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THE TRANS–PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP:

OUTLOOK AND OPPORTUNITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 1, 2013

Serial No. 113–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Edward F. Gerwin, Jr., president, Trade Guru LLC ..................................... 5

Mr. Steven Metalitz, counsel, International Intellectual Property Alliance ....... 16

Mr. Amgad Shehata, vice president, International Public Affairs, United Parcel Service ............................................................................................................. 24

Ms. Celeste Drake, trade and globalization policy specialist, The American 

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ....................... 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Edward F. Gerwin, Jr.: Prepared statement .................................................. 7

Mr. Steven Metalitz: Prepared statement ............................................................. 18

Mr. Amgad Shehata: Prepared statement ............................................................. 26

Ms. Celeste Drake: Prepared statement ................................................................ 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: 

Letter to the Honorable Ted Poe, dated August 2, 2013, from the Greater 

Houston Partnership ........................................................................................ 72

Statement from former Congressman Anh ‘‘Joseph’’ Cao ................................. 73

Partial list of Montagnard prisoners as of February 2012 ............................... 79

(1)

THE TRANS–PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: 

OUTLOOK AND OPPORTUNITIES 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

I am a strong supporter of promoting United States exports and 

increasing trade. To put it simply, I am a free trader. With unemployment 7.6 percent, we should be doing everything we can to create jobs for Americans, in America. Free trade agreements like the 

ones we have with Panama, Colombia, and South Korea grow jobs 

in the United States, help our economy get back on track and 

strengthen friendships abroad. Open trade is good policy and it 

makes sense. 

Right now, we are in the middle of negotiating a new agreement, 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the TPP, as an opportunity for the 

United States to expand its trade network in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. TPP will open trade between the United States 

and 11 other countries. This would make it America’s largest free 

trade agreement. Combined, these 11 countries account for 40 percent of the global GDP; and 30 percent of the entire world trade. 

We can make it even bigger after TPP is signed. It is possible for 

more countries like Taiwan to join. And I hope that is a strong consideration. 

For years now, many TPP countries have been experiencing an 

explosion in economic growth. The Asia-Pacific region alone is expecting to grow by 6 percent this year. This means more foreign 

consumers will want to import U.S. goods. That, in turn, will drive 

job growth in our manufacturing, shipping, and services industries. 

To put this in perspective, TPP countries represent a $1.7 trillion 

trading relationship for the United States. This makes it the largest export market for the United States. 

Many Americans are excited about what TPP will bring for them 

and their businesses. I know this because I have been hearing from 

my neighbors in Houston, Texas, how TPP will benefit our area. 

2

The Port of Houston is the biggest port in the United States on a 

per tonnage basis. With the expansion of the Panama Canal, we 

are primed to export even more to Asia. Three weeks ago, the Department of Commerce announced that Houston was the number 

one exporting metro area in the entire United States with a total 

of $110 billion in exports last year. That number will increase once 

we expand our markets through TPP. Houston will be able to build 

upon its close ties with Canada, Japan, Mexico and Singapore and 

the well developed, already emerging trade relationships with Malaysia, Australia, and Chile. 

America’s other major shipping hubs like Los Angeles, Long 

Beach which my colleague, Mr. Lowenthal, represents in his district, will see a lot of growth from TPP as well. The United States 

needs to be involved in trade agreements with these countries, otherwise, we may find ourselves shut out of a booming market. The 

United States is not the only player in the international trading 

market. The European Union, for example, has already negotiated 

agreements with Canada, India, and Japan. And China, Japan, and 

South Korea have also been having trade talks among themselves. 

At the same time, I think it is very important that we need to 

make sure this agreement is fair, fair to all countries concerned 

and it is fair to the United States. United States companies are not 

afraid of competing in international markets, but it is important 

that TPP creates a level playing field for all. And what I mean by 

that is we have to make sure that United States companies do not 

face a disadvantage from state-owned enterprises in other countries or risk having their intellectual property stolen by other nations. We need to understand the obvious and make sure that this 

does not occur. We need to set high standards in this area. This 

agreement is not about setting in stone already unfair advantages. 

Countries should not be able to steal American intellectual property. 

TPP is more important than the specific countries involved because it has the opportunity to set a strong precedent for future 

American trade agreements. This will especially be true as China 

opens up its economy to more exports and looks to sign its own 

agreements, competing with us and its own agreements to join existing countries. 

TPP is touted as a 21st century high-standard agreement. Our 

witnesses today will speak specifically about these principles and 

will be speaking for their industries. I look forward to hearing from 

them about what high quality free trade agreements should look 

like and what we should look out for in case there are some important issues that we may miss. 

I will now yield time to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from 

California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have a different view. The definition of insanity 

is to keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect a 

different result. We have been traveling this road for 20 years. We 

have the largest trade deficit in the history of the world. But one 

bright spot, as the chairman points out, is our ports where there 

are good jobs unloading the imports from other countries and sending back the containers empty or crammed with waste paper. 

3

Washington’s trade policies over the last two decades have created huge profits for Wall Street and an eroding middle class here 

at home. Now as to this TPP, it will eliminate over 1100 tariff lines 

among the parties, a massive trade deal with consequences that 

could very well be negative. We must be skeptical of this TPP because we were not skeptical as we should have been of the earlier 

agreements. 

The United States International Trade Commission has said our 

trade deficit with China would grow by $1 billion if we provided for 

permanent MFN. Instead, that trade deficit exploded from $84 billion in 2000 to $315 billion in 2012. According to the Economic Policy Institute, the U.S. trade deficit has eliminated or displaced 2.8 

million American jobs. 

In the early 1990s, the supporters of NAFTA criticized their critics as being Luddite protectionists. Almost two decades later, we 

know what the numbers are. We have posted a trade deficit with 

Canada and Mexico nearly every year since the enactment of 

NAFTA, most recently $62 billion with Mexico and $31 billion with 

Canada. 

Now I am concerned about the rules of origin which have yet to 

be negotiated in this deal, but we may be signing a free trade pact 

with China that is unilateral. That is to say, free access to our 

markets with us getting no access to theirs. Why? Well, let us look 

at the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement where goods can be 65 percent made in China. Then 35 percent South Korean content, but 

that includes Chinese workers living in barracks in South Korea, 

free access to the United States. 

One trembles when we think that the same negotiators may be 

involved in negotiating the rules of origin agreement in this latest 

deal. 

Let us look at the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement. Our trade deficit hit an all-time high in May of this year, $2.46 billion in 1 

month. Imports hit a record high in that month of $5.7 billion 

while U.S. exports in May were only 3.2 In fact, U.S. exports to 

South Korea from January through May of this year were lower 

than U.S. exports during the same period last year before the free 

trade agreement. 

We are going to be looking at a free trade agreement with Vietnam, a state-controlled economy. So the access we will have to 

their markets will be whatever their state-controlled economy decides to accept, whereas their access to our markets will be unlimited. Celeste Drake, I believe, mentions in her testimony, stateowned enterprises are common, not only in Vietnam and Malaysia, 

they could represent a threat to us, given America’s lack of comprehensive manufacturing strategy that is particularly the case. 

This TPP arrangement gives those who oppose the Buy American 

agreements which Congress has passed a chance to try to override 

them through the treaty process. 

And then finally, and this is a threat to our national security. We 

have used sanctions as an effective means of our policy and we are 

hoping very much to prevent a nuclear Iran through sanctions. 

Well, what does this agreement do? I am told that apparently, the 

USTR has agreed to text in which our right to impose sanctions is 

subject to a tribunal’s review. For example, the U.S. free trade 

4

agreement with Korea either party can have national security sanctions and that claim of national security is self-adjudicated whereas 

under the draft that appears we are prepared to accept a tribunal 

that could very well decide that we can’t impose sanctions. 

This agreement, therefore, poses a threat to our national security, as well as to our economy. I look forward to its substantial improvement. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the ranking member for his comments. He 

pointed out exactly why we are having this hearing, to find out the 

good, the bad, and the ugly about the TPP, to put it bluntly. 

The chair will recognize other members who wish to be recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mr. Kinzinger from Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our 

large and overwhelming hearing room. Thank you all for coming. 

We are here today to discuss the possibility of the largest and most 

comprehensive trade agreement in our nation’s history. The TPP is 

being negotiated by 12 countries including 4 with which we do not 

have existing trade relationships. No doubt, this would be an impressive accomplishment, a win for American business and middle 

class families. 

In 2012, U.S. trade with TPP countries totaled more than $1.5 

trillion. By lowering barriers and increasing market access for U.S. 

companies, the trade and the American jobs it supports can be 

made even greater. In addition, increasing trade, achieving a high 

standard agreement on this scale can have positive, long-term effects for U.S. businesses and innovators. Aiming high has the potential to influence future trade negotiations, lifting standards all 

over the world and serving as a permanent boost for American jobs 

and the American economy. 

There are certain issues that American trade representatives 

should give special priority to. These include ensuring market access to foreign countries for American agriculture producers, enhancing intellectual property right protections, ensuring regulatory 

transparency and competitiveness, and ensuring access for small 

businesses. These issues are at the core of what a 21st century 

trade pact should look like which is why they are included and 

should remain a top priority for U.S. negotiators. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. I am going to introduce 

each of the witnesses and give them time for opening statements. 

Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made part of the record. I ask that each witness please keep your 

presentation to 5 minutes because you may be gaveled. And as a 

former Judge, that is not a pleasant experience. 

If I mispronounce your name, I apologize. My name is Ted Poe 

and I have been called tadpole and many other things, so I will do 

the best I can with each of your names. But thank you for being 

here, all four of you. 

Mr. Edward Gerwin, Edward Gerwin is the president of Trade 

Guru, LLC and provides analysis and strategic advice on trade policy for domestic and international clients. He previously served as 

a senior fellow for trade and global economic policy at Third Way. 

5

Mr. Steven Metalitz is a partner in the Washington, DC, office 

of Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, LLP and counsel to the International Intellectual Property Alliance. For 20 years, he has advised on domestic and international anti-piracy and other copyright 

matters. 

Mr. Amgad Shehata is the vice president of International Public 

Affairs for UPS. He is based in Washington, DC. He serves as the 

chair of the Canadian-American Business Council and is treasurer 

for the Express Association of America. 

Ms. Celeste Drake is the trade and globalization policy specialist 

at the AFL–CIO. She actively follows negotiations for Trans-Pacific 

Partnership free trade agreements where she advocates for policies 

to ensure shared gains from trade. 

Mr. Gerwin, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD F. GERWIN, JR., PRESIDENT, 

TRADE GURU LLC 

Mr. GERWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee. The TPP has 

the potential to be a transformative 21st century trade deal—one 

that opens key global markets for American goods and services, 

while supporting stronger economic growth, good jobs for our workers, and key American values. In my prepared statement, I have 

discussed the TPP and its potential benefits from three different 

perspectives. 

First, how can the TPP be a transformative trade deal for America? Second, what recent trends are relevant to U.S. trade in the 

Asia-Pacific region? And third, how can we determine if the TPP 

is a good deal of the United States? 

Let me highlight a few points. The TPP can be a transformative 

trade deal in many ways. There are two ways that stand out. First, 

the TPP could strongly orient America’s trade toward the Asia-Pacific, especially toward dynamic markets in East Asia. These markets are forecast to grow two, three, or even four times faster than 

ours. By 2020, the Asia-Pacific will add 1.2 billion new middle class 

consumers to the global economy. 

In a report last year for Third Way, I detailed how these consumers and Asia’s growing businesses increasingly want what 

America excels in making—from heavy equipment and healthcare 

to financial services and wholesome food. A growing Asia has huge 

potential for America’s producers and workers, but to reach this potential, we will need strong agreements to clear away the many 

trade barriers that still block our access to the region. 

The TPP could also enhance America’s leverage in defining new 

rules for global trade. A number of key developing countries—including China and India—often support rules that protect their 

markets and favor their state-owned enterprises. A strong TPP 

could help America and like-minded countries to push back and advance an alternative vision that stresses high standards and open, 

transparent, and fairer trade. 

My prepared statement also highlights three important trade 

trends that are relevant to the TPP. First, there has been an explosion in new trade deals in Asia. In the last decade alone, Asia’s 

6

trade agreements have grown from 3 to 50, and 80 deals are currently in the pipeline. 

Secondly, America’s share of trade into key Asian markets has 

been plummeting, falling by over 42 percent between 2000 and 

2010. Meanwhile, China and Korea are growing their shares of 

these markets by 14 percent. 

Third, new studies show that countries are increasingly making 

things together. Because of strong supply chains in our region, for 

example, exports from Canada and Mexico to the rest of the world 

often contain a very high level of American content made by American workers. 

These trends highlight the need for a TPP that would get America back in the race for new trade deals, that would increase our 

share of trade into the region, and that would help America and 

American workers seize opportunities in global supply chains. 

Finally, for the TPP to be a good deal for the United States, it 

should be comprehensive and ensure broad access to foreign markets for both goods and services. It should have high standards on 

issues like intellectual property and food and technical rules. And 

it should promote key American values like nondiscrimination, due 

process, and protection of workers and the environment. 

If America is going to prosper in the 21st century economy, the 

TPP must also be part of a broader U.S. strategy—one that includes very strong trade enforcement: Investing in infrastructure, 

innovation, and worker training, and one that provides adequate 

funding for our hard-working trade officials. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I very much 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerwin follows:]

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82310a-1.eps

Testimony of Edward F. Gerwin, Jr. 

President, Trade Guru LLC 

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Outlook and Opportunities 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

August 1, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. My 

name is Ed Gerwin. I'm an international trade consultant and lawyer and was 

previously Senior Fellow for Trade and Global Economic Policy at Third Way. 

As you and your colleagues consider the TPP in the coming months, you'll hear 

repeatedly that the TPP can be a "21st Century" trade deal. The TPP-if done rightdoes have great promise to be a transformative, modern trade agreement-one that 

could help American producers and workers win fairer treatment for their goods 

and services in important global markets, while supporting stronger economic 

growth, good jobs, and key American values. 

The TPP as a Z 1 st Century Trade Deal 

There are three ways in which the TPP has the potential to be a new kind of trade 

agreement for the United States: 

First, the TPP could strongly orient the United States toward the growing 21" Century 

markets of the Asia-Pacific, especially the dynamic countries of East Asia. 

Economists project that, in the coming decades, U.S. economy will grow at an annual 

rate of less than 2.5 percent. That would be a full percentage point less than 

America's average growth rate in the six decades before the Great Recession. And 

this slower growth would have serious negative impacts on America's fiscal 

position, and on jobs, wages, and the quality of life for average Americans. 

Tapping into Asia-Pacific economies that are projected to grow two, three, or even 

four times faster than America's could provide a vital jolt to U.S. economic growth. 

The IMF projects, for example, that nearly half of global growth in the next five years 

will be in Asia. Much ofthis growth will be driven by a burgeoning Asia-Pacific 

middle class, which will surge by an estimated 1.2 billion by 2020 and make up half 

of the world's middle class consumers. These increasingly urban and affluent 

consumers will want high-quality goods, Western foods, modern financial services, 

and vacation travel. And, together with Asia's rapidly expanding business sector, 
8


82310a-2.eps

they'll press for modern infrastructure and increased spending on education, health 

care, and the environment. 

Here are a few of the many examples of how a fast-growing Asia will drive global 

demand: 

• The UN estimates that Asia needs to spend $600 billion annually, just for 

infrastructure to support new development. 

• By 2020, Asia's demand for food will double, to some $3 trillion. 

• Boeing projects that surging Asia-Pacific air travel will require 11,450 new 

aircraft, valued at $1.5 trillion, by 2030. 

As I detailed in a September 2012 report for Third Way, America's producers and 

workers are extraordinary well positioned to seize these and many other 

opportunities in the Asia-Pacific. 

Among its many strengths, the United States is the world's largest manufacturer, a 

global power in food production, and the #1 global exporter of services. Our 

companies are world leaders in construction equipment, infrastructure, and 

environmental services. We supply a third ofthe world's corn, cotton, and soybean 

exports and are home to a third of the world's leading food and beverage producers. 

Our companies are global leaders in health services, drugs, and medical devices, as 

well as finance and logistics. And we excel in building the planes, trains, and vehicles 

that move people and cargo around the world. 

In short, America makes what the Asia-Pacific increasingly wants. 

But for America to reach it's full potential in a fast-growing Asia-Pacific, we'll need a 

strong and comprehensive TPP to overcome steep trade barriers in key regional 

markets, including duties that average many times higher than America's, and a 

wide array of unfair technical, farm, service, and regulatory barriers. 

Second, the TPP can address new issues that America's exporters must overcome if 

they are to compete and win in the global economy of the 21st Century. 

As countries continue to eliminate high duties and the most egregious non-tariff 

trade barriers, U.S. negotiators are increasingly focusing on a series of new, crosscutting issues that can significantly impede U.S. trade-especially for the small and 

medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that make up over 97 percent of America's 

exporters. 

Our TPP negotiators are, for example, seeking e-commerce rules that would assure 

the free flow of data over the Internet, and rules requiring that competition laws be 

applied and enforced in a fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory manner. And 

TPP negotiators are scrubbing all sections ofthe TPP to assure that its various 

provisions are as user-friendly as possible for our SMEs. 

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82310a-3.eps

Inconsistent and duplicative regulations and other regulatory barriers can 

significantly increase the cost and complexity of American trade-without advancing 

vital health, safety, financial, or environmental protections. For example, regulatory 

differences between the United States and Canada require General Mils to run 

separate production lines for Cheerios sold in Canada and the United States, while 

Campbell's is required to sell soup in different-sized cans in the two markets. 

The TPP could help assure greater coherence among national regulatory systems by, 

for instance, requiring our trade partners to establish central authorities to 

coordinate and evaluate regulations and to provide sufficiently long comment 

periods for stakeholders to provide input on proposed regulations. And it could 

create mechanisms-like our current regulatory cooperation council with Canadathat bring countries together to eliminate unnecessary regulatory differences and 

assure the regulators are on the same page in evaluating emerging areas like 

nanotechnology. 

Third, the TPP-together with other u.s. trade initiatives-could help America maximize 

its leverage in the vital contest to shape global trade rules for the 21" Century. 

The World Trade Organization's decade-long effort to write new global trade rules 

is-in the words of The Wizard of Oz-not merely dead, but really most sincerely dead. 

With the demise of Doha, countries and blocs are now locked in a serious and 

important competition to define international trade norms for the 21st Century. 

A number of countries, including leading developing countries, often favor weaker 

rules that would lock in their current markets and perpetuate a wide range of 

barriers to foreign trade and investment. These countries seek to advance this 

vision though weak regional trade deals (which often exclude key products and 

important issues like services and intellectual property), as well as national poliCies 

that favor their state-owned companies, force the transfer of valuable intellectual 

property, or require local content or operations. India, for example, increasingly 

appears to be the latest practitioner ofthis approach. 

A trade future based on growing acceptance of these norms would put America's 

competitive and innovative producers and workers at a serious disadvantage in key 

global markets. 

The TPP could provide the United States with a powerful platform to push back and 

advance an alternative vision that stresses open, transparent, and fairer trade. When 

combined with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) that 

America is negotiating with the European Union, the TPP could enable the United 

States to team with a growing coalition of like-minded and economically powerful 

countries in the Pacific, North America, and Europe. While America certainly has any 

number of differences with these countries, we generally share a broad commitment 

to enforcing and enacting comprehensive and high-standard rules for global trade. 

Other countries are concerned about being left out of the TPP-additional Latin 

American and Asian countries have expressed interest in linking up with the United 

3 
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82310a-4.eps

States and its TPP partners. Even China has announced recently that it is studying 

the possibility of joining the TPP. While China is undoubtedly many years away from 

meeting the high level of ambition that the TPP would require, its apparent interest 

in a U.S.-led TPP is a stark illustration ofthe pivotal role and considerable influence 

that a strong TPP could potentially give the United States in writing new rules for 

global trade. 

Key Trends in the 21st Century Global Economy 

As you analyze the TPP, it's also important to keep in mind the new realities ofthe 

21 st Century economy. Too often, when we discuss trade agreements, it's tempting 

for many of us-supporters and opponents alike-to simply dust off old taking points 

about trade. But, if we do this, we'll miss some important recent trends that could 

strongly influence 21 st Century trade, especially U.S. trade prospects in the AsiaPacific region. 

There are three trends that merit your particular attention: 

First, there has been a surge in new trade deals among countries in Asia. 

In the last decade, the number of trade deals among Asian countries has exploded 

from three to over 50, and some 80 new deals are being negotiated. These include a 

pending megadeal-called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or 

RCEP-that would tie together 16 countries, including China, India, Japan, Korea, and 

the 10 ASEAN nations. 

As these countries eliminate barriers to trade with each other, existing duties and 

barriers to U.S. exports will loom even larger. This, in turn, will sap the 

competitiveness of America's manufacturers, farmers, and service providers in 

these vital markets and cause them to lose both current and potential business 

opportunities. The USDA has forecast, for example, that new trade deals that the 

ASEAN countries have cut with China, Australia, and New Zealand will reduce U.S. 

fruit and processed food exports by some $350 million. 

Second, America's share of trade into key Asian markets has plummeted. 

Between 2000 and 2010, America's share of exports to 15 key East Asian markets 

countries plummeted by over 42 percent. None of our major competitors in the 

region lost market share at anywhere close to this rate. (Japan had the next greatest 

loss, at 23 percent.) Meanwhile, during this same period, China and Korea grew their 

regional market shares by some 14 percent. 

While there are a number of reasons for this sharp decline in America's market 

share, the fact that America currently has only three market-opening trade deals in 

the region is likely a key reason for this alarming trend. And if this trend continues, 

America would, according to estimates by Third Way, leave hundreds of billions of 

dollars in potential exports and millions of good jobs on the table for our global 

competitors to grab. On the other hand, restoring America's share of major regional 

4 
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82310a-5.eps

markets to past levels would-in the year 2020 alone-increase U.S goods exports by 

an estimated $600 billion and support over three million jobs. 

Third, countries increasingly make things together. 

A recent landmark study by the OECD and WTO underscored the fact that products 

that are labeled as "made in" a particular country most often contain significant 

content from a variety of countries. The study especially highlighted the 

particularly close integration ofthe U.S., Canadian, and Mexican economies in 

making things together. It revealed, for example, that U.S. content accounts for $1 of 

every $5 of Mexico's global electrical exports and $1 for every $6 of Canada's global 

exports of transport equipment. Another study estimates that American content 

accounts for 40 percent of Mexico's U.S.-bound exports and 25 percent of Canada's 

exports to the United States. (China's U.S.-bound exports, on the other hand, contain 

only four percent U.S. content.) 

This new research highlights the importance of assuring that America gets a robust 

share of the business of globally produced products. It shows how closely integrated 

trading partners can serve as export platforms for American goods and services-as 

well as input suppliers for products made in America by American workers. 

This research also underscores why it's especially important that trade agreements 

like the TPP better facilitate trade flows-through clear, common rules of origin, 

increasing the efficiency of customs processing, and other measures-to assure that 

America has greater access to opportunities in global supply chains. 

What Makes a Good TPP? 

As you and your colleagues evaluate the TPP, you'll no doubt receive detailed advice 

on specific issues, chapters, and provisions and their effects on various sectors of 

the American economy. As someone who's looked at the prospects for a TPP more 

generally, I'd like to offer four broader tests for assessing whether the TPP is a good 

deal for the United States: 

First, is it comprehensive? 

Many of America's trading partners play only a few notes in international trade, 

relying on their competitive advantage in a limited group of resources, products, or 

services. 

The United States, on the other hand, plays a virtual symphony. Our producers, 

investors, and exporters are global leaders in consumer goods, transport equipment, 

and industrial machinery; farm commodities and processed foods; financial 

services, health care, and express deliveries; movies and innovative software; and a 

whole host of other products and services. 

5 
12


82310a-6.eps

As a consequence, America does best when our trade deals are truly comprehensive; 

we have consistently insisted on trade agreements that broadly open markets for all 

goods, services, and investment and apply core trade rules to all signatories. 

But achieving a comprehensive TPP will not be easy. Our negotiators, for instance, 

face strong pressures to exclude or significantly water down coverage of sensitive 

domestic sectors that are important to our TPP partners, like dairy, sugar, and 

apparel. However, excluding these sectors and others would quickly lead our 

negotiating partners to respond in kind, by excluding sectors that are important to 

American exporters, such as insurance and farm products in Japan. This, in turn, 

could lead to a downward spiral that would result in a seriously weakened TPP that 

would fail to deliver significant benefits to the United States. 

Second, does it embody high standards? 

The sophisticated nature of America's trade and investment also means that we 

benefit most from trade deals that are not only broad, but also deep-agreements 

that include high standards on key issues. 

An effective TPP must, for instance, build on existing WTO rules by establishing new 

requirements to assure that technical and farm standards are developed and 

applied in a fairer, more transparent, and more certain manner. It must facilitate 

regional trade and supply chains by assuring greater transparency, certainty, 

simplicity, and speed in customs operations. It should provide American investors 

with substantive legal protections and access to fair dispute resolution, while 

assuring the rights of countries to regulate in the public interest. And, because most 

American exports are based on some facet of intellectual property, it should include 

strong rules against infringement, piracy, and counterfeit products; strong IP 

protections for medicines and biotechnology products; and effective enforcement 

provisions. 

Third, is it built to grow? 

America's 11 current TPP negotiating partners together form a very significant 

market-one that accounts for a combined $12 trillion in annual GOP and over 45 

percent of America's exports of goods. Employing the TPP to streamline trade and 

knock down remaining barriers among these countries has the potential to open 

significant new opportunities for American manufacturers, farmers, and service 

providers in these key markets. 

Studies by the Peterson Institute and others emphasize that even greater potential 

benefit for the United States lies in a broader, comprehensive, high-standard AsiaPacific trade deal the spans the entire region, including Korea, the ASEAN nations, 

Latin America, and, eventually, even China and India. 

It is vital, therefore, that the TPP include mechanisms for efficiently adding other 

nations to a growing TPP, while assuring that the TPP remains comprehensive and 

high-standard. Additionally, it's important that the TPP establish programs that will 

6 
13


82310a-7.eps

drive continuing, further progress on key issues like trade facilitation, technical and 

farm standards, and regulatory coherence, and that it provide procedures and 

forums for addressing emerging trade issues. 

Fourth, does it reflect American values? 

For all their complexity, America's modern trade agreements can often be an 

exercise in promoting basic American values in the context of international trade. In 

chapter after chapter, these trade agreements contain detailed rules and 

requirements that promote such principles as openness and transparency, 

nondiscrimination, notice and comment, and due process. A successful TPP will 

maximize the spread of these vital values. 

The TPP also provides the United States with the opportunity to extend strong, 

enforceable rules on labor and the environment to additional trading partners and 

to highlight the importance of these issues in global trade. (Interestingly, it also 

offers the opportunity to strengthen our NAFTA-era understandings with Canada 

and Mexico.) It is important for the United States to lead in this regard, since many 

of our global competitors ignore these critical issues in their own trade deals. China, 

for instance, recently took labor and environmental issues offthe table in its new 

trade negotiations with Korea and Japan. 

The TPP and a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for Global Trade 

Finally, for America to prosper in the 21 st Century economy, it is vital that trade 

agreements like the TPP be part of an overall, comprehensive approach to America's 

global competitiveness. 

America must aggressively enforce existing trade rules to assure a level playing field 

for our producers and workers. We must fund modern infrastructure, promote 

policies that assure our continued leadership in innovation, and provide training 

and-when needed-adjustment assistance so that our workers are prepared to 

succeed in an increasingly competitive global economy. And-especially in an era of 

seemingly random sequesters-we need to provide our dedicated trade officials in 

Washington and around the world with the resources they need to continue to open 

doors and break down barriers for America's producers and workers and their 

exports. 

Conclusion 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. 

I believe that a comprehensive, high-standard TPP would have great potential to 

boost American growth and exports, support good jobs for our workers, and 

advance global trade rules that reflect America's priorities and values. 

I look forward to working with you and your colleagues as you evaluate the TPP. 

7 

82310e-1.eps

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16

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Metalitz, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN METALITZ, COUNSEL, 

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 

Mr. METALITZ. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Sherman, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this 

chance to present the views of the International Intellectual Property Alliance on progress toward the TPP agreement. 

IIPA represents the U.S. copyright-based industries that contribute so much to our nation’s economic health, international competitiveness, and to good, U.S. jobs. A strong TPP has enormous potential to open up important foreign markets to the copyrighted 

products and services that are the fruit of American creativity, ingenuity, and talent. Recently, that potential dramatically expanded 

as three of our four largest trading partners came to the TPP table. 

But these gains can only be achieved if the TPP embodies both 

high standards of copyright protection and enforcement and strong 

compliance mechanisms to ensure that our trading partners deliver 

on their obligations. 

Businesses and consumers around the world have demonstrated 

an insatiable appetite for U.S. books, music, movies, software applications, and other copyrighted works. But our industries still encounter many barriers overseas, most notably pervasive piracy. Piracy of U.S. works makes it difficult for legitimate distributors to 

gain a foothold in overseas markets and when those distribution 

channels do get established, piracy online or offline stunts their 

growth. This explains why it has been a cornerstone of U.S. trade 

policy for more than two decades under both Republican and Democratic administrations and with strong and consistent bipartisan 

support from Congress to get our trading partners to ensure the 

adequacy of their copyright laws and their regimes for enforcing 

those laws. 

Free trade agreements are a powerful tool for advancing this 

goal. 

The Korea FTA, approved last Congress, exemplifies this effort. 

It includes a state-of-the-art copyright chapter that we have urged 

U.S. negotiators to employ as a benchmark in the TPP. Even in 

those TPP partners that have relatively modern copyright laws, 

there are important and in some cases long-standing gaps that 

hamper our industry’s ability to fully compete in those markets. 

TPP offers the potential to resolve some of these problems. 

My written testimony gives several examples. I will just mention 

a few. We want the TPP partners to harmonize the term of protection of copyright, rather than simply meeting the minimum requirements in that area. We want them to enforce strong, legal 

protections for technological measures that right-holders use to protect their works, including meaningful remedies against trafficking 

in tools and services aimed at circumventing these controls. These 

technologies are absolutely essential to cloud computing services 

and to a lot of new ways of delivering copyrighted materials to the 

public. These governments should set a strong example by ensuring 

that their public sector uses only legal and licensed software. They 

should enact and implement deterrent civil and criminal remedies 

17

to copyright infringement and they should choke off the main supply channel for online movie piracy by specifically outlawing unauthorized camcording of films in theaters. This has been shown to 

be very effective everywhere it has been done. 

These issues are complex and we know that negotiating them 

with such a large group of major trading partners is especially 

challenging. The U.S. negotiators have worked hard and with 

unstinting dedication and our industries are committed to doing 

whatever we can to enable them to bring back a high standard TPP 

agreement with an exemplary copyright chapter. That outcome is 

critical not only to the continued growth of the U.S. copyright industries, and thus of the U.S. economy as a whole, but also to bolstering innovation, the healthy growth of the internet, and free expression. 

Our industries are proud of their role in providing more creative 

works to more people in more ways at more price points and on 

more devices than ever before in human history. A TPP that builds 

on KORUS FTA will help spread this creativity and innovation 

benefitting the citizens of all the TPP partner countries. 

Finally, the ultimate outcome of the TPP depends on a vigorous, 

prompt, and consistent compliance effort. Concluding a successful 

TPP agreement is only the first chapter. The rest of the story will 

be written in the legislatures, ministries, and market places of our 

trading partners. The U.S. Government needs to redouble its efforts and its commitment of personnel, intellectual bandwidth, and 

other resources to proactively enforcing our trade agreements including what the IIPA hopes will be a strong and comprehensive 

copyright chapter in the TPP. 

Thank you again for inviting me and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Metalitz follows:]

18


82310c-1.eps

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE® 

~C·'· 1818 N STREET, NW, 8 TH FLOOR' WASHINGTON, DC 20036 . TEL (202) 355-7900· FAX (202) 355-7899 . WWW.IIPA.COM· EMAIL: INFo@IIPA.COM 

aap AS>!oci.w<>n of "",eri~an 

Publishers, Inc. 

Written Testimony of 

Steven 1. Metalitz 

Counsel, International Intellectual Property Alliance 

Before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcolmnittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade 

August 1,2013 

Hearing on 

"The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Outlook and Opportunities" 

I BSA I The Software Alliance Independent YliI 

Film & Television ~%~A!llance' Motion Pic:1 

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ofAmerl~a,lnc. Reet>rdinglndustry 

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19


82310c-2.eps

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE® 

1818 N STREET, NW, 8 TH FLOOR' WASHINGTON, DC 20036 

~ . TEL (202) 355-7900· FAX (202) 355-7899 . WWW.IIPA.COM· EMAIL: INFo@IIPA.COM 

aap 

Thank you for this 0pp011unity to present the views of the International Intellectual 

Property Alliance (ITPA) on progress toward a Trans-Pacific Pal1nership Agreement (TPP). 

IIPA represents the U.S. copyright-based industries that seek to open up foreign markets 

clo~ed by piracy and other market acce~~ ban-ieTS. We are a coalition of seven trade associatiom, 

representing over 3,200 U.S. companies producing and distributing materials protected by 

copyright laws throughout the world. For nearly 30 years, this coalition has worked to ensure 

that U.S. trade policy fully rellec!> the impol1ance of copyright-based industries to the U.S. 

economy. jobs and international competitiveness. Member~ of the lIP A include the As~ociation 

of American Publisher> (AAP): BSA I The Software Alliance; Entertainment Software 

A"ociation (ESA); Independent Film & Television Alliance (TFTA); Motion Picture Association 

of America (MPAA); National Music Publishers" Association (NMPA); and Recording Industry 

Association of America (RIAA). 

Over the past five years, ITPA has followed closely and with great interest the progress 

toward a TPP agreement. Such an agreement has enonTIOUS potential to open Lip important 

foreign markets to the products and ~ervices that are the fruit of American creativity. ingenuity. 

and talent. Opening up these markets can mean more and better U.S. jobs for men and women 

involved in creating, marketing, di~tributing and disseminating the~e works. But these gains can 

only be achieved if the TPP embodies both high standards of copyright protection and 

enforcement, and ~trong compliance mechani~m~ to en~ure that our trading patiners deliver on 

their obligations. 

It is well e~tabli~hed that industrie~ dependent on copyright protection are critical to our 

country's economic health, to our international competitiveness, and to a growing and more 

highly "killed U.S. workforce. A long ~eries of economic studies commi"sioned by nPA has 

quantified this conclu,ion. ming well-accepted methodologie, endorsed by the World 

Intellectual Property Organization and employed in similar studies acro~~ the globe. The most 

recent lIP A ~tudy, released two year~ ago, found that the "core" copyright indmtries - tho~e 

primarily engaged in creating, producing, distributing or exhibiting copyrighted worksaccounted for o\'er 6.3% of U.S. GDP in 2010, or more than $930 billion in economic activity. 

These industries provided nearly 5.1 million U.S. jobs. or 4.75% of the entire U.S. private sector 

workforce; and those job~ paid, on average, 27% more than the overall workforce average. The 

latest edition of the study is in preparation, and we are confident that when it i~ relea~ed later this 

year. it will once again show how critical the copyright industries are to the American economy 

and to good U.S. jobs. The basic conclusions of these studies are also consistent with those from 

many other ~ources, including the comprehensive ~tudy of U.S. intellectual propeliy-intensive 

industrie~ relea~ed la~t year by the U.S. Depm1ment of Commerce. 

These economic stlldie~ also underscore the growing importance of international trade to 

the copyright sector, and therefore to the economy as a whole. The most recent TTPA study 

I USA I The Software Alliance entertainment 

software 

~~sor'~t'on 

Independent It! 

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20


82310c-3.eps

concluded that, in 2010, the core copyright industries collectively are responsible for foreign 

sales and exports of $134 billion, well exceeding the corresponding figures for major industry 

~ectors ~uch as automobiles, agricultural producb, food or pharmaceuticals. Bu~il1es~e~ and 

consumers around the world have demon~trated an insatiable appetite for U.S. books. movies. 

music, and software applications, both for busil1es~ uses and for entel1ainment and games. 

Those foreign sales figures would be even larger were it not for the barriers that our 

indu~trie~ encounter in many over~eas markets. One of the mo~t virulent and troubling of these 

barriers is pervasive piracy of copyrighted materials of all kinds. The widespread availability. 

both in physical marketplaces and in the online environment of unauthorized. illicit copies of 

U.S. work" makes it difficult for legitimate distributor~ to gain a foothold in o\'er~eas market,,; 

and even where there are well-established legitimate distribution channels. their growth is 

inevitably stunted when they must compete with pirates who pay nothing for the content they 

distribute or make available, who flout local rules and requirements with which legitimate 

market entrants must comply. and who pay no taxe~ on their ill-gotten gaim. 

These facts ul1der~core why the U.S. has long included ~trong copyright rule~ and 

enforcement obligations within our agreement~ with major trading partner~. and why building on 

that progress is so critical. Because trade in copyrighted materials is vital to U.S. economic 

intere'Sts. and became piracy in overseas markets i'S a major obstacle to growth of that trade. it 

rumt be a top priority to get our trading partners to ensure the adequacy of their copyright laws 

and their regime~ for enforcing thme laws. This has been a cornerstone of U.S. trade policy for 

more than two decades. under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and with strong 

and consistent bipartisan support from Congress. This policy has helped to grow our economy, 

support millions of U.S. jobs, nurture our creative 'park, and, not incidentally, foster the growth 

of the copyright 'Secton within our trading partner'S, thu~ building a global con~tituency for 

copyright protection and enforcement. The KORUS FTA. which was approved ]"t Congress, 

was in many ways the culmination of this effort. It includes a state-of-the-art copyright chapter 

that we have urged U.S. negotiators to employ as a benchmark in the TPP. 

A TPP agreement provides an important opportunity to build upon thi~ long-standing 

policy. Four of the seven trading partners with whom the initiative wa'S originally launched have 

already signed bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the United States. and all of those FTAswith Australia. Chile. Peru and Singapore - included ~trong intellectual property chapter~ with 

meaningful copyright provisions. A successful TPP will build on and extend these achievements, 

by bringing the copyright law and enforcement regimes of countries like New Zealand, Vietnam, 

Brunei and Malaysia into compliance with the'Se best practices. 

In recent months. three of Oll[ country' ~ four large~t trading partner~ - Canada. Mexico 

and Japan - have joined the TPP negotiations, thus dramatically expanding it~ importance. Each 

of these countries i~ a critically important exp0l1 market for the U.S. copyright indu~tries; and 

each has a relatively modem copyright law. Yet in each of these countries there are also 

imp0l1ant and in some case'S long-standing gaps. either in legal protections under copyright or in 

enforcement ~tandards (or both), which hamper our industries' ability to fully compete in these 

markets. Their engagement in TPP offer~ the potential to re~olve ~ome of the~e problems. 

Moreover, the TPP countries hope that other nation~ will join the fini~hed agreement. It is 

critical that we get it right. 

5454406.1/40488·00001 2 
21


82310c-4.eps

Let me offer a few examples of the kinds of specific improvements in the laws and 

enforcement practices of our trading partners that lIP A hopes will be achieved in the TPP 

negotiatiom. In each of these areas, the status quo falls ~hort of meeting the current global 

norms, as embodied in KORUS PTA and other instruments, in ways that are damaging to U.S. 

copyright indu~tries. Of cour~e it is not po~sible here to provide a comprehensive list, hut the 

following may hit some of the high points. 

Term of Copyright Protection. Over the pa~t couple of decade~, most major economies 

have moved to extend the term of copyright protection beyond the minimum leveb required by 

the WTO TRIPS Agreement, to reflect longer life-span~ and the need to maintain incentive~ for 

inve~tment in the conservation and di~~ernination of older work~. Many TPP partner~ have 

extended term for at least some types of works. but there are some important outliers. notably 

Canada. New Zealand. and Japan (other than for films). Greater harmonization of term will 

facilitate international commerce by minimizing the friction that occur!:l when a work is !:ltill 

under copyright protection in one country but not in another. The TPP agreement ~hould commit 

all participants to adhere to the evolving global norm of longer terms. 

Technolo~dcal Protection Measure~. The Internet ha~ opened up new and exciting way~ 

of delivering content to consumers, using a variety of business models and price points. The 

viability of these innovative meam of delivery - notably including cloud computing !:lervicesdepend'S directly on the ability to use technology to manage acce~~ to the~e 'Service~ and the 

underlying content. For thi~ rea~on, ~trong legal protection'S for technological mea~ure~ 

employed by rights holders to protect their works. and meaningful civil and criminal remedies 

against trafficking in tools or services aimed at circumventing these technological controls. are 

critical feature, of all 21st century copyright laws. While those TPP partne" that have recently 

entered into FTA~ with the U.S. have taken on (and in most cases implemented) detailed 

obligatiom in thi~ field, the other partner~ generally have not and in a number of ca~e~ there are 

significant gaps to be filled. Few improvement~ are more critical to growing international digital 

marketplaces for copyrighted materials in the years ahead. 

Govemment Legalization. Govemments are among the world's biggest consumers of 

software. but problem'S persi'St with high level'S of unlicensed 'Software use by government 

agencies. The KORUS FTA and other U.S. trade agreements impose obligations on 

government~ to emure that their ~oftware use i~ legal. The TPP ~hould build on and strengthen 

these obligations on government legalization programs. both to ensure legal software use in the 

public sector and to encourage governments to set a strong example for the private sector on the 

need to addre!:ls lP infringement and implement best practice~ in IT management. 

Civil and Criminal Remedies. To provide the right incentives for creation and 

dissemination of work~ within the economie~ of all our TPP partners, their enforcement regimes 

must also be ~trong, comprehensive and up-to-date, and they must deliver fully compensatory 

and deterrent remedies. Among other requirements, TPP should address: 

5454406.1/40488·00001 

Pre-set (Statutory) Damages. Traditional formulations for calculating civil 

compensatory damage!:l for copyright infringement too often fall short of deterrent levels. 

Thi~ i~ not a theoretical problem: in many markets, very low damages award~ allow 

infringers to treat liability (if one gets caught) as ~imply a co~t of doing bu~ine'S'S. A key 
22


82310c-5.eps

element of solving this problem is to establish pre-set damage levels that can be chosen 

by right holders in lieu of proving actual damages. Such a regime provides needed 

deterrence. and respond~ effectively to scenarios (such as illicit Internet uploading and 

streaming) in which calculation of actual damage~ is extremely difficult. While statutory 

damages are a well-e~tabli~hed feature of U.S. law, mo~t of our TPP pminers do 110t yet 

provide this important enforcement tool. 

Camcording. The great majority of pirate movie~ distributed via the Internet are 

sourced to cinemas where high-quality digital copies are surreptitiously recorded off the 

~creen, usually in the first few day~ of theatrical release. While technically thi~ 

constitutes copyright infringement, few countries have effectively combatted illicit 

camcording without putting a specific law on the books against it. Experience has 

demonstrated that when specific anti-camcording laws are enacted and are vigorously 

enforced, they are extraordinarily effective in choking off this supply channel for Internet 

audio-visual pirates. A~ many of om current FTA~ predate the proliferation of highquality camcording. this gap remains to be filled among ~everal of our TPP partner~. 

although impOitant markets ~uch as Japan, Canada and Malaysia are already largely in 

compliance. 

Criminal Remedies. Piracy remaim a big bu~iness; but the Internet has brought 

with it high-volume piracy operations in which money doe~ not directly change hand~ 

between ~upplier and customer. There is also the perva~ive problem of enterprises that 

gain commercial benefit from using unlicensed software and other copyright products to 

conduct their business. It is thus essential that criminal remedies be available for all 

piracy carried out "on a commercial scale:' whether for direct or indirect commercial 

benefit. a~ defined in part by the volume of infringement. Thi~ h particularly important 

in the many TPP countries in which the civil courts are unlikely to be effective in 

imposing deterrent remedies. 

Other imp011ant copyright issues at play in the TPP negotiations include providing a 

strong framework for enforcement against online piracy, including effective incentives for 

cooperation among all participants in the digital networked environment. as well as ensuring that 

exceptions and limitations to copyright protection conform to well-e~tabli~hed international 

norms. 

The issues summarized above are technically complex. and we recognize that 

negotiations on these issues with such a large group of major trading partners is challenging. 

While we appreciate the challenges that U.S. negotiators face. and are grateful to them for their 

hard work and umtinting dedication. the end goal for om industries remaim the same: 

negotiation of a high 'ltandard agreement that provides for ~trong protection~ and enforcement of 

copyrighted product~ and services. 

Despite some claims to the contrary, strong copyright protection and enforcement is 

critical to bobtering innovation, the growth of the Internet and free expression. The copyright 

industries represented by TTPA depend upon freedom of speech. which is the lifeblood of creato" 

everywhere. As the Supreme C0U11 hus acknowledged. "copyright i~ the engine of free 

expression." Companies that are members of lIP A' s associations are also at the forefront of 

5454406.1/40488·00001 4 
23


82310c-6.eps

innovation in the delivery of content - providing more creative works to more people in more 

ways at more price points and on more devices than ever before in human history. u.s. copyright law ha~ made a huge contribution to achieving thi~ result: and a TPP that adopb 

provisiom similar to prior U.S. FTAs ~uch a~ KORUS - which are fully consi~tent with U.S. law 

- will help spread this creativity and innovation throughout TPP market~. 

Finally. it is important to note that while my remarks today have focused on the copyright 

element~ of the TPP given the focu~ of IIPA's work. many other aspect~ of the agreement are 

critically important to allowing U.S. copyright industry companie!:l to access and compete in TPP 

markets. Among other features, TPP mu~t provide non-discriminatory market access for 

companie~. products and ~ervices, including provision~ to enable crm~-border data flow~ and 

prohibit local server requirements. Addressing these issues. along with strong copyright 

protection and enforcement. is key to the success of this agreement for the copyright industries. 

Whatever emerges from the TPP process, a good outcome will depend on a vigorous. 

prompt and consistent compliance eff011. While most of our trading partnen have done a good 

job of living up to the commitment~ they have made in previous FTA~ to upgrade their copyright 

law and enforcement regime~. some have not. Realistically we must anticipate that concluding a 

successful TPP agreement is only the first chapter, and the rest of the story will be written in the 

legislatures. ministries and marketplaces of our trading partnen. where these critical 

commitments must bear fruit. The U.S. government need~ to redouble its efforts, and its 

commitment of personneL intellectual bandwidth. and other resources. to the proactive 

enforcement of our trade agreements. including what liP A hopes will be a strong and 

comprehensive copyright chapter in the TPP. 

5454406.1/40488·00001 
24

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Shehata, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. AMGAD SHEHATA, VICE PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 

Mr. SHEHATA. Chairman Poe, thank you, and Ranking Member 

Sherman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and its 

effects on the U.S. economy. I am testifying today on behalf of UPS 

and our nearly 400,000 employees working in the United States 

and around the globe. In 1906, an enterprising 19-year-old, Jim Casey, borrowed $100 

from a friend and established American Messenger Company in Seattle, Washington. A lot has changed in 100 years. The American 

Messenger Company became United Parcel Service which eventually grew into the world’s largest package delivery and logistics 

company. Today, UPS operates in 220 countries and territories 

with a fleet of 100,000 vehicles and is one of the world’s largest airlines. 

We handle more than 6 percent of the U.S. GDP and 2 percent 

of the global GDP every day. 

With 95 percent of the world’s consumers living outside of the 

United States, new trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are critical to providing U.S. businesses greater access to 

the global marketplace. The TPP’s agreements are important to the 

global economy, stems from its recognition of some of the fastestgrowing regions in the world. With Japan’s recent entry into the 

negotiations, alongside the likes of Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia, a successful TPP would be the most commercially significant 

free trade agreement ever negotiated; as we heard earlier, representing a third of the world’s trade and 40 percent of global GDP, 

strategically integrating American supply chains with the Asia-Pacific. 

UPS’s goals within the TPP. Free trade agreements such as the 

TPP offer real, tangible benefits to UPS and our customers. As a 

global transportation company, UPS is expected to benefit greatly 

from the growth in trade. In our experience, with every new FTA, 

UPS’s export volume to that particular market increases on average over 20 percent in the first year. Of course, it is not enough 

to fill planes with goods if one cannot quickly get shipments to customers, freely establish as a foreign company, hire your own people 

or confidently invest in these foreign markets. In many of these 

markets we face a highly regulated transportation sector, complex 

board of procedures, and incoherent domestic regulations which effectively prevent us from providing the best and most competitive 

services to our customers. 

Through the TPP, we expect to secure critical commitments on 

market access, customs and trade facilitation, and regulatory disciplines which will allow us to compete on a level playing field. We 

operate in the new reality where businesses are linked together 

through a web of interconnected, predictable, and efficient supply 

chains. Inputs come from all over the world and are shipped to create products with the greatest values for consumers here in the 

U.S. or for eventual export. In order to enable these supply chains, 

25

UPS seeks strong commitments on customs and trade facilitation 

for express shipments including a competitive de minimis as well 

as electronic pre-clearance and guaranteed time release. Measures 

such as these are the basic building blocks of a modern and fluid 

trading regime. And best of all, these improvements and efficiency 

and regulatory coherence do not have to compromise the supply 

chain security. And in fact, can improve by leveraging new technological advancements. 

In conclusion, exporting to new markets continues to be the lifeblood of growth for the American economy and services are the central nervous system on which U.S. businesses rely, particularly 

SMEs. These businesses cannot penetrate foreign markets without 

support of a competitive and fluid supply chain. They must have 

free access to foreign markets and nondiscriminatory treatment 

within those markets. Given the TPP’s ambition for market access 

and setting a global gold standard, it is timely for this subcommittee to be holding its hearing today. At this critical point in 

global economic recovery, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to 

demonstrate its leadership in advancing a global trade agenda. We 

must oppose demands to accept protectionism. We cannot afford to 

turn the clock back on international trade, particularly the growing 

Trans-Pacific market. 

After the 18th round of negotiations this month in Malaysia, we 

are enthused by the vigor with which the U.S. and all other parties 

are attempting to close open items within the remaining chapters 

and successfully conclude negotiations this year. 

Thank you again for your attention and your ability to focus on 

this very important issue. A comprehensive and commercially 

meaningful TPP is of vital importance to the expansion and prosperity of America’s economy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shehata follows:]

26


82310b-1.eps

Written Testimony of Mr. Amgad Shehata 

Vice President, UPS International Public Affairs 

Before the 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee 

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Outlook and Opportunities 

August 1, 2013 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on the benefits of the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership (TPP) agreement to the US economy 

I am testifying today on behalf of UPS and our nearly 400,000 employees 

working in the United States and around the globe. In 1907 an enterprising 19-

year-old, Jim Casey, borrowed $100 from a friend and established the American 

Messenger Company in Seattle, Washington. Messengers ran errands and 

delivered packages in response to telephone calls received at their basement 

headquarters. They made most deliveries on foot and used bicycles for longer 

trips. 

A lot has changed in the 100 years since. The American Messenger Company 

became United Parcel Service, which eventually grew into the world's largest 

package delivery company. Today, UPS is a global leader in logistics offering a 

broad range of solutions including the transportation of packages and freight; the 

facilitation of international trade and the deployment of advanced technology to 

more efficiently manage the world of business. UPS operates in 220 countries 

and territories with a fleet of nearly 100,000 vehicles. UPS handles more than 6% 

of the US GOP and 2% of the global GOP every day. And, while UPS operates 

the ih largest airline in the United States, we still make some deliveries by 

bicycle in places around the globe. 

There is little doubt that the flourishing of cross-border commerce -- first 

throughout the United States and then in foreign markets -- facilitated the growth 

of UPS from its humble beginnings. Indeed, the creation of new trade lanes and 

elimination of trade barriers has allowed UPS to become what it is today - a 

global transportation network with a global workforce, servicing the global needs 

of our customers. 

In today's economy, however, growth has been stagnating, both in the U.S. and 

globally. One of the fastest ways to stimulate a weak economy is through 

international trade. Trade promotes economic development which, in turn, 

creates jobs. In fact, international trade currently supports approximately 38 

million American jobs. 

With 95% of the world's consumers living outside of the United States, new trade 
27


82310b-2.eps

agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are critical to providing U.S. 

businesses greater access to the global marketplace. 

The TPP agreement's importance to the global economy stems from its 

recognition of some of the fastest growing regions in the world. With Japan's 

recent entry into the negotiations alongside the likes of Singapore, Vietnam, and 

Malaysia, a successful TPP would be the most commercially significant Free 

Trade Agreement (FTA) ever negotiated, representing a third of the world's trade 

and 40% of global GOP, strategically integrating North American supply chains 

with the Asia Pacific 

Through this agreement, the U.S. seeks to boost U.S. economic growth, double 

U.S. exports, and support the creation and retention of U.S. high-quality jobs. 

The U. S. also hopes to capture new disciplines for 21 st century trade issues 

such as cloud-computing, competitiveness, state-owned and state-sponsored 

enterprises, regulatory coherence, labor, and environmental impacts. 

UPS's Goals for the TPP 

Free trade agreements such as the TPP offer real, tangible benefits to UPS and 

our customers. As a global transportation company, UPS is expected to benefit 

greatly from the growth in trade. In our experience, with every new FTA, UPS's 

export volume to a particular market increases on average over20% in the first 

year. We expect the regional free trade agreement of twelve economies 

representing a third of global trade to generate up to $78 billion in exports for the 

United States alone by 2025 (Peterson Institute study, 2012). This additional 

volume will allow us to more efficiently utilize cargo capacity which will in turn 

allow us to be more globally competitive. 

Of course, it's not enough to fill planes with goods if one cannot quickly get 

shipments to customers, freely establish as a foreign company, hire your own 

people or confidently invest in these countries. In foreign markets, we face a 

highly regulated transportation sector, complex border procedures, and 

incoherent domestic regulations which effectively prevent us from providing the 

best and most competitive service to our customers. Through the TPP, we 

expect to secure critical commitments on market access, customs & trade 

facilitation, and regulatory disciplines which will allow us to compete on a level 

playing field. Through the TPP, we also hope to put in place mechanisms to 

address gaps in trade policy that have the effect of distorting or disadvantaging 

supply chains. All too often, US companies face challenges in foreign markets 

requiring synchronicity of multiple agencies to address issues. We see this 

increasingly in the healthcare space where health regulation, logistics, and even 

tax policy are starting to intersect. And because the TPP is expected to be a 

template for future markets in the Asia Pacific to join, it is more important than 

ever to address these issues today. 
28


82310b-3.eps

In today's global economy, businesses are linked together through a web of 

interconnected, predictable, and efficient supply chains. Inputs come from all 

over the world to create products with the greatest value for the consumer here in 

the US or for eventual export Lim iting cross-border friction will boost the global 

competitiveness of U.S. businesses and reduce costs across our highlyintegrated operations. And best of all, these improvements in efficiency and 

regulatory coherence do not have to compromise supply chain security, and in 

fact can improve it by leveraging new technological advancements. 

The most promising aspect of the TPP agreement is that, if realized, it will be a 

high standards agreement where minimal products or policies are excluded in the 

various sectors and trade is increased among all partner countries - all boats will 

rise. 

Conclusion 

Small businesses are the lifeblood of the American economy, and services are 

the central nervous system on which small businesses depend. SME's cannot 

penetrate foreign markets without the support of a competitive and fluid supply 

chain network. They must have free access to foreign markets and nondiscriminatory treatment within those markets. 

Given the TPP's ambition for market access and setting global gold standards, it 

is timely for the Subcommittee to be holding its hearing today. At this critical point 

in the global economic recovery, it is imperative that the U.S. continue to 

demonstrate leadership in advancing a global trade agenda. We must oppose 

demands to accept protectionism. We cannot afford to turn the clock back on 

international trade, particularly the growing Trans-Pacific market 

After the 18th round of negotiations this month in Malaysia, we are enthused by 

the vigor that the U.S. and all other parties are attempting to close open items 

within the remaining chapters and successfully conclude negotiations this year. 

Thank you again, Chairman Poe and the Subcommittee, for giving attention to 

these issues of vital importance to the expansion and prosperity of America's 

economy through a comprehensive and commercially meaningful trade 

liberalization agreement 
29

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Drake, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CELESTE DRAKE, TRADE AND 

GLOBALIZATION POLICY SPECIALIST, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Ms. DRAKE. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, members 

of the committee, good afternoon. I appreciate this opportunity to 

testify on behalf of the AFL–CIO on the outlook for the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade and globalization agreement. I have submitted written testimony for the record and will summarize my 

comments here. 

American workers already live in a global, economic environment 

which includes deep trade ties with TPP partner countries, but 

those trade ties are severely unbalanced, particularly with Japan 

with which we have a trade deficit of more than $76 billion, $52 

billion in autos alone. The AFL–CIO does not believe that more of 

the same trade policy that brought us NAFTA and the WTO is 

going to fix the problem. Those deals have cost America’s workers 

nearly $700,000 and 2.7 million jobs respectively. They have led to 

increasing trade deficits and flat wages. This model of trade liberalization is also contributing to a declining share of national income 

for workers even as their productivity rises. In other words, as 

workers help their employers make record profits, they aren’t seeing rewards that are commensurate with their efforts. Entities as 

diverse as the Federal Reserve Board and the Economic Policy Institute have documented this trend. We can do better which is why 

seeing the potential of a new trade model in the TPP, the AFL–

CIO has actively engaged with the administration, Members of 

Congress, negotiators from each TPP country, and a variety of 

international allies to engage in this process and try to shape the 

deal into one that promotes American interests and not just the interests of its global business sector. 

Unfortunately, the publicly-available evidence has made us concerned that the TPP could repeat the mistakes of past trade policy 

which closed factories, sent jobs to overseas’ sweatshops and failed 

to protect workers, small businesses, family farms, and even our 

national security. To attempt to address some of the shortcomings 

of past trade policy, the administration secured a preliminary deal 

with Japan in April, but the deal excluded a number of critical 

issues including concrete commitments on currency, auto parts, 

rules of origin, and labor rights. 

American workers are not confident that the deal is strong 

enough to pry open Japan’s closed markets or create a level playing 

field, particularly in the auto sector. 

To promote the shared prosperity necessary to increase net exports and reduce our perennial trade deficit, we ask for your assistance in ensuring that the TPP charts a new course. It must include 

commercial terms that don’t dilute Buy American policies or let foreign state-owned enterprises use subsidies to harm U.S. businesses 

or their workers. It must require reciprocal market access and 

strict rules of origin that promote jobs here or in TPP partner counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:48 Sep 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\080113\82310 HFA PsN: SHIRL
30

tries, but not in countries like China that have not made commitments to us. 

In addition, all TPP countries must agree to enforce the ILO core 

labor rights which empower workers to seek improved wages, benefits, and working conditions. Enforcement measures when governments refuse to protect those rights must be at least as swift, effective, and meaningful and those for commercial violations. The TPP 

must not give foreign investors the right to bypass our courts to 

challenge American laws that they don’t want to follow. Investment 

policies to protect our states, cities, and workers against companies 

seeking to thwart the people’s will. 

To really grow the American economy, the TPP must also require 

nations to uphold basic environmental standards, contain an effective mechanism to address currency manipulation which has been 

used by China, Japan, and South Korea to advantage their own exports, include banking and insurance rules that promote economic 

stability, ensure imports including food and toys are safe, ensure 

the rights of publicly-supplied services like electricity and water 

and contain intellectual property rules that support American innovation and the arts without making life-saving medicines 

unaffordable. 

The TPP countries account for one third of global trade and 40 

percent of global GDP and that is before additional countries 

joined, so we can’t afford to get it wrong. To avoid a repeat of the 

mistakes of NAFTA, we encourage all members of this committee 

to review the developing TPP test. Your input could be vital to creating good jobs and fair opportunities for businesses in your district. 

I thank the committee for its time and would be pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Drake follows:]

31


82310d-1.eps

BEFORE THE HOUSE 

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE 

OUTLOOK FOR THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 

TRADE & GLOBALIZATION AGREEMENT 

CELESTE DRAKE 

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR & 

CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) 

AUGUST I, 2013 
32


82310d-2.eps

The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), on 

behalf of its 57 affiliate unions, appreciates this opportunity to comment on the outlook for the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade and Globalization Agreement (known as the TPP). The AFLCIO has long recognized that workers everywhere live in a global economic environment. Trade 

and globalization are not a temporary trend; they are an economic reality. The key questions for 

workers, therefore, involve the rules that govern trade and globalization, who makes them, and 

who benefits from them. If working families' preferences play little or no role in shaping trade 

and globalization agreements, then it should surprise no one that such agreements hann instead 

of benefitting workers and their families. 

Given its position as the first new trade and globalization agreement the Obama 

Administration has negotiated from scratch, the TPP is a particularly important agreement. Of 

course, much of the trade among the current TPP participants (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 

Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) and the 

U.S. is already covered by trade and globalization agreements. But the TPP, unlike past trade 

agreements, is being specifically designed as an open-ended agreement and potential new 

entrants, including China and Thailand, are already being discussed. In that sense, it is 

especially important to re-examine our trade policy-as the rules set down in the TPP will 

govern a large portion of international trade in years to come. 

As the Administration attempts to conclude the TPP by October of this year, the AFLCIO strongly encourages Congress to increase its participation, consultation, and oversight roles 

with respect to this agreement. Though there is time for the agreement to solidify into one that 

pursues a people-centered agenda, what has been publicly discussed and reported does not 

warrant optimism. 
33


82310d-3.eps

The AFL-CIO has attempted to work with the Administration to implement specific 

changes to the prior U.S. trade and globalization model in such critical areas as labor, stateowned enterprises, rules of origin, government procurement, currency, investment (including a 

more comprehensive screen for inward bound foreign direct investment, or FDI), reciprocal 

market access, cross-border trade in services (including financial services), the environment, 

food safety and other public interest regulation, and intellectual property protections (including 

access to medicines). 

To its credit, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has been open and 

accessible. However, based on publicly available information, few, if any, of the detailed 

proposals we submitted have been translated into transformative changes in the still secret text. 

While negotiations continue, it appears most of the rules being considered in the TPP too closely 

follow the current trade model. If the TPP does indeed follow a similar path to that carved by 

NAFT A, the WTO, and the U.S.-Korea Trade and Globalization Agreement, it would be a tragic 

missed opportunity to strengthen our economy, reduce income inequality, and promote 

sustainable growth. The United States cannot afford another trade agreement that hollows out 

our manufacturing base and adds to our substantial trade deficit. 

Unfortunately, it appears global firms that use the United States as a flag of convenience 

are once again substituting their interests for the national interest in TPP negotiations. Such 

firms seek to increase profits by pitting countries against one another in the quest to attract 

foreign investment by reducing labor, environmental, and other social costs. This is 

fundamentally at odds with the economic interests of the United States and its citizens, and in 

many cases also at odds with the interests of our trading partners, who seek rising living 

standards in their own countries. 

2 
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82310d-4.eps

The disproportionate voice of global corporations in the formation of U.S. trade and 

globalization policy has advanced deregulation, privatization, tax and other preferences for 

businesses, weakened worker bargaining power, and led to a dwindling social safety net The 

results are clear: massive trade deficits, lost jobs, rising inequality. falling wages, and weakened 

democratic governance.! 

Neither the USTR nor other federal agencies have perfbrmed and published 

comprehel1sil'e economic evaluations of the likely impacts of the TPP. As with prior trade 

agreements, this seems poised to happen only after the text is set in stone-too late to make 

changes to improve outcomes for workers. If America's workers only learn of the TPP's 

probable harm to particular industries and their employees or likelihood to increase our trade 

deficit after negotiations are complete, they miss opportunities to act to secure better outcomes. 

In addition, this failure to pe/form and disseminate a comprehensive (and unbiased) economic 

allalysis before negotiations conelude leaves USTR (and the working families whose interests it 

is supposed to represent) at a disadvantage in negotiations. It is unclear how any trade 

agreement negotiated under this closed system can ever really maximize job creation or prevent 

permanent harm to workers. 

Unfortunately. USTR's approach, largely based on the neoclassical theory of comparative 

advantage, specialization. and mutual gains from trade, relies on a set of assumptions that do not 

accurately describe today's global trading system (if indeed they ever did). In the I990s, Ralph 

Gomory and William Baumol demonstrated how adversarial relationships, economies of scale, 

1 For more information, see Robert E. Scott "The China Trade Toll: Widespread Wage Suppression 2 Million Jobs 

Lost in the U.S.," EP[ Working Paper. July 30. 2008 (wage suppression): Robert E. Scott, 'The China Toll: Growing 

U.S. Trade Deficit with China Cost More than 2.7 Million Jobs between 200 I and 20 II, with Job Losses in Every 

State," EPT Briefing Paper #345. Aug. 23 , 2012 (deficit 3ndjob loss): Mariam" Williams. "Challenges Posed by 

BITs to Developing Countries," in South Views No. -1-9, Dec. 11,2012, and -'Dangerous Weapons: Hmv 

International Tnvestment Rules Undermine Social and Environmental Justice," Nehvork for Justice in Global 

Investment, Aug. 20, 2012 (\veakened democratic govemance). 

3 
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82310d-5.eps

technological innovation, foreign direct investment, and indeed, even government policy 

undermine the predicted Ricardian outcome of mutual gains from trade 2 Under today's 

globalized system, there are winners and losers, instead of winners and winners. It is the 

workers in the U.S. and in many of our trading partners who have been the losers-especially in 

the most recent decade, while global capital has taken an ever increasing share of the world's 

wealth. 

America's workers have seen nearly 700,000 jobs displaced by growing trade deficits 

with our NAFTA partners and 2.7 million jobs (2.1 million in manufacturing alone) displaced 

due to trade with China since its accession to the WTO" High and rising trade deficits sap our 

nation's economic strength, are a significant drag on economic growth and job creation, and have 

turned the U.S. into the world's largest debtor nation. The most recent example of this trend is 

the U.S.-Korea Trade and Globalization Agreement: in just its first year in force, the bilateral 

u.s. trade deficit with South Korea increased by $5.8 billion, or nearly 40%, costing U.S. 

workers about 40,000 jobs at a time when we sorely need them4 

Meanwhile, workers in the territories of trade agreement partners Colombia, Guatemala, 

Honduras, Mexico, Bahrain, and Jordan, among others, have experienced varying levels oflabor 

repression, including in some cases the detention, persecution, and murder of union and human 

rights activists. This repression has kept workers from sharing fairly in any gains from trade---

and has seen global corporations keeping larger and larger shares of the gains from our trade 

agreem ents. 

2 See, e.g.. Ralph E. Gomory and William J. Baumol, G/obalD'ode and Conflicting Nationallnreresrs. 

Massachusetts Institute ofTcclmology. 2000 . 

.3 ,)'ee Scott 5;upra note L 

4 Robert E. Scott, "NO JOBS FROM TRADE PACTS: The Trans-Pacific Partnership Could Be Much Worse tlJaIl 

the Over-Hyped Korea Deal," EPI Issue Brief#369, Economic Policy Institute, luI. 18,211 13, a\'ailable at: 

http://,''\-,,,,\, .epi.org/puhhcation/trade-pacts-koms-traIlS-pacific-partllership!. 

4 
36


82310d-6.eps

u.s. workers' share of national income is at its lowest level since the 1940s and is plunging: 

On the other hand, the share of corporate profits has reached its highest level since 1952: 

Source: FRED Graphs/St. Louis Federal Reserve Banic available at https:i/reseaTch.stlouisfed.of!~!fred2/' 

5 
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82310d-7.eps

To serve as a net benefit for any but the 1%, the TPP must change course-more of the 

same will only promote the status quo, which is unacceptable.' The AFL-CIO has commented 

numerous times on the shortcomings of past trade agreements and the need for specific, 

achievable changes that would help U.S. workers and producers who are competing in a global 

marketplace. 1 will not reiterate all of our specific concerns here, but suffice it to say that past 

agreements have failed to address our concerns regarding jobs, investment, services (including 

public and financial services), government procurement, currency, intellectual property 

protection, worker rights, environmental safeguards, food and product safety, rules of origin, and 

other issues important to working families'" 

Without addressing the still-secret text of the TPP, I will discuss a few of our concerns 

and recommendations with regard to some of the most pressing topics of the agreement. 

LABOR 

It is imperative that the USTR address economic justice and the societal infrastructure 

that can promote it, not as an adjunct goal, but as a central part of its trade and economic 

development efforts. Freedom of association and the existence of free civil society 

organizations, including trade unions, are essential to a democracy. These institutions provide a 

venue for ordinary citizens to raise their voices collectively, claim their rights, advocate for 

policies that serve their constituents and the broader public interest, and hold government 

accountable. As large membership-based institutions advocating for social and economic justice 

5 See. e.g. Jacob S. Hackcr and Natc LocwcnthciL ·'Prospcrity Economics: Building an Economy ror AIL" 21l12. 

avai13 b Ie at: illJ1I!b1/\Y,;"'. pr0S}eritY.,fo rameric.(].c f!!J\Vp-C0 ntem/up]oaruf)O 12102LJ2rillip.critv {gi:illl. pdf 

o For a more comprehensive discussion of the AFL-CIO's specific suggestions for the TPP. please refer to the AFLCTG's Testimony Regarding the Proposed United States-Trans-Pacific Partnership Tmde Agreement, submitted to 

the USTR, January 25. 2010. 

6 
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82310d-8.eps

for workers and citizens, independent trade unions are among the most important of these 

institutions. 7 

To achieve these goals, the AFL-CIO recommends that the TPP build upon the changes 

achieved in the U.S.-Peru Trade and Globalization Agreement in 2007 (also known as the "May 

10" provisions). In other words, the labor provisions in the TPP must be stronger than those 

achieved in any prior agreement. The USTR should fulfill the promise that the "May 10" 

provisions will serve as a floor, not a ceiling, on labor rights. These provisions represented an 

important step forward for labor rights, but did not contain all of the essential elements of an 

effective labor chapter. 

The AFL-CIO, in conjunction with our counterparts from the majority ofTPP countries, 

developed and submitted to the USTR and its counterparts a "New Model Labor and Dispute 

Resolution Chapter for the Asia Pacific Region," which spells out in detail the recommended text 

for the labor chapter. Beyond reference to the ILO core conventions and the elimination of 

Footnote 2 from the Peru textR to clarify that ILO jurisprudence will help give meaning to each 

party's labor rights obligations, the AFL-CIO has several additional recommendations. 

The labor provisions should also apply in the broadest context possible: limiting 

consultation and redress solely to violations in which there is a "persistent pattern of failure" in a 

"trade-related sector," as is the case in NAFTA, excludes too many workers from coverage. Not 

only do these limitations make it exceedingly difficult to effectively pressure recalcitrant 

governments to do the right thing and protect their own workers-they allow governments to 

manipulate and depress their entire labor market through failure to enforce labor laws or defend 

The interaction ,vith the Investment Chapter here is clear: foreign investors must 110t be able to use the TSDS 

process to challenge i1l1prove~ne~ts in labor laws or increased s?cial protections. 

U.S.-Pem Tmde and Globalization Art. 17.2, aVailable at: 

7 
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82310d-9.eps

labor rights in sectors deemed not trade-related (e.g. the public sector). Such purposeful 

manipulation of the entire labor market could have massive trade-distorting effects and yet be out 

of reach under the current rules. 

In addition, the TPP should include enforceable standards for acceptable conditions of 

work, the right to strike, and the treatment of migrant workers. Given the labor mobility among 

the TPP countries, and the protections for migrant labor in the NAFTA side agreement known as 

NAALC (despite the weakness of the NAALC), omission of protections for migrant labor in the 

TPP would be a mistake with the potential to exacerbate the tendency of bad-actor employers to 

abuse, threaten, and take advantage of migrant workers to the detriment of native and migrant 

workers alike. 

The labor chapter's enforcement mechanism must be timely, accessible, and reliable. 

The TPP's labor provisions must ensure that meritorious petitions proceed in a timely manner to 

the next step of the process until they are resolved (including through dispute settlement if 

necessary). Workers' livelihoods depend on swift justice. Should countries fail to resolve their 

differences during the consultation stage and proceed to the dispute settlement stage, the process 

must be at least as strong and swift as that available to business interests, and penalties should, 

where possible, be directly related to the sectors in which violations occur (in order to leverage 

political power of employers who fear loss of trade benefits) and high enough to encourage 

parties to engage seriously at the initial stages. Token fines unrelated to the economic sectors 

where the violations occur will do little to encourage private sector compliance or deter future 

violations. 

8 
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82310d-10.eps

Gi ven that failure to uphold internationally recognized worker rights acts as a hidden 

subsidy for imported goods and services, the AFL-CIO is disappointed that more U.S.-based 

producers have not joined the call for stronger labor standards in trade agreements9 

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 

The potential disciplines that will cover State-Owned, State-Controlled, and StateInfluenced Enterprises (collectively, SOEs) represent, perhaps, the most important area for new 

disciplines in the TPP which could (if done right) have a beneficial impact on U.S. jobs. Unlike 

in the U.S, SOEs are common in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Moreover, given the 

interest expressed by both U.S. and Chinese officials in China's participation in the TPP, SOEs 

are of increasing concern for U.S. workers. The AFL-CIO does not oppose SOEs and does not 

seek to privatize them. However, given America's lack ofa comprehensive manufacturing 

strategy or adequate governmental support for manufacturing, without strict disciplines on anticompetitive behavior by SOEs, U.S. workers and producers remain at risk from those entities. 

The U.S. cannot afford to get disciplines in this area wrong. 10 

An SOE can be a threat to the U.S. economy when it "competes" in the commercial arena 

with a subsidies unavailable to U.S. producers. These subsidies can range from raw materials or 

other inputs at below-market rates to access to preferential debt and equity financing, including 

soft "loans" from state-owned banks that do not need to be repaid. 

Many SOEs consistently operate in a manner that gains them market share-rather than 

profits-and they do so with the advantage of these government subsidies. A private enterprise 

9 \Ve applaud producer organizations that have already done so. See, e.g., "21~t Century Tmde Agreement 

Principles." Coalition for a Prosperous America, available at: 

Iltl1J:j/ac\lon prospcrou<';Hlnclica.orgil)/saisa/\\cblcommon/public/contcm ?COlllcnt itcln KEY -1 n077. 

10 This is tme as regards our so-cal1ed "defensive interests'- as ,Yell: the disciplines on SOEs must not put at risk U.S. 

entities that could be considered SOEs, \vhether at the local, state, or federdlleveL no matter ,vIrich public service 

they engage in, from pmver generation (e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority). to public transportation (e.g., 

Amtrak), to education (e.g" the University of California). 

9 
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82310d-11.eps

would not long remain in business if it failed to respond to the market, but, because they are 

propped up by state resources, SOEs not only can, but do. Even when they lose money by 

selling goods at below-market prices, they have forced U.S. competitors out of business, gaining 

market share that can be exploited later when the competition has been thinned. 

I will concentrate my remarks on SOE activities here in the U.S. From the workers' 

perspective, the location of an employer's corporate headquarters is increasingly unimportant. 

There are good and bad employers no matter where they are headquartered. The critical question 

for workers is the behavior of the employer. 

If the U.S. imports a subsidized product from an SOE that injures a company and its 

workers, we have existing trade remedies (such as countervailing duties) to address the impact. 

But if that SOE instead becomes a foreign investor in the U.S. and produces a product at a cost 

far below that of an existing U.S. firm because of the subsidized inputs, there is no existing 

remedy in U.S. law to address that harmful activity. In addition, in certain circumstances, an 

SOE producing in the U.S. might have standing under our trade laws to challenge an action by a 

domestic producer against unfairly traded products from overseas. The TPP must seek to 

address these shortcomings. 

Several Chinese entities have already entered into or announced transactions that could 

pose problems for U.S. producers and their employees. Tianjin Pipe, a Chinese SOE, has broken 

ground on a $1 billion seamless pipe facility in Texas-its products will be used to transport oil 

and gas, a thriving business given the shale oil boom. However, as an SOE, it is likely that 

Tianjin has received from the Chinese national or sub-national governments a variety of benefits 

unavailable to its U.S.-based private sector competitors, including low-cost or no-cost capital, 

favorable regulatory and tax treatment, and inputs at below-market rates. 

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If Tianjin were exporting to the US., such preferential treatment-if proved-could be 

addressed through anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, but such laws do not apply to 

goods made in the U.S. by foreign investors, which leaves injured U.S. competitors at a 

disadvantage. Moreover, if any SOE's goal in investing in the U.S. is to drive U.S. competitors 

out of business through predatory behavior, the long-tenn effects on the U.S. economy and its 

workers could be devastating. The result will be fewer jobs and lower wages as firms are driven 

out of business and higher prices as competition is reduced. In addition to commitments within 

the TPP itself, the AFL-CIO has also recommended an update to domestic laws to ensure that an 

effective remedy is readily available to the private sector to fight for its interests when SOE 

behavior on U.S. soil injures U.S. businesses and their employees. We have also recommended 

increased transparency and the creation of a rebuttable presumption that an SOE is acting on its 

home country's behalf, not the interests of our workers, ifit seeks to block action to protect an 

injured party in the U.S. This particular chapter faces strong resistance by TPP partner 

countries-and whether it will result in strict disciplines that benefit non-subsidized U.S. 

producers and workers remains in doubt. 

Finally, the AFL-CIO recommends that Congress consider whether the existing screening 

mechanism for FDI is adequate to the task. The existing mechanism through which foreign 

investments are screened is the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 

States (CFIUS). Though CFIUS rarely makes the news, the few times that it does make it appear 

that CFIUS is constantly busy blocking foreign investment into the U.S. Nothing could be 

further from the truth. On the contrary, CFIUS's charge is quite limited: it reviews mergers and 

acquisitions (as opposed to "brand new" investments, known as "greenfield" investments), and it 

assesses threats to national security (as opposed to economic security). 

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In its 2012 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission (the Commission) recommended, among other things, that 

Congress examine foreign direct investment from China to the United States and assess 

whether there is a need to amend the underlying statute (50 U.S.c. app 2170) for the 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to (1) require a 

mandatory review of all controlling transactions by Chinese state-owned and statecontrolled companies investing in the United States; (2) add a new economic benefit test 

to the existing national security test that CFIUS administers; and (3) prohibit investment 

in a U.S. industry by a foreign company whose government prohibits foreign investment 

in that same industry. (p. 23) 

The AFL-CIO strongly supports these and other recommendations in the Commission's 

report.!! While we welcome foreign investment, we do not believe the current mandate of 

CFIUS adequately secures the economic interests of U.S. workers or the firms that employ them. 

Inclusion of these and related recommendations within the scope of the study could provide 

Congress with relevant and timely advice as more SOEs invest in the U.S. 

RULES OF ORIGIN 

The TPP must include strong rules of origin that will target benefits to the parties to the 

agreement (particularly, of course, the United States}-rather than weak rules of origin that will 

allow non-parties, who have made no reciprocal obligations to the U.S., to reap the rewards. Our 

primary goal must be to expand employment opportunities here in America. 

It is critical that the rules of origin are carefully crafted to promote production within the 

participating parties, which have each made commitments to each other Low standards for 

"regional value content" will allow non-parties (such as China) to reap great benefits from the 

II It is important to note tlmt the AFL-CTO is eoneemed with the question ofho" particular imestments will help 

create or hinder sustained economic grow1h-llot with the country from which they originate. The AFL-CTO urges 

Congress to consider the Commission's reconunendations to eX'}J311d CFlU S ,~..'ith respect to forei,gn investors of an,t' 

national origin. An expanded revie\v CFIUS revie\v that considers America's economic security would be most 

helpful if it focused onjob and economic impacts-not simply 011 the geographic sonTce of the investment. 

12 
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82310d-14.eps

TPp.12 Potential tariff benefits combined with strong rules of origin can tip the scale on a 

decision to build a new plant or keep a plant open in the U.S. or in a TPP country. On the other 

hand, a weak rule of origin gives producers a free pass to locate in a non-TPP country, knowing 

that only a token percentage of the value of the product, or a token transformation of a product 

from one tariff line to another, will be required to occur within a TPP country in order to reap the 

tariff benefits of the deal without having to subscribe to the other disciplines and provisions of an 

agreement. Because America's workers bear the brunt of decisions to produce elsewhere, we 

cannot emphasize strongly enough the importance of strong rules of origin that promote 

production within the TPP. 

Moreover, in a trade agreement which is designed to grow in membership, and has no 

maximum number of contracting countries, the proposed rules of origin must be designed to 

accommodate these potential changes. The rules of origin must take into account the promotion 

of domestic job growth in the U.S., not just for today or tomorrow, but for the next decade and 

into the future. Rules of origin that respond more to the corporate needs of today (looking 

forward only to next quarter's stock prices) than to the long-term needs of America's domestic 

economy and the workers who make it run will not achieve the domestic economic growth we 

need. 

A decision based on a simple calculation of where a product is currently produced does 

nothing to provide the right incentives to locate production within the TPP in the future. Our 

goal must be to maintain and then reclaim supply chains that have outsourced and offshored U.S. 

production and jobs. Simply cementing in place the status quo is not good enough. Given that 

the TPP model is designed to include an ever-growing list of countries, these rules of origin 

l~ An example of such a low RVe is the 35% standard for automobiles contained in the U.S.-Korea Tmde and 

Globalization Ah>reement. 

13 
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82310d-15.eps

should be designed to increase as the number of parties increases. Like NAFTA's rule of origin 

on automobiles, some should be designed to become more stringent over time, promoting growth 

of production within the agreement, rather than incentivizing choices to maximize production 

elsewhere. 

Without such a forward-thinking structure, the current trend of factory closures and 

depressed job growth is likely to continue. America's workers continue to wait to see if these 

recommendations will be included in the TPP. 

INVESTMENT RULES 

Too often U.S. trade policy assumes all foreign investment is good, and promotes it for 

its own sake rather than on the basis of its effects on employment, wages, and standards of living 

either here or abroad. Past U.S. trade and globalization agreements, such as the U.S.-Korea 

Trade and Globalization Agreement, have protected broader concepts of property than would 

apply under U.S. takings law, have given wider latitude for determining whether an "indirect 

expropriation" has occurred, and have included the obligation to provide "fair and equitable 

treatment" as part ofa "minimum standard of treatment" that foreign investors can claim a right 

to receive-but which domestic investors have no claim to. This minimum standard of 

treatment-an obligation whose scope is determined by reference to "customary international 

law"-provides no fixed obligation. 11 Together, these provisions grant foreign investors with 

enhanced opportunities to seek compensation from the public purse for a variety of real or 

perceived injuries. I,), 15 

11 Customary illternatiollalla\v, like cammon la,,",, can develop over time. HO\vever, due to llse of arbitrators (who 

may cycle benveen acting as ad'i/ocates .md acting as neutmls) rather than judges and the lack of binding precedent 

in investment cases, bad arbitral decisions (e.g .. decisions vvhich expand the concept or cllstonmry inlcmalionai by 

taking inappropriate factors into acconnt) can improperly expand the obligation a n3tion may owe as part of the 

minimum standard of treatment. 

14 For example. investors have claimed that a st3te ban on a toxic 

e"'Propriation. Methanex Corp. v. U.S. <llJlliLilii}DLS!t;ffi;W;>:@~~cEilillJF 

14 
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82310d-16.eps

The investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism ClSDS") is particularly troublesome 

and should not be included in the TPP.!6 lSDS allows foreign investors to bypass domestic 

courts and challenge a government directly before an international arbitration pane!.!7 The right 

to bypass the judicial system is a right domestic investors do not have. The system allows 

foreign investors to bypass U.S. Article III courts and have their claims heard in an 

undemocratic, unaccountable forum. 

Not only is the forum different, but so is the standard of review. Using the U.S. as an 

example, ordinary considerations, including the possibility of sovereign immunity and the 

"rational basis" standard, need not apply-nor is a panel required to consider whether the good 

of the public should outweigh the private right to make a profit. Instead, the panel considers 

whether the defendant nation violated its obligations to the foreign investor under the trade 

agreement in question-obligations that are decidedly one way, given that the investor makes no 

reciprocal promises to the defending nation or its people. 

Since the principle of stare decisis does not govern investment panels, a foreign investor 

is always free to pursue a failed but potentially lucrative challenge, and a subsequent panel is 

free to rule favorably.1s Moreover, past U.S. investment provisions have excluded minimal 

constraints, such as exhaustion of domestic remedies, a standing appellate mechanism, or a 

diplomatic screen, each of which could act to limit abuse of this private right of action. 

15 Even lhe VCI)' labor standards the U.S. fights [or in its current trade model arc not definitively exempt from an 

investor challenge should a foreign investor decide that a particular provision for the benefit of workers denies him 

or her fair and equitable treatment or goes too far in intelfering ,vith an assumption of risk or expectation of profit. 

Congress should protect labor and workplace laws froIll investor clk1llenges ill the TPP and all future "1"'00"<0"". 

1<> USTR has already committed to including TSDS in Ihe TPP. !J.!!.lLdi==ill.2"-±""''''-'''''''=",,"'''''=.!.'.l<~''-!.:: 

;Jlests!2011/HOYCIl.fu~.rL9utlil~s-tmHS:lli!Qf.J£::Q.mtnershiQ.:::Qg~ill!lelJ.!;. 

l' U.S.-Peru Tmde and Globalization Ah'feement Chapter 10 (available at: 

<hltp:! Iw,,\\. uslr. gOY Isitcs/dc raultm lcs/uploads/agrcclllcnis/rta/pcru/asscl_ upload _ ri Ic78 _ 954 7. pdf». 

18 Of course, the lack of stare decl5:ls may cut in the opposite direction as ,yell because it can result in a decision 

favoring govermnent action even where a prior panel fOlmd for a private party. In the long run, hmvever, the lack of 

binding precedent is likely to generate more challenges, greater costs to the public, less certainly for policymakers, 

and a stronger chilling effect against measures similar to those ,vhich attracted prior challenges. 

15 
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82310d-17.eps

Perhaps the most telling fact about the benefits of ISDS is that they only apply to 

investors. This special privilege to sue a national government in an international arbitration 

forum is denied to labor and human rights groups pursuing enforcement of the labor chapter, as 

well as to environmental advocacy groups seeking redress for a violation of environmental 

obligations. No credible legal or philosophical argument has ever been offered to explain this 

differential treatment of property rights and labor rights. 

These investment provisions may provide U.S. producers an incentive to invest offshore 

(compounding the incentive provided by U.S. tax treatment of foreign income). Of course, lower 

wages, safety standards, and environmental regulations can provide incentives of their own, but 

businesses are surely also aware of the power of the mere threat of an ISDS arbitration to stop 

new policies from being implemented. Such threats may be particularly effective in developing 

nations whose legal resources can be dwarfed by those ofa large global corporation. 19 

Unfortunately for developing countries, the evidence is mixed on whether there is even a 

correlation-much less a causal relation-between ISDS and attracting foreign direct investment 

and whether such foreign investment has had the desired development effects 20 

19 For more infonna1::ioll on the increasing use oftlle ISDS mechanism, see the May 2013 UNCTAD IIA Issues Note. 

"Recenl De\'elopmenls in In\'eslor-Slale Dispule Selliemenl (ISDS)." which reporled liml a new record [or lhe 

number ofTSDS cases filed was set in 2012. with at least j8 new cases-this is the highest number of known trcatybased disputes ever filed in one year (not all filings are public, so the realllllmber is likely far higher). More 

illfommtion available at: http:/h.mcwd,orgleIlJPublicationsUbran-hvebdiaepcb2U13d.3 eIlpdf. 

:::() See, e.g, Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Americas (Kevin P. Gallagher, 

Roberto POf7ecanskL Andres Lope7. and Lyuba Zarsky, eds., 2008) and Axel Berger at 31., "Do Trade and 

Investment Agreements Lead to More FDI? Accounting for Key Provisions Inside the Black Box;· Staff Working 

PaperERSD-20l0-I:l, World Trade Organi7ation, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Sep. 2010, available 

at: http://\"V\y\'i.\yto.org/endishfres eJreser e/ersd201013 e.pdf 

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82310d-18.eps

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENTIBUY AMERICANIDOMESTIC ECONOMIC 

POLICY 

The TPP must not surrender or limit the application of domestic economic development, 

national security, environmental protection, or social justice policies, including policies related to 

Buy America/Buy American. 

The AFL-CIO has long maintained that trade agreements should not constrain federal and 

sub-federal procurement rules that serve important public policy aims such as local economic 

development and job creation, environmental protection and social justice-including respect for 

human and workers' rights. Maintaining this policy space is not an academic issue. Tn 2008, 

procurement policy became part of the debate over the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act, the largest domestic economic stimulus program since the Great Depression. Even after the 

u.s. reiterated its intention to fully adhere to its procurement obligations under the WTO 

Agreement on Government Procurement and various additional trade and globalization 

agreements, foreign firms were not satisfied that they had sufficient access to U.S. federallyfunded projects. USTR must be more responsive to America's working families than it is to the 

complaints of enterprises that do not operate in the U.S 

After the current record-slow recovery ends, Congress and the Administration should 

carefully consider the diminished impact of fiscal stimulus caused by procurement commitments 

(which decrease the ability oflawmakers to direct funds toward domestic job creation) and carve 

out from its TPP commitments all procurement projects funded by stimulus funds appropriated 

in response to a verified recession. 

While access to foreign procurement does create opportunities for U. S. firms, some of 

which may support jobs in the United States, the question remains open whether the jobs 

potentially lost to opening U.S. procurement to foreign bidders are greater tban the jobs 

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82310d-19.eps

potentially gained by U.S. firms' access to foreign procurement markets. Also important are the 

kinds of jobs at stake. The AFL-CIO has repeatedly asked the USTR to provide figures for jobs 

created and lost due to prior procurement commitments, but has yet to receive a response. 

Additionally, the AFL-CIO still has concerns left unaddressed by the May 10,2007 

compromise. For many years, the AFL-CIO has raised concerns about technical specifications in 

procurement chapters. The procurement chapter of the U.S.-Peru Trade and Globalization 

Agreement took a good step forward by providing that a procuring entity is not precluded from 

preparing, adopting, or applying technical specifications: 

(b) to require a supplier to comply with generally applicable laws regarding 

(i) fundamental principles and rights at work; and 

(ii) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 

work, and occupational safety and health 

However, to promote goodjobs, the TPP should expand the language above to include 

living wage laws and, for the sake of clarity, prevailing wage laws. It must also leave room for 

the bidding process for non-discriminatory but potentially innovative policies such as providing a 

better score for employers with better on-the-job safety records or excluding bidders that do not 

have "clean hands" (e.g., firms that have failed to pay taxes, have outstanding unfair labor 

practice charges, OSHA violations, or outstanding violations of other national, state, or local 

laws) 

Finally, but importantly, the AFL-CIO expects that no sub-federal entities will be bound 

to the procurement provisions of the TPP without their express consent and that none of the 

exemptions or exceptions taken from obligations undertaken in the WTO GP A will be deleted or 

altered in any manner (e.g., highway and transit projects). We ask for Congress's support in 

ensuring that each country's ability to stimulate its own economy is not ceded to global 

corporations as part of the TPP. 

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82310d-20.eps

APPROPRIATE TRADING PARTNERS 

The AFL-CIO believes that Congress should carefully consider the choice of partners for 

any trade and globalization agreement. In choosing partners, Congress should analyze not only 

the likely commercial effects of reduced tariffs, increased investor rights, and the like, but also 

consider the human and labor rights conditions prevailing in the territory of the proposed partner. 

Congress should not cede these choices to USTR. 

With regard to human rights (including labor rights), due to existing commitments, the 

U.S. has already lost the use, in certain circumstances, of important economic tools to address 

these goals. The AFL-CIO does not support further limits on our ability to exert carefully 

crafted economic, rather than military pressure, to address nations that engage in egregious 

human rights violations. That is why we believe that the TPP must not allow "any willing 

partn er" to j oi n. 

Instead, the U.S. government should negotiate a democracy clause in the TPP. Linking 

market access and democracy is not without precedent in regional economic agreements. For 

example, the members of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), which includes 

Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, signed onto the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic 

Commitment in the Southern Common Market in 1998 21 In the event of a "breakdown of 

democracy" in any of the member states, Article 5 ofthe Protocol allows that the other state 

parties may apply measures that range from suspension of the right of the offending nation to 

participate in various bodies to the suspension of the party's rights and obligations under the 

Treaty of Asuncion (the MERCOSUR foundational agreement). We have also seen that 

economic engagement in the form of a trade agreement does not necessarily yield democratic 

~1 Te~1 of the Protocol is available online at Mll://untre<l!Y.llll,onrfunts/!,+.Wi8 lSS7ROnO/3/9lliJ?_tl.t. Associate 

MercosnI members Chile and Bolivia also si,gned onto the Protocol in 1998. 

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82310d-21.eps

reform and respect for human rights. The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 

Agreement (DR-CAFTA) provides a tragic example, with violent repression of union and other 

human rights advocates increasing since implementation. The U.S. government has already 

accepted submissions under the labor chapter regarding violations in Guatemala, Honduras, and 

the Dominican Republic. 

With respect to Vietnam, though we welcome cooperative efforts to further empower 

Vietnamese workers-who are already engaging in wildcat strikes to better their wages and 

working conditions when existing mechanisms fail them-the AFL-CIO is still unclear how 

Vietnam will meet anything close to minimum acceptable labor standards upon implementation 

of the agreement should the agreement conclude this year. We fear that Vietnam will go the 

route of Colombia, with the imposition of a Labor Action Plan that lacks measurable benchmarks 

for progress and fails to require sustained action or thorough implementation. Such a cursory 

approach would benefit neither the workers of the U.S. or those of Vietnam-and would likely 

encourage the transfer of U.S. jobs to Vietnam, where unscrupulous employers would take 

advantage of inadequate laws to abuse workers' rights. 

With respect to Japan, our concerns are commercial in nature. In 2012, the U.S. had a 

$76.3 billion deficit in trade in goods with Japan,22 nearly 70% of it in the auto sector. The AFLCIO deeply appreciates the efforts that USTR has made thus far to secure important 

commitments from Japan that will benefit America's workers, communities, and businesses, but 

our experience gives us little faith that these commitments will be completely implemented or 

effectively enforced. Therefore, the AFL-CIO is concerned that including Japan in the TPP 

~~ United States Census Bureau, Trade in Goods \vith Japan. available at: h!1l2.16nv\.y,census.goy/foreigll: 

trJde/bahmce/c5880.html. 

20 
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82310d-22.eps

would adversely impact America's workers and U.S. domestic production, particularly in the 

auto sector. 

Moreover, a number of critical issues were excluded from the deal announced in April, 

including concrete commitments on currency, auto parts, and labor rights. Japanese automakers 

manufacturing in the United States have persistently denied their workers a fair and democratic 

opportunity to decide on union representation. We believe securing additional commitments in 

these areas is essential. 

USTR has failed so far to answer important questions about reciprocal market access, 

rules of origin for autos and auto parts, currency provisions, tariff reduction schedules for autos 

and auto parts, snap-back tariffs, and the like. 

To combat likely harms to U.S. workers from a status quo approach to Japan's entry into 

the TPP, any future reduction in U.S. tariffs on Japanese imports must be tied to an actual, 

verifiable opening of the Japanese auto market and a substantial reduction in our bilateral auto 

trade deficit with Japan. In recognition of the dramatic risk involved in a premature phase-out of 

u.s. tariffs, USTR has already worked to secure an agreement that auto tariffs will be phased out 

in accordance with the longest staging period of any other product in the TPP. However, as 

previously noted, auto parts were not included in the initial agreement with Japan and the length 

of the phase out period has not yet been made public. Any tariff phase-out must be coupled with 

significant reforms and established penetration levels into the Japanese marketplace before any 

such phase out schedule begins. The inclusion of Japan in the TPP puts the recently renewed 

u.s. auto industry (an export leader) and its workers at grave risk2J 

~3 For a comprehensive list of provisions essential to creating the fonndation for fair and open trade bet\veen the U.S. 

and Japan in automotive goods, please see the UA \V statement 011 Japan" s inclusion in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 

(TPP), Apr. 12, 2013, available at: htt~!Lll·<'l'iv,o.rgiill1Lcles/U<T\V-stmement:Wlli1n~;·'0E2(.~Q80!;'il)9s-inciuSloH-tr:mspacific-l'artIlerslril'-tnp. 

21 
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82310d-23.eps

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS & ACCESS TO MEDICINES 

Intellectual property (lP) protections-designed to promote innovation and serve the 

public interest-are critical to creating and maintaining domestic jobs, as well as to increasing 

exports. The U.S. economy produces many products for which lP is critical, from movies, 

televisions shows, sound recordings, and documentary productions to fiber optics, specialty steel, 

medicines, and countless other products. 

In particular, the creative arts economy is a significant contributor to economic growth, 

the gross domestic product of our nation, and our rich cultural heritage. When we promote and 

protect the unique and original artistic and cultural contributions of America's artists and 

entertainers, we help these artists and entertainers to prosper. The IP provisions of past U.S. 

trade and globalization agreements have not effectively deterred rampant counterfeiting or online 

sites that profit from digitallP theft, a failure that resulted in lost jobs and reduced incomes for 

many workers. The AFL-CIO supports efforts by Congress and the Administration to address IP 

theft that jeopardizes worker incomes. 

To effectively promote U.S. jobs and standards of living, however, strong and effective 

IP protections must also secure legitimate r;eneric competitiol1-particularly in the area of 

medicines. Rules that prevent fair competition from generic producers not only fail to create as 

many jobs as they might, they also jeopardize public health both here and abroad, by ensuring 

that life-saving medicines are priced out of reach of many working people-in the U.S. and 

elsewhere. 

Past U.S. trade and globalization agreements have provided excessive protections for the 

producers of brand-name pharmaceuticals. Indeed, these agreements far exceeded the 

international standards for patent protection established in the WTO Agreement on Trade22 
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82310d-24.eps

Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRlPS). The AFL-CIO opposes TRlPS "plus" 

provisions because they jeopardize access to affordable medicines, particularl y in developing 

countries. 

The May 10,2007 compromise took a significant step forward in cutting back the most 

onerous requirements for the 1P protection of pharmaceuticals in U.S. trade and globalization 

agreements. However, harmful language on data exclusivity remains in the Peru Trade and 

Globalization Agreement. 24 

Data exclusivity precludes use of clinical trial data of an originator company by a drug 

regulatory authority, even to establish marketing approval, normally for a defined period (five 

years in past U.S. trade and globalization agreements). As a result, a generic producer cannot 

secure pre-approval for a generic version of a patented medicine until after the data exclusivity 

period has expired (unless that producer runs its own tests-a costly and ethically dubious 

proposition). This limitation can delay legitimate generic drugs from reaching consumers in a 

timely fashion. 

Data exclusivity can thus impose unnecessary costs-in financial and human health 

terms-on public health systems, which could be forced to purchase brand-name 

pharmaceuticals at elevated prices when cheaper generic medicines would otherwise be available 

but for the trade agreement. For example, a 2007 study by Oxfam found that the lP provisions of 

the U.S.-Jordan Trade and Globalization Agreement, especially the data exclusivity provisions, 

prevented generic competition for 79 percent of medicines launched by 21 multinational 

pharmaceutical companies in the first five years the agreement was in effect. Further, the study 

found that medicine prices in Jordan rose 20 percent, costing the government between $6.3 and 

24 The dal1 exclusivily provisions arc found in Article 16.10, sub-sections 2 (b) and (cJ oflilC Peru Trade and 

Globalization Agreement. 

23 
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82310d-25.eps

$22 million in additional expenditures for medicines with no generic competitor as a result of 

enforcement of data exclusivity. 2, 

Despite progress in the U.S.-Peru Trade and Globalization Agreement to roll back 

TRIPS-plus requirements, U.S. trade policy has since taken a turn for the worse with regard to 

access to affordable medicines. 

For example, the AFL-CIO opposes efforts (such as those included in the U.S.-Korea 

Trade and Globalization Agreement) to increase the power and influence of private sector 

drugmakers over the pricing decisions of public health systems and pharmaceutical benefit plans. 

The TPP must not include such provisions. Instead, it must not only protect current governmentsupported health care programs in the U.S. (including but not limited to Medicaid, Medicare, the 

Veterans Health Administration, and Community Health Centers) and abroad, but also ensure 

that countries retain the policy space to expand and improve such programs. 

Further, the US.-Korea Trade and Globalization Agreement requires patent term 

extensions for new methods of use and manufacture of a pharmaceutical product26 It also 

effectively eliminates "pre-grant opposition,,,27 which allows the validity of a pharmaceutical 

patent to be challenged before a patent is granted, a process which makes it cheaper and quicker 

to dispose of bad patent applications than after a patent has been granted to an undeserving 

application. These provisions should not be repeated in the TPP because they further delay 

" "All Costs. No Benefits: How TRIPS-plus intellectual property lllleS in the US-Jordan FTA affect access to 

medicines," O,ram Briding Paper 102. O,ram Tnlematiorm1, Mar. 21, 2007. a\ai1ab1e al: 

b1:.!QJ.LdonttffldeOlulivesmY!-lv files ·vmrW£2.S..:.cQ.m/HU]jO I l<1H-costs-no-benefits_J2Q,f 

co U.S.-Korea Trade and Globalization Agreement, Art. 18.8.6 (b). available at: 

http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defau1t/fi1es/up1oads/agreements/fta/koms/asset_ upload Ji1e273 _12717. pdf. 

,- Id.. Art. 18.8.4. 

24 
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82310d-26.eps

legitimate generic competition that plays a role in increasing access to medicines for working 

families 28 

The AFL-CIO strongl y supports governmental efforts to control costs of medicines so as 

to be able to provide affordable medicines to the public. 

CONCLUSION 

USTR and its partners must embark on economic development policies that explicitly 

address the creation of good jobs, the development of a thriving middle class, and respect for 

domestic policy space. Such an approach would require abandonment of the status quo. It 

would also require the cooperation of global corporations, many ofwhich are used to using their 

leverage to playoff one nation against the other in a race to the bottom in wages, benefits, social 

protection strategies, conservation, and public health and safety measures. The AFL-CIO cannot 

emphasize strongly enough that, for a trade agreement to benefit workers here and abroad, it 

must prioritize fundamental labor rights, the creation of high wage, high benefit jobs, and 

balanced and sustainable trade flows. When workers can exercise their fundamental rights, as 

well as have a secure and hopeful future and sufficient incomes, their demand will help 

businesses and the global economy grow in a sustainable way. 

,~ For additional infommtion, see Ruth Lopert and Deborah Gleeson, 'The High Price of "Free" Tmde: U.S. Trade 

Agreements and Access to Medicines;' The Journal (?fI011' .. lfedicine & F:thics, Vol. -1-1, Iss. I, Apr. 12, 201J, 

available at: http://onlinelibmrv "iley.conUdoillO.lllUjlme.1201-l/pdf 

25 
57

Mr. POE. I thank all four of our witnesses. Just so everyone 

knows, in approximately 30 minutes we are supposed to have 

votes, so I will save my questions until last and we will see how 

many members we can get in before votes. The chair recognizes the 

gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for that. I am 

going to hopefully keep this under 5 minutes. Politicians talking 

get old sometimes. 

Several countries not currently involved in the negotiations have 

expressed interest in signing on to the TPP once it is done, such 

as Taiwan. What is the likelihood that they will and what kind of 

opportunity does this present for U.S. trade. And I will ask just the 

three gentlemen here at the end if you can answer that. 

Mr. Gerwin? 

Mr. GERWIN. Yes, Congressman. I think it does create an opportunity for those countries to join on. As I mentioned in my testimony, one of the things that is good about the TPP is that we have 

an expanding group of countries that are coalescing around high 

standards. And other countries are attracted to that because I 

think they believe very strongly that if they don’t get in the game, 

they are going to get left out. So I think there is a certain degree 

of attraction that the TPP has that will bring in other countries. 

I know other countries—not only in Asia, but in Latin America—

have been expressing interest in joining. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Good. Mr. Metalitz? 

Mr. METALITZ. Yes, I would agree with what Mr. Gerwin said. It 

certainly provides that opportunity. It is a very complex negotiation 

even now and so I think the focus should be on getting that highstandard agreement in place and then if there are countries that 

are willing to step up to those standards they could certainly be 

considered at that point. 

Mr. SHEHATA. I guess a way to certainly raise the game of countries that want to join it is a template that forces them to live with 

disciplines that make open economy a reality. So from a UPS 

standpoint, we believe in a very efficient supply chain, so if those 

countries abide by standards that allow for that movement and velocity of goods, we think it is a good idea. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Do you believe there are negotiating areas in 

which the U.S. position will change if Congress weighs in and 

presses hard enough? And if so, what are they? 

Ms. Drake, I will start with you. 

Ms. DRAKE. I believe if Congress weighs in and presses hard 

enough the USTR could change its negotiating objectives in any 

area. Congress has the authority under the Constitution to negotiate international trade so the administration should follow Congress’ wishes. I think it would be important particularly for Congress to weigh in regarding state-owned enterprises. I know from 

speaking with negotiators from other countries that they do not 

like the U.S. proposal. They do not want their state-owned enterprises to be subject to disciplines that would level the playing field. 

So that would be one potential area and I would also ask Congress 

to look at other commercial sectors like rules of origin, Buy American, and these kinds of things to help us propose exports. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, sir? 

58

Mr. SHEHATA. Yes, actually, from a state-owned enterprise’s 

standpoint, my comments officially were focused on a level playing 

field. We do have concerns to ensure that within the negotiations 

on a level playing field against state-sponsored or state-owned enterprises is critical and it is a focus area of UPS. 

Mr. METALITZ. I think Congress has weighed in in many ways already in support of strong copyright protections in this agreement, 

but I think it would be valuable to continue to do so. This is a 

tough negotiating area on some issues and so it is important to express that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Any thoughts, Mr. Gerwin? 

Mr. GERWIN. Yes, Congressman. I agree with Ms. Drake. I think 

state-owned enterprises are a very, very important issue to focus 

on, not only for this agreement, but because we are setting a template for the world and we can use this to pressure other countries 

that are not part of these discussions like China to reconsider their 

policies on state-owned enterprises as well. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And then finally, what are the most significant 

obstacles that will impede the 12 countries involved in the TPP 

from reaching an agreement by the end of the year? And I will ask 

all four of you. I have got 1 minute left. 

Mr. Gerwin? 

Mr. GERWIN. I think the biggest obstacle, Congressman, is the 

lack of comprehensivity. If the agreement is not comprehensive, if 

we are not willing to enter into a comprehensive agreement, the 

other countries we are negotiating with will not as well and we will 

enter into this downward spiral where momentum will come out of 

the negotiations. And if we do get something, we are not going to 

get something that is in the best interests to the United States. 

Mr. METALITZ. I would agree with that. This is a complex agreement, but if we don’t aim for a comprehensive agreement that is 

possible, then we are not going to succeed. 

Mr. SHEHATA. I think the recent acceptance of Japan to the 

agreement may have some delaying consequences. So we need to 

ensure that like Canada and Mexico that we bring them on board 

quickly. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay, Ms. Drake? 

Ms. DRAKE. The most controversial issues appear to be labor, environment, intellectual property, state-owned enterprises and investment. And my advice would be to weigh and get these things 

right, rather than rush to finish. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I thank the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Ii yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the ranking member for 5 minutes. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I have got so many questions here. My 

colleague from Long Beach will be asking one that I wanted to ask, 

but it relates more to his district than mine and I still have too 

many questions. I have some efficiency ideas. 

I would ask members of the panel to raise their hands if they believe that this agreement is going to reduce our trade deficit with 

the countries involved. Now I will let you know that our trade deficit currently totals $154 billion, half of that if you exclude Japan. 

59

So how many people think it will reduce? Mr. Gerwin, okay. And 

how many people think it will increase our trade deficit? Okay. 

Which of you, either yourself or on record or your organizations 

are on record as predicting that MFN for China would dramatically 

increase our trade deficit? I see one hand. So the others who ventured—and that is Ms. Drake. 

So the other two gentlemen here didn’t get it right on China, but 

they are confident that they are going to get it right this time. And 

who here predicted that we would see an increase in our trade deficit with Korea after the Korea free trade agreement? I see Ms. 

Drake raising her hand. I see the other panelists not. 

So nothing more connotes insanity than doing the same over and 

over again and expecting another result.I21Mr. Gerwin, I want to 

focus on the footnote that we got in our most recent agreements 

with Panama, Colombia, Korea and that stated that if we invoke 

the essential security provision allowing us to take action essential 

for our own national security interests or for international peace 

and security that that matter was not subject to review. Can you 

shed any insight as to why we would in effect be erasing that that 

we got in the Korea free trade agreement by not having it in the 

TPP? 

Mr. GERWIN. I am afraid I can’t, Congressman. I don’t know exactly what is being discussed in the current context of the TPP and 

I must say I am not—I can’t say I am a specialist on national security issues. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, this is the subcommittee on terrorism and 

nonproliferation as well as trade and to think that we would sit by 

while that footnote is obliterated by those who want to make evergreater concessions on trade issues during these negotiations is 

surprising. And perhaps we can get Government witnesses to come 

before us here and find out why they are hell bent on sacrificing 

our national security interests in an effort to go forward with this 

agreement. 

Ms. Drake, can you give us a little insight as to what this enormous trade deficit means for working families in the United 

States? 

Ms. DRAKE. Absolutely. The trade deficit represents lost jobs, either directly, they were here, they were shipped overseas so that 

different services could be produced there and then exported back 

to the U.S. Or they are a lost opportunity where it could have been 

job growth within the U.S., but it was job growth elsewhere. 

Just from the first year of the Korea FTA which you discussed 

a bit in your opening statement, 1 year doesn’t make a trend, but 

those first-year numbers are quite disturbing and it looks like the 

$5.8 billion increase in our deficit from that first year represented 

about 40,000 jobs that American workers could have had. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can interrupt and you are the only person 

here representing an organization who predicted something close to 

that result. What about currency manipulation? Raise your hands 

if you or your organization have been actively calling for enforcement of the rules against currency manipulation. Again, we see 

only Ms. Drake’s hand go up. 

And I would just ask how can you call it a free trade agreement 

if American workers are protected by an organization, namely the 

60

U.S. Government that is unwilling to invoke the currency manipulation provisions that we have now, unwilling to call China a currency manipulator? I fear for the American people that they have 

to live with the trade decisions made by this Government. I yield 

back. 

Mr. POE. To answer the gentleman’s question, the United States 

Trade Representative was invited to testify and refused to testify. 

You can take that however you want to take it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Those with good cases don’t hesitate to present 

them. 

Mr. POE. Silence speaks loudly. The chair will recognize members of the subcommittee and then I see that we have some members of the full committee here. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, as procedure, we will take those individuals 

and then ask questions at the end. 

Mr. Lowenthal from California is recognized next. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you Ranking 

Member also for this. You know, I have a question to follow up on 

what Ms. Drake had said before about looking at how these really 

make sure that we as we promote free trade, we also protect American workers. We promote jobs here. And so I want to give you an 

example of something that is recently come to my attention. 

The question is how does this all fit together? Two large grain 

conglomerates, Mitsui and Marubeni, which are Japanese grain 

conglomerates have locked out members of the ILWU. I don’t know 

if you are aware of that in both Oregon and in Washington State. 

At grain export facilities, they have locked out these workers despite the fact that the American member of the Northwest Grain 

Handlers Association, Cargill, has reached an agreement with the 

ILWU with the help of Federal mediators. And so, you know, how 

are these—now we are about to engage in a trade agreement with 

Japan. How are these American workers going to be treated by 

Japanese companies? Should we be considering Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership when, in fact, we are beginning to document locking out workers that could be a radical harm 

to American workers? And shouldn’t we ensure that these foreignbased companies treat American workers with the respect and the 

dignity they receive, or should we just kind of disregard this and 

just move forward. 

My question is to you, Ms. Drake? 

Ms. DRAKE. American workers are very concerned about Japan 

joining the TPP. We are not sure that either the U.S. or Japan are 

ready for the kind of negotiations they would need to make sure 

that workers can get the best deal. 

When foreign investors, be they Japanese or from any other 

country, invest in the U.S., they should absolutely be held to the 

highest standards, the same standards as any other producer in 

the U.S. in terms of compliance with workplace safety laws, labor 

laws, wage standards, environmental regulations, all of it. And in 

fact, the AFL–CIO has suggested as one tool to incentivize foreign 

employers to operate here to comply to not give them access to 

some of the special privileges in a trade agreement such as investor/state dispute resolutions unless they absolutely have clean 

61

hands and don’t have unfair labor practice allegations against them 

or don’t have unpaid taxes and that kind of thing. 

Japanese corporations, in particular, tend to have good relationships with their Japanese unions and then often somehow it 

doesn’t translate when they operate in the U.S. And so in particular, the United Auto Workers have been very involved in trying 

to improve those relationships and actually get some recognition 

agreements and some contracts with the Japanese auto makers. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. One additional question and we have heard 

about safety issues, now about labor issues, environmental issues, 

some of the other unfinished business about state-own enterprises, 

some of the investment issues around investment of foreign corporations and legal issues around that where it will be heard. 

I have another question. This committee, since I have been on 

Foreign Affairs under the leadership of both Chairman Royce, 

Chairman Smith have really taken a very aggressive stand and 

myself about human rights violations, especially about one country 

that wants—one or more of these countries like Vietnam. This is 

a very critical issue to members of this committee. Should human 

rights—should we be rewarding countries that have severe human 

rights violations? I ask any member of the panel. 

Mr. GERWIN. Congressman, I absolutely agree. These are, as I 

mentioned in my testimony, I think it is extremely important that 

we use these agreements to promote American values. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. That is a critical American value. 

Mr. GERWIN. That is absolutely a critical American value. But 

one of the things that often happens is that others are doing trade 

agreements as well. For example, China is doing lots of trade 

agreements. One of the things that China has done is taken the 

issue of labor, and taken the issue of the environment off the negotiating table in their trade negotiations with other countries. So if 

we don’t do these trade agreements and do the best we can to enforce things like labor and the environment and other important 

American values——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. If it is not even being discussed, is it not a race 

to the bottom? 

Mr. GERWIN. No, Congressman. I think it enhances our ability to 

have good relations with these countries and to push them to improve their economies and to improve——

Mr. LOWENTHAL. So first we reward them and then we push the 

issue or do we do it before we——

Mr. GERWIN. Well, I think we are doing it in multiple contexts, 

but I think having closer relationships with them is helpful. And 

as I said, countries like China don’t care. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I hope you are right, but most human rights organizations have indicated just the opposite. They have not since 

asking to join the TPP, their human rights violations have escalated rather than not escalating. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair recognizes 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Castro, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman Poe. I thank each of you for 

coming and lending your testimony on this issue today. I have a 

question around our previous labor agreements and how well we 

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forced labor provisions and how well we have done in overseeing 

those issues in terms of labor and the environment, et cetera, and 

also the evolution of what we have required of other countries in 

terms of labor conditions, working conditions, going from NAFTA 

forward? 

Anybody on the panel is fine. 

Ms. DRAKE. I am happy to start. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. 

Ms. DRAKE. The commitments in labor that the U.S. has asked 

for in its free trade agreements certainly have evolved over time 

and have improved generally over time. It wasn’t necessarily 

straight line, but it started with sort of a side agreement that was 

largely unenforceable with NAFTA to a CAFTA standard of enforced labor laws to what is now the high water mark of the March 

2007 agreement in Peru which again is a promise to be a floor and 

should be higher in this agreement. 

Mr. CASTRO. So you would agree that it is going in the right direction? 

Ms. DRAKE. It is going in the right direction, but it is a weak tool 

because it involves sort of diplomatic relationships and there is no 

sort of hard penalty that puts in place immediately, but it highlights promises and it does put pressure on countries to comply. It 

is just that it is a slow process. But we encourage it to get stronger 

and stronger. 

Mr. CASTRO. And I guess that is what I am trying to get to the 

bottom of. There is sometimes a difference between what you have 

on paper and what happens in practice. So my question is essentially about the gap there. But you know, I take the point to heart 

about the trade deficit although I do think you have got to ask 

yourself the question about both parties, do both parties do better 

even though you may be buying more of their stuff than they are 

of yours, do both parties do better by the agreement? I think that 

is something that we struggle with. 

The reason I ask the labor question is because what we have 

seen over the years is America losing jobs to other countries, places 

where workers can be paid essentially a pittance for their work. We 

have got to improve the labor conditions and the working conditions and really the wage conditions in other countries if we are 

going to be successful in keeping American jobs in America. And 

so I see that as an opportunity in these agreements and really it 

is something that should be fundamental to them. I don’t think 

that we can be shut off from the reset of the world. I do think that 

we need to engage other countries in trade, but I do think that the 

agreement should be done in a useful way that accomplishes also 

making sure that American workers are able to compete fairly 

against people in other countries. 

If you all have any comments on anything I have said? 

Mr. GERWIN. Yes, Congressman Castro, a couple of things. First 

of all, I would like to address the question of our trade deficit 

which has been discussed. If you look at our agreements with free 

trade agreement countries, we actually have manufacturing goods, 

services goods, and ag goods surpluses with those countries. The 

reason we, for example, have mostly trade deficits with Canada 

and Mexico is because we import a lot of oil from those countries. 

63

The real drivers of our trade deficits are China, a country that we 

don’t have a free trade agreement with, and petroleum. So I think 

when we are talking about free trade agreements and deficits, I 

think it is important to drill down and see the effects that the 

agreements themselves have. 

Mr. CASTRO. So your point is that in certain sectors or industries, 

we are actually coming out ahead? 

Mr. GERWIN. Yes, I mean if you look at manufacturing services 

and ag. and you aggregate our free trade agreements historically, 

we are doing well. So I think that is important. And I will reiterate 

the other point. I think it is very important for us to get the highest possible labor standards and environmental standards that we 

can get in these agreements and one of the things the TPP could 

help us do is go back and perhaps improve the agreements that we 

have, the side agreements we have with Canada and Mexico, now 

that they are part of the TPP. 

Mr. METALITZ. If I could just add one point to what Mr. Gerwin 

said on the first point? If you look at the sectors that depend on 

copyright protection on books, on music, on publishing, on software, 

these are big exporters, $130 billion in foreign sales and exports, 

far bigger than many manufacturing industries, for example. And 

that has continued and if we can get stronger protections in these 

countries, we are going to be exporting more and we are going to 

be creating more jobs in the United States in all of those industries. So I think they get to look at it on a sector——

Mr. CASTRO. Just to make a final comment on that, Chairman, 

last week and several of us were in Los Angeles. Lucille RoybalAllard, a congresswoman from Los Angeles, led a discussion with 

the Motion Picture Association and former Senator Dodd who now 

heads up that organization was there and he was talking about the 

very extensive problem that you have with piracy in China and in 

other countries, so I hear you on that. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. I will yield myself 

5 minutes. We are in the process of votes. We will try to finish before the voting process because it is going to be a long process. 

Mr. Gerwin, you mentioned something about oil. I realize that 

oil, exporting into the United States, affects the overall trade deficit of the United States because we import so much oil. How much 

is it? The trade deficit made up of importing crude oil is what percentage? 

Mr. GERWIN. You know, I don’t know the precise number, Congressman, but I think it is about a third. 

Mr. POE. Does anybody else want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. GERWIN. We did a study when I was at Third Way and I 

think if you called oil its own country, I think it would be like our 

number three trade deficit country. 

Mr. POE. Hopefully, we will change that and become an exporter, 

especially of natural gas. That is a different issue however. 

Four of these countries are on the intellectual property watch list 

which means that we are watching them. Should we include them 

in the TPP, especially Vietnam as pointed out they have got some 

other issues. They don’t treat their own people right. They have got 

human rights violations, international trafficking. Should we just 

exclude those four or should we try to do something with them? 

64

Mr. Metalitz? 

Mr. METALITZ. Yes, those countries, I think it is important that 

those countries be involved in the TPP, but I think the fact that 

they are on the watch list and in one case on a priority watch list 

from USTR is significant and it raises issues that need to be addressed in the TPP negotiations. 

Chile is on the priority watch list. We signed a free trade agreement with Chile that had very strong copyright provisions and they 

simply have not implemented many of them and that is setting a 

terrible example for our future TPP partners. They may be thinking well, we can sign up——

Mr. POE. Let me interrupt just for a second. So they don’t agree. 

They are still violating the rules. They are cheating. And so what 

are we doing? Saying woe is me or taking them to the international 

court? What are we doing? 

Mr. METALITZ. Well, there are steps that could be taken under 

our free trade agreement. 

Mr. POE. Are we doing anything? 

Mr. METALITZ. I don’t think we are doing enough. It is a source 

of frustration——

Mr. POE. I am going to have to ask a lot of questions here. Our 

negotiators, are they good negotiators? Are diplomats negotiating 

this or do we have some horse traders in there fighting for America? I am serious about this. As the ranking member has pointed 

out, we go in to these agreements and all of a sudden we find out 

maybe we didn’t get the best deal and then we come back and we 

show it to the American public and it is a done deal and it is a 

deal. 

I am asking your opinion of the negotiators for the United States. 

It is an opinion. Everybody has got an opinion. 

Ms. Drake? 

Ms. DRAKE. If I may, we would like to see USTR do a lot better. 

For instance, we think that in the Korea FTA it was a huge mistake to let that 35 percent regional value content go for automobiles. That left jobs on the table and USTR could have done a 

heck of a lot better. And we have meetings with USTR fairly regularly. As I said, they do have an open-door policy and we are constantly saying we need you to really go after rules or origin, market access commitments, reciprocal market access commitments 

that get good jobs for Americans. And as was mentioned, allow 

workers in other countries to have rights that they can raise their 

own wages. 

Mr. GERWIN. Mr. Chairman, I think we also need more of them, 

too. 

Mr. POE. More negotiators? 

Mr. GERWIN. More negotiators. Ambassador Froman has said 

that the serious budget issues that USTR has makes it difficult for 

them to go and do some of the kinds of assessments they need to 

do in foreign countries to determine whether those countries are 

actually violating things like intellectual property rights. 

We only have 200 plus people at USTR. It has a lot of responsibility and I think they need some more resources. 

Mr. POE. Would you recommend, the four of you, as I am nearly 

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ommendations that we put on the table to make sure we think 

these are the best in America’s interest to go after them on these 

issues. Let us make this part of the deal, while it is still in flux 

and it hasn’t been signed yet. Would you agree with that, yes or 

no. I will just go down the list? 

Mr. GERWIN. Yes. 

Mr. METALITZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHEHATA. No. 

Ms. DRAKE. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Okay, why no? Why do you think Congress should——

Mr. SHEHATA. I’m going to wrap my answer in the question you 

asked earlier in regards to are they doing the best job they possibly 

can? I think they have been engaged for 31⁄2 years. They have 

learned the issues. They have America’s interest in mind. They are 

trying to take our core beliefs and instill them in a number of countries through an agreement that has discipline on getting them to 

where we need to go. 

So my answer of no is we need to give them more horsepower, 

but we need them to be able to achieve what we ask them to do. 

Mr. POE. And as Ms. Drake said, not rush through this, but get 

it done right, rather than just get it done. 

Last comment, just brief answer from one of you on the stateowned enterprises. I am very concerned about these state-owned 

enterprises competing with Americans because they seem to cheat. 

Should this be a bigger issue? Should we emphasize this more in 

the TPP negotiations that we want—they have to go by the same 

rules, even though they are state-owned enterprises, yes or no? 

Mr. GERWIN. Absolutely. We are certainly concerned with how 

the governments operate state-owned enterprises, especially in 

terms of respecting intellectual property. That is essential. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. SHEHATA. Critical, definitely very important. 

Ms. DRAKE. It is a critical issue. 

Mr. POE. Okay, thank you. I thank all four of you. I see that Mr. 

Rohrabacher is here. I will stay if the other members want to go 

on the House floor. 

And Mr. Rohrabacher, do you want to ask some questions? 

The question is, Mr. Rohrabacher, do you want to ask any questions? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. You have 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have 5 minutes, all right. I was just noting 

again as some of the other members did that we have Vietnam 

right in the middle there of all these other countries and there are 

some questionable political institutions or lack of institutions in 

some of these countries, but Vietnam is an out-and-out dictatorship. It is the dictatorship of the proletariat. You go there and they 

are still talking that stupid way. 

Is there some notion that we are going to be more successful in 

Vietnam that by trading with them they are going to become a 

freer society? That didn’t work in China, did it? China isn’t any 

more democratic today than it was—in fact, some people think it 

is less democratic today because they are using our computers to 

track down their dissidents. Is this just another mistake in an idea 

66

that we are going to make them more liberal by trading with them, 

the old hug a Nazi, make a liberal theory? [Laughter.] 

Does anybody want to tackle that? 

Mr. GERWIN. Well, Congressman, there is a difference between 

what we are proposing to do with Vietnam and what we have done 

with China. We have traded more with China. What we are proposing to do with Vietnam is to make them sign up to a whole 

bunch of new commitments including things like labor and the environment and rule of law and notice of process rulemaking, all of 

that. And if they are not willing to sign up to that, they are not 

going to do an agreement with us. And I think those kinds of deeper commitments can be helpful. A big slog, I understand that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think if you really dig down, you are going 

to find out that countries like Vietnam, governments like Vietnam, 

actually have constitutions. They have signed on to it with their 

people and then they don’t pay any attention to it whatsoever. I 

mean the Soviet Union had a wonderful constitution. Signing on 

isn’t the point. Actually, it is enforcing something that somebody 

signed on and I see our representative from labor is shaking her 

head. Maybe you can tell us do we enforce, do we have a history 

of enforcing these types of agreements once we have got countries 

like Vietnam under signature? 

Ms. DRAKE. Not strongly enough. For example, we have been told 

for years that signing countries up will exactly as you say, will liberalize, will improve human and labor rights conditions, et cetera, 

et cetera. What we found particularly with the CAFTA countries is 

that labor rights have been degraded. The same is true in Mexico 

and in many other countries and we are afraid that just sort of 

signing Vietnam up might lead us to a situation that is similar to 

Colombia where there is a labor action plan, there are commitments for what is going to be better, but the real day-to-day rights 

for workers change very little, if at all. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there a right to strike? Is there a right to 

strike in Vietnam? Do people have a right to strike in Vietnam? 

Ms. DRAKE. There is not. It is illegal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Only dissidents. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right. You know, years ago when I 

was a young man which is many, many years ago when I was 19 

I spent some time in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. I was not 

in the military, but I was with the Montagnards up there and I 

couldn’t help but note that there are 350 Montagnards right now 

being held in prison because they are evangelical Christians. They 

have managed to be converted to Christianity. 

I just can’t imagine that it is consistent with our values that we 

are going to declare that a country that holds 350 people and that 

is just these Montagnard Christians, they hold other religious people in prison, that we are going to lump them in with other free 

countries as if there is no difference in our relationship between 

New Zealand and this communist dictatorship that still tries to 

stamp out people’s belief in God. I just can’t believe we just ignore 

that fundamental fact that is staring us in our face. 

I think that the decisions we have, Mr. Chairman, are more than 

economic decisions. We are defining ourselves to the world as to 

what we believe most and if we believe that like we have been 

67

dealing with China that just making money is the only thing that 

America is all about I just don’t think that people will respect us 

and we won’t be any more prosperous of safe because of it. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank all four of you 

for being here. There will be more questions in writing submitted 

to you from members of the panel, just so you know they are coming. Don’t take a long time in answering them. So without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules of this committee and the committee is adjourned. Thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(69)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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SUBCOM1\UTTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TTVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE CO~nTTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in Room 2200 

of the Rayburn House Oftice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

\"\l1;"''A'.foreignaffairs hDuse,gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, August I, 2013 

1:30p.m. 

The Trans-Pacitlc Partnership Outlook and Opportunities 

:Mr. Edward F. Gerwin, Jf. 

President 

Trade Guru LLC 

Mr. Amgad Shehata 

Vice President 

illternational Public Affairs 

United Parcel Service 

Mr. Steven Metalitz 

Counsel 

International Intellectual Property Alliance 

Ms. Celeste Drake 

Trade and Globalization Policy Specialist 

The American Federation of Labor and Congress ofIndustrial Organizations 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ l'_e_"_or_is_"-'-',_N_OI-'-'J'_ro-'-'"-fJ'_rn_'_io~II,'_'I_11_'f_Tl_·"_"' _____ HEARING 

Day_----''J:'''''''"'''"'"s'''d''e..I''-' __ Date ___ '''A'''''''lg'''u'''s''-l=-l ___ Roollt ___ --'2"'2"'O"'O'----__ 

Starting Time __ ~I~·2{llO __ .Euding Time __ ",2~:3,,8,--_ 

Recesses ( __ to __ ) L-.to __ ) L-.lo---.J L-.tn __ ) L-.to __ )( __ 10 __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

R(~f1. Ted Poe 

Cited, 1/11 ojtlte j(JlloJVillg Ihal apply: 

Ope-n Session [Z] 

F.xeculivc (closed) Sl'ssion D 

Televised [{] 

TTTl.F. OF HEARING: 

Eleetl'onieally R"ol'd~taped) [{] 

Stenogra]lhic Recoo'd i.{J 

Tire lhms-P({cijic Pm"/lIe1"slrip: Ol/tlook {{Il" Opporillllitie., 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Reps. Poe, Castro, Lowenthul, WUson, ](illzillgelJ Cook, Pen)', Cotton, Shenllan, Scizl1eille}', Kennedy 

NON-SUBCOMMITTRR MI',MIlERS PRESENT: (Mark willi all * if they are lIo/melllbers offill! commillee.) 

Rep, Rohmbachcl' 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attaell«l? VeR IZI No D 

at" "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or orf!w1izolhm.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List allY statelllellls submittedjor the record.) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01" 

TIME ADJOURNED __ ~2._'3_1i __ 

Subcommittee ~~ Stall V, t, 
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August 2, 2013 

The Honorable Ted Poe 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade (House Foreign Affairs) 

2412 Rayburn Building 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Chairman Poe: 

On behalf of the 2,100 Members that comprise the Greater Houston Partnership (GHP), we are 

writing to express our support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement as it moves to 

increase trade and investment among the TPP countries and promotes existing trade 

relationships, economic development, and the creation and retention of jobs in the U.S. 

In Houston, more than 3,000 firms and organizations trade more than 259 types of products and 

services in 17 regions around the world. The Asia-Pacific region represents a unique opportunity 

for U.S. business, including the middle market and small businesses working to grow their 

companies at home through increased exports. The proposed legislation would help increase 

the quantity and quality of exports to the Asia-Pacific region, which would contribute 

significantly to additional job growth and economic growth. 

Houston is a global city with increasing business interest around the world. In fact, in 2012, 

according to the International Trade Administration, the Houston Metropolitan Area was rated 

the top exporter in the country, with $110.36 billion of goods shipped abroad. The Partnership 

believes that this agreement will stimulate trade for our region with our top existing trading 

partners and assist in forging new trade relationships that will facilitate business growth and job 

creation. 

We look forward to working with you and the members of the committee to advance the TIP 

and other important issues that maintain a global trade environment and fuel the U.S. economy. 

Regards, 

Bob Harvey 

President and CEO 

cc: Rep. Brad Sherma n 

cc: Rep. Joe Wilson 

cc: Rep. Adam Kinzinger 

cc: Rep. Mo Brooks 

cc: Rep. Tom Cotton 

cc: Rep. Paul Cook 

cc: Rep. Scott Perry 

cc: Rep. Ted S. Yoho 

cc: Rep. Alan S. Lowenthal 

cc: Rep. Joaquin Castro 

cc: Rep. Juan Vargas 

cc: Rep. Bradley S. Schneider 

cc: Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy III 

1200 SMITH, sun£: 700, HOlJSTON, TX 77002: PHONE: 713-844':3600 I 713-344-0200 

AUSTIN I BRAZORIA I CHAr.18ER5 I FOR r SEND I GALVESTON I HARRIS I UB!.-'RTY I MONTGOMERY I SAN JACIN-"'O I Wi\LLCR 
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TESTIMONY OF FORMER CONGRESSMAN ANH "JOSEPH" CAO 

DATE: 

TOPIC: 

AUGUST 1,2013 

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: OUTLOOK AND 

OPPORTUNITIES 

COMMITTEE/SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE 

Chairman Poe and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: 

I thank you for the opportunity to submit my testimony for the Congressional record of this hearing. 

This hearing comes at an opportune time: on the heels of the Vietnamese President's visit to the 

White House last week, where he discussed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with our President. 

Mr. Chairman, the principles of religious liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, 

freedom to organize, and the freedom to own property have served as the bedrock of our great nation 

for over two centuries. Not only do we defend our citizens against those internal forces that seek to 

suppress these freedoms, we fought and have given our lives to defend these freedoms against 

foreign nations that threaten to destroy these values. Since the inception of our great nation, we 

have demanded of ourselves that these freedoms must be preserved at all cost, and we demand the 

same from those nations with whom we associate. The policies of our country have been clear in 

prohibiting the United States from providing aid to those countries that have had a history of human 

rights violations, especially when such violations were inflicted against the citizens if this country. 

To make this story short, Vietnam's violation of the rights of a class of US citizens began after the fall 

of Saigon in 1975. When Communism took over Vietnam in late April of 1975, some 145,000 South 

Vietnamese who fought alongside the U.S. military during the Vietnam War fled to the sea. Most of 

them were picked up by the U.S. Seventh Fleet and brought to Guam. From there they were resettled 

to different parts in the United States. After the take-over, the Communist Regime forcibly arrested 

and sent hundreds of thousands of former allies of the United States-both military personnel and 

civilian government officials-to "re-education" camps, a euphemism for forced labor camp where 

detainees were tortured, and many were summarily executed. After evicting these detainees from 

their homes and properties, the government then occupied these lands that were left vacant by its 

acts. In addition, the Government of Socialist Vietnam evicted hundreds of thousands of South 

Vietnamese city dwellers from their homes and properties and sent them to the "New Economic 

Zones" (NEZ), where tens of thousands died of malaria and starvation. Left vacant, their land and 

homes were occupied by government units or officials of the Communist Regime. 

Between 1976 and 1988, over a million Vietnamese fled Communist persecution, primarily by sea 

(they are thus known as the "Boat People") but also by crossing Cambodia's Killing Fields, leaving 

behind their real property. Hundreds of thousands are estimated to have died during their escape. 

Survivors stayed in refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia and in a number of Asian countries. 

Their homes and land, left vacant, were occupied by government officials or agencies. Many of these 

Boat People later resettled in the United States and became US citizens. 

Responding to the large number of real estates obtained from forced evictions and from people who 

had no choice but to flee persecution and establish a safe, new life in foreign lands, the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam issued Executive Decision 111/1977/CP on Aprih4, 1977, to place the properties 

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under temporary state administration. The Executive Decision. in pertinent part. states: "All 

residential housing. land and properties absent of owners who are Vietnamese or foreigners are 

directly administered by the government. When these owners return, the government will resolve 

[the matter] with them. No one may unilaterally expropriate, transfer ownership, sell or buy 

residential housing or properties in the absence of their owners without authorization of the 

government agencies with proper jurisdiction." 1 In 1980, the SRV declared for the first time through 

its December 18, 1980, Constitution that "land belongs to the entire people with the State as the 

representative owner," thereby declaring in principle its policy to nationalize all land. On December 

29, 1987, the National Assembly promulgated Vietnam's Land Law to implement this new policy, 

placing all land under the people's collective ownership and the government's administration. This 

Land Law did not address the real property belonging to those who had left the country and being 

placed under direct State administration. In a communique dated November n, 1989, to the 

Chairman of the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Huu Tho, 

asserted that direct State administration of real properties left vacant by those who had fled the 

country was only a temporary measure, and that only the People's Court may strip a person of 

his/her ownership of real estate, which was allegedly protected by the Constitution. The 1992 

Constitution again reasserted the government's role in the administration of all land, and the 

government's power to assign land use rights to individuals and entities. It also reasserted the right 

of inheritance of privately owned property. On July 14, 1993, the Vietnamese National Assembly 

passed a new Land Law declaring that the government will not return land to its owners once that 

land had been assigned to other entities. The new provision effectively repealed all previous laws 

that regulated land ownership and land use, and essentially nullified private ownership of land left 

vacant by those who had fled the country. 

The expropriation of privately owned real property culminates in the 2003 Land Law 

(13/2oo3/QHn) with the accompanying Resolution 23/2oo3/QHn that repealed all laws 

addressing lands and residential housing administered by the State pursuant to policies predating 

.July 1, 1991-the date the Ordinance on Residential Housing took effect. The law authorized the 

government to spurn any claim for the return of land or residential housing already placed under 

State administration prior to .July 1, 1991. The Resolution thus nullified Executive Decision 

111/1977/CP about returning land and residential homes to Vietnamese expatriates who may want to 

return to Vietnam to reclaim their properties. The 2003 Land Law officially completed the process 

of nationalizing all land and housing under the administration of the State. 

22 U.S.C § 2370 is explicit in its prohibition against the granting of assistance to countries that have 

nationalized, expropriated or seized property of U.S. citizens, especially countries with Communist 

ties. The statute mandates, in pertinent parts: 

(e) Nationalization, e.:~propriation or seizure of property of llnited State citizens, or tuxation or other 

e.J:action having same effed; failure to compensate or to provide relief from taxes, exactions, or 

conditions; report on full value Qf property by Foreign Claims Settlement Commission; act of state 

doctrine 

rJ) lhe Fresident shall suspend assistance to the government of any to which assistance is 

prol'/ded under thIs chapter or WIJi other .'-I.et when the government slich country or any 

government agency or subdivision ll'ithin such country on or a!terJanuar.v 1. 1962-

(AJ has nationalized or expropriated or :.;eized ownership or control (~f property mfned hy any 

United States citizens or b:v any cOlporation. partnership, or associatIOn not less than 50 per 

cenlum bene/icia/~v owned b.-v United Slale:,; citizens, or association nol le.';s lhan 50 per 

centum henc.ficially mfned h y r~l1ited States citizens. or . 

1 The original document is in Vietnamese. The pertinent part has been trans1'1ted by those "v'ho are profi(,ient in both 

English and Vietnamese. 

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(f) Prohibition against assistance to Communist countries; conditions for waiver of restriction by 

President; enumeratum of Communi,,.t countries; removal from application of provision,,.; 

preconditions 

(I) ,Vo assi:.;tancc shall he filrnished under this chapter. section 2174 (h) olthis title) to 

any Communist countr:.,:, This restriction may not waived pursuant to an,1' authority 

contained in Ihis chapter unless the Presidentjinds and prompt(~' reports lO Congress that: 

(~'1) such assistance is vitallO the securi~v (~rthe United Stales: 

(13) the recipient country is not controlled by the international Communist conspiracy: 

and 

(C) such assistance wlllfilrther promote the independence o.lthe recipient countryfi'olll 

international communism, .For the pwposes of this subsection, The phrase 

"Communisl counlry" includes ,'Ip(!C{fical~v, hut is noi Iimiied to. ihe follmvmg 

countries: 

Democralic People's Republic of Korea, 

People's Repllhlic (?l( 'hina 

Republic a/Cuba, 

5,'ocialist Repllhlic o.fVictnam, 

Tibet. 

(2) ,Vol\J!ithstanding the provisions (?f paragraph (I) o.fthis :.;uhsection, the President may remOl'e 

a cOllna:v, jar such period as the President determines, ji'om the application of this 

subsection, and other provisions which reference this ,)'ubseclion, ~rthe jJresident determines 

and reports to the Congress that such action i:;; important to the national interest (~fthe United 

,)'tates, If is the sense o.l the Congress that Irhen consideration is gh'en to authorizing 

assistance to a country removedji-om the application ojthis subsection, one ojthe factors to 

he 1veighed, among others, is whelher lhe country' in question is giving evidence of.fhsfering 

the establishment oj a gen/Jine~v democratic with respect jor international(v 

recognized human rights .... 22 u.,s',c. § 23701e) (j), emphasis added. 

The Trade Act of 1974, (19 USC 2462(b)(2), requires that a beneficiary of the Generalized System of 

Preferences "may not have nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized property of U.S. citizens or 

corporations without providing, or taking steps to provide prompt, adequate, and effective 

compensation, or submitting such issues to a mutually agreed fomm for arbitration." 

Mr. Chairman, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has failed to take appropriate steps to discharge its 

obligations under widely accepted general principle of international law to fully compensate the 

Plaintiffs for properties unlawfully nationalized or expropriated. To make matters worse, the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam has failed to foster the establishment of a genuinely democratic 

system, and respect for internationally recognized human rights, including the right to own property, 

right to political speech/expressions, right to freely practice any religion or belief, and the right to life 

for its own people. 

Furthermore, U.S. policy towards the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has correlated to an increase in 

repression since early 2007. During his attendance of the APEC Summit held in Ha Noi on Nov 16-

19, 2006, President George W. Bush announced his intention to take the Socialist Republic of 

Vietnam off the list of Countries of Particular Concern, a designation for countries with a record of 

gross suppression of religious freedom. The following month, the U.S. government accorded the 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations status with the US (Dec 12,2006). 

With the support of the U.S. government, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam gained accession to the 

Page 13 
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"VTO on Jan 11, 2007. Almost immediately thereafter, the Vietnamese government launched a 

brutal crackdown against the pro-democracy movement. The Human Rights Watch criticized the 

SRV: "The Vietnamese government, emboldened by international recognition after joining the World 

Trade Organization and hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, is flouting its 

international commitments on human rights by launching one of the worst crackdowns on peaceful 

dissidents in 20 years." (Vietnam: Crackdown on Dissent in the Wake of "VTO and APEC, Human 

Rights Watch, March 10, 2007). The crackdown, which is on-going, has resulted in the arrest or 

detention of over a hundred dissidents, including religious leaders, well known writers, labor union 

organizers, social justice advocates and Nobel Peace Prize nominees. As part of this wave of 

repression, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has aggressively expropriated land from religious 

communities, including the Catholics, the Montagnard Protestants and Catholics, the Hmong 

Protestants, and the Khmer Krom Buddhists. 

Mr. Chairman, considering the egregious acts inflicted on US citizens and the citizens of Vietnam, I 

oppose Vietnam's inclusion into the Trans Pacific Partnership at this time for the following reasons: 

A) Membership in the TPP for governments that systematically violate fundamental human 

rights will be regarded - by the governments themselves, by the people of their countries, 

and by the world at large - as a vote of confidence. It will reinforce the message we already 

send in too many ways that such behavior imposes no important costs on governments: that 

it is unacceptable in theory but not in practice. In the case of Viet Nam, this message will be 

particularly unfortunate. I n the last few months the government has staged some 50 show 

trials of people whose only crime was to criticize the regime, or to show patriotism toward 

their own country. One of these trials involved a young female, Nguyen Phuong Uyen, whose 

only crime was to question Vietnam's concession of disputed land to China. 

B) In terms of labor rights, forced labor is still practiced in rehab centers and in prisons. 

Prisoners, including political prisoners, are forced to process cashews and seafood products 

for export. Labor trafficking under the national labor export program has grown in number 

and severity, including the trafficking of women to work as sex slaves. Migrant workers 

continue to be prohibited from joining labor unions even in destination countries. They are 

now discouraged from seeking help from NGOs that have not been vetted by the Vietnamese 

government. At any given time hundreds of thousands of inmates are subjected to forced 

labor throughout Vietnam. America imports a large volume of cashews from Vietnam, and 

Vietnam ranks as the second largest apparel exporter to the U.S. with exports totaling $7 

billion a year. 

According to Boat People SOS, a respectable national organization with operations 

throughout the United States and in three Asian countries, its Bangkok-based legal team has 

discovered, through interviews with Vietnamese asylum seekers in Thailand, that political 

prisoners and other prisoners of conscience have also been subjected to exactly the same type 

of forced labor. One Montagnard, jailed from 2002 through 2009, had to do this for 7 years. 

His hands were eaten by the acid from the cashew nuts because he was not allowed to use 

gloves. Another Montagnard jailed from 2005 until 2009 at Dai Binh Prison in Lam Dong 

described prisoners being divided into production teams (cashew production, farming, 

vegetation, packaging fish for exporting). Those failing to meet quota were beaten with a 

whip and kicked. A Vietnamese dissident sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for promoting 

democracy over the internet and for distributing leaflets was required to break cashew shells 

during his incarceration at the Z 30A Xuan Loc prison. His quota was about 22 kilograms 

per day. Human Rights Lawyer Nguyen Van Dai, a recently released prisoner of conscience, 

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also reported the wide use of forced labor in prison to manufacture products that were then 

exported to Western countries. Until and unless government-sponsored forced labor and 

labor exploitation ceases in Vietnam, the TPP would certainly encourage its government to 

increasingly use forced labor and labor exploitation to increase profits at the expenses of U.S. 

businesses and workers. 

C) Prisoners of conscience in Viet Nam are falsely accused and convicted on bogus charges 

because they attempted to organize independent labor unions, or advocate for the rights of 

workers to organize. These prisoners of conscience include Doan Huy Chuong, Nguyen 

Hoang Quoc Hung, and Do Thi Minh Hanh, as well as others who attempted to exercise their 

fundamental right to freedom of association, such as Nguyen Van Hai (Dieu Cay), the 

founder of the "Free Journalists Club". It would be particularly inappropriate to reward a 

government that imprisons people for exercising these rights with membership in an 

association whose whole reason for being is openness, transparency, and freedom of 

movement for goods and persons. 

D) The idea that dictatorial governments will improve their human rights practices after being 

granted TPP is not only counter-intuitive but also flies in the face of decades of experience in 

dealing with the governments of China and other countries. Once democratic nations give up 

their leverage and confer benefits that enrich and empower the undemocratic governments, 

the latter have no incentive to reform. The argument that expanded trade will bring about 

human rights improvements has not worked for Vietnam. Since the BTA trade between US 

and Vietnam has increased by more than 1,000% (from 2-4 billion in 2001 to 25 billion in 

2012). However, in that period of time, human rights violations have steadily become 

aggravated. The gradual backsliding started in 1998. The situation appeared to improve in 

2005 and 2006 due to the CPC designation. In 2007 the government launched a brntal and 

massive crackdown which lasts to this day. Today, Vietnam in the worst violator of human 

rights of all the countries in Southeast Asia. 

E) It is also important to notice the enormous difference between free trade with countries with 

entrepreneurial free-enterprise systems and those whose economies are dominated by stateowned companies and/or 'joint ventures" involving such companies. American workers and 

small businesses are productive enough to compete on a level playing field with their genuine 

counterparts in other countries, but the field is not level when it's workers and businesses on 

one side and governments on the other. 

F) Finally, although the TPP negotiations up to this point have been anything but transparent, it 

appears that Viet Nam and other potential TPP members have been given a series of "red 

lines" - anticompetitive practices in which they currently engage that are unacceptable to 

U.S. business interests and which these governments will therefore have to stop in order to 

become members of TPP. It is hardly unreasonable to suggest that these "red lines" should 

include a demand for the immediate release of labor activists, independent journalists, and 

others whose crimes consisted only in attempting to exercise internationally recognized 

human rights. 

I urge this Congress to exclude Vietnam from the Trans-Pacific Partnership until and unless all these 

prisoners have been unconditionally released. Otherwise, we may be unintentionally encouraging the 

Vietnamese government to escalate human rights violations on the belief that it can do so with 

practical impunity. Furthermore, Viet Nam shotrld allow migrant workers to join local labor unions 

in destination countries, start to investigate labor export companies implicated in labor trafficking, 

give domestic and international NGOs full access to victims of labor trafficking, end the practice of 

forced labor, set free prisoners of conscience particularly labor union organizers, and enable the 

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formation of independent watchdog groups to ensure proper implementation ofTPP provisions once 

and if Viet Nam joins it. 

[believe that my statement and position reflects the sentiments and views of Vietnamese-Americans 

from across the country. As a matter of fact, on June 4 some 800 Vietnamese-American community 

leaders from 30 states came to the Capitol to speak to their members of Congress about the need to 

precondition expansion of trade with Vietnam on improved human rights in that communist 

country. T hope that the voices of these Vietnamese-American leaders do not fall on deaf ears. T hope 

that the principles that have made us a great nation do not fall on deaf ears. 

Once again, I would like to thank the Chairman and esteemed members of this Subcommittee for the 

opportunity to submit my statement into the record in lieu of testimony. 

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Montagnard Prisoners 

Partial list As of February 2012 

(Primary sources: BPSOS and Montagnard Human Rights Organization) 

Montagnards have long been subjected to harsh treatment by the government of Viet Nam for a 

number of reasons including traditional prejudice against ethnic minorities; distrust of the 

Montagnards' fervent Christianity, which many in the government consider a subversive 

"American" religion; hostility on account of the close association of many Montagnards with the 

United States war effort prior to 1975; and an ongoing policy by the government to resettle ethnic 

Vietnamese from the North in the Central Highlands on lands confiscated from Montagnards. 

In recent years this mistreatment has intensified. Between 200 I and 2004, the Vietnamese 

government shut down or destroyed over four thousand Montagnard house churches in the Central 

Highlands, and vigorously seized the ancestral lands of the Montagnards, hence in most cases 

depriving them of their only means oflive1ihood and further disrupting their religious lives. This 

repressive policy prompted mass demonstrations by the Montagnards in 200 1,2002, 2004 and 

2008. 

" ... in J. e hruwy 200 I, unprecedented mass protests hroke Ollt in alljiJUr provinces of the Central 

Highlands. n10usands of Montag nards marched on Ihe provinciallowns 10 demand the reillm of 

anceslrallands and religiousfreedom. 

In response, the government launched all aggressive crackdmJ.'l/, dispatching military and police 

units to seal off the region and arresting dozens of Montag nard I', sometimes using torture to elicit 

confessions and puhlic statements of remorse . 

.. .In April 200-1 thousands qlMomaxnards axain took 10 Ihe streets, with smaller protests takinx 

place in September 2002 and April 2008 . 

... F;lile security units hat'e hunted down and arrested Montagnard actil'ists in hiding and sealed otf 

the horder with Camhodia to prevent a.\}ofllm seekersfromfleeing the counfly. 

During Ihese crackdowns, authorities have commilted clear-cut violalions ojjilfldamental rig/1Is, 

including arbitrmy arrest, imprisonment, and torture. Officials have employed coercion to pressure 

MOnfagnanA to renounce their religion alld pledge their loyalty to the government and the 

Communisl Parly qfVietfJam. Police ha\iC used exces,r"iveforce 10 di5.pellargely peace/if] prolc5;/'c,,', 

resulting in the deaths of as many as eight Montagnardl during demonsfl'ations in April 200-1 as 

well as injuries and deaths of others during arrest and in police cllstody ... "("Montagnard 

Christians in Vietnam, A Case Study in Religious Repression," Human Rights Watch, 2011) 

In 2004 the United States designated Vietnam as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) but 

removed the designation two years later despite the continued imprisonment of Montagnards who 

were involved in the peaceful demonstrations of2001, 2002 and 2004. The Vietnamese government 

again cracked down on the 2008 demonstration and arrested numerous participating Montagnards. 

Since 2009, the state news media has reported that at least 15 Montagnards had been tried and 
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2 

sentenced to up to 12 years imprisonment for "undermining national unity." The government has 

recently increased repression of the Montagnards, closing house churches, compelling public 

renunciations of faith and arresting worshipers. 

Below is a partial list of Montagnards imprisoned for taking part in the demonstrations in 2001-2008. 

Most of them were charged according to the following articles in the Vietnamese Criminal Code (VCe): 

· § 87: Undermining the national unity 

· § 89: Causing public disorder 

· § 91: Fleeing abroad to oppose the People's Govemment 

· § 257: Resisting officers in the performance of their duties 

Note: Information on the sentence may vary in some cases. The alternative information is placed in 

square brackets. 

Sentence 

No Full Name Year of arrest Province (Years) Prison last known 

1 YThuan Nie 2001 Dak Lak 10 Ha nam 

2 Y Tuan Bya 2001 Dak Lak 11 Ha nam 

3 Y Wang Nie kdam 2001 Dak Lak 4 Ha Nam 

4 Y Rin Kpa 2001 Dak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

5 Y Nuen Buanya 2001 Dak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

6 Y Mriu Eban 2001 Dak Lak 6 Ha Nam 

7 Y Muk Nie 2001 Dak Lak 5 Ha Nam 

8 Y Nuen Nie 2001 Dak Lak 2 Ha Nam 

9 Y Bhiat Ayun 2001 Dak Lak 3 Ha nam 

10 Ksor Sun 2001 Dak Lak 2 Ha Nam 

11 Y Nok Mlo 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha nam 

12 Y Bhiet Nie 2001 Dak Lak 6 Ha Nam 

13 Y Druk Nie 2001 Dak Lak 7 Ha Nam 

14 Y Phen Ksor 2001 Dak Lak 7 Ha Nam 

15 Siu Sop 2001 Dak Lak 6 Ha nam 

16 Y Khu Nie 2001 Dak Lak 5 Ha Nam 

17 YTum Mia 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

18 Y Suan 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Died in prison 

19 Y Kaa Buanya 2001 Dak lak 7 Ha Nam 

20 YTim Eban 2001 Dak lak 8 Ha nam 

21 YAre Nie 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

22 Y Bah Nie 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha nam 

23 YTien Nie 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha nam 

24 Y Nai Mlo 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha nam 

25 Y Pum Bya 2001 Dak lak 8 Ha nam 

26 YThamas Eya 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

27 Y Cai B. Krong 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

28 Y Lem B.Krong 2001 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 
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29 Rahlan Loa 2001 Dak Lak 9 Ha nam 

30 YThim Bya 2001 Dak lak 10 Ha nam 

31 Y Ju Nie 2001 Dak Lak 8 unknown 

32 Y Klah Bya 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Phu Yen 

33 H' Boc Eban 2001 Dak Lak 3 Ha Nam 

34 Y Grong 2001 Dak Lak 3 Ha nam 

35 Y Ngul 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

36 Y Bri Enuol Heleasec1 2001 Dak lak 10 Ha Nam 

37 Y Kro Nie 2001 Dak Lak 5 Ha Nam 

38 Y He Eban 2001 Dak Lak 12 Ha Nam 

39 Y Bhi Bya 2001 Dak Lak 7 unknown 

40 Y Dham Knul 2001 Dak Lak 5 unknown 

41 Y Cuan Ream 2001 Dak Lak S unknown 

42 Lat 2001 Dak Lak 7 Ha Nam 

43 Y Kroi B.krong 2001 Dak Lak 7 unknown 

44 Y Kua Bya 2001 Dak Lak 13 Ha Nam 

45 Y Hoen 2001 Dak Lak 7 unknown 

46 Y Oal Nie 2001 Dak Lak S Ha Nam 

47 Y Kim Enuol 2001 Dak Lak 7 unknown 

48 Jon Enuol Re!eaS!.?d 2001 Dak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

49 Y Lia Nie 2001 Dak Lak 7 Ha Nam 

50 Y Ku Nie 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

51 Siu Je 2001 Dak Lak 7 unknown 

52 Ksor Phom 2001 Dak lak Unknown Ha Nam 

53 YSu 2001 Dak Lak Unknown unknown 

54 Y Brik Bya 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Unknown 

55 Y Kao Nie 2001 Dak Lak Unknown unknown 

56 Ama Phi 2001 Dak Lak Unknown unknown 

57 Ksor Y Hoi 2001 Dak Lak Unknown unknown 

58 Ksor Y Lak 2001 Dak lak Unknown Ha Nam 

59 Y Nguyen kdoh 2001 Dak Lak 8 unknown 

60 YSom Hmok 2001 Dak Lak 6 Ha nam 

61 YBliet Ayun 2001 Dak Lak S Ha Nam 

62 AmaGam 2001 Dak Lak S Ha Nam 

63 Ama Hngem 2001 Dak Lak Unknown Unknown 

64 Dieu Rais 2001 Dak Nong Unknown Dak Nong 

65 Rmah Djoan 2001 Gia Lai S Ha nam 

66 Siu Un 2001 Gia Lai 16 Ha Nam 

67 YGlu 2001 Gia Lai 7 Ha Nam 

68 Siu Seo 2001 Gia Lai S Ha nam 

69 SiuTel Released 2001 Gia Lai S Ha nam 

70 Ksor Poi 2001 Gia Lai 10 Ha Nam 
82


82310h-4.eps

4 

71 Siu Yui 2001 Gia Lai 8 Ha Nam 

72 Siu Boch 2001 Gia Lai 8 Ha nam 

73 Ksor Kroih 2001 Gia Lai 11 Ha Nam 

74 Siu Tinh 2001 Gia Lai 8 Ha Nam 

75 Ksor Blung 2001 Gia Lai 5 Ha Nam 

76 Siu Ning 2001 Gia lai 5 Ha Nam 

77 Siu Beng 2001 Gia lai 7 Ha Nam 

78 Prom 2001 Gia Lai 8 Ha Nam 

79 Rmah Anhur 2001 Gia Lai 8 Ha nam 

80 Kpa Hling 2001 Gia lai 5 Ha nam 

81 Puih Em 2001 Gia Lai 7 Ha nam 

82 Nay Ph am 2001 Gia lai 5 Ha nam 

83 Klong 2001 Gia lai 5 Ha Nam 

84 Ksor Dar 2001 Gia lai 3 Ha nam 

85 Siu Be 2001 Gia Lai 3 Unknown 

86 Y Hnoch 2001 Gia lai 6 Ha Nam 

87 Siu Grih 2001 Gia Lai 6 Ha Nam 

88 Ksor Hnel 2001 Gia Lai 6 Thanh Hoa 

89 Goih 2001 Gia Lai 6 unknown 

90 Bah 2001 Gia Lai 6 unknown 

91 Rmah Teng 2001 Gia Lai 8 Thanh Hoa 

92 Rmah Nul 2001 Gia Lai 5 Ha Nam 

93 Ksor Blip 2001 Gia Lai 5 Ha Nam 

94 Ksor Doai 2001 Gia Lai 11 Ha Nam 

95 Y Yung 2001 Gia Lai 6 Ha Nam 

96 Treo 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Ha Nam 

97 Dinh Giam 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Ha Nam 

98 Ksor Buh 2001 Gia Lai 6 Ha Nam 

99 YTeo 2001 Gia Lai 5 Ha nam 

100 Ban 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Phu Yen 

101 Bro 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Phu Yen 

102 Khoi 2001 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

103 Nau Guh 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Ha Nam 

104 Hyun 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Phu Yen 

105 Bum 2001 Gia lai Unknown Ha nam 

106 Siu Mat 2001 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

107 Rcom Huong 2001 Gia lai 5 unknown 

108 Nai nay 2001 Gia lai Unknown Ha nam 

109 Krek 2001 Gia Lai 5 unknown 

110 Bru 2001 Gia lai 6 T-20 

111 Ksor Gng 2001 Gia Lai 5 unknown 

112 YTum 2001 Gia lai 13 Ha Nam 
83


82310h-5.eps

5 

113 Ream Oue 2001 Gia lai 5 unknown 

114 Ksor Kroi 2001 Gia Lai 2 unknown 

115 Rahlan Hir 2001 Gia Lai 3 unknown 

116 Ama Ngoan 2001 Gia Lai Unknown T-20 

117 YGru 2001 Gia lai Unknown Ha Nam 

118 Nay Ojong 2001 Gia Lai Unknown Ha nam 

119 Siu Bhung 2001 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

120 Rmah Hyuh 2001 Gia Lai Unknown T-20 

121 Rmah Thuk 2001 Gia lai Unknown Ha nam 

122 Ksor Nom 2001 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

123 Bom Jana 2001 Gia Lak 12 Ha Nam 

124 Nay Klong 2001 Gia Lak 5 unknown 

125 Y Longme 2001 Phu Yen Unknown unknown 

Y Het Nie Kdam 

126 Released 2002 Oak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

127 YTan Nie 2002 Oak Lak 8 Ha nam 

128 Y Hoang BKrong 2002 Oak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

129 Y Ben Nie 2002 Oak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

130 Y 00 Mlo 2002 Oak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

131 Y KUD Bya 2002 Oak Lak 13 [12] Ha Nam 

132 Y Tlup Adrong 2003 Oak Lak 12 [11] Ha Nam 

133 Y Bem Nie 2003 Oak Lak 5 Ha Nam 

134 Y Kuang Ecam 2003 Oak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

135 Siu Bor 2003 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

136 Rmah Kuet 2003 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

137 Y Jon Enuol 2003 Oak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

138 Y Krec Bya R.~':lie3'Sed 2003 Oak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

139 Y Yuan Bya 2003 Oak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

140 Rahlan Glel 2003 Gia Lai 5 Ha Nam 

141 Romah Phing 2003 Gia Lai 5 T-20 

142 Rahlan Khol 2003 Gia Lai 7 Ha Nam 

143 Kpuih Gyan 2003 Gia Lai 7 Ha Nam 

144 Rahlan Tuan 2003 Gia Lai 7 unknown 

145 Puih Huy 2003 Gia Lai 6 Ha Nam 

146 Ama Rap 2003 Gia Lai Unknown Ha Nam 

147 Jum, Ama Koi 2003 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

148 Rahlan Sang 2003 Gia Lai Unknown Phu Yen 

149 Noh 2003 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

150 Siu Ron 2003 Gia Lai Unknown unknown 

151 Kpa Thil 2003 Gia Lai Unknown T-20 

152 Blit 2003 Gia Lai Unknown Ha Nam 

153 Ream Glam 2003 Gia Lai 8 Ha Nam 
84


82310h-6.eps

6 

154 Rahlan Sam 2003 Gia Lai Unknown Thanh Hoa 

155 Croc 2003 Gia Lai Unknown Phu Yen 

156 KPuih Tin 2003 Gia Lai 13 Ha Nam 

157 Y Tui Enoul 2004 'Oak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

158 Siu Jun 2004 Ayun Pah 6 Ha Nam 

159 YThot 2004 Oac Nong 10 Ha Nam 

160 Hung 2004 Oak Ooa 12 T-20 

161 Rmah san 2004 Oak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

162 Y Phen Nie 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Phu Yen 

163 Y Suom Hmok 2004 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

164 YTlo Kbuor 2004 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

165 Y Gin Hmok 2004 Oak Lak 3 unknown 

166 Y Hlu Hmok 2004 Oak Lak 6 unknown 

167 Y Boi Nie 2004 Oak Lak 3 unknown 

168 Y Ohoeng Knul 2004 Oak Lak 8 unknown 

169 Y Oin Nie 2004 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

170 Y OAE Nie 2004 Oak Lak Unknown unknown 

171 Y Goi Nie 2004 Oak Lak 3 unknown 

172 Y Jim Eban 2004 Oak Lak 13 Ha Nam 

173 Y Jim Eban 2004 Oak Lak 13 Unknown 

174 Y Tuan HOok 2004 Oak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

Y Jim Eban (Group 1 of 7 

175 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

Y Jim Eban (Group 2, of 

176 7 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

Y Jim Eban (Group 3, of 

177 7 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

Y Jim Eban (Group, 4 of 

178 7 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

Y Jim Eban (Group,S of 7 

179 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

Y Jim Eban ( Group, 6 of 

180 7 UN-Named) 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 

181 Y Ruih (Ruh Eban) 2004 Oak Lak 10 Unknown 

182 Y Senat, Ksor N ie 2004 Oak Lak 7 Unknown 

183 Y Suan Mlo 2004 Oak Lak 10 Unknown 

184 Y Mun Nie 2004 Oak Lak 7 Oai Phat Thanh 

185 Y Kur Buon Oap 2004 Oak Lak 17 Unknown 

186 Y Ngun Knul 2004 Oak Lak 18 Ha Nam 

187 Y Rit Nie 2004 Oak Lak 12 [10] Ha Nam 

188 YNgun Knu 2004 Oak lak 5-10 Ha Nam 

189 YAng Knul 2004 Oak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

190 Y Yoan Hmok 2004 Oak Lak 9 Unknown 

191 Y Hiu Eban 2004 Oak Lak Unknown Unknown 
85


82310h-7.eps

7 

192 Y Nging Nie 2004 Dak Lak 11 [9] Ha Nam 

193 YRit Nie 2004 Dak Lak 5-10 Ha Nam 

194 Y Dec Nie 2004 Dak Lak 6 Unknown 

195 Dieu Xam 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

196 Y Bout B'Krong 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

197 Y Net Bya 2004 Dak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

198 Yang Knul 2004 Dak Lak 11 Unknown 

199 YBuot Bkrong 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

200 YTho Eban 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

201 Y Krong HDok 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

202 YRankBour 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Ha Nam 

203 YSe Nie 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Dak Lak 

204 YSamoel MID 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

205 Y Thomas Nie 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

206 Nay Het 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

207 Thomas Nie 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

208 Nay Het 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

209 Y Suan Bya 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

210 Y Soan MID 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

211 Y BHem KPor 2004 Dak Lak 10 Ha Nam 

212 Y DHam Eban 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

213 Y Ixio 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

214 Y Jup E Ban 2004 Dak Lak 11 Ha Nam 

215 Y Kur BDap 2004 Dak Lak 17 Ha Nam 

216 Y Pher HDruc 2004 Dak Lak 12 Ha Nam 

217 Y Phu Ksor 2004 Dak Lak 9 [8] Ha Nam 

218 Y Samuel MLo Released 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

219 Y Suon BYa 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

220 YTuan Hmok 2004 Dak Lak 8 Ha Nam 

Y Jim Eban (Group 7, of 

221 7 UN- Named) 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Unknown 

222 Y Niem Eban 2004 Dak lak 10 Ha Nam 

223 Y Don Bya 2004 Dak lak 15 [10] Ha Nam 

224 Y Jut Eban 2004 Dak lak 10 Unknown 

225 Y Jem Hwing 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Unknown 

226 Y Se Nie 2004 Dak Lak Unknown Dak Lak 

227 Y Nguyet Nie 2004 Dak Lak 7 Thanh Hoa 

228 Y Ben Nie 2004 Dak Lak 14 Ha Nam 

229 Y Blec Nie 2004 Dak Lak 9 Ha Nam 

230 Y Krat 2004 Dak Mil 3 Unknown 

231 Y Nguk 2004 Dak Mil 4.5 Unknown 

232 Tuan Ria 2004 Dak Nong Unknown Dak Nong 
86

[NOTE: The remainder of the above material is not reprinted here but is available 

in committee records.]

Æ


82310h-8.eps