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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHONY MICHAEL CASTELLO, : CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-1032 

 : 

Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

 : 

 : 

TYLER ARBOGAST, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a request to appoint counsel for the 

plaintiff, a pro se litigant. (Doc. 20). This request is made at the outset of the 

litigation and prior to our consideration of a motion to dismiss the complaint. While 

we appreciate the plaintiff’s on-going interest in securing court-appointed counsel, 

we also recognize that there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel 

for civil litigants. Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron 

v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) simply 

provides that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to 

employ counsel.” Under §1915(e)(1), a district court’s appointment of counsel is 

discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157-58.

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In Parham, the United States Court of Appeals outlined the standards to be 

considered by courts when reviewing an application to appoint counsel pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In passing on such requests we must first:

[D]etermine[] that the plaintiff's claim has some merit, then [we] should 

consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff's ability to present his or 

her own case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to 

which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the 

plaintiff to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to 

turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether the case will require the 

testimony of expert witnesses; [and] (6) whether the plaintiff can attain 

and afford counsel on his own behalf. 

Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d at 457. There is yet another practical consideration 

which must be taken into account when considering motions for appointment of 

counsel. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly 

observed:

Finally, in addressing this issue, we must take note of the significant 

practical restraints on the district courts' ability to appoint counsel: the 

ever-growing number of prisoner civil rights actions filed each year in 

the federal courts; the lack of funding to pay appointed counsel; and the 

limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such 

representation without compensation. We have no doubt that there are 

many cases in which district courts seek to appoint counsel but there is 

simply none willing to accept appointment. It is difficult to fault a 

district court that denies a request for appointment under such 

circumstances. 

Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). Mindful of this consideration it has 

been emphasized that volunteer lawyer time is extremely valuable. Hence, district 

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courts should not request counsel under § 1915(d) indiscriminately. As the Court of 

Appeals for the Second Circuit has warned: “Volunteer lawyer time is a precious 

commodity. . .. Because this resource is available in only limited quantity, every 

assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a 

volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause. We cannot afford that waste.” 

Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Tabron v. Grace, 6 

F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). 

In this case our analysis of these factors leads us to conclude that counsel 

should not be appointed in this case at the present time. At the outset, appointment 

of counsel would be premature since we have not had the opportunity to further

consider the threshold factor it must examine: the arguable merits of the plaintiff’s 

remaining claims. In any event, the issues in this case appear to be discrete and wellknown to the plaintiff. Moreover, the plaintiff has thus far shown the ability to 

litigate his claims. 

Taking all of these factors into account we DENY this request to appoint 

counsel (Doc. 20), at this time without prejudice to re-examining this issue at the 

request of the plaintiff, or sua sponte, as this litigation progresses.

SO ORDERED, this 5th day of September 2024.

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S/Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

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