No. 01-14-00848-CR

In the

Court of Appeals

For the

First District of Texas

At Houston

♦

No. 1870305

In the County Criminal Court at Law No. 4

Of Harris County, Texas

♦

NOMATHEMBA Y. SITAWISHA

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Appellee

♦

STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF 

♦

DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

TBC No. 796910

kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net

CASEY LITTLE

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

Tel: (713) 755-5826

FAX: (713) 755-5809

Counsel for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF GRANTED TO APPELLANT

ACCEPTED

01-14-00848-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

9/30/2015 9:06:21 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 9/30/2015 9:06:21 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39, the State requests oral argument only if oral 

argument is granted to the appellant.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Counsel for the State:

Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County

Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal

Casey Little  Assistant District Attorney at trial

Appellant or criminal defendant:

Nomathemba Y. Sitawisha

Counsel for Appellant:

Cheri Duncan  Assistant Public Defender on appeal

Nomathemba Y. Sitawisha  Pro se at trial 

Trial Judge:

Hon. John Clinton  Presiding Judge

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR.........................................2

A. The appellant knowingly and intelligently chose to represent herself with a 

full understanding of her right to counsel after receiving judicial admonishments 

on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.......................................3

B. Because the evidence of guilt was strong and the testifying toxicologist was 

subject to cross-examination, the appellant was not harmed by the lack of any 

admonishments on her alleged right to a taxpayer-funded toxicologist. .............10

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE ...........................................13

ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ake v. Oklahoma, 

470 U.S. 68 (1985).............................................................................................6, 8

Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963).................................................................................................9

Britt v. North Carolina, 

404 U.S. 226 (1971)...............................................................................................6

Cain v. State, 

947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).............................................................10

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 

472 U.S. 320 (1985)...............................................................................................7

Chadwick v. State, 

309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)...............................................................4

Dusky v. United States, 

362 U.S. 402 (1960)...............................................................................................4

Faretta v. California, 

422 U.S. 806 (1975)...............................................................................................3

Godinez v. Moran, 

509 U.S. 389 (1993)...............................................................................................3

Indiana v. Edwards, 

554 U.S. 164 (2008)...............................................................................................4

Johnson v. State, 

967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).............................................................10

Kane v. Garcia-Espitia, 

546 U.S. 9 (2006)...................................................................................................7

King v. State, 

953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).............................................................10

Little v. Armontrout, 

835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987)................................................................................6

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Missouri v. Armentrout, 

8 S.W.3d 99 (Mo. 1999)................................................................................ 5, 6, 9

Moore v. State, 

999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)...............................................................3

Morales v. State, 

32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)...............................................................11

Motilla v. State, 

78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)...............................................................11

Simmons v. United States, 

390 U.S. 377 (1968)...............................................................................................6

United States v. Agurs, 

427 U.S. 97 (1976).................................................................................................9

United States v. Bagley, 

473 U.S. 667 (1985)...............................................................................................9

United States v. Wilson, 

690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982)................................................................................7

Uresti v. State, 

98 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)..........................................................................4

Williams v. Martin, 

618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980)................................................................................8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. amend. VI..............................................................................................3

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV...........................................................................................3

STATUTES

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051 (West 2010)........................................................3

TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.01 (West 2010).....................................................................8

iv
RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 39....................................................................................................... i

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).............................................................................................10

v
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant was charged with DWI committed on December 29, 2012 (CR 

– 7). She pled “not guilty” to the charge, and the case was tried to a jury (CR –

64). The jury found her guilty and assessed punishment at 105 days in jail on 

October 1, 2014 (CR – 64). The appellant filed notice of appeal that same day, but 

the trial court has not yet certified her right to appeal (CR – 67, 71).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

During the night of December 29, 2012, Natasha Wilson and her husband 

were on their way home when they saw a red sports car driven by the appellant 

coming at full speed toward them (RR. IV – 13-14, 24, 29, 41-42). Wilson’s 

husband reversed their vehicle to avoid a collision (RR. IV – 16). The appellant’s 

sports car jumped the curb and crashed into a pole (RR. IV – 16-17, 36) (RR. V –

17). The appellant then nearly hit the Wilson’s vehicle a second time when she 

tried to back out of the crash scene and leave the area (RR. IV – 17). Natasha 

called 911 (RR. IV – 17).

Jared Taylor with the Jersey Village Police Department was in the middle of 

a traffic stop with another vehicle when someone pulled up to him and said, “Hey, 
there was some lady back here who jumped the curve and hit a pole; and she 

almost hit us....She’s parked back here.” (RR. IV – 35-36). Taylor drove over to 

the appellant’s location with his emergency lights activated (RR. IV – 36). He saw 

that the appellant’s vehicle had a damaged front windshield and some flat tires that 

were consistent with running over a curb and hitting a pole (RR. IV – 38-39) (RR. 

V – 12-13, 17). The appellant was still sitting in the driver’s seat, and the vehicle 

was still running (RR. IV – 39) (RR. V – 12, 15). 

The appellant was lethargic, with half-opened eyes (RR. IV – 39). She was 

belligerent, yelling, using profanity, and unsteady on her feet (RR. IV – 40) (RR. V 

– 13-15). She also reeked of alcohol (RR. IV – 40) (RR. V – 13). She refused to 

cooperate or perform any field sobriety tests, so the officers obtained a search 

warrant for and a sample of her blood (RR. V – 67-80). She was arrested around 

2:45 a.m.; the blood was drawn at 5:03 a.m., and it showed an alcohol level of 

0.21, which was more than twice the legal limit (RR. V – 108-109, 171-172) (St. 

Ex. 12). 

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR

In her sole point of error, the appellant complains that the trial court erred by 

failing to advise her that she had the right to request funds for an expert witness. 

(App’nt Brf. 3). This claim lacks merit because the appellant has failed to show 

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that the Constitution requires state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI trial, 

that the Constitution requires such funding where a defendant chooses to represent 

herself, or that a trial court errs in failing to admonish a pro se litigant of the right 

to receive such funding. Furthermore, the appellant was not harmed by the lack of 

any such admonishments because the evidence of guilt was strong and the 

testifying toxicologist was subject to cross-examination.

A. The appellant knowingly and intelligently chose to 

represent herself with a full understanding of her right to 

counsel after receiving judicial admonishments on the 

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 

guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court may dispense 

with counsel and make her own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–

20 (1975); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. Such a decision, to be constitutionally effective, 

must be made: (1) competently, (2) knowingly and intelligently, and (3) 

voluntarily. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 

834–36; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051 (West 2010). The decision to 

waive counsel and proceed pro se is made “knowingly and intelligently” if it is 

made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned, 

as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Moore, 999 

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S.W.2d at 409 n.5 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834–36). The decision is made 

“voluntarily” if it is uncoerced. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12).

The standard of competency to waive counsel is the same as that required to 

stand trial or to plead guilty: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to 

consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has 

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her. See

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 395 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 

(1960)). In addition, judges are permitted to “take realistic account of the 

particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks 

to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.” Indiana v. 

Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).

Whether a party is competent to proceed pro se is a mixed question of law 

and fact turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; thus, this Court must 

review the trial court’s ruling on the issue for an abuse of discretion. See Chadwick 

v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This Court must also 

afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings when the resolution of the 

issue turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to those rulings. Id. And this Court must imply any 

findings of fact supported by the evidence and necessary to support the ruling 

when the trial court fails to make explicit findings. Id..

4
In the present case, the trial court conducted a Faretta hearing prior to 

allowing the appellant to represent herself (RR. II – 4-6). The appellant 

acknowledged that she had a high school education with some additional college

classes and that she understood the dangers of being self-represented (RR. II – 4). 

She also stated that she knew she was charged with a class A DWI that had a 

penalty range “from probation to a dollar fine up to a year in jail and a 4,000-dollar 

fine.” (RR. II – 4-5). She affirmed that she had to follow the rules of evidence and 

procedure, that she would not be given special consideration, that she would not 

obstruct the orderly procedure of the case, and that she had no right to standby 

counsel (RR. II – 5). The appellant also signed written Faretta warnings, which 

acknowledged her right to free legal counsel and repeated the oral warnings (CR –

46-47). Thus, the appellant was properly admonished, and the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing the appellant to represent herself. 

The appellant claims that the trial court should also have admonished the 

appellant that she had the right to the appointment of an expert witness on the issue 

of intoxication. (App’nt Brf. 9-11). In Missouri v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 105

(Mo. 1999), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed a similar argument. It first 

recognized that Faretta guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right 

to self-representation in lieu of the right to assistance of counsel. Id. It also noted 

that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses “the basic tools for an 

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adequate defense,” that must “be provided to those defendants who cannot afford 

to pay for them.” Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)). And it 

stated that the State may not require a defendant to relinquish one of two 

procedural rights in order to obtain the protection of the other. Armentrout, 8 

S.W.3d at 105 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)). But it 

then concluded: 

In this case, it is clear that the appellant had the right to 

represent himself under Faretta. But it is not at all clear that Ake

requires state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI trial, or that 

Ake, which involved a defendant represented by counsel, requires any 

funding whatsoever where a defendant chooses to represent himself. 

Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105; see also Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 

(8th Cir. 1987) (“While the state need not provide the indigent with all the tools the 

wealthy may buy, it must provide the defendant with the ‘basic tools of an 

adequate defense.’”) (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). 

Whether something is a basic tool of an adequate defense that the State must 

provide to an indigent defendant depends on the circumstances. In Ake, the 

Supreme Court specifically decided that the Constitution requires a state to provide 

an indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist on the issue of the 

defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense “when [the] defendant has made a 

preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a 

significant factor at trial.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. Importantly, the Court noted that 

6
“the indigent defendant [does not] ha[ve] a constitutional right...to receive funds to 

hire his own” psychiatrist, and left “to the State the decision on how to implement 

this right.” Id., 470 U.S. at 83. 

In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Supreme Court 

suggested that Ake should not be read expansively:

Petitioner also raises a challenge to his conviction, arguing that 

there was constitutional infirmity in the trial court’s refusal to appoint 

various experts and investigators to assist him.... [P]etitioner also 

requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, 

and a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State 

Supreme Court affirmed the denials because the requests were 

accompanied by no showing as to their reasonableness..... Given that 

petitioner offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the 

requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of 

due process in the trial judge’s decision. Cf. Ake [] (discussing 

showing that would entitle defendant to psychiatric assistance as 

matter of federal constitutional law). We therefore have no need to 

determine as a matter of federal constitutional law what if any 

showing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type here 

sought.

Id., 472 U.S. at 323 n.1. 

In United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth 

Circuit found that the right to self-representation did not include “further rights to 

materials, facilities, or investigative or educational resources that might aid selfrepresentation.” And the Supreme Court adopted this view in Kane v. GarciaEspitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2006), stating, “Faretta says nothing about any specific legal 

aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant...The...court below therefore 

7
erred in holding, based on Faretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a 

basis for federal habeas relief.” Id., 546 U.S. at 10. Thus, without a clearly stated 

intent from the Supreme Court to extend Faretta, this Court should not expand the 

requirement of State-provided toxicologists in every DWI trial.

The appellant attempts to limit the provision of taxpayer-funded 

toxicologists to only DWI trials where the State has alleged a blood-alcohol level 

of 0.15 or higher. (App’nt Brf. 6). But there is no principled reason for doing so. 

Whether the 0.15 level is a substantive element of the offense is irrelevant on this 

issue because intoxication is nevertheless defined in part as “having an alcohol 

concentration of 0.08 or more.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.01 (West 2010). Thus, the 

appellant’s rule would require “state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI 

trial,” when such a requirement is not at all clear. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105. 

Indeed, the circumstances under which the Constitution requires provision of such 

experts remain few. See Ake, 470 U.S. 68 (requiring a psychiatrist to assist in 

preparation and presentation of defense once defendant demonstrates that sanity is 

likely to be significant issue at trial; however that right does not guarantee the 

psychiatrist of defendant’s choice); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir.

1980) (holding pathologist required where a substantial question regarding the 

cause of death required expert testimony). The appellant had failed to cite any 

cases that have extended Ake to toxicologists in routine DWI cases.

8
The appellant cites United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), for the 

proposition that evidence is “material, within the meaning of Ake, if its omission 

would create ‘a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist’.” (App’nt Brf. 7). 

But Agurs did not address Ake at all; Agurs dealt with the production of evidence 

by the State to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

Furthermore, the holding in Agurs has since been modified by United States v. 

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Under Bagley, evidence is material if its suppression 

“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id., 473 U.S. at 678. Thus, 

Agurs has nothing relevant to say about the appellant’s argument.

The appellant has failed to show that Ake requires state funding for a 

toxicologist in a routine DWI trial, or that Ake, which involved a defendant 

represented by counsel, requires any funding whatsoever where a defendant 

chooses to represent himself. See Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105. She has also failed 

to show that, even if such funding were required, a trial court errs in failing to 

admonish a pro se litigant of the right to receive such funding. Therefore, the 

appellant’s sole point of error lacks merit and should be overruled. The conviction 

should be affirmed.

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B. Because the evidence of guilt was strong and the testifying 

toxicologist was subject to cross-examination, the appellant 

was not harmed by the lack of any admonishments on her

alleged right to a taxpayer-funded toxicologist.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that, “except for certain federal 

constitutional errors labeled by the Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether 

it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory 

requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Cain v. State, 

947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Therefore, this Court must apply 

Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determine whether the 

lack of additional admonishment has affected the appellant’s substantial rights. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .

Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that any 

non-constitutional “error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 

substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right 

is affected when an error has a substantial, injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997). If, on the record as a whole, it appears the error “did not influence the 

jury, or had but a slight effect,” this Court must consider the error harmless and 

allow the conviction to stand. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1998).

10
The weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is a relevant factor in 

conducting a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 

360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2000)). And the evidence supporting the appellant’s guilt was strong. 

She was found by a police officer in the driver’s seat with her sports car still 

running (RR. IV – 39) (RR. V – 12, 15). She was lethargic, acted belligerent, used

profanity, was unsteady on her feet, reeked of alcohol, and refused to cooperate or 

perform any field sobriety tests (RR. IV – 39-40) (RR. V – 13-15, 67-80). Her 

condition and the condition of the vehicle corroborated the credible testimony of 

the citizens who were almost her victims. Finally, more than two hours after the 

crash, her blood alcohol level was still in the stratosphere (RR. V – 108-109, 171-

172) (St. Ex. 12). 

Another relevant factor in a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b) is “the 

character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with 

other evidence in the case.” Id., 78 S.W.3d at 359 (quoting Morales v. State, 32 

S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). In the present case, the appellant had 

ample opportunity to cross-examine the toxicologist who testified at trial, and she 

did so over the course of more than thirty pages of the reporter’s record and 

through two recrosses (RR. V – 172-199, 203-206, 207-208). Furthermore, while 

the appellant claims that her case is unique because she was accused of having a 

11
blood alcohol level of over 0.15, the judgment reflects that the appellant was found 

guilty of the class B misdemeanor of “DWI 1st Offender BAC .08.” (CR – 64). 

Thus, the lack of admonishments on her alleged right to a taxpayer-funded 

toxicologist could not have had more than a slight effect on the verdict. The 

appellant was not harmed, and her sole point of error should be overruled

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the conviction 

should be affirmed.

DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

/s/ Eric Kugler

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net

TBC No. 796910

12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE

This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program 

used to prepare this document reports that there are 3,562 words in it; and (b) a 

copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:

Cheri Duncan

Assistant Public Defender

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, 13th Floor

Houston, Texas 77002

Cheri.duncan@pdo.hctx.net

/s/ Eric Kugler

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

TBC No. 796910

Date: September 30, 2015

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