NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0238n.06 F iled: Marc h 31, 2009 No. 07-2286 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee , v. ERNEST O F RANCO De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

BEF OR E: KEITH , C OLE, and M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. DAMON J. K

EITH , Circuit Judge. Def endant- Appellant Erne sto Fra nco was a rre sted by fede ral a g ents for dr

ug possession following a reve rse sting operation and char g ed with one count
o f p o s s e s s io n o f c o c a in e w it h in te n t to d is tr ib u te in v io lati o n o f 2 1 U
. S. C. § 8 4 1 ( a ) (1). A jury returne d a g uilty

verdic t and he wa s sentence d by the United States District C o u rt for the Easter n Di str ic t of

Mic hig a n to 13 6 mon ths ’ imp ri so nme nt. Af te r a ff ir min g F ra nc o’ s c on vic tio n on

a pp e a l, this Court vacated his sente nce a nd rema nded to t h e d i s trict court f or re -sentenc ing in lig ht of the Supreme Court’s de cision in United St ates v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). At re -sentenc ing, the district court re fused to conside r F ranc o’s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 obj ection to his previously calc ulated
a dv iso ry imp ri so nme nt r a ng e e ven as it rev ise d h is s e nte nc e do wnwa rd to 1 20 mon ths ’ imprisonment. I n the instant a ppeal, Fr anco challeng es the lower c ourt’s re vised sentenc ing or der.No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

Th is C ourt

pr ov ide d a

de ta ile d f

a c tua l a c c ount o f t

he e ve nts lea din g up to F ra nc o’ s arr e st 1 in t he pr ior a pp e a l. United States v. Franc o ( Franco I ), 484 F .3d 347, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2007). - 2 - He c laims the district court er red ( 1) in its application of U.S .S.G. § 2D1.1 by char acte rizing sham
coca ine, sold to him by

underc over ope ratives, a s part of the rele vant drugquantity during the initial sentenc ing; a

nd (2) by ref

using to consider this objection during re-sentenc ing. For the following
rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s r evised sente ncing order
.

I. BACKG ROUND On Marc h 23, 1995, fede ral a g ents arr ested De fenda nt-Appellant Er

nesto Fr anco ( “F ranc o”) thr ou g h a re ve rs e sti ng op e ratio n in wh ic h F ra nc o pu rc ha se d wh a t he be lie ve d to be nin e kil og ra ms of coc aine, c ontained in nine individually wra pped, one kilog ram pa ckag es. I n rea lity , a n underc over ag ent and unde rcove r informant supplied Fra nco with only

one pac kag e conta ining a ctual coc aine, while t he re maining e ight pa ckag es consisted of sha m coca ine, lackingany

trac e of a

controlled
su bs tanc e . D ur ingthe de a l, F ra nc o p ro vid e d an in it ial pa y me nt o f $ 39 ,5 46 a nd

inf or me d h is “suppliers” that he wa s g oing to r eturn with the re maining ba lance afte r he store d the drug s. The
near l y $40,000 was a lleg edly

sufficie nt to purchase only two kilogr ams of coc aine at the thenexis ting mar

ket rate. Fr anco depar

ted from the s ellers with all nine kilogr ams in his possession and
was a rre sted shortly

there afte r. 1 Fr anco w as indicted on one count of possession with intent to dist ribute coc aine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)( 1) and later c onvicted by a jury for that of

fense on May 28, 1999. I n the Presentenc e Investig ation Report (PSR), the probation offic er a ssigne d Fr anco a total offense levelNo. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g ), t he 1998 edition of the Guidelines, whic h was in ef fec t at 2 tim e of ini tia l se nte nc ing , w a s a lso a pp lie d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

duri ngF ra

nc o’ s r e -s e nte nc ingin October 2007. Section 2D1.1 establishes the base offe nse leve l for drugpossession violations under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) . U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. Statutory Provisions. The drug quantity table located in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) de termines the r eleva nt base off

ense l evel ba sed on the ty pe of c ontrolled substance a

nd the amount involved in the offe nse. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)( 3), (c ) n. A. On J une 16, 2000, this Court dismi ssed Fr an co ’s initial attempt at appeal f or wa nt of 3 prosec ution because of a failure to file a joint appendix. He filed a motion for post-c onviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 i n the district court. The district court equitably tolled the statute of limit ations, which had a lrea dy passed, a nd denied the petition on the merits of Fr anco’ s ineffe ctive a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l c la im. On July 14 , 20 05 , he re ne we d h is m oti on to o pe n h is a

pp e a l, w hic h th is Court gr anted on Nove mber 15, 2005. Notwithstanding the ea rlier ha beas pe tition, hi s c a s e r e ma ine d a direct appea l of hi s conviction and se ntencing when a rg ued on January

30, 2007. Franco I

, 484 F.3d at 350. - 3 - of 32 un de r § 2D1.1 o f t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s b e c a us e he fo un d th e of

fe ns e inv olv e d at le a st five, but less than 15 kilog rams of c ocaine
. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)( 4) (1998)
. Fr anco’ s lack of 2 a prior c riminal history

led the probation of

fice r to r ecommend an imprisonment r ang e of 121 to 151
mon ths
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ult imate ly iss ue d a mid -r a ng e se nte nc e of 13 6 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt i n addition to a mandatory

five y ear term of supe rvised re lease
. F ra nc o ti me ly

a pp e a le d h is s e nte nc e , b ut fo r va ri ou s re a so ns the a

pp e a l w a s n ot h e a rd

by thi s Court until J anuar

y 30, 2007. He r aised seve ral a rg uments challeng ing h i s cu l p ability under 21 3 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), all of which the C ourt denied in a ffirming the conviction. Franco I , 484 F.3d at 351-57. F ranc o also cha lleng ed his sentenc e base d on an alleg ed denia l of a ri gh t to jury deter mination, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and ar g ued the lowe r cour t mi sap pl ied U .S. S.G . § 2D 1. 1 in de te rm ini nghis g uid e lin e ra ng e by inc lud ingthe e ig ht k ilo g ra ms of se pa rate ly pa c ka g e d s ham c oc a ine in t he re levan t drug qu a nti ty us e d to de te rm ine his of fe ns e level. B rief f

or De fenda

nt-Appellant, Franco I

, 484 F.3d 347 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (No. 99-2194) , 2006No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

- 4 - WL57 21 96 0, *1 5- 20 . T he Court re je c te d F ra

nc o’ s Ap pr e nd i argument but did not address the calc ulation of Fr anco’ s g uideline ra ng e. See F

ranco I , 484 F.3d. at 356-57. Be cause Fr anco’ s direct appea l was still pending whe n the S upreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Book er , the Court v a c a te d h is s e n te n c e a n d r e ma n d e d th e c a s e to th e d is tr ic t c o u rt f o r “ th e li mi ted purpose of deter mining a se ntence under the now-a dvisory Guidelines.” Franco I

, 4 84 F .3 d at 35 7; see ge ne ra lly Booke r , 543 U.S. at 245. During re- sentenc ing, F ranc o ag ain ar g ued the lowe r cour t misapplied U.S.S .G. § 2D1.1 by includ in g th e e ig h t k il o g r a ms o f s e p a r a te ly p a c k a g e d s h a m c o c a in e a s p a rt o f h is r e le v ant drug quant i ty . The district cour t refuse d to consider F ranc o’s ar g ument, deeming the objection “not timely ” and implying it we nt bey ond the scope of the Franco I rema nd. Transc ript of Re-se ntencing Hea ring at 5, United States v. Franc o , No. 95-80248 (E .D. Mich. Oc t. 4, 2007) ( rema rki n g that Fr an co ’s re -sentencing was “ rea lly [about] allocution”)

. After weig hing the rele vant 18 U.S.C. § 35 53 (a ) s e nte nc ingfa c tor s, the dis tr ic t c ourt revis e d F ra nc o’ s se nte nc e do wnwa

rd to 1 20 mon ths , the statutory

minimum
. Id. at 11. His five y ear term of supe rvised re lease was lef t undisturbed. Th e ins tant a

pp e a l f oll ow e d on Oc tob e r 9, 2 00 7. F ra nc o c la ims the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in its
a pp lic a tio n o f U .S. S.G . § 2D 1. 1 d ur ingini ti al sen ten cinga nd that it a lso e rr e d b y

re fu sin g to consider his objec tion during re- s entenc ing. H e see ks a re mand for r e-se ntencing under U .S.S.G. § 2 D 1
. 1 b a s e d

o n a r e d u c e d dr u g qu a n t i t y.

II. AN AL YSI S A. Scope of the RemandNo. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

- 5 - Fr anco a rg ues the Franco I rema

nd authorized the district court to re -sentenc e him de novo
a nd thu s e na ble d th e c ourt

to r e vis it his g uid e lin e c a lc ulatio n. Ap pe llate c ourt s h a ve the a uth or ity t o gra n t ei t h er gen er al o r l i m i t ed re m an d s fo r r e- s en t en ci n g. United States v. Orlando , 363 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2004). I n the ca se of a g ener al re mand, the district cour t may re- sentenc e a de fenda nt de novo, whe rea s a limited rema nd restric ts the district court’s author ity “to the issue or issues
rema nded.” Id. I n other wor ds, a district court is limited by the scope of the re mand under which it operate s. Un ite d S

tat es v . M

oo re , 13 1 F. 3 d 5 9 5 , 598 (6th Cir. 1997). The inter pretation of a
rema nd is a leg al issue, which this Court review s de novo. S e e U n i t e d S t a t es v . O’

De ll , 320 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 2003). I n this case, there is littl e doubt the C ourt issued a “limited re mand” in orde ring Fr anco’ s resentenc ing. “The differ ence betwee n the limit ed manda tes and the g ener al mandate s is the presenc e of limiti ng lang uag e.” Id. at 680. I n Franco I , we state d our re mand wa s “ fo r t he lim ite d p ur

po se
o f re -sentenc ing in lig ht of Booke r .” 4 8 4 F
. 3 d a t 3 4 9
. We c o n f

ir me d th e n a r r o w s c o p e o f

the
rema nd later in the opinion by

emphasizing it was “ for the limit ed purpose of dete rmining a sentenc e
u n d er t h e n ow-a dvisory

Guidelines.” Id. a t 3 5 7
. G iv e n th a t w e tw ic e s tate d w e r e ma n d e d with a “limited pur

pose,” the rema

nd cannot rea sonably be construed to be g ener al i n n at u re . Such restric ting languag e as w as found in our opinion constitutes an “unmistakable” indication that the Court never

contemplated a

g ener al re mand. See Un ite d S tat es v. C am pb e ll , 1 68 F .3 d 2 63 , 2 68 (6 th Cir. 1999). The que stion remains , howeve r, whe ther F ranc o’s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 objection fe ll within t he
sc op e of thi s li mit e d r e mand . T he g ov e rn me nt a rgue s i t di d not, r e lyingup on our s ta te me nt i nNo. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

The district cour

t judge also implied he would not rule on the objection bec ause it wa s 4 bey ond the scope of the Booke r re mand wh e n he state d that F ra nc o’ s re -s e nte nc ing wa s “really [ab ou t] a llo c uti on .” Tr a ns c ri pt of Re -s e nte nc ing He a ri ng a t 5. As su g g e ste d h e re in, the tim e lin e ss - 6 - United States v. Hay nes , 468 F.3d 422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006), t hat “[ r]emands for consideration in light of Booke r are for the pur

pose of a llowing the se ntencing court to dete rmine if it would have g rante d a diffe rent sente nce, ha d it known at the time of sentenc ing that the Sentencing Guideli nes we re
a dv iso ry , n ot m a nd a tor

y .” Th e g ov e rn me nt ma int a ins F ra nc o’ s U.S. S.G . § 2D 1. 1 o bje c tio n p la inl y falls outside the scope of this limi ted mandate
. But a s we have pre viously rec og nized, “Hayne

s o f f e r s n o s u p p o rt f o r th e p r o p o s it io n that issues rel at ed to guide lines determinations-matter s that are inext rica bly linked to the sentenc ing proce ss-are not properly

befor e the c ourt following a Bo ok e r rema nd.” United St ates v. Nanez , No. 06-6039, 2007 WL 2386474, *2 (6th Cir. Aug . 21, 2007) (unpublished). Ha y ne s me re ly pr oh ibi ts
a se nte nc ingc ourt

fr om e nte rt a ini ngc ha lle ng e s to a de fe nd a nt’ s underlying conv iction when the prior remand order is limit ed to re -sentenc ing in lig ht of Booke r . See id
. It does not fore close the distr ic t c o u rt f

r o m r e v is it in g a

d e f e n d a n t’ s o b

je c ti o n s to th e in it ia l s e n te n c in g g u id elines computation. See id. A s i n d i c a t e d b y Nanez , a Bo ok

e r re mand

pe rm its a de fe nd a nt t o r e vis it tho se sentenc ing obje ctions proper ly raised a nd prese rv ed ea

rlier in the litigation, which have y et to be decide d on appea l. See id. Notably , the g overnme nt c oncede d this ve ry point at or al argument. As
a re su lt, the iss ue fo r t

his Court be c ome s w he the r F ra

nco adequ a te ly

ra ise d a nd pr e se rv e d h is objection to the district court’s a pplication of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 prior to the Franco I rema nd. At the re- sentenc ing hear ing held on October 4, 2007, the district c ourt ref used to consider Fr anco’ s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 arg ument beca use i t found his objection to be untimely
. Transc ript of 4No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

of F ra nc o’ s o bje c tio n a

nd the sc op e of

the re mand

in t his c a se a re int e rr e la te d a nd mos t e ff ic ie ntl y addre ssed tog ether
. - 7 - Re -s e nte nc ingHe a ri nga t 5. A f a ilure to o bje c t on

pa rt ic ula r g ro un ds a t se nte nc ingg e ne ra lly fo rf e its any challeng e to the s entenc e on those same g rounds during appea l, although a n appellate court may overlook a

defe ndant’s fa ilure to do so. See U nited States v. W

ade , 266 F.3d 574, 585- 86 (6th Cir. 2001). B ut wh en a d efendant see ks appellate revie w of a n issue underlying a

district court’s de c isi on , h e wi ll n ot b e pe rm a ne ntl y “ ba rr e d f ro m r e a sse rt ingtha

t issu e in any

su bs e qu e nt a

pp e a ls
occur ring in that case .” See U nited States v. Mc

Kinley , 2 2 7 F. 3d71 6, 71 8 (6 th Ci r. 2 00 0). By extension, the def

endant would similarly

be bar red f rom raising the issue on re mand in the district court if he neg lected to a ssert it in the prec edin g ap p ea l . Thus, Fr anco w ould only be for eclose d from cha lleng ing his g uidelines ca lculation during re- sentenc ing if he had f ailed to ra ise the issue in Franco I

. Review of the prior appe al re vea l s t h at Fr anco a dequate ly prese rved his objec tion to the rele vant drugquantity

considere d by the di strict court. I n his brief filed in the prior appe al, Fr anco specific ally

argued: Sig nif ic a ntl y , M r. F ra

nc o w a s n ot c ha

rg e d w itha tte mpt ingto p os se ss wi th i nte nt t o distribute under 21 U.S.C. § § 8 4 1 (a)(1) a nd 846. Cf. Un ite d S

tat es v . P e nn e ll , 737 F .2 d 5 21 a t n. 2 ( 6th

Cir . 1 98 4) (u

ph old ingc on vict ion f

or a tte mpt to p os se ss w ith intent to dist ribute despite use of sham coc aine in reve rse sti ng but emphasizing that that w a s an atte mpt

case , not o ne c ha

rg e d und e r 8 41 (a )( 1) ). He wa s c ha rg e d w ith actua l possession with int ent to distribute, a cr ime requiringthe possession of an actua l controlled sub s t an ce . Be cause he only ac tually possessed one k ilogram of cocaine , but he was sentence (sic) for thepo sse

ssi on of ni ne kilo gr am s, his convic tion and sentence must be rev ersed
.No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

- 8 - Mr . F ra nc o w a s unf

a ir ly pr e jud ic e d [w he n c ha

rg e d w ithpo sse ssi on

of nin e k ilo g ra

ms of coc aine], as he wa s sentence d pursuant to a guideline r ang e that re sulted in a 136 month se ntence
. But “In calc ulating the applicable g uideline ra ng e, the district cour

t was . . . re quired to consider ‘the e ntire we ight of an y mix ture or substanc e containing a dete ctable a m o u n t o f the c ontrolled substance .(sic)” United States v. W hit e , No. 97-6132, 1998 U.S. App. L EXI S 20665 (6th Cir., Aug
. 11, 1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l(c) Dr

ug Quantity

Table)
. If the district court had started wi th the offense lev el spec ified in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for one kilogram of coc aine , level 26, Mr. Fr anco w ould have ha d a sente nce imposed be tween 63 a nd 78 month s , and may have a lrea dy

completed his sentenc e by now.
Br ief for Def en d an t -Appellant, 2006 W L5721960, at *20 (e mphasis added) . Fr anco c laimed the district court er

red b y s en tencing him under U.S.S.G § 2D1.1 for posse ssion of nine kilogr ams of
coca ine, when in r eality h e possessed only one kilog ram c ontaining a ctual coc aine. Thus, he dis pu te d h is s e nte nc e ba se d o n th e inc lus ion of the eig ht k ilo g ra

ms o f s ham c oc a ine so ld t o h im during the re verse sting ope ration. This is pr ecise ly the same argument Fr anco raised in his objection
a t r e -s e nte nc ing , a

nd in t he br ie f h e su

bmi tte d o n th is a

pp e a l. Although Franco I

acknow ledg ed F ranc o’s opposition to t he lower court’s sc oring of the eig ht kilogra

ms of sham coc aine, it neve r reache d the i ssue before remanding the ca se. See F ranco I , 4 84 F .3 d at 35 5. We s pe c if ic a lly limit ed our

dis c us sio n o f s ham c oc a ine to F ra nc o’ s se pa

rate
ar gu m en tt h at a j u ry , ra t h er t h an t h e j u d ge, s h o u l d h av e d et er m i n edt h e t y p e a n d qu an t i t y o f d ru gs upon which his sentenc e wa s based pur suant to the Supreme Court’s de cision in Apprendi
. See id. at 35 6. Franco’s c on te nti on tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

mis a pp lie d U .S. S.G . § 2D 1. 1 in c a lc ulatin g his g uideline ra

ng e, howe ver, repr esente d a distinct basis for c halleng ing his sente nce that was not resolved by

our Apprendianaly sis. Thus, Fra nco’s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 objec tion wa s left undec ided in his pr ior

a pp e a l.No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

Given that F ranc o proper ly raised a nd prese rved his U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 objection, we need 5 no t de c ide the se pa

rate qu e sti on of wh e the r the dis tr ic t court wo uld have ha d disc re tio n to r e vis it i ts g uideline ca lculation following the Bo ok e r re m an d in the event F ranc o had no t raised the issue ear lier in the litigation. - 9 - Be cause Fr anco r aised the U .S.S.G. § 2D1.1 objection based on the i n cl u s i o n o f the sham
coca ine in his prior appe al and the issue w as left unde cided by the Court, he wa s not barre d from
asser ting it at r e-se ntencing following the Booke r rema nd as we ll as in this appeal. See M cKinley , 227 F.3d at 718. To find to the contra ry would improperly “insulate the district court’s g uidelines computations from appe llate re view.” Nanez , 2 0 0 7 W L2386474, at * 2. Ther efor e, the district court e rre d in refusingto co n s i d er Fr anco’ s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 objection following the rema nd for
re- sentenc ing in lig ht of Booke r . 5 We are compelled to note that F ranc o also raise d a U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 obj ection duringinitial sentenc ing. I

n the pre s en t en ci n g memorandum submitted to the district court, F ranc o claimed throug h counsel that the district c ourt improperly ap p l i ed U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 by finding that the rele vant drug quantity was nine kilogr ams when the evidenc e alleg edly established that he only had funds to pay for a

pproxi mately

two kilogr ams. Def

endant’ s Memorandum in Support of Sentenc ing Submis sion, United States v. Franco , No. 05-80248 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 23, 1999). The a bility -to-pay theory , howeve r, ar g uably repr esents a dif

fer ent rationale for attacking the dis tric t c o u r t’ s application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 t han that raised by the Def endant in Franco I

, wher e he oppose d the g uideline calc ulation due to the inclusion of sham coca ine in his rele vant drug quantity
. As mentioned above , the c on sid e ratio n o f sha

m coc a ine wa s als o the ba sis fo r F ra nc o’ s o bje c tio n at r e -s e nte nc inga s w e ll as the a rg ument Fran co re l i ed u p o n in his brief filed in the instant appe al. I t was only at ora lNo. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

I t sh ou ld b e no te d th a t F ra nc o c omp le te d h is i mpr iso nme nt t e rm on F e br ua ry 8, 20 08 , w hil e 6 this appeal wa s pending . This case is not moot , howeve r, bec ause he is stil l subject to five y ear s of supervised r elea se and his appe al “potentially implicates” the le ng th of that term. United States v. Make n , 510 F.3d 654, 656 n. 3 ( 6th Cir. 2007). - 10 - argument on the instant appea l did Fra nco’s c ounsel resur

rec t the ability -to-pay challeng e to the lower c ourt’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. A def endant’ s failure to object to his sentence befor e the district cour t on the same g round raised on a

p p ea l l imits subsequent re view to plain er ror. See U

nited States v. Darwich , 337 F.3d 645, 655 n. 11 (6th Cir. 2003)
. But a s demonstrated be low, Fr anco’ s arguments on the merits are not persuasive , whether

the district court’s de cision is reviewe d de n o v o o r o n ly for plain e rror . Thus, we ne ed not deter

mine whether

Fr anco materially chang ed the gr ounds for his objection such that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on wo uld be su bje c t to a mor e de fe re nti a l st a nd a rd of revi e w. I t is sufficie nt to rule that Fr anco’ s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 object i o n was properly raised be fore the district
c ourt a t r e -s e nte nc inga s w e ll a s b e fo re thi s Co ur t in the ins tant a

pp e a l.
B. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 O bjection Fr anco c ontends that a prope r application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 wo u l d est ablish a re levant dr ug qu a nti ty fo r him of on ly on e kil og ra m of c oc a ine . T his le sse r f

ig ur e wo uld

have re du c e d h is advisory imprisonment r ang e from 121-156 months to 63-78 months. Fr anco a rg ues in his brief the alleg ed er ror pr ejudiced him as he rec eived 120 months’ imprisonment

. 6 Appellate c ourts “g ener ally revie w[] a district cour

t’s drug quantity

ca l cu lation for cle ar
err or” w hile “interpr etations of the g uidelines are leg al questions that this Court reviews de novo.”No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

F ra nc o’ s PSR s ta te s a lth ou g h h e a g re e d b e fo re ha nd to b uy te n k ilo g ra

ms o f co c a ine , h e on ly 7 took possession of what he be lieved to be nine kilogr ams. The distinction make no diffe renc e under - 11 - United States v. Olsen , 537 F.3d 660, 663 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Fra nco’s opposition to the l ower court’s inclusion of sham coca ine i n its relevant dr ug quantity

deter mination raises a le g al ar g ument, which we f ind to be without merit. The commentar y acc ompanying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 provides in rele vant pa rt : I n an off

ense involving an agr eeme nt to sell a controlled substanc e, the a g ree d-upon qua n ti ty o f th e c o n tr o ll e d

s u b s ta n c e s h a ll b e u s e d

to d e te r mi n e th e o f

f e n s e le vel unless the sale is c ompleted and the amount delivere d more acc urate ly ref lects t he s c a le o f th e o f

f e n s e . . . . [I ]n a r ev erse sting , the agree d-upon quantity of the c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e wo uld

mor e a c c ur a te ly re fl e c t the sc a le of the of fe ns e be c a

us e the a mou nt ac tua lly de liv e re d is con tr oll e d by the g ov e rn me nt, no t by the de fe nd a nt. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 12 (“Note 12”) ( emphasis adde d). Note 12, in this respe ct, m akes it plain that in case s of a r ever se sting ope ration, the re levant fig ure a sentenc ing c o u rt s h o u l d consider unde r U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is the amount of drug s the unsuspecting defe ndant ag ree d to purcha se bec ause the defe ndant’s intenti o n t o purcha se that amount def ines the “sc ale of

the offe nse.” We find no
a uth or ity in t he Gu ide lin e s, no r i n in te rp re tin g c a se law, that say s th e re le va nt d ru g qu a nti ty

sh ou ld be limited to the actual a

mount of genuine drug s sold. Thus, the pr esenc e of f ake dr ug s during such
a re verse sting tra

nsaction does not mater ially diminis h the scale of the offe nse or the sever ity of the offe nder’ s sentence
. See U nited States v. Burke , 12 F. App’ x 209, 213 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding de fe nd a nt r e sp on sib le fo r a n a g re e d p ur c ha se a mou

nt o f 1 00 kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine e ve n th ou g h o nly 75 kilogr ams, including 74 kilogr ams of fa ke coc aine, we re a ctually delivere d). The dispositive fac t in this c ase is that F ranc o conce des he ag ree d to buy nine kilogr ams of
coca ine from the underc over a g ent and infor mant. Given Note 12’ s focus on the “ ag ree d-upon 7No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

the Guidelines a s the drug quantity table assig ns the s ame base offense level of 32 when at least five kilogr ams but less than 15 kilogr ams of coc aine a re involved. U .S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)( 4). No te 12 re le va

ntl y state s tha t if the “ de fe nd a nt es ta bli sh e s tha t he or sh e did

no t in te nd

to 8 provide, or w as not rea so n ab l y capa ble of providing , the ag ree d-upon quantity of the c ontrolled substance, the court shall exclude fr om the offe nse leve l determination the a mo u nt of controlled substa n c e th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t e s ta

b li s h e s th a t h e o r s h e d id n o t in te n d to p r o v id e o r was not rea sonably

capa ble of providing .” - 12 - qu a nti ty ,” we fi nd

F ra nc o’ s r e lia

nc e on the fa c t th a t on ly

on e kil og ra

m of the dr

ug s han de d ove r t o him cont ai n ed genuine cocaine to be misplaced. Indeed, F ranc o’s re levant drugquantity under U. S
. S
. G
. § 2 D 1
. 1 w o u l d r e m a i n u n c h a n g e d e v e n i f t h e qu a n t i t i e s s u p p l i e d t o h i m we re e nti re ly devoid of a ctual coc aine. Thus, the d istrict court prope rly applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 in holding Franco r esponsible for the nine kilogr ams he a g ree d to purcha se, and w hich nine kilog rams he actua lly took possession of, believing them to be nine kilog rams of c ocaine
. At or a l argume nt, F ra

nc o’ s c ouns e l f

urth er co nte nd e d th a t e ve n th ou g h F ra nc o a g re e d to purc ha se nin e kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine , h e sh ou ld o nly be he ld r e sp on sib le fo r, a t mo st, $3 9, 54 6 w or th of drug s–which wa s the d o l l ar am o u n t Fr anco br oug ht to the sale and w hich counse l arg ued wa s bare ly e n o u g h to p u r c h a s e tw o k il o g r a ms o f c o c a in e . Re ly in g o n N o te 1 2 , c o u n s e l r e a s o n e d that be c a u s e n o s i g n i f

i c a n t f u n d s w e r e f

o u n d b y l a w e n f

o r c e m e n t o n F r a n c o ’ s p e r s o n n o r i n his ho me fo llo wi nghis a rr e st, he c ou ld n ot p os sib ly have “ int e nd e d” to pur c ha se , nor have be e n “ re a so na bly capa ble” of purcha sing, a ll nine kilogra ms provided to him. Counsel instead theorized that F ranc o 8 intended to run off

with the approximately

seven kilograms of coca ine that was f ronted him, for wh ic h h e sti ll o we d p a y

me nt.No. 07-2286

United States v. Franc o

- 13 - Setting aside our doubt s on the m erits of this argument, we note as a proce dural matter that F ra nc o f a ile d to a dd

re ss thi s inte nt/ c a

pa bil ity a rgume nt i n th e op e nin g br ie f h e su bmi tte d o n a

pp e a l, in a dd iti on

to e sc he wi ng su

bmi ssi on of a re ply br ie f a lto g e the r. I t is we ll- e sta bli sh e d th a t argume nts not adequately develope d are waived on a ppeal. Brindley v. M

cCullen , 61 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir. 1995). Ther efor e, we do not find Fra nco’s Note 12 argument a valid basis for disturbing the district court’s guideline ca lculation under U .S.S.G. § 2D1.1.

III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a me n d e d j u d g m e n t o f s e n te nc e is AF F IR M ED
.