NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the 

State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the 

rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). 

Appellant first argues that Rose v. State, 127 Nev. , 255 

P.3d 291 (2011), which discussed the second-degree-felony-murder 

doctrine, provides good cause for his claim that the trial court improperly 

instructed the jury regarding second-degree felony murder. Appellant also 

argues that Rose has retroactive effect and that the district court erred by 

failing to conclude that appellant should receive a new trial based upon 

retroactive application of Rose. Appellant's claim is without merit. 

Appellant's reliance upon Rose is misplaced as the State did not rely upon 

the second-degree-felony-murder rule. Rather, the State presented 

evidence of appellant's mental state, arguing that he acted with the intent 

to kill. This court determined on appellant's direct appeal that there was 

substantial evidence that appellant intended to kill the victim. Barton v. 

State, Docket No. 27076 (Order Dismissing Appeal, December 20, 1996). 

As there was substantial evidence that appellant intended to kill the 

victim, a later case discussing the second-degree-felony-murder rule, such 

as Rose, has no bearing upon appellant's case. Accordingly, appellant fails 

to demonstrate that Rose provides goodS cause and actual prejudice to 

overcome the procedural bars. 2 

2Appellant also argues that error regarding the second-degreefelony-murder instruction is structural error and therefore, he is entitled 

to a new trial without a consideration of prejudice related to this claim. 

Appellant's claim is without merit. As discussed in Rose, this court 

reviews claims regarding erroneous instructions for second-degree felony 

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Douglas 

Second, appellant argues that Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 

132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315, 1319-20 (2012), provides good cause to 

overcome the procedural bars. However, appellant merely cites to 

Martinez and does not discuss how that case would provide good cause or 

how his case was affected by the holding of Martinez. Accordingly, 

appellant fails to provide any cogent argument as to how Martinez applies 

to his case. "It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority 

and cogent argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by 

this court." Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

Thus, we need not address this claim. 

In addition, appellant fails to overcome the presumption of 

prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 

the petition as procedurally barred and barred by ladies. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Cherry 

. . continued 

murder under a harmless error standard. 127 Nev. at 

295, 298. 

255 P.3d at 

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cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge 

Nguyen & Lay 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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