Art of War Papers

Operations at the Border

Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens

 Eric Hunter Haas, Major, US Army

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Operations at the Border

Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army

Command and General Staff College 

by

Eric Hunter Haas, Major, US Army

B.A., The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2011
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Haas, Eric Hunter.

 Operations at the border : efforts to disrupt insurgent safe-havens: a 

thesis presented to the faculty of the US Army Command and General 

Staff College / by Eric Hunter Haas.

ISBN 978-0-9837226-8-7

 1. Counterinsurgency--Case studies. 2. Border security--Case studies. 

3. Insurgency. 4. Terrorist safe havens. 5. Great Britain. Army--

Colonial forces--Pakistan--North-West Frontier Province--History. 6. 

Oman--History--Dhofar War, 1964-1976. I. Title. 

 U241.H33 2012

 355.4’25--dc23

 2012017413

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many 

of them available for downloading, can be found at 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Abstract

Operations at the Border

Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens

by

Major Eric Hunter Haas

Disrupting an insurgent’s access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a 

critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By 

denying an insurgent’s access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the 

counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker 

force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using 

international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent 

force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to 

accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain 

and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching 

strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success. Through the 

examination of the British experience in the North-West Frontier, 1849-

1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in the Sultanate of Oman’s Dhofar 

Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can develop techniques for applying border 

control operations to disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts 

are not the decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical 

to defeating the insurgent’s ability to maintain their ability to conduct 

operations.
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining 

earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected 

to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns 

throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of 

understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and 

doctrinal response to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 
v

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... 

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil... 

is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr. Daniel Marston

Brigadier General, US Army DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Deputy Commanding General

 CAC LD&E

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair in 

 the Art of War US Army Command & General 

 Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

Though only a single name appears on the cover of this thesis, it 

was built on the work of a great team of people. The Art of War Scholars 

Program was a challenging academic course of study that forced the 

students to read, think, analyze, and develop coherent ideas. It was an 

honor to have had the opportunity to study and learn under Dr. Daniel 

Marston, Dr. Scott Stephenson, and Dr. Nicholas Murray.

For the “Bunch of Five”, Mike Gunther, Mike Stewart, Darrell 

Vaughan, and Marcus Welch, it was an honor to debate, explore, and learn 

with and from you throughout the program. If all else, we are much better 

prepared to operate in an uncertain environment.

A special thanks to Arish Turle, Colonel Alex Alderson, and Will Clegg 

for the hospitality and assistance supporting the team’s travel to the United 

Kingdom, and for arranging interviews with the Dhofar Veterans. The 

opportunity to conduct these interviews and store them for future scholars 

is truly amazing. In addition, my deepest appreciation to the Middle East 

Center at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, the Liddell Hart Library at King’s 

College London, the British Library, and the Combined Arms Research 

Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for the outstanding support and 

efforts assisting in my archival research efforts necessary for this thesis.

Lastly, to my wife and soul mate, Erica, thank you for all of your 

feedback, patience, and understanding throughout the program. I could 

not have done it without you and your loving support (and detailed edits!).
vii

Table of Contents

Chapters

Abstract...................................................................................................iii

Objectives................................................................................................ iv

Acknowledgments.................................................................................. vi

Table of Contents .................................................................................. vii

Acronyms..............................................................................................viii

Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2: What Is Insurgency?................................................................ 7

Chapter 3: Border Operations and Counterinsurgency........................... 29

Chapter 4: Case Study: The North-West Frontier................................... 43

Chapter 5: Case Study: The Dhofar Campaign, Oman........................... 71

Chapter 6: Conclusions........................................................................... 97

Glossary ............................................................................................... 103

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 105

Figures

Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in War...................................................... 9

Figure 2. Map of the North-West Frontier.............................................. 45

Figure 3. Disposition of Pathan People................................................... 46

Figure 4. Location of Initial Punjab Irregular Force Recruitment Sites. 49

Figure 5. Map of Oman........................................................................... 74

Figure 6. Location of Defensive Lines Built in Dhofar.......................... 86
viii

Acronyms

BATT British Advisory Training Team

CAT Civil Aid Team

CSAF Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces

DFL Dhofar Liberation Front

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FCR Frontier Criminal Regulations

FLN Front de Libération Nationale

IRA Irish Republican Army

PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen

PFF Punjab Frontier Force

PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf

PIF Punjab Irregular Force

PIRA Provincial Irish Republican Army

RIC Royal Irish Constabulary

SAF Sultan’s Armed Forces

SAS Special Air Services

SEP Surrendered Enemy Personnel

SOAF Sultan of Oman’s Air Force

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

The role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be 

overriding in a revolutionary war. If the insurgent, with his initial 

weakness, cannot get any help from geography, he may well be 

condemned to failure before he starts.

— David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

Ever since the United States military entered a state of protracted 

conflict following the attacks by Al Qaeda in 2001, the study of 

counterinsurgency and limited war theory has come to the forefront of 

military thought. US military personnel reexamined theories of how to 

conduct counterinsurgency operations written in the 1950s and 1960s 

by British and French practitioners operating in Malaya, Algeria, and 

Vietnam. One of the ideas addressed in these writings was the denial 

of external support to an insurgent group. David Galula’s seminal work 

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, published in 1964, 

noted the importance of isolating an insurgency from its outside support to 

weaken an insurgent’s material, political, and financial support.1

The US Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, published in 

2006, further reinforces this idea by stating, “access to external resources 

and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies.”2

At the start of an insurgency, the counterinsurgent force, whether the 

host-nation or an interventionist power, has a distinct advantage over the 

insurgents.3 The counterinsurgent has the resources, bureaucracy, and 

institutions of a nation-state, while an insurgency is struggling to amass 

assets, control a population base, and build a capability to match the 

counterinsurgent. This initial weakness on the insurgent’s part makes the 

insurgent dependent on outside support during the conflict for funding, 

equipment, and moral support. If the counterinsurgent force can focus its 

efforts to isolate the insurgent force from accessing their external support, 

the counterinsurgent force may be able to contain an insurgency during its 

early stages.4

External support is a broad term that includes any form of support 

provided to an insurgent force from outside the political boundaries of 

the insurgency.5

 Examples of support include monetary funding for the 

insurgency, weapons, and equipment. A specific subset of external support 

is external sanctuary. 
2

External sanctuary is a term normally used by the counterinsurgent 

force to describe an area outside of their political boundaries or ability to 

control. For this study, the author will use the term external sanctuary to 

describe the physical terrain outside the political national boundary of the 

host nation, recognized through international treaty or negotiation, which 

the insurgent force uses to conduct recruitment, financing, equipping, and 

training for the conduct of insurgent activities. The external sanctuary does 

not require the neighboring country to support or approve of the areas used 

by insurgents. This sanctuary is more than a source of moral or financial 

support, which an outside organization could provide through a global 

communication network, like the internet or global banking networks.6

The idea of external sanctuary is usually a limitation imposed by 

the counterinsurgent force on its own operations. Generally, when a 

counterinsurgent force is attempting to disrupt an insurgent force access 

to this safe haven it results from the counterinsurgent lacking the will 

for an expansion of the conflict into the territory of another sovereign 

government. This lack of will to expand the conflict may stem from a 

number of reasons, which include a desire by the counterinsurgent force 

to limit the cost of the conflict, a lack of political will for risking a larger 

conflict with another sovereign nation, or a desire to avoid potential 

international condemnation for this expansion.7

Also for this thesis, the term denial requires clarification. Denial is to 

hinder or prevent an enemy’s use of specific terrain, locations, or facilities. 

Most practitioners and border control theorists acknowledge the near 

impossibility to prevent all movement across a border without prohibitive 

cost or effort. The use of “hinder” ensures a broad enough definition to 

provide solutions that another counterinsurgent force may consider for a 

similar situation. If a counterinsurgent force can hinder the movement of 

insurgents to or from their external sanctuary, this hindrance may either 

force insurgents to change locations or abandon the safe haven. By forcing 

an insurgent organization to change how and where it conducts operations, 

the counterinsurgent force may make the insurgents more vulnerable to 

targeting and defeat. 8

A number of factors can determine the effectiveness of an external 

sanctuary for an insurgent force. A major factor is the physical terrain that 

comprises the avenues of approach to and from the external sanctuary. In 

1962, the RAND Corporation hosted a Counterinsurgency Symposium in 

Washington DC, in which the organization brought in twelve experienced 

practitioners from previous counterinsurgency campaigns to analyze 

lessons to develop a way for addressing the expanding US involvement 
3

in South Vietnam. During the five days of discussion, the practitioners 

discussed at length the effect of terrain on border control. The consensus 

that emerged was the more difficult the terrain, the more difficult it was for 

counterinsurgent forces to deny access for movement across the border.9

Another factor that affects an external sanctuary is the cultural 

demographics of the insurgent force and the population present in the 

external sanctuary. Most of the international boundaries across the world 

cross some type of cultural boundary, and an insurgent group may find 

sympathy and support from a similar group across that boundary.10

Missing from the writings of the practitioners, as well as the US 

Army’s own doctrine, are effective tools to defeat insurgent groups’ access 

to external support. How should the counterinsurgent force address the 

insurgent’s use of the border issues? What factors should influences how 

counterinsurgents disrupt insurgent access to its external support? 

In order to disrupt an insurgent force access to its external support, 

the counterinsurgent should consider the physical terrain, cultural 

demographics, the role of border control operations within the strategic plan, 

and the allocation of security forces to border operations. By formulating a 

unified plan, which addresses these factors, a counterinsurgent force may 

be able to disrupt an insurgent force’s access to their external sanctuaries. 

Within the plan, there should be consideration for the recruitment and 

employment of local security forces, building and maintaining physical 

barriers along likely insurgent avenues to the external sanctuary, and 

development of border policies addressing issues exploited by the 

insurgents along the border if these factors support the strategic end state 

desired by the counterinsurgent.

The border has two or more governments that can influence it. The 

counterinsurgent government can work through the adjacent government 

to restrict access to insurgent safe havens, in theory, but in actuality, it is up 

to the counterinsurgent to deny the insurgent access from the external safe 

haven to the population centers. Beyond disrupting insurgent access to 

external sanctuaries, these border efforts can demonstrate to the population 

the government’s capability to protect its citizens.11

The denial of access to external sanctuaries has been and will continue 

to be a critical aspect of military operations. Counterinsurgent forces 

must apply a solution that hinders the insurgent access without causing 

a further escalation of the conflict. Failing to address the border and 

external sanctuary support an insurgent group receives will only prolong 

the conflict, as the insurgent group is able to rearm, re-equip, and re-man 
4

its formations for continued violence against the counterinsurgent. This 

outside influence could potentially undermine government efforts to 

demonstrate capability to its population.

This paper examines the concepts for disrupting insurgent access to 

external sanctuary through examination of two historical case studies. 

The first case study examines the British experience in the North-West 

Frontier of India from 1849 until 1947. British experiences in the NorthWest Frontier demonstrate success and failures for the roles played by 

physical terrain, cultural demographics, strategic goals, and security force 

allocation to control a border region and support operations.

The second case study examines counterinsurgency operations in 

the Dhofar Province, Oman from 1965 to 1975. The operations in Oman 

demonstrated the defeat of a communist-backed insurgency with a secure 

external sanctuary, by a counterinsurgent force. The Sultan’s Armed Forces 

and British advisors incorporated locally raised security forces, a series of 

defensive lines, and a unified foreign and internal policy to defeat a wellfunded and inspired insurgency. The defeat of the adoo was never assured 

during the campaign and may provide lessons for future operations.

The research methodology used for this thesis involved archival 

historical research in the United Kingdom and interviews with practitioners 

from these campaigns. Through the Art of War Scholars Program, 

there are a number of oral history interviews conducted with surviving 

participants of the Dhofar campaign. Due to the sensitive nature of some 

of the interviews, this paper will not reference the names of interviewees 

but rather will provide contextual data, such as job title and theater of 

operations, for the background of the subject.
5

Notes

1. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing, 2005), 39-40. David Galula based this 

work on his experiences as a company-grade officer serving in the French Army 

during the Algeria War. The paper examines these ideas of Galula in greater detail 

in Chapter 2.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24,

Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-16. 

Field Manual 3-24 draws heavily from the counterinsurgent theories of the 1960s 

and 1970s, which some critics contend makes the manual too focused on waging 

war against a Maoist-based insurgency. This idea will be examined in detail in 

Chapter 2.

3. For this thesis, the author will use the term counterinsurgent to refer to all 

aspects of the counterinsurgent force–whether the counterinsurgent is one nation, 

a multi-national coalition, or an interventionist power assisting a weaker nation in 

waging a counterinsurgency campaign.

4. An example is the efforts undertaken by the United Kingdom in building 

a defense system between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland from 

1969 through 1997 during “The Troubles.” The British developed an elaborate 

surveillance system to monitor border crossings, as well as extensive analysis 

of vehicles crossing the border. In addition, in 1981, then Prime Minister 

Thatcher made a personal appeal to the then US President Reagan to assist in 

halting the trafficking of weapons between the United States and the Provincial 

Irish Republican Army (PIRA). These efforts assisted in weakening PIRA’s 

position and capability, eventually allowing for a negotiated settlement with the 

“Good Friday Accords.” Brigadier Sir Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War,” in 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian 

(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 157-174; Nick Van Der Bijl, Operation 

BANNER (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2009), 82-90.

5. There is additional discussion of the definition of borders in Chapter 2 of 

this thesis. 

6. Since the attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States on 11 September 

2011, a number of theorists have presented a concept that the western world is 

now in a “Post-Maoist” period for insurgency. A key point of this discussion 

revolves around the idea that global communication networks have made the 

digital environment a sanctuary and a physical sanctuary is no longer necessary. 

There is no evidence yet of a purely digital insurgency, once this is present 

then sanctuary may need a new definition. This paper will mainly focus on the 

physical, terrestrial external sanctuary and border operations necessary to disrupt 

the movement of people, equipment, and resources into the area in which the 

counterinsurgents and insurgents are engaged in combat. Also, the scope of the 

paper will not address the full capabilities of a nation to wield “soft power” to 

influence another nation. For information on the “Post-Maoist” ideas, see Dr. 

John Mackinlay, Insurgent Archipelago (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2009); Steve Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st 

Century Insurgency,” Parameters (Winter 2007-2008): 20-32. For information 

on “soft power,” see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” 
6

Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004), http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-softpower (accessed 16 November 2011).

7. The second case study of this thesis, the Dhofar Campaign in Oman, will 

examine this concept in some detail. Also, the Second Chimurenga Campaign 

in Rhodesia represents a case of a country, at first not wishing to increase 

international condemnation, later in the campaign authorizing major cross-border 

attacks to destroy insurgent safe-havens in Zambia and Mozambique. Part of 

then Prime Minister Ian Smith’s decision rested on the amount of international 

sanctions already in place on the country, and a desire to weaken his political 

rival, Robert Mugabe, quickly as Ian Smith worked an agreement with Reverend 

Ndabaningi Sithole. J. R. T. Wood, Counter-Strike from the Sky: The Rhodesian 

All-Arms Fireforce in the War in the Bush, 1974-1980 (Johannesburg: 30 Degree 

South Publishers, 2011), 123-128.

8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, Operational 

Terms and Graphics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-58. 

A key question when military and civil planners examine border control should 

to be the question of how much legitimate traffic moves across the border. In 

addition, they should question the assumption that the border is required for 

commerce. If the border is required for legitimate commerce, then border control 

operations must address this factor. 

9. Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, ed., Counterinsurgency: A 

Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 

41-44. Some of the practitioners present at this Symposium included David Galula, 

Frank Kitson, Rufus Phillips, Tony Jeapes, and Edward Landsdale. All these men 

would prove influential in future thinking on the theories of counterinsurgency. 

In terms of border operations, the consensus from the practitioners was 

counterinsurgent operations on islands were the easiest to control the borders, 

followed by open, desert terrain, with jungle and mountainous terrain being the 

most difficult for disrupting enemy movement to safe-havens. 

10. Examples include British efforts to stabilize the North-West Frontier 

from 1849-1947, Dhofari tribal support in the People’s Democratic Republic of 

Yemen to Dhofari adoo in Oman from 1965-1979, the Pathan tribal support to 

Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet Union from 1979-1989, 

and Sunni tribal support in Syria and Jordan to Iraqi Sunni insurgents from 2003 

to 2010. 

11. Joby Warrick, “Clinton Confirms US Contact with Haqqanni Network,” 

Washington Post, 21 October 2011. This article details efforts by the US 

Department of State to influence Pakistan to control groups in its borders, which 

conduct insurgent activities in Afghanistan. The first case study of this thesis on 

the North-West Frontier provides an example of border operations conducted 

mainly to protect the internal population of the Punjab from raids originating out 

of the North-West Frontier.
7

Chapter 2

What is Insurgency?

The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the 

counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this 

advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the 

initial violence states of the insurgency. By moving from one side 

of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape 

pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.

— David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice

As the quote above highlights, an insurgent force will use any advantages 

to its favor to defeat the counterinsurgent. If the counterinsurgent fails to 

identify how insurgent or external forces exploit this weakness in border 

areas, the counterinsurgent’s security efforts may be in vain. This chapter 

will examine insurgency and counterinsurgency within the context of war, 

to differentiate this type of conflict from other types within the spectrum 

of war. 

In order to understand how insurgency fits within the spectrum of 

conflict, it is necessary to examine the definition of war. First presented 

with the definition of war, this section will then examine how insurgency 

differs from other forms of conflict. This will help to differentiate the role 

of border control in insurgency-type operations compared to other types 

of conflicts.

The current archeological and historical evidence tends to indicate 

that armed conflict between different groups of humans arose in the thirdmillennium BC.1

Yet, from that initial rise of armed conflict through the early 19thCentury, and the rise of nation states, few theorists examined the essence 

of war. Many of the historical works on war discuss how to conduct the 

military activities necessary to defeat an opponent, how to organize one’s 

forces, and even discussions on developing duty titles and responsibilities, 

but few theorists or philosophers addressed the essence of war.2 Sun 

Tzu, the Chinese military philosopher of the Warring States period (fifth 

through third century BC) of Chinese history was one who provided some 

insights into the essence war. He wrote in the opening lines of his work 

The Art of War, “Military action is important to the nation–it is the ground 

of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative 

to examine it.”3
8

In the opening line of his work, Sun Tzu acknowledges the importance 

war and conflict has upon society, but he makes few other efforts to 

breakdown the fundamental essence of war. Deeper within The Art of War, 

Sun Tzu writes, “The ordinary rule for use of military force is for the 

military command to receive the orders from the civilian authorities, then 

to gather and mass the troops, quartering them together.”4 This statement 

combined with another passage from his section “Adaptation,” provides 

evidence that Sun Tzu most likely saw a major divide between the military 

and imperial leadership on the essence of war, which one could surmise 

as civilian leadership decided what war is and the military leadership then 

sends the army to accomplish the goals laid out by the leadership.5

The Greek historian, Thucydides, writing about the Peloponnesian 

War in the fifth-century B.C., discussed the effects of war upon a society 

and presented an idea that the motives of “fear, honor, and interest” 

within a society led to war. The three motives provide some insight into 

the interplay of emotion on the two belligerents, but it fails to provide 

a comprehensive view of competing factors that influences a society’s 

behavior in war.6

The concise definition of war developed by the Prussian military 

thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, in his posthumous work On War, provides 

the basic framework for war’s definition in this chapter. That definition is, 

“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Within 

Clausewitz’s tome, he highlights that a nation ties war to its political 

objectives, so that war is the means to achieve the political ends.7

 Using 

these concepts from Clausewitz, the definition of war for this paper is: the 

use of organized violence by a political body to influence or force another 

group to meet the first group’s political objectives.

War does have a spectrum of conflict, with governments employing 

different levels of violence to achieve their desired ends. Figure 1 

highlights the spectrum of conflict from the lowest level of hostile act 

through the logical absolute of the application of force.8

 The spectrum 

of conflict usually depends on the level of commitment and the level of 

violence that both sides are willing to engage in to meet their objectives.

With this definition for war, is insurgency different?9

 To understand 

insurgency, one must study the term from both the insurgent’s and the 

counterinsurgent’s perspectives. How one defines insurgency does rely on 

which perspective one employs, as the constraints and characteristics of 

the conflict differ from whether one is an insurgent or the counterinsurgent.
9

Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in War.

Source: Created by author

Note: The spectrum represents a combination of the level of commitment 

to resolving the political desire and the amount of potential organized 

violence to achieve the ends. It is meant as a graphic representation of 

the range of options on a spectrum, and the author understands that no 

conflict will ever fit neatly into a category, there are always exceptions. A 

conflict that starts in one part of the spectrum can move up and down the 

scale based on the commitment and violence. An example is the American 
10

Civil War, 1861-1865, which started closer to the internal rebellion part 

of the spectrum in 1861, but was much closer to the absolute extreme by 

the end of 1864.

One British Army counterinsurgency practitioner, General Sir Frank 

Kitson, wrote in his work Bunch of Five, “the main characteristic which 

distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they 

are primarily concerned with the struggle for men’s minds.”10 This idea 

provides a starting point for analyzing insurgency. As highlighted earlier, 

war is a struggle to impose one government’s will upon another group of 

people with organized violence; hence, all wars are struggles for the minds 

of the opponents.

What does begin to differentiate how a counterinsurgent views the 

conflict is the internal and potentially limited nature of an insurgency. 

Insurgencies arise when groups of people, in a weaker position than the 

government, make the conscious decision to employ violence to force 

change within a government opposed to the change.11 General Kitson is 

most correct in that the struggle for men’s minds is the central aspect, but 

he omitted, or at least assumed without stating, that this form of conflict 

was internal to a country and not a direct conflict between two nationstates. 

Consequently, since the conflict is within a country, the 

counterinsurgents under attack by insurgents elect to limit some aspects of 

how they conduct their actions in response to the insurgents’ attacks. This 

limited form of warfare may take numerous forms, including not attacking 

population centers loyal to the central government, not employing the 

full capabilities of violence against the insurgent, or not expanding the 

conflict across other international boundaries. A counterinsurgent could 

elect to employ nuclear weapons on an insurgent location, but the longterm effects of that decision would more than likely nullify any advantage 

achieved with the result. For this reason and due to a desire to maintain 

their legitimacy, the counterinsurgent deliberately constrains their use of 

military power.12

The idea of insurgency is not new to war. History has numerous 

examples of revolts, uprisings, and civil wars. However, it was not until 

the rise of industrialism and imperialism when insurgencies became a more 

viable form of warfare for disenfranchised groups.13 Industrialism caused 

a significant shift for how populations lived, worked and interacted. Large 

numbers of the people moved from rural villages into cities, in order to 

work in the newly developed factories and industries. This concentration 

of population made it more difficult for governments to suppress dissident 
11

thoughts or actions from the broader population. Additionally, new ways 

to communicate messages to a broad market developed with the rise of 

urbanization. These forms of communication, from the rolling printing 

press to the wireless telegraph, allowed communication across large areas 

for groups who may have been geographically isolated previously. This 

rise of communication techniques allowed disparate groups to receive 

manifestos and ideas rapidly, and across a broad audience. 14

With the changes occurring in society, new political movements 

and grievances among groups of people also began to arise. One of the 

dominant movements from the mid-19th-century through late 20th-century 

was the socialist movement, which sought to address real or perceived 

inequities between workers and factory owners. With the rise of the 

socialism, the founders Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels highlighted the 

interconnectedness of the political and violent aspects of their movement. 

The closing paragraph of the 1888 edition of the Communist Manifesto

states, “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They 

openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow 

of all existing social conditions.”15 Only through violent activity, could the 

socialist movement achieve its goals and change the social order. 

Using the ideas developed by Marx and Engels, both Vladimir Lenin 

and Mao Tse-Tung inspired their own insurgent movements to gain power 

within Russia and China, respectively. Vladimir Lenin used many of the 

ideas espoused by Marx and Engels to develop a communist political base 

within the working classes and then focused much of his violent activity 

within the population centers of Russia.16 This forced the collapse of the 

Kerensky Government, the short-lived Russian Republic that followed 

the abdication of Tsar Nicholas I in 1917.17 Mao Tse-Tung used similar 

ideas, but after his temporary defeat in 1927, focused his political efforts 

to the agrarian society and building his support within the peasantry.18

Both leaders would then work to export their models for insurgency 

after stabilizing control in their respective countries. Following Mao’s 

successful rise to power in China in 1948, his model for insurgency 

became the hallmark of the communist-inspired movements. His work 

On Guerrilla Warfare would serve as the example for many of the other 

communist-inspired insurgencies during the last half of the 20th-century.19

The Maoist principles provided a three-stage framework for 

conducting an insurgent campaign. The first phase was the development 

of a strong political cadre, which Mao referred to in On Guerrilla Warfare 

as “Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation.”20 This was the most 

important stage in Mao’s view as this provided the fundamental essence 
12

of the movement. Within this phase was the establishment of the political 

movement within the civilian population, the development of regional 

support bases in areas difficult for the government to interdict, and the 

undermining of the government’s political and legal institutions in the 

targeted areas. Mao reiterates through the work that the preservation of the 

guerrilla force is one of the critical elements for the first phase.21

The second phase Mao called “Progressive Expansion,” and others 

have referred to as the “Guerrilla Phase.” At this stage, Mao believed in 

small-scale attacks against areas of government weakness. The aim during 

this phase was to:

exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large 

forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases 

capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy’s rear; to 

force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these 

activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.22

This second stage aligned with Mao’s views of a long, protracted 

struggle in which the guerrilla force would work to wear down the 

government’s forces. He did not see this second stage as operating in 

isolation, but rather in support of building capability to a conventional 

force and eventually transform into a conventional force.23 Mao reiterated 

throughout his work On Guerrilla Warfare that this second stage was 

part of a protracted struggle that depended upon maintaining mobility, 

employing manpower in “proper concentrations,” and a constant focus on 

surrounding and destroying vulnerable enemy units.24

The third stage was “positional warfare,” or as others referred to it, “a 

war of movement.” This stage would resemble conventional, army-versusarmy fighting using organized formations, tactics, and units. Mao believed 

an insurgency should only enter this phase when conditions assured 

victory. He reiterated that an insurgent force must move easily between the 

phases to prevent defeat by a superior force, as survival of the movement 

was more important than being in a specific phase of insurgency.25

The form of insurgency developed by Mao became the dominant form 

of communist-inspired insurgency for peasant-based economies following 

his successful rise to power in Mainland China post-1949. One explanation 

for the dominance is the amount of publishing Mao undertook to spread 

his revolutionary ideas across the world. Other revolutionaries, such as 

General Vo Nguyen Giap and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, used Mao’s ideas 

as the basis for their strategy, but then adapted the teachings to the specific 

situation facing them.26
13

Beside the rise of industrialism, the decline of imperialism in the 20thCentury also provided another source of grievance that spawned insurgent 

movements. The Maoist form of insurgency focused on population 

grievances for building support within society. This was especially true 

following the end of World War II, when the empires of Great Britain 

and France began to withdraw. The anti-colonial movement provided a 

rallying point for many insurgencies after 1945.27

One can derive a holistic definition for insurgency through a thorough 

analysis of Maoist principles. What emerges from the insurgent’s 

perspective of insurgency is the use of organized violence, in conjunction 

with political action, by an initially weaker force to cause a change upon a 

government to address a real or perceived grievance. From the insurgent’s 

perspective, there are no self-imposed constraints for the level of violence 

used. The insurgent is waging a war as total as their capacity allows, since 

the insurgent is fighting for its survival. Any constraints on their use of 

violence derive from a lack of capability, strength or ability to escalate 

the levels of violence, rather than a desire to limit the violence, until the 

insurgency built its potential to escalate.28

With the development of nuclear weapons in 1945, the scale of 

war changed for the major Western powers. The scope of violence a 

government could employ within a conflict had the potential now to end 

human civilization.29 The rise of these new weapons now established 

the conditions in which potentially neither belligerent could achieve 

their desired political goals. This then led to governments using indirect 

methods to achieve their goals against other nation-states or to spread their 

influence. One means to accomplish this was through providing support 

for insurgencies, or conversely counterinsurgencies, as more powerful 

countries conducted proxy wars to gain influence within desired spheres 

of influence. 

Great Britain, France, the United States, the USSR, and China 

all conducted proxy insurgencies and counterinsurgencies during the 

1950s through 1970s. Despite all five of the permanent members of 

the United Nations Security Council supporting both insurgencies and 

counterinsurgencies, Great Britain, France, and the United States are 

most associated with support to counterinsurgents, while China and the 

USSR are most identified with sponsoring insurgency through the end of 

the Cold War in 1991. Counterinsurgent practitioners from Great Britain, 

France, and the United States wrote about their experiences to encapsulate 

potential lessons for fighting in counterinsurgencies. Since many of 

these insurgencies had communist support or were communist inspired, 
14

a number of the theorists addressed their works to target the communist 

movement.30 Many consider this period after 1945 through the end of the 

1970s the “classical” period for counterinsurgency. One could group the 

works produced in this period into three major perspectives: the French 

School, the British School, and the American School.

The French School developed out of the French counterinsurgency 

efforts in Indochina and Algeria during the 1950s through early 1960s. The 

two authors most associated with this perspective are Roger Trinquier and 

David Galula. Both men served in Algeria, though in different capacities, 

and both men produced works in English that many British and American 

military officials read at the time.

French colonial paratrooper commander, Roger Trinquier, published 

his work Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency in 

1962, and though controversial for his views on the use of torture to 

elicit information, he otherwise provides a very detailed, though severe, 

examination of counterinsurgency operations.31

Trinquier believed the key difference with “modern warfare” 

compared with earlier conflicts was “victory is not expected from the clash 

of two armies on a field of battle.” He saw revolutionary warfare had the 

primary aim of “overthrowing the established authority in a country and its 

replacement by another regime.”32 The critical idea that Trinquier presents 

while defining modern warfare is the enemy is “an armed clandestine 

organization” and the only chance for victory by the counterinsurgent is 

the “complete destruction of that organization.” 33

In addition to his experiences in French Indochina and Algeria, 

the French concept of guerre revolutionaire heavily influenced Roger 

Trinquier. The guerre revolutionaire ideas built upon earlier 19th-century, 

French colonial writings and developed a view that since communisminspired insurgencies waged an unrestricted form of warfare against 

capitalist societies, the capitalist force must likewise wage unrestricted 

war against the insurgents.34 Included within this viewpoint was the 

concept that the military had to annihilate the insurgency, as negotiations 

or compromise only provided the insurgency with time to regroup and 

consolidate, which damaged the counterinsurgent’s efforts. Since Algeria 

was not considered a colony, but part of the French political boundaries, 

many French officers held a strong belief that failure in Algeria would lead 

to an eventual, complete defeat of France by communist insurgents.35

The second person heavily associated with the French perspective is 

David Galula. He had a different military career than Roger Trinquier, 
15

and these experiences led him to develop a different perspective on 

counterinsurgency than Trinquier. Galula produced two works, which came 

to define his views of counterinsurgency. The first, Pacification in Algeria 

1956-1958, he published in 1963. The second work, Counterinsurgency 

Warfare: Theory and Practice, he published in 1964. Counterinsurgency 

Warfare: Theory and Practice would extract many of Galula’s lessons on 

counterinsurgency from Pacification in Algeria in order to provide readers 

with a collection of principles. Galula did produce both works from the 

perspective of a company-grade officer, so there is little effort by Galula to 

place his experiences into a larger context of operational planning. 36

In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Galula provided 

a framework for understanding revolutionary warfare. Galula stated, 

“A revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict, although external 

influences seldom fail to bear upon it.”37 The distinction in which 

revolutionary warfare is an internal conflict is a perspective shared by 

many counterinsurgent theorists. Many insurgents though did not always 

see the conflict as an internal fight; they viewed the conflict as a fight for 

survival.

The second difference that Galula provided for what separated 

revolutionary war from other types of war is the insurgent is the initiator 

of a revolutionary war, as “counterinsurgency is an effect of insurgency,” 

while either side can initiate a war in conventional war.38 Due to this 

reactive nature of counterinsurgency operations, Galula believed the 

insurgency had strategic initiative at the start of the conflict. 

The third difference between revolutionary warfare and conventional 

was the initial asymmetry between the two belligerents at the start of the 

hostilities. The insurgent was in a much weaker position at the start of the 

conflict; depending on the insurgent’s achievement, the insurgent would 

grow stronger, while the counterinsurgent’s strength would decline in 

direct relation to the insurgent’s success.39

Contemporaneous with Trinquier and Galula, a number of British 

officers also wrote of their experience conducting counterinsurgency 

operations. Of these, two influential writers at the time were General Sir 

Robert Thompson and General Sir Frank Kitson. Both men had extensive 

experience conducting counterinsurgency operations and their respective 

works encapsulated their principles for how to defeat an insurgency.

General Sir Robert Thompson was a member of the Royal Air Force in 

the Second World War who spent a large portion of his career from 1948 

through 1960 assisting in the British counterinsurgency efforts during 
16

the Malayan Emergency. His work, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 

provides a perspective focused mainly on the strategic and policy levels 

for administrating a counterinsurgency. Thompson’s major influence, 

beyond his practical experience, was also Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare. 

The structure of Defeating Communist Insurgency mirrors much of 

Mao’s work. Thompson writes that one of the primary characteristics of 

an insurgency is the requirement for a cause. The cause had to appear 

“legitimate, progressive, and desirable” in order for the population to lend 

support to it. He further stipulates that following the end of World War 

II, a readily available cause for most communist insurgencies was anticolonialism or anti-imperialism.40

Once the insurgents established the cause within the population, 

Thompson believed the critical factor that led to an insurgency was “the 

breakdown, or near breakdown, of the government’s rural administration.”41

This factor was vital to the insurgent’s desire to drive a wedge between the 

population and the government. The insurgents used subversion, murder, 

intimidation, accusations, and malicious information to discredit the 

government, neutralize and eliminate opponents of the insurgent cause, 

and frighten the population. Thompson also believed the insurgents would 

not use indiscriminate terrorism, as they could push the population closer 

to the government. He believed the insurgents would attempt to appear 

disciplined and exhibit “good behavior” in order to discredit further any 

misstep by the government.42

Thompson further detailed that an insurgent would attempt to collapse 

the government through this relentless focus on subversion. If this did not 

prove successful, then the insurgents would move their operations from 

subversion to full insurgency. He believed this demonstrated both success 

and failure, in that, the insurgent had the strength to move into another form 

of conflict, but was unsuccessful in collapsing the government through 

subversion alone. This movement into insurgency was a calculated risk by 

the insurgent, since it did make them more vulnerable to government attack 

and potential collapse. How the insurgent was successful was through the 

combined political and military operations of “gaining control over the 

population, by continued subversion and terror.”43

The second of the British theorists, General Kitson, also had experience 

in many of the post-World War II counterinsurgencies waged by the British 

government. He produced two influential works. The first, Low Intensity 

Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping, and the second, 

Bunch of Five. Both works provide excellent descriptions of insurgency 

along with lessons from Kitson’s considerable experience.
17

Within Low Intensity Operations, Kitson provided his definitions for 

subversion and insurgency. Subversion is:

all measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the 

people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, 

or to force them to do things which they do not want to do. It can involve 

the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, protest marches, and 

propaganda, and can also include the use of small-scale violence for the 

purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the population into giving 

support.44

Kitson’s definition for insurgency is “the use of armed force by a 

section of the people against the government for the purposes mentioned 

above.”45 He then proceeded to explain how subversion and insurgency 

differ from other forms of war. The two differences he notes is the 

relationship between the use of force and influence upon the population, 

and the role of force supporting forms of persuasion.46

Six years after the release of Low Intensity Operations, Kitson 

published Bunch of Five. This work described four of the campaigns in 

which Kitson served Kenya, Malaya, Oman, and Cyprus, plus a detailed 

chapter on counterinsurgency theory. He refined his view of the insurgent’s 

ultimate aim, which “is to overthrow a government, or force it to do 

something it does not want to do”47 This definition differs from previous 

theorists by highlighting that insurgent goals may be more limited than the 

complete overthrow of the government. Their goals could be to carve out 

an exclave for themselves free from the government’s influence. This also 

contrasts with the severe views of Roger Trinquier, who prescribed to a 

school of thought that the counterinsurgent had to wage unrestrained war. 

Kitson’s definition allowed for more variation within an insurgent’s goals, 

and it opened up the counterinsurgent to employ a larger pool of resources 

to end the conflict.

A third perspective, the American School, identified with a US Army 

veteran from the Vietnam War, John H. McCuen and his work The Art 

of Counter-Revolutionary War published in 1966. His work differs from 

the other theorists by focusing on the protracted nature of this type of 

warfare. McCuen’s intent with his work is to detail how to defeat a Maoist 

structured and influenced insurgency, as the United States was beginning 

to face in South Vietnam at the time of publishing this work.48

McCuen also differed from other theorists by not providing his own 

definition for insurgency. He used the ideas presented by Mao for the 

basis of his definitions, and then focused his efforts on addressing how to 

counter a Maoist insurgency.49
18

Following the defeat of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese 

in 1975, most of the conventional United States Army turned away 

from study of counterinsurgency.50 This lack of focus continued, for the 

most part, until the attacks by Al Qaeda against the United States on 11 

September 2001. Following the terrorist attacks, a number of theorists 

began to question whether the world had entered a “post-Maoist Period,” 

and the previous works on counterinsurgency were no longer valid as the 

nature of insurgency had fundamentally changed in the digital age. Many 

of these theorists questioned whether Islamic Fundamentalism presented 

an inherently different cause than communism did among the population. 

Two authors, who represent the post-Maoist view, are General 

Sir Rupert Smith with his work The Utility of Force and Doctor John 

MacKinlay with his work The Insurgent Archipelago. General Smith’s 

work The Utility of Force highlights that in a post-Cold War era, nations 

will fight more conflicts within civilian populations. This intertwining of 

military and civilian interactions will create issues separating regular and 

irregular forces from the battlefield. General Smith also emphasizes that 

in a revolutionary war, “force is being used to form the people’s intentions 

as to their governance: throughout all lines of operations the revolutionary 

is working to increase the acceptance of the people to be governed by the 

revolution.”51

General Smith believed that with the increasing urbanization and 

globalization of the population, conventional military forces would have 

greater difficulty separating the opposing combatant from the population. 

He also stated that the desired ends, which led to war, are changing from 

“hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more malleable 

objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states.”52

Though compelling, these ideas tend to overlook many of the smaller 

wars and imperial policing activities undertaken by the larger western 

powers over the last 200 years. He only looked at the large-scale wars, 

while discounted the smaller wars in which western powers, especially 

the British Empire, fought and negotiated with non-state elements to 

establish their empires.53 In addition, General Smith overstated the role 

of urbanization in describing the terrain in which western powers would 

fight wars. This overlooked the instability in less populated regions, such 

Afghanistan, or the space between the population centers where fighting 

can still occur.54

Another theorist, Dr. MacKinlay, postulated that the nature of 

insurgency has fundamentally changed following the end of the Cold War. 

With the rise of globalization and modern communication technology, Dr. 
19

MacKinlay stipulated insurgencies are essentially a political process which 

evolve their techniques based on the society they are a part of that organize 

as an act of desperation and finally involve the population.55 He defined 

post-Maoism as, “a transformation of the operational space, in which the 

center of gravity for insurgency and counter-insurgency moves from the 

national to the international, superseding traditional forms of conflict in 

which the outcome is decided ‘on the ground’, and creating a myriad of 

influential factors spread around an archipelago of concerned states and 

communities across the globe.”56

These ideas presented by Dr. MacKinlay overstate the role of 

globalization, and understate the centrality of a major grievance to an 

insurgent’s agenda that the government is unwilling or unable to address. 

Through global communication networks, an insurgent group may be 

able to keep pressure on the counterinsurgent force and provide moral 

support to the insurgent, but that does not provide enough evidence that 

insurgencies are fundamentally different after 11 September 2011.57

After a thorough examination of these ideas related to insurgency 

and counterinsurgency, one can build a comprehensive definition of 

insurgency in which to examine border control operations. The definition 

for insurgency is: the use of organized violence by an internal group 

which is initially militarily weaker than the government, in order to force 

a significant change upon the government which does not want to change 

through other political means, and the counterinsurgent elects to impose 

limits to how it will conduct operations in order to maintain the support of 

all or part of its population. Though a long definition, it encompasses the 

ideas laid out by insurgent and counterinsurgent theorists and details what 

each is are attempting to accomplish through organized violence.

With the definition of insurgency established, the paper will present 

a second concept, which has relevance for operations across the British 

Empire, of “imperial policing.” Imperial policing was the starting point for 

British doctrine that evolved into counterinsurgency operations. Imperial 

policing was the intervention of British armed forces for the restoration 

of internal peace in British colonies or a country within the British sphere 

of influence. The goal of the intervention was a return to law and order 

through military actions, when other means failed or appeared to fail. The 

imperial policing ideas developed from Colonel Charles Callwell’s work 

Small Wars – Their Principles and Practice, published in 1896.58

The doctrine of imperial policing underwent a number of revisions 

during the 1920s and 1930s. Through these revisions, a number of 
20

bedrock principles arose, which the British Army continued to incorporate 

into doctrine as it transformed from imperial policing to countering 

insurgency.59 The principles of minimum force, subordination to civil 

authorities, firm and timely action are paramount, and the importance of 

military cooperation with police and civil authorities.60
21

Notes

1. Geoffrey Parker, ed., Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12.

2. The trend that develops when examining the body of “Art of War” text, 

which survives from the initial written record through the early Industrial 

Revolution, is how common war is between societies, but the lack of effort put 

into examining the essence of war by military theorists. There is a great deal 

of effort put in to examine war by religious and philosophical thinkers, like St. 

Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine of Hippo, but there is little written by military 

practitioners during this period. It is difficult to assert if this is due to the nature 

of the text that survived or whether theorist made little effort to define war. The 

nature of feudal kingdoms may have contributed, as the military leaders were 

beholden to a monarch who decided what war was.

3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala 

Publications, Inc., 1988), 41.

4. Sun Tzu, 114.

5. Sun Tzu, 125. The translation by Thomas Cleary appears to take some 

liberties with the original Chinese text, as he uses the term “civil authorities” in 

his translation in both sections. Most likely, the term “emperor” or “ruler” would 

most likely be better terms, as Sun Tzu wrote during the collapse of the Chou 

Dynasty. “Civil authorities” would be a liberal, democratic society term. 

6. Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides (New York: Free Press, 

2008), 43. I also based this concept on discussion and lecture presented in the 

Command and General Staff College’s course A699, History of War Theory, 

taught by Mr. Robert Bowie in October 2011. Unlike later theorists, Thucydides 

is not as clear with his definition and ideas on the essence of war. The whole 

of his The Peloponnesian War traces the transformation of Greek society due 

to the effects of the war upon the various city-states. In Clausewitz’s work On 

War, he presented his paradoxical trinity consisting of blind natural force, the 

play of chance and probability, and the subordination of war as an instrument of 

national policy. The trilogy of Thucydides (fear, honor, and interest), I believe, 

may provide an excellent model for the interactions within the blind natural force 

leg of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trilogy. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and 

ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1984), 89.

7. Clausewitz, On War, 75, 84. Clausewitz’s masterful work provides the 

most concise definition for war. Throughout his work, he ensures that violence and 

the application of this violence in a controlled manner is at the heart of warfare.

8. Clausewitz, 75-77. “The thesis, then, must be repeated war is an act of 

force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, 

therefore compels its opponent to follow suit: a reciprocal action is started which 

must lead in theory, to extremes.” Clausewitz, 77. 

9. The term “insurgency” will be used to cover the terms revolutionary 

warfare, counter-revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare. At times in this 

section, I will address these terms to provide the broader definition to insurgency.
22

10. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 282. Part 

V of this work should be mandatory reading for all field-grade and flag officers 

preparing for combat operations, as Kitson provides an excellent framework for 

how to successful conduct counterinsurgency operations or post-major combat 

operations activities to stabilize a civilian population. 

11. Two aspects of this idea are worth expanding. The first is the conscious 

decision by an insurgent to use violence to force a change. This is in response to 

some counterinsurgency theorists who imply many insurgents are unconsciously 

fighting due to the presence of “foreigners” on their soil. This idea is an underlying 

assumption through David Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerrilla (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2009). The second is the insurgent’s position of weakness. If 

the insurgent force was at a level of parity with the government, a long-term 

insurgency is unnecessary and a coup d’état would be sufficient for forcing a 

change within the government. 

12. Examples of this include Great Britain not invading mainland France 

during the American Revolution (1776-1783) to prevent French support to the 

colonist; the United States Government not conducting full-scale, protracted, land 

invasions into Laos or Cambodia during the Vietnam Conflict (1963-1975); the 

United States electing not to invade Iran for their support to Shi’a Iraqi insurgents 

during the Iraqi War (2003-2011).

13. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Makers of 

Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1986), 822.

14. The development of the rolling printing press in the 1840s allowed for a 

much higher production of handbills and pamphlets to communicate messages. 

An example is the rotary printing press developed by Richard M. Hoe and 

patented in 1847. United States Patent and Trademark Office, patent number 

5,199, http://patft.uspto.gov/

netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FP

TO% 2Fsearchdv.htm&r=1&p=1&f=G&l=50&d=PALL&S1=(18470724.

PD.+AND+00051 99.PN.)&OS=isd/7/24/1847+and+PN/5199&RS=(ISD/18470

724+AND+PN/5199) (accessed 24 October 2011).

15. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel 

Moore (New York: Washington Square Press, 1964), 116. 

16. Shy and Collier, 827-828.

17. Robert Service, Comrades! A History of World Communism (Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 60-62.

18. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Urbanna: 

University of Illinois Press, 2000), 41-44; Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military 

Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 92-94. In 

Mao’s writings, there appears to be a definite shift in tone following the Long 

March in 1935 when he tends to highlight differences with the Soviet experience 

in their struggle for control compared to the Chinese experience against the 

Nationalist Chinese and Japanese. 

19. Most of the other communist writers would base their ideas from Mao’s 

work. Che Guerra’s work Guerrilla Warfare attempted to provide a Latin model 
23

for communist insurgency, which de-emphasized the Maoist principle of building 

a strong political base first. Che Guerra believed that rapid, violent action would 

inspire the revolutionaries to action, so a slowly developed political cadre was 

unneeded. Ernesto “Che” Guerra, Guerrilla Warfare (USA: BN Publishing, 

2007), 7-9. 

20. In a 1936 essay entitled “On Protracted War,” Mao refers to this first state 

as “Mobile Warfare.” He highlights within the essay that the primary requirement 

of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. 

Since the insurgency is weak in this first stage, self-preservation was the dominate 

objective hence his term “mobile warfare.” Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War,” 

in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Mae Tse-Tung (Peking: 

Foreign Language Press, 1967), 244-246.

21. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 20-22, 95.

22. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 53.

23. Mao, “On Protracted War,” 246.

24. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 98.

25. In the essay “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” written in December 

1936, Mao states, “The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle 

of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield.” Mao Tse-Tung, 

Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, 136.

26. Other revolutionaries had various levels of success with Maoist principles. 

General Giap found much success with parts of Mao’s ideas though the decision 

to launch the Tet Offensive in 1968 hurt the North Vietnamese War effort andrew 

Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1986), 239. Che Guevara also had mixed success with victory in Cuba, but 

suffered defeat, and his death, in Bolivia. One of the major flaws in Che Guevara’s 

ideas was second lesson espoused in Guerrilla Warfare, “It is not necessary to 

wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create 

them.” Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 7. Che’s movement, called 

focoism, believed that violent insurgency could create the conditions for success, 

so growing a strong political base beforehand was unnecessary. Additional study 

may need to be done on the focoist approach in light of the events of the Arab 

Spring of 2011, as there little underlying political framework before the protests 

began in February 2011. I drew the term foco from the essay by John Shy and 

Thomas W. Collier “Revolutionary Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 850.

27. Examples of this type of insurgency include the French-Indochina 

war (1954-1958), the French Algeria Conflict (1954-1962), the British-Aden 

Emergency (1963-1967), the British-Palestinian Conflict (1945-1948), and 

numerous other violent confrontations between colonies and the western powers.

28. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (St. Peterburg, 

FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 50-52.

29. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and 

Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1991), 15.
24

30. Due to many of these theorists use of “communist” in their titles, some 

contemporary leaders have dismissed these earlier theories following the collapse 

of the Soviet Union in 1989. The important thing to bear in mind is the communist 

movement was just an ideological base for a movement targeting underlying 

grievances in a community of people. The approach to counter this ideological 

movement is similar whether the base is communists, fundamentalist jihadist, 

republicanism (not the political party), or unionist. The idea is to target the idea 

and grievance the insurgent is using to gain support.

31. Roger Trinquier served in the French colonial army for most of his career. 

He saw service in the Far East during World War II, including as a Japanese 

Prisoner of War, served in Indochina, and in Algeria. During service in Algeria, 

Trinquier participated in the Battle of Algiers, and commanded the 3rd Colonial 

Airborne Regiment. As part of Trinquier’s discussion on the use of torture, he 

believed the counterinsurgent must acknowledge an insurgent is using terrorist 

activity against the civilian population. This requires the counterinsurgent treat 

insurgents differently than criminals or uniformed combatants. Trinquier believed 

that the counterinsurgent direct all means in having the insurgent divulge his 

organization’s structure. Once the insurgent provided the data, all other questioning 

was to stop as well as any physical coercion. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A 

French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 

2006), xiv-xvii, 18-20.

32. Trinquier, 5.

33. Trinquier, 7.

34. One of the major problems within the guerre revolutionaire theory is 

the classification of everyone as either “with us” or “against us.” The concepts 

do not allow the practitioner to view the population as neutral or uncommitted. 

This harsh view could provide a counterinsurgent justification to inflict atrocities 

on the population by believing if a group was uncommitted then they were 

supporting the insurgency. Military officers should examine the concepts of 

guerre revolutionaire to serve as an object lesson on the dangers of a total war 

view within a counterinsurgency framework. These concepts assisted in creating 

an environment that led to violence against the civilian population that hurt French 

efforts in Algeria. In addition, these concepts blinded many French officers to the 

effects their own actions had in turning Algerian support away from the French 

cause.

35. In 1848, the Second Republic of France declared Algeria an integrated 

part of France. This meant that Algeria was no different from any of the provinces 

inside the territorial boundary of France. Similar to the southern States during the 

American Civil War, France believed it had a complete right to use any means 

to stop the insurrection. This distinction also made Algeria different from other 

French North African colonies (Tunisia and Morocco), to whom France gave 

independence prior to the Algerian Insurgency. Alistair Horne, “The French Army 

and the Algerian War 1954-62,” in Regular Armies and Insurgency, ed. Ronald 

Haycock (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 70. Information on guerre revolutionaire:

Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The 

Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 
25

29-30; Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French 

Colonial Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1986), 376-378.

36. David Galula had experience fighting in Europe during World War II 

and served in China as a military attaché during Mao Tse-Tung’s defeat of Kiang 

Chi-Shek in 1948. He also served in Greece during their communist-sponsored 

insurgency. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 2005), V-VI. Though only a captain during 

his time in Algeria, Galula did have a collection of experiences with communistinspired movements in other theaters of war. Trinquier’s experience was much 

narrower, only participating in French anti-communist efforts in Indochina and 

Algeria, so that may explain some of the differences in their perspectives. In 

addition, Trinquier had direct experience in the “Battle for Algiers” in the capital 

city, while Galula’s experience was mainly in the rugged, densely populated 

mountain regions of Kabylia.

37. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 3.

38. Galula, 3.

39. Galula, 6-7.

40. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: 

Hailer Publishing, 2005), 21-23.

41. Thompson, 24.

42. Thompson, 25. These views of Thompson were idealistic and did not 

consider that some insurgent groups would use indiscriminate terrorism to cow 

a population into submission. There were times that indiscriminate terrorism 

backfired on the insurgent and pushed the population more into supporting the 

government, such as in Iraq in 2006. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, 

“The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” Prism 2, no. 1 (December 

2010): 1-16.

43. Thompson, 30.

44. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and 

Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1991), 3.

45. Kitson., 3.

46. Kitson., 4. Kitson stated that insurgents will most likely use influence and 

persuasion upon populations whose support the insurgents require or want, and use 

violence as a back up. This dovetails into his second characteristic that belligerents 

use force to reinforce persuasion, while in conventional combat belligerents use 

persuasion to support the use of force. From this view the relationship between 

force and persuasion are inverted in a counterinsurgency compared to conventional 

combat. These definitions also match the definitions of subversion and insurgency 

published in the British Army Manual Land Operations, Volume III–CounterRevolutionary Principles, Part I – General Principles in August 1977.

47. Kitson, Bunch of Five, 282.

48. John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (St. Petersburg, 

FL: Hailer Publishing, 1966), 27-30.
26

49. Since McCuen’s work was published a year after the decision by the 

United States to escalate the War in South Vietnam, he may have felt that since the 

country was now in a counterinsurgency a definition was unnecessary. McCuen 

instead spent his efforts detailing what the enemy’s actions would most likely be 

and how to counter those actions. 

50. Following the post-Vietnam reforms of the US Army, the conventional 

force spent most of its training time and doctrinal focus on fighting against a 

Soviet-style armored force, most likely in the Fulda Gap in Germany. Special 

Force doctrine did focus on counterinsurgency, but mainly on Foreign Internal 

Defense. James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1995), 151-155. 

51. General Sir Rupert Smith. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 

Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 170.

52. Smith, 19.

53. Examples of smaller wars include imperial policing operations in the 

North-West Frontier, which the author discusses in Chapter Four. General Smith 

appeared to look only at when western powers fought each other, and discounted 

when western powers fought colonial engagements. The examples studied in detail 

by General Smith in his work are the Napoleonic War, the American Civil War, the 

Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, 

the Vietnam War, the Israel-Arab Wars, Desert Storm, and the NATO operations in 

Bosnia and Kosovo. General Smith does have one chapter examining the concept 

of insurgency, which briefly highlights the Malayan Emergency, Northern Ireland, 

and Algeria. General Smith makes no mention of the smaller wars fought by the 

British Empire in the North-West Frontier, Aden, Zululand, or Oman.

54. The military operation conducted by NATO in 2011 to assist in the 

toppling of the Qaddafi-Regime in Libya is an example of this. This military action 

commenced while Libyan forces were moving between the population centers 

towards Benghazi, while the Libyan conventional force was easily identifiable by 

NATO warplanes. The Office of Press Secretary, White House, “Remarks by the 

President in Address to the Nation on Libya,” presented on 28 March 2011, http://

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-addressnation-libya (accessed 20 November 2011).

55. John MacKinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2009), 4-5.

56. MacKinlay, 101.

57. A paper, which provides an excellent counterpoint to Dr. Mackinlay 

is Mark O’Neill,’s Confronting the Hydra (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 

2009). During the Philippine Insurrection from 1899-1902, the insurgents, led 

by Emilio Aguinaldo, actively used American press to build American public 

opinion opposition to US efforts in the Philippines. Though more extensive and 

faster in speed of communication, the use of international media to influence the 

counterinsurgent’s home opinion is not a new phenomenon after 11 September 

2011. Anthony James Joe, “Counterinsurgent in the Philippines, 1898-1954,” in 

Counterinsurgent in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian 

(Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 46.
27

58. The War Office, War Office Code Number 8439, Imperial Policing and 

Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (London: The War Office, June 1949), 4-5; Charles 

E. Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles and Practise (London: Harrisons and 

Sons, St. Martens Lane, 1903); Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, Imperial 

Policing (1934; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004).

59. The British Countering Insurgency manual produced in 2010 outlines 

the evolution of British counterinsurgency doctrine very well. The term 

counterinsurgency did not become the title of the manual until 1995, as the term 

went from imperial policing, to counter-revolutionary operations, until the British 

lexicon adopted counterinsurgency. Ministry of Defense, Army Code 71876, 

Army Field Manual, Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defense, 

January 2010), 1-1–1-4.

60. The principle of minimum force arose from the Amritsar Massacre, when 

Indian Army Soldiers fired into a rioting crowd. The Amritsar Massacre occurred 

on 13 April 1919, when British authorities called in British military forces to 

Amritsar, India to assist in restoring order after large-scale, violent rioting 

destabilized the region. The commanding officer, General Dyer, believed he faced 

an insurrection, which differed from other types of instability in that regulations 

allowed for the use of lethal force to restore order. General Dyer’s unit fired upon 

the rioters. This action led to 379 rioters killed and over a thousand wounded. An 

inquest led by Lord William Hunter determined the firing on the crowd without 

warning, and continued firing by troops into the crowd when the crowd dispersed 

as unlawful. Ministry of Defense, Army Code 71876, Army Field Manual, 

Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defense, January 2010), 3-10.

29

Chapter 3

Border Operations and Counterinsurgency

When the time comes, however, for the insurgent to pass from 

guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular 

army, the need for much larger and more varied supplies becomes 

acute. Either he is able to capture it from the counterinsurgency, 

or it must come from the outside. If not, the development of the 

insurgent military establishment is impossible.

— David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice

As noted by the above quotation, the counterinsurgent has an 

opportunity to isolate an insurgency and prevent its spread if the 

counterinsurgent undertakes efforts to disrupt the insurgent supply efforts. 

A critical aspect of this involves border control operations.1

The conditions that most influence border control operations during 

either a counterinsurgency or imperial policing environment are the 

physical terrain of the country, the cultural demographics, the role of 

border operations within the strategic framework, and the allocation of 

security forces to this aspect of the campaign. 2

Borders are important factors for governments, because the border is a 

political demarcation that demonstrates to a population where government 

power stops. It also demonstrates to a population where the benefit of being 

a member of that political entity begins.3 The political boundaries, which 

divide countries, can cut across ethnic, tribal, racial, and economic groups. 

In many border areas, there are no physical markings to demonstrate 

the divide from one area to another. In countries with weak central 

governments, or a belief among the people that there are few benefits of 

being a member of the political body, the population may have much more 

discontent with the political borders.4

The physical terrain within a country will also determine how important 

border control will be to the counterinsurgent. As mentioned in the 

previous section, the insurgent starts the conflict in a weaker position than 

the government. The insurgent must create space between themselves and 

the counterinsurgent in order to build their political and military capability. 

The insurgent can use difficult and inaccessible terrain within the country 

to create this space, but if that option is not available, the insurgent will 

turn to areas outside the government’s control to build capacity. Galula 

succinctly states, “The border areas are a permanent source of weakness 
30

for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this 

advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial 

violent stages of the insurgency.”5

If an insurgent group operates within a large country with varied 

terrain, they have the potential to create safe havens in border areas on 

either side of the demarcation line. Mao referred to these areas as base areas 

and defined them as “the strategic bases on which the guerrilla force rely 

in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving 

and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy.”6

Mao put less emphasis on the cross-border nature of these base areas. This 

lack of emphasis most likely stems from the vast territory within China 

that allowed the Maoist movement to establish secure areas away from 

government interference.7

Mao did list three conditions for establishing base areas, which 

included the requirement for a military force to hold the base area, the 

coordination between the military arm and the people to defeat the enemy 

in that area, and arousing the masses to the cause. Once the guerrilla set 

these conditions, they would have a secure base area to conduct operations.8

If the insurgency is occurring in a country that is already geographically 

isolated, the insurgent will have more difficulty creating these safe areas. 

During the 1962 RAND Symposium on Counterinsurgency, the consensus 

of the participants that conducting a counterinsurgency campaign on an 

island nation would be the most preferred, due to the ease of isolating 

the insurgency from outside support.9 The most difficult terrain for the 

counterinsurgency would be a country surrounded by heavily mountainous 

terrain, which would make establishing a physical barrier most difficult 

and potentially cost prohibitive.10

Though the RAND Symposium concluded a counterinsurgent had an 

advantage over the insurgent if the insurgency depended on water routes 

for access to their safe havens, this advantage is still dependant on the 

counterinsurgent’s ability to disrupt the movements across the water. The 

French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars from 1796 through 1815 provide 

examples of successful use by the British and Spanish forces of a seabased sanctuary to maintain an insurgency.

The insurrection, waged by the Spanish against French rule in Spain 

during the Napoleonic War, began in 1808. The Spanish received extensive 

support from the British Empire, and this part of the conflict historians 

refer to as the Peninsular War. The British and Spanish waged a combined 

campaign employing both conventional forces and guerrillas to defeat 
31

Napoleon’s forces in Spain.11

The type of conflict waged by the British and Spanish against 

Napoleon was possible due to the earlier defeat of the French fleet at the 

Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. After 1805, the Royal Navy had freedom of 

movement along the sea lines of communication. This allowed the Royal 

Navy to provide external support to resupply both the British Army and 

the Spanish guerrillas. With the French naval forces blockaded into its 

ports, the French were unable to interdict the Royal Navy’s support to 

these ground forces.12

An example of a successful disruption of an insurgent’s access to 

a safe haven through naval force, the American experience during the 

Philippines Insurrection provides some lessons. At the end of the 19thCentury, the United States was involved in an active counterinsurgency 

campaign in the Philippines. A major operation for the United States’ 

counterinsurgency efforts was the US Navy’s establishment of an effective 

blockade around the island territory. This blockade effectively contained 

each insurgent group to its own island and prevented external sanctuary 

for the insurgents. The blockade also cut off the insurgent’s system for pay 

and resupply. Although this blockade did create hardship for the civilian 

population with food shortages, it did allow for the rapid occupation of 

Zamboanga in 1899.13

The border length between adjacent countries also influences how 

the counterinsurgent can affect insurgent movements into the country. 

A small border length, as found during the Malayan Emergency and 

in Oman, favors the counterinsurgent efforts to disrupt insurgents. A 

long border with difficult terrain, as found during the US operations in 

South Vietnam from 1965-1972, can greatly aid the insurgency with 

evading the counterinsurgent forces. The supply lines used by the North 

Vietnamese, called the “Ho Chi Minh Trail,” used the dense jungles of 

Laos and Cambodia to enter the Republic of South Vietnam south of the 

Demilitarized Zone, which divided the two Vietnams. The Ho Chi Minh 

Trail consisted of a series of trails, roads, and paths cut through the dense 

jungle vegetation, which even provided some protection for the North 

Vietnamese Army from aerial bombing and observation.14

In addition to the physical terrain, the cultural demographics within the 

border region can also influence efforts the counterinsurgent undertakes. If 

the local population at the border shares characteristics with the insurgents, 

such as tribal affiliation, ethnicity, or mutual dislike of the government, 

then the population may work to assist the insurgency. However, if the 
32

population does not share cultural similarities with the insurgents, the 

insurgents may have difficulty finding support in that population.15

The loyalties of the population within a specific demographic may be 

difficult to ascertain initially, and can change quickly based on the actions 

of the counterinsurgent force. An example of this was the initial reactions 

of the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland to the arrival of British 

forces in 1969. When the British military first entered into Northern 

Ireland, the Catholic and Protestant communities greeted them with a 

degree of relief in hopes the Army would restore order after civil control 

had collapsed following major rioting in Belfast. Unfortunately, for the 

British Army, this good will by the Catholic community changed through a 

series of missteps that led many Catholics to believe that the British Army 

was biased in favor of the Protestant Communities.16

The role of the cultural demographics is critical within tribal societies 

through Central Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Sahara Africa. These 

tribal identities are a major part of the culture’s worldview. The levels 

of success western powers had when interacting with these tribal groups 

depended on how well they recognized how the tribal organization 

functioned. The cultural demographics of Iraq would also prove important 

for when the United States and Coalition partners entered Iraq in 2003 to 

topple the Ba’athist Party led by Saddam Hussein. The Coalition found 

itself attempting to maintain order between three warring factions, the 

Iraqi Sunnis, Iraqi Shi’as, and Kurds, all attempting to gain economic, 

political, and military control of the country in the anarchy that followed 

the collapse of the Saddam Regime.17

The third major consideration in counterinsurgency planning is the 

role border operations have within the strategic framework. By taking 

the physical terrain and cultural demographics into consideration, the 

counterinsurgent can develop an inclusive strategy that incorporates the use 

of border areas to isolate the insurgency from outside support. Techniques 

for denying this support can include building defensive positions to 

control movements around the border, raising local security forces loyal 

to the government to disrupt insurgent movements, or conducting crossborder operations to destroy insurgent stockpiles. The counterinsurgent 

must ensure that the method they employ supports their strategic plan, and 

complements other operations to defeat the insurgency in their country.

As the counterinsurgent builds their strategic framework, a number 

of factors can drive their decisions for border operations. They must 

consider how the insurgent is using the border regions, what cost the 
33

counterinsurgent is willing to expend to disrupt insurgent operations at 

the border, and the amount of potential international condemnation the 

counterinsurgent is willing to accept to support these operations.

The “classical” counterinsurgency theorists are very divergent in how 

they address the operational plan for border operations. John McCuen 

highlighted that the counterinsurgent must make all efforts to isolate the 

revolutionary force while simultaneously building international support 

for the counterinsurgent.18 David Galula focused on the role that external 

support had in sustaining the insurgent cause through moral, material, and 

training support.19 Another view presented by Roger Trinquier focused 

on what the counterinsurgent had to undertake to avoid defeat. Trinquier 

believed if an insurgent sanctuary was across an international boundary, 

the counterinsurgent still had to destroy the safe haven–despite any 

international condemnation or expansion of the conflict. Trinquier stated, 

“The destruction or neutralization of enemy bases on foreign territory is 

essential if we are to hasten the end of hostilities and ensure a durable 

peace.”20

Trinquier elaborated by pointing out that crossing a recognized 

international boundary with a conventional armed force would be a 

cause for war. However, allowing an armed insurgent group to cross into 

a neighboring country is not automatically a cause for war. Trinquier 

believed these definitions needed to change because modern warfare had 

changed as well.21 The French defeats in Indochina and Algeria heavily 

influenced Trinquier’s view, which resulted in a harsher view of how to 

engage insurgents within another country’s boundary. 

Also during the French counterinsurgency operations in Algeria, their 

strategy dictated a major effort to sever the insurgent access to safe havens 

in Libya and Tunisia. Massive expenditure went into the implementation of 

the Morice Line by the French. The French constructed this barrier to divide 

Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco, and it required a major engineering 

effort and dedication of forces to emplace. The Morice Line was a series of 

obstacles consisting of barbed wire, electrified fencing, explosive mines, 

focused intelligence collection, and extensive patrolling by the military.22

The Morice Line cut off the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the 

Algerian insurgent movement, from foreign sanctuaries, as much as 

any physical barrier could and it did severely restrict their movement to 

external safe havens. In addition to the physical barrier, the French also 

committed a large amount of their forces, over 80,000 Soldiers, to patrol 

the barrier and interdict FLN insurgents moving across the border. This 
34

combination of barriers and security forces had a major deterrent effect 

upon the FLN, though the FLN did expend considerable resources to 

discover weaknesses in the Morice Line for exploitation.23

The construction of the Morice Line played a significant role within 

the French strategy for ending the insurgency, and though the FLN was 

effectively cut off from outside support, the Morice Line did not address 

the grievances of the population. It also did not solve the perceived 

brutality of French operations against the Algerians, or relieve the level 

of international condemnation leveled by the world against the French for 

their operations. Ultimately, the French government, under the leadership 

of Charles de Gaulle, ended the conflict by granting Algerian independence 

in 1962.24

Similar to the French in Algeria, the Rhodesian counterinsurgency 

efforts during the Second Chimurenga, which occurred from 1962 

through 1980, also demonstrated a major disconnect between its strategic 

goals and how the Rhodesians conducted operations.25 During the later 

phase of the insurgency, the Rhodesian government approved the use of 

the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Rhodesian Special Air Services, Selous 

Scouts, and Rhodesian African Rifles to cross the borders with Zambia 

and Mozambique to conduct operations against the insurgent’s safe 

havens. The Rhodesian military had very good success with the individual 

operations, at times killing thousands of insurgents per engagement. 

However, the military command did not nest these operations with the 

overall campaign plan, and by the end of 1977, the military was no closer 

to achieving its end state.26 It was not until 1978, late in the insurgency, 

when the Commander of Operations, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, 

published a strategy. This strategy included the cross-border operations as 

the fourth major operational task, but the Rhodesian military dedicated the 

majority of its efforts to these operations through the end of the war.27 Due 

to the effects of international sanctions, and then British Prime Minister 

Margret Thatcher rejecting the Rhodesian power sharing agreement, the 

Rhodesian government lost the insurgency and collapsed.28

The Rhodesians dedicated major efforts to the cross-border operations 

following the massive success of Operation DINGO. The costs of these 

operations increased as the effects of international sanctions strangled 

their military supplies and access to critical repair parts for their aircraft 

required for the airborne insertions across the borders. Unfortunately, these 

cross-border operations did not address the problems that drove many in 

the population to support the insurgency, especially the racial disparity 

within the country.
35

Another consideration when counterinsurgency planners ponder 

border operations, especially cross-border operations into other 

sovereign countries, are the effect those operations will have upon the 

counterinsurgent’s population. This is a critical consideration if the 

counterinsurgent force is an interventionist force operating in another 

country. An example of this was the decision by the United States to attack 

into Cambodia with US and South Vietnamese forces in order to destroy 

North Vietnamese Army cache sites along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

Militarily this operation was a huge success with a large number of 

caches discovered and destroyed. In terms of support for the American 

war effort, this operation was a massive failure. Protest occurred in many 

of the major colleges and universities in the Unites States, including at 

Kent State University in Ohio, where National Guardsmen fired on 

a crowd of demonstrators killing four students. Additionally, the US 

Congress rescinded the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which provided 

the American President authorization of military action in South Vietnam. 

All of these consequences would lead to a hastening of the American 

withdrawal from South Vietnam and a reduction in military aid to the 

embattled country.29

Two examples of long term strategic policies for border control include 

the Roman Empire of the post-Republic Period and the British Empire of 

the late 19th-century through mid-20th-century. Both empires provided 

a level of bureaucratic support to the population under their control. 

This support required both the empires to know where their influence 

extended and for the population to know if they were living within the 

area of the empire’s control. Both empires also struggled strategically with 

determining what they wished to accomplish in their border regions.

It was during the period of the Emperor Hadrian (117 – 138 AD) in 

which Rome undertook a process to demarcate the boundary of Rome to 

distinguish what was Roman and what was not. This demarcation was part 

the Emperor Hadrian’s decision to establish firm boundaries to control 

against outside invasion. The Romans built a series of walls across the 

Empire to mark the extent of Roman control. The most famous of these 

structures was Hadrian’s Wall, parts of which still survive at the boundary 

between England and Scotland.30

Rome also conducted a number of negotiations with the Germanic 

tribes to bring stability to the border regions. Rome used a mixture of 

punitive actions, economic incentives, trading status, and civil projects 

to build this stability.31 By building a series of border forts, the Romans 
36

created a system of mutual support for their diplomatic and military 

actions. These border forts allowed for the garrisoning of troops near 

trouble areas in which the military governors could rely on to enforce 

any required punitive action. Additionally, through the negotiations the 

Romans convinced the local tribes to provide levies and irregular, local 

security forces to the Roman Army. This assisted the Roman Army by 

providing a source of local recruits, and convinced many of the tribes to 

support the Roman system. The two formations raised of local security 

forces were the auxilia and the numeria.

32

As the Roman Empire in the west began to contract in the 3rd-century 

AD, the auxilia and numeria became even more important for the defense 

of Roman borders. These organizations provided a high degree of mobility 

and rapid employment capability that the legions did not. This use of 

locally raised security forces also proved a cost saving method to provide 

a significant security presence across the Roman Empire.33 The Roman 

Empire did provide a model for later empires for how to use local security 

forces within the context of the larger strategic goals in a region.

Similarly, the British Empire in the 19th-Century developed a 

border strategy on the fringes of their empire. The border zone between 

Afghanistan and the Indian Empire would prove especially difficult. It 

would not be until the 1890s, with the establishment of the Durand Line, 

that the British and Afghan governments achieve agreement as to the 

demarcation between the two countries. The next chapter on the Northwest 

Frontier Province will examine these issues in detail and the role of the 

border in imperial policing activities.

The fourth major factor in border control operations is the allocation of 

security forces for the mission. The counterinsurgent force must consider 

what type of force to allocation, whether they are police, irregular forces, 

paramilitary forces, conventional military, or special forces. Another 

consideration is the type of mission the security forces should have at the 

border. Missions could range from operating static, border checkpoints, 

conducting mobile patrolling, or launching cross-border interdiction 

missions. The counterinsurgent must nest these considerations with the 

strategic goals for the border.

A subset of this factor is also the decision as to the type of local 

security forces the counterinsurgent force should raise in the area, or even 

if local security forces should be raised. The cultural demographics for 

the region should heavily influence this decision as to the need for local 

security forces, and if needed, the recommended composition.
37

An example of the role played by the composition of security forces 

occurs during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960. The major grievance 

driving the Chinese insurgency was the lack of Chinese representation in 

the Malayan government. During World War II, the Japanese occupiers 

of Malaya had singled out the Chinese population for harsh treatment. 

In addition, the Chinese had fought actively in the organized resistance 

movements against the Japanese occupation, which many of the Malayans 

had not done. Following the defeat of Imperial Japan in 1945, the Chinese 

population in Malaya expected to receive a representative share of political 

and economic power in the country, especially since they had fought 

against the occupiers. Though the Chinese insurgents had communist 

backing, the central grievance was about equal representation in the 

country’s governance, not an economic ideology.34

As the insurgency in Malaya spread in 1948-1949, the British 

working through the Malayan government worked to develop Chinese 

representation in the police. The British also induced the Malayans to 

create position for Chinese Affairs Officers, and Chinese Home Guard 

provided security for the resettlement “New Villages.” All these efforts, 

plus negotiated settlements for government representation based on the 

proportion of Chinese, Malayan, and Indian members of the population, 

addressed the central grievance of the Chinese insurgents. The British and 

Malayan forces raised the right local security forces for the conflict, not 

just any local security forces.35

The Malayan Emergency demonstrated how best to raise a security 

force that undercut a central grievance exploited by an insurgency. Efforts 

by the United States and its coalitions to raise security forces in Iraq 

have had an opposite effect. Initially, United States, operating in most 

of the Iraqi urban centers, did not focus on raising security forces that 

the population would perceive as working in their interest. Shi’a and 

Kurds joined the fledging Iraqi Army, Iraqi National Police, and Iraqi 

local police forces in large numbers, including a large number of Shi’a 

and Kurdish militia members. With the Sunnis refusing to join or fight 

their own tribesmen, the Iraqi security forces, especially the police, gained 

a reputation for sectarianism. Following the Al Qaeda bombing of the 

Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the major Shi’a holy sites in Iraq, a 

sectarian civil war commenced in which the security forces were see as 

playing an active role in conducting murders of rival sects. It was only 

through the combination of the decision by President Bush to authorize 

additional forces, the changes in leadership for the senior commander in 
38

Iraq and at the United States Central Command, and the development of 

the Sons of Iraq Program, that allowed for a retraining and recruitment of 

a more professional Iraqi Security Force.36

As well as considering whether to raise local security forces due to 

cultural considerations, another aspect for determining the best type of 

force is also the level of violence expected. The type of force employed 

must have the capability to protect itself and the population in the area 

from insurgent attack. A feature in many of the insurgencies of the 20thcentury is the specific targeting of police and constabulary organizations 

by the insurgents in the early phases of the insurgency to remove the 

government’s internal intelligence gathering capability.

During the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921, the Irish Republican Army 

(IRA) specifically targeted the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). This 

effectively removed the first line intelligence organization to identify 

members of both the political and military arms of the insurgency in a 

community. This led the British government to hire a large number of 

non-Irish personnel to fill the vacant positions in the RIC. A large 

number of the new recruits were recent veterans of World War I, and 

they received little training on police or paramilitary skills. The arrival 

of these British ex-Soldiers, wearing a combination of police and military 

uniforms, nicknamed the “Black and Tans” by the local Irish, increased the 

population’s perceptions that Britain was sending an army of occupation. 

This inflamed Irish sentiment and increased the rebellion, leading to a 

British withdrawal from Ireland and establishment of Home Rule in 1921.37

There are no quick answers for how a counterinsurgent force should 

address border control within their campaign. Careful study of the physical 

terrain, cultural demographics, and allocation of security forces all within 

a strategic framework must drive the campaign decisions regarding border 

control. The following two case studies examine in detail efforts by western 

forces to control their border areas during counterinsurgency and imperial 

policing operations. Both campaigns provide examples of successes and 

failures for how to best control border regions.
39

Notes

1. The term counterinsurgency from this point forth includes 

counterinsurgency, counter-revolutionary warfare, imperial policing, and keeping 

the peace operations.

2. I include a brief examination of Roman efforts to control the empire’s 

borders in response to recent publishing by some theorists that refer to a “Roman 

Way” to conduct counterinsurgency. This “Roman Way” seems based on a false 

view of how the Roman Empire managed its border. An example of this view 

is Michael Cohen’s “Tossing the Afghan COIN,” The Nation (3 January 2011), 

www.thenation.com/article/ 157154/tossing-afghan-COIN (accessed 20 October 

2011). Although Colonel Gian Gentile does not use the term “Roman Way” of 

counterinsurgency, many identify his arguments against the “population-centric” 

COIN debate with the “Roman Way”.

3. Both these distinctions are important when examining the Roman Empire 

of the post-Republic Period and the British Empire in the late 19th-century. 

Both empires needed to demarcate their boundaries so the population knew, 

respectively, where Roman and British power stopped, and also where the benefits 

of the empires extended. 

4. A number of examples of population discontent with political borders 

appear to within Central Asia and the Middle East following the Versailles Treaty 

of 1919. With the demarcations of the areas that had been part of the Ottoman 

Empire in the Middle East, the British and French governments separated a number 

of tribally and culturally similar groups. This would have some repercussions 

in later counterinsurgency operations, especially in Iraqi from 2003 to 2011, as 

insurgents received support from cross-border tribal groups. Halim Barakat, The 

Arab World: Society, Culture, and State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1993), 251-256; Richard Engel, War Journal: My Five Years in Iraq (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2008), 79-82.

5. Galula, 35.

6. Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War,” Selected Military 

Writing of Mao Tse-Tung, ed. Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 

1967), 167.

7. Tse-Tung, 173. Mao specifically states, “By and large, the vastness of 

China’s territory and the enemy’s shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in 

China with this condition.”

8. Tse-Tung, 172.

9. For more information on the 1962 RAND Corporation Symposium on 

Counterinsurgency, see Chapter 1.

10. Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, ed., Counterinsurgency, A 

Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963), 

41-45.

11. There are a number of sources for the Peninsular War. One of the best 

histories is the Spanish Ulcer by David Gates. There is also Charles Esdaile’s 

Peninsular Eyewitnesses: The Experience of War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-

1813, Owen Connelly’s Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms and Blundering to Glory: 

Napoleon’s Military Campaigns.
40

12. Roy Adkins, Nelson’s Trafalgar (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 328-

335. Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington who commanded the British Army 

during the Peninsular Campaign, stated, “If anyone wishes to know the history 

of this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority which gives me the 

power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so.” Adkin, 335.

13. Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, 

KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 131. The town of Zamboanga is on 

the southwestern tip of the Philippine Island of Mindanao. The blockade was 

unpopular with some in the US Navy due to its questionable legal status and 

the level of hardship imposed on the Filipino population. The blockade did 

also interdict a large amount of legal trade, which General Otis, the American 

Commander during this period, believed might negatively affect reestablishing 

order. 

14. James H. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South 

Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 70-72. 

Efforts by the US Military to disrupt movement along the Ho Chi Mihn Trail will 

be examined in greater detail further in the chapter.

15. The best example of this is the lack of a cross-border safe haven for the 

Chinese insurgents during the Malayan Emergency, who did not share the same 

ethnicity as the border region population, who were Malayan and Thai. Thompson 

highlights in his work Defeating Communist Insurgency that Malaya only had a 

150-mile border with another country, Thailand. Since the Malayan Emergency 

pitted the Malayan Government, with British support, against an ethnically 

Chinese insurgency, the border with Thailand was relatively inconsequential. This 

was also one of the reasons the Chinese used the jungles for their safe havens. 

This would greatly assist Malayan and British efforts to control this insurgency. 

Thompson, 19.

16. Rod Thornton, “Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the 

Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 

to March 1972),” The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 

82-83. The missteps included using the Protestant names for Londonderry, the 

initial force package into Belfast was the wrong troops (mainly consisted of the 

Scots Guards Regiment, who as Presbyterians, appeared to naturally side with 

the Protestants), and during initial demonstrations tended to face the Catholic 

crowds with their bayoneted rifles. This all led to a perception within the Catholic 

community that the British Army was not there to provide assistance, but to 

subjugate the Catholics. Additional information can also be found in David 

McKittrick’s Making Sense of the Troubles and Kevin Toolis’s Rebel Hearts.

17. Dr. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 287-304.

18. McCuen, 68-60.

19. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 35-41.

20. Trinquier, 78.

21. Trinquier, 81.
41

22. Alistair Horne, “The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-62,” in 

Regular Armies and Insurgency, ed. Ronald Haycock (London: Croom Helm, 

1979), 80. One can find the description for how the French constructed the Morice 

Line in the 1962 RAND Symposium, 45. David Galula was the counterinsurgency 

practitioner who provided the details during the Symposium.

23. Alistair Horne, Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: 

New York Review Books, 2006), 263-264.

24. Alistair Horne, “The French Army and the Algerian War 1954-1962,” 81-

82; Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945-1962,” in Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 88-99.

25. The Rhodesian Insurgency pitted the white African government of Ian 

Smith against a communist-inspired, anti-colonial insurgency composed of two 

armed groups, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and 

Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZAPRA). The two armed organization 

tended along tribal lines. Robert Mugabe was a member of ZANLA and its 

political wing the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Dr. J. R. T. Wood, 

“Countering the Chimurenga,” in Countering Modern Insurgency, ed. Daniel 

Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2010), 191-208. 

26. One of the first and largest external operations conducted by the 

Rhodesians was Operation DINGO, which occurred from 23-26 November 

1977. The attack involved 165 Rhodesian Special Air Service, Rhodesian Light 

Infantry, Selous Scouts, and Rhodesian African Rifles who conducted an airborne 

assault into an insurgent base camp across the Rhodesian border to Mozambique. 

The insurgent camp strength the Rhodesians estimated between 9,000-10,000 

insurgents. The operation employed Rhodesian ground and air forces over a threeday period. Estimates following the battle indicate the Rhodesians killed over 

5,000 insurgents, over 20 percent of the overall insurgent strength, with very few 

Rhodesian casualties. There was some international condemnation of the attack, 

but that did not dissuade Rhodesia from continuing cross-border operations, 

though none of the future operations had the level of success of Operation 

DINGO, 202-203; J. R. T. Wood, Counter-Strike from the Sky: The Rhodesian 

All-Arms Fireforce in the War in the Bush, 1974-1980 (Johannesburg: 30 Degree 

South Publishers, 2009), 123-206.

27. Wood, Counter-Strike from the Sky, 44-49.

28. Wood, 205-208. There has been a recent increase in books by Rhodesian 

veterans, which provide a more complete picture of the last years of the Rhodesian 

country and the cross-border operations conducted by the Rhodesian military. 

Some of these works are: The Bush War in Rhodesia by Dennis Croukamp, 

The Saint: The Rhodesian Light Infantry by Alexandre Binda and Chris Cocks, 

Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry by Chris Cocks, 

Masodja: The History of the Rhodesian African Rifles and Its Forerunner, the 

Rhodesian Native Regiment by Alexandre Binda.

29. Willbanks, 69-86. The US-South Vietnamese raid into Cambodia captured 

and/or destroyed over 16-million rounds of small-arms ammunition, 2500 crewserved weapons, 68,000 mortar rounds, 435 vehicles, and 14-million pounds 
42

of rice. This had significant impacts upon the North Vietnamese Army’s ability 

to resupply itself in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the long term effects would 

cripple the US-South Vietnamese war efforts as US public opinion, which was 

already waiving for the war, collapsed.

30. Edward N. Luttwak. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, From the 

First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1976), 60. The policy of demarcation, building defensive walls, and not 

venturing forward of the demarcations is very similar to the Close Border Policy 

used by the British Empire in the North-West Frontier during the 19th-century. 

This concept will be examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

31. This is based on a collection of works including: Herodian of Antioch. 

History of the Roman Empire: From the Death of Marcus Aurelius to the Accession 

of Gordian III, trans. Edward C. Echols (Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 1961), 14; Luttwak, 86-108; Arther Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire: 

The Military Explanation (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1986), 10-30.

32. Luttwak, 122-123.

33. Luttwak 168-171.

34. James S. Corum, “Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: 

A Tale of Two Insurgencies,” Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.

strategicstudiesinstitute. Army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=648 (accessed 1 

June 2011).

35. Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” in 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian 

(Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 101-118; Karl Hack, “The Malayan 

Emergency as a Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” The Journal of Strategic Studies

32, no. 3 (June 2009): 383-414. The changes in the Malayan security forces to 

accommodate the Chinese is often overlooked aspect of the Malayan Emergency, 

as many historians tend to focus on the Briggs-vs.-Templer debate or the role of 

forced resettlement had on ending the insurgency. 

36. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 287-306; 

CB20110904M0001_SESSION1A, Interview.

37. Charles Townsend, “In Aid of the Civil Power: Britain, Ireland, and 

Palestine, 1916-1948,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel 

Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2010), 21-29; Hugh 

Jeudwine, “A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-1, and the Part Played by 

the Army in Dealing with it (Intelligence),” in British Intelligence in Ireland: The 

Final Reports, ed. Peter Hart (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), 17-60.
43

Chapter 4

Case Study: The North-West Frontier

The North-West Frontier Province was a region of the British Indian 

Empire, which served as a source of near constant strife and turmoil for 

the British government from the middle of the 19th-century through to the 

Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.1

The region had an amalgamation of tribes, harsh terrain, and limited 

resources that contributed to the sources of conflict between the British 

and local tribes in this region. British interest in the North-West Frontier 

arose following the annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849, which led 

to a desire by the British to secure the borders of this major agricultural 

region.

Throughout the ninety-seven year period of responsibility for the 

North-West Frontier, the British Government attempted to develop a 

coherent strategy for the region, which would reduce the violence and 

create some level of long-term stability in the area. Debates would rage 

in India and in the British Parliament over how much responsibility the 

British had to improve conditions for the tribes in this region, or whether 

to focus on policies of noninterference. Operations by the Indian Army2

 in 

the North-West Frontier Province would bear many of the hallmarks of the 

frontier wars fought by the British Empire, including the use of indigenous 

forces in an attempt to pacify tribal areas, conducting tribal negotiations to 

broker agreements, and punitive expeditions in response to cross-border 

attacks.3

Over time, the British Empire pursued a number of border and tribal 

policies in an attempt to bring lasting stability to this region. Due to the 

various tribal and ethnic groups competing for control of the region, 

British civil administrators and military officers undertook nuanced and 

varied approaches to integrate the tribes into the regional administration 

with varied levels of success. Following the Partition of India and Pakistan 

in 1947, this region fell under the control of Pakistan, and became a source 

of instability for the region following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

in 1979.4

In order to develop a comprehensive picture of policy within the 

North-West Frontier, this case study will examine the terrain and people, 

the border policies, and the raising of indigenous security forces through 

the lens of the three major border policies: the closed, forward, and 

modified forward policies. Up until the Partition of India and Pakistan, the 

military operations conducted by the Indian Army in this region fell under 
44

the British concepts of imperial policing and providing military aid to civil 

authorities. Imperial policing served as the basis for the development of 

British counterinsurgency policies as the concepts developed in the 1960s. 

This is relevant in that many of the considerations taken by the British 

for the region have importance in the modern study of counterinsurgency, 

especially in relation to post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, 

this study of the North-West Frontier provides an examination of different 

policies and actions to secure a restive border, which has application for 

future counterinsurgency operations in tribal and underdeveloped areas.5

Terrain and People

In order to understand the types of policies and operations the British 

Empire embarked on in the North-West Frontier, it is beneficial to examine 

the terrain and people that inhabited this region of the world. The NorthWest Frontier, now called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 

occupied the region of India bounded by the Kingdom of Afghanistan to 

the west, the Baluchistan Province to the southwest, the Indus River to the 

southeast and the Kashmir Province to the Northeast. 

The region abuts the Hindu-Kush Mountains located to the north, 

which contains mountains up to 20,000 feet in height. The mountains then 

gradually decrease in size as one moves south. This produces a patchwork 

of fertile, valleys where populations could subsist. These valleys are 

relatively isolated as only one or two passes bisect the mountains into the 

valleys. This produces a population that is very insular from other groups 

outside of the specific valley one lives, creating a degree of xenophobia 

amongst the valley populations.6

The largest ethnic group within the North-West Frontier was the 

Pathans.7

 The Pathan ethnic group occupied an area from the Indus 

River on the east, to the boundary of the Persian Empire to the west. The 

Sulaiman Mountain Range, which feeds to the Hindu-Kursh Mountains, 

provided the northern line for the Pathan people, and to the south, the 

Pathans abutted with the Baluch culture.8

The Pathans are an amalgamation of groups that passed through the 

region over time. They draw their identity from a belief that they descend 

from one of the lost tribes of Israel, but also had contact with Alexander the 

Great’s forces in the fourth-century BC, as the Greeks passed through on 

the way to the Indus River. The Pathans also had contact with the Mongol 

armies of Genghis Khan, as he conquered the region between the HinduKush Mountains to the Indus River. A characteristic that starts to define 

the Pathan culture is its position between empires, with the Punjab to the 
45

East and the Persian to the west. In addition, the Pathans, and the land 

they occupied, represented the crossroad, which empires passed through 

to reach other empires.9

Figure 2. Map of the North-West Frontier.

Source: J. G. Bartholomew, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir, Imperial Gazetteer 

of India, Volume 19 (Clarendon Press, 1909), http://dsal.uchicago.edu/maps/

gazetteer/images/gazetteer_V19_ pg218.jpg (accessed 6 November 2011). Adapted by 

author.

Another of the defining features of the Pathan people is their shared 

belief in the Pashtunwali code. Pashtunwali is the core of tribal interactions 

and personal conduct for the Pathans. Pashtunwali is a rigidly enforced 

code within the Pathan people, as it serves as a buttress against the strong 
46

individualism of the Pathans.10 There are many tenets a Pathan must follow, 

but the three most important are badal [revenge], melmastia [hospitality], 

and nang [honor]. A fourth component was the use of a jirga [council] to 

mediate disputes and conflicts between tribes. These four components are 

a major source of Pathan identity and conflict-resolution structure.11

Figure 3.Disposition of Pathan People.

Source: Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 534. Adapted 

by author. The dots represent the concentration of Pathans by population density within the 

Pathan belt.

Colonel J. P. Villiers-Stuart, who wrote an influential work on 

operations in the North-West Frontier Province, stated about the Pathan 

character: 

A great many people have tried to describe Afghan and Pathan 

character, and found it difficult because it is a mass of contradictions. 

They are often recklessly brave, and nearly always brave, yet rather easily 

discouraged by failure. Very proud of their race, and of their honor, yet 

often treacherous and faithless.12
47

This dichotomy of character would prove very frustrating for western 

officials as they conducted negotiations and interactions with the Pathan 

tribes. What does emerge when studying the Pathan character is the 

importance of self-interest, which may point to difficulties in reaching a 

negotiated, long-term settlement with Pathan tribes.13

In addition to the Pathans, a second major group that influenced the 

North-West Frontier Province are the Baluchs. They occupied the land 

south of the Pathan people, in which the geography produced a different 

tribal organization and type of people. The land consisted of open desert, 

arid mountains, and small areas of cultivation that follow the drainage. 

Though the Baluch areas extended to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, 

the terrain only made one harbor possible in Karachi.14

One of the key differences between the Baluch people and the Pathans 

is the strong hierarchical structure of the Baluch people. The tribal chiefs 

held the power within Baluch tribes and the members followed his rulings. 

This hierarchical structure most likely stemmed from the harsh conditions 

in which the Baluchs lived, as well as the cultural tradition of trading. In 

addition, the British viewed the Pathans as “fanatical and priest-ridden”, 

while they viewed the Baluchs as “free from religious bigotry.”15

The terrain and people within the North-West Frontier Province had 

significant impacts upon how the British conducted operations in the area 

and worked to develop their border policy. 

The Closed Border Period (1849-1881)

British interest in the North-West Frontier began following the Second 

Sikh War and annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849. This interest 

derived both from a desire to ensure a defensible border for the Punjab 

as well as a way to address the tribal raids that originated in the Pathan 

and Baluch areas into this newly acquired region. The acquisition of the 

Punjab also coincided with the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War, 1838-

1842, which built a desire within the British government for a border that 

did not include the Kingdom of Afghanistan.16

As the British government interacted with the tribes in the NorthWest Frontier, the recruitment of local security forces became a major 

priority for the government. The British government hoped that with the 

creation of locally manned security forces, the tribes would integrate into 

the British system and violence would reduce. Within some parts of the 

North-West Frontier, this would be the case, while in others, especially 

in Pathan dominated regions, the inter-tribal violence and conflicts would 

prove major obstacles to stability.
48

Initially, the British government only wanted influence over the 

mountain regions, and they did not want full control or responsibility for 

the tribes west of the Indus River. In addition, from 1849 until 1893, the 

border between the British Indian Empire and the Kingdom of Afghanistan 

was undefined. This created a nebulous space between Afghanistan, the 

Punjab Region, and the “Independent Tribal Area.”17 The policy the British 

developed to deal with this area called for the raising of local forces to 

serve as a police force at the edges of the frontier, non-engagement with 

the tribes, and the use of punitive expeditions against belligerent tribes. 

This policy was called the “Close Border Policy.”18

The Close Border Policy instituted by the British government regulated 

British interaction with the tribes located north-west of the Indus River. A 

central tenet of this policy was noninterference with tribal governance in 

the tribal zones from the Indus River to the Kingdom of Afghanistan. The 

British government employed a system of punitive expeditions, written 

agreements between tribes, and allowances for good behavior, called 

muwajib, to enforce behavior on the tribes.19

The first action the British commander, Sir Henry Lawrence, undertook 

after the annexation of the Punjab Region in 1849 was to raise local security 

force to provide security for the boundaries of the Punjab. There had been 

a locally hired, mixed tribe organization, known as the Frontier Militia, 

which proved unreliable, and Lawrence raised an organization, called the 

Corps of Guides, in 1846 to assist with policing the Punjab Region.20 With 

the full annexation of the Punjab, Lawrence required a larger, uniformed 

organization to secure the border from outside raiders.

This organization raised in 1849 the British named the Punjab 

Irregular Force, or the PIF. The initial organization consisted of ten 

regiments, evenly split between infantry and cavalry. The PIF had mixed 

race companies, consisting of Punjabi “Musalmans” [Muslims], Sikhs, 

and Pathan Soldiers, and a British Commandant with three British officers 

for each regiment. Organizationally, the PIF fell under direct civil control 

through the Board of Administration of the Punjab. Recruitment of Soldiers 

and leaders focused on both sides of the Punjab boundary, and the British 

formed mixed race companies.21

The PIF’s mission was to secure the border of the Punjab Province 

from tribal raids, provide internal security around the border, and prevent 

safe haven for outlaws in the border areas from between Kohat and 

Mithunkote. In order to accomplish this mission, the PIF had five infantry 

and five cavalry regiments. The PIF leadership organized two infantry 
49

regiments, a cavalry regiment and an artillery battery in each district. A 

series of forts, supported by a road running parallel to the border, allowed 

the PIF to rapid respond to any incursion.22

Figure 4. Location of Initial Punjab Irregular Force Recruitment Sites.

Source: Resource Maps. Adapted by the author.

From 1849 through 1881, the Indian Army conducted over 23 punitive 

expeditions into these tribal areas in retribution for tribal raids. The 

operations earned the nickname “butcher and bolt” expeditions from Indian 

troops, since the Indian Army never sought to occupy the tribal territories 

they marched against. These punitive operations became increasingly 

unpopular, as Indian forces rarely had the necessary intelligence to target 

the specific individuals or tribal groups who conducted the raids into 

the Punjab. This led to the Indian punitive expedition burning villages 

and taking livestock, in order to force the Pathan tribes to fight and as 

retribution for the earlier raids. Following these expeditions, the Indian 

Army would withdraw back into the Punjab having little interactions with 

the Pathan tribes until the next punitive expedition.23
50

Beyond the punitive expeditions, the British would use fines and 

blockades to punish belligerent tribes. However, later writings indicated 

that these two forms of punishment rarely produced any tangible results. 

One problem with these punishments was the requirement for British 

presence to enforce them. Secondly, due to the Pashtunwali tenet of 

nanawatia (hospitality), it was impossible to force a Pathan to deny 

someone sanctuary.24

The British government also attempted to employ non-punitive means 

to control the tribes within the North-West Frontier. Two key methods the 

British used were written agreements between the British government and 

local tribes and the paying of allowances by the British to tribes for good 

behavior. The British relied on intermediaries, called Arbabs, to facilitate 

these negotiations. These Arbabs had questionable motivation and the 

British had difficulty knowing what was actually worked out between the 

tribes and the Arbabs at the British’s behest.25

In the 1860s, the British undertook a reorganization of the local 

defense forces. One change was the creation of the Frontier Militia, who 

the British recruited from the Pathan tribes living on both sides of this 

administrative area. The Frontier Militia, which eventually became known 

as the Frontier Scouts, provided local intelligence and served as scouts for 

the conventional forces. In addition, in 1865, the British renamed the PIF 

to the Punjab Frontier Force, or “Piffers,” as many called them.26

The PIF initially fell under the Board of Administration, the civil 

authority in the Punjab. This gave the Board of Administration the 

ability to respond to tribal raids with a local force and did not have to 

receive permission from the Indian Central Government in Calcutta. This 

civil control of the PIF would exist until 1886, when the British Army 

reorganized all of its irregular forces and place all of them under military 

control.27

Two other organizations operated with the PIF. They were the Sind 

Camel Corps and the Corps of Guides, and within a few years, these two 

organizations became a part of the PIF. The Sind Camel Corps provided 

the PIF with the capability to more large number of Soldiers with logistical 

supplies within an hour’s notice. The Corps of Guides the British intended 

to provide intelligence on the terrain and cultures in the border region, 

as well as provide escorts during reconnaissance operations. The officers 

staffing the Guides also had magisterial powers and could serve in police 

duties if the situation required. The Guides predated the PIF and proved 

a reliable force following the Sikh Wars and the Great Mutiny of 1857.28
51

The PIF and Guide Corps received modern arms from the British 

government, issuing percussion muskets to four of the regiments and 

rifles to the fifth. The regiments had a mixture of uniforms with three 

regiments in traditional, scarlet British uniforms, one regiment in green 

(the First Regiment, who were the Rifles), and one regiment in brown. 

The Guides wore brown uniforms, which would eventual transition into 

khaki uniforms, which would be the dominant uniform for operations in 

the North-West Frontier.29

During punitive expeditions, the organization and capability of the 

PIF and Guides would prove invaluable during the fighting in the hills and 

mountains in the frontier regions. One issue that started to become apparent 

within the Indian Army was the lack of mountain capability within the 

Bengal Army, which the government organized along traditional British 

structures and uniforms. The Eusufzye Field Force expedition in late 1863 

represented this difference in capability, as the largest force assembled 

since the First Anglo-Afghan War took to the field. The expedition ended 

up taking large casualties before it destroyed the village of Malka and 

ended the campaign.30

The Close Border Policy would govern British interactions with the 

Independent Tribal Areas until after the Second Afghan War, 1878-1881.31

Once the British concluded hostilities with the Kingdom of Afghan, British 

officials began to examine their border policies and their effectiveness. 

At this same period, the British administrator in Baluchistan, Colonel Sir 

Robert Sandeman, was having success with a different approach to how he 

interacted with the Baluch tribes.

During the 1870s, the Close Border Policy became increasingly 

unpopular with the British Government and military leaders. This 

unpopularity arose from the cost of prolonged military operations, which 

produced few definitive results, a desire to ensure Tsarist Russia could 

not interfere with British affairs in India, and a belief among some civil 

administrators they would bring the benefits of “civilization” to the frontier 

region. This led to a willingness among British administrators to look for a 

new policy for tribal interactions in the North-West Frontier.

In 1874, the government in the United Kingdom underwent a turnover 

in leadership, as Benjamin Disraeli assumed the duties of Prime Minister 

at the head of the Conservative Party. This opened the possibility for new 

policies for tribal interactions in the North-West Frontier, especially if the 

tribal interactions worked to strengthen British control in the region and 

deny Russian access to the British Empire in India.32
52

Two major policy changes arose soon after, which allowed the 

British an opportunity to change fundamentally their tribal interactions 

in the North-West Frontier. The first major change was the introduction 

of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The other was Colonel Sir 

Robert Sandeman’s negotiated Treat of 1876 with the Baluch tribes in 

Baluchistan. These changes would provide a means for other British civil 

administrators to change how they interacted with tribes within the NorthWest Frontier.33

The FCR was a system of local governance developed in 1872, which 

moved certain criminal cases from civil courts to tribal arbitration. The 

FCR had specific provision that made any crimes committed on roads under 

British jurisdiction, this also applied to crimes, which passed over roads, 

such as two tribes firing shots at one another over a road. In addition, the 

FCR outlined the penalties the jirgas could impose, and outlined conditions 

in which the British government could authorize punitive expeditions or 

blockades against noncompliant tribes. Many, especially Sir Olaf Caroe, 

the anthropologist and British colonial administrator in the North-West 

Frontier Province, saw the FCR as a failure since it “satisfied neither the 

law nor the custom.”34 However, the FCR remained in effect for the tribal 

areas through to the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and remains 

the basis of law for the FATA to this day. 35

The second major change in policy within the tribal regions was Colonel 

Sir Robert Sandeman’s negotiated treaty with the Baluch tribes in 1876. 

Though not officially part of the North-West Frontier, his engagements 

would influence engagements within in the North-West Frontier as others 

attempted to replicate Sandeman’s policies. The negotiations conducted 

by Sandeman established a system of indirect rule over the Baluch tribes 

in the area. The deal struck in 1876 by Colonel Sandeman would bear the 

name the “Sandeman System.”36

Under the Sandeman System, the Baluch tribes were free to manage 

their internal tribal affairs without interference from British police or 

government officials, but the village leaders, or Maliks, had to provide 

levies to the government to serve as tribal local security forces trained 

by the British. Meanwhile, the British instituted a system of road and rail 

construction to open up Baluchistan to trade, and the British garrisoned 

Soldiers in Quetta, the capital of the Baluchistan. Sandeman was able to 

reinforce the weakened tribal structure of the Baluchs in the area. He also 

worked to address what he believed was the source of instability, which 

was the poverty of the tribes.37
53

The Sandeman System’s implementation in Baluchistan aligned with 

the cultural structures and mores of the Baluch culture, which was not the 

case in the North-West Frontier. Primarily, the Baluch tribes were very 

hierarchical and they were not Pathans. The Baluchs, having a different 

ethnic and cultural background than the Pathans, did not follow the tenets 

of Pushtunwali. With a hierarchical structure, the Baluchs tended to 

sentence punishments under the Frontier Crimes Regulations that satisfied 

the British administrators. In addition, the Baluchs were a much smaller 

population, living in a much smaller part of the district compared to the 

North-West Frontier. This made administering the district much easier for 

all parties, and the Baluchs had had very little interaction with the British 

before these negotiations. Lastly, Sandeman, though his system worked 

by empowering the tribal leaders, had Indian Army Soldiers stationed in 

Quetta, the district’s capital, to immediately respond with punitive action 

against noncompliant tribes. This system represented a balance of reward 

and punishment to encourage compliant behavior from the Baluchs.38

Many have used the Sandeman System as a synonym for the Forward 

Policy. These policies were different however, and though the Sandeman 

System served as a model for others for tribal engagements, it was not until 

the 1880s through early 20th-century that a Forward Policy was pursued in 

the North-West Frontier as a matter of strategy.39

Forward Border Period (1881-1905)

Following the initial success of the Sandeman System and the conclusion 

of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British civil administrators began to 

implement the Forward Policy within the North-West Frontier. A major 

component of this was the creation of additional security forces. In 1878, 

Colonel Robert Warburton entered into negotiations with the Afridi clan. 

These negotiations led to the creation of an Afridi-based security force 

to protect the tenuous pass through the mountains in this province, while 

the British government in turn would not interfere with tribal feuds in the 

district.40. The Khyber Pass was a critical commercial, as well as military, 

route to move between Afghanistan and India. This local security force, 

known as the Khyber Rifles, was one of the first native levies raised in 

the North-West Frontier and would be a base of comparison by British 

authorities for other native levies.41

With the success in Khyber, other British officials would implement 

elements of the Khyber and Sandeman systems into their districts. What 

becomes apparent though, is what the Sandeman System or, as Brigadier 

E.C. Gepp, the Western Commander for the Army in India, wrote in 1931, 
54

“the policy of peaceful penetration” required was the ability to enforce 

tribal responsibility. The ability of the British to enforce this accountability 

would tax their abilities as they brought the Forward Policy into the center 

of the Pathan people.42

As the Second Anglo-Afghan War concluded in 1881, the British 

government began implementing parts of a more forward boarder policy 

in the North-West Frontier. With the rise of the Forward Policy, a critical 

element required for this policy to work was a clear delineation between 

the Kingdom and Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire. This 

requirement drove the British Commission, led by Sir Mortimer Durand, 

to negotiate a country boundary with Afghanistan in 1893. This boundary 

would be known as the “Durand Line” and is still a source of friction and 

misunderstanding between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.43

With the establishment of the Durand Line, the British Empire could 

work towards a more progressive policy of engagement with the tribes 

between the Indus and Durand Line. With the creation of a physical 

marker for what the British considered the extent of its Indian boundary, it 

was possible for the British to recognize which tribes to engage and which 

to exclude from its sphere of influence. In addition, the British, in theory, 

could hold the Kingdom of Afghanistan accountable for tribal areas on the 

other side of the line. Without this defined boundary, it would have been 

difficult to attempt a change in the border policies.44

During the late 19th-century, a theory called the “Martial Races” 

developed within the British and Indian military. This idea postulated that 

certain races had the innate capability for successful military services. The 

races associated with this theory were the Scottish Highlanders, Indian 

Sihks, Nepalese Gurkhas, and Pathan Muslims. This idea would drive 

Indian Army recruiting efforts, and would lead to a large number of Pathan 

recruits across the Indian Army. Lieutenant General George MacMunn, 

an Indian Army veteran a major proponent of this theory, wrote in 1901, 

“Hardy, active, alert, and inured to war, are these clansmen of the Afghan 

hills, endued with considerable courage when well led, and capable of 

much élan.”45

The belief in martial races would lead to number of recruiting efforts 

to raise local security forces in the Pathan regions. In addition to the 

multi-tribal Piffers and the Khyber Rifles, the Indian Army made efforts 

to recruit the future Frontier Militia (Scouts). Once Lord Curzon assumed 

the position of Viceroy in 1899, these local security forces became the 

primary means to secure the North-West Frontier. 
55

Under the direction of Lord Curzon, the Indian Army raised tribal 

forces named the Kurram, Zhob, North and South Waziristan Militia, and 

Chitral Scouts. These organizations had Indian officers seconded from the 

Indian Army to provide the leadership to raise the force. The major issue 

was a lack of other conventional forces to mentor and assist the officers in 

training the forces. These militias contained roughly 500 light infantrymen, 

and manned forts and piquets to interdict and disrupt raiding parties from 

the Afghan side of the Durand Line.46

In 1903, the Piffers ceased being a separate administrative unit, and 

became a fully incorporated part of the Indian Army.47 They were no 

longer dedicated to just operations in the North-West Frontier, and though 

they retained the title “Frontier Force”, they saw duty across the Indian 

Empire and overseas.48

Other aspects of the Forward Policy began to break down in the 

early 20th-Century. As mentioned previously, the Pathans’ cultural 

mores focused on a high degree of individualism and consensus building 

for tribal agreements. This strong cultural pull made the fundamental 

tenet of tribal responsibility a near impossibility for the Pathan tribes 

to accomplish. Combining these tenets with the principle of hospitality 

within Pashtunwali, the Pathans rarely enforced the FCR to a degree that 

was acceptable to the British civil administrators.49

The Forward Policy would never achieve the level of success in the 

Pathan regions that Sandeman saw in the Baluch regions. One reason 

may also have been how the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, elected to allocate 

Indian regular forces. Under the Sandeman System, the Baluchs had 

regular forces immediately posted in Quetta, followed by the recruitment 

of Baluchs into the Indian Army. This served as a demonstration of British 

intent and provided Sandeman the capability to employ military forces 

quickly, if needed, to force compliance. Lord Curzon saw native levies as 

the answer to questions of security, which would have uneven performance 

when used as a punitive force against their own tribes in later expeditions. 

By not having the same capability to force compliance, any potential to 

replicate the Sandeman System failed at the onset.50

During the 1890s, there were a series of tribal uprisings among the 

Pathan tribes, which led to punitive expeditions or fierce fighting between 

the Indian forces and locals. One uprising in Khyber, even led to the 

Khyber Rifles having to fight their own tribesmen. Due to the levels of 

unrest during this period, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, decided in 

1901 to form the North-West Frontier into its own province, separate from 
56

the Punjab Province. It was from this period that the North-West Frontier 

Province came into being as a full province rather than just a frontier.51

Modified Forward Border Period (1905-1947)

Following the creation of the North-West Frontier Province, there was 

a relative calm within the region until the end of World War I. It was not 

until 1919 when the North-West Frontier Province became the focal point 

of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. This confrontation differed from the past 

two in that Afghanistan was the aggressor and invaded across the Durand 

Line. Afghanistan’s leader, Amir Amanullah, hoped to gain control of 

Peshawar, as well as regain control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy. The 

war was a shorter campaign than the last two Anglo-Afghan Wars, lasting 

from 3 May to 9 August 1919. The British government employed ground 

forces, armored vehicles, and aircraft in its defeat of the Afghan army.52

During the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British government 

disbanded a number of the local security forces, including the Khyber 

Rifles, the Northern Waziristan Militia, and Southern Waziristan Militia.53

These organizations during this conflict were unable to enforce the desired 

British policy upon their tribesmen, which led to their disbandment by 

the Indian Army.54 A major side effect was the destabilization of many 

parts of the North-West Frontier Province, especially in Waziristan. This 

deterioration in conditions was the result of both the disbandment of 

mutinous militias and a major increase in raiding by tribes in the area. 

The combination of disbanded militias and increased Pathan raiding 

led the Indian Army to undertake a new recruiting effort to raise reliable, 

local security forces. A major reform to the recruitment was the banning of 

single tribe garrisons. The Indian Officers believed this would help prevent 

mutiny. Though it did make training more difficult with a more diversity 

for each garrison, there was also focused effort to recruit from both sides 

of the Durand Line to create a balanced force. Recruitment also did not 

include Waziris or Mahsuds for any of the reformed frontier units, due to 

their unreliability. This volatility led to a series of punitive expeditions by 

the Indian Army into the North-West Frontier Province to restore order.55

The initial punitive expedition launched in late 1919 to suppress this 

unrest within the Waziristan District was a disaster for the Indian Army. 

The force, named the Derajat Column, suffered very high casualties during 

a series of engagement with tribesmen from 19 to 21 December 1919. One 

major reason for the losses was the degradation of mountain and frontierfighting capability within the Indian Army, due to an overexpansion of the 

Indian Army during World War I. Prior to World War I, the Indian Army 
57

had a large cadre of experienced Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and 

officers in mountain warfare. After the heavy attrition sustained during 

conventional operations in the Great War, the frontier fighting capability 

was deficient. In addition, the tribesmen reached a level of parity with the 

Indian infantrymen in terms of weapon capability and marksmanship. No 

longer could the British expect an easy, overwhelming victory over native 

tribesmen.56

Through the 1920s and 1930s, the British border policy in the NorthWest Frontier Province shifted to a “modified forward policy.” The 

modified forward policy continued tribal engagements in regions that 

complied with British rule, while in restive regions a policy more in line 

with the Close Border Policy of non-interference was the norm. In 1922, 

the Indian Army established a presence in Waziristan in Razmak in order 

to emplace a force capable of punitive operations within the troublesome 

district.57

The modified forward policy would remain contentious through to the 

Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Charles Edward Bruce, the son of 

Robert Bruce, was an outspoken critic of this modified policy, and wanted 

the British government to return to the Forward Policy in Waziristan. He 

believed the “Protected Area,” what he called the modified forward policy, 

did not create a policy of “control from within.”58 Bruce believed this 

internal control was a critical element for tribal success in the frontier and 

the secret to Sandeman’s success in Baluchistan.

Following the start of the global economic depression in 1929, the 

British government did not have the money to invest in the North-West 

Frontier Province’s infrastructure, especially road construction. Bruce 

argues during this period that the cost of the infrastructure improvements 

would be vastly cheaper than the cost of the punitive expeditions, but the 

argument would fall on deaf ears.59

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the situation in Waziristan and 

in other districts within the North-West Frontier Province continued to 

deteriorate. This led to increasing number of punitive expeditions and 

military operations. One effect of these operations was a renewal in frontier 

warfare techniques and tactics. In addition, air support and armored 

vehicles saw increased service in the frontier fighting within this region, 

with mixed results. The Indian Army also continually examined means 

to create greater mobility for their forces operating in the frontier. This 

also led to a number of debates within the Indian Army about whether the 

British government should raise certain frontier forces, who only trained 
58

on frontier fighting, with no focus on European tactics. The debate between 

“Borderers” and conventionalist was not decided before the outbreak of 

World War II.60

During these debates on military organization, the Indian Army 

circulated three major works to assist in training, organizing, and 

conducting operations in the North-West Frontier. The first, The Manual of 

Operations of the North-West Frontier of India, provided guidance on how 

to plan operations against the Pathan tribes. A major focus of the writing 

is on securing the highest ground, establishing piquets in supporting 

locations to the movement, and ensuring Soldiers receive conditioning for 

operating in the mountains.61

The second work, Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force Officer to 

His Nephew, published in 1925 by J.P. Villiers-Stuart, provided advice and 

guidance for junior leaders new to the North-West Frontier Province. The 

major points highlighted within the work is the frank discussion on burning 

villages to draw the tribesmen out to fight, the importance of holding the 

high ground, and knowing the terrain. Villiers-Stuart repeatedly highlights 

that the tribesmen study the column for patterns and weaknesses, so units 

had to prepare for an adapting enemy.62

The third work, Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on 

the North-West Frontier of India, was written by General Sir Andrew 

Skeen. He served as the expedition leader for the Derajat Column in 1919, 

and in 1932, wrote a work to pass key lessons on to junior officers and 

leaders operating within the North-West Frontier Province. General Skeen 

devoted a good portion of his work providing specific details of emplacing, 

removing and manning piquets during operations in the hills. Passing It On

proved very popular and became required reading for officers operating in 

the North-West Frontier Province.

These works demonstrated both official and unofficial attempts 

to impart critical lessons for operating within the North-West Frontier 

Province. Casualty rates for the Indian Army proved very high during 

the punitive expeditions. Above and beyond the debate on training, other 

debates surface on equipping and organization for the frontier forces, as a 

conventional-focused force required heavier equipment and more machine 

guns, while a frontier-focused force in the mountains required speed, 

light equipment, and a higher concentration of rifles to mass against the 

tribesmen.63

The unrest and punitive operations continued off and on from 1919 

through the Partition in 1947. The punitive operations had mixed success 
59

with bringing stability to an area, especially in the 1930s when anti-Imperial 

discontent grew stronger within the Pathan areas. In addition, a number of 

charismatic Pathan nationalist leaders and “Mad Mullahs”, attempting to 

incite religious warfare, would lead rebellions against British rule, which 

spawned more punitive expeditions.64

The Pathan nationalist movements of the 1930s would consume a 

large portion of the British effort in the North-West Frontier, with the 

equivalent of three divisions dedicated to restoring order in Waziristan in 

1936 alone. These operations provided little long-term security. With the 

arrival of World War II, and later the Partition of India and Pakistan, would 

the Indian Army depart the North-West Frontier.

Lessons of the North-West Frontier

As the British government withdrew from the North-West Frontier 

Province in 1947, they left a mixed record as to their success in this region. 

With just under 100 years of continuous operations in the region, there are 

many lessons produced during this time. Many of the problems that arose, 

and are still present in the region, can relate back to not synchronizing 

operations into a larger, overarching strategy for the region. Secondly, 

many problems arose from attempting to apply blanket policies across 

different tribal structures without regard to the cultural demographics. 

Finally, the lack of integration for recruiting local security forces with the 

strategic end state produced unreliable security forces in many areas. 

The lack of a strategic vision for the North-West Frontier, especially 

following the Third Anglo-Afghan War, led to a series of short-term 

policy decisions that did not provide the level of stability desired by the 

British. The modified forward policy represents this strategic confusion, 

as the British reached out to some tribal areas, while had a policy of 

noninterference with others.65

Secondly, the attempt to use blanket policies on different tribal 

structures produced a series of policies that were unsustainable for the 

British in the region. The major principle of the Forward Policy was 

ensuring tribal accountability by the tribal elders. This was also a major 

requirement for the FCR to have a positive impact upon the tribes. Instead, 

in Pathan regions, the jirgas prevented a means to hold individual and 

tribal groups accountable for their actions without longer-term punitive 

expeditions. There may have been more success for the Forward Policy if 

there was a means to hold the tribes, outside of punitive raids, accountable 

for their member’s actions.
60

Finally, the uneven recruiting of local security forces did not prepare 

the Indian Army for when some forces deserted or proved unwilling 

to engage their tribesmen militarily. This would lead to a reform in 

recruitment in the 1920s, following the chaos of the Third Anglo-Afghan 

War, when large numbers of local security forces either refused to fight or 

deserted their posts. 

The North-West Frontier did develop the Indian Army’s capability to 

wage mountain warfare and many of its security forces were the best in 

the world at mountain operations. Unfortunately, many of these lessons 

occurred after the Indian Army suffered high casualties during the opening 

stages of the campaign. A more integrated strategic vision for the region 

may have better prepared the Indian Army for these operations in terms of 

training, equipping, and manning.66
61

Notes

1. Some of the secondary sources that provide descriptions of the of the 

specific campaigns from 1849 through 1947 include: Captain H. L. Nevill’s 

Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, George MacMunn’s The Armies of India, 

and Victoria Schofield’s Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia.

2. For the sake of clarity, this chapter will call all British and East India 

Company troops: the Indian Army. A full description of the development of 

the East India Company Army to the formation of the Indian Army, post-1860, 

with supporting British Army troops, can be found in many books. The best one 

volume is Phillip Mason’s A Matter of Honour. The term British will be used 

when discussing civil administration and policy, as it was the product of the 

British Government.

3. A number of writers have studied the North-West Frontier, especially the 

district of Waziristan, since 2001. Jules Stewart has produced three works, On 

Afghanistan’s Plain, The Savage Border: the Story of the North-West Frontier and 

The Khybar Rifles. T.R. Moreman’s The Army of India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947 is an excellent account of use of the Indian Army 

and the development of local security forces in this region. Also, Caroe’s The 

Pathans is probably the most detailed, anthropological account of the Pashtu or 

Pathan People, though his account is becoming dated since he passed away at the 

start of the Soviet-Afghan War, so it does not include the effects of the Soviets, 

the Taliban and the post-9/11, 2011 activities on the region. 

4. Once the North-West Frontier Province fell under Pakistani control, 

the government referred to the area as the Federally Administered Tribal Area 

(FATA). This region served as a major safe haven for the Afghan fighters during 

the Soviet Occupation of 1979 to 1989, and continues to serve as a safe haven for 

Haqqani Network and Taliban Fighters fighting against the International Security 

Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin 

Books, 2004), 131. 

5. This region always fell under the British’s ideas of imperial policing, so 

the change in terminology to “countering insurgency” did not occur until the 

late-1960s. Many of the base concepts would remain within the British doctrine, 

especially unity of effort with civilian authorities, minimum force, cooperation 

with police, and the importance of accurate, relevant intelligence. Since these 

operations fell under imperial policing, the military operated under the control 

of civil authorities and in support of the civil objectives. In addition, some of 

the local security forces raised would operate under the civil authorities until the 

British government undertook a major reorganization of irregular forces in the 

1880s. See Chapter 2 for an explanation of British doctrine development from 

Imperial Policing to Counterinsurgency. British Army Field Manual AC 71876, 

Countering Insurgency, Case Study, 1-1 to 1-4.

6. T. R. Moreman. The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849-1947 (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 1-2; Caroe, The Pathans,

xix-xxvi. Caroe’s introduction provides a colorful and detailed layout of the 

terrain of this region as well as the overlay of the tribes within the terrain.
62

7. For this thesis, the term Pathan describes this ethnic group, and Pashtu, 

describes the language. Two subtypes compose the Pathans, the Pashtun and the 

Pakhtun. These groups share a similar language and cultural identity, and the 

internal dividing difference is a mixture of geographical location and personal 

identity. The Pakhtun center their identity on Peshawar and spread to the northeast; 

the Pashtuns identify with the Durrani Tribe and spread to the southwest. There are 

slight differences in language, with ethnographers believing the Pashtun language 

to be softer, while the Pakhtun is harsher in syllable pronunciation. Caroe, xviixix. There is still debate among Pathan scholars as to where the sub-groups divide 

geographically, or at all.

8. Moreman, xix-xxvi.

9. The Pathans trace their roots to a lost tribe of Israel, a lost son of the 

Biblical King Saul, who had a son Afghana. Caroe, 4-5. The Pathans also believed 

that Khalid bin Walid, one of Prophet Muhammad’s companions was a descendant 

of the Afghana Tribe and he converted the Pathans to Islam soon after receiving 

conversion from the Prophet Muhammad. Caroe, 9. This tale does not align with 

other written sources, which indicates the Pathans around Kabul converted in 

approximately 870 AD and Islam did not reach the Indus River until the mid to 

late-11th century. Victoria Schofield. Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in 

Central Asia (New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003), 24-25; Caroe, 9. During 

the Mongol conquests, Genghis Khan destroyed the city of Peshawar during his 

drive across the Indus River. Schofield, 26. 

10. Jules Stewart. The Savage Border (Phoenix Mills: Sutton Publishing, 

2007), 153.

11. The tenets of Pashtunwali, I derived from Jules Stewarts The Savage 

Border, 153-155, Victoria Schofield’s Afghan Frontier, 116-117, and notes I 

received from a Leader Development and Education for Sustain Peace program 

I attended in Gig Harbor, Washington on 30-31 March 2009, as part of predeployment training for duty in Afghanistan. The role of individuality was very 

important to the Pathan people, which manifested itself in the jirga system, in 

which the tribes worked to build consensus for a resolution between the two parties. 

The system was not hierarchical nor was leadership passed by hereditary lines for 

a seat on a jirga. This lack of a strong hierarchy, and reliance on consensus, will be 

important later in this paper during the examination of the various border policies 

enacted by the British Empire in the North-West Frontier.

12. J. P. Villiers-Stuart, Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force Officer to 

His Nephew (London: Sifton Praed and Company, 1925), 5. Though written as a 

letter to his nephew, this work would prove every influential for officers operating 

in the North-West Frontier Province, until Andrew Skeen’s Passing It On (also 

written in a conversational tone).

13. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/8. The 

papers of R. I. Bruce at the British Library provides the best example of this, when 

R. I. Bruce wrote in 1888, “I have never met one yet who fanaticism was so strong 

as to be allowed to stand in the way of his own interests, or to prevent his serving 

us if made worth his while to do so, and I believe few, if any, such exist.” This 

drive of self-interest could lead to rapid changes in position by tribal elders in 

order to maintain their position within the Pathan tribes. Also, Charles Chenevix 

Trench. The Frontier Scouts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 2.
63

14. Thomas Henry Thornton. Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on 

our Indian Frontier (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1895), 98-105.

15. Thornton, 110; Caroe, 377. These differences will have significant impacts 

upon early 20th-century border policies enacted by the British Government. The 

description of Baluchs as traders is from Villiers-Stuart, 8. He wrote specifically, 

“The Pathan tribes of Baluchistan are traders first and warriors second–indifferent 

warriors at that.”

16. Schofield, 78-88; Moreman, 1-5; Thornton, 11-13. The First AngloAfghan War occurred from December1838 through the end 1842 when British 

forces initially entered the Kingdom of Afghanistan to overthrow Dhost 

Muhammad Khan and install a ruler seen as more favorable to British interest in 

India. The British expedition met initial success, returning Shah Shuja to rule after 

a thirty-year absence, and establishing garrisons in Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kandahar, 

and Kabul. The Afghans quickly began to turn against the British forces, who the 

Afghans viewed as occupiers. This would lead the British government to opt for 

withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the retreat, the Afghan fighters attacked the 

British column and decimated the force. After this disastrous defeat, the British 

sent a retribution force, which marched into Afghanistan, rescued the hostages 

from the previous defeat, burned parts of Kabul and then retired back to India. 

This war with Afghanistan was the only time the British Empire attempted to 

occupy Kabul, but it did set a pattern for punitive expeditions to punish Afghan 

behavior. Schofield, 62-80.

17. This region Caroe referred to as ghairilaqa (unadministered territory) or 

Yaghistan (land of the rebels). This term “Yaghistan” was not just a British term, 

but the Afghans used the term as well. Caroe, 347-348. What became apparent 

during this research is that neither Britain nor the Afghans wanted responsibility 

for this region.

18. Stewart, 137-138; Caroe, 348; Thornton, 16-19.

19. Caroe, 348-349; Stewart, The Savage Border, 137-138; Moreman, 4-5. 

Some referred to this policy as the “Lawrence Policy” named for the Chief 

Commissioner of the Punjab, Sir Henry Lawrence. Since the British and Afghan 

governments would not define the boundary for another fifty years, this tenet of 

noninterference would present difficulties for the British government, as they did 

not know where their empire ended and the Kingdom of Afghanistan began.

20. According to G.J. Younghusband, who wrote a history of the Corps of 

Guides, Sir Henry Lawrence specifically used the term Corps of Guides for the 

formation to instill a sense of élan inspired from the Napoleonic Wars. “It was to 

contain trustworthy men, who could, at a moment’s notice, act as guides to troops 

in the field; men capable, too, of collecting trustworthy intelligence beyond, as 

well as within, our borders; and, in addition to all this, men, ready to give and take 

hard blows, whether on the frontier or in a wider field.” G. J. Younghusband, The 

Story of the Guides (London: Leonaur, 2006), 9-17.

21. Moreman, 6. The raising of the PIF occurred during the fall and winter 

1849 and the organization and manning did not significantly differ from other 

irregular forces raised in the Bengal Army. The Indian Officers and NCOs, the 

British recruited from local tribal leaders’ families, which assisted in tying this 
64

local security force to the community. The organization of the PIF under the civil 

authority was a major difference for this organization compared to other irregular 

forces raised by the British. This did make the PIF very responsive to local needs 

and crisis, as the local authorities did not require central government approval to 

employ the PIF. The initial composition of the infantry regiments consisted of 

four European Officers, 16 native officers, 96 native Non-commissioned officers 

and 800 Soldiers. The cavalry regiments had the same leadership mix with only 

588 Soldiers. General Report upon the Administration of the Punjab Proper, for 

the Years 1849-1850 & 1850-1851: Bring the two First Years After Annexation: 

With a Supplmentary Notice of the Cis- and Trans-Sutles Territories (Lahore: 

Chronicle Press, 1854), 35 (this work will be referred to as General Report on the 

Punjab in the future citations to save space); Moreman, 5-6. 

22. The First Cavalry Regiment was in Peshawar, the Second Cavalry was 

in Rawul Pindee, the Third Cavalry was in Lahore, the Fourth Cavalry was in 

Pind Dadun Khan, the Fifth Cavalry was in Mooltan and Leia, the First Infantry 

Regiment was in Peshawar, Second Infantry was in Lahore, Third Infantry was 

in Huzara, the Fourth Infantry Regiment was in Lahore, and the Fifth Regiment 

was in Leia. There were also two companies of Sappers and Miners raised, one in 

Asnee and the other in Kohat. General Report on the Punjab, 36-37; Moreman, 

6-7.

23. C. Collin Davies. The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 25-26. Davies highlights how 

these punitive expeditions would rarely produce any permanent effects, also due 

to the Pathan jirga culture, it made distinction between the guilty and innocent 

difficult. The punitive expedition numbers I derived from Caroe’s The Pathans, 

348. Caroes’ numbers were also used by Stewart in The Savage Border, and 

Schofield’s Afghan Frontier. 

24. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR 163/80, 

The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-Day, by Colonel 

C. E. Bruce, January 1932, 48. Bruce states, “It was also a system whereby 

punishment was meted out to the tribes by either fines, blockades, or expeditions, 

or a combination of these. Fines–which, if paid at all, were generally paid by the 

most respectable and law-abiding section of the tribe. Blockades–which kept the 

laborious, hard-working portion of the tribesmen from going about their lawful 

occasions. Expeditions, where the villages of the wretched people were burnt to 

the ground, their women, children, and flocks turned out to the hillside. Eventually 

the troops retired, leaving behind them a legacy of hatred and contempt. A policy 

which made a desert and called it peace. A policy neither dignified, becoming a 

Great Power, humane nor even economical.” Additionally, the information about 

inability to deny safe haven was from Caroe, 350-351.

25. Sir Robert Warburton, who would raise the Khyber Rifles in 1878, stated in 

his autobiography, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, “my firm and solemn conviction 

is that the majority of the wars and fights between the British Government and the 

independent tribes of the Punjab Border were due entirely to the evil intrigues and 

machinations of the Arbabs and middlemen, who had been employed by us to do 

our work with the tribesmen.” Robert Warburton, Eighteen Years in the Khyber

(London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1900), 37.
65

26. Moreman, 23-27.

27. Moreman, 7; Scofield, 82.

28. General Report on the Punjab, 38-39; Younghusband, 64-74. Members 

of the Corps of Guides the British drew from numerous tribes in the area and paid 

them more than ordinary scale for a similar PIF Soldier. 

29. General Report on the Punjab, 41. The khaki was adopted for frontier 

forces in 1853. Moreman, 14; Schofield, 8.

30. General Report on the Punjab, 21-24.

31. One could describe the Second Afghan War as an extended punitive 

expedition by the British Army into Afghanistan followed by a withdrawal. The 

British invaded Afghanistan following an Afghan meeting with Russian envoys. 

The result of the war was the removal of the Afghan leader, Sher Ali, installing 

his son, Yaqub Khan, as Amir, imposition of British control over Afghan Foreign 

Policy under the Treaty of Gandamak , and the use of Afghanistan as a buffer state 

between Russia and Britain. This war also demonstrated aspects of the “Great 

Game” in the region, as Afghanistan became a pawn between Russia and Great 

Britain as each vied for influence in the region. Schofield, 90-91; Stewart, 77-79.

32. There is some debate within the available literature about the timeline for 

the introduction of the Forward Policy. In a newly published book, On Afghanistan’s 

Plain, Jules Stewart argues that the Forward Policy was the direct result of the 

change in British Government in England to the Prime Minister Disreali headed 

Conservative Government in 1874. This change in government led directly to 

the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War and the immediate adoption of the Forward Policy. 

Jules Stewart. On Afghanistan’s Plain: The Story of Britian’s Afghan Wars (New 

York: I. B. Tauris and Company, Ltd., 2011), 139-143. This view does not align 

with primary sources of the time, especially writings by Robert Bruce as late as 

1888 in a memorandum to the Viceroy of India in which Roberts is advocating a 

change from the Close Policy in Waziristan to the Forward Policy, as Sir Robert 

Sandeman instituted in Baluchistan. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call 

no: MSS EUR F163/8 “Memorandum of Waziri-Bhittanni and Shirani Tribe,” 

1888. The change in government was important, so British civil administrators 

had more options for dealing with the North-West Frontier, but there was not an 

immediate move to the Forward Policy.

33. Christian Tripodi, “Peacemaking through bribes or cultural empathy? 

The political officer and British strategy towards the North-West Frontier, 1901-

1945,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (1 February 2008): 122-135; Jules 

Stewart, On Afghanistan’s Plain, 139.

34. Caroe, 354.

35. The FCR would undergo two revisions, once in 1876 and in 1901. There 

would be a number of issues with the Frontier Crimes Regulations, especially 

due to cultural differences about criminal activity and punishment. The Pathan 

system focused on providing satisfaction to the aggrieved, and did not focused on 

punishing the aggressor to the same level of western courts. This would led to cases 

of Pathan crimes receiving relatively light sentences – especially crimes against 

Hindus or Punjabis. Since a Pathan jirga required consensus many decisions could 
66

be watered down to satisfy everyone on the jirga. Caroe, 353-356; Jules Stewart, 

The Savage Border, 151-154; Government of the North-West Frontier Province 

Law Department, The Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (Regulation III of 1901)

(Peshawar, Pakistan: Manager Government Stationary and Printing, 1973). 

36. Caroe, 374-37; Thornton, 93.

37. Caroe, 376; Dr. Theodore Leighton Pennell. Among the Wild Tribes of the 

Afghan Frontier: A Record of Sixteen Years’ Close Intercourse with the Natives of 

the Indian Marches (1908, Repr, New York: Ishi Press, 2010), 62; Christian Tripoli. 

“‘Good for One but Not the Other’; The ‘Sandeman System’ of Pacification as 

Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947,” The Journal 

of Military History, 73, 767-802; and Bruce Papers, British Library, London, 

Call no: MSS EUR 163/80, The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems 

of To-Day, written by Colonel Charles E. Bruce, January 1932. Unfortunately, 

Sandeman died in 1892, right when the debate for increased engagement in the 

North-West Frontier Province was reaching a crescendo. 

38. Caroe, 376-37; Tripoli, 769. Caroe dedicates a whole paragraph on page 

377 highlighting that Sandeman had a clean slate for interacting with Baluchistan, 

which someone negotiating in the North-West Frontier does not have. Caroe 

believed that was a major advantage and one reason the Sandeman System worked 

in Baluchistan.

39. One of the major writers who used the terms synonymously is Charles 

Bruce, the son of the North-West Frontier Administrator Robert Bruce. Within 

both his works Waziristan 1936-1937: the Problems of the North-West Frontiers 

of India and Their Solutions and his paper, The Sandeman Policy as Applied to 

Tribal Problems of To-Day, he stated the British had two policies, the Closed 

Border and the Sandeman System. Also, the Forward Policy did not become 

policy until the 1880s, so Sandeman appeared to be operating outside of policy 

as he moved into the Baluch region and commenced negotiations with the Baluch 

tribes. 

40. Caroe, 378-380; Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS 

EUR 163/11, “Letter from Robert Bruce to the Government of Punjab,” 28 

February 1894. Bruce highlights as he moved into the North-West Frontier that 

only two lines of policing a district were available, the Sandeman System and the 

Khyber System. Bruce did not believe the Khyber would work in his area since 

the Khyber had only one tribe. Bruce believed that with three tribes, that were 

hereditary enemies, he would need another approach.

41. Jules Stewart. The Khyber Rifles (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing 

Limited, 2005), 31-32, 42-43. The initial formation of the Khyber Rifles depended 

heavily on the leadership of Colonel Warburton, who in the 1890s had to return 

from retirement to assist in quelling an Afridi uprising. Part of the success of the 

Khyber Rifles in this region was the tribal homogeneity present in Khyber with 

the Afridi Clan. This was not the case in other districts within the North-West 

Frontier. Also, due to the single tribe, the British were able to develop a system 

of rule that allowed the Afridis to control their internal governing (which was 

primarily intra-tribal), which the British would have difficulty implementing in 

other areas. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/11, 

“Printed Proceeding of the Punjab Civil Secretariat on the Demarcation of 

Southern Waziristan,” 17 February 1891.
67

42. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/62, “A 

Short Paper on the Political Administration of Baluchistan Province,” by E. C. 

Gepp, Brigadier, HQ Western Command, October 1931.

43. Bijan Omrani, “The Durand Line: History and Problems of the AfghanPakistan Border,” Asian Affairs 40, no. 2 (July 2009): 183-185. This article 

provides an excellent summation for many of the issues surrounding the Durand 

Line, though in a footnote, Mr. Omrani makes the contention that the British 

Empire considered the Durand Line just a temporary fix to the frontier border 

problem facing the Empire. This does not align with writings from Robert Bruce 

and Sir Mortimer Durand for the time of the establishment of the border with 

Afghanistan. Both men write on the border being a permanent demarcation 

between India and Afghanistan. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call 

no: MSS EUR 163/14, “Memorandum Number 1078” and MSS EUR 163/11 

“Foreign Department’s Annual File 1894 Indo-Afghan Border.” 

44. Bruce Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR F163/1, 

“Letter from Robert Bruce to The Times,” undated, though the context of the 

archive indicates Robert Bruce wrote the letter around 1905. Bruce writes, 

“When the Durand boundary line was demarcated the Waziris and other tribes 

believed that the British government would control and be responsible for the 

tribes on their side, and the Amir would be the same within his jurisdiction, and 

that raiding across the line would – as long as the Beluchistan limits – be put to 

a stop to.” One aspect of the Durand Line debates that is missing, is the Amir of 

Afghanistan at the time of the Durand Line negotiations was not in control of any 

of the land on the British side of the line. Most of the tribal areas were outside 

his control as well, with no indications he had the capacity or desire to exercise 

long-term control over the North-West Frontier area. Appendix B of Caroe’s The 

Pathans has exerts from the Durand Agreement and subsequent affirmations by 

the Afghanistan government in 1905, 1919 and 1921. Caroe, 382, 463-466.

45. George MacNunn, The Armies of India (1901, repr, Bristol: Crecy Books, 

1984), 148. MacNunn was one of the major proponents for the idea of martial 

races. These ideas led the Indian Army to over recruit from Sikh, Gurkha, and 

Pathan communities. During the Partition of Pakistan and India this would cause 

significant problems during the violence that occurred during the population 

migration between Indian and Pakistan. For a description of this see Daniel P. 

Marston, “The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-

1947,” War in History 19, no. 4 (2009): 469-505. For more on martial races, see 

Heather Street, Martial Races: The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British 

Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

46. Michael Barthor, The North-West Frontier: British India and Afghanistan

(New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1982), 141-143.

47. The Piffers merged into the Bengal orbit in 1883 and then in 1903 all the 

previous commands (Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and Hydrabad) all became one–

the Indian Army. George MacMunn, The Armies of India (1911, reprint, Bristol: 

Crecy Books, 1984), 173-176.

48. Moreman, 89-90.

49. Caroe, 354.
68

50. C. Collin Davies. The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 34. Davies highlights that 

Colonel Bruce did not have the military position of strength that Sandeman 

had when Bruce entered Waziristan, so he was unable to negotiate a positive 

settlement for the British government. Also see: Stewart, The Savage Border, 142, 

143; Moreman, 89.

51. Stewart. The Savage Border, 148-151; Caroe, 415-416; Schofield, 145. 

Lord Curzon’s decision was somewhat controversial in that it elevated this region 

in status to equal with Punjab and the other provinces within India. Stewart 

highlights that part of Lord Curzon’s thinking may have been to reduce costs for 

punitive expeditions by allowing the British Empire to employ other forms of soft 

power. In addition, the creation of this province now allowed its population to be 

members of the British Empire, rather than just unregulated frontiersmen. Caroe 

highlights in his work that Lord Curzon undertook this decision very deliberately 

and his concern for the control of the border. Lord Curzon also did not want 

the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab in a position to interfere with the border 

policies the Viceroy implemented through his Foreign Minister.

52. Stewart, On Afghanistan’s Plain, 210-223; Moreman, 104-106. For 

how short the campaign was, it still produced a very high casualty count in the 

Indian Army, with over 1700 casualties in the four-month period. Also within the 

campaign, the British employed a four-engine bomber, which executed a bombing 

raid against Kabul. Stewart implies in On Afghanistan’s Plain that the bombing 

led to Amir Amanullah’s capitulation. This seems doubtful as the Afghan army 

was in a full rout before the strategic bombing of Kabul, but the bombing may 

have been enough for Amir Amanullah to realize the further armed resistance 

would achieve very little. Stewart, 223. Stewart does highlight that though British 

forces defeated the Afghan army in every engagement, Amir Amanullah received 

a number of concessions from the British, including the removal of the Treaty of 

Gandamak.

53. Moreman, 104.

54. Trench, Frontier Scouts, 41-49.

55. Trench, 53; Moreman, 107-114. Immediately following cessation of 

the Third Afghan War, Charles Howard Foulkes, who served as Director of 

Gas Services at the end of World War I, conducted a survey to determine if the 

introduction of chemical warfare to the North-West Frontier Province may assist 

in quelling hostilities. His account of the survey and discussions with the Viceroy 

of India are enlightening. The Viceroy was adamant that he would not authorize 

the use of chemical weapons, stating, “If there was war with Japan, for example, 

I wouldn’t hesitate to sanction the use of gas: due I don’t wish to use any weapon 

against tribesmen which savours of taking an unfair advantage.” Major General 

Foulkes’ accounts of his tribe in the North-West Frontier Province are interesting 

mainly in the disgust expressed by most of the British living in India to the use 

of chemical weapons. His account of a dinner seated next to Lady Chelmsforth, 

the wife of the Viceroy, was especially interesting as Major General Foulkes 

attempted to explain the benefits of chemical weapons to a group clearly opposed 

to them. The British government never decided to employ chemical weapons into 

the North-West Frontier Province or the border areas of Afghanistan. Foulkes 
69

Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College Longon, Call no: GB99 KCLMA 

FOULKES, Item 6/103.

56. Moreman, 108-109; Stewart, The Savage Border, 175-178; Schofield, 

149-152; General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing it On: Short talks on Tribal Fighting 

on the North-West Frontier of India (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1939), 17.

57. Tripodi, 145.

58. C. E. Bruce, Waziristan 1936-1937: the Problems of the North-West 

Frontiers of India and Their Solutions (1937; repr., Candler Press, 2007), 7.

59. C. E. Bruce, 24-28.

60. Moreman, 147-150.

61. Army Headquarters, India. Manual of Operations on the North-West 

Frontier of India (Calcutta: Government of India, 1925), 11-13.

62. Villiers-Stuart, 18, 25, 31. Villiers-Stuarts’ frank views of the punitive 

expeditions are best surmised with this statement, “In operating against tribesmen, 

we have two objects in view: i) (emphatically) to kill as many as possible, that 

being by far the most convincing form of argument; ii) to destroy his villages 

and stores of food, and capture his cattle and sheep.” Villiers-Stuart, 25. VilliersStuart in a later section expounds on the destruction of villages highlights that the 

burning of villages and taking of livestock was only to force the tribesmen to fight. 

Though he closes the section with the warning, “The withdrawal will certainly be 

closely pressed. People don’t like having their homes burnt.” Villiers-Stuart, 75.

63. Moreman, 176-179. 

64. Moreman, 138-168; Stewart, The Khyber Rifles, 178-181; Schofield 218-

224; Cunningham Papers, British Library, London, Call no: MSS EUR D670/14 

“Governor’s Report from the North-West Frontier Province,” 9 November 1937. 

The late-1930s especially saw a serious problem in Waziristan with British 

operations launched against the Faqir of Ipi. The Faqir of Ipi incited Muslim-onHindu violence in the Bannu District, about would receive safe haven from Wazir 

tribes starting in 1937 and continued raids, attacks and mayhem until his death 

in 1960. His influence did begin to lessen after 1942 with an abortive attempt 

to seize Datta Khel. Also, with the announcement of a future Muslim state after 

partition, it allayed some of the fears of tribesmen in the North-West Frontier 

Province of domination by a Hindu majority. Stewart, The Savage Border, 89-90.

65. An example of this is also how many of the historians for this region use a 

different term to describe the post-forward policies in the North-West Frontier. C. 

E. Bruce writing as a contemporary to this period uses the term “protected areas” 

to describe the policy for this period. Caroe makes no mention of a different 

border policy during this period, even though he is a civil administrator in the 

North-West Frontier during this specific period. 

66. One source not used for this thesis was the work Waging War in Waziristan

by Andrew M. Roe. Though it is a recent piece of scholarship, the factual errors 

by Mr. Roe concerning British Border Policy for the North-West Frontier made 

it a dangerous work to attempt to incorporate with the other research. A similar 

work Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias by Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew 
70

likewise have their fundamental facts of the border policies incorrect. Both works 

are deeply confused as to the closed, forward, and modified policies were and 

what the British government hoped to attain from them. These works I caution 

others from using due to their inaccuracies.
71

Chapter 5

Case Study: The Dhofar Campaign, Oman

On December 11, 1975, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the ruler of the 

Sultanate of Oman and Muscat, issued a proclamation from a police 

station in the Dhofar Region declaring the ten-year insurgency within his 

country defeated.1

The insurgency was a communist-inspired, externally supported 

conflict, which aimed to overthrow the Sultanate and establish a communist 

state within Oman.2

 The British Government, after withdrawing from 

Aden in 1967 and areas east of the Suez Canal, opted to provide significant 

military, advisory, and material support to Sultan Qaboos’s efforts to 

defeat the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf 

(POFLOAG) in 1970.3

 These military efforts, integrated with governmental 

and economic reforms, civic action, and a focused psychological operations 

campaign under a unified strategy designed and implemented by Sultan 

Qaboos, addressed many of the grievances expressed by the population 

and led to a defeat of the adoo.

When violent action associated with this insurgency began in 1965, 

no one knew the outcome or the best way to address the grievances of 

the adoo. The roots of the conflict went back many years and efforts by 

the Omanis and British required the counterinsurgents to build trust and 

understanding with the tribally organized people of the Dhofar Region. 

This was a conflict fought largely outside the glare of the world’s media 

and many British veterans who fought there called it “The Secret War.”

Within the strategic construct developed by Sultan Qaboos was a 

specific campaign to disrupt insurgent access to their safe havens across 

Omani borders. This campaign plan was not without problems and 

missteps, but eventually the Sultan’s Armed Forces would use locally 

raised security forces and physical barriers to hinder movement between 

the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Sultanate of 

Oman and Muscat.

The Sultanate of Oman was an underdeveloped country in the Arabian 

Gulf that lacked many basic services for its people when the violence 

began in 1965. Due to this lack of basic services, an insurgency arose in 

the southern Dhofar region of the country. The Dhofar Liberation Front 

(DLF), initially having Saudi Arabian support, wished to bring a degree 

of modernization to Dhofar and exercise self-rule over the region. By 

1967, the DLF and Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) were in a stalemate, as 

neither had the capability to successfully hold ground and drive the other 
72

out of their strongholds. These conditions changed by the end of 1967, 

as the DLF began to receive external support and sanctuary from PDRY, 

to the west of Oman, following the withdrawal of the British from Aden 

and South Arabia. This provided the adoo with a state-sponsored, safe 

haven in which to receive training, material support from other communist 

nations, and sanctuary from attack. The DLF’s leadership was replaced 

and changed the name of the insurgent group to PFLOAG in 1968.4

This case study will examine the efforts made in the Sultanate of 

Oman to combat this insurgency, despite the apparent advantages of the 

PFLOAG. The focus of the case study will be the physical and cultural 

terrain, the history of the campaign, and the specific efforts undertaken by 

the Sultan of Oman to conduct border control operations and disrupt the 

adoo’s ability to use its safe haven. With the recent declassification of this 

campaign by the British Government, one can conduct a new examination 

of this counterinsurgency operation and official military documents from 

the time.5

Terrain and People

To fully comprehend the insurgency in Oman, it is necessary to 

understand the physical and cultural make-up of the country. The Sultanate 

of Oman is situated on the southeastern side of the Arabian Peninsula. 

Saudi Arabia to the northwest, the United Arab Emirates to the northeast, 

and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to the southwest bound 

the country. Two sides of the Sultanate of Oman are surrounded by water 

with the Straits of Homuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea.

The majority of Oman consists of open desert, but along the coastline, 

there are areas of lush, green vegetation. Due to the desert conditions and 

location of urban areas, the country divides into two regions. To the north 

are the few population centers and the country’s capital of Muscat. The 

population centers clustered along the coastline between the Gulf of Oman 

and a series of mountain ranges, known locally as jebels.

6

In the north, the people are more ethnically Arab and consider 

themselves Omani. The primary language is Arabic and there are significant 

cultural and tribal ties to Saudi Arabia. The majority of the country’s 

population live in the north and it was also the center of the majority of 

the country’s commerce. Additionally, the Omani government discovered 

oil reserves in the 1960s in the north, which continues to demonstrate the 

economic strength of this area of Oman.7

The southern region, known as Dhofar, is separated from the north by 

desert that is 400-miles wide. The population areas cluster mainly around 
73

the coastline but also extend into the jebels to the northwest. In 1970, 

there was roughly a population of 70,000 Dhofaris with approximately 

half living in the jebels and half living in the towns near the coast. The 

largest city was Salalah with approximately 35,000 residents.8

In the Dhofar Region, the people are a different ethnicity and tribal 

make-up than the north. The Dhofaris shared similar traits and features with 

Somali or Ethiopian groups. The Dhofari language, Jebeli, was unwritten 

and shared linguistic characteristics with Aramaic rather than Arabic. The 

commerce focused on cattle, goat, and camel herds, and the Dhofaris in 

the Jebel were nomadic. The nomadic tradition was necessary in order to 

find water for the cattle or camel herds, which was in scare supply outside 

the monsoon season. Cattle and herding played a critical role in Dhofari 

society, as these herds provided the Dhofaris with the means to survive. 

The Dhofaris also had tribal ties and connections that extended across the 

Omani-Yemeni border and these tribal linkages were a major source of 

identity within the society. The tribal organization centered on consensus 

building and valuing individual independence, which at times presented 

problems for discipline and collective action within the tribes.9

The north and south had almost no physical features that tied the 

country together. When the campaign started in 1965, few roads extended 

through the 400-mile desert. A single route, the Midway Road, was the 

only ground link between Dhofar and the rest of Oman. That road was 

poorly constructed and it was not until the 1970s that the Sultan funded 

the building of hardtop, improved roads to the south. This lack of an easily 

navigable route to the south further contributed to the differences felt 

between the Dhofaris and Omanis as the violent phase of the insurgency 

began.10

Though the Dhofaris had many differences from the Omanis of the 

north, they did share a common connection through their Islamic beliefs. 

This religious tie would prove important during the Sultan’s campaign 

against the communist insurgents.11

Another group that featured prominently in this campaign was the 

Baluchs. The Sultan of Oman had controlled parts Baluchistan, Pakistan 

through the 19th and early 20th-century and retained the ability to enlist 

Soldiers from Baluchistan into the Sultan’s Armed Forces. This would 

create another rift between the Sultan’s Armed Forces and the Dhofari 

people, as the Dhofaris viewed the Baluch Soldiers as a truly foreign force 

operating in their lands.12
74

Figure 5. Map of Oman

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/oman.gif (accessed 22 

November 2011).

History of the Campaign

In order to explain fully the Dhofar Campaign, a brief review of the 

1958 intervention by the British SAS into northern Oman is necessary to 

provide context and to understand the mindset of the BATT who arrived 

in 1970. The 1958 SAS intervention also assists in explaining the actions 
75

of Sultan Said bin Taimur during the later insurrection. Following the 

explanation of the earlier campaign will be a review of the 1965 to 1979 

Dhofar Campaign.

The rebellion in 1958 arose from a change in religious leadership 

within the Sultanate of Oman. In 1954, a well respected imam, Imam 

Muhammad bin Abdullah, died without an apparent successor to take over 

the religious leadership for northern Oman. A relatively unknown imam 

named Imam Ghalib bin Ali became the religious leader of Oman, but fell 

under the influence of the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments. These 

outside powers provided material, weapons and moral support for Ghalib 

bin Ali to raise a revolt against Sultan Said bin Taimur in the northern 

Jebels of Oman.13

In 1958, Iman Ghalib bin Ali, his two brothers, Talib bin Ali and 

Suleiman bin Ali, and 600 followers rose in revolt against Sultan Said bin 

Taimur. The Sultan’s forces were quickly overwhelmed and the British 

Government decided to intervene to secure their ally on the Arabian Sea.14

A squadron of SAS departed Malaya and arrived in Oman in November 

1958. The SAS consisted of two troops and the squadron headquarters, 

and only numbered 71 individuals.15

The original mission of the SAS upon arrival to Oman was to conduct 

reconnaissance of rebel positions in the northern jebels in order to launch 

later operations to kill or capture Iman Ghalib bin Ali, Talib bin Ali 

and Suleiman bin Ali. One of the major planning assumptions was the 

operations would take approximately six months to complete. The focus of 

the SAS’s operations was to remove Talib bin Ali, due to their assessment 

that he was the major leader holding the rebellion together against Sultan 

Said bin Taimur.16

After conducting detailed reconnaissance, Colonel DeaneDrummond, the senior SAS commander during this operation, requested 

a second squadron of SAS to conduct a major assault up the largest jebel

in the north, the Jebel Akhdar.

17 In January 1959, the SAS conducted an 

approach march up the jebel and successfully defeated Iman Ghalib bin 

Ali’s rebellion. Unfortunately, Iman Ghalib bin Ali, Talib bin Ali, and 

Suleiman bin Ali all escaped the assault and fled to Saudi Arabia.18

This early rebellion would have significant impacts on the later 

insurgency in Dhofar. The first impact was the constant concern by Sultan 

Said bin Taimur and his son Sultan Qaboos bin Said of a potential rebellion 

in northern Oman while Dhofar was in rebellion. This led to the continuous 

commitment of a SAF battalion to the north, leaving only one additional 
76

battalion to fight the insurgency in the south. Secondly, then Major Johnny 

Watts, Captain Tony Jeapes, and Captain Peter de la Billiere all served in 

this campaign and would go on to serve in the Dhofar insurgency. Finally, 

this rebellion, and a later assassination attempt, led Sultan Said bin Taimur 

to live as a semi-recluse in Salahah, away from the capital of Muscat. He 

still exercised complete control over all decisions affecting life in Oman.19

In 1965, another rebellion erupted, this time in the Dhofar region of 

Oman. The DLF led the rebellion against Sultan Said bin Taimur. The DLF 

had a number of legitimate grievances against the government, which 

included the lack of medical care in the country, individual movement in 

the country requiring the Sultan’s approval, lack of secondary schooling, 

and a lack of access to more modern veterinary care for the livestock.20

In 1967, as the British withdrew from Aden and South Arabia, the newly 

emboldened communist party in the People’s Democratic Republic of 

Yemen began exerting significant influence on the DLF. This led to the 

DLF changing their name to PFLOAG, and a significant increase in direct 

material support from the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet 

Union. Some of the support received included modern AK-47 assault 

rifles, 82mm mortars, and communist indoctrination in China and the 

Soviet Union. The support gave the PFLOAG a marked advantage against 

the SAF.21

In 1965, the SAF’s Northern Frontier Regiment and Muscat Regiment 

consisted of two battalion-sized elements composed of Omani and Baluch 

soldiers22 The SAF was a light infantry organization, trained along a 

traditional European model. Many veterans noted the discipline and 

capability of the SAF during the campaign in Dhofar, but early in the 

campaign, the small size of the SAF hampered its efforts. The composition 

of the SAF in 1965 was 50 percent Omani or locally hired Baluch and 50 

percent Baluch recruited from Baluchistan. British Officers provided all 

the officer positions within the SAF, as Sultan Said feared a possible coup 

from Arab or Baluch officers.23

During the Dhofar Campaign, there were three major types of British 

Soldiers serving in Oman: seconded officers, contract officers, and the 

Special Air Service.24 Each would have a unique role and effect upon 

the outcome of the campaign. Starting in 1958, the British Army began 

seconding officers to serve in the Sultan’s Armed Force. Seconding was a 

system whereby the British Army provided officers to the SAF to serve in 

positions from platoon commander up through the Commander, Sultan’s 

Armed Forces (CSAF). These officers wore the uniform of the SAF and 

reported to the SAF chain of command, but when their time expired they 
77

would return to the British Army with no loss of time in grade or service 

for promotion within the British Army. The seconded officers would serve 

between one to two year tours in the SAF.25

In addition to the seconded officers, contracted officers also served 

in the SAF, usually commanding below battalion level. The British Army 

provided contract officers, but they did not receive the same benefits as 

a seconded officer. The contract officers elected to serve in the SAF and 

received a contract for a set number of years. During the period of service, 

the contract officers were effectively out of the British Army and did not 

receive any special benefits or longevity while contracted out. The CSAF, 

Brigadier John Graham, recorded in his diary that the quality of contracted 

officers was very mixed. Some were excellent officers who led their units 

well, while others were mediocre or worse, officers who did not perform 

their duties. The contract officers did provide a higher level of continuity 

as many of the contracts were for a minimum of two years and many 

served much longer in the SAF. The contracted officers served within 

the SAF chain of command and were not answerable to the British Army 

while under contract.26

The SAF in 1965 had antiquated equipment compared to their 

communist adversaries. The SAF was primarily equipped with the Enfield 

.303 bolt-action rifle, a Bren magazine-fed light machine gun, and had 

poor equipment for fighting in the jebels in Dhofar. Additionally, the state 

of the SAF’s wheeled vehicles and logistical capability made SAF efforts 

to maintain resupply in the jebels difficult for extended operations.27

From 1965 through July 1970, the SAF continued to lose ground 

and influence in Dhofar. Sultan Said bin Taimur refused to allow for a 

reconciliation or Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) program. He also 

refused to address the grievances expressed by the DLF before the outbreak 

of violence. Due to Sultan Said bin Taimur’s concerns of a possible 

rebellion in northern Oman, one battalion stayed in the north while the 

other rotated into Dhofar for fighting in four-month increments.28

By 1967, the British Army completed its withdrawal from Aden and 

South Arabia, which served to bolster the PFLOAG efforts to expand 

control into Oman. The Sultan was losing government control of Dhofar 

and his unwillingness to address legitimate grievances caused large 

portions of the population to side with the adoo. However, during this 

period, PFLOAG also made costly mistakes as they worked to control 

the Dhofari population. Notably, PFLOAG worked within the villages 

to establish an atheist, non-tribal, gender-egalitarian environment. These 
78

programs were unpopular with most Dhofaris, as it went against their 

conservative, Muslim beliefs. This PFLOAG attempt to restructure the 

Dhofari society led to the adoo employing harsh techniques to control the 

population.29

In 1970, the British Government sent a team led by Colonel Johnny 

Watts, then the commander of 22 SAS, to assess Sultan Said bin Taimur’s 

counterinsurgency campaign. Two days later, a bloodless coup occurred 

in which Sultan Said bin Taimur’s son Qaboos bin Said came to power, 

and Said bin Taimur flew to England to live in exile. Sultan Qaboos bin 

Said was a graduate of the British Military Academy at Sandhurst and 

received training in civic government while studying in England. Upon his 

ascension, Sultan Qaboos bin Said immediately began a series of reforms 

within his government to address local grievances.30

Following the coup that brought Sultan Qaboos bin Said to the throne, 

the British Special Air Service (SAS) began operations in Oman. When the 

British government sent the SAS it was only in an advisory role and was 

kept secret from the public. This secrecy stemmed from a British political 

desire to maintain a smaller presence in the Arabian Gulf region, as well as 

due to the escalating conflict in Northern Ireland.31 When the SAS arrived, 

they served under the moniker of the British Advisory Training Team 

(BATT) and their sole function was in training irregular forces, known as 

the firqat.

32 Initially only one squadron of the SAS served in Oman, but in 

1971 another squadron arrived to assist in training the irregular forces. The 

BATT operated in four- to six- person teams as they mentored the firqat, 

which allowed the BATT to operate throughout the Dhofar Province with 

each of the trained firqat.33 For most of the campaign, the SAS served in 

4-month tours and operated in the Dhofar Region. They also had a dualcommand relationship with responsibilities to the CSAF and well as back 

to Hereford, Wales and the SAS Regimental Commander. The equipping 

of the SAS did appear to be one of the major challenges, and a source of 

tension between the SAS and SAF, as there were differing expectations by 

the SAS as to who would provide equipment and sustainment in Dhofar.34

Additionally, the SAS provided members to the Civil Action Teams 

(CAT). The CAT supported military operations by providing civil 

development, veterinary, and medical services to areas cleared of adoo. 

These teams would drill wells, work with Dhofar herders to breed cattle, 

undertake medical examinations of locals, and provide civil services in 

the name of Sultan Qaboos. Later in the insurgency, the CATs would enter 

areas the SAF cleared of adoo within hours, which demonstrated to the 

Dhofari people the immediate, positive effects the Sultan could provide 

to the people.35
79

Of note with the British involvement in Oman is the limited number 

of British that ended up serving in this campaign. The contracted and 

seconded officers only made up 11 personnel for each SAF battalion, and 

the SAS was never more than 400 officers and Soldiers at one time. This 

presented a very low number of “white-faces” during this campaign and 

assisted in furthering the information messaging that this was a campaign 

waged by the Sultan of Oman to defeat communist insurgents.36

Upon assuming the throne, Sultan Qaboos bin Said instituted a series of 

reforms to address the grievances the PFLOAG exploited. Simultaneously, 

the CSAF, then Brigadier John Graham, instituted a campaign plan 

provided to him by the SAS assessment team. The plan, known as the 

Watts Plan for Colonel Johnny Watts, focused on five major areas that led 

to a successful defeat of the adoo. The five points were the development 

of an effective intelligence cell, the development of an information team, 

improved medical care to the Dhofaris, improved veterinary care of 

Dhofari livestock, and the raising of Dhofari local security forces to fight 

the adoo.

37

As well as domestic reform, Sultan Qaboos bin Said also executed 

a series of diplomatic and international engagements after assuming the 

throne. This engagement assisted in building up the credibility of the 

Omani government and would eventually lead to international aid, besides 

Great Britain’s, to support Oman’s counterinsurgency efforts. Specific 

diplomatic efforts included the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat joining the 

Arab League and taking a more active role in the United Nations.38

As Sultan Qaboos bin Said continued internal reforms, he also worked 

to expand the size of the SAF. The expansion he conducted was gradual 

from 1970 through 1974 and fully was funded by Omani oil revenues. 

During the expansion and equipment modernization, the Sultanate of 

Oman received no outside funding or military aid. This expansion ensured 

everything the Sultanate acquired, the government could afford over the 

long term. In 1974, the Sultan also started a system of “Omanization” 

within his military to ensure Omani military members would start to 

assume a greater share of the leadership and officer positions.39

Raising of the Firqat

When Sultan Qaboos bin Said assumed control of Oman, he allowed 

for the reintegration of SEPs. His father Sultan Said bin Taimur was 

adamant that there could be no reconciliation with former insurgents, 

but his son recognize that welcoming SEPs back into society would only 

quicken the defeat of an insurgent force.40
80

Immediately following the removal of Sultan Said bin Taimur and 

the ascension of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, a squadron of 22 SAS arrived 

in Oman with the task of raising a local irregular security force. The 22 

SAS was only identified with the non-descript term British Army Training 

Team, or BATT, and had the specified task of training the firqat. The 

squadron commander during this pivotal period, then Major Tony Jeapes, 

had experience during the SAS action within the 1958 rebellion against 

Sultan Said bin Taimur and believed the SAS could quickly raise and train 

a local security force.41

The first firqa, was a multi-tribal organization. A leader of a small 

tribe, Salim bin Mubarrack, approached the SAS with the idea of recruiting 

former members of the adoo to fight for the Sultan against the communists. 

The CSAF and the Commander, Dhofar Brigade met the idea with some 

skepticism, but allowed the raising of the first firqa, Firqa Salahadin.

42

The Firqa Salahadin would prove to be the only multi-tribal firqa

raised by the Sultan and BATT during the Dhofar Campaign. The Firqa 

Salahadin formed around the leadership of Salim bin Mubarack, who until 

crossing over to the government’s side was the second-in-command of 

an adoo battalion in Dhofar. The Firqa Salahadin had approximately 40 

individuals who joined, all former adoo. Salim bin Mubarack believed that 

a multi-tribal organization would allow for the imposition of discipline 

upon the firqat formations.43

Not long after forming in February 1971, the Firqa Salahadin

conducted two major operations with the SAF in a supporting role. The 

first was the identification and arrest of the communist political leadership 

within the town of Taqah, a town to the east of the Dhofar capital Salalah. 

The second was a seaborne assault to recapture the town of Sudh, which 

the firqa and SAF conducted without loss of life.44

After the raising of the Firqa Salahadin, the Sultan authorized the 

raising of five other firqat. The next four fiqat were all tribally-aligned 

organizations with a tribal leader serving as the senior firqa commander. In 

addition to providing jobs and salaries to the firqat, the Sultan also provided 

veterinary care for the firqat’s livestock, medical care for families, and 

wells for water. The wells especially drew a number of people to the firqat

locations, and at times, the BATT had concerns that the firqat and their 

families would overwhelm the infrastructure in the area.45

On 5 March 1971, only thirty days after the raising of the Firqa 

Salahadin, Salim bin Mubarack died of an apparent heart attack. A month 

later, the Firqa Salahadin, self-disbanded as the firqat members no longer 
81

wished to serve in a multi-tribal organization. Most of the members joined 

their tribally aligned firqat and continued fighting the adoo. The firqat

program continued throughout the war, but all were tribally based.46

The firqat were an irregular security force, but did prove invaluable 

to the Sultan’s efforts to liberate the communist controlled areas in the 

southern jebels. The firqat were dependant on their BATT advisors to 

provide fire support, air support, logistics, and medical evacuation, but the 

firqat provided excellent intelligence and were very brave fighters. The 

BATT did experience a number of problems with the firqat during the 

course of the Dhofar Campaign, but outside of the Firqa Salahadin, no 

other firqat disbanded.47

The BATT served as the primary advisors to the firqat through 1973, 

at which point the advisory mission began to shift to the SAF. After 

mid-1971, the SAF and firqat worked as a complementary force during 

operations. The firqat was a light, irregular force, which meant they could 

be very unreliable for certain operations. BATT Commanders mention in 

their dispatches and in interviews the constant negotiation they engaged 

in with the firqat commanders to ensure a sufficient number of firqat were 

present for operations. If the firqat were not present during an operation in 

which the SAF took casualties, the SAF would believe the firqat withheld 

information or informed the adoo about the SAF movement timelines. 

There was never any definitive evidence of firqat sabotage of a SAF plan, 

and many of the interviewed Dhofar Veterans believe the firqat just knew 

it was a bad plan and wanted no part in it.48

The CSAF never used the firqat to conduct cross-border attacks 

into PDRY. There is some debate as to whether the Omani Ministry of 

Intelligence used firqat with tribal ties across the border as a cross-border 

force, but no written orders or signed documents provide evidence of the 

use of firqat in this way. The reason for this restriction on the use of the 

firqat appears to stem from the concern of conflict escalation. The SAF 

was stretched too thin fighting the internal threat to deal with a potential 

conventional invasion by PDRY into Oman.49

The raising and training of the firqat was not a completely smooth 

process. Besides the self-disbandment of the Firqa Salahadin, there were 

a few cases of firqa members returning to the adoo after swearing an oath 

to Sultan Qaboos. One example occurred on 10 May 1972, when a former 

quartermaster for an adoo unit, who served in the firqa for two months, 

returned to PDRY after stealing a Commando Carrier, which was a form 

of armored car.50
82

In addition to a few isolated cases of firqa returning to the adoo, the 

other major problem faced by the BATT was the temperament of the firqa. 

As mentioned earlier, the Dhofaris valued independence and individualism. 

This would present problems in a military organization, as members of the 

firqa would disobey orders, exercise poor individual discipline (especially 

concerning water consumption rates), and at times would not muster for 

patrols. This would cause a great deal of frustration for the BATT and SAF 

officers, and contributed to a feeling of untrustworthiness within the SAF 

about the firqa. Some of this belief was justified, but other times the firqa

did not patrol because they knew no enemy was present.51

Once the BATT raised, training, and equipped the firqat, they were 

employed increasingly as a static defensive forces, especially following 

the establishment of the Hornbeam Line in 1973. The use of the irregular 

forces, allowed SAF elements more flexibility to engage the adoo. After 

the arrival of Iranian and Jordanian forces to assist the Sultan of Oman, the 

SAF had the capability to begin conducting major offensive operations to 

drive the adoo back into PDRY. The SAF required a significant amount of 

time to build them capability, as it was not until 1973 through 1975 that the 

SAF shifted from defensive operations to larger scale clearing operations. 

These operations will be discussed in more detail in the following section, 

as they tie into development of defensive lines in Dhofar.

The firqa would serve throughout the remainder of the insurgency in 

the employ of Sultan Qaboos. They served as irregular forces, and provided 

the Sultan a means to bring SEPs back into the government’s side with 

honor. By allowing a Dhofari to swear allegiance and reenter the fight on 

the side of the government, the firqa created more allies than killing adoo

would produce.52 Outside of the Firqa Salahadin, no other firqa disbanded 

and there were no reported incidents of firqa members killing BATT or 

SAF officers. Though they were not without their problems, they proved 

reliable enough to allow the SAF to continue operations against the adoo.

The raising of these local, irregular security forces were the fifth 

tenet of the Watts Plan, the overarching strategy developed by the Sultan 

and British advisors in 1970. These forces proved a major element in the 

eventual defeat of the adoo, by allowing former adoo a chance to return to 

the government’s side without losing their honor. The firqa provided the 

SAF actionable intelligence and usually provided captured weapons when 

they crossed to the government side. The raising of these forces were a 

major element in weakening the adoo and the eventual PFLOAG defeat.
83

Building of the Defensive Lines

Starting in 1972, the Sultan’s Armed Forces, supported by the BATT 

and firqat, began operations to establish a series of defensive lines in 

Dhofar to disrupt adoo supply lines from the PDRY. These operations 

were part of the larger campaign to put pressure upon adoo movements 

and slowly defeat the insurgency.

The first operation approved by the CSAF to establish a defensive 

line was Operation JAGUAR. The goal of the operation was to establish a 

permanent presence west of Salalah in an area known as White City. The 

operation commenced on 2 October 1971 and the combined SAF, BATT 

and firqa operation rapidly seized their objectives and began construction 

of a defensive line through the jebel to the coast. This operation began to 

signal a change in the momentum of the campaign with the Sultan and 

the counterinsurgent forces beginning to gain and maintain the initiative 

against PFLOAG.53

Following the success of Operation JAGUAR, Brigadier Graham 

began planning Operation SIMBA. This operation’s goal was to establish 

a permanent SAF presence in the town of Sarfayt and to deny permanently 

adoo movement south of the 50 northing gridline into PDRY. This town 

was a border town next to PRDY and offered a natural narrow point for 

adoo supplies entering into Oman. The operation nested within the over 

arching strategy, as the CSAF wished to fragment and hunt down the 

adoo, and impose a total blockade of land and sea routes of adoo aid into 

Dhofar.54

Unlike during Operation JAGUAR, the reaction by the adoo to the 

establishment of a large SAF and firqat presence so close to the PDRY 

border provoked an immediate response. The adoo with PDRY artillery 

support conducted a diversionary attack against the town of Habrut, a 

town 80-kilometers north of Sarfait, on May 5, 1972. The attack killed five 

members of the SAF and wounded another eight. This was also one of the 

first direct actions by PDRY against Oman at this point in the insurgency. 

Brigadier Graham and Hugh Oldman, the Minister of Defense, expressed 

concern to Sultan Qaboos bin Said about a possible escalation in the 

conflict. The danger expressed by the senior military leadership was the 

weakness of the SAF if a conventional force from PDRY invaded across 

the border. Hugh Oldman convinced Sultan Qaboos bin Said not to retaliate 

against PDRY for the artillery support to the adoo.55

After receiving his military advisors recommendation, Sultan Qaboos 

bin Said built international support through the Arab League and the 
84

United Nations to condemn the cross-border attack by PDRY. This support 

would not have been possible if the Sultan had not opened up his kingdom 

diplomatically over the previous year. On May 25, 1972, Sultan Qaboos 

ordered Brigadier Graham to conduct a limited aerial attack against the 

Yemeni town of Hauf, which lay directly across the border from Sarfait. 

Before the air strike occurred, the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force dropped 

leaflets on the town to warn about the impending attack.56

After the leaflet drop, Brigadier Graham authorized the launch of 

an aerial attack against the Yemeni city of Hauf. He expressed much 

trepidation before the attack about an escalation of the conflict with PDRY. 

When the fleet of Omani Strikemaster aircraft, piloted by British seconded 

officers, hit Hauf a number of adoo commanders died in the attack. At the 

time, the SAF did not realize how many adoo commanders had been in 

Hauf for a PFLOAG conference on future operations. PDRY did respond 

to the air attack by expanding artillery fire across the border against Sarfait 

and Habrut, but PDRY never sent large concentration of conventional 

forces across the border.57

The secondary effect Sultan Qaboos received working through the 

Arab League was commitment from Iran and Jordan for additional troops 

to assist in defeating the communist insurgency. In January 1973, the 

Shah of Iran provided, initially, a battalion of Iranian Special Forces and a 

large number of Augusta Bell 204 helicopters. The helicopters, especially, 

were a critical resource for the Omani government. The Iranian forces 

served primarily in a static role within the fortified positions of subsequent 

defensive belts.58

Unfortunately, the overall effect of Operation SIMBA was not a success 

for the SAF. The positions established north of Sarfait were too difficult 

for the SAF to resupply with their capabilities at the time. The positions 

also required more manning than the SAF had the capability to produce 

at this point in their operations, especially with a large adoo controlled 

area between Salahah and Sarfait (a distance over 100-kilometers). A more 

gradual build would be necessary to liberate the ground between Salalah 

and Sarfait before the SAF could successfully execute the SIMBA Line 

in 1975. The SAF would not have the capability for long-term logistical 

resupply until the arrival of the Iranian helicopters.59

After Operation SIMBA, SAF decided to conduct a more deliberate 

operation expanding the defensive lines from Salalah towards the PDRY 

border. The clearing of adoo around the defensive belts, creation of the 

lines, and the manning of the positions became the main effort for SAF 
85

from the end of 1972 through 1975. The most extensive defensive line 

created was the Hornbeam Line, which extended from the coastal city of 

Mughsayl into the jebel to Oven. The line was a series of stone forts with 

defensive obstacles laid in between. Beyond manning the nine forts, the 

battalion that manned the Hornbeam Line would conduct active patrolling 

day and night to detect adoo movements across the line and any damage 

to the minefields.60

For the construction of these defensive lines, the first step was the 

establishment of fortified sangars, which was a form of stone fort. These 

sangars served as fortified locations from which the SAF forces patrol 

out. The Hornbeam Line consisted of nine such positions, and over time, 

the SAF built a series of barbed wire and mined obstacles between the 

sangars. These defensive lines extended from the coastline through the 

jebel, but did not completely bisect Oman to the border with Saudi Arabia. 

These lines would force the adoo into the desert, which made them easier 

targets for interdiction by the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force or the use of 

SAF indirect fire assets.61

As the SAF constructed the Hornbeam Line, the Sultan’s Civil Action 

Teams would move rapidly into the villages behind the line to build up civil 

development. The major focus of their operations was the construction of 

water wells. Secondly, they would bring in veterinary care and medical 

clinics to care for the livestock and people in the villages. The message 

presented to the villagers was that the civil development was from the 

Sultan. The critical aspect of the Civil Action Teams work was the speed 

in which they constructed wells. Later in the campaign, the Civil Action 

Team would start well construction while fighting was continuing outside 

the village, so that by the time of the village’s liberation the village had a 

new well.62

From 1973 through 1975, the SAF finished construction of the 

Hornbeam Line, the Hammer Line, Damavand Line, and finally, the Simba 

Line. All of these positions allowed the SAF to extend methodically its 

presence out from Salalah to the border of PRDY. Though these lines were 

manpower intensive, the systematic approach allowed for the SAF to build 

its combat power and capability to properly resource these operations. With 

the introduction of Iranian and Jordanian forces, the SAF had additional 

combat power to rely on that served well in static, defensive positions.

After the setback with Operation SIMBA, the CSAF ensured the 

development of the defensive lines was systematic and planned. The 

SAF did not establish forward positions, which they could not support 
86

logistically. Over time, this systematic pressure applied to the adoo

reinforced popular support for the government, especially as the population 

reaped the benefit of the CAT projects in their villages. The PFLOAG was 

never able to provide the desired civil projects to the communities to build 

long lasting ties to the population.

Figure 6. Location of Defensive Lines Built in Dhofar.

Source: Created by Author

The Sultan had distinct advantages when constructing these defensive 

belts. The first was the physical terrain did not require defensive lines 

across the entire country. The distance from the coastline to the jebel near 

the PDRY border is only eight-kilometers; the Hornbeam Line extended 

for 30 kilometers. These short distances allowed for detailed obstacle 

planning and a concentration of the Sultan’s assets to effectively disrupt 

the adoo movements. Secondly, by immediately bringing civil relief 

projects to recently cleared areas, Dhofaris could witness the advantages 

of siding with the government against the adoo, as they received fresh 

water, veterinary care for their herds, and medical help for the population. 

The third major advantage was integrated military operations with 

conventional and irregular forces to main the static positions and conduct 

aggressive patrolling. These efforts would hinder PFLOAG efforts to 

maintain contact with the civilian population and would eventually defeat 

the insurgency.

Lessons of Dhofar

By the end of 1975, the adoo had limited capability to conduct their 

insurrection inside Oman. Even after Sultan Qaboos’s declaration that the 

SAF defeated the adoo, PFOAG still managed to conduct attacks within 

Oman until the early 1980s. However, through the development of local 
87

security forces and the use of physical barriers, the government of Oman 

effectively disrupted PFLOAG’s access to their external safe havens. What 

stands out during the examination of this case study was the development 

of a long term strategy that incorporated the physical terrain, cultural 

demographics, resources available to the government, and a unified means 

of addressing the serious grievances of the population.

The raising of the local security forces and the establishment of 

physical barriers would not have mattered if the CSAF had not nested these 

means within the overall strategy. The government of Oman raised local 

security forces in order to create a Surrendered Enemy Personnel program 

and allow former adoo to return to the government’s side with honor. 

Through interviews with Dhofar Veterans, what becomes apparent is how 

the Dhofaris welcomed the adoo joining the firqat. The firqat received the 

former adoo with open arms, and considered the adoo “misguided” until 

they came over to the government’s side. This willingness to welcome the 

former adoo led more Dhofaris to defect from PFLOAG.63

The government of Oman, working through the BATT, raised the 

firqat and integrated them into their overall strategy. The former adoo

had to swear loyalty to the Sultan, and they had to provide immediate 

intelligence on adoo locations. This helped to solidify their relationship 

with the government and cut ties to PFLOAG. The firqat had informal 

communication with the adoo, which helped to convince other adoo

to cross into the government camp. Also, the firqat were not an over 

bureaucratized organization, but rather loosely manned, organized and 

led with the SAS serving as advisors. This system fit within how the 

Dhofari culture functioned. If the Sultan expected the Dhofari firqat to 

act as conventional forces, like the rest of the SAF, the firqat would have 

failed. Instead, this organization functioned within its cultural norms and 

maintained their loyalty to the Sultan.64

Likewise, the building of the defensive lines starting in 1972 was part 

of the larger strategy. After the initial misstep with Operation SIMBA, the 

CSAF developed a systematic plan for building defensive lines starting at 

Salahah and working westward to Sarfait. Once additional forces arrived 

from Iran and Jordan, the SAF, in conjunction with firqat elements, had 

the capability to build these defensive belts, conduct aggressive patrolling 

to defeat adoo forces and conduct civil development projects. The 

combination of the offensive operations to establish the defensive belts, 

in conjunction with civil aid, allowed for immediate, positive effects 

upon the Dhofari population. This would help solidify support among the 

Dhofari population for the Sultan’s government.65
88

Lastly, the strategy employed by the Sultan of Oman focused on 

maintaining the Dhofari culture. PFLOAG allowed communist ideology 

to influence how they interacted with the people of the Dhofar Region. 

PFLOAG worked to remove Islam from the Dhofaris, which was actually 

a unifying element for the Omani people. The Sultan incorporated the 

attacks against Islam into his psychological operations messaging, with the 

simple message, “Islam is our Way; Freedom is our Aim.” This resonated 

with the Dhofaris and formed a deep wedge between the people and the 

insurgents. If the Sultan had tried to attack the Dhofari culture or force 

a radical system on the Dhofaris, success would have been much more 

difficult.66

The success of the SAF against the PFLOAG was always in doubt. 

It was a difficult campaign, but the unified campaign strategy allowed 

for the use of complementing operations. By executing a strategy that fit 

within the physical terrain, worked with the demographic composition of 

the region, and aimed to address legitimate grievances of the population, 

the SAF defeated the adoo.
89

Notes

1. The Sultan of Oman and Muscat, “Speech of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos 

at the Police Station,” 11 December 1975, http://www.mofa.gov.om/mofanew/

hmspeech.asp? title=92 (accessed 18 October 2011); Calvin Allen, Jr and W. 

Lynn Rigsbee, II, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996

(Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 73.

2. Since the declassification of the documents related to this conflict in 2008, 

Dhofar Veterans are writing about their experiences and presenting their views 

of the conflict. Currently, most of the more popular works focus on the role 

of the Special Air Squadron (SAS) in the campaign. Examples of these works 

include Major General Tony Jeapes’s work SAS Secret War: Operation Storm 

in the Middle East and Peter Sibley’s work A Monk in the SAS. For works by 

veterans who served in the Sultan’s Armed Forces, Ian Gardiner’s In the Service 

of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency and Bryan Ray’s 

Dangerous Frontier’s: Campaigning in Somaliland and Oman are both pivotal. 

A perspective that is still lacking in the narrative of the Dhofar War is from the 

Omanis and the adoo. Members of the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF) have 

also started producing works, including Rowland White’s Storm Front published 

in 2011. 

3. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf was 

how the Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces called the communist insurgency 

at the time of Sultan Qaboos’ ascension in 1970. The communist force also 

used the organizational name Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 

Arabian Gulf, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the 

People’s Organization for the Liberation of Oman (POLO). For this case study, I 

will use PFLOAG when referring to the communist movement for consistency, 

as the overall aims and goals of the movement are fundamentally similar. I will 

use the term adoo, which translates in Arabic to “enemy”, to refer to specific 

fighters or Surrendered Enemy Personnel. The term adoo was also used by the 

enemy fighters to refer to themselves. From interviews conducted with Dhofar 

Veterans, when fighters came across the lines to surrender, they would refer 

to themselves as adoo as well: CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; 

CF2011091 4DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0002_

SESSION2A, interview.

4. Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 

1996), 26-27; John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency (New York: Palgrave, 

2002), 140-141; Ian F. W. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign 

in Dhofar, 1965-1975,” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel 

Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 177-178; Paul 

Sibley, A Monk in the SAS (London: Spiderwize, 2011), 61-62

5. Due to the recent declassification of all the campaign material, Dhofar 

is receiving a great deal of focus by the British COIN Center and American 

counterinsurgency practitioners. Due to this recent focus, the Dhofar Campaign 

has the potential to become a “cherry-picked” case-study for “silver bullets”. By 

failing to examine the full context of the campaign, one could fail to see why this 

campaign worked.
90

6. Jebel is the Arabic word “mountain” or “hill.” The jebels run along 

the coastline both in the north and south of Oman, and separate the vegetated 

coastline from the interior desert in Oman. A northern jebel, the Jebel Akhdar, 

figured prominently in the 1958 insurgencies against the Sultan Said of Oman.

7. Beckett, 175-177.

8. The population data was provided during an oral interview with a former 

member of the British Army Training Team (BATT) who served in Oman from 

1971 through 1974 and then returned to Oman to work in the Civil Development 

Office. He allowed me to copy the Oman Census Data for Dhofar taken in 1970. 

Derived from interview CF20110914DV0001_ Session1A. Descriptions of the 

Dhofari culture also taken from Jeapes, 19.

9. Interviews: CF20110914DV0001_Session1A, CF20110914DV0001_

Session 2A, CF20110917DV0002_Session1A. Through interviews with the 

Dhofar Veterans, one can surmise that individual independence was the highest 

personal trait valued by the Dhofari people. This did present problems for the 

British Army Training Team and SAF later in the campaign, as the Dhofari 

irregulars, firqat, would elect not to go on operations if they did not wish to.

10. Walter C. Ladwig, III., “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain 

and the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 1 (March 2008): 

64. Besides of a difference in ethnicity and physical separation, a large number 

of grievances from the Dhofaris drove the insurrection. Sultan Said bin Taimor, 

the father of Sultan Qaboos, required his written permission for anyone to travel 

between villages. Oman had no hospitals and very limited education facilities. 

Even with the discovery of oil in the 1960s, Sultan Said refused to expand Oman’s 

infrastructure and provide services the population desired. Besides for driving 

the insurrection, the underdevelopment of Oman led to significant emigration 

by Omanis to other areas of the Middle East. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontiers: 

Campaigning in Somaliland and Oman (South Yorkshire: Pen and Swords Books, 

2008), 60-61; Beckett, 175-177.

11. Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the 

Dhofar Insurgency (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2011), 11-23; Jeapes, 

19-27.

12. Jeapes, 31; Gardiner, 13-14; Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart 

Library, King’s College London, Call No: GB00099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. 

Annex D to Order SD/2939 “Composition of SAF,” 30 June 1965

13. Deane-Drummond Private Papers, Liddel Hart Library Archive, King’s 

College London, Call No: GB0099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. This information 

is principally derived from Annex B, Order SD/29 “The History of British 

Involvement in Oman,” 25 June 1965.

14. Oman had vital national security interest to the British Government due to 

its position in the Persian Gulf in relation to India, eastern Africa, and the Middle 

East, as well as Oman’s ability to protect shipping lanes through the Straits of 

Hormuz. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 155.

15. Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College London, 

Call No: GB0099/1 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. The operations order deploying 

22 SAS from Malaya to Oman.
91

16. Deane Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College London, 

Call No: GB0099/1 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. The original operations order 

just focused on Iman Ghalib bin Ali and Talib bin Ali, but the second order issued 

one month after arriving in theater included Suleiman bin Ali. 

17. The SAS and the Omanis also referred the Jebel Akhdar as “Green 

Mountain.”

18. W. C. Ladwig, III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and 

the Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 1: 65-66; Beckett, 176; 

Kitson, Bunch of Five, 155-201; Ministry of Defense, Operations in Muscat and 

Oman, 1952-1959 (London: The Historical Section Army Department Library, 

1964); A. J. Deane-Drummond, “Operations in Oman,” British Army Review

(September 1959): 7-15.

19. Ray, 60-63; Jeapes 18-20.

20. Jeapes, 18-24. 

21. Interviews CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A; CF20110912J0001_

SESSION

1A; CF20110913C0001_SESSION1A; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A. 

All veterans interviewed mentioned specifically the high quality weapons and 

equipment used by the adoo during their engagements with either the SAF or 

firqa. They also mentioned how the SAF was overmatched in equipment during 

the early stages of the SAF counterinsurgency efforts.

22. Ian W. F. Beckett, “The British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Dhofar 

1965-1975,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and 

Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 177.

23. Deane-Drummond Private Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College 

London, Call No: GB0099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. This information was 

derived from Annex B and Appendix 2 of Annex B to order SD/29 dated 25 June 

1965.

24. The British Government developed a special relationship with the 

Sultanate of Oman and Muscat in 1798, when the East India Company signed a 

treaty with the Sultan in order to prevent French usage of Omani ports during the 

Napoleonic Wars. The Sultanate never became a British colony or protectorate, 

but they did maintain a special relationship with the British government through 

the modern day. This special relationship mainly focused on anti-piracy and 

shipping concerns that could affect the British shipping lanes to and from India 

through the 19th-century. This relationship also led to the integration of British 

officers into the Sultan’s Armed Forces as seconded officers or as contractors. 

Deane-Drummond Papers, Liddell Hart Library, King’s College London, Call No: 

GB00099 KCLMA Deane-Drummond. Annex B to Order SD/2939 dated June 

1965. This annex provides the history of the British relationship with Oman from 

1798 through 1965, and provides background to the start of the Dhofar Insurgency 

in 1965. Additionally, other British officers from the Royal Corps of Engineers 

and Royal Logistic Services deployed to Oman and provided assistance during 

this period, but were not seconded or contracted.
92

25. The British Army charged the Sultanate of Oman the price of the 

seconded officer’s pay and allowances, plus the cost of replacing that officer 

in the British system. In the 1970s, the British Army suspended the cost of the 

replacement officer due to Omani budget issues. The Commander, Sultan’s 

Armed Forces, the senior commander in the SAF, was provided by Whitehall 

in London to the Sultan. During the 1970s, many officers serving in traditional 

line units in the British Army of the Rhine did volunteer for seconding in order 

to gain combat experience and leave the boredom of peacetime maneuvers 

in Germany. Information on seconding I derived from interviews with the 

Dhofar Veterans: CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, CF20110914DV0001_ 

SESSION2A, CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, CF20110912J0001_

SESSION1A.

26. Graham Papers, Middle East Center Archive, St. Antony’s College, 

Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Box 4 of this archive contains the transcribed 

copy of General John Graham’s Diary for his time as the Commander, Sultan’s 

Armed Forces from 1970 to 1972. During General Graham’s second year as 

the Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces, he devoted a number of entries in his 

diary to the question of how effective the contract officers were in relation to 

the seconded officers. Also interviews: CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, 

CF20110917DV0002_SESSION2A.

27. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A, interview. With the arrival of Iranian Forces in 1972, the number 

of helicopters available for logistical resupply increased significantly. Until that 

time, resupply would always be tenuous. The SAF did not have proper boots for 

operating in the rocky conditions of the Jebel. In interviews with Dhofar Veterans, 

many commented on the SAF wearing tennis shoes which had to be replaced after 

two days of operation in the jebels of Dhofar.

28. CF20110 914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A, interview.

29. Harsh techniques included shooting dissenters and holding cattle or 

livestock hostage to force compliance with communist principles. The adoo

did also attempt to collectivize land and establish model farms to demonstrate 

communist progress. D. L. Price, “Oman: Insurgency and Development” (London: 

Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1975), 4-5; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, 

St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Graham in his diary wrote 

on 13 February 1971, “Intelligence report to-day about camels being seized by 

communists in central area for resupply convoys. Owners protested so four subsheiks had their throats cut and bodies flung over a cliff.” This demonstrated some 

of the techniques employed by the adoo on an uncooperative Dhofari population.

30. Sultan Qaboos had served in the British Army of the Rhine with the 

British Regiment the Cameronians before returning to Oman. There have been 

no official documents discovered which provide direct evidence that the British 

Government sponsored this coup. However, the timing of the coup while the 

assessment team was in Oman; the positioning of a C-130 aircraft at the airport 

in Salalah to transport Sultan Said bin Taimur; and the former Sultan’s housing 

in London, until his death in 1972, indicate a large amount of circumstantial 

evidence that the British government knew and approved of the changeover in 

leadership. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview.
93

31. Beckett, 179.

32. Firqa is Arabic for “Company” and was the term for the irregular forces 

raised in the Dhofar Campaign. The plural is Firqat. Each Firqa raised was named 

for either a figure in Islamic history, Arab culture, or Omani heroes

33. This staffing also allowed the BATT to post a guard at night, especially 

as the BATT and firqat were building their relationship. When the SAF officers 

took over the mentoring of the firqat in 1973, they operated in one-person 

teams, which did not allow for a guard at night. Dhofar Veterans who served 

after 1973 that I interviewed indicated a higher level of trust with the firqat since 

otherwise they would never have been able to sleep during their two-year tour. 

CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview. The role of the firqa will be 

expanded later in this chapter.

34. Graham Papers, Middle East Center Archives, St. Antony’s College, 

Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/4. Interviews CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A; 

CF20110914DV

0001_SESSION1A; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A; 

DC20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A. The command relationship appeared to be quite contentious from 

1970 to 1972, when Colonel Mike Harvey served as the Commander, Dhofar 

Brigade. Both from interviews conducted with former SAS members and 

from Graham’s diaries, it appears as though Colonel Harvey did not support 

the concept of the firqat, primarily because he doubted their reliability and 

commitment to the Omani government. The Commander, Dhofar Brigade was 

a seconded officer and had responsibility for the entire Dhofar region, reporting 

directly to Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces. After Colonel Harvey departed 

Oman in 1972, Brigadier John Fletcher replaced him and many of the command 

problems between the SAS and Commander, Dhofar Brigade no longer appear 

in written or oral records. 

35. Ray, 148; Jeapes, 32-33. The civil support was a major part of the Watts 

Campaign Plan developed by then Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Watts, the 22 SAS 

Regimental Commander during his assessment of Oman before the coup of 1970. 

The CAT usually had a veterinarian and medical doctor permanently assigned to 

ensure the Dhofaris had access to their specialties.

36. The interviewed Dhofar Veterans presented these numbers during 

oral interviews: CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, CF20110914DV0001_

SESSION2A, CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, and CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION2B. The Dhofar veterans did state a number of times that due to the 

small number of British present during this campaign it really was a war fought 

by the Omanis and Dhofaris for their country. They also expressed that if a 

larger number of British had entered the campaign, the fighting could very well 

have escalated as the Dhofaris would have fought against foreign intervention in 

their internal affairs.

37. Jeapes, 32-33; Beckett, 180-181. Interviews conducted with Dhofar 

veterans stressed the simplicity and effectiveness of the Watts Plan for 

synchronizing efforts in the Dhofar Region. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, 

interview; CF20110913C

0001_SESSION1A, interview.
94

38. Calvin Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee, III, Oman Under Qaboos

(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 180-195.

39. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_

SESSION2A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview. The 

process of transitioning officer position from British to Omani officers continued 

through the 1980s with mixed results.

40. Beckett, 183; Jeapes 38-39.

41. Jeapes, 39-41. The speed that the Firqat Salahadin was formed was also 

reinforced through interviews with the Dhofar Veterans: CF20110914DV0001_

Session1 A, CF20110912J0001_Session1A.

42. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 

Call No: GB165-0327/4. In Brigadier John Graham’s Diary, he wrote about 

his reservations with the firqat on 14 February 1971, 7 May 1971, and 10 May 

1971. He saw the advantage the firqat would bring to the counterinsurgency 

fight, but also had specific concerns about their reliability and capability in the 

end. Information derived from interviews with Dhofar Veterans indicate that 

Colonel Mike Harvey, the Commander, Dhofar Brigade, may have expressed 

even greater reservations, which most likely contributed to the strained 

relationship with the BATT during his time in command. CF20110912J0001_

SESSION1A, interview. Graham’s diary also indicates the Colonel Harvey had a 

problem with tact, which required Brigadier Graham to smooth ruffled feathers 

in Dhofar regularly.

43. Jeapes, 54; CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview.

44. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB164-0327/4. Brigadier Graham discussed the arrest of the communist 

leadership in Taqah and he indicates this operation was a loyalty test for the firqa. 

The operations in Sudh are described in detail in Jeapes, 71-81.

45. The five other firqat raised shortly after the Firqa Salahadin, with their 

tribal affiliation, were the Eastern Mahra Firqa A’asifat, the Western Mahra Firqa 

Tariq bin Zeead (also called the Firqa Tariq bin Ziad), the Bait Kathir Firqa 

al Nasr, the Bait Ma’asheni Firqa Khalid bin Waalid, and the Bait Umr Sudh 

Defense Force (which was renamed the Firqa Gamil Abdul Nasser). Jeapes, 

111; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call no: 

GB164-0327/4.

46. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB164-0327. “Irregular Forces-SAF View” Annex A to Section 10, 1972. 

Also, Graham wrote in his diary on 7 May 1971 that firqa should be organized as 

one tribe, one firqa, and strength limited to 70 men.

47. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB165-0327/4. The Firqa Tariq bin Ziad was threatened with disbandment. 

The only information on this came from Brigadier Graham’s diary in which he 

records traveling to the Firqa Tariq bin Ziad on 7 October 1972 due to Colonel 

Harvey’s recommendation that CSAF disband that firqa. After Brigadier Graham’s 

inspection, he decides not to disband the organization, because they performed 

“not too bad” and heralded from the southwestern portion of Dhofar where the 
95

adoo were strongest. This incident may have contributed to the ill feeling between 

the BATT and Colonel Harvey. Other sources within Brigadier Graham’s papers 

also hinted that Colonel Harvey might have sent the disbandment recommendation 

back to London as well, since Brigadier Graham mentions responding to Whitehall 

about the Firqa Tariq bin Ziad recommendations. 

48. This is based on interview file CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A and 

CF20110917 DV0002_SESSION2A.

49. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB165-0327/4, In mid-1971, Brigadier Graham writes about a group under 

the command of a Saudi named Karama who operated inside the Oman border 

and conducted a series of small arms and mortar attacks against PDRY. This group 

had sponsorship from the Omani Prime Minister Seyyid Tariq. Brigadier Graham 

and the Minister of Defense Hugh Oldman were able to have the group sent back 

to Saudi Arabia after informing Sultan Qaboos of the dangers associated with 

escalation of the conflict. There was debate within Brigadier Graham’s diary that 

Karama’s group may have been an attempt by the Saudis to destabilize Oman. 

Interviewed Dhofar Veterans also indicate that Karama was considered a “rouge.” 

CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview.

50. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB165-0327/4, Graham Diary, entry 10 May 1971. Graham follows the story 

with the line, “BAT [sic] especially should take note, the SAS have become a bit 

starry-eyed about their Firqa protegees.”

51. 20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; 20110913C0001_

SESSION1A, interview; 20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; 

20110914DV0001_

SESSION2A, interview; 20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview; Graham 

Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-

0327/4; Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the 

Dhofar Insurgency (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2011), 156-158. 

Ian Gardiner’s book provides an excellent point of view from a member of the 

Sultan’s Armed Forces of how the firqa operated in 1973 through 1974.

52. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview. Killing an adoo would result 

in the adoo losing a man and no gain for the SAF, net of zero for the government. 

By recruiting an adoo into the firqa, the adoo lost a man and the SAF gained one, 

so a net of one for the government.

53. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; Jeapes, 135-144. The 

operations to secure White City most of the Dhofar Veterans considered the first 

of three turning points in the war. The other two were the Battle of Mirbat on 19 

July 1972, and the last was the operations into Saufait in 1974 which finally cut 

the adoo’s supply lines with PRDY.

54. Headquarters, Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces, “Warning Order: 

Operation SIMBA” (20 February 1972) from Graham Papers, Middle East Center, 

St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/1.

55. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

no: GB165-0327/4, Diary entries 9 May through 20 May 1972.
96

56. Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Call 

No: GB165-0327, When Sultan Qaboos bin Said approached Brigadier Graham 

on 8 May 1972, the Sultan stated that he believed Hugh Oldman had given him bad 

advice not to conduct a retaliatory attack against the PDRY. The tone expressed in 

Graham’s diary indicated the Sultan was disappointed that Graham had sided with 

Hugh Oldman and also recommended against action. The Commander, Dhofar 

Area, Colonel Harvey, also planned a ground operation using SAF forces to attack 

across the border. The operation never received permission to execute, and most 

likely would have completely changed the dynamic of the conflict if it had been 

authorized. Ray, 85-87.

57. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION2A, interview; Ray, 87. The role of the 

Sultan of Oman’s Air Force is just recently receiving more attention. The former 

Chief of the United Kingdom’s Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Graham 

Eric “Jock” Stirrup flew as a seconded officer in the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force. 

Also, a recent publication only available in the United Kingdom, Storm Front by 

Rowland White was published 9 June 2011, details the role of the SOAF in this 

campaign.

58. Ray, 117-120; CF20110917DV0002_SESSION1A, interview.

59. Ray, 120; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; 

CF20110917DV

0002_SESSION1A, interview.

60. Ray, 146-151.

61. Gardiner, 78; Ray, 86, 148-150.

62. Price, 11.

63. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_

SESSION

1A, interview; Jeapes, 57-59.

64. CF20110912J0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110913C0001_

SESSION

1A, interview; CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; 

CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A, interview; Graham Papers, Middle East Center, St. Antony’s 

College, Oxford, Call no: GB165-0327/1, “Annex A to Section 10: Irregular 

Forces-SAF View”; Jeapes, 39.

65. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A, interview; Ray, 146-161.

66. CF20110914DV0001_SESSION1A, interview; CF20110917DV0002_

SESSION1A, interview; Jeapes, 37-39; 
97

Chapter 6

Conclusions

To sum up, the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large 

land-locked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with junglecovered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the 

plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed population 

and a primitive economy. The counterinsurgent would prefer 

a small island shaped like a pointed star, on which a cluster of 

evenly spaced towns are separated by desert, in a tropic or arctic 

climate, with an industrial economy.

— David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice

Conclusions

As David Galula noted above, both the insurgent and counterinsurgent 

have types of environment in which they would prefer to operate due to the 

advantages provided them. Unfortunately, one rarely chooses where one 

fights. The counterinsurgency force will emerge victorious if it can rapidly 

adapt to the actual environment (not the one they wish they had), develop 

an integrated strategy, and apply their forces to defeat the insurgent. By 

conducting an integrated border control operation, the counterinsurgent 

force can isolate the insurgency from its external support and material 

supplies, and will diminish the insurgency’s ability to conduct operations.

When entering into an occupation of new territory, or assisting another 

country contain an insurgency, counterinsurgency planners must examine 

four factors to ensure successful border control operations. The first is 

developing a detailed understanding of the physical terrain. The second 

is examining the cultural demographics to determine their relationships 

to the border areas. The third factor is nesting border operations within 

the overall campaign strategy, ensuring the desired effects at the border 

complement the overall strategic end state of defeating the insurgency. 

The fourth factor is determining the allocation of security forces for border 

operations, including the type and mission the forces should execute.

Border control operations require detailed planning and a relentless 

focus on ensuring the effects complement the larger counterinsurgency 

campaign plan. The counterinsurgency planners and leaders must ensure 

they design their operations to fit the environment they are fighting in, and 

do not attempt to clone techniques from one campaign and insert them into 

another without modification.
98

Factor One: The Physical Terrain

The physical terrain figured very predominately in the two case studies 

presented in this thesis. The mountains of the North-West Frontier and the 

jebels of Oman made conditions very difficult for both sides of the conflict. 

The SAF used the terrain very well, especially during the implementation 

of a series of defensive barriers that pushed the adoo into the desert. The 

SAF realized they did not have to construct barriers across the entire 

country, which would have been outside both the SAF’s capability and 

desire, but rather they built barriers from the coastline through the jebel. 

By forcing the adoo into the desert, the SOAF could more easily interdict 

the adoo camel-based supply convoys. 

In addition to understanding the terrain, the counterinsurgent must 

also ensure they are prepared to operate in the terrain. A theme that arose 

often during operations in the North-West Frontier was concern for the 

lack of experience of the Indian Army operating in the mountains. The 

high peaks in the Hindu-Kush Mountains necessitated a degree of physical 

fitness and terrain knowledge that required specialized training. The loss 

of experienced leaders in the Indian Army due to the casualties of World 

War I made the Indian Army unprepared for combat operations during the 

Third Anglo-Afghan War. 

Counterinsurgency planners must ensure they fully understand the 

type of physical terrain in the border regions, to ensure a border control 

operation will have the desired effects.

Factor Two: The Cultural Demographics

The cultural demographics in the border region can have a significant 

impact on a counterinsurgent’s ability to disrupt insurgent external 

sanctuary. These demographics can also affect how the population 

perceives the counterinsurgent force’s operations in the area which may 

impact their ability to raise local security forces. Initially during the 

Dhofar Rebellion, the SAF was viewed as a force not representative of the 

people in Dhofar, due to the Omani and Baluch composition of the force. 

By raising an irregular, indigenous force with the firqat, the Sultan built a 

force loyal to him and willing to attack the adoo.

Both the Pathan culture of the North-West Frontier and the Dhofaris 

in Oman fostered a strong sense of individualism. Neither tribe was 

hierarchical and both groups had to rely on a system of consensus building 

to function. In Oman, Sultan Qaboos understood this and worked with the 

SAF and BATT to develop the firqat, who could be unreliable compared 

to the conventional forces, but still maintained their loyalty to the Sultan 
99

through the conflict. Outside of the multi-tribal Firqa Salahadin’s selfdisbandment following the death of Salim bin Mubarrack, no other firqat

organization disbanded.

On the other hand, in the North-West Frontier, the recruitment of local 

security forces had a more mixed result. The PIF was a successful, multitribal organization, who earned a reputation for strong military capability. 

The Khyber Rifles, however, had initial success under the leadership of 

Colonel Sir Robert Warburton in the 1880s-90s, but failed completely 

during the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. This would lead to major 

reforms in recruitment and training for irregular force in the North-West 

Frontier, which included banning recruitment of certain tribes and groups 

from the region.

As well as the role of cultural demographics in security force 

recruitment, the Dhofar Rebellion also demonstrated how Sultan Qaboos 

and his British advisors developed a campaign plan that resonated with 

the population. The PFLOAG attempted to radically change parts of the 

Dhofari society by forcing atheism and gender equality, and undermining 

tribal structures. Sultan Qaboos built a campaign plan that focused on 

maintaining the tribal structure and highlighted the importance of Islam 

to the Dhofari People. This was best encapsulated with the psychological 

operations message, “Freedom is our Aim, Islam is our Way.” This message 

resonated with the population in Dhofar and assisted in concluding the 

campaign.

This demonstrates the understanding of the cultural demographics at 

the border region are necessary for the counterinsurgent to determine how 

best to integrate border operations into the campaign plan.

Factor Three: Integration of Border Operations in the Strategic 

Framework

Of the four factors listed, this is probably the most vital to ensuring 

success in the border regions during an insurgency. However, the 

integration of border operations in the strategic framework depends on the 

previous two factors to ensure the border operations are applicable to the 

specifics of the counterinsurgency environment.

Over time during the British involvement in the North-West Frontier, 

the British Civil Administrators lost focus for why they had become 

embroiled in the area. After the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British 

desired to protect this region from outside raiders coming from the NorthWest Frontier. By the 1870s, the British started to become more concerned 

with possible Russian encroachment through Afghanistan into India. 
100

This would lead to the Forward Policy, in which the British government 

moved deeper into the tribal regions to create the necessary buffer from 

Russian involvement. When Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, created 

the North-West Frontier Province in 1901that action made this region an 

equal province to the Punjab or other major provinces and displayed a 

complete lack of strategic insight as to why the British were involved with 

the region to start with. By creating the North-West Frontier Province, the 

British now had responsibility for a region it neither desired to administer 

or the ability to provide the services required for a full province. This 

would lead to a cycle of under-resourcing and violence in the region, 

especially following the Third Anglo-Afghan War, that would never be 

resolved before the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.

Due to the length of time of British involvement in the North-West 

Frontier, it allowed for numerous changes in the British government which 

in turn, generated changes in strategic outlook and goals. Unfortunately, 

the lack of coherent strategy due to these changes only led to a deeper 

commitment of Indian forces into a region that served little importance for 

the British national interest.

The insurgency in Dhofar, on the other hand, had the distinct advantage 

of a single, benevolent, autocratic ruler driving the strategic framework. 

The Watts Plan changed very little from its inception in 1970 through the 

end of the Dhofar campaign. There was changes made to how the SAF, 

with British assistance, accomplished the end goals, but the plan always 

served to integrate the operational objectives. Even with the temporary 

setback caused by the overreaching with Operation SIMBA in attempting 

to build the first defensive line right at the border of Oman and PDRY, the 

SAF maintained its focus on the larger strategy and accomplishing the 

desired end state. 

Factor Four: The Allocation of Security Forces

Once counterinsurgency planners integrate border operations into the 

strategic framework, they can determine the allocation of security forces 

for the border. This allocation should include the type of force and the 

force’s mission at the border. Both case studies detailed key considerations 

for allocating security forces to the border.

If the counterinsurgent decides to raise local security forces, especially 

irregular forces, they must build controls into the recruitment system to 

ensure the local forces remain loyal to the counterinsurgent. The NorthWest Frontier demonstrated the dangers of rushing to build local security 

forces without considering if they were the right force for the strategic 
101

goals. When the Khyber Rifles collapsed during the Third Anglo-Afghan 

War, a number of them joined with the invading Afghan army to fight 

against the Indian Army. These deserters brought the weapons and 

equipment provided by the British government with them when they 

joined with the invading army.

Among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier, the British 

civil authorities had great difficulty creating a system that ensured tribal 

accountability for the local security forces. Neither the FCR nor tribal 

engagements seemed able to create a system that ensured loyalty to the 

government in exchange for providing security in the region. The cultural 

mores of the Pathans, especially the adherence to tenets of Pashtunwali, 

stymied efforts to creating a lasting, reliable security force.

In Oman, the SAF was able to integrate the conventional brigades 

with the irregular firqat to provide a loyal, indigenous security force. 

Part of this integration also included employing the different security 

forces to their strengths, and ensuring the government resourced what it 

had the capability to sustain for the campaign. Even though the Dhofar 

tribes valued individual independence, the Sultan was able to develop a 

system that ensured their loyalty. Part of ensuring this loyalty included 

the immediate arrival of CATs to provide wells and basic services to the 

tribesmen. This assisted the Sultan in tying the Dhofaris to wanting the 

counterinsurgent efforts to succeed.

This fourth major factor is important to ensure the counterinsurgent 

considers the available resources and properly allocates them as part of 

the overall strategy to defeat the insurgency. All efforts and forces must 

remain focused on defeating the insurgency.

Recommendation

The application of border control operations to defeat an insurgency 

remains a vital component to the success of a counterinsurgency. As the 

United States looks towards the future, a degree of uncertainty is apparent 

in the strategic outlook of the armed forces. Though President Obama has 

outlined a withdrawal plan for US forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the 

United States will likely remain engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan for 

years to come.

Currently, the US is engaged in a confusing policy in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan in that the United States conducts a policy similar to the 

British Closed Border policy on the Afghanistan side of the border. 

Simultaneously, the United States is putting pressure on the Pakistani 

government to conduct a form of Forward Policy on the Pakistan side of 

the same border.
102

The aspects of the Closed Border Policy in the Afghanistan side 

include the use of punitive strikes using armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

and a lack of interaction from the Afghanistan side to the tribes in Pakistan 

by US forces. The aspects of the Forward Policy include US pressure on 

Pakistan to conduct sustained engagements with the FATA tribes, the use 

of US foreign aid for economic development in the FATA, and increased 

funds to build Pakistan military capability to operate in the mountainous 

tribal regions.1

In order to have success in the border region of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan it is critical the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan develop 

a unified policy for both sides of the border. The tribes will move to 

whichever side provides them the least amount of interference and 

maximize independence. By having an uneven American policy, the tribes 

can continue to cause instability in the border regions.

If history is a guide, sometime in the future the United States will 

engage in an overseas operation that will require defeating an insurgent 

force. It is critical that planners for that operation understand the 

importance of the border regions to providing an insurgency external 

support. By moving quickly to understand the physical terrain, identifying 

the relevant cultural demographics, integrating border control operations 

in the strategic framework, and allocating appropriate security forces, the 

counterinsurgent force can rapidly strangle the insurgency and restore 

stability.

Note

1. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, 

and US Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 

November 2011); K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, Islamist Militancy 

in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and US Policy (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, 21 November 2008); K. Alan Kronstadt, 

Pakistan-US Relations: A Summary (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, 21 October 2011).
103

Glossary

Adoo. Arabic for “enemy,” this was the term for the insurgent fighters 

during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1965-1975. This was even 

how the fighters referred to themselves when surrendering to the Sultan’s 

Armed Forces.

Black and Tans. The paramilitary force used by the British Empire to 

replace the Royal Irish Constabulary during the Irish War of Independence 

from 1919-1920. The name derived from the mix of police and military 

uniform worn by the members. Many of the members were ex-veterans 

from World War I and had a reputation for brutality.

Firqat. Arabic for “company,” this was the term for the irregular 

security forces raised during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman by the Sultan. 

Many of the firqat were surrendered enemy personnel who swore an oath 

to the Sultan.

Jebel. Arabic for “mountain,” this was the term used to refer to the 

mountainous region between the coastline and desert in the Sultanate of 

Muscat and Oman. The majority of fighting during the Dhofar Rebellion 

in Oman occurred in the jebel.

105

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