IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAHENDRA KUMAR TRIVEDI, : Civil Action No. 4:11-CV-2390

TRIVEDI FOUNDATION, :

TRIVEDI MASTER WELLNESS, :

LLC, :

Plaintiffs, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

TANIA M. SLAWECKI, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

December 1, 2015

When a self-proclaimed energy healer was employing his powers to alter the

molecular composition of water and a university research assistant publicly derided

this claim, it is unlikely that either could have foreseen the future of their dispute as

it is now, a question of the outerlimits of a federal court’s supplemental

jurisdiction. The quarrel between the parties has taken an unpredictable trajectory,

but leads to a well-known conclusion: “Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction.”1

1

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675,

128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994).

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I. BACKGROUND

On December 28, 2011, Plaintiffs, Mahendra Kumar Trivedi, Trivedi

Foundation, and Trivedi Master Wellness, LLC2

, commenced the instant action by

filing a complaint. Jurisdiction was predicated on diversity, Plaintiffs from the

state of Arizona, Defendant, Tania M. Slawecki3

, a resident of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania. Trivedi filed an amended complaint on December 17, 2012.4

Trivedi alleged three counts against Slawecki: defamation, tortious interference

with contractual relations of affiliates, and tortious interference with contractual

relations with employees. 

Slawecki filed multiple answers to the complaint. In the first, dated

December 13, 2012, Slawecki alleged three counterclaims against Trivedi - abuse

of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Electronic

Communications Privacy Act.5

 In her amended answer, dated December 28, 2012,

Slawecki alleged only an abuse of process counterclaim. She seemingly

abandoned the remaining counterclaims.6

 Slawecki then filed a second amended

2

Hereinafter collectively “Trivedi”

3

Hereinafter “Slawecki”

4

ECF No. 31. 

5

ECF No. 30. 

6

ECF No. 33. 

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answer on May 7, 2013.7

 Her answer was amended to meet the amount in

controversy requirement for diversity pleadings. It too only asserted an abuse of

process counterclaim against Plaintiffs.8

 

Slawecki filed a motion for summary judgment on August 25, 20149

 and I

heard oral argument on the motion on October 29, 2014. The motion was styled as

a motion for summary judgment on Trivedi’s amended complaint and also on 

Slawecki’s counterclaim; Slawecki, however, made no arguments as to her

ancillary10 counterclaim in her briefs. The Court therefore deemed the motion as to

the counterclaim to have been abandoned. 

The Court granted the motion for summary judgment, with the

7

ECF No. 40. 

8

Id. 

9

ECF No. 64.

10

Pendent state claims are generally claims by the plaintiff over which the court has

jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's federal claims. Ancillary claims are generally

claims other than those of the plaintiff, such as compulsory counterclaims. See

Ambromovage v. United MineWorkers, 726 F.2d 972, 989 n. 48 (3d Cir.1984).

Section 1367 codifies the doctrines of both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under

the name “supplemental jurisdiction.”

New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3d

Cir. 1996) 

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aforementioned exception, on December 3, 2014.11 I subsequently entered final

judgment against Plaintiffs. 

Because Slawecki did not brief her motion for summary judgment on the

abuse of process counterclaim, the Court presumed that it was her intention

voluntarily dismiss the claim, as it appeared to have been abandoned. However, a

telephone conference was subsequently held between the Court and the parties,

who asked the Court for leave to file dispositive motions on the abuse of process

counterclaim. The request of the parties was granted, and the parties were given

until April 3, 2015 to file summary judgment motions on the abuse of process

counterclaim. Cross motions for summary judgment were also later filed.12 

Some weeks later, Slawecki filed a “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental

Counterclaims,”13 complicating matters further. In this new motion, she requested

leave of Court to supplement the alleged facts supporting the existing abuse of

process counter claim and attendant damages; she also sought to add four new

counts: misuse of civil proceedings, civil conspiracy, defamation, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress, all arising from state law claims. 

11ECF Nos. 84 and 85. 

12ECF Nos. 114 and 115. 

13May 15, 2015, ECF No. 116. 

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Although the Court had intended to retain its supplemental jurisdiction over

the sole of abuse of process counterclaim, as the undersigned had retained

jurisdiction over it since the year 2012, the motion to supplement, predicated on

state law issues, forces me to relinquish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will

deny all motions in their entirety, without prejudice, and will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over what is now an entirely state law matter; I conclude

that this Court has no basis for original jurisdiction over this matter. 

II. DISCUSSION 

It is by now well-established that “[f]ederal district courts have original

jurisdiction over all civil actions either “arising under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States” or where complete diversity of citizenship exists and

the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.”14 Supplemental jurisdiction, as

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is limited, however, particularly as it relates to

diversity. “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim if – the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The current procedural posture

recited above is significant because in December of 2014, this Court dismissed “all

14Campos v. W. Dental Servs., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2005), citing

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. 

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claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction.”15 In that vein, “[A] court lacks

discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.”16

“Because federal jurisdiction over this counterclaim is supplemental to the

diversity jurisdiction of plaintiff's claims, whether to retain jurisdiction now that

plaintiffs’ claims have been dismissed is within the discretion of the court.”17 “It

has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of

discretion, not of plaintiffs’ right.”18 “That discretion extends to the dismissal of

counterclaims outside the original jurisdiction of the Court.”19 “[P]laintiffs

without an independent ticket of entry to federal court should not be able to get

into federal court by ‘piggybacking’ onto other claims which do satisfy the

jurisdictional requirements.”20 ““Section 1367 is intended to allow supplemental

1528 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3). 

16Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d

571 (1981). 

17 Saxton Commc'n Grp., Ltd. v. Valassis Inserts, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 0388 (MBM), 1995

WL 679256, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1995), 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993); Purgess v.

Shamrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994). 

18United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.

Ed. 2d 218 (1966).

19Id, citing Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assoc. of the Black Hills, 141

F.3d 1284 (8th Cir.1998).

20N. Am. Mech. Servs. Corp. v. Hubert, 859 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (C.D. Ill. 1994) see also

Leung v. Checker Motors Corporation, No. 93-C2704, 1993 WL 515470, at *1 (N.D.Ill.

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claims to be appended to actions already properly before a federal court, not to

squeeze in an initial action that is otherwise beyond the court's jurisdiction.””21

It should be noted that “[w]hen making this decision [whether or not to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim once plaintiff’s claims have

been dismissed], courts consider several factors, including judicial economy, the

relationship between the dismissed and remaining claims, comity, and fairness to

litigants.”22 “When a dismissal occurs late in the action, after the court and the

parties have expended substantial energy to review the dependent claims,

“knocking them down with belated rejection of supplemental jurisdiction may not

be fair,” or necessary.”23 “By contrast, when the dismissal of all claims with

independent jurisdiction occurs early in the action, before trial, dismissal is

appropriate.”24

For the sake of comity, this Court will not permit Slawecki to supplement

December 7, 1993). 

21Id. citing Duet v. Lawes and The Hertz Corporation, No. Civ.A. 94–0739, 1994 WL

151095, *1 (E.D.La. April 7, 1994).

22Saxton Commc'n Grp., Ltd. v. Valassis Inserts, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 0388 (MBM), 1995

WL 679256, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1995), see, e.g., Castellano v. Board of Trustees, 937 F.2d

752, 758 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991). 

23Id. citing Purgess v. Shamrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2nd Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. §

1367, Practice Commentary (1993) at 835). 

24Id. 

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her existing counterclaim with four new state law claims. In sum, this Court no

longer has original jurisdiction over the matter. To proceed over an entirely state

law matter with no independent basis for original jurisdiction would be overreach

by this Court. 

 Moreover, for the sake of judicial economy, this Court will now relinquish

jurisdiction over the abuse of process counterclaim. Although it may seem at first

blush inequitable to have retained jurisdiction over the one remaining state law

counterclaim only to now relinquish it, I conclude that it is not. “[W]hen the

dismissal of all claims with independent jurisdiction occurs early in the action,

before trial, dismissal is appropriate.”25

Had Slawecki not moved to supplement her counterclaims, the Court would

have retained jurisdiction and disposed of the abuse of process counterclaim on its

merits. I would have acted accordingly because the parties had spent time in

litigation in this Court, and because the best exercise of discretion would have been

to retain jurisdiction over that last claim. But Slawecki has moved to change the

nature of this action. This Court does not have original jurisdiction over the four

new claims Slawecki moved to supplement. Should she choose to file an action in

the appropriate court with these four new claims, she should also litigate the state

25Id. citing Castellano, 937 F.2d at 758. 

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law abuse of process claim in one action with the four new claims, again for the

sake of judicial economy. 

III. CONCLUSION 

As Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit memorably commenced

an opinion: “Once again litigants’ insouciance toward the requirements of federal

jurisdiction has caused a waste of time and money.”26 That said, however, “[i]n the

absence of another bar like the statute of limitation, a plaintiff retains the option of

filing permissive claims in a separate action.”27 Accordingly, the entire matter shall

be dismissed without prejudice, so that Slawecki may re-file her claims in the

appropriate forum.28 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

26Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir.

2003) (Easterbrook, J.).

27Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.

1998). 

28Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and thus should be ordered

‘without prejudice.’)

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