IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOMINGO COLON MONTAÑEZ and

TIMOTHY A. HALE,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:CV-04-2569

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

Plaintiffs,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al., 

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before me are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Suggestion of Mootness

(Doc. 315) and the Motion to Intervene (Doc. 320) filed by Plaintiff Timothy Hale and

Applicants Nakia Yancy and Marc Anthony Arnold. For the reasons that follow, the motion

to dismiss will be granted and the motion to intervene will be denied. 

I. Background

Plaintiff Timothy Hale (“Hale”) commenced this action in December 2004.1

In his

subsequently filed amended complaint, Hale alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (“DOC”) violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when

they withdrew money from his prison account. Specifically, Hale contended that inmates

“must be provided with notice of the DOC Policy and an opportunity to be heard regarding

application of the Policy prior to the first deduction” of funds from their prison accounts. See

Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 773 F.3d 472, 482-83 (3d Cir. 2014).

After two appeals to the Third Circuit, the action proceeded to discovery. Following

the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On January

22, 2013, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and Plaintiffs’ cross1 Domingo Colon Montañez filed a separate action in this Court in 2004 raising a

due process claim identical to that raised by Hale. The actions were ultimately

consolidated in 2010 under the above-captioned civil action number. 

Case 4:04-cv-02569-ARC Document 326 Filed 05/21/15 Page 1 of 9
motions for summary judgment were denied. (Docs. 293; 294.) As to Plaintiff Hale, I

reasoned that his constitutional rights were not violated because the DOC’s post-deprivation

grievance procedures were sufficient to meet his due process rights, and that no predeprivation hearing was required. (Doc. 293, 15-16.) Additionally, I noted that individual

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because

the right to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing before monies were deducted from inmate

prison accounts was not clearly established in 2004. (Id. at 18.)

Hale timely appealed, and the Third Circuit held that inmates are entitled to predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of funds from their

inmate accounts. See Montanez, 773 F.3d at 485-86. Accordingly, the Third Circuit

concluded that the Corrections Official Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment

because “disputes of fact exist[ed] regarding notice and because Hale never had any

opportunity to be heard prior to being deprived of funds in his inmate account . . . .” Id. at

486-87. The Third Circuit additionally held that it was not clearly established in 2004 that

the failure to provide prison inmates with a pre-deprivation opportunity to object to automatic

deductions from their prison accounts violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 487. Thus,

the Third Circuit held that “the DOC was entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Hale’s

claims for monetary relief.” Id. But, although the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity on Hale’s damages claim, the Third Circuit emphasized that this did not prevent

the case from proceeding to trial on Hale’s claim for injunctive relief. See id. at 488 (“The

fact that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Hale's damages claim does

not prevent this case from moving forward on Hale's claim for injunctive relief. . . . As a

result, Hale may still proceed to trial on his claim for injunctive relief.”). As such, the Third

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Circuit remanded for further proceedings on that claim. See id.

2

Following remand, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on October 21,

2014. Defendants note that during the pendency of the appeal to the Third Circuit, Hale

was released from prison by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. (Doc. 315,

Ex. A.) Defendants contend that Hale’s release from prison renders his claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief moot. Hale filed a brief in opposition to the motion to

dismiss on November 17, 2014, and Defendants filed a reply brief in further support of their

motion on December 3, 2014.

Subsequently, Yancy and Arnold filed the motion to intervene on February 25, 2015.

Yancy and Arnold assert that their motion to intervene should be granted because they

satisfy the requirements to intervene as of right or permissively pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 24. Defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion to intervene on

March 16, 2015, and Yancy and Arnold filed a reply brief in further support of their motion

on March 30, 2015.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss and the motion to intervene are now fully briefed

and ripe for disposition. 

II. Discussion

A. The Motion to Dismiss

As stated, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff Hale’s claims as moot because he

was released from prison in March 2014. The motion to dismiss will be granted.

 “Under Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, federal judicial power extends

only to cases and controversies. If a claim no longer presents a live case or controversy,

2 Unlike Hale’s appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment 

against Montañez because his claims were barred by the statute of limitations. See

Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480-82.

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the claim is moot, and a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.” Nextel Partners Inc. v.

Kingston Twp., 286 F.3d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750,

104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984)). In other words, “[f]ederal courts are not

empowered to decide moot questions.” Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001)

(citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S. Ct. 402, 30 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1971)

(per curiam)). “In general, an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief becomes

moot on his release from prison.” Cobb v. Yost, 342 F. App’x 858, 859 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing

Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195,

206 (3d Cir. 1993)).

As to Hale’s claim for injunctive relief regarding the collection of funds from his

inmate account without notice, he no longer has a continuing interest in that prison policy

because he has been released from prison. See, e.g., Cobb, 342 F. App’x at 859; AbdulAkbar, 4 F.3d at 206; see also Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A]

prisoner lacks standing to seek injunctive relief if he is no longer subject to the alleged

conditions he attempts to challenge.”). Therefore, Hale’s request for injunctive relief is

moot.

Moreover, Hale’s injunctive and declaratory claims do not satisfy the exception from

the mootness doctrine for cases “capable of repetition yet evading review.” See Sutton, 323

F.3d at 248 (release from prison generally moots equitable and declaratory claims unless

the inmate can satisfy the “capable of repetition” doctrine). “The ‘capable of repetition’

doctrine is a narrow exception to the mootness principle and is limited to cases presenting

two elements: ‘(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior

to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable likelihood that the same

complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’” Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at

206 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975)).

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Hale fails to satisfy either of these requirements. First, inmates subject to the action

at issue- the deduction of funds from an inmate account without notice and an opportunity

to be heard- are incarcerated for a sufficiently lengthy time to fully litigate challenges to

these deductions. See, e.g., Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206 (“Abdul-Akbar does not assert that

mootness could be avoided on the ground that inmates at MSU fail to remain confined in

that facility for a sufficient length of time to fully litigate a legal claim.”). Second, there is not

a reasonable likelihood that Hale will be subjected to the same action again because

“[s]peculation that [he] could return to prison does not overcome the mootness doctrine.”

Cobb, 342 F. App’x at 859; see also Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 207 (“Such conjecture as to the

likelihood of repetition has no place in the application of this exceptional and narrow grant

of judicial power. . . . Because the district court had no support or basis for its ‘reasonable

expectation’ that Abdul-Akbar ‘could’ again be incarcerated at MSU, we cannot sustain the

district court's speculative hypothesis.”); Glaster v. Federal BOP-Inmate Designation and

Custody Classification Personnel/Officer, No. 08-193, 2008 WL 2563275, at *1 (M.D. Pa.

June 24, 2008) (Caputo, J.) (“A prisoner's transfer or release from prison moots his claims

for injunctive or declaratory relief because he is no longer subject to the conditions he

alleges are unconstitutional. “). Because Hale fails to satisfy the “capable of repetition”

doctrine, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

B. The Motion to Intervene 

Also before me is the motion to intervene in this action filed by Nakia Yancy, an

inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Dallas, and Marc Anthony Arnold, an inmate presently

incarcerated at SCI Fayette.3 Yancy and Arnold seek to intervene in this action either as

of right or permissively pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Rule 24 states: 

3 SCI Fayette is located in Fayette County, which is in the Western District of

Pennsylvania. 

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(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to

intervene who:

(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject

of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical

matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless

existing parties adequately represent that interest.

(b) Permissive Intervention.

(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene

who:

(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or

(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common

question of law or fact.

. . . .

(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider

whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

original parties’ rights.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Rule 24 also provides that the motion to intervene “must state the

grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or

defense for which intervention is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). “An application to intervene,

whether of right or by permission, must be timely under the terms of Rule 24.” In re Fine

Paper Antitrust Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1982). 

In opposition to Yancy and Arnold’s request to intervene, Defendants argue that: (1)

the application was not timely filed; (2) the requirements to intervene as of right are not

satisfied; and (3) permissive intervention is not warranted in this case. For the reasons that

follow, the motion to intervene will be denied. 

First, while not addressed by the parties, the movants fail to comply with the

requirements of Rule 24(c). As stated, Rule 24(c) requires that the motion to intervene “be

accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is

sought,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), and “[c]ourts in this Circuit have denied motions to intervene

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when an applicant fails to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 24(c).” Surety Adm’rs,

Inc. v. Samara, No. 04-5177, 2006 WL 173790, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2006) (citing, inter

alia, SEC v. Investors Sec. Leasing Corp., 610 F.2d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Because

the requirements of [R]ule 24(c) were not complied with, the owners were not proper parties

in the district court.”)); but see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Frank M. Sheesley Co. v. St. Paul Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 404, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“The Court thus finds that it has the

authority to employ its discretion and consider a motion to intervene that contains no

pleading, but instead includes a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings.”).

Second, even disregarding Yancy and Arnold’s failure to comply with the

requirements of Rule 24(c), the motion to intervene is untimely. “The timeliness of a motion

to intervene is ‘determined from all the circumstances’ and, in the first instance, ‘by the [trial]

court in the exercise of its sound discretion.’” In re Fine Paper, 695 F.2d at 500 (citation

omitted). Factors relevant to this determination include “(1) [h]ow far the proceedings have

gone when the movant seeks to intervene, (2) the prejudice which resultant delay might

cause to other parties, and (3) the reason for the delay.” Id. (alteration, citations, and

internal quotation marks omitted). Although the mere passage of time does not render an

application to intervene untimely, “the critical inquiry is: what proceedings of substance on

the merits have occurred? This is because the stage of the proceeding is inherently tied

to the question of the prejudice the delay in intervention may cause to the parties already

involved.” Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361,

369-70 (3d Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted).

Applying these factors, and considering the stage of the proceedings of the litigation,

Yancy and Arnold’s application to intervene is not timely. This action has been proceeding

for over ten years. Discovery closed four years ago. Dispositive motions have been ruled

on and appealed to the Third Circuit. At this point, reopening discovery to address the facts

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and circumstances specific to the deduction of funds from Yancy and Arnold’s inmate

accounts would unfairly prejudice Defendants. Thus, because the application to intervene

is untimely, Yancy and Arnold are unable to satisfy the requirements to intervene as of right

or permissively. 

Third, even if the motion to intervene was timely, Yancy and Arnold fail to satisfy the

requirements to intervene as of right. To intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), the Third

Circuit has stated that the movant must establish: “(1) the application for intervention is

timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be

affected or impaired, as a practical matter, by the disposition of the action; and (4) the

interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation.” In re Cmty. Bank

of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596

(3d Cir. 1987)). Here, Yancy and Arnold are unable to establish that their interests will be

impaired by the disposition of the action as there is not “a tangible threat to [their] legal

interest.” Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that

this factor can be met when “a determination of the action in the applicants' absence will

have a significant stare decisis effect on their claims, or if the applicants' rights may be

affected by a proposed remedy”); accord McLune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 486 (3d Cir.

1979) (“it is axiomatic that intervention will not be permitted to breathe life into a nonexistent

lawsuit.”).

Lastly, permissive intervention is not appropriate in this case. Rule 24(b)(1) permits

intervention when the applicant “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a

common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). “In exercising its discretion,

the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the

adjudication of the original parties' rights.” Id. at (b)(3). As previously explained, Defendants

would be prejudiced by allowing Yancy and Arnold to intervene at this stage in the litigation.

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Thus, under the facts and circumstances presented here, permissive intervention is not

warranted. 

III. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted and the motion

to intervene will be denied. 

An appropriate order follows.

May 21, 2015 /s/ A. Richard Caputo 

Date A. Richard Caputo

 United States District Judge

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