alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 FEB-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   JAN-31-1997
<CASH>                                         284,921
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  12,922,738
<ALLOWANCES>                                   323,587
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               13,524,665
<PP&E>                                         1,823,004
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (1,191,668)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 15,569,649
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          11,201,887
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       69,302
<OTHER-SE>                                     3,076,320
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   15,569,649
<SALES>                                        7,298,447
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               7,298,447
<CGS>                                          5,064,588
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  2,904,372
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (1,745)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             311,737
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (980,505)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   377,188
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (603,317)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (603,317)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.09)
        


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 21 (Friday, January 31, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4720-4721]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-2524]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Deschutes Provincial Interagency Executive Committee (PIEC), 
Advisory Committee

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Deschutes PIEC Advisory Committee will meet on February 
13, 1997 at Rock Springs Conference Center, 7 miles north of Bend, OR 
on Highway 20. The meeting will start at 9:30 am., and finish at 5:00 
pm. Agenda items include: (1) Introduction of new members, (2) Review 
of scientific documents for the Eastside Ecosystem project, (3) Reports 
from subcommittees, and (4) Open public forum. All Deschutes Province 
Advisory Committee meetings are open to the public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Harry Hoogesteger, Province Liaison, USDA, Fort Rock Ranger District, 
1230 N. E. 3rd, Bend, Oregon 97701, 541-383-4704.


[[Page 4721]]


    Dated: January 24, 1997.
Sally Collins,
Deschutes National Forest Supervisor.
[FR Doc. 97-2524 Filed 1-30-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 22 (Monday, February 3, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 5058]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-2602]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM


Telecommunications Service Priority System Oversight Committee

AGENCY: National Communications System (NCS).

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

    A meeting of the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) System 
Oversight Committee will convene Thursday March 6, 1997 from 9 a.m. to 
12:00 a.m. The meeting will be held at Booz-Allen & Hamilton 8283 
Greensboro Drive, McLean VA.

--Opening/Administrative Remarks
--Status of the TSP Program
--Preview of the TSP and CPAS Home Page
--Status of the CPAS Program

    Anyone interested in attending or presenting additional 
information to the Committee, please contact LCDR Angela Abrahamson, 
Manager, TSP Program Office, (703) 607-4930, or Betty Hoskin (703) 
607-4932 by March 1, 1997.
Dr. Dennis Bodson,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, National Communications System.
[FR Doc. 97-2602 Filed 1-31-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5003-25-M
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2727 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2727

To preclude the Department of Labor from allowing the Deputy Secretary 
            to serve as the Secretary of Labor indefinitely.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 6, 2023

  Mr. Cassidy introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To preclude the Department of Labor from allowing the Deputy Secretary 
            to serve as the Secretary of Labor indefinitely.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Advice and Consent Act''.

SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR VACANCIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1 of the Act of April 17, 1946 (60 Stat. 
91; 29 U.S.C. 552) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
``Notwithstanding the previous sentence or any other provision of law, 
if the Deputy Secretary is performing the duties of the Secretary due 
to the death, resignation, or removal of the Secretary and the 
individual serving in the position of Deputy Secretary has been 
nominated to the position of Secretary, the Deputy Secretary may not 
perform the duties of the Secretary after the date that is 210 days 
after the date on which the President submits such nomination to the 
Senate. If the Deputy Secretary is prohibited from performing the 
duties of the Secretary under the previous sentence, the President may 
direct an officer to perform the functions and duties of the Secretary 
temporarily in an acting capacity in accordance with subchapter III of 
chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code.''.
    (b) Applicability.--In the case of a Deputy Secretary of Labor that 
is performing the duties of the Secretary of Labor under the authority 
under section 1 of the Act of April 17, 1946 (60 Stat. 91; 29 U.S.C. 
552) on the day before the date of enactment of this Act and who is 
prohibited from continuing to perform the duties of the Secretary under 
the amendment made by this Act, the termination of the authority of the 
Deputy Secretary to perform the duties of the Secretary shall take 
effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
110 STAT. 762 PUBLIC LAW 104–108—FEB. 12, 1996

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 2111 (S. 1076):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 104–411 (Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

Vol. 141 (1995): Aug. 9, S. 1076 considered and passed Senate.

Dec. 18, H.R. 2111 considered and passed House.

Vol. 142 (1996): Jan. 26, considered and passed Senate.

Æ

Public Law 104–108

104th Congress

An Act

To designate the Federal building located at 1221 Nevin Avenue in Richmond,

California, as the ‘‘Frank Hagel Federal Building’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

The Federal building located at 1221 Nevin Avenue in Richmond, California, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Frank

Hagel Federal Building’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,

or other record of the United States to the Federal building referred

to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Frank

Hagel Federal Building’’.

Approved February 12, 1996.

Feb. 12, 1996

[H.R. 2111]
#### Jesus Onate AGUIRRE, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 76-3933

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 6, 1977.

J. C. Codias, Harris S. Tannenbaum, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.

Philip Wilens, Chief, Dept, of Justice, Gov. Reg. & Labor Sect., James P. Morris, Atty., Rex L. Young, Atty., Criminal Div., Washington, D. C., other interested parties, for respondent.

Before AINSWORTH, MORGAN and GEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 Rule 18, 5 Cir.; *see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5*Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner, Jesus Onate Aguirre, seeks review of the decision and order of the Board of Immigration Appeals holding him deportable for having entered the United States from Mexico without having been inspected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Petitioner contends that the evidence used at the deportation hearing to establish his deportability was inadmissible because he had been illegally arrested and detained. We find no merit to this contention.

The uncontested evidence shows that an Immigration and Naturalization Service of*502ficer, having received an anonymous telephone call that the Monterey Restaurant was employing illegal aliens, visited the restaurant on May 20, 1976 and stated to petitioner that he was searching for illegal aliens. Petitioner responded that he was the only illegal alien employed there and volunteered information that he had been “picked up before.” Petitioner was arrested and taken to the Immigration and Naturalization Service office in Atlanta, where he signed a statement admitting his alien-age as well as an illegal entry into the United States in January, 1974. This statement and petitioner’s oral statements prior to arrest were received in evidence at the deportation hearing.

Under the express authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) and (2) the warrantless arrest was legal.1 Petitioner’s voluntary admissions prior to arrest formed a sufficient basis for the arresting officer to believe that petitioner might abscond before a warrant could be obtained, thus justifying the warrantless arrest. The Board of Immigration Appeals, which sustained the order of the Immigration judge, so held. We find no error.

ENFORCED.

1

. The statute provides that:

> “(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant—

> (1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States;

> (2) . . to arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest . .
#### Richard W. DODGE, Appellant, v. Samuel ENGEL, Jr., and First National Bank of Pompano Beach, Appellees.

No. 70-910.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 7, 1971.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; Otis Farrington, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Aubrey James LOPEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 0-290.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 25, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1971.

Aubrey James Lopez, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks reversal of the order denying his motion to vacate and set aside judgment and sentence for the offense of aggravated assault. Said judgment and sentence have previously been affirmed by this Court. Lopez v. State, 222 So.2d 813 (Fla.App.lst, 1969).

We have given full consideration to the record on appeal and the briefs filed herein and, if appearing therefrom that appellant has failed to demonstrate that prejudicial error was committed in the proceedings below, the order appealed herein is affirmed.

JOHNSON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
```

[104th Congress Public Law 135]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ135.104]

[[Page 110 STAT. 1322]]

Public Law 104-135
104th Congress

                                 An Act

 
  To designate the Federal Justice Building in Miami, Florida, as the 
   ``James Lawrence King Federal Justice Building''. <<NOTE: Apr. 30, 
                          1996 -  [H.R. 255]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The Federal Justice Building located at 99 Northeast Fourth Street 
in Miami, Florida, shall be known and designated as the ``James Lawrence 
King Federal Justice Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building referred to in 
section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``James Lawrence King 
Federal Justice Building''.

    Approved April 30, 1996.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 255:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 104-361 (Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
                                                        Vol. 141 (1995):
                                    Dec. 5, considered and passed House.
                                                        Vol. 142 (1996):
                                    Apr. 16, considered and passed 
                                        Senate.

                                  <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN DUNMIRE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Civil Action No. 05-64 Erie

)

CAPT. DEPASQUAL, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of October, 2005, the Magistrate Judge having filed a

Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 20] on September 23, 2005 in the abovecaptioned case recommending that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint

[Doc. # 15] be granted, and upon consideration of the same as well as the Plaintiff’s

objections thereto, this Court declines to adopt the September 23, 2005 Report and

Recommendation. Specifically, in light of the Plaintiff’s representation in his objections

to the effect that the state prison officials failed to comply with the SCI-Albion’s own

grievance procedures, we find, as the record is presently postured, a material issue of

fact.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. # 15] is

DENIED. This order is without prejudice to the Defendants’ refiling a motion under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on a fully developed record.

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record.

Case 1:05-cv-00064-SJM-SPB Document 23 Filed 10/21/05 Page 1 of 1
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED
FROM  THE
STATEMENTS  FOR THE TWELVE  MONTHS  ENDED  MARCH  31,  1997 AND AS OF
MARCH  31,  1997 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO
SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                     0000904147
<NAME> EMERGING ALPHA CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                    1
<CURRENCY>                      US dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Mar-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 Apr-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         285,250
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  2,052
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               287,302
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 287,862
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       43,600
<OTHER-SE>                                     243,392
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   287,862
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               15,538
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  20,717
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,179)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,179)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,179)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.119)
<EPS-DILUTED>                            ^     (.119)
        



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 5, 2002 Session

ROBERT L. POWELL, JR. v. BLALOCK PLUMBING AND ELECTRIC

AND HVAC, INC., ET AL.

Appeal by Permission from the

Supreme Court Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel

Chancery Court for Franklin County

No. 16,186 Jeffrey F. Stewart, Chancellor

No. M2001-00204-WC-WCM-CV - Filed July 12, 2002

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., concurring in results only.

I agree with the result reached in this case by the majority. I write separately, however, to

express my disagreement with the reasoning the majority employs. My problem is with the reliance

on Wilkins v. The Kellogg Co., 48 S.W.3d 148 (Tenn. 2001), as the analytical basis for holding that

“wage” should be defined to mean “hourly rate of pay.” I would hold, as I expressed in Wilkins, that

“wage” should involve a weekly, rather than hourly, basis for calculating pay. Id. at 156 (Birch, J.,

dissenting). Defining “wage” to mean “hourly rate of pay” is problematic “because hourly rate of

pay, unlike average weekly wage, is not a reliable indicator of the economic impact of a workplace

injury.”

The employee in this case returned to work at the same hourly rate of pay, but his injury

caused him to work fewer hours and earn less money on a weekly basis. Clearly, his injury has had

an economic impact regardless of his hourly rate of pay, and it is only logical to allow greater

compensation to offset that impact. As a result, it would be unnecessary to employ the

“reasonableness” analysis used by the majority–an analysis which, notably, appears nowhere in the

elements of the statute. Compare Wilkins, 48 S.W.3d at 154 (criticizing the dissent as being at odds

with “the statute’s express terms”). 

Consequently, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but not in the analysis.

Additionally, I would encourage the General Assembly to consider the adoption of a terminology

that could be applied by this Court in a manner more congruent with the intended purposes of the

Workers’ Compensation Act.

___________________________________ 
-2-

ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE
#### MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL and Zurich Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Richard Carl SESS et al., Respondents.

No. 40919.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 17, 1971.

Certiorari dismissed.
#### Anne M. BRUGGISSER, Appellant, v. Arthur T. BRUGGISSER, Appellee.

No. 69-848.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 3, 1970.

Joseph Pardo, Miami, for appellant.

Edward P. Swan, and J. Leo Gorman, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal by a former wife from an order denying her petition for increase in alimony payments. The parties were divorced in 1960. In the final decree the appellee husband was ordered to pay to the appellant $150 per week as alimony and $100 per week as child support for the parties’ two minor children. Because of a change in the health of the appellee and consequent reduction in his *279earning capacity, the amount of alimony was twice reduced. Appellee currently pays $80 weekly alimony, $15 a week for the daughter, who is in college and whom he is supporting there, and $40 a week for the son, whose hoarding school expenses the appellee is also paying. The un-controverted evidence before the trial court shows that appellee’s current income substantially equals his income at the time of the divorce. No reduction in the needs of the wife was shown.

The record reveals that on the day immediately prior to the hearing on appellant’s petition, the appellee placed the minor son of the parties in a boarding school without previous consultation with the appellant mother. Nevertheless, she did not object and stated in the record that she thought attendance at the school was in the boy’s best interest.

We are not unmindful of the rule that an appellate court will not ordinarily substitute its jtidgment for that of the trial, court when the trial court’s judgment is based upon controverted evidence. See, e. g., Neal v. Harrington, 159 Fla. 381, 31 So.2d 391 (1947). In addition we acknowledge that this rule is especially applicable in cases regarding the amount of alimony. It is our conclusion that this cause does not fall within the purview of that rule, since the evidence concerning the husband’s current income was uncontroverted. Cf. Duncanson v. Service First, Inc., Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 696, 699.

The order appealed must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial judge with directions to conduct a new hearing upon appellant’s petition. After the hearing the court shall enter an order granting the appellant an increase in alimony commensurate with her needs and with the appellee’s ability to pay. In addition the trial judge shall, if he sees fit, modify the award of support for the son, who is in boarding school.

Reversed and remanded.