Filed 6/27/13 P. v. White CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
NICKLAS ANTHONY WHITE,
Defendant and Appellant. B236536
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA364552)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part.

Sylvia Koryn, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Carl N. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 INTRODUCTION A jury found defendant and appellant Ni cklas Anthony White guilty of carjacking and of receiving stolen property. Based on the victim’s surprise testimony that the carjacker had a red mohawk like defendant, de fendant contends that his discovery rights and right to a fundamentally fair trial were vi olated. We disagree with that contention. But we do agree that his conviction of rece iving stolen property must be reversed,
because he cannot be convicted of stealing and recei ving the same property. We therefore reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND I. Factual background.
A. Prosecution’s case. On November 11, 2009, ar ound 1:00 p.m., Denise Ali ca Taylor and her friend, Dylon Downer, were at Milton’s restaurant on Slauson Avenue in Los Angeles. When Taylor returned to her car to get some fliers, she noticed defendant getting out of the passenger side of a black Chrysler. As Tayl or was closing her car door, a voice beside her said, “ ‘Give me your moth er-fucking keys.’ ” Turning, she saw defendant standing a foot away and pointing something covered with a T-shirt at her. Defendant threw off the shirt, revealing a gun. Taylor threw her keys into the air and ran into the restaurant. When she and Downer went back outside, her car and th e black Chrysler were headed westbound on Slauson. Downer saw the drivers of Taylor’s car and the black Chry sler talking before they drove away. Taylor had left her cell phone and $280 in the front drink compartment. She left her purse, which contained a checkbo ok, credit cards, identification, bible and journal, in the backseat. Taylor called 911and described the carj acker as a Black male wearing all black clothing. Officer Brett Ehring and his partner arrived at the scene. Officer Ehring put out
an initial crime broadcast descri bing the suspect as a Black ma le, about 20 years old, with a dark complexion and bad teeth. After Taylor calmed down, she gave a further description of the suspect: he had a black and red mohawk and a Jamaican accent.3 Officer Ehring broadcast that information as well. When Officer Bret Banachowski arrived at the scene, officers told him that the suspect was a Black male with a dark complexion, bad teeth and a red mohawk. 1
Barbara Gentle was across the street fro m Milton’s when Taylor was carjacked. She saw Taylor’s car leave Milton’s and head west on Slauson. She did not see the
driver. Within 30 minutes of the crime, O fficer Banachowski found Taylor’s car, abandoned, at 52nd Street and Ninth Avenue. No prints were lifted from the car. Based on searches for Taylor’s cell phone, Officer Ba nachowski was directed to a motel, where
he found defendant in one of the rooms. 2 Several women were in the room with defendant, and Officer Orland o Diaz saw defendant pass a gu n partially hidden inside a glove to one woman. The wo man told the officer that sh e didn’t know defendant was going to give her the gun. Defendant had Taylor’s cell phone in his pocket. Later that night, Taylor was taken to a field show-up at a hotel parking lot, where
she identified defendant as the carjacker. She also identified defendant at trial as the man who carjacked her. All of Taylor’s possessi ons were returned, ex cept for the $280.
B. Defense case. Defendant’s friend, Christine Denise J ackson, testified that on the day of the carjacking he was with her and his girlfriend all day at his girlfriend’s shop. A woman named Meeka was also there, but Jackson be came upset when she saw that Meeka had a

gun. Defendant also testified that he was at his girlfriend’s store all day. He did not steal Taylor’s car. For $75, he bought Taylor’s cell ph one from two crack addicts who came into the store. They always came into th e store, and defendant wanted to help them

1 Officers did not obtain surveillance foot age from the restaurant’s video camera.

2 Officer Diaz described defendant’s hair as a “fohawk,” “where they shave the hair down and then it’s the lowere d part here and it was red.”4 out by buying the phone. At the motel, he di d not hand a gun to Meeka. The gun was
Meeka’s. II. Procedural background. On May 6, 2011, a jury fo und defendant guilty of: count 1, carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) 3 and found true gun-us e allegations (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)), and count 2, receiving stolen pr operty (§ 496, subd. (a)) and found true a gun allegation (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). On September 28, 2011, the trial court se ntenced defendant on count 1, to three years plus ten years for the gun-use enhancem ent. The court imposed but stayed under
section 654 a 16-month sentence on count 2.
DISCUSSION I. Admitting evidence of defendant’s re d mohawk did not lead to reversible

error. Defendant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 306 4 regarding untimely disclosure of evidence. He alternatively contends that admitting evidence of the re d mohawk rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. We disagree.

3 All further undesignated statutor y references are to the Penal Code.

4 CALCRIM No. 306 provides, in part: “B oth the People and the defense must disclose their evidence to the ot her side before trial, within the time limits set by law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the othe r side the chance to produce all relevant evidence, to counter oppo sing evidence, or to receive a fair trial. [¶] An attorney for the (People/defense) failed to disclose: [¶] _____ < describe evidence that was not disclosed > [within the legal time peri od]. [¶] In evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence, you may cons ider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.” (See generally, People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4t h 248, 307-311 [discussing criticism of instructions on untimely disclosure of evidence]; People v. Bell (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 249, 255-257 [instructing on untimely disclosure was prejudicial error]; People v. Saucedo (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 937 [criticizing instruction on untimely disclosure as speculative and offering insuffici ent direction, but finding th at giving it was harmless error].)5 A. Additional facts. During his opening statement, defense coun sel argued that his client was innocent, because Taylor did not describe the carjacker as having a red m ohawk, which defendant
had at the time of the events: “The evidence is going to show that when the alleged victim spoke to police, she said that the man had black hair. The ev idence will show that [defendant] that day, he had black hair on th e sides, and he has about a 3- or 4-inch mohawk in red running down the top of his he ad. The victim never described that. [¶] . . . [¶] When [defendant] was arrested, th e police took a booking photo. Look, there is barely any hair on the sides. A nd at the top, although this is not a great picture, you see a red mohawk. [¶] The eviden ce will show that [defenda nt] is not the person that committed these alleged crimes. [¶] . . . [¶] He’s not th e guy. He doesn’t fit the description. He’s not 19 years old. He has a mohawk. The robber didn’t have a
mohawk.” Taylor, the victim, was the People’s firs t witness. While cr oss-examining Taylor, defense counsel asked, “When the police aske d you of anything odd about the person’s face, you told them there was nothing odd about his face; true?” Taylor answered that she told officers the suspect had a “unique hairdo like a moha wk or something.” “He had a little mohawk going.” She didn’t mention the mohawk in prior testimony because she
wasn’t asked. 5 Defense counsel objected and asked that evidence of the mohawk be excluded
because it had never be en provided in discove ry. The prosecutor represented that the mohawk was “new to me,” and she agreed it wa s not mentioned in the police reports or at the preliminary hearing. After Taylor testifie d, the prosecutor spoke to one of the officers who would be testifying, and he confirmed he was told to look for somebody with a red
mohawk.

5 Taylor also said that before she iden tified defendant at a field show-up, she was shown four other men at four different fiel d show-ups. The defe nse, however, had not been given discovery about those other field show-ups.6 The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s representation she had no knowledge of the evidence, and therefore th e court refused to exclude it, finding that a discovery
violation had not occurred unde r section 1054.1. The court also denied the defense’s request for an instruction th at the evidence had not been turned over and should be viewed with skepticism. Th e court did, however, order the prosecutor to make the officers having knowledge of th e evidence available to defense counsel before testifying. Thereafter, Officer Banachowski testifie d that when he arrived at Milton’s restaurant he was advised the suspect was a Black male with a dark complexion, bad
teeth and a red mohawk. Defense counsel then renewed his objec tion, because he had learned that the prosecutor was trying to obtain radio calls referencing the red mohawk. Counsel argued that there had been a plea offe r before trial, and based on the evidence th en known to him, defense counsel advised his client. “And now they bring in all of this new evidence which was––which we were not privy to. I mean, I think––I think to proceed in this
fashion interferes with the a ttorney-client relationship a nd, again, it fundamentally deprives [defendant] of a fair trial.” Defens e counsel therefore aske d for a mistrial. The trial court again found that th ere had been no discovery viol ation and denied the mistrial
motion. Officer Ehring then testified that after th e victim calmed down, she added that the carjacker had a black and red mo hawk and a Jamaican accent.
B. Admitting evidence of the red mo hawk did not require a limiting instruction, and it did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
The trial court neither abused its discreti on by refusing to give an instruction to address any discovery violation nor were defendant’s due process rights violated. Section 1054.1, the reciproc al discovery statute, “ ‘independently requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense . . . certain categories of evidence “in the possession of the prosecuting attorn ey or [known by] the prosecuti ng attorney . . . to be in the possession of the investigating agencies.” ’ ” ( People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 279-280; see also People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1 082, 1133, overruled on7 another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 135 [prosecutorial obliga tion to disclose relevant materials includes information within the pros ecution’s possession and contro l and information reasonably accessible to the prosecution].) Evidence subject to disclosure includes “any ‘[r]elevant
written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial’ ” and any exculpatory evidence. ( Verdugo , at p. 280; § 1054.1, subds. (f) & (e ).) “ ‘Absent good cause, such evidence must be disclosed at least 30 days before tria l, or immediately if discovered or obtained within 30 days of trial.’ ” ( Verdugo , at p. 280; § 1054.7; Zambrano , at p. 1133.) If any party fails to comply with the statutory di sclosure requirements, the trial court “may make any order necessary” to enforce these provisions, “including, but not limited to, [ordering] immediate disclo sure, [initiating] contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a w itness or the presentation of real evidence, continu[ing] . . . the matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the court may advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untim ely disclosure.” (§ 1054.5, subd. (b); see
also Verdugo, at p. 280.)
We review a trial court’s decision whet her to give an instruction concerning a discovery violation for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299.) A violation of the disc overy statutes is subject to the harmless-error standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, and therefore reversal is required only where it is reasonably probable that the omission affected the outcome at trial. ( People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1135, fn. 13.) Here, evidence the carjacker had a red mohawk was not disclosed to the defense. It was not mentioned in Taylor’s 911 call, in the police reports or at the preliminary hearing. The first time it was mentioned dur ing trial was in defense counsel’s opening statement. He said that Taylor’s failure to describe her assailant as having a red mohawk
showed that defendant did not commit the ca rjacking. Taylor undercut that defense8 when, on cross-examination, sh e testified that the carjacker had a red mohawk and that she told police officers about it. 6 Section 1054.1 requires disclosure of information the prosecutor possesses or
knows to be in the possession of investigating ag encies. The prosecut or here represented that she did not possess this information before Taylor testified and that she did not know the investigating officers had any knowledge of it. It was “new” information to her. The trial court accepted her representation, and the record supports it. The police reports, the 911 call, and Taylor had not previously mentioned a red mohawk. Officer Banachowski testified that the day of his trial testimony was when he first mentioned the mohawk to the prosecutor. Given this record and the standard of review—a n abuse of discretion— we cannot disregard the court’s finding that th e prosecutor did not k now of the evidence; hence, she did not violate the criminal di scovery statutes. If there was no discovery violation, then there was no duty to in struct the jury on untimely discovery. Nor can we find that the surprise disclo sure of that evidence and its admission, even if erroneous, violated defendant’s due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and rendered the trial fundamenta lly unfair. “ ‘Ordin arily, even erroneous admission of evidence does not offend due proce ss unless it is so prejudicial as to render the proceeding fundamentally un fair.’ . . . [¶] ‘To prove a deprivation of federal due process rights, [a defendant] must satisfy a high constitutional standard to show that the

6 We reject the Attorney General’s su ggestion that defense counsel “opened the door” to the admission of evidence of the re d mohawk simply because the evidence was first elicited during his cross-examination of Taylor. Defense counsel stated in his opening that defendant was not the carjacker, and he would establish this by evidence the victim never described her assa ilant as having a red mohawk. To establish that defense, defense counsel asked Taylor, “When the po lice asked you of anything odd about the person’s face, you told them there was nothing odd about his face; true?” Taylor then answered that she remembered telling police officers that the carjacker had a “unique hairdo like a mohawk or something.” Base d on Taylor’s prior testimony, the 911 call, and the police report, none of which referenced a red mohawk, it is clear that defense counsel was trying to establish that Tayl or did not mention a red mohawk when describing her assailant. Under these circum stances, defense counsel did not “open the door” to the evidence in a way that ex cused any alleged prosecutorial error.9 erroneous admission of evidence resulted in an unfair trial.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The dispositive issue is . . . whether the trial c ourt committed an error wh ich rendered the trial ‘so “arbitrary and fundamentally unfair” th at it violated federal due process.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” ( People v. Covarrubias (2011) 202 Cal.Ap p.4th 1, 20; see
also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) Defendant analogizes the disclosure of th e red mohawk evidence during trial to what happened in Sheppard v. Rees (9th Cir. 1989) 909 F.2d 1234 and in U.S. v. Gaskins (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 454 ( Gaskins ). The defendant in Sheppard was tried for murder on a theory the murder was pr emeditated and deliberate. ( Sheppard , at p. 1235.) After the parties rested and the instructions were settled, the prosecutor, for the first time, requested instructions on fel ony murder on a th eory that the murd er occurred during a robbery, a crime with which the defendant was not charged. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court gave the instructions. Sheppard held that the ri ght to counsel was “directly implicated.” ( Id. at p. 1237.) “That right is next to meaningless unless
counsel knows and has a satisfac tory opportunity to respond to the charges against which he or she must defend. Sheppard’s counsel had no occasion to defend against the felonymurder theory during the evid entiary phase of the trial. This error affected the composition of the record.” ( Ibid. )
In Gaskins , the trial court and the parties agre ed that the jury should not be instructed on aiding and abetting at the defendant’s trial for possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine. ( Gaskins
, supra , 849 F.2d at p. 45 6.) But when the jury asked a question about aiding and abetti ng during deliberations, the court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting. ( Id. at pp. 456-457.) Gaskins found that the trial court
violated rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Cr iminal Procedure regarding instructions and that giving the aiding and abe tting instruction during jury delib erations unfairly prevented the defendant’s counsel from arguing against an aiding and abetting th eory to the jury. ( Id. at p. 460.)10 What happened in Sheppard and in Gaskins , namely, failing to notify the defendant of the charges against him and precluding the defense from arguing against a theory of liability, is far different than what happened here. Here, defendant was surprised by previously undis closed evidence at trial. 7 A defendant, however, is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. (See generally People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009; Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 183 [“ ‘Darden’s trial was not perfect—few are—but neither was it fundamentally unfair’ ”].) Taylor’s and the officers’ testimony that she described her carjacker as having a red mohawk, a fact not mentioned by Taylor in her prior testimony or in her 911 call or in the police reports, was certainly a surprise. But surprises often occur at tria ls: witnesses fail to appear, recant prior testimony, and recall forgotten de tails. Where, as here, such surprises are unaccompanied by a discovery violation or other misconduct or error, they rarely render a trial fundamentally unfair. Although he was surprise d by the evidence, defens e counsel was able to aggressively cross-examine witnesses about it and, through cross-examination, suggest
that the evidence was fabricated . He had Taylor, for example, review the police report to
refresh her recollection whether she mentioned the mohawk to the po lice, and she agreed that the report did not mention a mohawk. He asked if the first time she mentioned a red
mohawk was when she saw defendant at the fi eld show-up, which Taylor denied. Officer Banachowski, during cross-examination, deni ed that the first time a red mohawk was
mentioned was when the district attorney and detective called him. Defense counsel also asked the officer why he didn’t mention the m ohawk in his “daily . . . D.F.A.R. report.” Counsel asked, “Isn’t it true then it wasn’t that you were looking for a person with a red mohawk but that you found a person with a re d mohawk?” The officer testified that he remembered he was looking for a person with a red mohawk, but he admitted he never

7 As we have said, the trial court found that the prosecutor also had no notice of this evidence, and therefore there wa s no discovery violation. No thing in this record shows that the court abused its discretion in making that finding.11 produced a report mentioning that detail and no report was updated with that detail, even though defendant’s hairstyle stood out. Defense counsel similarly cross-examined Officer Ehring about his failure to mention the red mohawk in the police report. The officer explained that he did not mention it because the report wa s prepared before Taylor described th e red mohawk and he did not update the report once she gave the additional information. When asked if the
officer considered his failure to include information about the red mohawk an oversight,
the officer said he wouldn’t call it a failure. Defense counsel was also given substan tial leeway during his closing argument. He argued that the police had “f umble[d] this case” and “tried to walk in here and bring you new evidence.” “This isn’t a case wher e [defendant] fit the description of the suspect. This is a case where they’re trying to make [defenda nt] fit the description of the suspect. And although the tr ial court did not instruct on untimely discovery, counsel essentially made that argument: “Now, what happens next in this whole process is very concerning to me and it ought to be to you. In fact, it’s scary. Because you remember my opening statement and one of the issues I raised is that he couldn’t be the guy because he had a red mohawk that day. And now af ter I say that, all of the sudden everybody wants to run in here and say, yeah, that’s ri ght, he did, the suspect had a red mohawk.” “Now, in the middle of trial, we call this sa ndbagging, that’s where you go to trial in the case and somebody tries to bring in evidence at the last minute to try to save themselves.” Counsel also cast doubt on Taylor’s asserti on that the carjacker had a red mohawk. Only Taylor claimed to have seen it; neith er Downer nor Gentle could describe the carjacker. Taylor also didn’t mention it duri ng her 911 call, although “that would be the most distinctive thing about him.” And alth ough it would have been easy to do, Officer Ehring never updated the police report to incl ude the red mohawk. “So why would he do that? Why wouldn’t he do that? It’s because it never happened.” Therefore, even though th e jury was not instructed with CALCRIM No. 306 and
evidence of the red mohawk wa s admitted, defense counsel was permitted to argue that the evidence was fabricated and not prod uced in a timely manner. Through cross-12 examination and closing argument, he was able to put that possibility in front of the jury. The jury, however, may not have found the issue to be compelling, in li ght of the strong evidence that defendant was the carjacker; na mely, defendant had Taylor’s cell phone in his pocket, a fact he did not dispute at tria l. That fact alone was sufficient to tie defendant to the carjacking, and therefore any error in allowing evidence that the carjacker had a red mohawk was harmless, even when measured by the federal
constitutional standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 663 [ Chapman harmless-error inquiry asks whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt a rational ju ry would have found the defendant guilty absent the error]; Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15 [same].) Defendant, however, suggests that the admission of the evidence adversely impacted his constitutional rights in one add itional way: had his co unsel known of this evidence against him, he might have taken the seven-year-plea deal offered before trial. That may be, but, as we have said, surprises occur at trial that might make a previously rejected deal look more attractive. We th erefore conclude that evidence of the red mohawk did not render defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.
II. Defendant could not be convicted of carjacking and of receiving stolen property.
Defendant was convicted in count 1 of carjacking an d in count 2 of receiving stolen property, namely, Taylor’s cell phone . He correctly contends he cannot be
convicted of both. His conviction of count 2 must therefore be reversed. Former section 496, subdivision (a), pr ovides: “Every pe rson who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has be en obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in con cealing, selling, or wit hholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year.” But “no person may be convicted both pursuant to th is section and of the theft of the same property.” (See also People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 874.)13 Section 496 therefore follows the general rule that a person may not be separately convicted of stealing and rece iving the same property. ( People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 871, 874; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757; People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529 [a defendant cannot be convic ted of carjacking and of receiving stolen property where the property is the car stolen in the carjacking].)
One thus cannot be both the thief and the re ceiver of the same stolen property. ( Garza, at p. 875; People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 852.) This general rule applies here. The ju ry found defendant guilty of count 1, carjacking. He stole Taylor’s car. The ce ll phone was in that car. Therefore, when defendant stole the car, he also stole ever ything in it, including the cell phone. (See People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 699 [a de fendant who steals multiple items during the course of an indivisible transac tion involving a single victim commits only one robbery or theft, regardless of how many ite ms he or she steals], overruled on another ground in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228-1229.) The Attorney General, howeve r, points out that the general rule “does not apply in
the uncommon situation ‘when there is evidence of complete divorcement between the theft and a subsequent receiving, such as when the thief has disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a transacti on separate from the original theft.’ ” ( People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 874-875.) To establish a complete divorcement, there must be a significant break in the defendan t’s possession and control over the stolen property. ( Id. at p. 879.) The Attorney General argues th at the evidence here could be interpreted to show a complete divorcement between the carjacking and defendant’s receipt of the cell phone based on defendant’s testimony he bought the cell phone fro m two addict friends. The Attorney General thus posits this scenario: after carjacking Taylor, defendant left the cell phone and other items in the car and then just so happened later that day to buy the phone he left in Taylor’s car from his friends. Th at scenario, however, was entirely speculative.14 The Attorney General sugges ts a second way defendant’ s conviction of receiving stolen property can stand: if the jury belie ved that defendant did not drive Taylor’s car away or had been inside her car, then “[u] nder that reasonable scenario, [he] could be convicted of carjacking and the receipt of the cell phone.” The Attorney General’s argument is unclear and no aut hority is cited for any specif ic proposition. But if the Attorney General is suggesting that defendant could be guilty of both crimes if he didn’t drive Taylor’s car from the cr ime scene and merely later me t his accomplice, who then gave him the cell phone, then we would reject that argument. Based on evidence at trial, defendant and his accomplice in the black Chrysler both par ticipated in the carjacking and therefore were equally guilty of carjacki ng. There was no evid ence that defendant, after he and his accomplice stole Taylor’s car, received the cell phone during some transaction completely sepa rate from the carjacking.15 DISPOSITION Defendant’s conviction of count 2, rece iving stolen property is reversed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.