1

Operation

Enduring Freedom

The United States Army in Afghanistan

March 2002–April 2005
Introduction

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 

on 11 September 2001 dramatically changed the world in which we live. 

Never had an enemy attacked us on our own soil to such effect. Over 

three thousand Americans and several hundred foreign nationals from 

over ninety countries died that day at the hands of a ruthless, and to some 

degree faceless, enemy. The terrorist organization known as al-Qaeda, 

perpetrator of the attack, operated in the shadows to take advantage of 

the freedom and openness that are American hallmarks. Afghanistan, a 

known training ground and a safe haven for al-Qaeda, quickly became 

the focus of the first military efforts to strike back. Osama bin Laden, 

al-Qaeda’s enigmatic leader, believed he and his followers were beyond 

the reach of American arms in that far-off mountainous land, protected 

by its fanatical Taliban regime.

Bin Laden was wrong, and America reached deep into Central Asia 

to find his organization and neutralize it. Most Americans are familiar 

with the military operation that subsequently took place in Afghanistan. 

In a matter of months, the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and 

Navy, in a masterful display of joint operations and in concert with our 

Afghan allies, overthrew the Taliban regime and drove the terrorist alQaeda into worldwide flight. 

This pamphlet provides details on the role of the U.S. Army in the 

critical three-year period following the conclusion of Operation Anaconda in March 2002. It details the story of American and international 

forces working to solidify the initial invasion’s crippling of al-Qaeda and 

removal of the Taliban. It recounts the story of the quest to build a new, 

democratic Afghan government capable of maintaining internal security 

and tending to the needs of the Afghan people. It tells the tale of the 

U.S. Army’s search for a proper balance between counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency operations as the enemy rebuilt his forces from safe 

havens in Pakistan. Finally, it chronicles the Army’s efforts to maintain 

an effective presence in Afghanistan while juggling the challenges of 

an indigenous population historically opposed to foreign forces and 

the decreased resources available after the start of the Iraq war in 2003.

Operation Enduring Freedom, March 2002–April 2005, was written 

by historians Dr. Brian F. Neumann, Dr. Lisa Mundey, and Dr. Jon 

Mikolashek in the Histories Division of the Center of Military History. 

We hope that you enjoy and profit from this dramatic but often overlooked story of our Army in action in the Global War on Terrorism. It 

is the second in the Center’s series of campaign brochures on the U.S. 

Army in Afghanistan.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
3

The U.S. Army in Afghanistan

Operation Enduring Freedom

March 2002–April 2005

In a fast-paced, low-cost campaign in Afghanistan from October 

through December 2001, small numbers of U.S. troops backed by 

U.S. airpower joined local militias to topple the Taliban regime and 

damage the al-Qaeda network. Thus began Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF) and the fulfillment of President George W. Bush’s 

promise after the 11 September attacks on the United States to wage 

war on the perpetrators and their protectors. For the next three years, 

while also striking in Iraq, the United States sought to create a viable 

Afghan government and complete the dismantling of the Taliban 

and al-Qaeda. It would take the full three years, however, for the 

Americans and their allies to realize just how complex the issues in 

Afghanistan were and to devise a plan to address them.

Strategic Setting

With the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 and subsequent operations by American, British, Canadian, Australian, and 

Afghan forces in the first three months of 2002, Enduring Freedom

appeared to be on track. In December 2001, the United Nations 

sponsored a meeting of prominent Afghans in Bonn, Germany, to 

establish a plan for constituting a new national government. The 

group agreed to establish a six-month Afghan Interim Authority, to 

be followed by a two-year Afghan Transitional Administration. During the latter period, a loya jirga (a gathering of tribal dignitaries to 

select national leaders or approve government changes) would meet 

to adopt a constitution and arrange for elections. The Bonn meeting selected Hamid Karzai—scion of a prominent Pashtun family, a 

former deputy foreign minister, and leader of a small band of militia 

fighters during the overthrow of the Taliban—to serve as chairman of 

the interim authority. While the Bush administration supported this 

process, it sought to do so without becoming enmeshed in a drawnout military intervention or engaging in nation building.

Yet, for all the administration’s hopes, the situation in Afghanistan was far from stable. Decades of civil war, religious division, 

and economic malaise had left the country the very embodiment 

of a failed state. Ethnic differences in the population, consisting of 
4

Pashtuns (42 percent), Tajiks (27 percent), Hazaras and Uzbeks (9 

percent each), and various smaller groups, bred competition and 

discord. Provincial governors, some of whom were warlords rewarded 

for their part in toppling the Taliban, operated semi-independently, 

if they were at all able to establish control in their regions. At times, 

President Karzai seemed to hold sway only in the capital of Kabul. 

Indigenous security forces capable of providing stability did not exist, nor did a sense of national unity or identity that could bind the 

competing groups together.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda, though forced underground or 

across the border into Pakistan after their defeats at Tora Bora in 

December 2001 and in Operation Anaconda in March 2002, also 

remained active. Al-Qaeda took root primarily in North and South 

Waziristan in Pakistan’s semi-autonomous Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas. From there, fighters crossed the border at will into the 

Afghan provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Paktika, 

and Khost. The Taliban sought refuge in and around the city of 

Quetta, in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province, where it began to rebuild. 

Rank-and-file members of the Taliban who could not escape to Balochistan melded into the Afghan population, generally in Uruzgan 

and Kandahar Provinces where their support among the Pashtuns 

remained strong. There they waited, determined to undermine efforts 

to build support for the emerging central government until such time 

that their movement could go on the offensive. 

During the late spring and early summer of 2002, other groups 

joined the Taliban and al-Qaeda for either nationalistic or religious 

reasons to oppose the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. 

The most prominent of them proved to be Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. A militia leader during the war 

with the Soviets in the 1980s, he served as prime minister in one 

of Afghanistan’s warlord-based governments prior to the Taliban’s rise. Operating in northeastern Afghanistan, Hekmatyar’s 

fighters seldom engaged in open combat with the Americans and 

their allies, favoring indirect means of laying mines or launching 

rockets. Narcotics traffickers also resisted incursions into poppygrowing areas. 

Geopolitics fed Afghanistan’s instability. For centuries the region 

had been a crossroads of cultures and an avenue of invasion. More 

recently, Iran supported the Hazaras, a Shi’ite group. Saudi Arabia 

provided aid to the Sunni Muslims of the Taliban. And China, Russia, and India all had economic and political interests in the war-torn 

country. (See Map 1.)
5

Pakistan’s long-term conflict with India made it acutely concerned 

with Afghanistan. Pakistan and India fought four wars between 1947 

and 1999, mostly over the disputed Kashmir region, and almost 

fought a fifth in 2002. Fearing strategic encirclement, the Pakistanis 

preferred instability on their western border over a coherent Afghanistan in India’s camp. Pakistan supported the mujahideen following the 

1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where Pakistan’s Inter-Services 

Intelligence Directorate, aided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), provided assistance to Afghan leaders like Hekmatyar and 

Jalaluddin Haqqani. After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued 

to furnish support to Muslim fundamentalist groups in the region, 

including the Taliban after its emergence in the early 1990s.

Ethnicity and religion complicated relations between Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, were 

the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan, making up just over 15 

percent of the population. They constituted a majority in Pakistan’s 

western territories and provinces that border Afghanistan. Religious 

schools, or madrassas, located in northwestern Pakistan offered free 

education to hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns. The Taliban grew out of these schools, many of which taught a 

radical version of Sunni Islam. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia provided 

vital assistance to the schools and expanded that support to include 

the Taliban. The Pakistani government used the fundamentalists as 

a source of opposition to expanding Indian, Iranian, Russian, and 

Chinese influence in the region.

The Pakistanis did not believe their relationship with the Taliban was incompatible with their alliance with the United States, 

which they saw as a useful strategic counterweight to China’s links 

with India. Pakistan allowed the U.S. military to use its territory as 

a logistical base in exchange for financial aid and access to modern 

weaponry. Yet after the Taliban government’s collapse, Pakistan 

continued to support Muslim fundamentalist groups, including 

Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and the Haqqani network. Indeed, factions 

within the Pakistani government often worked at cross-purposes, 

with one group supporting the Americans while another offered aid 

to insurgent groups operating within Pakistan. The schizophrenic 

nature of Pakistan’s policy settled into a pattern where Pakistan 

would go aggressively after al-Qaeda but only selectively target 

the Taliban in order to preserve it as an option for future influence 

in Afghanistan. The quandary for the United States was obvious. 

Pakistan provided America’s lifeline in Afghanistan and sanctuary 

for America’s enemies.
Map 1

Karshi-Khanabad Air 

Kandahar Aireld

B A D G H I S

FA R YA B

J O W Z J AN

B A L KH

S A R - E P U L

S A M A 

B A M YA N 

Z A B UL

D AY K U N D I G H 

U R U ZG AN

G H O R

H E R AT

FA R AH

N I M R O Z

H E L M A N D

K A N DA H A R

Herāt

Shīndand

Maīmanah

Sar-e Pul

Mazār-e Sharīf 

Bāmy

Kakarak

Tarīn Kōt 

Quetta

Lashkar Gāh

Spīn Bōldak

T U R K M E N I S T A N

I R A N

I R A N 

U Z B E K I S T A 
Bagram

Air Base

Base

Indus River

Indus River

L i n e o f Co nt ro l

N G AN

PA R WA N

B AG HL AN

K U N D U Z

T A KH A R

B A DA K H S H AN

NU R I S TA N

K U N A R

N A N G A R H A R

L AGH M A N

K A P I S A

K A B UL

W A R D A K

L OG A R

PA K T I YA

K H O S T

PA K T I K A 

H A Z N I

Kunduz

DUSHANBE

Pul-e Khumrī

ān

KABUL

Gardēz

Khōst

Ghaznī

 Peshāwar ISLAMABAD

Jalālābād Pul-e

 Charkhī

Faīzābād

P A K I S T A N

I N D I AC H I N A

T A J I K I S T A N

A N

0 150

0 150 Kilometers

Miles

September 2004

A F G H A N I S TA N

Air Base or Aireld

Ring Road and extensions

Provincial Boundary
8

Consequently, the United States faced a situation that defied 

easy solution. The previous six months had witnessed military and 

diplomatic progress. By March 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom

had produced a coalition of fifty-six nations that furnished support 

ranging from the commitment of combat troops to logistical aid. 

American, British, Canadian, and Australian troops formed the major 

share of coalition fighting forces, with the largest contingent from 

the United States. In addition, in December 2001 the United Nations 

authorized a small security element under British command, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to protect Kabul and 

its environs. The United States did not participate in the effort, and 

ISAF was not initially a part of the coalition. The total foreign troop 

commitment numbered some twelve thousand, of which the United 

States contributed about half. But there were no plans to increase that 

contingent. As Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld later explained, “Long-term stability comes not from the presence of foreign 

forces but from the development of functioning local institutions.” 

The United States would aid Afghans in creating those institutions 

without, it hoped, making large-scale deployments to the country.

Operations

Lt. Gen. Paul T. Mikolashek’s Third Army headquarters, serving in Kuwait as the Combined Forces Land Component Command 

(CFLCC), assumed responsibility for Afghanistan in late 2001. Special 

Operations Forces supplied much of the American presence on the 

ground during the war’s opening months, but, as that fight expanded, 

more conventional units arrived in Afghanistan. The Afghan landscape 

played a critical role in defining what type of forces the United States 

deployed. Roughly the size of Texas, Afghanistan can be divided into 

five regions. The Hindu Kush Range begins in the northwest and runs 

to the southwest, creating a large plateau that bisects the country. The 

capital city of Kabul rests on the southeastern edge of this plateau. 

The eastern and northern sections of the country are mountainous and 

defined by long, thin valleys and relatively arid terrain. The western 

regions are more fertile lowlands bordering Iran. The southern provinces running between the Hindu Kush and the Pakistan border are 

characterized as scrubland or desert. The country’s size and dispersed 

population required a mobile force to provide effective security. The 

difficult terrain meant helicopters were necessary to reach the isolated 

rural population, particularly in the mountainous regions along the 

Pakistan border in the east. Therefore, the United States needed a light, 
9

mobile force that could conduct operations and be inserted, supplied, 

supported, and evacuated by helicopter.

Maj. Gen. Franklin L. Hagenbeck’s 10th Mountain Division 

represented just the type of light force that the situation in Afghanistan demanded. Its headquarters deployed in December from Fort 

Drum, New York, to Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan to 

take control of ongoing operations. Dubbed CFLCC-Forward or 

Task Force Mountain, Hagenbeck’s headquarters moved in February 

2002 to Bagram Air Base, a former Soviet base thirty-five miles north 

of Kabul, to oversee planning for Operation Anaconda, a large-scale 

mission to clear out the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from 

Paktiya Province in eastern Afghanistan (Chart 1).

By the time Task Force Mountain reached Bagram, U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan had grown significantly. The 10th Mountain 

Division’s main contribution consisted of Task Force Commando, 

formed around the 2d Brigade headquarters, with one infantry 

battalion, three aviation battalions, and attached special operations units. It joined Joint Special Operations Task Force–North, 

composed of the 5th Special Forces Group; the 19th Special Forces 

Group; and the 2d Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment. Joint Special Operations Task Force–South, which 

included the 3d Special Forces Group and the 3d Battalion, 160th 

Special Operations Aviation Regiment, arrived in January 2002. 

Task Force Rakkasan, which was built around the 3d Brigade, 

101st Airborne Division, and contained three infantry battalions, 

three aviation battalions, and the 626th Support Battalion, landed 

in theater at the same time. In March, U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) concentrated command authority over special operations units in Afghanistan by creating the Combined Joint Special 

Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and placed it under Task Force 

Mountain’s tactical control.

With the completion of Operation Anaconda, the U.S. military 

sought to consolidate its successes and to help the Afghans create 

civil and military institutions without increasing its military presence 

in Afghanistan. Additional coalition forces arrived as allied nations 

contributed troops to the mission of rebuilding the war-torn country. In April 2002, the United Kingdom added the 45 Commando, 

a battalion-size unit of about six hundred Royal Marines. Canada 

deployed the 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, as well as special forces soldiers. Romania sent the 26th Infantry 

Battalion, which provided base security for Kandahar airfield. Several coalition partners deployed engineer units, including Poland, 
U.S. Central Command

(General Tommy R. Franks)

Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)

(Lt. Gen. Paul T. Mikolashek—Third Army HQ) 

CFLCC-Forward/Task Force MOUNTAIN

(Maj. Gen. Franklin L. Hagenbeck—10th Mountain Div)

International Security

Assistance Force

(United Nations)

Combined Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

Task Force COMMANDO

(HQ/2d Bde, 10th Mountain Div)

Combined Joint Civil-Military

Operations Task Force

(489th Civil Affairs Bn)

Task Force RAKKASAN

(HQ/3d Bde, 101st Abn Div)

Tactical controlCoordination

Chart 1—Combined Forces Land Component Command–Forward Rotation, February–May 2002
11

Norway, Slovakia, and Italy. The Poles and Norwegians cleared mines 

in Bagram, while the Slovakians and Italians worked on the airfield 

and runway. Meanwhile, U.S. Army logisticians established more 

permanent ground lines of communications. The coalition’s overland 

supply system into Afghanistan ran through Karshi-Khanabad in 

the north and the port of Karachi, Pakistan, in the south. As the 

number of coalition forces in Afghanistan grew, these supply routes 

became even more important.

Though the United States did not commit itself to long-term 

engagement in Afghanistan, it did decide to continue operations 

after Anaconda, which began to strain Task Force Mountain’s 

capabilities. Essentially a stripped-down division headquarters, 

the task force proved increasingly ill-suited to coordinate all conventional and unconventional operations taking place across Afghanistan. As the number of American forces jumped to over five 

thousand by March 2002, the task force headquarters grew more 

overstretched. Its geographic responsibility expanded to encompass 

not only Afghanistan, but also Tajikistan, some of Uzbekistan, and 

parts of Pakistan. U.S. commanders understood that they were 

operating under an informal force-cap, established by CENTCOM 

and the Defense Department, of around seven thousand personnel. 

Such strictures required flexibility not only of combat units, which 

would be called on to perform a wide variety of missions, but also 

the command and control apparatus required to oversee those operations. The challenges facing Mountain increased when CFLCC 

headquarters in Kuwait began devoting more effort to planning a 

potential campaign against Iraq. With authority for operations and 

responsibility for missions divided between CENTCOM, CFLCC, 

and Task Force Mountain, it soon became clear that the Army 

required a more simplified and capable system to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

Operation Mountain Lion

Despite Operation Anaconda’s success in dislodging the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda from the Shahi Kot valley in Paktiya Province, U.S. and coalition forces needed to maintain the pressure in 

southeastern Afghanistan to prevent the enemy from interfering 

with the upcoming loya jirga intended to create a new transitional 

government. Planning for what would be Operation Mountain

Lion began in March 2002. Envisioned as a three-month operation composed of week-long missions launched by helicopter 

from Bagram and Kandahar, Mountain Lion sought to identify, 
12

isolate, and destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces as well as to deny 

them sanctuary and freedom of movement in Paktiya, Paktika, 

and Uruzgan Provinces. The operation featured a new set of tactics that relied less on Afghan allies and airpower and more on 

well-trained coalition light infantry. Begun in April and running 

through June, the operation’s key tasks included isolating important border areas, locating the enemy, conducting reconnaissance 

and raids, and patrolling the border with Afghan militia forces. 

In order to undermine al-Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s influence on 

the Afghan people, General Hagenbeck directed coalition forces 

to provide humanitarian assistance. He also encouraged the work 

of private organizations, such as the Red Cross and Care International, and the Afghan government to improve living conditions 

for the population. 

Mountain Lion involved several thousand American, British, 

and Canadian troops from conventional units, as well as American 

and Australian special operations forces, operating in southeastern 

Afghanistan. Mountain Lion kicked off with U.S. troops from 

the 101st Airborne Division, along with a battalion-size task force 

of Royal Marines, being airlifted into Paktika Province. While 

conventional forces failed to make contact with the enemy, on 30 

April a reconnaissance patrol from the 2d Australian Special Air 

Service Regiment encountered several Taliban near Khost. After 

killing two enemy fighters, the Australians were reinforced by a 

rifle company of the 101st Airborne Division dispatched from 

Bagram. Although the appearance of coalition reinforcements 

drove the Taliban survivors into hiding, U.S. soldiers searched 

the surrounding area and uncovered several caches of weapons 

and ammunition.

Canadian troops joined the operation in early May, participating in an air assault on Tora Bora in Nangarhar Province to gather 

intelligence from al-Qaeda cave complexes abandoned months earlier. 

In addition to the operations conducted by conventional units, U.S. 

Special Operations Forces established small forward bases in three 

eastern Afghan provinces. The teams recruited local militias to disrupt Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin fighters operating in Kunar Province. 

In Nangarhar Province, they coordinated with the local warlords 

to target terrorists seeking sanctuary in Jalalabad, a city of about 

two hundred thousand on the main road from Kabul to Peshawar, 

Pakistan. In Uruzgan Province, Special Forces teams and Afghan 

militia conducted patrols to keep the enemy from reestablishing a 

foothold in the region.
13

Combined Joint Task Force–180 Takes Over

In April 2002, General Tommy R. Franks, head of CENTCOM, 

addressed the issue of command and control in Afghanistan by 

deciding to deploy a corps-level headquarters to Bagram. Franks 

assigned the mission to Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill’s XVIII Airborne 

Corps, redesignated as Combined Joint Task Force–180 (CJTF-180). 

While primarily an Army organization, it included members of the 

U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps, as well as British, Australian, 

Polish, South Korean, Romanian, and other coalition personnel, 

making it a joint and combined staff. Although a typical combined 

joint task force could consist of a thousand personnel, CJTF-180 

arrived in May 2002 at Bagram from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

with only 365 people in order to comply with personnel restrictions 

on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The transfer of authority from Task 

Force Mountain to CJTF-180 occurred on 1 June 2002. Task Force 

Mountain did not disappear but instead assumed a subordinate 

role nested within McNeill’s headquarters.

CJTF-180 had three other subordinate commands. A medical task 

force provided assistance to coalition forces and helped build Afghan 

medical programs. The Aviation Task Force (composed of Army and 

Marine air units) supplied helicopter and fixed-wing support, projection of combat power, and a quick reaction capability throughout 

Afghanistan. Finally, the Joint Logistics Command managed support within the area of operations. CJTF-180 also exercised tactical 

control of CJSOTF, though Central Command’s special operations 

component retained its administrative and logistical responsibilities 

for Special Forces units operating in Afghanistan. Composed primarily of U.S. Special Operations Forces, CJSOTF included special 

operations elements from Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 

Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 

others at one time or another between 2001 and 2005.

While the command structure evolved, the mission for U.S. forces 

in Afghanistan remained the same. CENTCOM ordered CJTF-180 

to eliminate the remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the country, to train the Afghan National Army, and to conduct operations 

to stabilize and secure Afghanistan so that terrorist organizations 

could not reemerge there. Central Command continued to operate 

under the assumption that McNeill’s headquarters would turn over 

responsibility for security, civil-military operations, and humanitarian 

assistance to the Afghans within twelve to eighteen months, though 

no specific timeline existed (Map 2).
14

The operational realities that emerged during the spring of 2002 

made eliminating al-Qaeda and the Taliban difficult for CJTF-180. To 

do so, coalition forces needed to cross into Pakistan, which international 

law and the rules of engagement prohibited. Instead, McNeill focused 

on denying sanctuary and restricting freedom of movement within Afghanistan for the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In particular, 

TORA BORA

Dec 2001

MOUNTAIN SWEEP Aug 2002 ANACONDA Mar 2002

WARRIOR SWEEP Jul 2003

CHAMPION STRIKE Sep 2002

MOUNTAIN VIPER Aug 2003

MONGOOSE Jan 2003

Bagram

Air Base

Kandahar

 Aireld

Indus River

FA R YA B

J O W Z J AN

B A L KH

S A R - E P U L

S A M A N G AN

B A M YA N

PA R WA N

B AG HL AN

K U N D U Z

T A KH A R B A DA K H S H AN

N U R I S T AN

K U N A R

N A N G A R H A R

L AGH M A N

K A P I S A

K A B UL

W A R D A K

L OG A R

PA K T I YA

K H O S T

PA K T I K A

Z A B UL

G H A Z N I D AY K U N D I

U R U ZG AN

G H O R

H E L M A ND K A N D A H A R

Sar-e Pul

Mazār-e Sharīf Kunduz

Pul-e Khumrī

Bāmyān

KABUL

Gardēz

Khōst

Ghaznī

Kakarak

Tarīn

 Kōt 

 Peshāwar

Jalālābād Pul-e Charkhī

Quetta

Spīn

Bōldak

P A K I S T A N

2001–2005

0

0

100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Selected Operations

Operational Area

A R E A S O F O P E R AT I O N A L E M P H A S I S

Map 2
15

U.S. forces hoped to prevent the enemy from using trails across the 

Afghan-Pakistan border, dubbed rat-lines, which smugglers often traveled. The difficult terrain meant that the paths were passable only by 

foot or pack animal. U.S. forces also sought out caches of weapons and 

ammunition, taking these munitions from the enemy and giving them 

to the Afghan National Army. 

The inability of U.S. forces to pursue the enemy into Pakistan did 

not mean that the region offered complete safety to al-Qaeda. After 

joining the American coalition, and especially in the wake of Tora 

Bora, the Pakistani military and intelligence services increased their 

efforts to locate and arrest members of al-Qaeda. With the aid of U.S. 

Special Operations Forces and law enforcement agencies, including 

the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Pakistan’s 

Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, the Pakistanis arrested dozens 

of fugitive fighters, most notably Abu Zabaydah. Despite these successes, American authorities had their doubts regarding the Pakistani 

government’s commitment to defeating the Afghan Taliban. On a 

positive note, Mountain Lion prevented insurgents from disrupting a meeting of Afghan tribal leaders to form a new government 

to replace the interim authority. On 19 June, the United Nations 

announced the creation of the Afghan Transitional Administration 

(also known as the Afghan Transnational Authority), with Hamid 

Karzai as president.

Though coalition operations succeeded in keeping pressure on 

the enemy, they also had unintended consequences. On the night of 

30 June 2002, a Special Forces team conducting reconnaissance near 

the village of Kakarak reported antiaircraft fire directed at nearby 

U.S. aircraft. The soldiers on the ground called in the coordinates of 

suspected enemy positions to an AC–130 Spectre gunship orbiting 

overhead. A B–52 Stratofortress also responded, dropping a Joint 

Direct Attack Munition precision bomb. The next day, the villagers 

asserted the air strikes hit a wedding party, killing forty. The provincial 

governor claimed that the Americans mistook celebratory gunshots 

for antiaircraft fire or that a rival tribe misinformed the Special 

Forces team. However, Army civil affairs personnel responding to 

the incident found antiaircraft artillery in the vicinity. They treated 

some injured Afghans but could not identify anyone killed by air attacks. Nevertheless, the incident resulted in unfavorable Afghan and 

international opinions concerning U.S. operations in Afghanistan. 

News stories focused on the reported civilian deaths and not on the 

U.S. troops’ belief that they had been under attack. The experience 

highlighted the importance to the U.S. military of supplying timely 
16

and accurate facts. If it did not, as the bombing story indicated, 

reporters would seek out stories from other sources.

While the battle for U.S. and global opinion mattered, the more 

important issue was the reaction of Afghans to these events. American soldiers believed they were justified in using airpower to attack 

legitimate targets in a way that limited their own casualties, even if 

the enemy intermingled with civilians. The local population, however, 

remained disinterested in the finer points of U.S. fire support doctrine. 

The people objected to the loss of lives and property and the general 

behavior of coalition forces. House-to-house sweeps, the detention of 

men suspected of supporting the Taliban or al-Qaeda, and searches 

of women all added to growing tensions. Making matters worse, 

such actions sometimes were the result of baseless allegations made 

by one tribe or faction against rivals. These activities tarnished the 

image of the U.S. military in the country and CJTF-180’s relations 

with the population. 

Combined Joint Task Force–82 Arrives

In the summer of 2002, elements of the 82d Airborne Division 

under Maj. Gen. John R. Vines began rotating into Afghanistan to 

replace Task Force Mountain. Designated Combined Joint Task 

Force–82 (CJTF-82), it assumed responsibility for tactical operations. Two infantry battalions from Col. James L. Huggins’ 3d Brigade, along with a battalion from the 1st Brigade, became the main 

maneuver force, designated Task Force Panther. The arrival of a 

sizable element of the 82d Airborne Division increased the overall 

number of U.S. forces in the Afghan theater from seven thousand 

in May 2002 to over nine thousand by the end of August (Chart 2).

While military units rotated in and out of Afghanistan, civilian 

contractors remained and took on an increasing amount of work. 

In 2003, when a forward support battalion from 10th Mountain 

Division arrived at Kandahar airfield, Kellogg, Brown, and Root—

a Halliburton subsidiary—already ran the laundry and performed 

camp maintenance. Contractors expanded into food preparation, 

as well as staffing the warehouse, supply point, and other facilities. 

Civilian engineers, carpenters, masons, electricians, and plumbers 

also supported base operations. Despite their increased workload, 

contractors did not venture out into the country, leaving the most 

dangerous tasks to soldiers.

For combat units in Afghanistan from mid-2002 until autumn 

2003, their basic mission statement remained to deny sanctuary to 

the enemy, disrupt the ability of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to plan 
U.S. Central Command

(General Franks)

Combined Joint Task Force–180

(Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill—XVIII Abn Corps) 

International Security

Assistance Force

(United Nations)

Combined Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan

(1st Bn, 3d Special Forces Gp)

Combined Joint Civil-Military

Operations Task Force

(489th Civil Affairs Bn)

Combined Joint Task Force–82

(Maj. Gen. John R. Vines—82d Abn Div)

Task Force PEGASUS

(HQ/Aviation Bde, 82d Abn Div)

Task Force DEVIL

(HQ/1st Bde, 82d Abn Div)

[December 2002–May 2003]

Task Force ANGEL

(HQ/3d Bn, 229th Aviation)

Task Force PANTHER

(HQ/3d Bde, 82d Abn Div)

[August 2002–January 2003]

Tactical controlCoordination

Chart 2—Combined Joint Task Force–180: First Rotation, June 2002–May 2003
18

and execute operations, and destroy enemy forces when in contact. 

Coalition operations followed a typical template of search and attack 

within a defined area. Inside a designated box, troops methodically 

searched villages after cordoning them off. On occasion these were 

battalion-size missions, though more often smaller forces such as 

companies or platoons were used. In addition, twelve-man Special 

Forces teams worked with companies of Afghan troops and accompanied coalition battalions on the cordon and search missions. 

Bagram Air Base and Kandahar airfield served as the primary 

bases for these units with smaller elements spread out in forward operating bases. When given a mission, the troops typically conducted 

an air assault by helicopter into an area before proceeding on foot for 

the next two or three weeks. They sent any detainees back to Kandahar or Bagram for interrogation. At the conclusion of the operation, 

the unit pulled back to its base, debriefed, refitted for a week to ten 

days, and then went out on the next mission, which could be in an 

entirely different area.

The Taliban responded to these cordon and search missions by 

attacking isolated operating bases with rocket-propelled grenades 

or mortar rounds rather than direct assaults on coalition units in 

the field. The outposts at Lwara and Shkin in Paktiya and Paktika 

Provinces, respectively, endured several attacks in the latter half of 

2002 because they were close to the border with Pakistan. Although 

helicopters attempted to block the enemy retreat into the Pakistani 

sanctuaries, the difficulties associated with spotting individuals moving under tree cover in rugged terrain usually allowed the Taliban 

fighters to escape with impunity. 

A few notable missions exemplified the war during this period. In 

August 2002, CJTF-82 launched Mountain Sweep, which targeted 

al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Paktiya and Khost Provinces on 

the Pakistan border. A task force of two thousand soldiers, formed 

around Lt. Col. Martin Schweitzer’s 3d Battalion, 505th Infantry; 

several companies of Army Rangers; combat engineers; civil affairs 

teams; coalition special operations forces; and Afghan militia forces, 

took part in the operation. The maneuver began with the construction of a forward operating base near the border by personnel from 

the Louisiana National Guard and the 307th Engineer Battalion 

(Airborne). The week-long mission began on 18 August with an air 

assault by the 3d Battalion, 505th Infantry, using CH–47 Chinook 

helicopters from Kandahar airfield. After their insertion, Schweitzer’s 

troops moved from village to village across the Zurmat District, 

southwest of the town of Gardez. The Americans discovered anti-
19

aircraft artillery, weapons, and ammunition and captured ten men 

with suspected al-Qaeda or Taliban ties.

While CJTF-180 called Mountain Sweep a success, Special Forces 

detachments in Khost Province faced a much more hostile population 

after the campaign. The special operations soldiers believed that the 

tactics used by conventional units undermined the rapport they cultivated among the local populace. The mission also failed to achieve 

the capture of a suspected al-Qaeda financier, who fled to Pakistan 

just prior to the action’s commencement. “I have no doubt that they 

had advance warning that we were coming,” Colonel Huggins stated. 

“We have to share information with the country we’re in. I have no 

idea what they do with that information.” Though Huggins saw no 

deliberate activity by Afghans that undermined the operation, his 

concerns reflected the continuing difficulties in coordination, communication, and intelligence sharing between coalition and Afghan 

forces.

In September 2002, the 82d Airborne Division launched another big operation, Champion Strike. Approximately one thousand troops, including Schweitzer’s 3d Battalion; elements of the 

newly arrived 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry, led by Lt. Col. David 

T. Gerard; Special Forces teams; and Afghan militia, conducted air 

assaults into the Bermail valley of Paktika Province. They captured 

Inserting troops via Chinook helicopter, March 2002 
20

an al-Qaeda or Taliban financier along with other suspects and also 

uncovered weapons caches and Taliban documents. Female military 

police soldiers discovered that some Afghan females were concealing 

weapons and ammunition under their full-length garments (called 

burkas), probably because enemy fighters thought they would not 

be searched. Changes in U.S. troop behavior in these searches did 

not produce the same disruptions as in previous operations.

At the end of 2002 as winter weather set in, CJTF-180 and 

CJTF-82 prepared to rotate their maneuver forces. Task Force 

Panther gave way to Col. John F. Campbell’s Task Force Devil. 

Formed around the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, it included 

A female American soldier searching two Afghan women
21

the 1st and 2d Battalions, 504th Infantry; 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery; and the 307th Engineer 

Battalion. Located at Kandahar airfield with smaller units stationed 

at forward operating bases in areas where the enemy remained active, the new task force conducted operations until it rotated out 

in late spring 2003.

In January 2003, Company A of 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, and 

Company A, 307th Engineer Battalion, along with a contingent of 

coalition and Afghan forces conducted Operation Mongoose, engaging Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin fighters in the Hade Ghar Mountains 

near the city of Spin Boldak in eastern Kandahar Province. After 

heavy fighting, which required several air strikes by Norwegian F–16 

aircraft, coalition forces entered an extensive underground complex 

filled with arms caches and documents, as well as food, water, and 

livestock. It appeared that the compound had been used to smuggle 

weapons and supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

In June 2003, Special Forces teams set up small bases along the 

eastern borders of Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces to stop enemy 

fighters in Afghanistan from contesting Pakistani Army operations 

against al-Qaeda. Although the undetected movement across the 

border of armed insurgents using old smuggling trails remained a 

problem, the operation expanded the sparse coalition presence in 

northeastern Afghanistan. The deployment also improved cooperation with Pakistan, drew a larger Pakistani military presence to the 

border in that area, and, in U.S.-led talks, helped set the conditions 

for resolving border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan that 

became known as the tripartite meetings.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan, however, 

remained strained, with most of the tension stemming from the complex nature of Pakistani politics. Pakistan continued to allow U.S. 

supplies to move overland from Karachi into Afghanistan. President 

Pervez Musharraf had come out strongly against Muslim extremists 

in January 2002, banning several organizations from operating within 

Pakistan. In March 2003, Pakistani intelligence operatives captured 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the principal architects of the 11 

September 2001 attacks, and turned him over to the United States. 

In June, President Bush rewarded Pakistan with the promise of $3 

billion in aid to be distributed over the next five years. However, 

Musharraf’s crackdown on militant groups also led to two failed assassination attempts in late 2003. Caught between the United States 

and Muslim extremists, the Pakistani regime’s behavior appeared 

inconsistent and duplicitous.
22

Dealing with Detainees

The question of handling captured al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Hizbe-Islami Gulbuddin fighters became more pressing in the wake of 

escalating American-led combat operations. Heretofore, U.S. soldiers 

who detained enemy fighters operated under customary guidance 

to “search, segregate, silence, safeguard, and speed to the rear.” Yet 

standard doctrine did not apply in all circumstances given the unique 

peculiarities of Afghanistan and the changing nature of the conflict.

Until late 2001, the simplest course of action consisted of turning 

over prisoners to the Afghans, but the lack of a centralized government in Kabul forced the Americans to rely on Northern Alliance 

warlords to oversee them. Events surrounding a prisoner uprising in 

late 2001 provided ample evidence of the problems pursuing this path. 

During the first month of the war, forces under Northern Alliance 

General Abdul Rashid Dostum assembled hundreds of prisoners in 

Qala-i Jangi, a nineteenth-century fortress near the city of Mazar-e 

Sharif. Following Afghan cultural norms, the captives were held 

in loose confinement after promising not to fight anymore against 

coalition forces. However, many of the prisoners were non-Afghan 

members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Ignoring their earlier promise, 

these prisoners mounted an uprising on 25 November that resulted in 

the deaths of two American intelligence officers. The ensuing battle 

to retake the prison facilities required the commitment of Dostum’s 

troops, U.S. Special Forces, and coalition airpower.

Controversy arose regarding the subsequent incarceration and 

transport of the surviving prisoners by Dostum’s forces. Numerous 

prisoners died while being transported to other facilities in sealed 

shipping containers, which resulted in media claims that American 

forces were somehow complicit in the deaths. While the actual number 

of deaths remained uncertain, no credible evidence emerged regarding 

possible U.S. involvement or knowledge of the event. Nevertheless, 

accusations of brutality levied against a key regional ally reflected 

poorly on the United States with Afghans, internationally, and with 

the American public. To avert similar controversies in the future, 

the Americans recognized they had to assume a more active role in 

detainee operations.

The U.S. decision to take responsibility raised a number of cultural and religious issues. For example, it is standard U.S. Army practice 

when dealing with lice among detainees to trim prisoners’ hair and 

beards. For most Afghan Muslims, however, a clean shaven head and 

face served as a mark of shame. Should the prisoners be released, both 
23

they and their families would harbor ill will against coalition forces 

for the insult. Detainee prayers also initially caused some confusion 

at first. The Muslim practice of praying aloud caused some soldiers 

to think that the detainees were violating rules against talking with 

each other. Gender also created a point of friction. Male detainees 

reacted poorly to the military police women guarding them. As Pvt. 

Marisa A. Wondra of the 65th Military Police Company described it, 

“At first, they would think twice about what I’m telling them to do. 

‘Do I have to listen to the female?’ But then they probably realized 

that I have a weapon and that they have to listen to me.”

While cultural and religious differences proved troublesome, the 

most basic problems revolved around facilities and personnel. At the 

beginning of the conflict, adequate prison facilities were virtually nonexistent in a nation devastated by decades of war (and whose culture 

reflected little concern for prisoners in any case). Military engineers 

constructed a short-term detainee holding compound at Kandahar 

airfield that had guard towers, chain-link fence with razor wire, cells, 

showers, and latrines. A more permanent structure at Kandahar was 

eventually built, along with a larger detention facility at Bagram Air 

Base and smaller holding facilities elsewhere. Though austere at the 

start, the facilities improved over time. Authorities transferred select 

detainees to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and others were released outright or turned over to the nascent Afghan government, but enough 

remained in Afghanistan detention centers to cause difficulties for 

the Army.

Handling prisoners and intelligence gathering were the most 

critical elements of detainee operations. Military police internment 

and resettlement battalions, composed of an escort company, a 

guard company, processing detachments, and a headquarters unit, 

operated the detainee facilities. However, these specialized units 

were not always available in sufficient strength, with Guantanamo 

Bay and eventually Iraq having higher priorities than Afghanistan. 

As a result, units often undertook duties beyond the scope of their 

training, such as military police companies trained for escort duty 

being used to operate detention facilities. Furthermore, most internment and resettlement units came from the Army Reserve and 

National Guard, which created additional problems in training. 

Theoretically, their normal training regimen would prepare them 

for duty in Afghanistan. However, while they underwent predeployment training for service in a combat zone, many reservists received 

only cursory specialized instruction in detainee operations. Sgt. 

Alan J. Driver Jr., 377th Military Police Company, later charged 
24

with abusing detainees, stated, “We received one day of training 

on prison techniques before we arrived in the country and actually 

took over the prison in Bagram.” Lt. Col. Thomas S. Berg, a staff 

officer who investigated charges linked to Driver’s unit, reported 

that “little of the training focused on the actual mission that the 

377th anticipated it would assume upon arrival in theater.”

The need to gather intelligence also complicated the detainee 

situation. Detainees were considered a crucial source of information, 

particularly since the coalition forces in Afghanistan were opposed by 

a clandestine foe hiding in the population rather than a conventional 

opponent. While military intelligence units expected to handle these 

interrogations, Special Operations Forces and other civilian agencies 

also questioned detainees, making it difficult to create any kind of 

procedural uniformity. The Defense Department and Central Command initially relied on Field Manual (FM) 34–52, Intelligence Interrogation, published in 1992, to provide basic guidelines for military 

intelligence personnel. However, some interrogators in Afghanistan 

began to use enhanced interrogation techniques authorized for 

Guantanamo Bay but not by FM 34–52, such as removal of clothing, 

prolonged periods of isolation, sleep deprivation, and stress positions. 

How these techniques migrated to Afghanistan remains unclear, but 

they contributed to uncertainty over allowable interrogation methods. 

A detainee facility in Kandahar, February 2002
25

Frequent adjustments to detainee policies caused additional confusion, and it would be two years before a uniform policy appeared.

Army doctrine also gave conflicting guidance on the relationship 

between military intelligence personnel and military police. FM 34–52 

implied an active role for military police in the interrogation process. 

However, FM 3–19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement 

Operations, published in 2001, stated that only military intelligence 

personnel could conduct interrogations at detention sites. It provided 

no rules for military police to assist in interrogations, nor did it spell 

out approved or prohibited military intelligence procedures at a facility operated by military police. In the absence of official guidelines, 

local commanders and their troops had to improvise.

The ambiguity between military intelligence and military police 

doctrine began with the classification of detainees. The lack of a 

formal declaration of war and a uniformed enemy raised the question of how to determine whether any given individual was in fact 

a fighter or involved in terrorism. Those captured did not readily fit 

under the Geneva Conventions rubric of enemy prisoners of war. 

Ultimately, they came to be labeled as detainees or persons under 

control. President Bush stated in early 2002 that prisoners would be 

treated in a humane manner, even though they were not accorded 

protection by the Geneva Conventions. But the administration and 

Defense Department provided no additional guidance as to how to 

deal with captives under this new classification.

With inadequately trained personnel operating under ambiguous 

guidelines, abuses occurred. Offenses included denial of access to 

medical care, repeated physical abuse, prolonged periods of detainment in shackles suspended from a ceiling, and the negligent homicide of at least two detainees. The most serious abuses occurred at 

the detention facility at Bagram Air Base, but cases of mistreatment 

took place at facilities throughout the country during 2002 and 2003. 

As a result of these abuses, a number of Army military police and 

military intelligence personnel received administrative punishments 

or faced criminal charges.

The problems in detainment operations in Afghanistan remained 

outside the public’s knowledge until a scandal erupted in late April 

2004 over claims of abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, prompting 

a review of all detainee practices in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. forces 

conducted a “top to bottom” evaluation of all coalition detention and 

holding facilities to make sure that procedures were “in accordance 

with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions.” The study did not uncover 

systemic abuse but did see a need for better guidance and training 
26

for prison staff. Responding to criticisms, the Defense Department 

ended the practice of holding detainees indefinitely. New rules stated 

that prisoners being held at a temporary facility had to be released 

or transferred if they were held for more than ten days. All prisoners 

would have access to the Red Cross/Red Crescent within fifteen days 

of detention. A coalition spokesperson in December 2004 concluded 

that “U.S. forces have tightened up procedures for training up our 

people to handle and care for the prisoners.” However, organizations 

such as Human Rights Watch disputed these official pronouncements 

and remained highly critical of the Army’s oversight of detainees.

Creating the Afghan National Army

The coalition started planning for an Afghan army in January 

2002, but that process required more time and effort than creating 

an Afghan national government. Afghanistan did not have the professional military tradition or capabilities to establish and sustain 

such a force. Though the nation had been at war for decades, the 

contenders were primarily militias, loyal to a particular warlord, or 

mujahideen guerrilla fighters. Neither group could provide a solid 

foundation for a professional army. The warlords served as a stopgap 

in the military sphere as they had in the political realm, with their 

militias continuing to fight alongside coalition forces. But the lack 

of broad ethnic representation and the politicized leadership of 

the militias made them poor representatives of national authority. 

The linguistic differences in the country, when combined with the 

absence of common procedures among the coalition to train the 

Afghan military, were major impediments to molding a cohesive 

national army.

In April 2002, the United States and its allies convened in Geneva, 

Switzerland, to discuss security issues in Afghanistan. The allies 

agreed on five “pillars” of reform, with a different nation taking the 

lead in each. The United States would create and train the Afghan 

army, while Germany would build the Afghan police. Italy accepted 

responsibility for reform of the justice system. The United Kingdom 

took on the counternarcotics problem, and Japan became the lead 

nation on disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration of the 

Afghan warlords and militias.

The International Security Assistance Force under British command trained the first battalion of Afghan infantry. When Turkey took 

over leadership of ISAF in June 2002, it created a second battalion. In 

the spring of 2002, U.S. Special Forces units partnered with the French 

to begin training additional Afghan infantry units. Progress was slow.
27

That fall, the United States established the Office of Military 

Cooperation–Afghanistan to manage the overall effort to create the 

Afghan National Army. Normally an office of military cooperation 

is part of the U.S. Embassy and facilitates the sale or transfer of 

American equipment and the provision of technical advice to the 

local military. In this instance, the new organization’s much broader 

mandate resulted in the group working under dual chains of command. For traditional equipping and advising issues, the commander 

coordinated with the U.S. ambassador. The Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan also received direction from CJTF-180 and its 

successors for overseeing the Afghan National Army’s training and 

operational employment.

In October 2002, Maj. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry took command 

of the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan. His headquarters 

near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul started with just fifteen people, a not 

inconsiderable number given that similar efforts in Iraq a year later 

began with six soldiers. The staff grew slowly with augmentation from 

CJTF-180, Army reservists, and a number of civilian contractors. The 

Netherlands, Germany, Romania, France, and the United Kingdom 

also contributed people. The majority of the contractors worked for 

Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which hired retired 

officers to mentor senior Afghan leaders of the General Staff and 

the Ministry of Defense. 

When Air Force Maj. Gen. Craig P. Weston succeeded Eikenberry 

on 30 November 2003, the staff still had only 90 out of an authorized 

228 billets. Given the disparate source of personnel, the length of 

tours of duty varied, which resulted in heavy turnover in the office. 

While the Army typically sent someone for nine to twelve months, 

a marine served for only seven months, and Air Force personnel 

rotated every three or four months. In a single two-month period, 

the organization experienced an almost 100 percent turnover in staff. 

This contrasted with the rotation of combat units in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, which preserved some organizational continuity.

General Eikenberry designated three “top-down” priorities. 

First, he emphasized rebuilding the Ministry of Defense and the 

General Staff, so that these institutions could establish policy and 

operational direction. Second, he concentrated on increasing the 

size of the combat forces of the Afghan National Army. The initial 

phase of this development consisted of creating the Central Corps, 

a light infantry division numbering about 12,500 stationed around 

Kabul. From this starting point, the army would expand with four 

regional corps based in the cities of Kandahar in the south, Herat in 
28

the west, Gardez in the east, and Mazar-e Sharif to the north. Third, 

the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan would form sustaining institutions for the Afghan National Army, including commands 

for recruiting, education, training, medical, acquisition and logistics, 

and communications and intelligence.

At first, coalition troops and U.S. Special Forces teams trained 

the Afghan soldiers while the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan handled other matters. But when Operation Iraqi Freedom

started in March 2003, special operations units could no longer be 

spared. Responsibility then fell to a new organization, Combined 

Joint Task Force Phoenix, under Brig. Gen. F. Joseph Prasek and 

formed around Col. Mark A. Milley’s 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain 

Division. The war in Iraq brought more change a few months later 

at the end of the brigade’s tour of duty in Afghanistan. With regular 

combat forces covering two conflicts, the U.S. Army could not afford to continue assigning active duty units to the Afghan training 

mission. A contingent from the 45th Enhanced Separate Brigade of 

the Oklahoma National Guard under the command of Brig. Gen. 

Thomas P. Mancino assumed duties as Task Force Phoenix II in the 

fall of 2003. Thereafter, each rotation of Task Force Phoenix consisted of several hundred soldiers from a National Guard brigade 

augmented by coalition personnel and soldiers drawn from National 

Guard units from several states. The 76th Infantry Brigade of the 

Indiana National Guard assumed duties as Task Force Phoenix III

in August 2004. The 53d Infantry Brigade of the Florida National 

Guard took over as Task Force Phoenix IV in 2005. Embedded teams 

from these commands mentored Afghan National Army units during 

their training and deployed with the units after graduation.

In December 2002, the international community and Afghan 

government met again at Bonn, Germany. All parties agreed that the 

new Afghan National Army would be a volunteer force numbering 

no more than 70,000, composed of 43,000 combat soldiers, 24,000 

support troops, and 3,000 Ministry of Defense and General Staff 

personnel. In addition, each unit down to battalion would contain 

a mix reflecting the ethnic and regional makeup of the country. By 

fielding a national and representative force, the coalition leadership 

intended to send a message of Afghan national unity and demonstrate 

that the Kabul government could provide security for the population. 

The challenge of forging an army from scratch proved daunting. 

Doing so in the midst of an ongoing conflict, which put a premium 

on fielding combat units at the expense of staffs and logistical troops, 

made the process even more difficult. In order to accelerate the for-
29

mation of combat units, the plan for the Afghan National Army 

combined individual basic training with unit creation and unit training. Building on the initial method developed by the International 

Security Assistance Force, the program brought together recruits, 

organized them into a battalion (known as a kandak), installed a full 

array of unit leaders, and put the outfit through a training cycle that 

lasted about ten weeks. The greatest problem lay not with teaching 

basic skills to privates—though that proved hard enough in just ten 

weeks—but selecting and tutoring noncommissioned officers, junior 

officers, and battalion commanders. Although there were many veterans available from the militias and even the old Communist-era 

Afghan army, the requirement to balance ethnic backgrounds and 

ascertain loyalty made it problematic to fill out the leadership ranks of 

each battalion. In some cases, members of the same unit had fought 

on opposing sides in previous years. Beyond that, even generals and 

those in the Ministry of Defense had no experience with a reliable and 

respected national army. Their lifetimes had been spent in a system 

where ethnic and tribal ties were the rule and national-level security 

institutions were suspect at best. Every Afghan involved, from private 

soldier to the president, had to not only acquire new skills, but also 

develop a new mind-set. 

A lack of adequate training facilities served to constrain the 

growth of the Afghan military. The Kabul Military Training Center 

on the eastern outskirts of the capital, established in 2002, could only 

be reached by a poorly maintained highway. The base did not have adequate sanitation, a decent mess hall, or heat in most of its dilapidated 

buildings. Trainers relied on cellular telephones with uneven coverage 

to speak with their superiors just a few miles away in the city. Meeting 

face to face, after a slow trip over inadequate roads, continued to be 

the most reliable way to talk. There was one geographic advantage 

at first, as all elements of the effort—the Ministry of Defense, the 

training center, and the Central Corps—were located in the environs 

of the capital. After watching recruits attempt to master Western 

military skills amid cold and squalor on a visit to the training center 

during the harsh winter of 2002–2003, General Eikenberry remarked, 

“This is the Valley Forge of the Afghan National Army.” 

On 30 August 2003, the formal activation of Central Corps, which 

reached a strength of ten thousand soldiers organized into three brigades, took place at Pul-e Charkhi, just east of Kabul. Efforts to field 

the unit at full strength had been thwarted by desertion. By February 

2004, the Afghan National Army numbered only seven thousand, as 

soldiers continued to leave the ranks. Low pay accounted for many 
30

of those who left. As Mohammed Tahir, a platoon sergeant from 

Jalalabad, put it, “If we can’t pay rent, we have to find another job.” 

Arming and equipping the force proved just as difficult. The coalition provided financial support but drew the line at extensive funding for new hardware, particularly in a country awash in Soviet-era 

weapons. In addition to being plentiful, these weapons had the added 

advantage of being familiar to most Afghans, having been in use by 

the old army and the militias for decades. Many Eastern European 

countries were also willing to donate older materiel as they converted 

to more modern Western arms. The Mongolians contributed mobile 

training teams on artillery, Romanians gave instruction on T55 and 

T62 tanks, and Bulgarians sent training crews to teach how to operate 

armored personnel carriers. On the downside, the reliance on donated 

equipment prevented standardization in many areas, exacerbating 

problems with maintenance and spare parts.

Coalition partners contributed in other ways to the building of 

the Afghan National Army. The British created a program to train 

noncommissioned officers. The French established a command and 

general staff course. The Turks assisted in creating a National Military 

Academy in Kabul—the Afghan West Point. Italian teams trained 

the Afghan Central Corps on setting up vehicle checkpoints. The 

different styles among the coalition did not always fit together. For 

example, the French placed less reliance on noncommissioned officers, 

while the British and the Americans viewed them as the backbone of 

their military forces. Since the French played a major role in training 

Afghan officers, the latter developed an attitude about the use of 

noncommissioned officers that U.S. training teams had to work to 

overcome. Over time this problem diminished as Afghans familiar 

with American and British military culture assumed more instructor 

positions in the training and education programs.

In one of its first significant missions, the Central Corps provided 

security for the ratification of the new Afghan constitution in January 2004. The command also secured the opening ceremony for the 

Bagram-to-Kandahar section of the Ring Road, a loop connecting 

the major Afghan population centers of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, 

and Mazar-e Sharif. The Central Corps did these missions with far 

fewer troops than authorized until Task Force Phoenix completed 

training additional battalions in June. Thereafter, new units slowly 

moved out into surrounding provinces as they finished the cycle at 

the Kabul training base. The Afghan army now existed on more than 

just paper but still did not have the capability to take a significant 

role in combat. 
31

Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Militias

As the Afghan National Army slowly formed, the process of disbanding warlord militias got under way. The program, formally titled 

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, was administered 

by the United Nations under the leadership of Japan and managed 

by the Afghan Ministry of Defense, with assistance from other coalition forces. In the case of the warlords who had contributed to 

the Taliban overthrow, they could usually be integrated into the new 

government in some fashion. In a few instances, warlords straddled 

the fence, accepting the Karzai administration while keeping their 

military forces intact and maintaining their regional influence. Some 

also continued to participate in illegal smuggling and drug dealing.

In the autumn of 2003, two warlords vied for control over several 

provinces in northeastern Afghanistan. General Dostum, an ethnic 

Uzbek, controlled the town of Mazar-e Sharif and surrounding areas. 

His rival, Attah Mohammed, was an ethnic Tajik. Both men had 

tanks, artillery, and other heavy weapons. The two factions shelled 

each other near Mazar-e Sharif in early October, killing at least fifty 

fighters. British soldiers responding to the incident positioned their 

vehicles between the two forces to halt the exchange of fire. Minister 

of the Interior Ali Jalali and coalition military officials met with the 

leaders to negotiate a truce. A similar situation occurred in August 

2004 between the governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, and militia commander Amanullah Khan. The Afghan government defused the situation by convincing Ismail Khan to accept a ministerial post in Kabul. 

The United Nations facilitated the process by banning warlords from 

running in the upcoming elections for president and parliament. As 

the presence of coalition troops reduced the potential for wielding 

power through armed force, and the prospects for a legitimate government increased, many militia leaders saw the handwriting on the 

wall and turned in their heavy weapons.

A British officer in the coalition headquarters, Maj. Gen. Peter 

Gilchrist, monitored the effort to make sure that Disarmament, 

Demobilization, and Reintegration remained honest and transparent. By May 2005, the warlords had relinquished most of their 

heavy weapons, with serviceable items helping to equip the Afghan 

National Army. The rest of the process did not always work as well. 

One officer in Afghanistan observed, “We used to call it two big 

‘Ds’ with a little ‘r’ because any significant reintegration plan really 

wasn’t there.” In theory, reintegration provided former fighters with 

alternative skills, such as farming or car repair. Others could join 
32

the Afghan National Army. As of September 2004, about 13,200 

Afghan men had availed themselves of one of these options, but 

estimates of the total number of militia were around 100,000, leaving 

a large number unemployed, still serving a warlord, or relying on 

freelance violence to make a living. Those Afghans who turned to 

banditry often formed into small bands and set up roadblocks in the 

countryside to extort illegal “tolls” from merchants and travelers.

Civil-Military Operations

The civil affairs mission in Afghanistan began on 13 December 

2001 with the creation of the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force in Kabul. Commanded by Army Brig. Gen. David 

E. Kratzer, the task force consisted of a mix of active and reserve 

units, to include elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, 122d 

Rear Operations Command, and 377th Theater Support Command. 

Kratzer’s mission was to help establish good relationships with local 

authorities and the population, in large measure by bringing improvement to their communities. Decades of civil war, neglect, and 

isolation had left the majority of the country’s rural areas severely 

underdeveloped, and the nation’s anemic economy proved insufficient 

to generate the funds necessary for internal developments.

To achieve his mission, General Kratzer split the overall civilmilitary effort into two components. Company C, 96th Civil Affairs 

Battalion, based in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, took responsibility for twelve northern Afghan provinces. Company D, operating 

from Kabul, covered seventeen provinces in the south, including the 

capital. Each company deployed teams of three to five members to 

each province within its area of responsibility. In an effort to emphasize their noncombat orientation, the teams were dubbed coalition 

humanitarian liaison cells (referred to as chicklets based on their 

acronym CHLC). 

The civil affairs teams worked with coalition military forces, the 

United Nations, the interim Afghan government, U.S. government 

agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to evaluate 

humanitarian needs and coordinate assistance projects. In addition to 

dealing with poor roads, uncertain security, and inadequate numbers 

of personnel, the civil affairs teams found their efforts frustrated by 

lack of funds. At the onset, the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and 

Civic Aid program, a high-profile Defense Department fund aiming 

for a quick impact, served as the only available source of money for 

these projects. But the time-consuming bureaucratic procedures that 

had to be followed to access those funds made rapid progress difficult, 
33

especially given the limited manpower available to the task force. 

Later, the civil affairs teams tapped into Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program funds, a proven process, with fewer prerequisites, 

already used in Iraq, which allowed projects to get started faster. 

Lingering issues with roads, security, and lack of personnel would 

require more time and resources to address.

Beginning in March 2002, reserve component Special Forces and 

civil affairs units started to replace their active duty counterparts. 

Growing tensions with Iraq put a premium on these active duty units, 

preventing them from being committed to long-term deployments 

in Afghanistan. The 19th Special Forces Group, a National Guard 

unit from several states, replaced the 5th Special Forces Group. The 

489th Civil Affairs Battalion, an Army Reserve unit from Tennessee, 

replaced the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. At first, the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion did not deploy at full strength due to the belief that 

it would be in Afghanistan briefly, perhaps only until July. As the 

mission expanded, the rest of the unit arrived over the summer, along 

with augmentees from the 401st Civil Affairs Battalion from New 

York. In November, the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion from Riverdale, 

Maryland, took over the mission.

As the reserve civil affairs units began to arrive in theater, they 

discovered that CFLCC in distant Kuwait now authorized them to 

operate only in uncontested areas. For increased security and logistical 

support, the cells were also confined to the same locations as Special 

Forces teams. When CJTF-180 assumed command, its staff had not 

anticipated the wretched conditions in the country or the severity of 

the Afghans’ humanitarian requirements. As reports on the desperate 

needs of the population made their way up the chain of command, 

CJTF-180 expanded the reach of the humanitarian cells, authorizing 

their deployment into more isolated areas. The 489th Civil Affairs Battalion soon established a permanent presence in eleven cities around the 

country.The soldiers often lived off the local economy, leasing vehicles, 

purchasing food, and paying for local labor. Enemy forces responded to 

the increased civil affairs presence by attacking the teams, which began 

taking security details with them when working among the population. 

The 489th Civil Affairs Battalion oversaw the completion of some 

one hundred major projects, including the construction of schools, 

health clinics, hospitals, wells, and irrigation systems during its deployment. The largest project took place in Herat, where soldiers 

hired hundreds of local Afghans to dig out 166 miles of irrigation 

canals. School projects proved popular with the people. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Roland de Marcellus, noted that so many 
34

students, especially girls, wanted an education that teachers had to 

hold classes in shifts. Civil affairs soldiers also distributed food and 

other humanitarian assistance. After an earthquake in Nahrin in the 

northeast, the civil-military task force organized the movement of 

forty-five tons of humanitarian supplies into the area within a 48-

hour period via twenty-four Chinook helicopter sorties.

The humanitarian cells proved so successful that the program 

began to expand at the request of many provincial governors. But 

the small teams were still limited in what they could accomplish, 

often depending on international civilian organizations to undertake 

any long-term projects. The Afghan government and the coalition 

needed a means to do more, especially in areas not fully secure. At 

Central Command, civil affairs and special operations planners, as 

well as representatives from the State Department and the Agency 

for International Development, came up with a new idea. Over the 

summer and autumn of 2002, they developed a model for “joint regional teams.” The CJTF-180’s plans section improved on the initial 

concept, making final decisions on its structure in terms of force 

protection, the civil-military operations centers, and other details. 

The interagency effort resulted in the formation of robust teams 

consisting of sixty military and civilian personnel. The first joint 

teams, created using people already in Afghanistan, however, would 

not follow a rigid table of organization.

In December 2002, Joseph J. Collins, a retired Army colonel serving as deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations, 

announced a program to establish eight to ten of the new joint teams 

across Afghanistan. While their mission mirrored that of existing 

humanitarian cells, it extended further to encompass developing and 

strengthening local governance. The joint teams included security 

elements so that they could operate in volatile areas. In addition, 

they would have better access to quick reaction forces and close air 

support in case of hostile contact. General McNeill, President Karzai, and CENTCOM approved the final composition of the teams. 

President Karzai requested that the name be changed to provincial 

reconstruction team (PRT), which he thought emphasized the civil 

affairs role along with its connection to his government. 

In January 2003, the first PRT went to work in Gardez in Paktiya 

Province on the border with Pakistan. Others colocated with combat 

units manning forward operating bases in key areas across the country, such as Bamyan just west of Kabul, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif 

in the north, Kandahar, and Herat, covering the main ethnic groups 

and former Taliban-held areas. Eventually, coalition partners fielded 
35

their own provincial reconstruction teams. The British took over 

the mission in Mazar-e Sharif and opened a new site in Maimanah 

near Turkmenistan. Germany replaced the U.S. PRT in Kunduz and 

started one in Faizabad in the far northeast. The New Zealanders 

assumed responsibility for Bamyan, and the Netherlands founded a 

team in Pul-e Khumri north of Kabul.

Each provincial reconstruction team’s mission and composition 

differed based on local conditions. As the program developed, the 

standard organizational template consisted of about eighty people 

centered on two civil affairs teams (four soldiers each) and a forceprotection platoon (forty soldiers) as well as support personnel, such 

as cooks, mechanics, and headquarters staff. There might also be military police, a psychological operations team, an explosive ordnance 

detachment, intelligence personnel, and medics. When available, a 

provincial reconstruction team also incorporated representatives 

from the Agency for International Development, the State Department, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Afghan Ministry 

of the Interior. The majority of personnel and support for the PRTs 

came from the military because the armed forces had resources that 

civilian agencies lacked.

A U.S. column moving over poor roads and rough terrain, 

December 2003
36

Command of the provincial reconstruction teams originally fell 

under the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. This 

arrangement led to significant issues whenever the teams operated 

in the same areas as combat troops and Special Forces detachments. 

Since each of these three elements reported through different chains 

of command, it proved difficult to determine which units were conducting operations in a given area. The CJTF-180 staff had to step in 

to synchronize missions and keep all three command chains informed.

As PRTs interacted with the local population, commanders 

observed a recurring pattern. At first, the Afghans appeared apprehensive about the introduction of the team. After the completion of 

several projects the initial uneasiness turned into curiosity and people 

started initiating contact with the team members. Eventually, the 

team developed a level of trust with the local population. One senior 

American general in Afghanistan characterized the appearance of 

the teams as “outposts of hope” in areas that previously had been 

visited by only armed soldiers seeking the enemy. 

The commanders of the initial provincial reconstruction teams 

were told to be “creative” in lieu of formal training. As a result, the 

teams soon tackled a wide variety of tasks to include conducting 

village assessments, identifying projects, and monitoring humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. The early projects focused on 

“quick-impact” activities, such as digging wells, while providing 

other humanitarian-type assistance typical of the work done by aid 

agencies and contractors. Once the immediate needs of the population had been met, the teams moved into longer-term reconstruction 

projects, mentoring local officials and extending the reach of the 

Kabul government into the provinces. They also served a separate 

valuable function for President Karzai, providing another source 

of information that allowed him to better evaluate the situation 

outside Kabul.

Even as the PRTs grew more effective, the coalition’s humanitarian efforts faced continuing challenges. One difficulty for the 

reconstruction team commanders was to manage the expectations 

of the local Afghan population. Although the teams had access to 

various sources of funding, needs far exceeded resources. Moreover, 

Afghanistan had few of the ingredients necessary to build on, such 

as an educated population, trained workers, and basic services such 

as electricity and running water. As one soldier later remarked, “The 

people say we’re in there doing reconstruction. Well, there are days 

that I will tell you we’re in there doing construction.” She explained, 

“There’s no power grid to repair because there was never a power 
37

grid to begin with.” This problem repeated itself again and again as 

U.S. forces engaged in nation building in the truest sense.

Another issue that plagued the provincial reconstruction teams 

arose out of the fact that personalities and relationships played a large 

role in each PRT’s success. The very nature of the teams—a mixture of 

military and civilians from multiple organizations—made it difficult 

to develop unit cohesion among people with different backgrounds 

and objectives. The challenges of working in a foreign culture were 

exacerbated in Afghanistan by the mix of ethnicities, ancient tribal 

and religious mores, decades of devastation and dislocation due to 

war, and antipathy toward outsiders. It took an enthusiastic and perceptive team commander to gain the cooperation of the local elders, 

the local government, and provincial governor to establish priorities 

and foster projects that were most wanted, most needed, and most 

likely to be effective. The division of command also made it vital that 

reconstruction teams collaborate with combat units operating in the 

same terrain, so that the teams could move more freely and gain access 

to more areas. Even under the best of circumstances, it was hard to 

judge the teams’ effectiveness. They could complete small-scale relief 

projects and improve relations with various villages, but transforming those gains into solid support for the Afghan government and 

opposition to the Taliban remained uncertain.

Finally, the PRTs had trouble interacting with the numerous 

nongovernmental organizations operating in Afghanistan. Many of 

the latter had been active in the country for over a decade and took a 

cautious approach to ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom forces’ 

recent combination of military and humanitarian efforts. Several 

NGOs complained that special operations units, as well as members 

of other organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, 

often wore civilian clothes, which made it difficult for Afghans to 

distinguish between NGO personnel and similarly garbed coalition 

personnel. In response, General Kratzer announced in April 2002 

that U.S. troops providing humanitarian assistance while in civilian 

clothes would wear identifying apparel. The new policy did not, 

however, apply to all American or international personnel operating 

in Afghanistan and only partially abated the concerns expressed by 

the NGO community.

The tension between NGOs and coalition forces highlighted the 

unique nature of the conflict. Afghan stability required a combination 

of military and humanitarian assistance in the midst of an active conflict. The need to foster and sustain a legitimate Afghan government 
38

sometimes blurred the lines between these areas, presenting a host 

of challenges to the United States and its international and Afghan 

allies. Unfortunately, while the United States continued to adjust its 

approach to Afghanistan, other events took center stage.

Reorganizing CJTF-180

Beginning in September 2002, the Bush administration began to 

increase diplomatic pressure on Iraq. Escalating diplomatic moves 

were mirrored by the deployment of expanding numbers of U.S. 

and allied troops to Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein failed to meet 

any U.S. deadlines or demands, 148,000 American, 47,000 British, 2,000 Australian, and troops from an assortment of coalition 

nations invaded Iraq with the purpose of overthrowing the Iraqi 

regime. Baghdad fell by 9 April 2003, prompting President Bush 

to declare an end to major combat operations on 1 May. Despite 

the relative ease of initial operations, the Iraq war evolved into a 

protracted struggle requiring the United States and its allies to 

maintain a significantly larger presence there than in Afghanistan. 

For Operation Enduring Freedom, the invasion of Iraq meant that 

the necessity to limit the number of troops and materiel deployed 

to Afghanistan grew more pressing. From 2003 to 2005, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom accounted for almost 90 percent of American forces 

deployed in the region, while Operation Enduring Freedom remained 

at just over 10 percent. The allocation of other resources reflected 

the proportion of troops in each country.

As most Americans focused on developments in Iraq in the 

spring of 2003, CENTCOM implemented another rotation of its 

forces and revision of its command structure in Afghanistan. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division, still under the command of 

General Hagenbeck, began rotating back into the theater in May 

to replace the 82d Airborne Division. Col. William B. “Burke” 

Garrett’s 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, formed the core of 

Task Force Warrior, which included 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry; 

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry; and 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, from 

the 172d Infantry Brigade based in Alaska. After a four-month 

stint with Task Force Phoenix training Afghan forces, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, joined Warrior in November to round out 

the new task force’s ground maneuver forces. The task force also 

included 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry; 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery; 10th Forward Support Battalion; 50th Signal Battalion; 126th 

Finance Battalion; and 3d Battalion, 229th Aviation. Completing 

Warrior were Battery A, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery; 
39

Company A, 41st Engineer Battalion; and Company C, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation. With roughly five thousand soldiers, Warrior

began operations in August 2003 and remained in Afghanistan until 

April to May 2004 (Chart 3).

At the same time it rotated in new combat forces, Central 

Command decided to amalgamate the operational and tactical 

commands into a single echelon by eliminating Combined Joint 

Task Force–82 as a separate headquarters, reverting to the structure prior to creation of CJTF-180. The desire to avoid redundancies and improve efficiency provided the rationale. This enabled 

CENTCOM to maintain what it determined to be adequate forces 

in Afghanistan while still keeping the bulk of its resources available for impending operations in Iraq. For those in CJTF-180, it 

became evident that Afghanistan would remain an economy of 

force campaign in the larger war against terrorism.

In flattening out the command structure in Afghanistan, 

CENTCOM melded the staff of 10th Mountain Division into 

CJTF-180 when it worked alongside General McNeill’s XVIII 

Airborne Corps command echelon until the latter rotated out in 

the fall of 2003. General Hagenbeck became the deputy task force 

commander, while General Vines replaced McNeill as the commanding general on 27 May 2003. It took some time to shake out 

the new arrangement. The 10th Mountain Division had received 

little advance warning of its new role as a joint command and thus 

had little time to prepare for it. In addition, a significant portion 

of its headquarters consisted of individual augmentees, many 

of them reservists who joined the organization in theater and all 

of whom were unfamiliar with the command. Beyond that, the 

merger of two commands and two distinct missions generated its 

own challenges.

The reorganization and new personnel policies reflected the 

continuing difficulty Operation Iraqi Freedom posed for CJTF-180. 

Soldiers involved in Operation Enduring Freedom felt that as the two 

campaigns competed for resources, Afghanistan slipped to secondary status. Iraq became the priority for personnel, funding, materiel, 

leadership, and intelligence resources. CJTF-180’s requests for additional personnel were not approved by CENTCOM. Most of the 

Special Operations Forces, which had played such a vital role since 

October 2001, were diverted to Iraq. The international community 

tried to offset the shortfall by expanding its role in Afghanistan. On 

11 August 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

formally took command of the International Security Assistance 
U.S. Central Command

(General John P. Abizaid)

Combined Joint Task Force–180

(General Vines—10th Mountain Div)*

International Security Assistance Force

(United Nations/North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

Combined Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan

Combined Joint Civil-Military

Operations Task Force

(403d Civil Affairs Bn)

Task Force WARRIOR

(General Hagenbeck/Maj. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III—

1st Bde, 10th Mountain Div)

Task Force PHOENIX

(HQ/2d Bde, 10th Mountain Div)

 *From May to October 2003, the XVIII Airborne Corps and 10th Mountain Division staffs merged to form the Combined Joint Task Force–180 staffuntil the former rotated out.

Tactical controlCoordination

Chart 3—Combined Joint Task Force–180: Second Rotation, May–October 2003
41

Force, which had been providing security in Kabul. In October 2004, 

the NATO-led command assumed responsibility for nine northern 

Afghan provinces. That allowed U.S. forces to concentrate on eastern 

and southern Afghanistan, where a majority of the insurgents were 

located. However, no combined command over both ISAF and CJTF180 existed, and the latter reserved the right to operate anywhere in 

the country. The operational limitations that the European governments placed on their contingents also made it necessary that U.S. 

forces be ready to deploy wherever a threat arose.

Even with these issues, U.S. forces generally worked hand in hand 

with their coalition partners and the Afghans. In July through September 2003, coalition forces conducted Operation Warrior Sweep, 

targeting the infiltration of al-Qaeda fighters from Pakistan into 

Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. A combined 

force of 82d Airborne Division troopers in Task Force Devil, U.S. 

Special Forces detachments, Italian troops in Task Force Nibbio, and 

four battalions of the Afghan National Army worked to cordon off 

and search suspected enemy bases and confiscate weapons. Beginning 

in late July, helicopters inserted American paratroopers into the Ayub 

Khel valley in Paktiya Province at heights of ten thousand feet, so 

they could set up blocking positions. The paratroopers did not encounter enemy forces, but, acting on new intelligence that al-Qaeda 

operatives were in a nearby village, they moved to intercept them. 

With heavy packs, the soldiers hiked six miles over rough ground on 

narrow goat trails to reach the target. Once there, they uncovered 

caches of ammunition and explosives and captured a few suspected 

insurgents, but most had slipped away.

Although coalition and Afghan units augmented U.S. military efforts, a shortage of certain critical skills required U.S. units 

to use manpower in nontraditional ways. For example, explosive 

ordnance disposal detachments accompanied infantry units conducting dismounted patrols. The ordnance disposal soldiers dealt 

with mines, improvised explosive devices, and weapons caches 

along the way instead of remaining at the forward operating base 

until called on. One team leader, Sgt. Brett A. Fisher, recalled 

“humping in the mountains, carrying the packs, walking with 

them, doing these missions that technically we would not do in 

the States.” He remembered a weapons cache his team discovered 

containing six tunnels bored a hundred feet down and full of 

shells and bullets. Most of the ammunition proved unserviceable, but the Ministry of Defense claimed the remainder for the 

Afghan National Army. The work could be extremely dangerous. 
An example of a seized weapons cache
43

On 29 January 2004, a weapons cache exploded just west of the 

city of Ghazni, killing eight U.S. soldiers. It was the largest loss 

of American lives since Operation Anaconda in March 2002. 

Although the coalition swept up tons of weapons and ammunition in the Bagram and Kandahar areas, the efforts had minimal 

impact on enemy stocks. As Brig. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, 

chief of staff at CJTF-180, observed, “Frankly speaking, this 

country is over running with those types of things, so I would 

suspect that we have only scratched the surface of the amount 

that is hidden.”

During the course of 2003, it also became apparent to CJTF180 that the Taliban sought to isolate Kandahar from the capital by 

taking advantage of long-standing tribal rivalries. While President 

Karzai came from the Pashtun Durrani clan, Taliban leader Mullah 

Omar was a member of the Pashtun Ghilzai. In addition to exploiting his natural ties to the Ghilzai, Mullah Omar stoked perceptions 

that Karzai had been favoring his own tribe. General Vines noted 

in September that as many as one thousand Taliban fighters were 

believed to be operating in Zabul Province, northeast of Kandahar. 

To help counter these efforts, the coalition headquarters directed subordinate echelons to place more emphasis on information operations 

and civil-military cooperation. As the Afghan National Army grew 

in size, Vines also encouraged the incorporation of more indigenous 

forces into combat operations.

With the 10th Mountain Division completing its rotation into 

Afghanistan, CJTF-180 devised a series of missions dubbed the 

mountain operations. Operation Mountain Viper began on 25 August 2003 with the goal of combating the growing Taliban insurgency 

in southern and southeastern Afghanistan. Troops from Task Force 

Warrior, Special Operations Forces, and the U.S. Air Force took 

part in the operation. CJTF-180 sent Special Forces detachments 

into the mountains north of Kandahar, where they expected to find 

a small advance party of Taliban fighters. Instead, the teams discovered hundreds of insurgents gathered there. In response, a Special 

Forces unit and one platoon from Task Force Courage—the 2d 

Battalion, 22d Infantry—set up blocking positions in the valley near 

De Daychopan, a district north of Kandahar, as the rest of the task 

force conducted an air assault to flush out the enemy. The Americans 

expected the enemy to retreat into the mountains without a fight. 

Instead, the Taliban stood and fought for the first time since March 

2002. U.S. forces routed the enemy, killing one hundred forty to two 

hundred insurgents.
44

CJTF-180 envisioned a follow-up operation, dubbed Mountain

Viper II, to continue the pursuit. But the joint task force received 

guidance from CENTCOM to focus instead on Kunar and Nuristan 

Provinces in northeastern Afghanistan. Intelligence sources indicated 

that several al-Qaeda and Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leaders might be 

there, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In response to the information, soldiers conducted an air assault into a river valley in Nuristan 

Province within ninety-six hours, keeping pressure on enemy forces 

and denying them stable access to the area.

Operation Mountain Resolve began on 6 November 2003. One 

participant, Sgt. Carl A. Ashmead of Company B, 2d Battalion, 22d 

Infantry, explained, “Our job was to helicopter into the base of the 

valley and move up it, and basically flush any ACM [anticoalition 

military] out left, right, and forward, into these JSOAs [joint special 

operations areas] where the special operators would get them.” The 

heliborne movement occurred at night into a zone secured by Task 

Force Catamount, the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The landing zone 

was a terraced field, which caused problems for the all-terrain vehicles 

the soldiers brought to haul supplies. The men endured slippery conditions in the rain, while walking narrow goat trails wide enough for 

only a single person. The troops traveled across about thirty miles of 

mountainous terrain in five days to reach their objectives. The operation 

showed that American soldiers were becoming accustomed to the physical requirements that Afghanistan demanded. One officer explained,

Soldier endurance was a highlight throughout the operation. The 

average soldier walked approximately 50 kilometers with a 100-pound 

load over the worst terrain that Afghanistan has to offer. He then 

conducted night security, search and attack operations, and patrols 

over a six-day period without fail. . . . They did this with supplies of 

one MRE [meals, ready to eat] and as little as three quarts of water 

in extreme temperatures of heat and cold.

After the soldiers climbed two thousand feet to reach the villages 

overlooking the valley, companies conducted search operations in 

nearby towns, interviewing residents for information on enemy activities in the area and seizing weapons caches and components for 

improvised explosive devices. Though Mountain Resolve did not 

inflict significant casualties on the enemy, the soldiers achieved their 

objectives of denying the area as a winter base of operations to the 

enemy and forcing enemy fighters to remain on the move when they 

were more likely to be captured or killed.
45

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan Takes Over

Over the summer and autumn of 2003, the stress of having a 

single headquarters responsible for the full spectrum of command 

and control, from the tactical to the strategic, again became apparent. CJTF-180’s attention span ranged from small-unit skirmishes in 

the mountains to dealings with President Karzai and the leaders of 

surrounding nations. With the bulk of its staff coming from Hagenbeck’s headquarters, CJTF focused on what it knew best—the tactical 

level. The departure of the remaining XVIII Airborne Corps staff in 

the fall exacerbated the problem. Brig. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, the 

assistant division commander (maneuver) for the 3d Infantry Division in Iraq until June 2003, arrived in September to replace General 

Hagenbeck as 10th Mountain Division commander. When General 

Vines departed in October 2003 for medical reasons, Austin assumed 

temporary command of all operations in Afghanistan.

In the late summer of 2003, General John P. Abizaid, who took 

over Central Command from General Franks in July, asked Lt. 

Gen. David W. Barno to establish a senior-level headquarters in 

Afghanistan. Designated Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan 

(CFC-A), its mission was to take over politico-military functions, 

A gun position in an Afghan village, December 2003
46

build good relationships with both the U.S. Embassy and the Afghan 

national government, and coordinate with the International Security 

Assistance Force. CJTF-180 would focus on tactical operations, performing once again as a normal division headquarters.

Establishing CFC-A posed several challenges. General Barno arrived in November 2003 and set up his headquarters in Kabul within 

the U.S. Embassy compound with only six people. This initial attempt 

to operate with a skeletal staff, while relying on CJTF-180 at Bagram 

Air Base for further support, proved unsuccessful. Barno described 

this minimalist approach to creating a new command echelon as “the 

instant coffee model. Just add water and it springs out of the ground.” 

The only saving grace came from the fact that half of the officers had 

served in his battalion in the 82d Airborne Division a decade earlier. 

That familiarity allowed them to “cut through all kinds of bureaucratic 

inertia in all the getting to know you and forming and storming things 

because we already knew and trusted each other and understood how 

each other thought and operated.” Realizing that he needed to build 

a full-fledged headquarters, Barno began drawing personnel from 

CJTF-180, which in turn placed additional strains on that headquarters.

The CFC-A staff soon drafted a document that outlined manpower requirements for the headquarters, but the process of obtaining personnel proved difficult. Because CFC-A headquarters was 

competing with Iraq and its own combat forces for qualified active 

duty personnel, the Defense Department decided to staff the new 

headquarters with individual ready reservists, some of whom had 

not been on active duty in years. “I couldn’t even get SAMS—School 

of Advanced Military Studies—graduates,” Barno stated, “and I 

even asked the chief of staff personally for that at one point in time 

with no results.” Meanwhile, the Army’s peacetime personnel system 

continued to send those same graduates to units deployed elsewhere. 

CFC-A tried to rely on coalition partners to make up the shortfalls, 

designating as many as one hundred staff positions for coalition 

people, but other nations only filled twenty-five to thirty billets at a 

time. About four to five months after Joint Forces Command validated CFC-A’s requirements in late 2004, the U.S. military services 

began sending quality personnel in sufficient numbers. However, it 

took almost eighteen months to fill out the headquarters. By May 

2005, over four hundred soldiers staffed the command.

General Barno believed that both the process of creating a combined and joint organization and the quality of available staff would 

have been much improved had a standing Army headquarters been 

tasked to serve as the nucleus. On the other hand, he acknowledged the 
47

limitations of the one-year-rotation policy on any type of unit deployed 

to Afghanistan. “Every twelve months, it’s the first day of school. . . . 

Everybody’s trying to find their lunch box and get their rain jacket and 

discover where their shoes are, when we already knew all those things 

six months earlier.” While a standing Army headquarters would have 

to cope with the frictions caused by rotation, the procedure used to 

fill Barno’s staff compounded that problem by assigning individuals, 

instead of a cohesive group, to his staff. 

Another issue for the new headquarters concerned security restrictions on coalition personnel. Americans conducted their work 

on a classified Internet system and often accessed documents classified as secret/NOFORN, which meant the information could not 

be released to foreign nationals. Although the coalition staff had 

use of a parallel system, Americans often did not transfer material 

to it. This posed problems both within the headquarters and with 

subordinate commands. An Italian unit, for example, could not 

receive intelligence despite operating with U.S. forces. Sometimes 

the results bordered on the absurd, except for the very real impact. 

In one case, a British officer could not read intelligence designated 

NOFORN, even though the original material had come to the 

United States from the United Kingdom. Only in May 2005 did 

key coalition staff receive restricted access to the secure American 

Internet network.

Shift in Mission Focus

One of General Barno’s first priorities was reevaluating the operational situation. As Barno saw it, the information available to him 

slanted toward a military view of the situation, often described as 

kinetic operations. Units made extensive reports of combat activities 

but did not have the expertise to assess the political and economic 

status of the areas in which they worked. What the commander of 

CFC-A really wanted to know was “the nuance there, what was the 

environment, what was the sense, and what was happening.” Barno 

could get information on combat operations, but he could not find 

out who was the chief of a particular village, whose side the chief 

preferred at the moment, and what opportunities there were to better 

the lives of his people. Barno found that the best information came 

from the PRTs’ State Department representatives, who spent extended 

periods in a specific region collecting intelligence and building relationships with the people. Barno believed that for the coalition to be 

successful its tactical units needed to develop these same connections 

with the Afghan people.
48

After reviewing the situation on the ground, Barno determined 

that Afghanistan “was at a point of transition—a strategic fork in 

the road.” He concluded that the initial post–11 September strategy, 

which focused on combating terrorists and their supporters, seemed 

less applicable in the wake of growing efforts by the Taliban to topple 

Karzai from power. Barno consequently called for a change in coalition military emphasis from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency. 

In addition to combat operations, the coalition needed to help the 

Kabul government protect the Afghan people while persuading 

them to join the fight against the enemy. He summarized the new 

course: “My focus was on the people of Afghanistan. The people of 

Afghanistan were the center of gravity.”

At the time, the U.S. Army did not have an updated doctrine for 

this type of campaign, and Barno admitted, “None of us really had 

much of any training on the counterinsurgency business.” To fill in 

the slate, he went back to basics, starting with his 1974-edition history 

textbook from the United States Military Academy at West Point, 

which described counterrevolutionary warfare. Some Army units 

ordered books on the subject, including the Marine Corps’ Small 

Wars Manual, first published in 1935, and John Nagl’s Learning to 

Eat Soup with a Knife, printed in 2002. General Barno also sought a 

British deputy since he believed that nation had considerable counterinsurgency experience. However, not everyone felt disadvantaged 

with the lack of official doctrine. The chief of staff of CFC-A, Col. 

David W. Lamm, believed “we were blessed by the absence of existing 

doctrine” because that allowed initiative to flourish.

The changing mission focus necessitated a fundamental shift in 

operations and unit deployments. Previously units had sallied forth 

from bases to search for the enemy in a designated location selected 

as a result of available intelligence. They might sweep one region in a 

given week and helicopter into an entirely different one far away the 

next month. Now General Barno assigned each unit responsibility 

for an area of operations—for the most part aligned with the political boundaries of provinces and districts—where it would operate 

for its entire tour in country. The switch not only allowed a company 

or battalion to become familiar with the terrain, but also made it 

possible for soldiers to develop relationships with the local leaders 

and people. And those ties permitted the coalition to tap a previously overlooked source of intelligence needed to wage a successful 

counterinsurgency campaign.

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan summarized General Barno’s new emphasis in a formal campaign plan designed to 
49

govern operations for the next five years. It consisted of five “pillars” of operation. Counterinsurgency operations constituted one 

pillar, with the effort focused on turning the population away from 

supporting the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. A 

second involved the familiar goal of building the Afghan National 

Army and the Afghan National Police. Establishing area ownership 

for coalition forces constituted the third, while the fourth repeated 

the earlier emphasis on building good governance and extending the 

reach of the Afghan central government into the provinces. Finally, 

General Barno himself would handle the fifth pillar, engaging the 

regional states: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 

A critical feature that enabled General Barno’s strategic shift and 

assignment of areas of operations was the decrease in violence during 2003. At the beginning of Task Force Warrior’s deployment, it 

engaged primarily in direct combat with limited opportunity to build 

a relationship with the local population. Although the northern 

part of Afghanistan remained calm, violence often erupted in the 

southern and eastern areas of the country. A year later, conditions 

quieted down enough so that the troops could balance their time 

between combat operations and humanitarian assistance. With less 

than fourteen thousand troops in Afghanistan at the beginning of 

2004, the coalition had to spread its forces very thin to maintain 

a visible presence in the Afghan provinces. In some instances, a 

battalion task force (roughly eight hundred soldiers) had responsibility for a 2,000-square-mile region. This dispersion required 

significantly more preparation by tactical units before they could 

perform large-scale counterinsurgency operations but did enable 

them to maintain a small but consistent presence throughout the 

provinces. Barno’s goal was to create a level of comfort and trust 

between Afghan civilians and coalition forces that could be developed into positive relationships. By balancing offensive operations, 

humanitarian projects, and intelligence gathering, General Barno 

hoped to produce stable environments within the provinces that 

would not support renewed Taliban infiltration. At the same time, 

however, the low density of coalition troops meant that they would 

not be able to provide sustained security in the remote villages that 

defined Afghanistan.

One of the first operations conducted under the new campaign 

plan focused on furnishing security for the December 2003 loya 

jirga, which met in Kabul to agree on a constitution. Maj. Gen. 

Lloyd J. Austin III, the CJTF-180 commander, sought to prevent 

the Taliban from disrupting the gathering. As a result, CJTF-180 
50

settled on Operation Mountain Avalanche as a means to pressure the enemy across a six-province zone. The plan called for Task 

Force Warrior to focus on Taliban forces operating in and around 

Kandahar while special operations units targeted Hizb-e-Islami 

Gulbuddin groups in Kunar Province along the Pakistan border. 

More than two thousand U.S. and Romanian troops conducted 

patrols and searches, uncovering several weapons caches that included tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, as well as 

improvised explosive devices. Coalition forces also killed ten enemy 

fighters and detained over one hundred people suspected of ties to 

the insurgents, enabling the constitutional loya jirga to complete 

its work without disruption.

Task Force Warrior conducted two other major operations 

involving thousands of troops scouring the countryside during 

its rotation: Mountain Blizzard in January 2004 and Mountain

Storm in March. These operations disrupted enemy lines of communications stretching between Zabul and Kandahar Provinces to 

safe havens in Pakistan. Mountain Storm, the final operation by 

Warrior, focused on establishing suitable security conditions for the 

Afghan presidential election scheduled for the fall of 2004. Coalition 

forces, including the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit and Afghan 

National Army units, coordinated a hammer-and-anvil operation, 

where Pakistani troops drove the enemy into stationary ambushes set 

up by coalition troops in Afghanistan. Unfortunately for the coalition, the Pakistan Army proved less than capable. The movement of 

as many as twenty-five thousand Pakistani troops into North and 

South Waziristan led to significant casualties for those forces. The 

operations mirrored Pakistan’s efforts in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, where government forces launched a series of incursions in the spring of 2004. Though the efforts produced hundreds 

of enemy casualties, the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership survived 

and maintained their presence in the region. The Pakistani offensives 

followed a sad pattern in which early enthusiasm quickly collapsed 

due to high casualties, forcing President Pervez Musharraf to seek 

truces with various tribes in Waziristan and the tribal areas. Circumstances had compelled the two sides to cooperate, but relations 

between Pakistan and the United States continued to be strained.

On the whole, however, U.S. efforts in southern and eastern Afghanistan followed a typical pattern by the spring of 2004. Following 

an operation to clear an area, civil affairs teams would come to deliver 

food, build a well, or offer other assistance. Medical teams provided 

care to villagers and their animals. Chaplains visited with local 
51

religious leaders. Psychological operations units transmitted radio 

programs and distributed leaflets to the population. The broadcasts 

did not reach everywhere, however, allowing the Taliban to spread 

propaganda almost unopposed in some areas.

Coalition casualties remained low during these operations in 

2002 through 2004, with an average of five deaths per month (both 

combat and nonbattle). However, one loss stood out in the public eye. 

Patrick D. “Pat” Tillman had gained national attention in 2002 when 

he gave up a multimillion dollar National Football League contract 

with the Arizona Cardinals to enlist in the Army. By the spring of 

2004, he and his brother Kevin were serving with the 2d Battalion, 

75th Ranger Regiment. On 22 April, Private Tillman’s platoon had 

been delayed in its mission to search a village by a broken-down highmobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. To complete the assignment 

before dusk, half the unit moved out toward the objective, while the 

rest followed with the disabled vehicle in tow. Shortly after departing, 

the lead element (including Tillman) lost communications with the 

slower group. Insurgents then ambushed the latter. Hearing the sound 

of firing, Tillman and others rushed back to the top of a nearby hill 

to provide cover. He and an Afghan soldier were killed by friendly 

troops who mistook them for enemy fighters.

The Army’s initial public announcement claimed that Tillman 

died as a result of enemy action. He was awarded a Silver Star and 

promoted to corporal, even though some senior leaders had reason 

to doubt the veracity of initial reports. The Tillman family did not 

receive notification of the investigations or the final determination 

that he died due to friendly fire until thirty-five days after Tillman’s 

death, despite Army regulations stating that next of kin be notified 

as new information became available. Members of Tillman’s unit 

and chain of command violated Army protocols for processing and 

reporting the incident. Investigations brought the true story out, but 

not before causing additional pain to the Tillman family and chagrin 

for the Army. The affair embarrassed the Bush administration while 

providing critics of the war with additional ammunition.

In addition to the Tillman case, the changing nature of the 

conflict that accompanied the shift in mission focus was not always 

positive for the coalition. As the enemy grew to understand the rules 

of engagement, he exploited those restrictions. One of the regulations 

prohibited Army forces from crossing into Pakistan, so insurgents 

launched rockets or mortar rounds from Afghan territory before 

retreating over the border to safety. Another rule prohibited firing 

on unarmed persons. In one case, four Taliban ambushed a convoy 
52

with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, prompting soldiers 

to call for air support. By the time helicopter gunships arrived, the 

fighters had discarded their weapons and were walking down a hill, 

preventing the pilots from engaging them. The ground convoy located and detained the men, but in the absence of weapons or other 

conclusive evidence, it was an open question how long they would 

remain prisoners. Events such as this prompted the chief of staff of 

CJTF-180, Brig. Gen. Byron S. Bagby, to give the Taliban forces their 

due: “They are a living, breathing, and thinking enemy.”

Reorganizing Under Combined Joint Task Force–76

Between February and April 2004, the 25th Infantry Division 

from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, replaced the 10th Mountain 

Division as the combined joint task force and provided a number 

of individual augmentees to Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan. In recognition of the transfer and in a nod to the year 

of American independence, CJTF-180 changed its designation to 

Combined Joint Task Force–76 (CJTF-76). The 25th Infantry Division commander, Maj. Gen. Eric T. Olson, assumed command of 

CJTF-76 on 15 April.

According to General Barno’s plan for deploying coalition 

forces, CJTF-76 divided its area of responsibility into two main 

sectors, now called regional commands. On 6 May 2004, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, conducted a transfer of authority 

with 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Task Force Warrior), 

at Kandahar airfield. With the additional forces already at Kandahar, the 3d Brigade transformed into Combined Task Force 

Bronco under the command of Col. Richard N. Pederson. It 

included the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry; the Romanian 280th 

Infantry Battalion; the French Special Operations Task Group 

Ares; two Afghan National Army battalions; and four provincial 

reconstruction teams. Containing over three thousand soldiers and 

headquartered at Kandahar airfield, Bronco had Regional Command South (RC South) as its area of responsibility, encompassing 

Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Paktiya, Khost, 

Paktika, and Daykundi Provinces.

Responsibility for Regional Command East (RC East) originally 

fell to the 6th Marines. The area of operations included Bamyan, 

Parwan, Kapisa, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman, Kabul, Wardak, Logar, 

Nangarhar, and Ghazni Provinces. The 25th Infantry Division Artillery headquarters, commanded by Col. Gary H. Cheek, took over 

RC East in June 2004. It formed Combined Task Force Thunder, 
53

composed of 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (with the addition of 3d 

Battalion, 116th Infantry, 29th Infantry Division, in July and the 1st 

Battalion, 505th Infantry, in September); 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; 

three Afghan National Army battalions; a military police platoon; 

eight provincial reconstruction teams, including a New Zealand 

reconstruction team; and Logistics Task Force 524. The primary 

mission for the four thousand soldiers in Thunder was to stem the 

growing stream of weapons and Taliban recruits flowing into northeastern Afghanistan from Pakistan (Chart 4).

The 25th Division Artillery headquarters’ deployment to Afghanistan was the first instance of a field artillery fires brigade deployed as 

a maneuver headquarters. It brought over only one battery—Battery 

F, 7th Field Artillery—which carried 120-mm. mortars instead of 

its standard 155-mm. howitzers. The battery returned to 155-mm. 

howitzers in August 2004. Because of the differences in the table of 

organization and equipment between an artillery and infantry brigade 

headquarters, the divisional artillery saw its staff grow to include all 

elements necessary to undertake a nonstandard mission.

The situation in Afghanistan’s western provinces proved less tumultuous in early 2004. The 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and Company 

B, 193d Aviation, initially took over responsibility for the area as 

Combined Task Force Saber. When tensions between rival warlords 

increased in September, CJTF-76 created a third area of operations, 

designated as Regional Command West (RC West), to monitor activities in Herat, Farah, Ghor, and Badghis Provinces. All but one 

of these provinces bordered Iran. Three Afghan National Army 

battalions and two provincial reconstruction teams were added to 

Saber, creating a 2,400-strong force, renamed Combined Task Force 

Longhorn, under the command of Col. Phillip Bookert. Bookert’s 

command would stabilize the region and pave the way for its eventual 

transfer to ISAF control.

Afghanistan presented a conceptual change for the 25th Infantry 

Division. Prior to its deployment, the division had concentrated on 

training for conventional operations. Once in Afghanistan, the division’s officers had to rethink how they would operate to ensure the 

actions of their units supported Barno’s focus on counterinsurgency. 

As Brig. Gen. Bernard S. Champoux, the assistant division commander (operations) for the 25th Division who was serving as the 

deputy commanding general of CJTF-76, explained,

I think, initially, we didn’t understand the insurgency. I think we thought 

we were going to go kill/capture and defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda 
U.S. Central Command

(General Abizaid)

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

(Lt. Gen. David W. Barno)

International Security

Assistance Force

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

Combined Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan

Combined Joint Task Force–180/Combined Joint Task Force–76*

(General Vines/General Austin—10th Mountain Div)/(Maj. Gen. Eric T. Olson—25th Inf Div)

Combined Task Force BRONCO

(HQ/3d Bde, 25th Inf Div)

[February 2004–April 2005]

Combined Task

 Force THUNDER

(Div Arty, 25th Inf Div)

[February 2004–April 2005]

Task Force WARRIOR

(HQ/1st Bde, 10th Mountain Div)

[Rotated out May 2004]

Combined

Task Force COYOTE

(Engrs)

Task Force PHOENIX

(HQ/45th Inf Bde [Separate])

[November 2003–August 2004]

(HQ/76th Inf Bde [Separate])

[August 2004–August 2005]

Task Force WINGS

(HHC/Aviation Bde, 25th Inf Div)

Combined Task Force SABER

(3d Squadron, 4th Cav)

*This changeover occurred in April 2004.

Tactical controlCoordination

Chart 4—Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan: First Rotation, October 2003–April 2005
55

and Hekmatyar. In a short window of about sixty days, we really started 

rethinking all of those things. . . . Really, what we were confronted with 

was voter registration and this election, and then the inauguration and 

the constitution. Those are the things that became measures of success, 

not how many Taliban we killed and captured, or al Qaeda.

By late summer, the 25th Division’s task forces were using 

the traditional “ink spot” or “oil stain” operating method when 

they could. Troops pushed out from the division’s larger garrisons 

around Kandahar by establishing smaller forward operating bases 

in contested areas, initially the southern and eastern provinces. Once 

several smaller bases were established, the soldiers began conducting 

progressively overlapping patrols in order to deny the enemy access 

to the local population. 

In July 2004, General Barno decided to transfer responsibility 

for Paktika, Khost, and Paktiya Provinces from RC South to RC 

East to balance out the territory between the regional commands. 

The combined task forces exercised operational control over every 

unit in their zone—ground, air, and logistics—with the exception 

of Special Operations Forces, which still came under the Combined 

Joint Special Operations Task Force. The Special Operations Forces 

elements were careful to coordinate with the brigade commanders 

whenever they worked in those zones. In addition to conducting 

combat operations, the brigade task forces mentored and worked 

with recently deployed Afghan security forces, fostered civil-military 

relations with the Afghan population, and cooperated with other 

government agencies in an attempt to increase popular support for 

the Afghan government. 

General Barno decided that setting conditions for a successful 

Afghan presidential election would be the main effort in 2004. He 

requested and received additional troops for that mission, and by June 

U.S. forces numbered around eighteen thousand, up from just under 

ten thousand a year before. The International Security Assistance 

Force also grew in size. A Spanish light infantry battalion served as 

a quick reaction force stationed in Mazar-e Sharif, while the Italians 

added a battalion as the theater’s reserve. In addition to fixed- and 

rotary-wing aviation units, NATO designated the 1st Battalion, 63d 

Armor, based in Vilseck, Germany, to serve as an on-call reserve if 

required by ISAF.

CJTF-76 dubbed the operation to secure the presidential election 

Lightning Resolve. Coalition forces conducted joint security operations with the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and 
56

the United Nations, as all parties prepared for the election. They also 

met with local elders, religious leaders, and officials to involve them 

in the election process and the security of the elections. Not surprisingly, insurgent forces attempted to undermine voter registration. 

In July 2004, an improvised explosive device planted in a mosque in 

Ghazni Province killed two United Nations employees registering 

voters. Other problems hampered election preparations. The Afghan 

government’s limited infrastructure, the paucity of trained personnel, and security concerns throughout the country caused delays in 

voter registration. The slow rate of disarmament, demobilization, 

and reintegration also created fears within the coalition that the election could spark organized opposition. As a result of these concerns 

and the need to provide more time to register voters and disarm the 

militias, the Afghan interim government postponed the presidential 

election from June until September and then again until October, and 

the parliamentary elections were rescheduled for the following spring.

The focus on preventing Taliban interference in the elections 

also influenced the use of the Special Operations Forces. There were 

only twenty-five of its operational detachments alpha in the country 

at that time, totaling about two hundred fifty men. In April 2004, 

CJTF-76 directed the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 

to disrupt the movement of insurgents and materiel from Pakistan 

into Afghanistan under the code name Operation Ticonderoga. 

The directive called for the special operations task force to shift assets from the interior of the country to the eastern border areas, in 

coordination with operations by the Pakistani military in Waziristan 

and the tribal areas. In Regional Commands East and South, Special 

Forces operated out of fire bases along the boundary with Pakistan. 

In order to move into Paktika Province, the Special Forces teams had 

to assault and reoccupy abandoned camps near Shkin and Lwara.

From 30 September until 10 October 2004, Special Operations 

Forces elements conducted Operation Trenton to preempt enemy 

attempts to disrupt the elections. On 8 October, the day before the 

voting, about two hundred Taliban attacked a Special Forces base 

camp in the Deh Rawod District of Uruzgan Province. The teams 

returned fire and called in air support, killing about seventy fighters. 

The enemy also rocketed Special Operations Forces positions along 

the Pakistan border. The Americans responded with artillery, killing 

a number of insurgents. A short while later, another force of about 

twenty Taliban crossed the border into Zabul Province to link up with 

fighters already inside Afghanistan, but a Special Forces detachment 

directed bombing missions that destroyed the group.
57

Election day arrived on 9 October 2004. United Nations personnel had registered 10.8 million voters, about 42 percent of them 

women, and they turned out in large numbers to cast their ballots. 

In Bamyan, citizens lined up in the snow five hours ahead of the 

opening of the poll station. Although officials expected the Taliban 

to do their utmost to disrupt the process, only a handful of attacks 

took place with approximately one hundred sixty planned attacks 

thwarted. At the end of the day, coalition forces worked with the 

Afghans to move the balloting materials and secure the counting 

places. As expected, Hamid Karzai won the election. He took office 

in December, with coalition military units assisting Afghan security 

forces protect the ceremony.

Searching for Stability

After the presidential inauguration, U.S. and coalition forces 

launched several operations in RCs South and East, each lasting 

from three to ten days, in support of the next phase of the electoral 

process that called for parliamentary elections. Generally, if Army 

forces did not encounter resistance when entering an area they immediately transitioned to conducting civil affairs assessments and 

providing humanitarian aid. Despite the overall success of these 

operations, the parliamentary elections were again postponed until September 2005. The justification for the decision was to give 

the government more time to finalize logistics, such as producing 

a more accurate census and developing a clearer ballot. However, 

news reports pointed to growing security concerns as an alternative 

explanation.

The slow process of building up the Afghan National Army contributed to public fears regarding security for the parliamentary elections. Through the end of 2003, the coalition training regimen formed 

and trained one Afghan battalion at a time. With a ten-week cycle, 

that meant only about five new battalions a year. Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld asked the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan to 

accelerate this process so the coalition could hand off responsibility 

for security to the Afghans more quickly. During 2004, the training 

system expanded to produce multiple battalions simultaneously. By 

March 2005, 18,300 Afghan soldiers had graduated (totaling roughly 

31 battalions), or about 42 percent of the authorized end strength 

of 43,000 personnel.

While the expansion of the Afghan National Army gradually accelerated, it focused on infantry battalions, leaving their facilities and 

supporting logistical system underdeveloped. The army had quickly 
58

developed shortages in uniforms, serviceable equipment, weapons, 

vehicles, and habitable barracks, among other necessities. Afghan 

units deployed in the field lacked a functioning logistical system, so 

Task Force Phoenix had to step in to fill the gap on an ad hoc basis. 

Accelerated instruction also taxed the training teams. Producing additional battalionsrequired more teams, but increased staffing did not 

arrive quickly, forcing reassignment of personnel from other duties 

and a decrease in the size of teams from sixteen members to twelve.

Other factors also degraded the Afghan National Army’s combat 

effectiveness. Without a banking system, Afghan soldiers periodically took leave to deliver money to their families. Frequently, they 

remained at home past their authorized leave time to help harvest a 

crop or meet other needs. These absences created uncertainty about 

the present-for-duty strength of Afghan units, as some soldiers returned after an extended delay while others never came back. During 

its first two years, the Afghan National Army’s desertion rate averaged 

around 20 percent, dropping into the teens over the next two years. 

Therefore, while the Afghan National Army’s overall performance 

slowly improved, the main task of providing security and humanitarian assistance and building support for the national government 

remained with the coalition.

As systemic problems continued to plague coalition efforts to create the Afghan National Army, General Barno strove to counteract 

any perceptions of a faltering local government by expanding the 

provincial reconstruction team program. Since there were too few civil 

affairs personnel to meet the need, he disbanded the Combined Joint 

Civil-Military Operations Task Force headquarters and dispersed 

most of its personnel to the new provincial reconstruction teams. By 

the spring of 2004, Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan had increased the number of teams operating around Afghanistan to twelve, 

with the newest ones in the southern part of the country where the 

Taliban proved most active. The dissolution of the civil-military task 

force had the added benefit of consolidating the chain of command, 

since operational control of the teams now resided with the regional 

commands. The transition proved difficult for some teams, with one 

team falling under six different commands in a six-month period.

By the summer of 2004, the relationship between provincial reconstruction teams and civilian agencies had matured, and both worked 

cooperatively to complete larger projects. In the city of Lashkar Gah 

in Helmand Province, the Agency for International Development 

funded school-building projects, while the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program provided money for books, desks, chairs, carpets, 
59

and computers. In a similar fashion, the Agency for International 

Development built medical clinics, the World Bank arranged for staff 

and some equipment, and the provincial reconstruction team paid to 

refurbish existing clinics and distribute more medical equipment. The 

reconstruction team commander also funded police stations, road 

construction, and buildings for the Women’s Association, among 

other projects.

For all the good the reconstruction teams did, they did not do as 

much as desired. In a culture where personal rapport was critically 

important, frequent turnover in personnel hampered good relationships with local leaders. The pressure to show quick results sometimes 

influenced the choice of projects or methods in ways that favored 

short-term outcomes over long-term progress. On occasion, structures 

and equipment were put in place even though the local population 

did not have the skills or money to maintain them on their own. 

The small size of the teams, the country’s poor infrastructure, harsh 

terrain and weather, and the fragile security environment meant that 

reconstruction teams often had the ability to affect the lives of only 

a few Afghans in nearby areas. The provincial reconstruction team 

concept was sound, but there simply were not enough people, money, 

and time to realize its full potential. They remained selectively useful 

but insufficient to meet the country’s huge needs.

Afghan women and children awaiting medical care, March 2004
60

The Calm Before the Storm

In the winter of 2004–2005, the Taliban went to ground, as irregular Afghan fighters had traditionally done for centuries. With 

the onset of the early spring thaw, the Taliban resumed operations. 

In February 2005, fighters launched three attacks against coalition 

forces in southeastern Afghanistan. They ambushed an Afghan National Army patrol in Helmand Province and detonated a roadside 

bomb and employed small arms against an American unit in Kandahar Province. The insurgents also attacked ground troops in Khost 

Province in order to fire on responding helicopters. But after years of 

adapting to the situation in Afghanistan, coalition forces responded 

to these new attacks by stepping up their own activity. A Romanian 

battalion, which had performed only base security for Kandahar 

airfield after the formation of Combined Task Force Bronco in 

May 2004, began conducting mounted patrols in RC South. Some 

Romanian patrols involved overnight stays in Uruzgan Province and 

eastern Helmand Province because the unit, with vehicles dating to the 

1970s, could not operate effectively in the heat of the day. In another 

example, U.S. artillery batteries in RC South divided into two-gun 

sections and deployed into austere forward operating bases from 

which they could provide fire support to Special Operations Forces 

A soldier hands out school supplies to Afghan children, March 2004.
61

and other units. The artillerymen not only manned their pieces, but 

also served as infantry if called on to operate on foot beyond the 

fire bases.

In 2005, the Afghan National Army also began to take a wider 

role in combat operations. An Afghan battalion led Operation Nam

Dong in Uruzgan Province in April, with Special Forces advisers 

assisting the unit in establishing a command post and directing fire 

missions. That same month, the 1st Kandak (Afghan battalion), 3d 

Brigade, conducted Operation Minesweeper with coalition forces 

around Herat and Shindand. The Afghan soldiers searched homes, 

uncovering weapons caches and capturing a suspected local anticoalition militia leader.

The increasing presence of Afghan troops contributed to the 

population’s willingness to aid coalition forces. Between February 

2004 and February 2005, the number of weapons caches reported 

by Afghans almost doubled and accounted for 43 percent of all such 

stocks uncovered by the coalition. The overall number of improvised 

explosive devices turned in by Afghans rose 30 percent from summer 2004 to spring 2005, totaling 90 percent of all roadside bomb 

discoveries. The quantity and quality of intelligence coming from 

local civilians, police, and military provided tangible evidence that 

U.S. and coalition forces were achieving some results in Afghanistan. 

In an example of the overall expansion of coalition efforts in 

early 2005, Army engineers moved beyond base construction projects to take a greater role in civil development. Elements from the 

National Guard rebuilt a segment of the highway between Kandahar and Tarin Kot in Uruzgan Province, which formed part of the 

Ring Road. The Agency for International Development funded the 

project, and, though security concerns prevented civilians from building parts of it, American engineers trained their Afghan National 

Army counterparts on the project and also used local contractors 

when possible. Completion of that section of the highway reduced 

driving time between the two cities from eighteen hours to five. 

Afterward, Combined Task Force Bronco troops began mentoring 

local Afghan National Police and the highway patrol, teaching them 

how to establish checkpoints and protect travelers. Although security 

along some roads improved, the Afghan population remained wary 

of displaying any public sign of support for the coalition and the 

Afghan National Army. 

On 15 March 2005, the Army commenced its sixth major rotation 

of forces in Afghanistan. Southern European Task Force from U.S. 

Army, Europe, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya, began 
62

replacing the 25th Infantry Division as CJTF-76. The new command 

was composed of two combined task forces. The 173d Airborne 

Brigade from Vicenza, Italy, commanded by Col. Kevin C. Owens, 

became Combined Task Force Bayonet and took over RC South. It 

included 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery; 74th Infantry Detachment (Long Range Surveillance); and the 

173d Support Battalion. The other task force, Combined Task Force 

Devil, took over responsibility for RC East. Commanded by Col. 

Patrick J. Donahue II, Combined Task Force Devil formed around 

1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and included 1st Battalion, 325th 

Infantry; 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, 

173d Airborne Brigade; and the 3d Battalion, 141st Infantry, Texas 

Army National Guard (Chart 5). Several Marine battalions also rotated 

through, and a special operations group and aviation units provided 

additional support. Responsibility for a fourth regional command, RC 

North, which had been created in October 2004 under ISAF and the 

Germans, changed hands in May 2005 when Italian forces took over. 

Although already organized to operate as a joint headquarters, 

General Kamiya’s command, composed of two hundred Army personnel, had to expand to over seven hundred to meet its new commitment. That increase, with about 30 percent drawn from the other 

American military services and the coalition, as well as individual 

augmentees joining in theater, posed the same continuity issues that 

had dogged earlier commands in Afghanistan. General Barno lamented that General Kamiya “had the disadvantage of coming in 

with an organization that was not, for the first time in Afghanistan, a 

divisional headquarters, tasked to perform a divisional headquarters 

and CJTF role.”

What made it possible to rely on a marginally suited force such 

as Southern European Task Force were signs of improvement at the 

beginning of 2005. The focus on developing the economy and the 

government continued under this task force. As Lt. Col. Timothy P. 

McGuire, commander of 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, 173d Airborne 

Brigade, explained, “The enemy can only destroy, cannot build. So our 

asymmetrical advantage was that we were able to bring about signs of 

progress.” U.S. forces supported other reconstruction projects, trained 

the local police, and helped extend the reach of the central government. CJTF-76’s medical task force sustained work started by previous 

rotations through Afghanistan, coordinating closely with the Afghan 

Minister for Public Health to assist hospitals in eastern and southern 

Afghanistan. Jordan, Egypt, and Spain continued to operate their hospitals in Afghanistan, and the South Koreans ran an outpatient clinic. 
Chart 5—Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan: Second Rotation, Beginning April 2005

U.S. Central Command

(General Abizaid)

Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

(General Barno)

International Security Assistance Force

(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

Combined Joint

Special Operations

Task Force

Office of Military

Cooperation–Afghanistan

Combined Joint Task Force–76

(Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya—Southern European Task Force)

Combined Task Force BAYONET

(HQ/173d Abn Bde)

Combined Task Force DEVIL

(HQ/1st Bde, 82d Abn Div)

Task Force PHOENIX

(HQ/76th Inf Bde [Separate])

Tactical controlCoordination
64

Despite continuing problems developing Afghan security forces, 

providing adequate humanitarian relief, and maintaining mission 

continuity as personnel rotated in and out of theater, the situation 

in Afghanistan appeared more positive at the beginning of 2005. 

The Afghan National Army made an increasing number of forays 

onto the battlefield, successful elections signified progress in forming democratic processes in a country that had little experience with 

them, and expanding aid to the civilian sector improved the lives of 

many Afghans. As General Champoux stated regarding the end of 

the 25th Infantry Division’s tour, “The Taliban’s ability to conduct 

operations was nonexistent.” The Taliban’s inability to defeat so 

much as a platoon, coupled with the presidential elections and the 

scheduled parliamentary election, “was huge.”

Even with these signs of improvement, enemy attacks began to 

escalate in 2005. The insurgent forces made greater use of roadside 

and suicide bombing tactics, particularly against aid workers, Afghan 

soldiers, police, progovernment clerics and politicians, and those 

who taught classes for girls. The Taliban also started a radio station, 

called the Voice of Shariat. After three years of war, the Taliban remained a formidable foe and had reconstituted some of its leadership 

and resources. From their sanctuaries in Pakistan, Taliban leaders 

prepared to launch a new wave of violence on Afghanistan. With 

increased aid from outside sources, and often coordinating attacks 

with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and other anticoalition groups, the 

Taliban was far from defeated. The war in Afghanistan was about 

to enter a new, more violent phase.

Analysis

After overthrowing the Taliban regime and crippling al-Qaeda 

by March 2002, the United States had no intention of undertaking 

a long-term mission in Afghanistan. However, the need to establish 

a functioning state capable of preventing the Taliban’s resurgence 

required the presence of American forces. Between 2002 and 2005, 

the United States, its allies, and its Afghan partners accomplished a 

great deal. The United States provided leadership to an international 

effort to rebuild a war-torn country. American forces supported 

a new representative government in a region that had almost no 

notion of the concept. They prevented insurgents from interfering 

with an election deemed fair and honest by international observers. They established and nurtured an Afghan army that grew in 

size and achieved some level of effectiveness. They adapted to an 
65

unanticipated situation and developed new doctrine and entities 

to fit the facts they faced on the ground. And while forced to do a 

great deal with very little, they achieved the objective of keeping a 

resilient foe at bay in an economy of force operation, while their 

compatriots in Iraq fought an even larger and more deadly conflict. 

The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who participated in Operation Enduring Freedom achieved a great deal in some of the 

most trying conditions ever faced by U.S. armed forces.

But as evidenced by the upsurge in violence following the 2004 

elections, the troubles the United States faced in Afghanistan proved 

far more endemic and lasting. After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 

Bush administration’s reluctance to commit additional resources in 

Afghanistan proved to be a key impediment to American efforts. 

Never intending to engage in nation building and fearing involvement 

in the type of drawn-out struggle that had crippled the Soviet Union, 

U.S. policy makers sought only to create the circumstances that would 

allow for honorable withdrawal. This ends-based approach, which 

lacked a clear plan for achieving those goals, resulted in an everchanging and often ad hoc command structure that hobbled decision 

making and execution in all other facets of the conflict. The failure 

to settle on whether to have a corps-level command separating the 

strategic from the tactical set the tone for pervasive uncertainty for 

soldiers in Afghanistan. Requiring service-oriented headquarters to 

become combined and joint commands through augmentation, and 

replacing them at intervals, forced senior leaders and their staffs to 

undergo a significant learning curve during their deployment. The 

individual services’ differing rotation policies compounded the problem because they resulted in constant personnel turnover even in the 

midst of a command’s tour in country. Some headquarters, such as 

the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan, were created from 

scratch and remained understaffed for long periods. Cohesion, continuity, efficiency, and interaction with both coalition and Afghan 

counterparts suffered.

The approach to building a new Afghan army proved equally 

frustrating, with responsibility for tasks parceled out to different 

countries without creating a mechanism to coordinate those efforts. 

While there were logical reasons behind this decision, the constraints 

created short- and long-term deficiencies within the Afghan military. 

Pay remained too low to retain recruits and to minimize the likelihood of corruption, especially when the enemy offered a higher wage. 

Training was both too fast and too slow. Creating a battalion out of 

raw recruits in ten weeks produced a force unready for the test of 
66

battle. Conversely, training a single battalion at a time delayed when 

Afghans could shoulder more responsibility for their own security. 

Keeping the army small and organizing it as light infantry with limited firepower made the prospects less likely that it could deal with 

the enemy successfully on its own.

General Barno made an important decision in the fall of 2003 to 

shift the focus of operations, moving from what he and others termed 

counterterrorism to counterinsurgency. In the absence of service or 

joint doctrine to guide that campaign, he and his staff and subordinate 

commanders had to improvise and create their own methods. The 

shift in mind-set and the switch to geographic areas of responsibility were moves that, it was hoped, would better position U.S. and 

coalition forces for the threat posed by the Taliban. On the other 

hand, lacking an adequate number of troops, Barno concentrated 

his resources within the provinces bordering Pakistan rather than 

throughout the entire country. The decision to cede a sizable portion 

of the rural population and terrain to the enemy provided the Taliban 

with footholds inside Afghanistan from which it could later expand.

Regional politics also undercut coalition efforts. Pakistan’s 

unwillingness or inability to deny extremists sanctuary within its 

borders prevented the coalition from destroying the Taliban. This, 

along with the tribal factionalism and undeveloped infrastructure 

in Afghanistan, gave anticoalition forces time to reconstitute and 

rebuild. Safe in their bases in Pakistan and hidden among almost 

inaccessible Afghanistan valleys, they renewed their fight against the 

Karzai government and its foreign supporters.

Sustaining a coalition effort in Afghanistan amid European 

nations’ opposition to the invasion of Iraq proved troublesome. 

European opinion of the United States declined significantly from 

2002 to 2005, with favorable opinion ratings falling below 40 percent 

in France, Germany, Spain, and Russia. These coalition partners had 

to navigate a difficult course in contributing support to American 

efforts in Afghanistan while dealing with public opposition to the 

Iraq war. Too often coalition members had to provide support in 

Afghanistan with caveats that secured domestic approval, which 

limited their ability to function as U.S. leaders desired. Differing 

rules of engagement and requirements for approval from home 

governments made employing coalition forces efficiently impossible 

for a theater command. Each national contingent helped, but not 

always as much as it might have. The need for detailed coordination 

also added a burden to a command and control system challenged 

by other shortcomings.
67

The United States generally, and the U.S. military in particular, had good reason to avoid getting involved in long-term nation 

building. But having toppled the regime in Afghanistan and wanting to prevent al-Qaeda and the Taliban from returning to power, 

the United States had little choice but to follow such a course in a 

country crippled by decades of war. The one bright spot came with 

the creation of the provincial reconstruction teams, an innovation in 

organization and process that proved effective in a limited number of 

areas. But more of them were needed, with more robust interagency 

staffing and easier access to funding.

The conflict in Afghanistan proved far more complex than envisioned in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks. 

An apparently battered and broken enemy, low coalition casualties, 

and visible progress by the new Afghan government gave rise to a 

positive appraisal of the situation in 2005. But Afghanistan was about 

to require a renewed American commitment as the Taliban and alQaeda increased their efforts to wrest control of the country from 

the coalition. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan would 

demand a far larger and longer U.S. commitment than anticipated 

as victory remained an elusive goal.

69

Further Readings

Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: W. W. Norton, 2009.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in 

Central Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. 

Second edition published in 2010.

Wright, Donald P., et al. A Different Kind of War: The United States 

in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001–

September 2005. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2010.
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Abbreviations

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CFC-A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan

CFLCC Combined Forces Land Component Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CTF Combined Task Force

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FM field manual

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO nongovernmental organization

NOFORN not releasable to foreign nationals

PRT provincial reconstruction team

RC Regional Command
CMH Pub 70–122–1

Cover: Soldiers from Company B, 1st Battalion, 505th Infantry, 

conduct a dismounted patrol in the mountains of Afghanistan

on 7 October 2004. (Department of Defense)

All photos, except for the cover, are in the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History files.
PIN : 103161–000