

political activity that would never be authorized to begin with, and implemented hundreds of 
15


81509e-2.eps

political training programs, workshops, and grants to persons, organizations, and entities 

unlicensed to operate in the civil sphere to prevent any infringement on Egypt's sovereignty. 

I was reassured by testimony from Dr. Fayza Abul Naga, Minister of Planning and International 

Cooperation, former Ambassador Marwan Zaki Badr, supervisor of the Office of the Minister of 

International Cooperation, Osama Abdel Moneim Shaltout, Director of non-governmental 

organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leila Ahmed Bahaa ai-Din, deputy assistant to 

the Foreign Minister for Human Rights, and Aziza Yussef, head of the Federation for 

Associations, Solidarity and Social Justice Unions, National Security Investigations, and Federal 

Monitoring and Public Funds, [in addition to] the report of the fact-finding committee, the 

statements of the defendants before the investigating judge in establishing these branch offices 

and receiving funding from organization headquarters in the United States, as well as Germany, 

and the result of the search and seizure ofNGO offices that occurred with the knowledge ofthe 

public prosecutor 

Knowing that the criminal law and complimentary penal laws are applied erga omnes, pleas of 

ignorance cannot be used to deny criminal intent. The Law on Associations and NGOs, 84 of 

2002, provides a criminal penalty, and thereby complements the Penal Code. It applies the rules 

of the Penal Code whereby ignorance does not absolve one of criminal intent. The fact that the 

accused is unaware that the organization is unlicensed by the government does not deny criminal 

intent. Ignorance by virtue of the criminal principle itselfis not an excuse so long as this criminal 

principle imposes on one a commitment to vet the organization before approaching it. If one 

neglects his duty to abide by it, there is no one to blame but himself, as negligence and intent are 

considered one and the same. 
16

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you. 

As this decision makes clear, there can be no doubt that the politics and not the law was what drove and decided this case. Secretary Kerry noted in his June 4th statement on this the decision 

was clearly politically motivated. So it is now obvious that we cannot expect to find justice through further legal proceedings. The 

only viable solution in this case is a political one. And we look to 

President Morsi to exercise his powers to wipe clean the slate for 

all 43 NGO convicts in this case. On this, the U.S. Government 

should weigh in at the highest levels. And we certainly hope that 

the Members of Congress will echo and support this as well. 

Now, the Egyptian Government for its part likely expects a return to business as usual once the current furor over the verdicts 

subsides. Just last month, Secretary Kerry quietly waived conditions on military aid, despite the fact that Egypt clearly has not 

met the conditionality that Congress has written into the law, requiring Egypt to ‘‘implement policies to protect freedom of expression, association, religion, and due process of law.’’ As I understand 

it, the money has not yet been transferred to the Egyptians’ account and should not be in our view under present circumstances. 

In many ways, the deteriorating human rights situation in Egypt 

is worse than it was at points under President Mubarak. 

So the United States should take three clear steps: To persuade 

President Morsi to reverse course and get Egypt’s democratic transition back on course. First, U.S. should reconsider delivery of aid 

to the Egyptian Government until all 43 NGO workers are clear 

and the organizations that were closed are allowed to reopen and 

operate freely. 

Second, a top-to-bottom review of the U.S. relationship with 

Egypt, including the assistance and support for the IMF loan package, should be conducted by the State Department and approved by 

Congress before any further money is appropriated. The relationship cannot be allowed to operate on autopilot given the dramatic 

political changes in Egypt and the region. 

Third, the U.S. Government must consistently speak with a louder voice and at the highest levels about the importance of civic and 

political rights and condemn abuses whenever it finds them. The 

U.S. should make clear that it will continue to support funding for 

the free operation of civil society and its international partners. 

Twenty Egyptian organizations, human rights organizations, 

issued a statement June 6th through the Cairo Institute of Human 

Rights Studies sharply criticizing the verdict and expressing complete support for the defendants in this case. This characterized 

this as a blow against the democratization process in Egypt. 

And, again, with your permission, Madam Chair, I would like to 

have that statement entered. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

17


81509f-1.eps

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies 

20 Egyptian organizations in solidarity with 

the NGO workers sentenced to prison: 

Politically motivated case a fatal blow to 

freedom of expression and association 

Junc 6, 2013 

The undersigned Egyptian rights organizations condemn in the strongest terms the verdict issued 

on June 4 by the Cairo Criminal Court which convicted 43 staff members of international NGOs 

in the so-called "foreign funding case." The defendants, who include nationals from Egypt, 

Palestine, Jordan, the US, Germany, Serbia, and Norway, received prison terms ranging from 

one to five years and were each fined LEI,OOO. 

The undersigned organizations assert that this unjust ruling represents a fatal blow to the 

objectives of the revolution and democratization and further entrenches the pillars of the new 

system of authoritarian rule, which is exhibiting unremitting hostility to civil society. Inspired by 

the former regime, the current authorities have excluded civil society, harassed human rights 

defenders and democracy activists, criminalized their activities, and used the media to defame 

civic organizations and promote views hostile to the universal values of human rights. The 

current authorities have further deployed the security apparatus to block civic initiatives, denied 

victims of abuses of their rights and legal support, and dragged the judiciary into their deceitful 

battle against civil society. 

Throughout the last year since coming to power the regime of President Mohamed Morsi has 

revealed its unrelenting political agenda to sideline civil society - and to undermine 

organizations which defend human rights in particular - instead of allowing civil society space to 

play its essential role in supporting democratization. In fact, President Morsi's policies in many 

areas demonstrate that democratization is not a goal for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its 

Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) This has been made crystal clear in the successive draft laws 

submitted by the ME, the FIP, and the presidency to organize the judiciary and govern civil 

society, as well as those hinted at by the MB which would restrict media freedoms. 

The "foreign funding case" began in July 2011, when the prime minister formed a fact-finding 

committee to investigate what was called "the foreign funding that had entered Egypt following 

the January 25 Revolution." This was accompanied by a concerted smear campaign against 

Egyptian and international civil society groups, accusing them of acting as agents for foreign 

powers, threatening national security, and implementing foreign agendas to create chaos - tactics 

taken directly from Mubarak-era policies. Tn fact, the smear campaign against civil society was 
18


81509f-2.eps

headed by officials and ministers from the Mubarak regime who had remained in their positions 

after the revolution, in an attempt to seek revenge against rights organizations which had played 

an essential role in preparing the way for the revolution. 

In a move unprecedented in Egypt's recent history, police and army forces raided 17 offices of 

ten organizations, among them Egyptian organizations, in late 2011, after which 43 staff 

members were referred to the Cairo Criminal Court on charges of establishing and administering 

branches offoreign organizations and recei ving foreign funding. 

On ~bnwTV ~~QJ1, 31 rights organizations issued a statement condemning the investigations 

into this case, which relied on intelligence gathered by Mubarak's State Security agency. A 

review of the resumes of the judges who carried out the investigations may help explain the 

court's verdict, which was based on the report they prepared. Both judges had served as longtime chief prosecutors in the Supreme State Security Prosecution, which was the subject of 

widespread criticism and whose abolition had been called for by advocates of judicial 

independence, advocacy groups, and various political and social forces fighting for democracy 

prior to the revolution. The State Security Prosecution had been involved in fabricating charges 

against opponents of the Mubarak regime, aided in covering up acts of torture committed by 

State Security Investigations against political detainees, and functioned as a tool used in 

collaboration with State Security by the Mubarak regime to seek revenge against its political 

opponents. 

During the period in which investigations were being carried out, these two judges violated a 

number ofthe most essential legal principles governing the work of the judiciary - considered by 

the Supreme Iudicial Council to be among the crimes warranting the punishment of the judge 

responsible - by "trying" the suspects and others who had not been charged via the media over 

the course of several months, setting another dangerous new precedent. However, the Supreme 

Iudicial Council, which was headed at the time by Hossam al-Ghariani (who later became the 

head of the Constituent Assembly), took no measures in response to these acts by the 

investigating judges, even after legal complaints were tiled regarding the matter. 

From the very beginning (summer and fall 2011), the "foreign funding case" saw blatant 

interference by the executive in the court's work, beginning with the manner in which the two 

investigative judges were appointed and including the pressure exerted on the judiciary to lift the 

travel ban on foreign staff of the involved organizations. It should be noted that some of the 

organizations whose staff members were given severe sentences for promoting democracy had 

operated in Egypt since 2005, cooperating consistently and publicly with the Egyptian 

government and with the full knowledge of the security apparatus. These organizations had tried 

repeatedly to register officially and had failed due to bureaucratic security procedures - the 

Egyptian Foreign Ministry did not reject their applications for pennits, yet it also did not grant 

acknowledgement of receipt of their applications, placing these organizations in a precarious 

position indefinitely. The Egyptian government had sent official letters to a number of these 

organizations - even during the period during which investigations were being carried out and 

the smear campaign in the media was ongoing - inviting them to monitor the parliamentary 

elections which were held during the last three months of2011. 
19


81509f-3.eps

The undersigned organizations assert that this unfair ruling comes in the context of attempts by 

the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated government and parliament to suppress civil society and curb 

its activities by judicial and legislative means. For example, the deputy justice minister for 

legislative matters and the head of the fact-finding committee on foreign funding stated before 

the Shura Council on March 24, 2013 that investigations into the "foreign funding case" had 

ended with the referral of 43 defendants to the criminal court. He added that investigations of 

Egyptian organizations were still underway, which means that we can expect a second round of 

attacks on civil society groups, including the summoning of their directors and staff members for 

questioning and possibly being referred to triaL 

Moreover, on the same day that the verdict was issued by the Criminal Court in Cairo, the 

Committee for Human Resources Development and Local Governance in the Shura Council 

began debating the draft NGO law submitted by the president on Wednesday, May 29. The bill 

has been severely criticized by Egyptian and international organizations as well as by the UN 

High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

The new l:lilt which is currently being discussed in the Shura Council, blatantly contravenes both 

international standards for the freedom of association and the Egyptian constitution. It would 

impose severe restrictions on activities of Egyptian NGOs, registration, and the operation of 

foreign NGOs and place civic associations under the control of various security agencies, which 

would be represented on the steering committee to be established by the law. This bill would 

make the situation of foreign NGOs even more difficult than under the Mubarak regime This 

proposed bill and the recent judicial ruling are essentially two expressions of the same process of 

undermining civil society in Egypt. 

The undersigned organizations declare their solidarity with the statf of the foreign NGOs who 

were convicted in a politically motivated case that exploited repressive legal statutes and 

implicated the judiciary. We will continue to stand up to all attempts to restrict the right to 

association with draconian laws that do not comply with international standards. 

Finally, we note that the current authorities still have the opportunity to renounce their aspiration 

to restrict the activities of organizations advocating democracy and human rights by withdrawing 

its repressive NGO bill and using the powers granted to the president by Article 149 of the 

constitution - which have been used more than once to grant amnesties for detainees and 

prisoners affiliated with armed Islamist movements - to issue a pardon for the democracy 

advocates and human rights defenders convicted in this clearly political case. 

Signatories: 

1. Cairo Institute for hnman rights stndies (CIHRS). 

2. Andalus Institute for Tolerance & Anti-violence Studies (AITAS). 

3. Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI). 

4. Arab organization for human rights. 

5. Arab Penal Reform Organization. 

6. Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression. 

7. Center for Appropriate Communication Techniques (ACT). 
20


81509f-4.eps

8. Center for Egyptian Women's Legal Aid. 

9. Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights. 

10. Egyptian Foundation for the Advancement of Childhood Conditions. 

11. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). 

12. Egyptian women's union. 

13. Habi Center for Environmental Rights. 

14. Hisham Mubarak Law Center. 

15. Human Right association for the Assistance of Prisoners. 

16. Masriyon Against Religious Discrimination. 

17. Nazra for Feminist Studies. 

18. New Woman Foundation. 

19. The Egyptian Association For Community Participation Enhancement. 

20. The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights. 
21

Mr. DUNNE. So it is clear that, despite Egyptian Government 

propaganda, our organizations do have willing partners in Egypt, 

willing to do the hard work of democracy on the ground. We look 

forward to the day when we can cooperate with them once more. 

Finally, I want to note that the NGO case has come with a steep 

human cost that the staffs of all of these organizations and others. 

The staffs of all these four organizations and others, 13 other Egyptian organizations, were rated on the same day ours were, by the 

way. 

Lives have been disrupted, careers threatened, and deep emotional stress imposed. To the Egyptian Government, the people involved in this case are mere pawns in an internal power struggle. 

To me, my Egyptian staff members are dear friends and colleagues. 

I pay tribute to their courage and determination to build a better 

Egypt. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dunne follows:]

22


81509b-1.eps

Testimony of Charles W. Dunne 

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, Freedom House 

before the 

United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and North Africa 

"American NGOs Under Attack in Morsi's Egypt" 

June 12, 2013 
23


81509b-2.eps

11 

Madame Chair, Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you today for this 

hearing on "American NGOs Under Attack in Morsi's Egypt." My colleague, David Kramer, the 

president of Freedom House, deepl y regrets not being able to join you today along with his 

distinguished counterparts from NDI, IRI, and ICFJ; however, he has a meeting of his board of 

trustees at this very time and hopes you understand. 

I, of course, know this issue very well. For the last year and a half, I was Defendant Number 30 

in the Egyptian government's case against four US-based NGOs that work in the field of 

democracy promotion and civic and political liberties. Today, as the result of a verdict issued 

eight days ago, I stand convicted in that case, sentenced to tive years in prison and a tine, and my 

organization's oftice in Cairo has been ordered shut down along with those of the other 

organizations represented here today. This all comes as a shock for me, having spent 24 years as 

a U.S diplomat, three of them in Cairo where I worked closely with the Egyptian military. As 

long as this sentence stands, I can never return to Egypt, and my ability to travel and work freely 

in my field will always be in question. 

Six of my Freedom House colleagues-five of them Egyptian and one of whom has since moved 

on from Freedom House-have also been convicted. Oftice director Nancy Okail and staff 

members Mohamed Abdel Aziz, Basem Fathy, and Magdy Moharram have all been put through 

a terrible ordeal, as have our Jordan oftice director Sameer Jarrah and fonner Freedom House 

program officer Sherif Mansour. For our Egyptian staff, this whole episode is particularly 

painful and unsettling, for this is happening in their country. I stand here in solidarity with them 

and hope my views expressed today represent their plight as well. 

How did things get to this point? 

What began as a campaign of vilification in the Egyptian media against foreign NGOs in July 

2011, launched by the Minister of International Cooperation in a dispute with the U.S. 

Government over how to handle assistance funds, turned into a nightmare on December 29 of 

that year. That is when the oftices of our four organizations were raided at gunpoint by the 

security services, our staff held incommunicado while searches were conducted, and our offices 

were sealed and closed. In February 2012, fonnal charges were proffered against 43 NGO 

workers in Egypt and abroad. I was one of them. Our alleged crime? Operating an organization 

and receiving funds from a foreign government without a license. In Freedom House's case, we 

had completed and submitted all the paperwork required to seek formal government recognition 

just three days before the raids. Ironically, one of the conditions for registration was to have 

opened an office. 

We had no doubt from the beginning that the raids and the trials were politically motivated. All 

doubt was removed by the explanation of the verdict itself, which has not yet been formally 

released, but large portions of which were obtained and printed in the Egyptian press. Rather 

than relying on legal argumentation, the judges leaned on worn-out nationalist conspiracy 
24


81509b-3.eps

12 

theories with a strong dose of anti-Israel sentiment thrown in. It's worth quoting at some length. 

The explanation said 

Funding has become one of the global mechanisms that constitute the framework ofintemational 

relations between donor and beneficiary. It has become a new fOlln of control and domination. a 

soft imperialism - less costly in ten1lS ofloss and resistance than military might - pursued by 

donors to destabilize, weaken, and dismantle beneficiary' countries. 

Under the former regime that diminished Egypt's regional and international standing and 

prostrated before America's will to normalize relations between Egypt and Israel, foreign funding 

for civil socicty organizations emcrgcd as a manifestation of this normalization policy. It 

produced calls for foreign assistance, dialogue with the Other, democracy promotion, govemance, 

human rights, mld other synonyms that hide in its shadow. TI,ey emptied these te1111s of any true 

substance and imprinted upon it their greed mld mnbition to breach Egypt's national security. 

TI,ey aimed to undellnine mld dismml1le state institutions. leading to the di vision and 

disintegration of society. They aimed to restructure its national fabric, its sectarian and political 

map. to serve American and Israeli interests which surpassed those ofthe EtlYptiml people and 

their country under tl,e fanner regime. 

TI,e degraded political m1d social conditions in Egypt. a sense of weariness by its people. mld a 

lax, disintegrating state that left its fate in the hmlds of political groups (a gmlg) govemed by 

special interests - not by loyalty to the homeland -brought fOrtIl a true popular revolt on January 

25,2011, to brush aside this rubble from the shoulders ofthe Egyptim1 people. It broke the chains 

of domination, subordination. mld dependence on Israel tl,at bloodied the wrist of every Egy ptian, 

and reclaimed the freedom, human dignity, and social justice. long absent in Egypt. It overthrew 

the existing power and paved the way toward building a modern civil democratic state. 

TI,e United States mld supporters ofthe Zionist entity. fclt fear mld horror. TI,e United States 

reacted by throwing all its weight against this chmlge, but its old tactics could not suppress it. The 

isslLe of US funding took on new dimensions in an attempt to contain the revolution_ to twist its 

path and direct it to serving its O'W11 interests and the interests of Tsrael. One manifestation ,vas to 

establish Egyptiml brm1ches of foreign orgmlizations that lie outside the legal framework to take 

on activities of a political nature (which would never be authorized) to breach the principle of 

"sovereignty," a known principle in international law, and punishable in all countries of the world 

including the United States. 

It goes on in this vein. With your permission, Madmne Chair, I would like to submit the 

explanation of the verdict, as translated into English by the Rafik Hariri Center, for the record. 

As this astonishingly vitriolic screed makes clear, there can be no doubt that politics and not the 

law was what drove and decided this case. In his June 4 statement, U.S. Secretary of State John 

Kerry acknowledged as much, stating that the trial was "politically motivated." And here I 

would like to express my and my organization's deep appreciation for the many strong 

statements on this case that have come from both the House and the Senate, from both sides of 

the aisle. This sends a loud and clear message that will surely be heard in Cairo. 
25


81509b-4.eps

13 

It is now obvious that given the political nature of the case and the political motives of the 

Egyptianjudiciary, we cannot expect to find j ustice through further legal proceedings. The only 

viable solution is a political one. We look to President Morsi to exercise his powers to wipe the 

slate clean for all of the 43 NGO workers who were unjustly convicted. The US. government 

should weigh in at the highest levels with him with this expectation, and we hope Members of 

Congress will echo this .. This case did not begin under President Morsi's tenure; it started when 

the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was temporarily running the country after the 

revolution in early 2011. But it has been his problem since he was elected in June oflast year, 

and it has only gotten worse, culminating with last week's verdict. 

We welcome the deep concern expressed by Secretary Kerry about the verdicts and the 

sentences, but the Egyptian government likely expects a return to business as usual once the 

current furor over the verdict subsides. This is in part because issues of democracy and civil 

society have taken a back seat to the bilateral economic and military relationships over the past 

two-plus years. Just last month, the Secretary quietly waived conditions on military aid despite 

the fact that Egypt clearly has not met the Congressional requirement that it "implement policies 

to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process oflaw." As I 

understand it, that money has not yet actually been transferred and should not be under the 

present circumstances. 

The U.S. government needs to convey a stronger message that we cannot go back to business as 

usual while the crackdown on Egyptian civil society worsens. Nor can we fail to respond when 

Americans and Egyptians alike are considered criminals for implementing US. governmentfunded programs to protect the rights of Egyptians and support the emergence of democratic 

institutions. The message will only get across if the U.S. government makes clear that this is a 

turning point in the U.S.-Egyptian relationship that cannot be overlooked. 

The United States has a clear interest in Egypt's economic recovery, because it would facilitate 

democratic progress and avert an economic collapse, which might plunge Egypt into deep 

instability. But the US. government cannot efIectively assist Egypt's economic recovery 

without a reliable partner in the Egyptian government The verdict in the NGO trial shows that 

the Egyptian government is anything but a reliable partner. Moreover, the verdict follows a 

pattern of abuses by Morsi' s government and makes clear that there is no democratic transition 

taking place in Egypt today. These include continued torture and abuse in prisons and jails, 

impunity for security sector otlicials responsible these abuses and attacks on protesters, and 

restrictions on press and speech freedoms. One can be j ailed under blasphemy laws and for 

"insulting the President;" nationally popular comedian Bassem Youssef, for example, was 

accused with insulting both Islam and President Morsi in March. A repressive draft law on 

NGOs now before the Shura Council would severel y tighten government control over Egyptian 

and international NGOs and give the government the right to cut off their funding and activities 

at any time. In many ways, the deteriorating human rights situation in Egypt today is worse than 

under the former regime. 
26


81509b-5.eps

Thus, continuation of US. aid in its present form would do more to enable repression in Et,'ypt 

than to address the country's economic problems. 

14 

To persuade President Morsi to reverse course, and get Egypt's transition back on track, the 

United States should take three clear steps. First, it should reconsider delivery of aid to the 

Egyptian government until the slate is wiped clean for all of the 43 NGO workers and unless and 

until the American and German organizations that were ordered by the judges to be shut down 

are allowed to reopen and operate freely in Egypt. After all, it is hard to understand how the US. 

Government could continue to provide assistance to the Egyptian government unless these steps 

are taken, particularly in light of the clear aid conditionality written into law. 

Second, a top-to-bottom review of the U.S. relationship with Egypt - including U.S. assistance 

and its support for Egypt's requested IMF loan package- should be conducted by the State 

Department and approved by Congress before any further aid is appropriated. The relationship 

cannot be allowed to operate on autopilot given the dramatic political changes in the region and 

particularly in Egypt. A new approach is needed that reflects new realities and promotes 

democratic progress. 

Third, the US government must consistently speak with a louder voice and at the highest levels 

about the importance of civic and political rights and condemn abuses whenever it sees them. 

The US should make clear that it will continue to support funding for the free operation of 

Egyptian civil society and its international partners. 

We fear, however, the administration may be moving in the opposite direction. The 

administration has requested $27.9 million for democracy and human rights programming in 

Egypt for FY 14, which represents less than 2% of the entire aid package being requested for the 

country, most of which is for military assistance. In the request, the administration describes a 

"time of profound change," during which it intends to "support the Egyptian people as they strive 

to develop a legitimate democratic government that represents all Egyptians, promotes political 

freedoms, and creates economic opportunities." However, it is difficult to see how those goals 

can be achieved under the current circumstances. 

While the democracy aid request as a whole is almost double the FY12 figures, most of that 

increase goes toward election processes and to the national and local governments in Egypt. 

Money allocated to help the Egyptian people achieve political freedoms and human rights, which 

should go through local organizations and their international partners, certainly not through the 

government, decreased by 44% compared to FY12. This is a huge hit to an already miniscule 

budget and will severely hamper the ability of the US. to help the Egyptian people in their 

aspirations for democracy and freedom. 

The case against the NGOs is part ofa larger effort to stifle Egyptian civil society, make 

government less accountable to the people, and restrict freedom of speech and association. Some 
27


81509b-6.eps

15 

will say that if that is the type of political arrangement Egyptians want, who are we to meddle in 

their politics? 

That is not what Freedom House or any of our sister organizations were there to do. We were 

there to support our Egyptian friends as they sought to build the freedoms for which those in 

Tahrir Square demonstrated. We worked to empower citizens to monitor elections. We worked 

to teach a new generation of civic activists how to bring about peaceful political change. We 

worked to enable citizens to end the culture of impunity surrounding torture. We worked to help 

educate Egyptians about their rights as citizens. We don't discriminate by party, ethnicity, 

religion, or gender. We worked with a local onice of entirely Egyptian staff and with many 

Egyptian partner organizations. 

Twenty of these organizations issued a statement June 6 expressing their views on the case in the 

strongest terms. With your permission, Madame Chair, I would like to offer the full statement 

for inclusion in the record. 

The statement, issued by the Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies, said in part 

The undersigned Egyptian rights organizations condemn in the strongest ten1lS the verdict issued 

on June 4 by the Cairo Criminal Court which convicted 43 staff members of intemational NGOs 

in the so-called "foreign funding case'-... The undersigned organizations assert that tins lmjust 

ruling represents a fatal blow to the objectives of the revolution and democratization and further 

entrenches the pillars of the new system of authoritarian fille, which is exhibiting unremitting 

hostility to ci,il society ... The undersigned organizations declare their solidarity with the staff of 

the foreign NGOs who were comicted in a politically motivated case that exploited repressive 

legal statutes and implicated the judiciary. We will continue to stand up to all attempts to restrict 

the right to association with draconian laws that do not comply with international standards. 

Despite Egyptian government propaganda, our organizations do have willing partners. We look 

forward to the day we can cooperate with them once more. 

Finally, I want to note that the NGO case and the appalling verdicts come with a steep human 

cost to the staffs of these four organizations. Lives and families have been disrupted, careers 

threatened, and deep emotional stress imposed. To the Egyptian government they are pawns in 

an internal power struggle and tools to help defy the United States. To me, my Egyptian staff 

members are dear friends and colleagues. I pay tribute to their courage and determination to 

build a better Egypt. 
28

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Barnathan? Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JOYCE BARNATHAN, PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR JOURNALISTS 

Ms. BARNATHAN. Madam Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the terrible verdict in Egypt. 

Just as background, the International Center for Journalists’ 

work in Egypt and around the world is aimed at raising professional standards. We offer practical, hands-on programs that use 

the latest digital tools. And we aim to help journalists produce responsible, ethical coverage. 

When we first learned of the startling charges against five ICFJ 

employees, we worked with our really excellent lawyers to present 

overwhelming evidence that the allegations were false. Up until the 

verdict, our lawyers were convinced of an acquittal. The decision to 

convict all of the NGO workers is a politically motivated move, and 

it does not reflect on the work of ICFJ in Egypt. But I want to 

highlight the human toll here. This decision is ruining lives. 

What do you say to a distinguished journalist like Yehia 

Ghanem, who is right behind me, whom we hired to lead our new 

program, which hadn’t even begun, and to finish the registration 

process? He got a 2-year sentence and cannot return home to his 

wife and three children and the country he loves without going to 

prison. What do we say to his children, who cry daily because they 

miss their father? One of his kids had both arms broken in school 

for defending his father’s honor. 

Our other Egyptian employee, who is also here, Islam Shafiq, is 

separated from his pregnant young wife. Though his 1-year term 

was suspended, is it really safe for him to return? The court labeled the three U.S.-based defendants, Patrick Butler, Natasha 

Tynes, and Michelle Betz, as fugitives, though they were not based 

in Egypt and they were not there when the charges were filed. 

They got 5-year terms. 

These people’s livelihoods depend on travel. Labeled as convicts, 

will they be arrested and sent to Cairo by a nation that has an extradition treaty with Egypt? 

There is also the societal impact. Egyptian court officials say 

they are going to pursue anyone who provided help to NGOs, and 

they want to investigate other civil society groups. 

As others have mentioned, the draft of a new NGO law, by many 

accounts, including the State Department’s, is onerously restrictive. 

There is a chilling effect that has frozen the hopes of Arab Spring 

in Egypt. 

For ICFJ, this politically motivated decision is particularly painful. We are not a political organization. We do not take political decisions or offer political advice. ICFJ has been working in Egypt 

since 2005 with the complete knowledge of the government. We applied for registration from the start, and shortly before our offices 

were raided, we gave the government full details about all of our 

programs. We have always had formal contracts with prestigious 

universities and news organizations, which are registered to carry 

out our activities. 

29

And, in 2011, as we have noted before, our lawyer recommended 

that we open an office, a legal requirement for registration. We had 

conducted no activities in the office while we waited for approval. 

At the heart of this matter is a dispute, as we all know, between 

the U.S. and Egyptian Governments over funding for NGO activity. 

As others have said, the Egyptian minister of international cooperation was angered that U.S. gave funds to NGOs, instead of to 

her ministry. ICFJ and its employees were not aware of this dispute. 

The verdict is full of loaded language. The court claims that 

NGOs may appear to support human rights and democracy, but the 

underlying goal is to ‘‘undermine Egypt’s national security and lay 

out a sectarian map that serves U.S. and Israeli interests.’’ The 

judges also described NGO work as a new form of ‘‘soft imperialism 

practiced by donors to destabilize, weaken, and dismantle’’ Egypt. 

How on Earth do we even relate to any of these charges? 

The ICFJ defendants did nothing wrong by training journalists. 

We are discussing with our lawyers how to appeal this verdict. But 

how can we be confident in the appeal process when judges simply 

ignore the facts? Our employees also risk getting thrown in jail if 

they return home for an appeal. And those tried in absentia have 

no legal recourse. 

Egypt’s news media have made groundless attacks on our defendants. And these distortions show precisely why Egyptian media 

needs ICFJ’s assistance more than ever. I think the real victims 

are the Egyptian people, who will likely see further backsliding in 

democracy and freedom of expression. 

Members of Congress visited Egypt during the trial and assured 

our staff there that they had nothing to worry about, the U.S. Government would protect those working on programs it funded, they 

said. We urge Congress now to hold fast to that promise. Please 

use all means possible to get these unjust verdicts overturned. We 

need a pardon so that good, decent people like Yehia Ghanem and 

Islam Shafiq can recapture their lives. It would be a true shame 

if Egyptian citizens now feared that working to build democratic institutions will only land them in jail. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Barnathan follows:]

30


81509c-1.eps

TESTIMONY OF JOYCE BARNA THAN 

PRESIDENT 

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR JOURNALISTS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

"AMERICAN NGOS UNDER ATTACK IN MORSI'S EGYPT" 

JUNE 12,2013 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today about the terrible verdict in Egypt. 

The International Center for Journalists' work in Egypt and around the world is aimed at raising 

professional standards. We offer practical, hands-on programs using the latest digital tools. We 

provide today's journalists-both professional and citizen-with the skills needed to provide 

responsible, ethical coverage so that citizens can make the best possible decisions in their lives. 

When we first learned of the startling charges against five employees, we worked with a team of 

excellent lawyers to present overwhelming evidence that the allegations were false. Up until the 

verdict, our defense lawyers were convinced of an acquittal. The decision to convict all of the 

NGO workers is a politically motivated statement directed at the U. S. and German governments. 

Tn our view, it does not reflect on the work ofTCFJ in Egypt 

But this move has far-reaching impact. First, it has ruined lives. What do you say to a 

distinguished journalist like Yehia Ghanem, who agreed to be our country director so that we 

could raise journalism skills in Egypt? We hired Yehia to lead the program, which hadn't even 

begun, and to finish the registration process. He got a two-year sentence and cannot return home 

to his wife and three children - and the country he loves - without going to prison 

What do we say to his children, who cry daily because they miss their father? One of his kids had 

both arms broken in school as he defended his father's honor. Yehia has also been vilified in the 

media. Our other Egyptian employee, Islam Shafiq, a newlywed, is now in the U.S., separated 

from his young wife. Though his one-year term was suspended, is it really safe for him to return? 

The court labeled the three other U.S.-based defendants - Patrick Butler, Natasha Tynes and 

Michelle Betz - as fugitives, though they were not based in Egypt for ICFJ and were not there 

when the charges were tiled. They got five-year terms. These are people whose livelihoods 

depend on travel. Labeled as convicts, will they be arrested and sent to Cairo by a nation that has 

an extradition treaty with Egypt? 

The personal toll cannot be underestimated. 

Then there's the societal impact. Egyptian court officials say they will pursue anyone who 

provided help to NGOs-and these officials want to open investigations into other international 

and Egyptian civil society groups. The draft of a new NGO law, by many accounts, is onerously 

restrictive. 
31


81509c-2.eps

In a society where questioning authority is now at risk, I would advise any non-governmental 

group working in Egypt to think twice. All are vulnerable now. Yes, there is a chilling effect that 

has frozen the hopes of an Arab Spring 

The situation could get worse. Other countries, eager to crack down on civil society, may now 

follow the poor example set by Egypt. 

For ICFJ, this decision is particularly painful. We are not a political organization. We do not take 

political decisions or offer political advice. We do not fund political activities, including protest 

movements, or support political parties. That's why a politically motivated verdict is so 

outrageous. 

Our funding comes mainly from private sources, but we receive about a third of our budget from 

the US. government, including this Egypt grant from the State Department. We cherish our 

integrity and maintain autonomy in every program. 

ICFJ has been working in Egypt since 2005, with the complete knowledge of the Egyptian 

government. We had formal partnerships with prestigious universities and news organizations. 

We are transparent in all of our work. We applied for registration from the start-and shortly 

before our offices in Egypt were raided, we gave the Egyptian government full details of all our 

work over the years. 

We have cooperated with partner organizations, including the state-run Al Ahram newspaper, 

which were registered to carry out our projects. Tn 2011, our lawyer recommended that TCFJ 

open an office as this was legally required for the registration. Since we opened the office, we 

had conducted no activities while we waited for final approval. 

At the heart of this matter is a dispute between the US and Egyptian governments over funding 

for NGO activity. The Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation at that time was angered 

by a US government decision to give funds to US.-based NGOs that she thought should go to 

her ministry. ICFJ and its employees were not aware of this dispute. 

The verdict's loaded language makes it clear that this was a political dispute between countries. 

The judges claim that non-governmental organizations may appear to support human rights and 

democracy, but that the underlying goal is to "undermine Egypt's national security and layout a 

sectarian map that serves US. and Israeli interests." The judges called the work of NGOs a new 

form of "control, predominance and soft imperialism practiced by donors to destabilize, weaken 

and dismantle" Egypt. 

How do we even relate to any of these charges? The ICFJ defendants did nothing wrong in 

launching programs that would help Egyptian journalists do their work better. We are discussing 

with our lawyers how to appeal this verdict. But how can we be confident of success when 

judges make decisions not on the facts but on political grounds aimed at appeasing public 

opinion? 

Today's Egypt is a complex place with a struggling economy and political infighting at home 

2 
32


81509c-3.eps

and abroad. Despite our best intentions, we got caught in the middle. 

As a journalists' organization, we don't pressure governments to do anything. But we urge 

Congress to use all means possible to get these unjust verdicts overturned. 

Given the vitriol and distortions perpetrated in Egypt's media, our services are needed there 

more than ever. Newspapers have made groundless attacks, based on false and distorted 

information, about the case and the defendants. The real victims are the Egyptian people, who 

wi11likely see further backsliding in democracy and freedom of expression. 

Again, we ask Congress to do everything in its power to get a pardon for the defendants or 

prevent the enforcement of this verdict so that good, decent people like Yehia Ghanem and Islam 

Shafiq can recapture their lives. It would be a shame if Egyptian citizens now fear that working 

to build democratic institutions such as a vibrant media or free elections would only land them in 

jaiL 
33

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Wollack? 

STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH WOLLACK, PRESIDENT, 

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. WOLLACK. Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the 

conviction in Egypt of the current and former staff members of 

NDI, who, along with counterparts from the IRI, Freedom House, 

the ICFJ, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, were sentenced last 

week to prison. I also want to thank you and many of your colleagues for the statements of support that you have issued for 

those unjustly convicted. And we wish to thank as well the many 

Egyptian civic organizations and political leaders who have issued 

statements of support. 

We were all shocked and deeply distressed by the verdict. These 

individuals did nothing wrong, and they should be praised, not 

prosecuted, for the work they did to support Egyptian democracy. 

In NDI’s case, there are 15 individuals who have been the victims 

of this prosecution: 5 Americans, 4 Egyptians, 3 Serbians, 2 Lebanese, and 1 Romanian. It has been an ordeal for all of them, disrupting their personal and professional lives, as a number of them 

grappled with the trauma of armed raids on our offices, an abrupt 

work stoppage, an intense government-led media campaign against 

them, hours of interrogation by government authorities, a draggedout trial, and now a jail sentence. 

These proceedings began under the military-led government and 

were instigated, as Mr. Connolly noted, by a holdover cabinet member from the Mubarak regime. Our alleged crime was operating an 

unlicensed branch of an international organization and receiving 

funds from the United States Government without the approval of 

the Egyptian Government. 

While the motivations for the original investigation and charges 

remain unclear, a central issue was a longstanding conflict over 

who controls U.S. assistance to Cairo. Those wrongfully convicted 

were ultimately the victims of an intergovernmental dispute between the United States and the then Egyptian Government. The 

Egyptian view had been that such assistance should be passed 

through Egyptian Government ministries and be used only for programs and groups sanctioned by government authorities. 

By providing assistance, often through people-to-people programs, the U.S. sought to assist the emergence of a vibrant civil 

society and political parties whose participation in the country’s 

evolving political, social and economic development could lay the 

foundation for a functioning democracy. 

NDI fulfilled all legal requirements for registration through the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005, shortly after we opened an office in Cairo. And Article Six of the relevant Egyptian law states 

that if a registration application is not formally rejected within 60 

days, it will be considered approved. NDI’s application has never 

been rejected: Verbally or in writing. In fact, one government ministry involved in the registration process wrote that NDI’s activities 

complied with Egyptian laws. 

34

Ironically, 1 month prior to the raid on our offices, NDI and IRI 

were formally invited by Egyptian authorities to observe the country’s parliamentary elections. NDI’s nonpartisan programs in Egypt 

always responded to local demands and requests for technical assistance. We shared international experiences by leaders who were 

instrumental in their own democratic transitions from such diverse 

places as Chile, Indonesia, and Poland. We conducted programs on 

the development of political parties. And we assisted civil society 

groups engaged in nonpartisan election monitoring and civic and 

voter education. 

If there was any doubt about the political nature of the judicial 

proceedings, it was dispelled by the judges themselves in a summary of the verdict provided to journalists last week. As has been 

noted earlier, they described foreign assistance as, and I quote, ‘‘a 

form of new control and domination and a less expensive form of 

soft colonialism pursued by donor countries to destabilize the security and stability of the receiving countries. This weakened Egypt’s 

position, regionally and internationally, and bowed to the will of 

[the] U.S.A. in building bridges to normalize relations with Israel.’’ 

The judges claimed that, ‘‘One cannot imagine . . . that the U.S.A. 

or other countries supporting the Zionist entity has any interest or 

a genuine desire for establishing a real democracy in Egypt.’’

Coming in tandem with last week’s convictions is the referral of 

a new draft NGO law that is being discussed in the Shura Council. 

And it is far more restrictive than the one under which our employees were charged and convicted. This should be a time for active 

civil engagement. Last week’s verdict and the proposed NGO law 

could create the opposite effect. 

We know that the relationship between the Governments of 

Egypt and the United States is complex and important to regional 

security. We also know that democratic development leads to longterm economic and social advancement that improves quality of 

life, spurs trade, advances peace, and eliminates conditions that 

fuel extremism. 

We hope the international community will not give up on a 

Egypt’s democratic transition. The issues it presents and Egypt’s 

place in the world are too important. 

Since NDI’s founding in 1983, our staff members, who represent 

96 nationalities, have repeatedly overcome the challenges of working in difficult and sometimes hostile environments. But not once 

in those 30 years has any of our staff ever been charged, tried, and 

sentenced to prison. 

Foremost on our minds today are the innocent people caught up 

in this highly political process. We believe there should be justice 

for them, which can still be accomplished through legal, constitutional means, including a pardon. 

In closing, I would like to thank the many Members of Congress 

and officials in the administration who have worked and continue 

to work tirelessly to help resolve this crisis. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wollack follows:]

35


81509d-1.eps

STATEMENT BY KENNETH WOLLACK 

PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

"AMERICAN~GOs UNDER ATTACK IN MORSI'S EGYPT" 

JUNE 12, 2013 

Madam Chailwoman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this oppOltunity 

to testify today about the conviction in Egypt of the current and former staff members of 

the National Democratic Institute who - along with counterparts from the International 

Republican Institute, Freedom House, the International Center for Joumalists and the 

Komad Adenauer Foundation - were put on trial in Cairo and were sentenced last week 

to prison. 

I also want to thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and many of your colleagues for the 

statements of support that you have issued for those unjustly convicted. And we wish to 

thank as well the many Egyptian civic organizations and political leaders who have 

issued statements of support. 

NO! was shocked and deeply distressed by the verdict. These individuals did nothing 

wrong, and they should be commended, not prosecuted for the work they did to 

strengthen and SUppOlt democracy in Egypt. 

In NDT's case, there are 15 individuals who have been the victims of this prosecutionfive Americans, four Egyptians, three Serbians, two Lebanese and one Romanian. It has 

been 24 months since Egypt initiated this legal action, 21 months since staff 

interrogations began, 18 months since our offices were raided, and 16 months since 

charges were filed and the trial began. It has been an ordeal for all of them, disrupting 

their personal and professional lives as a number of them grappled with the trauma of the 

armed raids, an abrupt work stoppage, an intense government-led media campaign 

against them, hours of interrogation by government authorities, a dragged out trial and 

now a jail sentence. One former member of parliament went so far as to call them traitors 

and suggest that they be executed. 

These proceedings began under the government led by the Supreme Council of the 

Aimed Forces (SCAF) and were instigated by a holdover cabinet member from the 

Mubarak regime. Our alleged crime was operating an unlicensed branch of an 

international organization and receiving funds from the United States Government 

without the approval of the Egyptian government. The Congressionally appropriated 
36


81509d-2.eps

2 

funds were provided by the United States Agency for Intemational Development 

(USAID) and the State Department's Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor 

(DRL). 

While the motivations for the Ollginal investigation and charges remain unclear, a central 

issue was a longstanding conflict over who controls U.S. assistance to Cairo. Those 

wrongfully convicted were ultimately the victims of an intergovenunental dispute 

between the U.S. and the then-Egyptian government. The Egyptian view had been that 

such assistance should be passed through Egyptian govemment ministries and be used 

only for programs and groups sanctioned by govelmnent authorities. By providing 

assistance, often through people-to-people programs, the U.S. sought to assist the 

emergence of a vibrant civil society and political parties whose participation in the 

country's evolving political, social and economic development could lay the foundation 

for a functioning democracy. This is the same way that these groups have played positive 

roles in successful transitions around the world and throughout history. 

NDI fulfilled all legal requirements for registration tlu·ough the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs in 2005, shortly after we opened an office in Cairo. I was personally told at tlle 

time by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that our paperwork was in order and that 

registration would be granted in a matter of weeks. And Article Six oftlle relevant 

Egyptian law states that if a registration application is not formally rejected within 60 

days, it will be considered approved. NDl's application has never been rejected, verbally 

or in writing. 

Throughout this so-called "unregistered" period, we were open and transparent about our 

work, regularly informing officials of our activities. We were never asked to stop work or 

close our offices - until they were raided on December 29, 2011. The Institute 

maintained a bank acconnt, and its staff members were legally employed and paid their 

taxes. 

Ironically, one month prior to the raid on our offices, NDI was fonnally invited by 

Egyptian authorities to observe the conntry's three phases of parliamentary elections that 

ran from November 2011 to January 2012. Our Institute organized inte1l1ational 

delegations for those elections with 82 observers from 19 cOllltries. The armed raids 

themselves were carried out as our third delegation was arriving in Egypt; the fnnds 

seized from our Cairo office were to support that observation mission. 

NDI's nonpartisan programs in Egypt always responded to local demands and requests 

for information sharing and technical assistance. In 2011 alone, more than 13,000 

Egyptians from across the country participated in some 700 sessions sponsored by the 

Institute. We shared illte1l1atiollal expellences by leaders who were illstrnnlental in their 

own democratic transitions from such diverse places as Chile, Indonesia and Poland. We 

conducted programs on the development of political parties with participants from all the 
37


81509d-3.eps

parties that were later elected to the parliament; and we assisted civil society groups 

engaged in nonpartisan election monitoring, and civic and voter education. These 

programs had supported public confidence and participation in the very process designed 

by the Egyptian authorities -- both civilian and militaty -- atld approved in the 2011 

national referendum. At no time has N DI ever funded, or aligned itself with any political 

pat1y or movement, or sought a particular electoral outcome. 

Yet the actions to date -- from the armed raids and the nature of the interrogations of staff 

members, to the public pronouncements by Egyptian authorities and last week's verdict --

were not influenced by facts or by law. They were driven by politics and an llilshakable 

opposition to democratic development. 

If there was any doubt about the political nature of the judicial proceedings, it was 

dispelled by the judges themselves in a sununalY of the verdict provided to joulllalists. 

The judges' wildly conspiratorial view of the outside world, which sounds like a 

throwback to a bygone era, provided the rationale for the verdict and painted a disturbing 

picture of how the work ofnongovelllmental organizations is viewed by some within 

Egypt. 

According to a translated account published by the Egyptian newspaper Youm7, they 

described foreign assistance as - and I quote - "a form of new control and domination 

and a less-expensive form of soft colonialism pursued by donor countries to destabilize 

the security and stability ofthe receiving countries, which are meant to be weakened and 

dismantled under the fonner regime. This weakened Egypt's position, regionally and 

intelllationally, and bowed to the will of [the 1 USA in building bridges to normalize 

relations with Israel." The judges claimed that, "One Catffiot imagine ... that the USA or 

other countries supp011ing the Zionist entity has any interest or a genuine desire for 

establishing a real democracy in Egypt." 

They went on to say that, ..... foreign funding of nongovelllmental organizations is a 

stumbling block in front of the new Egypt, which its people watlt; but at tlle same time 

paves the way for a new Egypt, that its enemies want." While this rhetoric runs hot, it 

also runs contrary to the budgetary realities of Egypt, which currently receives billions of 

dollat·s in foreign assistance each year. 

There can be little doubt that this prosecution and subsequent verdict had the specific 

goal of dramatically reducing, and perhaps even effectively eliminating intelllational 

supp011 for independent civil society in Egypt. 

Coming in tandem with last week's convictions is the referral of a new draft N GO law 

that is far more restrictive than tlle one under which our employees were charged and 

convicted. While this law is being discussed in the Shura COllilCil, we know tllat it 

contains language that requires Egyptian civil society groups to: 
38


81509d-4.eps

4 

• receive prior approval from the govenllnent to accept fmlding from intelllational 

donors; 

receive prior approval from the govelllment to conduct domestic fundraising effOlis; 

and 

risk increased penalties for noncompliance with fines that are 100 to 1,000 times 

higher than the old law. 

International NGOs like ours would still be subject to the prior approval of multiple 

govelllment ministries, and possibly state security apparatus, before registration is 

granted, and even afterward be vulnerable to charges of violating the law due to the 

overly broad language included in the draft. For example, registration could be 

telminated for any activity that the govelllment deemed to "violate national sovereignty" 

- a phrase broad enough to be used once by the SCAF to describe election observation. 

This should be a time when an independent and vibrant civil society is engaged in 

democratic reforms, human rights, health care, help for the poor, other social services, 

economic development and a host of other causes that improve the lives of citizens. Civil 

society organizations are the engine that keeps a democracy healthy - facilitating 

dialogue between citizens and policymakers, monitoring government activity and holding 

officials accountable. This is hue in traditional, new and emerging democracies alike. 

This should be a time for active civic engagement, exuberant discourse, energetic 

political activity and a participatory debate on the country's evolving political process. 

Last week's verdict and the proposed NGO law could create an opposite effect. 

NDI works to support and strengthen democratic institutions in nearly 70 countries where 

we work today. And we know from experience that political self-determination and 

paliicipatory democracy is the prefened form of govenllnent by people in evelY region of 

the world. With it comes freedom of expression and association, peace and stability, 

pluralism and tolerance, and a citizemy that believes it has a stake in the future. These 

principles are enSlll1:ned in nmnerous intelllational conventions and treaties to which the 

government of Egypt is a signatory. 

We know that the relationship between the governments of Egypt and the United States is 

complex and impOliant to regional security. We also know that democratic development 

leads to long-term economic and social advancement that improves quality oflife, spurs 

trade, advances peace and eliminates conditions that fuel extremism. 

The U.S. has made a huge inveshnent in Egypt, including the funding disparaged by the 

judges that led to last week's verdict and this hearing today. We hope the international 

community will not give up on a democratic transition in Egypt. The issues it presents 

and Egypt's place in the world are too important. It is a key leader in the region and there 
39


81509d-5.eps

5 

remain reasons for a strong partnership between the govermnent and peoples of Egypt 

and the United States. What happens in Egypt will be important not only for the people of 

the country but will likely influence developments far beyond its borders. 

Since its founding in 1983, NDI has worked with 13,000 civic organizations, 720 

political parties and organizations, 10,000 legislators and 1,300 women's organizations, 

and monitored more than 300 elections. Many of om staff members, who represent 96 

nationalities, have repeatedly overcome the challenges of working in difficult and 

sometimes hostile environments. 

But not once in those 30 years has any of om staff ever been charged, tried and sentenced 

to prison. Foremost on om minds today are the nmocent people caught up in this highly 

political process. We believe there should be justice for them, which can still be 

accomplished through legal, constitutional means, including a pardon. 

In closing, I would like to thank the many members of Congress and officials in the 

Administration who have spoken out and worked tirelessly to help resolve the cunent 

crisis. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee. I hope that my full 

statement could be included in the record. 
40

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And thank you to each and every 

one of you. Excellent testimony. 

Without objection, I would also like to include for the record testimony provided to our subcommittee by Michelle Betz, former contractor for the International Center for Journalists. 

[The information referred to follows:]


81509g-1.eps
41


81509g-2.eps

treaties with Egypt. I asked more than half a dozen times. I only received a response more than 

one year later, in May 2013. 

The situation for the Egyptians who have been convicted has been dire indeed, resulting in 

de facto exile away from their families and careers in shambles. Yes, in the political 

gamesmanshi p, we are the forgotten ones. 

The list is long of those who have not risen to the occasion and instead paid only lip service to 

the causes and principles for which these NGOs were established and for which donors 

contribute. I have had no contact with anybody from State, Justice, the Administration, the Cairo 

Embassy, or any government official despite my inquiries over the past 18 months with such 

basic questions as to my status on INTERPOL wanted lists and the risk of extradition. Not one 

government official has met with the defendants to answer their questions, to listen to their 

concerns or simply to offer support. 

I asked, on numerous occasions, what would trigger an airport stoppage due to a red notice or 

ditlusion. These queries were never answered and to this day I still await an answer. My work 

travels and my consulting business came to a crashing halt and I have not travelled since the 

charges were filed. 

And how have I found out about the charges against me and then finally about the conviction? 

Not from the NGO, State Department or other official channels. In the first instance, I saw my 

name on Twitter as someone tweeted all 43 names of those charged. On June 4, 2013, verdict 

day, I received a call at 05:20 am from one of my Egyptian colleagues who had been woken by a 

call from AI Jazeera in Egypt asking for comment on his conviction and his two-year jail 

sentence. It would be several hours later that I would get some meager information from the 

NGO though no one bothered to call me or reach out to me. Everything was through the sterile 

medium of emaiL 

Government otlicials seem to be more interested in issuing statements of 'deep concern' 

publically than actually providing support to the defendants themselves. While the NGO 

leadership has had some contact, the infonnation shared with the defendants is limited and one 

way. Make no mistake - the response of the all parties involved since the start of this saga has 

been to downplay the significance and effect on those named and prosecuted. The defendants, 

now convicted criminals, are real people. They have made inordinate sacrifices over the past 18 

months and many of them, particularly the Egyptians, now find themselves in exile here in the 

United States far from their loved ones, their homeland and their careers destroyed. 

I mentioned INTERPOL and wish to elaborate on the nature of their procedures in what are 

clearly, as both the White House and the Department of State have characterized, political 

charges. There is no accountability of this organization and its procedures for which the US is a 

signatory. What the Egyptians did at the onset of this situation was to issue a 'secret' 

2 
42


81509g-3.eps

diffusion notice which has no appeals process or oversight. Any signatory country can do this 

against any American any time they wish. There is no due process or challenge. Once this was 

issued the ability of the defendants to travel was put in jeopardy. Keep in mind that the 

careers of many of us absolutely require travel, often to harsh and austere parts of the world, in 

the conduct of our work developing civil society. 

Tn my quest to seek answers to legal questions such as extradition, red notices and diffusion, T 

tried to contact INTERPOL as the US Justice Department would not answer my questions. 

Justice said that I had to tum to my "local law enforcement agency", in this case, Metro PD. 

After speaking to numerous people at MPD, I finally got a very nice lady who, although 

sympathetic, didn't even know what INTERPOL was, let alone the INTERPOL liaison at MPD. 

In the end, apparently some behind the scenes negotiations occurred resulting in a statement by 

INTERPOL in which they asked member countries to erase the already issued notices from their 

data bases. It was rather bizarre that in their press release they state individuals with questions 

should ask them directly but gave no mechanism to do this and their own procedures do not 

allow it - INTERPOL simply does not speak to individuals. Now we face this situation anew as 

the Egyptian prosecutor has publicly stated they will again seek extradition and put out 

international wanted notices through INTERPOL. 

I'm sure the testimony you will receive from the NGO leadership will give you ample 

information on how this case damages the ability ofNGOs to promote civil society and how 

other countries are already following Egypt's innovative approach to crushing employees' lives 

to nullifying the important work NGOs have done. I'm also sure they'll talk to you about how the 

precedents here are rapidly being adopted by repressi ve governments. 

Perhaps you will hear that this case is not, and should not be, construed as, a spat or problem 

with President Morsi. This case started long before Morsi was elected. However, what cannot be 

ignored is that he and the Brotherhood and the holdover Mubarakites in the judiciary have the 

same goals - to squash civil societies and freedom of expression. And they are succeeding. This 

verdict will have an intense chilling effect -- not only on Egyptian NGOs but on NGOs around 

the world and, perhaps more importantly, the people that work for them. 

What I hope you hear today is what was done to myself and my colleagues, and how the needs of 

the NGOs and U.S. Government have trumped ours. What happened to our values of freedom 

and justice? Let us remember the words of Martin Luther King, Jr: "Injustice anywhere is a 

threat to justice everywhere". 

I would ask that the Committee consider the following actions 

Encourage the Administration to vigorously advocate for the rights of the defendants who 

have now been unjustly convicted. This should include consultation with the defendants 

regarding safety of travel and address other questions they may have. 

3 
43


81509g-4.eps

Continue to show support for NGOs around the world that promote democracy and 

freedom of expression. 

Advocate for a review of the U.S. agreements with INTERPOL in light of this situation 

and make changes to ensure the protection of U. S. citizens. 

Thank you for your time. 

4 
44

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I also ask unanimous consent to insert at 

this point in the record a copy of the Connolly-Wolf letter to President Morsi that has been signed, including——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]


81509h-1.eps
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48


81509h-5.eps

1. Connol/y, Gerald E. (VA-l1) 

2. Wolf, Frank R. (VA-lO) 

3. Bachmann, Michelle (MN-06) 

4. Bass, Karen (CA-37) 

5. Bera, Ami (CA-07) 

5. Bilirakis, Gus M. (FL-12) 

7. Boustos, Cheri (lL-17) 

8. Broun, Paul C. (GA-IO) 

9. Chabot, Steve (OH-Ol) 

lO.Cicilline, David N. (RI-Ol) 

11.Davis, Rodney (lL-13) 

12.Deutch, Theodore E. (FL-2l) 

13.Duckworth, Tammy (IL-08) 

14.Duncan, Jeff (SC-03) 

lS.Engel, Eliot L. (NY-l6) 

l6.Eshoo, Anna G. (CA-18) 

l7.Frankel, Lois (FL-22) 

l8.Franks, Trent (AZ-08) 

19.Gabbard, Tulsi (HI-02) 

20.Gutierrez, Luis V. (lL-04) 

21.Higgins, Brian (NY-26) 

22.Hoyer, Steny H. (MD-OS) 

23.Hultgren, Randy (IL-l4) 

24.Joyce, David P. (OH-14) 

2S.Keating, William R. (MA-09) 

26.Kennedy, Joseph P., III (MA-04) 

27.King, Peter T. (NY-02) 

28.Kinzinger, Adam (lL-16) 

29.Lance, Leonard (NJ-07) 

30. Latta, Robert E. (OH-05) 

31.Lowenthal, Alan 5. (CA-47) 

32.McDermott, Jim (WA-Ol) 

33.Meadows, Mark (NC-ll) 

34.Meeks, Gregory W. (NY-05) 

35.Moran, James P. (VA-08) 

35.Nunnelee, Alan (MS-Ol) 

37.Peters, Gary C. (MI-14) 
49


81509h-6.eps

38.Pitts, Joseph R. (PA-16) 

39.Poe, Ted (TX-02) 

40.Price, David E. (NC-04) 

41.Quigley, Mike (IL-OS) 

42.Roskam, Peter J. (IL-06) 

43.Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL-27) 

44.Schakowsky, Janice D. (IL-09) 

4S.Schneider, Bradley S. (lL-lO) 

46.Schock, Aaron (lL-18) 

47.Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. (WI-OS) 

48.Sherman, Brad (CA-30) 

49.Shimkus, John (lL-1S) 

50. Smith, Christopher H. (NJ-04) 

51.Vargas, Juan (CA-51) 

52. Weber, Randy K., Sr. (TX-14) 

53.wilson, Frederica S. (FL-24) 

54.Yoho, Ted S. (FL-03) 
50

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

You talked about the personal toll. All of these folks have felt 

this impact deeply. Your organizations have felt the impact. Egyptian civil society has felt the impact. And, seeing as you have experience and firsthand knowledge of what has really happened there 

on the ground, can you tell us where you think in a broader picture, where you think Egypt is going under Morsi? Which direction 

is it headed toward? Is there a chance for democracy left? Is that 

window rapidly closing? What should U.S. funding priorities in 

Egypt with respect to supporting civil society, the rule of law, 

building political parties? What role do you see us having there? 

And do you expect the pardon to come for all of the folks who have 

been sentenced? Do you expect the new NGO law to be implemented, to be passed, and that will further restrict your activities? 

So thank you if anybody would like to take a stab at either parts 

of those. Mr. Dunne? 

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

As far as where Egypt is going broadly, as Lorne mentioned in 

his testimony, it is a very troubled democratic transition, which I 

personally would describe as a suspended democratic transition at 

the moment. 

I still have a lot of hope for Egypt. A huge amount of political 

space has been opened up by the revolution. There are different 

parties contesting that space. We cannot count out the liberals and 

secularists, whose views, after all, underpinned the Tahrir Square 

revolution. It will be a long process, and it will be a messy process. 

But it does require support from outside, political support and perhaps some aid support, especially for civil society. 

As you noted, the environment for civil society has become extremely difficult. And just how we can operate there, any of our organizations as well as Egyptian organizations, especially in light of 

this new NGO law, is very problematic. We are trying to think of 

some creative ways to engage civil society. Maybe that involves advocacy, instead of work on the ground with organizations, but we 

are trying to figure that out ourselves right now. 

We have no expectations, our organization does not, of the legal 

process, including a pardon. We are hopeful that one will be granted, but that is what we are trying to think about right now. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And you are convict number 40? 

Mr. DUNNE. Defendant number 30. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Defendant number 30. Yes. 

Mr. DUNNE. I was a fugitive at the time. Now I am a convict. 

So yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right. Thank you. 

Lorne, would you like to take a stab at it? 

Mr. CRANER. You know, I have always said these transitions in 

the Middle East are going to take 10, 15, 20 years. This is not a 

very encouraging start for Egypt. 

I was just thinking while Charles was talking, if you tried to 

think of a central European analogy, maybe you would think of 

Serbia, where the revolution was hijacked early on in the post-Soviet era. That was not a very encouraging story. 

51

I think the issue for us is 5, 7, 10 years from now, when I don’t 

think the Egyptian economy will have taken off given how it is 

being run. And Egyptians are looking for new kinds of policies. Will 

those be available to them or will they be stuck with a government 

that is repressive and isn’t producing anything economically? And 

I think it is important that the U.S. stay engaged and Europe and 

others to make sure that the Egyptian people do have choices if 

they want them, that it is a more open system. 

In terms of our particular case, a court appeal is only available 

in Egypt to people who were present for the trial. And you will recall that the foreigners, at the behest of the State Department—

and we agreed with that at the time—left Egypt and were not 

present for the trial. The only way a foreigner can file an appeal 

is to present themselves at Cairo Airport, begin serving their 5-

year sentence, and then they are free to appeal, to begin an appeal. 

And obviously that is not something we wish upon our staffers. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Wollack, let me see if I——

Mr. CRANER. So an appeal is not a possibility. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I see that. 

Mr. WOLLACK. Madam Chairman, we are all in the optimism 

business. And ultimately we believe that people all over the 

world—and that includes the people of Egypt—want the same 

thing. They want to put food on the table. They want to have shelter. They want to have jobs. And they want to have a political voice 

and a stake in their future. And every public opinion poll in Egypt 

and elsewhere shows that. So I believe in the long term that will, 

that desire, those expectations, of the Egyptian people will bear 

fruit. 

Lorne mentioned Eastern Europe. Let’s not forget that 10 years 

after the fall of the wall, the war in Yugoslavia was just beginning. 

Milosevic was still in power. But these do take a long time. Sometimes generational changes have to take place. 

But there are elements, I believe, some within the new government, some within the previous government, and now we see in the 

judiciary, that represent a throwback to another era. And I think 

this represents Egypt’s past isolation and insular outlook. I think 

that there are elements in the government, elements in other sectors of society that have a very different view, and I just think that 

we have to stay engaged and support those who want to build a 

democratic future. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you to all of 

you. 

And I am sorry I am out of time. Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And I am picking up on Mr. Wollack’s last comment to stay engaged but, at risk of being imprisoned or tried or humiliated, I 

think you are going to find it difficult to recruit folks in Egypt or 

from outside of Egypt to want to put themselves at that kind of 

risk, especially so long as this is unresolved. 

I will say I would like to read into the record, Madam Chairman—this is a shocking statement. I think——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, no. I am going to read it into the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Oh, you are going to read it? 

52

Mr. CONNOLLY. This is from the verdict: ‘‘The United States and 

supporters of the Zionist entity felt fear and horror,’’ meaning 

about the revolution. ‘‘The United States reacted by throwing all of 

its weight against this change, but its old tactics could not suppress it. The issue of U.S. funding took on new dimensions in an 

attempt to contain the revolution, to twist its path and direct it to 

serving its own interests and the interests of Israel.’’ That is from 

the verdict. It is hard to read that statement and to conclude, nonetheless, we are allied powers, that we are partners in the peace 

process in the Middle East, that we share common values or some 

basis for common values about democracy and civil society. 

This statement by a court that convicted 43 people, including 

Americans, says we were actively conspiring against their revolution, that we were using these spigots, aid spigots, to do just that 

and that we were foiled. And, therefore, one must at least infer 

that the convictions are part of their foiling us. That is chilling, 

and that goes far beyond some misguided instructions to a court in 

Cairo. I am very troubled by that. And I welcome any observation 

from the folks at the table. And I will ask one other question to 

throw it out there since all of you mentioned pardon. 

I am concerned that if we go down the route of pardon—and I 

take Mr. Craner’s point of view. There may not be any other legal 

options in the system of jurisprudence in Egypt at this time to vacate a guilty verdict. But if you go down the route of pardon, you 

are conceding the basis of the conviction. And I as a Member of 

Congress am not willing to do that. 

I am not going to put myself in your position, but there is no 

basis for this conviction. And we must not concede that. I wonder 

what your thoughts are about that issue with respect to a pardon, 

those two issues. Quick. We are running out of——

Ms. BARNATHAN. On the pardon, this was a political problem 

started by political forces. It is going to get solved, if it gets solved, 

by political means. The only tool we have in our arsenal now, short 

of a very imperfect appeals process, is to get a pardon. I don’t know 

of any other options. And I think that a pardon will not materialize 

out of thin air. As I said, it was a political decision. We need a political solution. 

Mr. WOLLACK. I would just say, Mr. Connolly, that every aspect 

of this process—from the interrogations to the raids on the offices 

to the press conferences, statements by Egyptian authorities to the 

trial—every aspect of this process, was a political one. It had very 

little to do with legal issues. And the interviews that were given 

by the judges sort of laid bare the political nature of the entire 

process. And this wildly conspiratorial view of the outside world 

was shocking, I think, for everybody when they read the remarks 

of the judges, as you did. 

I agree with you completely that all the people involved are totally innocent. And the question becomes what alternatives there 

are. And when one is looking for ways in which people are not 

placed in jeopardy, we are also looking for the road of least resistance, of trying to achieve something that does not put people in 

legal jeopardy or worse. 

Mr. DUNNE. Sir, if we have time, I would like to comment on 

that. I mean, everybody that I know who works on and is a speVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:24 Aug 22, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061213\81509 HFA PsN: SHIRL
53

cialist in the Egyptian affairs was, likewise, shocked by the language of the verdict. And so it comes as a surprise to everyone and 

is a very troubling statement, I found. 

Just the other thing I would say on the legal route, I understand, 

congressman, your concerns about the pardon route but, as my colleague said, that seems to be the only route available to us now. 

For me, I wouldn’t have the right of appeal. I would have to go 

back, go to jail, and then I would get a retrial. The last one lasted 

about a year and a half. And that is not an appealing route for any 

of us who were out of the country when the verdicts were issued. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. CRANER. Just one last thought on what you were addressing, 

which is how the judges explained themselves. It is not only the 

Egyptian judicial system that appears to believe this, but, again, 

I would encourage you to go back and read the testimony of the 

woman through whom hundreds of millions of dollars of American 

aid flowed, that the Americans were engaged in a neo-colonial plot 

at the behest of Israel to divide Egypt. That is literally the person 

directly receiving our aid. 

Mr. WOLLACK. I should say also the judges claim that they accepted the validity of her testimony during the trial. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Excellent questions and great answers. 

Dr. Yoho, my Florida colleague, is recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I appreciate you guys being here. You know, it is hard. I just feel 

so bad for the people that are in those 43 NGOs that have been 

convicted. With the Arab Spring and this flowering we were supposed to have democracies and all this, but obviously it is not working. In the old guard with Mubarak, when we gave aid, you could 

pretty much anticipate what we were going to get, you know, because we had had a working relationship with them for 30–40 

years. But with the new leaders emerging with the Muslim Brotherhood, we don’t know the ground rules. And so we don’t know how 

they are going to respond to anything we do. 

And one of my questions is—and I would like for you all to briefly answer this—is, what do you see happening to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. If you could answer that real quickly? 

And then are you recommending that the U.S. should stop pouring aid to Egypt until they release the NGOs? And if so, what effect 

is that going to have on the NGO members that are there? Is that 

going to make the situation worse? 

And then you talked about the success in Tunisia. Why, in your 

opinion, is Tunisia proceeding favorably when Egypt is not? I 

would like to hear your statements on that. And if you could take 

30 seconds on each one, it would be great. 

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you very much for those questions, congressman. They are great ones. 

With regard to the 1979 peace treaty, when I was stationed in 

Cairo, I had the opportunity to be in meetings with the defense 

minister and other senior staff members, who later became the rulers of the country. And it was very clear from all of these interactions and I think is today that they are totally uninterested in 

any violations of the peace treaty. They want to maintain that 

54

peace with Israel, in part, because a war with Israel would be a 

disaster. And they couldn’t sustain it without U.S. military assistance in such a conflict. So I think that is safe. I mean, the Morsi 

government has made very clear that they wanted to have some readjustments around the margins of the basics of that peace, but so 

far that simply hasn’t happened. 

In terms of our recommendations on stopping aid, Freedom 

House takes a position that aid should be suspended while the relationship is reconsidered with the administration and the Congress because the relationship has not changed substantially in the 

last 30 years, but it needs to change because of the important 

changes that have occurred in the region. 

And as far as Tunisia, the ruling Ennahda party, there is also 

an Islamist party, but they have consistently taken the view that 

there needs to be consensus politics in Tunisia. All parties have to 

be included in the process of drafting a new constitution and ruling 

the country. That has made for some very slow executive decisionmaking and a delay in the constitution, but it has also helped to 

have other parties feel a sense of conclusion in this. The Muslim 

Brotherhood, on the other hand, is ruling in sort of a majoritarian 

way. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. DUNNE. We won the election. We make the rules. And I 

think that is a key difference there. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Next? 

Mr. CRANER. I think on Tunisia, that Tunisia started out with 

a very strong liberal base. It was a highly educated population. 

There is certainly, as we saw in the election, a strong Islamist base 

as well——

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. CRANER [continuing]. From the interior. But I think there 

has been a willingness and an understanding that compromise is 

necessary, as Charles said, that it is not a winner take all system. 

I don’t mean to say that Tunisia is a paradise right now. It is not. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. CRANER. They had a political assassination earlier this year. 

A government fell. But when I was there about 6 weeks ago, I got 

the sense that people have looked over the cliff. And what they saw 

at the bottom was Egypt and Syria. And Tunisians kind of looked 

and said, ‘‘That is not how we want our country to end up.’’

Mr. YOHO. Okay. And you also feel that they will honor the 

Israeli-Egypt peace treaty? 

Mr. CRANER. I understand from news reports that that is what 

they are saying. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Yes. Ma’am? 

Mr. WOLLACK. I would——

Mr. YOHO. Sir? 

Mr. WOLLACK. I would just make a couple of points, congressman. First, I would caution against looking back at the Mubarak 

regime with nostalgia. And I think there is always a temptation to 

do that; but I think that it was the abuses of the Mubarak regime, 

including some of the rhetoric, the same type of rhetoric, that we 

have heard today that drove the revolution. 

55

Second, I do believe that the peace treaty will hold because I 

think it serves the interests of both Egypt and Israel. 

Also, with regard to Tunisia, I think there are two ingredients 

here. One is leadership. And the second is the understanding of a 

coalition government, that there was a need to form coalitions with 

different political ideologies. And I think that has helped the trajectory in Tunisia in terms of being a more inclusive process, despite 

all of the current challenges that are happening in the country. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Ms. BARNATHAN. I was going to just add that you mentioned that 

we don’t know the ground rules. I am not an Egypt expert, but I 

think it is very complicated in-fighting domestically as well. And 

how that decision played out domestically is something worth exploring because the judiciary seemed to take the word of a Mubarak-era holdover as the basis for this trial, which indicates a certain political bent, which may or may not be the political bent of 

the current government. So we don’t know whether the judiciary 

and the government are also at odds in this thing, and it is very 

complicated. And it is worth exploring. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to the 

witnesses for your time here today but also for your work. 

A little over 2 years ago, when the events started to unfold in 

Egypt, I think we all looked there with hope and anticipation for 

a prospect for a new destiny. And what we saw, the work that you 

were doing, other NGOs, that for there to be that new destiny, they 

were going to have to have space, space to engage that includes 

both the physical, intellectual space but also political space. And I 

think what we are seeing is that space closing. 

Mr. Wollack, you mentioned briefly and you were saying it may 

take 10 years. We heard the comparison to what was happening in 

Syria. But my concern in Egypt is we are seeing the erosion, if not 

destruction, of the institutions that are going to lead to the opportunity for a sustainable Egypt. 

And my question, real briefly, is, what can we do to help reinforce or make sure that those institutions are sustainable or survivable? 

Mr. WOLLACK. I would say a couple of things. I believe that these 

issues have to be elevated on the bilateral agenda. And in every 

meeting, in every setting these issues have to be addressed to demonstrate our continued interest in a genuine democratic transition 

and working with friends and allies and intergovernmental organizations to push that agenda as well, and to support what I believe 

are the hopes and aspirations of the Egyptian people. And I think 

that is first and foremost. 

Second, I think that there are many groups on the ground that 

deserve and need, continue to need, outside support. And we have 

to look for opportunities to continue to support those groups that 

did receive robust assistance in 2011. And there are groups now 

that are reaching out and want to be part of the rest of the world, 

and need and desperately seek that type of assistance. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

56

And I think this hearing in itself is evidence of that commitment 

to keep it on the agenda. I have not had the chance to be in Egypt, 

but my colleague from Virginia has. And I would like to defer my 

time to him to extend his questions he started earlier. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend and colleague. 

We have been talking about Fayza Aboul Naga. What is her position currently in the Morsi government? 

Mr. CRANER. She is the wife of the Egyptian Ambassador to 

Japan. And I understand she currently lives in Tokyo. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good place for her. What is that, Mr. Wollack? 

Mr. WOLLACK. I think she is back in Egypt. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But she has no official role——

Mr. WOLLACK. No, no government——

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. In the current government? Well, 

that is——

Ms. BARNATHAN. But she has clout. Look at the decision in the 

judiciary. And these are people with like minds from the previous 

regime, not the existing regime. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. The U.S. law does circumscribe the 

$1.3 billion of military aid to Egypt. And it says, inter alia, that 

‘‘the Secretary of State has to certify to the appropriations committees in the Congress that the Government of Egypt is supporting 

the transition to civilian government, including holding free and 

fair elections, implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.’’

The convictions last week would seem to nullify any compliance 

with that provision. There are reports that Secretary of State Kerry 

recently decided to avail himself of a waiver provision and waive 

that requirement because obviously it could not be met and proceed 

with U.S. military assistance. In your view, is that harmful to a 

resolution of the issue we are discussing here today or is it irrelevant? Mr. Dunne? 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes, congressman, I think it is harmful because it 

does signal a return to business as usual. Last year when Secretary 

Clinton issued a similar waiver, there was at least a spirited public 

debate. And there wasn’t any on this because it was done so quietly. It was issued, as you know, on May 10th. So I think that those 

kinds of signals to the Egyptian Government are not going to help 

with the resolution of this case. And we need to align policy and 

actual acts, such as this, with what we are saying publicly about 

democracy in the NGO case. And so far I don’t see that as having 

been done. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank each of 

you for being here to testify but, in addition to that, for investing 

in a passion and a heart for Egypt. And, truly, the message needs 

to be to the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people that, 

really, a stable Egypt, not one that is under our control or directed 

by us, is something we want and, quite frankly, something that is 

in the best interest of the entire community, both internationally 

and in the Middle East. 

57

I look forward to your comments on a couple of different issues. 

It seems like politically what we have done is we have gotten 

caught in a Catch-22, where some of us, they see us as supporting 

the Morsi government or they see us as not supporting the Morsi 

government on the ground. I was interested to find out that a lot 

of the citizens believe that we are very supportive of the Morsi government. And, yet, the Morsi government seems to think that we 

are not supportive of it. And in this Catch-22, how is that political 

aspect of that playing into what we have seen come out of their judiciary? Mr. Dunne? 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes, congressman. I think you are absolutely right 

on this. I mean, the U.S. has so far given the impression that it 

is completely supportive of President Morsi and, in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood. Until very recently, there have been very few contacts between the U.S. Government and the people on the ground 

in the NGO community who are really looking for our support. I 

understand that that is changing significantly because of the troubles that we have had in our relationship. And there is much better 

contact between the NGO community and the U.S. Embassy now, 

which is good. 

You know, as to the effects on the legal case, it is very hard to 

parse that out. As Joyce mentioned, the situation on the ground is 

extremely complicated politically. And so——

Mr. MEADOWS. I guess my point is, is this the judiciary, saying 

that, quite frankly, you know, ‘‘We don’t want to have anything to 

do with America because you are supporting Morsi’’ or, where are 

we on this? And that is what it appears to be. 

Mr. DUNNE. I could only add to that that there has been a theory 

circulating, which is credible to me, that the judiciary issued this 

decision or the judges in the case issued the decision, in part, to 

get Morsi in hot water politically with the U.S. Government. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Wollack? 

Mr. WOLLACK. I have given up trying to ascribe motives to people. I think this is a place where there are a number of different 

power centers, perhaps each motivated by different things. And, to 

some degree, it is like reading tea leaves. This is a place where the 

past and the present have merged, where people are trying to hold 

on to power who no longer have it, people who still maintain power 

but represent the previous regime, and new actors, who have never 

assumed governing authority before. And so it is very, very difficult 

to understand the reasoning behind language that is being used, 

verdicts that are being made, or the motivations behind them. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you think that the citizens and/or the government understand how difficult it will be for Congress to continue 

to appropriate money and continue to be involved if we are going 

back home and the people on Main Street are saying, ‘‘Well, why 

are we giving money when they are arresting people for things that 

they didn’t do?’’ It is already difficult. Do you think that they understand how much more difficult this will make it on Members of 

Congress? 

Mr. WOLLACK. Well, I don’t know the answer to that. I don’t 

want to be evasive. For us, however, we don’t take positions as an 

institution on U.S. aid. And so, therefore——

58

Mr. MEADOWS. I know you don’t. We have to, though. And so I 

am looking for where this goes. 

Mr. WOLLACK. But I can’t——

Mr. MEADOWS. My time is running out. Yes? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. I also don’t take positions, but I am not sure—

somebody mentioned the current furor over this. I don’t feel a current furor over this. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, it is so new——

Ms. BARNATHAN. So if there isn’t——

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. But it is. And I can tell you that 

there need to be pardons or it is going to be very difficult for us 

to do anything in a positive manner in terms of our U.S.-Egyptian 

aid and going forward. It is just very difficult. 

I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Very good questions. 

Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. Just 5 minutes, Madam Chair? Is that all I get? 

Mr. Dunne, you said that every one of those who were specialists 

in Egyptian affairs were shocked by the verdicts. What does that 

say about our ability to make accurate assessments about what is 

going on in Egypt? 

Mr. DUNNE. Well, I would say, congressman, that sometimes the 

analysts are right and sometimes they are wrong. And in this case, 

I know that we expected certainly in Freedom House some sort of 

a mixed verdict where some people would get off, and others would 

be sentenced. I think it also speaks to the opacity of the judiciary 

and the deep political motives behind this trial. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me follow that up, then, because I am only going 

to have 5 minutes. So one of you said—maybe I can find it—that 

they were a holdover from the former regime and the verdict that 

came out wasn’t necessarily the viewpoint of the current regime. Is 

it Barnathan? Is that how you——

Ms. BARNATHAN. Barnathan, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Was that you who said that? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. I did say that. 

Mr. WEBER. Elaborate on that. 

Ms. BARNATHAN. Well, I just have to look. You know, as I said, 

I am not a specialist in this area, but if you look at what the decision was, the judiciary said they believed everything that this minister told them lock, stock, and barrel. 

Mr. WEBER. Was that the lady that had gotten hundreds of millions of dollars? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. She was the one who has got the hundreds of 

millions of dollars who was part of the former regime. They seem 

to be——

Mr. WEBER. And issued an anti-Semitic remark? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. Sorry? 

Mr. WEBER. And she issued an anti-Semitic remark? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. Fayza? Well, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. 

Ms. BARNATHAN. She did. And they echoed her sentiment and basically made the case based on her specious testimony, which has 

no evidence and no backing behind it. 

59

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Then you said you don’t hear a furor over this 

in your exchange with my colleague over here on the right. Are you 

talking about a furor here in America——

Ms. BARNATHAN. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER [continuing]. Or are you talking about over in Egypt? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. I’m talking about a furor here in America. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Go back home to Texas. 

Ms. BARNATHAN. Do you hear it? Do you hear it? 

Mr. WEBER. We do. We hear people saying, ‘‘Why are we giving 

money to Egypt as well as others?’’ And so I kind of echo my good 

friend’s comments that it is hard for us to go back and do that. 

Mr. Dunne, you said that the regime is going to go ahead and 

maintain the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty because to do otherwise would be disastrous. Okay? Do you hold that view, remembering that our record of assessing this accurately is somewhat 

under suspicion? Do you hold that view if the Muslim Brotherhood 

gets into full power? And, going forward 2, 3, 4 years, would you 

still hold that view? 

Mr. DUNNE. Well, I couldn’t predict that far in advance, especially since the situation politically in Egypt is so fluid, but, I 

mean, based on my personal experience, working there for 3 years, 

it is my assessment that even the Muslim Brotherhood will want 

to maintain that treaty. They might want to make some alterations 

in its terms, which would have to be negotiated with Israel, but 

they do not need the military trouble, the political break with the 

United States, and the diplomatic program that would come with 

broaching the treaty or significantly breaking it. 

Mr. WEBER. So you are not concerned in the long-term—and I 

hesitate to use the word ‘‘long-term’’ because you are afraid of predicting out 2 or 3 years—long-term implications for Egypt? You are 

not concerned about that? 

Mr. DUNNE. I think there are plenty of implications for Israel in 

the current political situation in Egypt. I think my personal view 

is that Israel’s interests lie in a stable, politically democratic Egypt 

in the long term. I think we should definitely keep our eye on the 

treaty and what the Muslim Brotherhood says and does on it. I 

think that is critically important. And their feet need to be held to 

the fire on this. But at the moment, I am not concerned that they 

are likely to broach the treaty. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Last question. Very simple ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No,’’ I 

hope. There are some jets that we still—are there four jets, six 

jets? How many jets do we have holding out there? Madam Chair, 

do you know?—that are due over to Egypt? 

If you had your druthers, Mr. Craner, would you hold up the 

issuance of those jets to the Egyptian military? 

Mr. CRANER. Like NDI, we don’t address questions of aid. 

Mr. WEBER. We won’t tell anybody. 

Mr. CRANER. Charles. 

Mr. WEBER. Yes? 

Mr. DUNNE. Congressman, we do take a position on this. And, as 

I said earlier, I mean, we believe that aid to the Egyptian Government should be suspended pending resolution of this particular 

issue and, really, a thorough assessment from the ground up of 

what the bilateral relationship should be going forward. 

60

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Ms. Barnathan? 

Ms. BARNATHAN. I don’t feel like I can give political advice on 

this. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Just an opinion. Mr. Wollack? 

Mr. WOLLACK. Again, I don’t want to be evasive, but we as an 

organization don’t take positions on——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Madam Chair, I yield back 6 seconds. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Those are valuable 6 

seconds. 

I want to thank the witnesses, all the members, the audience 

members who were here, and the press. We need to get the word 

out far and wide. I find that, even in my very international city, 

there is a lack of knowledge about what has been going on. There 

was an initial flurry of news stories. And now it is on to bigger 

issues as if there were any bigger issue than freedom, democracy, 

and the promotion of the rule of law. So thank you for the work 

that your members do. We will be working with you to do what we 

can, what influence we can bring to bear to make sure this issue 

is resolved in the favor of democracy, and because the Egyptian 

civil society deserves better. 

And, with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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81509n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-IlL), Chairman 

June 6. 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be 

held jointly by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Alrica, the Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House 

Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at ~~~wJ.Qr.:d.gJ1..'iiJ}llI~.h.Q~UillY) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, June 12,2013 

I:OOp.m 

American NGOs Under Threat in Morsi' s Egypt 

Mr. Lome W. Craner 

President 

International Republican Institute 

(Former Assislafll Secretary for Democracy, Human Righls alld ["ahor) 

Mr. David Kramer 

President 

Freedom House 

(Former Assislafll ,-,'ecrelaryjiJf Democracy, Human Righls and rahor) 

Mr. Kenneth Wollack 

President 

National Democratic Institute 

Ms. 1m. cc Bamathan 

Presid~nt 

Intemational Center for Journalists 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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81509m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMlTTEE ON _______ "t_h_·dd_!_e_E_",_'fm_d_M_o_"_h_A"-f'_ic_o __ HEARING 

Day Wedne."dar Date. __ ---"O-"61'-'1-=2'-'l2"'O:..:1.=c3 ___ Room ___ -"2c'cl-'-'72"-__ _ 

Starting Time ['04p ttL Ending Time 2:14 p.m. 

Recesses __ L-lo __ ) L-lo __ ) L-lo __ ) L-lo __ ) L-lo __ ) L-to __ ) 

Presiding '\'lember(s) 

ChaiJ'mUll R.o.\'-Lehiilll.'!fl 

Check oil oflhefollowing I"al app(v: 

Opcn Session G'J Executive (closed) Session D 

Telcvi,eil G'J 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

American NCOs Uttder Attack itt MOl"si's Egypt 

SUBCOMMITTEE YIEMBERS PRESENT: 

(See (lltem/atlce sheet) 

Electronically Recorded (taped) G'J 

Stenographic. Record G'J 

NON-SUBCOMlIUTTEE MEl\ffiERS PRESENT: (Mark will. an * if they are not munhers offail ('am",;!tee) 

HEARING WlI'NESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'] Yes 0 No 0 

(1.r '·no ", please list below and include title., agency, department, or organizabrm.) 

STATEME.'!TS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor Ilze record) 

SFRs - Mr. Dunne 

SPRs - /{ep. COllnolly 

SFR - Ms. Michelle Belz 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TrME ADJOUll:'iED 2:141',111. 
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81509m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title: American NGOs Under Attack in Morsi's Egypt 

Date: 06112/13 

Noncommittee Members 

Membel' Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OH) Connolly, Gerald (VA) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (NY) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) Cicilline, David (RI) 

Cotton, Torn (AR) 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (IL) 

Desantis, Ron (FL) Kennedy, Joseph (MAl 

Radel, Trey (FL) Meng, Grace (NY) 

Collins, Doug (GA) X Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) X 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X 

Messer, Lnke (IN) 

Present 

X 

X 

X 
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81509i-1.eps

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-ll) 

MENA Subcommittee Hearing: American NGOs Under Attack in Morsi's Egypt 

Wednesday June 12, 2013 

lpm 

The June 4th gUilty verdict against 43 non-governmental organizations' (NGO) staffersincluding 17 Americans-raises key concerns about Egypt's commitment to democratic 

principles. The ordeal began one and a half years ago, when Egyptian forces carried out 

raids against American and non-American NGOs. During the raids Egyptian forces seized 

records, electronic equipment, and hard currency from NGO offices. Egyptian 

authorities, after every event and escalation, repeatedly assured the NGOs and u.s. 

authorities that the situation would be appropriately resolved, only to renege on their 

word. For example, three days after the raids, U.S. NGOs were waiting for the return of 

their confiscated property as promised by Field Marshal Tantawi. Simultaneously, 

another Egyptian official-Fayza Abou Naga-was holding a press conference saying the 

property would not be returned. She also accused the NGOs of illicitly funneling money 

to the April 6th Youth Movement. The last straw in this ordeal was the guilty verdict 

handed down last week against the 43 individuals. 

Egyptian authorities ought to immediately return confiscated property to the NGOs; 

dismiss charges against all NGO workers; and permit them to continue their work 

supporting a free, fair, and open and democratic society. This applies to all NGOs and 

their staffers, not just the American ones. In order for the U.s. government and the 

American people to have any confidence that the Egyptian government is undertaking a 

genuine transition to a democratic state under civilian control where the freedoms of 

assembly, association, religion and expression are guaranteed and rule of law is upheld, 

there ought to be a swift and satisfactory resolution to this case that takes into full 

account the concerns expressed by Members of Congress. This includes reconsidering 

the new NGO law Egyptian authorities have proposed, which would be even more 

restrictive than the NGO law under which the 43 individuals and their organizations 

were targeted in December of 2011. 

Whatever the motivations for the raids, u.S. law with regard to this issue is clear. 

Regarding the $1.3 billion in military aid for Egypt, U.S. law states: 

Prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this Act under the heading 

'Foreign Military Financing Program: the Secretary of State shall certify to the 

Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt is supporting the 

transition to civilian government including holding free and fair elections; 

implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, 

and due process of law. 

Page 1 of 2 
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The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly (VA-ll) 

With the current state of affairs in Egypt, any certification that Egypt is implementing 

policies to guarantee the pillars of a free society would be met with skepticism. It is in 

the United States' interest for Egypt to be a free and fair society where all NGOsregardless of their nation of origin-are allowed to operate freely. Absent such an 

atmosphere, the U.S. cannot in good conscience release $1.3 billion in military aid. I 

hope that Egyptian officials will come to this same realization and return confiscated 

property to the NGOs, remove their staff from the no-fly list, and permit them to 

continue their work supporting a fair and open election process. 

I encourage my colleagues (if they haven't already) to sign the Connolly-Wolf letter that 

expresses the sentiment outlined in my statement. Moreover, I encourage Members to 

vote for the Connolly/Wolf/Schneider amendment to the NDAA on this issue (assuming 

it is ruled in order). Though the State Department quietly exercised its waiver authority 

in May, as reported by The Daily Beast last week, it is not too late to include the NGO 

issue in a larger discussion about releasing (or withholding) various tranches of money 

to Egypt. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

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