### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15

‐ 2926

L IVELL F IGGS

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v.

A LEX D AWSON and L ORI F ISHEL

, Defendants

‐ Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:13

‐ cv

‐ 03218

‐ CSB

‐ EIL— Colin S. Bruce

, Judge.

A RGUED M AY 27, 2016

— D ECIDED J ULY 25, 2016

Before P OSNER and F LAUM

, Circuit Judges

, and A LONSO

,

District Judge. *

A LONSO

, District Judge

. Plaintiff, Livell Figgs, was convicted

of murder and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment in the

Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). He served the

* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.2 No. 15

‐ 2926

latter part of his sentence at Logan Correctional Center and

was released on June 28, 2012 after having survived summary

judgment in his state

‐ court mandamus proceeding in which he

alleged that his release date had been miscalculated. Figgs then

brought this § 1983 action against prison officials at Logan,

alleging, among other things, that they had been deliberately

indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully.

Figgs now appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 21, 1989, Figgs was arrested on a drug offense. He

committed a murder on August 5, 1990 while on bond for the

drug offense. After pleading guilty to the drug offense, Figgs

was sentenced on April 23, 1991 in the Circuit Court of Cook

County to a 4

‐ year term of incarceration with credit for 201

days he had already served. On March 24, 1992, Figgs was

arraigned in the Circuit Court of Cook County on a charge for

the August 1990 murder. On December 4, 1992, Figgs

completed his prison term on the drug sentence and began his

term of Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”). Because he

had been charged with murder, however, he was transferred

that day from IDOC custody directly into Cook County

custody pending trial.

On September 11, 1993, a jury convicted Figgs of

first

‐ degree murder. He was sentenced on October 25, 1993 to

40 years’ imprisonment with credit for time served in custody

since January 16, 1991, with the sentence to run consecutive to

the sentence on the drug offense. On November 5, 1993, Figgs

returned to IDOC custody.No. 15

‐ 2926 3

On November 16, 1993, Figgs received a “Violation Report”

from IDOC indicating that on December 4, 1992 (the date his

MSR began on the drug conviction), he had violated the terms

of his MSR by committing the murder for which he was

serving the 40

‐ year sentence. Figgs signed this report and

acknowledged receiving it. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board

(“PRB”) entered an order on the same date, declaring that

Figgs had violated his MSR as of December 4, 1992 by

committing the murder. The PRB’s order also stated: “Offender

contends that he was incarcerated on the violation date

(12/4/92). He subsequently pleaded guilty to poss of controlled

subst. and was found guilty of murder.” The form order did

not have the box checked indicating that Figgs’s parole or

release was revoked, nor did it indicate the consequences of

the determination that Figgs had violated his MSR. The order

also did not indicate whether a hearing had been conducted or

would be scheduled. The violation report and the PRB’s order

were entered in error; the murder occurred well before Figgs’s

conviction in the drug case, at a time when he was not on MSR.

After the PRB issued its order, IDOC’s chief record officer

sent multiple letters to the Cook County State’s Attorney

requesting that he review the mittimus (the order directing

jailers to carry out the judgment) for Figgs’s murder

conviction. The letters noted that Figgs had completed his

sentence for the drug offense on December 4, 1992 and was

released on a two

‐ year MSR term, which had not been revoked

at the time he was sentenced on the murder conviction. The

chief record officer explained that she sought clarification

regarding whether the circuit court intended for Figgs’s

40

‐ year sentence to “run consecutive to any mandatory4 No. 15

‐ 2926

supervised release violation time the inmate is required to

serve as a consequence of the Prisoner Review Board’s order

revoking mandatory supervised release,” and if so, asked the

State’s Attorney to ensure that a corrected mittimus was

issued. The record does not reveal what prompted the requests

or why the chief record officer sought clarification of Figgs’s

sentence from the State’s Attorney, as opposed to seeking

clarification directly from the court or from the PRB about the

basis for its order.

While the chief record officer awaited a response to her

letters, Figgs requested a transfer to a medium

‐ security facility

(at the time, he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional

Center). In October 1994, an IDOC official, the assistant deputy

director of adult institutions, responded in a letter stating that

Figgs was ineligible for transfer and that his projected release

date was January 16, 2011.

Two months later, on December 19, 1994, the circuit court

issued a “corrected mittimus” in Figgs’s murder case, which

stated that Figgs’s 40

‐ year sentence was “to run consecutive to

any sentence imposed after a violation of mandatory

supervised release” in the drug case. It is not clear why the

corrected mittimus was phrased this way, but the document

evidently perpetuated the mistaken belief within IDOC that

Figgs had violated his MSR term on the drug offense.

IDOC sentence calculations are prepared at the facility to

which an inmate is first assigned. When an inmate is

transferred to a different prison, the record office at the new

prison does not usually perform a new calculation but simply

checks the previous calculation for accuracy. If questions ariseNo. 15

‐ 2926 5

about an inmate’s sentence, the record office at the facility

where the inmate is housed will review the sentence

calculation, or it may refer the matter to the IDOC chief record

office in Springfield, Illinois, which oversees each institution’s

record office. Each inmate’s master file is kept at the facility at

which the inmate is housed.

In January 1995 and again in May 1996, before Figgs was

transferred to Logan, IDOC employees prepared handwritten

sentence

‐ calculation worksheets pursuant to the December

1994 “corrected mittimus.” The calculations were prepared on

a form used specifically for inmates who had been declared to

have violated MSR. Figgs’s projected release date, according to

these worksheets, was November 3, 2013. It appears that this

release date was computed by adding to the 40

‐ year sentence

a 2

‐ year term resulting from the (assumed) revocation of MSR

in the drug case and then adjusting for time served and

good

‐ time credit. The same calculation was repeated on

subsequent sentence worksheets prepared in December 2001

and May 2003, although the projected release date changed

due to later adjustments of good

‐ time credit.

Figgs arrived at Logan in 2005. He says that he became

aware in 2009 that Logan officials had miscalculated his

sentence and projected release date. In the months leading up

to January 2011 and thereafter, Figgs submitted several inmate

request slips to various officials at Logan, including defendants

Lori Fishel, who was the record office supervisor, and Alex

Dawson, who was the warden, complaining about a

miscalculation of his projected release date. Copies of these

slips are not in the record, but it is undisputed that Figgs

submitted them.6 No. 15

‐ 2926

Fishel looked at Figgs’s existing sentence calculation and

believed that it was correct because in her view, Figgs was on

MSR when he was sentenced for murder, so it appeared that he

had violated MSR. Fishel understood the “corrected mittimus”

as ordering Figgs to serve his 40

‐ year sentence after the

(nonexistent) two

‐ year term for violating MSR. Because the

matter seemed complex and Figgs raised “so many questions”

in his complaints to her, she “didn’t do too much with it” and

instead let the IDOC’s chief record office in Springfield handle

it. Fishel referred the matter to Ona Welch, who was then the

assistant chief record officer. Although Fishel sent some of the

pertinent documents to Welch, including an inmate request

slip, the corrected mittimus, the PRB’s order, and a sentence

calculation worksheet completed prior to Figgs’s arrival at

Logan, Fishel did not send Figgs’s entire master file, nor did

Welch request it. 1 According to Fishel, Welch told her that the

current calculation was correct, and therefore Fishel informed

Figgs of this determination. Although Figgs’s projected release

date changed during his incarceration due to the revocation of

good

‐ time credits, all of Figgs’s previously

‐ revoked good time

credits were restored as of August 25, 2011.

On October 20, 2011, Figgs filed a petition for habeas corpus

against Dawson in the Logan County Circuit Court. In that

petition, Figgs alleged that he had “never had a[n MSR]

revocation hearing or

... been told that he violated mandatory

supervised release” in the drug case. He also alleged that

1 The chief record office does not maintain inmates’ master files. They are

kept at the institution where an inmate is incarcerated.No. 15

‐ 2926 7

IDOC had erred in “starting his sentence credit to run after this

alleged [MSR] violation.”

On October 31, 2011, Figgs filed a formal IDOC grievance,

marking it as an emergency and asserting that he should have

been released from custody on January 16, 2011. He further

asserted that the corrected mittimus for the murder conviction

ordered his 40

‐ year sentence “to run consecutive to ANY

sentence imposed after a violation of mandatory supervised

release” in the drug case, but there “was never a parole

revocation or violation of [MSR]. Accordingly, there is no

[MSR] violation to run this sentence consecutive too [sic].” A

counselor discussed Figgs’s concerns with Fishel, who reported

that she had previously looked into the calculation of Figgs’s

release date and determined that it was correct. Fishel did not

recalculate Figgs’s sentence at this point or check again with

the chief record office. The counselor indicated that the

sentence calculation appeared to be correct because Fishel had

stated that “[MSR] time stopped when [Figgs] committed

offense. Sentence then ran consecutive with

... [MSR] term.

Forwarded to Warden Dawson.” Dawson reviewed Figgs’s

grievance, but not his master file, and determined on

November 8, 2011 that it was not an emergency after

consulting Fishel, who confirmed that the sentence calculation

was correct.

On November 28, 2011, Dawson moved to dismiss Figgs’s

state habeas petition on the basis that Figgs was serving a term

of MSR at the time he committed the murder and therefore was

being legally detained, rendering unavailable habeas corpus

relief. On December 1, 2011, the state court dismissed Figgs’s

habeas complaint for the reasons set forth in Dawson’s motion.8 No. 15

‐ 2926

The court subsequently granted Figgs’s motion to reconsider

and for leave to amend his petition to seek mandamus relief,

and Figgs restyled his petition as a mandamus complaint.

In the meantime, the grievance officer who was handling

Figgs’s IDOC grievance reported on November 30, 2011: “The

records office supervisor contends that the inmate’s corrected

mittimus was adhered as directed by Judge James Flannery

[who issued the mittimus]. Fu[r]thermore, the clinical service

supervisor and the directing record office and the law office in

Springfield concurred with the Logan’s Record Office

interpretation of the mittimus.” The grievance officer

recommended that the grievance be “withheld” (stayed)

pending the outcome of Figgs’s state habeas petition. On

December 13, 2011, Dawson or someone acting on his authority

concurred in this recommendation, and the grievance was

stayed.

In November 2011, while the grievance and state

‐ court case

were pending, Figgs also wrote to IDOC’s chief record officer,

stating that record personnel at Logan had miscalculated his

release date by factoring in a nonexistent parole violation.

Figgs reiterated that during all his years of incarceration, he

had never had an MSR violation or a hearing. Along with his

letter, Figgs submitted the corrected mittimus and the October

1994 IDOC letter denying his request for a transfer from

Menard and noting a January 2011 projected release date. On

December 2, 2011, Welch responded to Figgs, attaching a copy

of the PRB’s order and stating: “Your current tentative

mandatory supervised release date is November 3, 2013, as

indicated on your sentence calculation work sheet dated May

3, 1996, because as of August 25, 2011, all of your revoked timeNo. 15

‐ 2926 9

for disciplinary issues has been restored

... . The sentence

calculation has been completed per the Order of the sentencing

court and Order of the [PRB].”

On March 6, 2012, Dawson filed a motion for summary

judgment in the mandamus proceeding, arguing that the PRB

had revoked Figgs’s MSR and thus Figgs was lawfully

incarcerated and could not be released until his consecutive

sentences were completed. Fishel submitted an affidavit in

support of the motion in which she stated that IDOC had

released Figgs on December 4, 1992, he was then picked up on

a Cook County warrant, and in 1993 after the murder

conviction, the PRB had issued an order declaring Figgs to

have violated MSR as of December 4, 1992. On June 26, 2012,

the state court issued an order denying Dawson’s motion for

summary judgment, reasoning that Fishel’s statement about

Figgs’s 2013 projected release date was “conclusory” because

the calculations set forth in the attached sentence worksheet

were “not self

‐ explanatory and Defendant has failed to

otherwise inform the court of the manner in which the

Plaintiff’s projected discharge date was determined.”

The day after the state court denied Dawson’s motion, the

PRB vacated, without comment, its November 1993 violation

order. According to Fishel, someone in IDOC’s chief record

office prompted the PRB to review its order. The following

day, Fishel recalculated Figgs’s release date as January 11,

2011, 2 and Figgs was immediately released from prison. The

2 Although defendants do not appear to dispute that this was the correct

release date, we have some reservations about it. The original mittimus for

(continued...)10 No. 15

‐ 2926

Logan County Circuit Court subsequently dismissed the

mandamus proceeding as moot.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 4, 2013, Figgs filed his complaint in the instant

case against Austin Randolph (a former warden of Logan), 3

Dawson, and Fishel. Figgs alleged that Dawson and Fishel

violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also

brought state

‐ law claims for false imprisonment and

negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all

of Figgs’s claims, and Figgs moved for summary judgment on

his Eighth Amendment claim against Dawson and Fishel and

2 (...continued)

the murder conviction stated that Figgs was to receive credit for time served

since January 1991 (when he was still serving the sentence on the drug

conviction) while at the same time stating that the sentence was to run

consecutive to the drug sentence. Illinois law, 730 ILCS 5/5

‐ 8

‐ 4(d)(8) (which

was section 5

‐ 8

‐ 4(h) at the relevant time), requires consecutive sentencing

where a defendant is charged with a felony and commits a separate felony

while on pretrial release. The “corrected” mittimus muddied the waters by

omitting any reference to the drug sentence and providing for the murder

sentence to run consecutive to a nonexistent “sentence” for a nonexistent

MSR violation. It is possible that the newly

‐ calculated January 2011 release

date was in fact incorrect in that it would have allowed Figgs to have served

partially concurrent sentences in contravention of the consecutive

‐ sentence

requirement. The record does not enable us to confidently draw a

conclusion about the correct release date.

3 No claims against Randolph are involved in this appeal, and the record

does not disclose why he was not dismissed from this action. Although his

name is included in the caption on the complaint and there are certain

factual allegations against him, plaintiff did not attempt to state any claim

against him.No. 15

‐ 2926 11

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against

Dawson. On August 4, 2015, the district court granted

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and entered

judgment in their favor, on Figgs’s federal claims. The court

then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Figgs’s

state

‐ law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Figgs filed this timely appeal, challenging the grant of

summary judgment in favor of Fishel and Dawson on the

Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference and the

grant of summary judgment in favor of Dawson on the

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment, considering all facts and reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to Figgs, the nonmoving party. See Boss v.

Castro

, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is

proper only where there are no genuine issues of material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc.

, 739

F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2014)). We may affirm on any basis fairly

presented in the record. Ellis v. CCA of Tenn. LLC

, 650 F.3d 640,

647 (7th Cir. 2011).

A. Deliberate Indifference

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment on a § 1983

claim, we focus on “‘(1) whether the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and

(2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws12 No. 15

‐ 2926

of the United States.’” Armato v. Grounds

, 766 F.3d 713, 719

‐ 20

(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor

, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981)). Incarceration beyond the date when a person is entitled

to be released violates the Eighth Amendment if it is the

product of deliberate indifference. Burke v. Johnston

, 452 F.3d

665, 669 (7th Cir. 2006); Campbell v. Peters

, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th

Cir. 2001).

Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or

even gross negligence; a plaintiff must show that the defendant

was essentially criminally reckless, that is, ignored a known

risk. Armato

, 766 F.3d at 721; McGee v. Adams

, 721 F.3d 474,

480

‐ 81 (7th Cir. 2013). A state officer is deliberately indifferent

when he does nothing, Hankins v. Lowe

, 786 F.3d 603, 605 (7th

Cir. 2015), or when he takes action that is so ineffectual under

the circumstances that deliberate indifference can be inferred,

Burke

, 452 F.3d at 669 (citing Moore v. Tartler

, 986 F.2d 682, 686

(3d Cir. 1993)); see also Arnett v. Webster

, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th

Cir. 2011) (noting that a prison doctor demonstrates deliberate

indifference by pursuing treatment “so blatantly inappropriate

as to evidence intentional mistreatment”).

It is undisputed that Dawson and Fishel knew of the

possibility that Figgs was being held beyond the date when he

was entitled to be released, but it is disputed whether their

conduct amounted to deliberate indifference. As for Dawson,

the district court first noted that it is undisputed that the

warden was not responsible for calculating prisoners’ release

dates. He was responsible, however, for reviewing emergency

grievances, and it was his or his designee’s decision to treat

Figgs’s grievance as a non

‐ emergency and withhold review

until the state

‐ court action was resolved. The district courtNo. 15

‐ 2926 13

concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that Dawson

checked whether Logan’s release date for Figgs matched the

most recent sentence calculation sheet, asked the Logan record

office whether the date was correct, and confirmed that Fishel

had reviewed Figgs’s file and she believed the release date to

be correct. Dawson therefore took some steps to address

Figgs’s grievance, the district court reasoned, so Figgs could

not establish that Dawson was deliberately indifferent. The

court further held that Dawson’s decision to let the state court

determine the validity of Figgs’s claims, which was made after

his consultation with the record office and determination that

the grievance was not an emergency, was not evidence of

deliberate indifference.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment for

Dawson on this claim. Dawson’s conduct does not demonstrate

a sufficiently culpable state of mind. He did not disregard

Figgs’s grievance or its designation as an emergency; rather, he

consulted with Fishel, the record office supervisor, to make

sure that she had looked into the problem, and he relied on her

determination that the calculations Logan was using were

correct. That was a reasonable response to Figgs’s emergency

grievance, as was Dawson or his designee’s ensuing decision

to stay the grievance pending resolution of the mandamus

proceeding. See Johnson v. Doughty

, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir.

2006) (warden was not deliberately indifferent where he

investigated the situation, ensured that the medical staff was

monitoring and addressing the problem, and reasonably

deferred to the medical staff’s opinion); Greeno v. Daley

, 414

F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate indifference where

grievance appeals examiner investigated plaintiff’s complaints14 No. 15

‐ 2926

and referred them to the medical providers who could be

expected to address plaintiff’s concerns). Top

‐ level

administrators like Dawson are entitled to relegate to prison

staff like Fishel the primary responsibility for specific prison

functions. See Burks v. Raemisch

, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.

2009) (a prison warden is entitled to relegate to medical staff

the provision of medical care). Figgs contends that what

Dawson did was “not really anything of substance,” but this

argument is misplaced because it was not Dawson’s

responsibility to calculate, or investigate the calculation of,

Figgs’s release date, and Dawson consulted with the individual

who had that responsibility. See id. at 595 (“Public officials do

not have a free

‐ floating obligation to put things to rights

... .

Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that

one employee do another’s job. The division of labor is

important not only to bureaucratic organization but also to

efficient performance of tasks; people who stay within their

roles can get more work done, more effectively, and cannot be

hit with damages under § 1983 for not being ombudsmen.”).

Fishel’s conduct is another matter. The district court held

that Figgs cannot prove that Fishel was deliberately indifferent

to the risk of prolonged detention because she took “numerous

steps” to determine whether Figgs’s concerns were warranted.

The court explained that Fishel did not ignore or suppress

Figgs’s complaints, but took the following steps: (1) relied

upon the sentence calculation made prior to Figgs’s arrival at

Logan; (2) forwarded certain documents to the chief record

office; and (3) relied upon that office’s determination that the

sentence calculation was correct. On appeal, plaintiff points out

that Fishel personally did not attempt to calculate Figgs’sNo. 15

‐ 2926 15

sentence until June 27, 2012, and contends that her act of

forwarding a few documents from the master file to someone

who was thus not fully equipped to evaluate the problem was

so woefully inadequate that it amounted to deliberate

indifference. Fishel, on the other hand, asserts that she

“thoroughly investigated” Figgs’s complaints.

When evaluating Fishel’s conduct, it is important to

consider the substance of Figgs’s complaints. In his emergency

grievance, Figgs was not complaining about simple arithmetic,

but that his projected release date was premised on the

falsehood that he was on MSR when he committed the murder

for which he was serving his sentence. He was asking prison

officials to verify the basis for the addition of two years to his

sentence. Although copies of Figgs’s inmate request slips are

not in the record, it can reasonably be inferred from Fishel’s

deposition testimony that Figgs made the same kind of

substantive complaints several months earlier in his request

slips. In response, Fishel admittedly did not perform any

calculation, nor did she review all of the documents in Figgs’s

master file. In Fishel’s own words, she responded to those

complaints by “let[ting] the chief records office handle it”

because Figgs raised “so many questions” in his multiple

request slips, the matter was “complex,” and she was not sure

about the calculation. Fishel was the only one who had Figgs’s

master file, yet when she referred the matter to the chief record

office, she sent only an inmate request slip from Figgs, the

previous sentence calculation sheet, the corrected mittimus,

and the PRB’s order. Fishel did not send anything else from

Figgs’s file (such as a Statement of Facts that would have

indicated when the murder had been committed) that would16 No. 15

‐ 2926

have enabled the chief record office to determine whether

Figgs’s complaints had any merit or whether further

investigation was needed. There is no evidence that Fishel had

discussions with the chief record office, contacted the PRB, or

sought legal guidance from any state officials such as IDOC

attorneys, the Circuit Court, or the Office of the Attorney

General, even when the matter resurfaced by way of the

emergency grievance. 4 Furthermore, Julia Bickle, who

succeeded Ona Welch as assistant chief record officer in

Springfield, testified at her deposition that it was the

responsibility of the chief record officer at the facility where an

inmate is housed to contact the PRB or the court for

clarification of orders that are necessary to properly calculate

a sentence.

The record belies Fishel’s assertion that her investigation of

Figgs’s complaints was “thorough.” Her reliance upon the

previous sentence calculation, which was done long before

Figgs complained, did not constitute a step taken to verify its

accuracy (nor did her reliance upon the chief record office’s

determination). The only action she took prior to the state

court’s denial of Dawson’s summary judgment motion was

forwarding selected portions of Figgs’s master file to the chief

record office after receiving several inmate request slips. In

response to Figgs’s emergency grievance, Fishel relied on the

4 Although the clinical services counselor who reviewed and responded to

Figgs’s grievance stated in his response that “the law office in Springfield

concurred with” the Logan Record Office’s “interpretation” of the mittimus,

the record does not reveal who contacted the “law office in Springfield.”

Fishel did not testify at her deposition that she did.No. 15

‐ 2926 17

same prior determination by the chief record office without

further investigation. Given the circumstances, a jury could

find that this minimal action was so ineffectual that it rose to

the level of criminal recklessness and thus constituted

deliberate indifference. Therefore, we will vacate the grant of

summary judgment for Fishel on this claim and remand for

trial. 5

Fishel argues that even if a reasonable factfinder could

conclude that she violated Figgs’s Eighth Amendment rights,

summary judgment in her favor was proper on an alternative

ground, qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified

immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan

,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald

, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). “In general, once the defendants raise the

qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must show two

things: first, that there has been a violation of one or more of

5 It should be noted, however, that even if Figgs proves that Fishel acted

with deliberate indifference, he must also prove that this deliberate

indifference caused him to be held beyond his lawful term of incarceration.

See, e.g., Armato

, 766 F.3d at 721. Causation could be difficult to prove for

the reasons discussed above at footnote 2. Still, we are not persuaded by

Fishel’s causation

‐ related arguments on appeal. They are myopically

focused on the sentence calculation itself and ignore the specific issues

raised by Figgs, the problems with the PRB’s order, and the admittedly

confusing “corrected” mittimus. Although Fishel points out that she had no

authority to disregard court and PRB orders, she fails to acknowledge that

she had other courses of action such as making inquiries of the PRB or court

and seeking legal guidance.18 No. 15

‐ 2926

her federal constitutional rights, and second, that the

constitutional standards at issue were clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation.” Campbell

, 256 F.3d at 699

(citations omitted). The law is “clearly established” when

“various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a

constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair

way from the facts presented in the case at hand.” Id. at 701

(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Saucier v. Katz

, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The right allegedly

violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity

before a court can determine if it was clearly established. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Layne

,

526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).

Fishel contends that “no clearly established constitutional

rule established that [she] violated the Eighth Amendment by

failing to recalculate Figgs’s sentence in response to his

concerns or by referring it to” the chief record office. This

argument is flawed because it does not address the broader

deficiencies with Fishel’s chosen course of action, which we

have discussed above. The appropriate inquiry here is whether

it was clearly established that Fishel’s failure to investigate the

substance of Figgs’s complaints violated his constitutional

rights by requiring him to serve more time than his sentence

required. See id. at 700

‐ 01 (“[W]e must determine whether it

was clearly established that the defendants, in revoking the

good conduct credits and computing a new release date after

the recommitment, were violating Campbell’s constitutional

rights by requiring him to serve more time than state law and

his sentence required.”).No. 15

‐ 2926 19

At the time Figgs presented his complaints, it was clearly

established by decisions in closely analogous cases that the

failure to investigate a claim that an inmate is being held

longer than the lawful term of his sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment if it is the result of indifference. See Haygood v.

Younger

, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354

‐ 55 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the

Eighth Amendment is violated when prolonged detention is

the result of deliberate indifference, where prison officials

failed to investigate claims in prisoner’s letter questioning the

method used to compute his release date); Sample v. Diecks

, 885

F.2d 1099, 1108

‐ 10 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding same, where senior

record officer failed to take substantive action on prisoner’s

claim that he was being held despite the expiration of his

sentence); Alexander v. Perrill

, 916 F.2d 1392, 1397

‐ 99 (9th Cir.

1990) (rejecting defendants’ qualified immunity argument and

concluding that the right to be free from incarceration beyond

the expiration of one’s sentence was clearly established, where

prison officials failed to investigate the prisoner’s claim that he

was incorrectly denied credit for time served in a foreign jail).

While, to be clearly established, “a right must be specific to the

relevant factual context of a cited case and not generalized with

respect to the Amendment that is the basis of the claim,” the

“very action in question” need not have previously been held

unlawful for a public official to have reasonable notice of the

illegality of some action. Viilo v. Eyre

, 547 F.3d 707, 710

‐ 11 (7th

Cir. 2008) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen

, 543 U.S. 194, 198

‐ 99 (2004)

and Anderson v. Creighton

, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Viewing

the record in the light most favorable to Figgs, the evidence

supports his claim that Fishel’s conduct violated his

established constitutional right to be free from cruel and20 No. 15

‐ 2926

unusual punishment. Thus, Fishel is not entitled to qualified

immunity.

After dismissing Figgs’s federal claims, the district court

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state

‐ law false imprisonment claim against Dawson and

negligence claim against Dawson and Fishel. Because we are

vacating the judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim

against Fishel, and the state

‐ law claims relate to the same set of

operative facts, we reinstate those claims as to all defendants

they are asserted against. See Edwards v. Snyder

, 478 F.3d 827,

832 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Albany Bank & Trust Co. v. Exxon

Mobil Corp.

, 310 F.3d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 2002) and Armstrong v.

Squadrito

, 152 F.3d 564, 582 (7th Cir. 1998)).

B. Procedural Due Process

Figgs also challenges the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Dawson on Figgs’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim for violation of procedural due process.

Figgs had a constitutionally

‐ protected liberty interest in being

released from prison before the end of his term for good

behavior. See Toney

‐ El v. Franzen

, 777 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir.

1985) (citing McKinney v. George

, 726 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir.

1984)). To prove a deprivation of procedural due process, Figgs

must show: (1) the deprivation occurred; (2) it occurred

without due process of law; and (3) Dawson subjected him to

the deprivation. See id. “In section 1983 actions challenging the

mistakes made by state employees rather than the state

procedures by which those mistakes were made, Parratt

requires a court to consider the adequacy and availability of

remedies under state law before concluding that a deprivationNo. 15

‐ 2926 21

of life, liberty, or property violates due process of law.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also

Armato

, 766 F.3d at 722 (noting that in Toney

‐ El

, this court

found that state

‐ court remedies such as the right to seek a writ

of mandamus and a cause of action for false imprisonment are

“adequate and available” remedies for an inmate claiming he

was held beyond the term of his incarceration, precluding a

claim for a violation of procedural due process).

Figgs claims that Dawson violated his procedural due

process rights by deferring action on Figgs’s grievance until

resolution of the state

‐ court mandamus proceeding. In

granting summary judgment in Dawson’s favor, the district

court relied on Toney

‐ El and Armato and held that not only did

Figgs have available and adequate state

‐ court remedies, he

took advantage of them by filing the mandamus proceeding.

Figgs asserts on appeal, as he did before the district court, that

the mandamus proceeding was inadequate because it was

pending for several months until he was able to obtain a ruling

that led to his release.

In Toney

‐ El

, this court found that the state

‐ court habeas

corpus remedy was adequate despite the fact that the prisoner

plaintiff had been held for 306 days past his lawful term of

incarceration. Like Toney

‐ El, Figgs did not utilize his

state

‐ court remedy until well after the point in time when he

maintains he was deprived of his liberty. Figgs cites no

authority for the proposition that because he did not obtain

immediate relief, his mandamus remedy was inadequate.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the

state

‐ court remedy, which Figgs utilized, precludes his claim

against Dawson for procedural due process.22 No. 15

‐ 2926

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of

Alex Dawson on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment claims. We VACATE the grant of summary

judgment in favor of Lori Fishel on plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, VACATE the

dismissal of the state

‐ law false imprisonment and negligence

claims, and REMAND the case to the district court for further

proceedings on those claims.