UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Technical Services 

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: 

MOVEMENTS, 

TRAINING, AND SUPPLY 

by 

Chesler Wardlow 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990 





Foreword

The history of World War II is making increasingly clear the central fact

that the tightest rein on the military effort of the United States in that war was

imposed by transportation. As long as this nation fights overseas the same

situation is likely to reoccur—a prospect that gives a special importance to the

exposition of the subject in this series. The Army promptly recognized the importance of transportation when, as in World War I, it centralized its supervision of this branch of its vast logistical effort in a Chief of Transportation and

created (in July 1942) a Transportation Corps.

The Army did not, and could not, control all the factors that entered into

the movement of its men, munitions, and supplies. The larger story the reader

must seek elsewhere— in the two volumes on Global Logistics and Strategy and in

the theater volumes of the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL Here the story

is told from the records and point of view of the Army's Chief of Transportation, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross. In this volume, the second in the group of

three Transportation Corps volumes, Mr. Wardlow passes to the policies and

methods adopted to move men and matériel within the continental United

States and out to theaters of operations—the core of General Gross's mission—

and to provide the Transportation Corps' quota of equipment and trained

soldiers necessary to accomplish its oversea mission.

ALBERT C. SMITH

Maj. Gen., U. S. A. Chief of Military HistoryWashington, D. C. 7 June 1954

vii
The Author

Mr. Chester Wardlow was pursuing graduate studies in Political Science at

the University of Chicago when the United States entered World War I. In

1918, employed by the Shipping Board, he went overseas with the mission that

became the American Section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. From

1921 until 1935 he was connected with private shipping organizations. During

the period 1935-41 he held the office of Sole Arbiter of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Conference. In 1941 Mr. Wardlow was employed as Coordinator of

Transportation for the Army and remained in that position until 1946. From

1946 until his retirement in 1954 he was the Chief Historian of the Transportation Corps. He is the author of the first volume of the Transportation Corps

subseries in the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, published in 1951.

viii
Preface

The purpose of this volume is twofold: to present and evaluate the

machinery and the procedures employed by the Army Chief of Transportation

in moving troops and military matériel within the United States and from the

United States to the oversea theaters of operations, and to outline the methods

used and the problems encountered by the Chief of Transportation in training

the troops and providing the equipment and supplies needed to maintain

effective transportation services in the oversea commands.

The movement of troops and matériel was the basic and distinctive function

of the Chief of Transportation, and for that reason the greater part of the book

has been devoted to that aspect of his work. Training and supply functions

were performed by other technical services as well as by the Transportation

Corps, and since all technical services worked under the general direction of

Army Services Forces headquarters, there was considerable similarity in the

methods employed and the standards enforced. The discussion of training and

supply is therefore confined to those aspects in which the Chief of Transportation had unique responsibilities or encountered exceptional problems.

Much of this account is presented by simply stating what the functions of the

Chief of Transportation were and how he performed them, although his operating difficulties and his disagreements with other agencies are treated as fully

as seems warranted. During the prewar emergency period, as the United States

steadily drifted toward open belligerency, one of the handicaps suffered by

those concerned with military transportation was the lack of an adequate

record of how the Transportation Service had functioned in World War I. The

documented account given here should in large measure obviate a similar lack

if the nation should again become involved in a major conflict.

In the interest of completeness some matters that were discussed in The

Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations are dealt with

again, but the second treatment has been kept as brief as practicable and cross

referenced to that volume. Since the discussion of movements, training, and

supply activities can be better understood if the reader has some knowledge of

the background of the Transportation Corps, its relations with other agencies,

and the broad policies of the Chief of Transportation, these aspects of the

Transportation Corps story are reviewed briefly in the introduction.

Valuable information and opinions have been obtained from officers and

civilian experts who were on the staff of the Chief of Transportation during the

ix
war and were still accessible for interviews while this volume was in preparation. The assistance of those who have contributed personally or through their

writings, and whose names therefore appear in the footnotes, is gratefully

acknowledged. It must be emphasized, however, that the author bears

responsibility for interpretations of fact and any inadvertent errors or omissions.

The statistics used in this book have been drawn so far as possible from

compilations prepared in the Office of the Comptroller of the Army for the

statistical volume to be published in this series. Special credit is due Mr. George

M. Adams of that office, who by recourse to the original sources has done a

thorough job of verifying, correcting, and amplifying the statistics compiled in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation during the war. Mr. George R. Powell

of the same office has given valuable assistance in the presentation of statistical

data and the preparation of graphic charts.

Special thanks are also due Leo J. Meyer, Colonel, Transportation Corps

Reserve, Deputy Chief Historian, who read the manuscript and offered helpful

suggestions in the light of his wartime experience with Army transportation,

and to Marie Premauer, who aided substantially in locating source material

and verifying citations in addition to typing the manuscript. Helen McShane

Bailey carried out the final editing, Allen R. Clark copy edited the manuscript,

and Margaret E. Tackley selected and prepared the photographs.

Washington, D. C. CHESTER WARDLOW

7 June 1954
Contents

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTION ...................... . 3

I. ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES ... 11

Nature and Volume of the Traffic ............... . 11

Working Arrangements With the Carriers ............ . 15

Army Policies and Procedures ................ . 25

Mobilization and Conservation of Railroad Equipment ....... . 35

Special Troop Trains ................... . 4 6

Official and Furlough Travel on Regular Trains ......... . 58

Movement o f Patients ................... . 7 0

Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens .............. . 77

A Job Well Done ..................... . 81

IL TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS . . 84

Categories of Troops Moved ................. . 86

Troopships and Sailing Schedules ............... . 89

T h e Ports o f Embarkation ................. . 9 9

Movement to the Ports ................... . 105

Troop Staging at the Ports ................. . 109

Embarkation Procedures . .................. . 12 5

Troopship Administration .................. . 13 6

The Liberty Ship as a Troop Carrier. ............. . 145

Movement of Organizational Equipment. ............ . 148

Joint Use of Troopships by the Armed Services .......... . 161

A Test of Method and Efficiency ............... . 164

III. REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION ......... . 167

Return Traffic Before V-E Day ............... . 167

Preparations fo r Redeployment ................ . 17 3

Redeployment Between V-E Day and V-J Day .......... . 182

Repatriation After the Surrender of Japan ............ . 197

Evacuation of Patients From Oversea Theaters .......... . 212

Transportation of Soldiers' Dependents ............. . 231

Repatriation of the War Dead ................ . 237

Results Under Pressure ................... . 23 9

xi
Chapter Page

IV. FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES ... . 241

Characteristics of Army Freight Traffic ............. . 243

Distribution of Freight Among the Carriers ........... . 248

Routing and Related Practices ................ . 255

Control of Traffic Flow ................... . 264

Transit Storage Operations ................. . 28 1

Mobilization and Conservation of Freight Cars .......... . 295

Consolidated Ca r Service .................. . 30 5

Freight Rates and Classifications ............... . 316

The Measure of Accomplishment ............... . 326

V. OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS ........... . 327

Analysis of Outbound Freight Traffic ............. . 330

Regulation of Oversea Supply Movements ............ . 335

Transshipment of Cargo at the Ports .............. . 357

Shipment of Ammunition and Explosives ............ . 376

Packing, Marking, Documentation, and Security ......... . 391

Adjustments at the End of Hostilities ............. . 405

The Return Cargo Movement ................ . 408

International Ai d Shipments ................. . 41 0

Theater Requirements Met. ................. . 41 7

VI. MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING ........ . 419

Distribution of Training Responsibilities ............ . 420

Schooling for Officers and Officer Candidates ........... . 425

Troop Units for the Operation of Oversea Ports ......... . 431

Troop Units for Military Railways .............. . 438

Crews for Smalt Boats and Amphibious Trucks .......... . 442

Other Types of Units. ................... . 449

Cadres, Fillers, and Replacements ............... . 451

Civilian Schooling for Specialists. ............... . 455

Final Inspection of Units .................. . 457

Review of Training Problems ................. . 460

VII. THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION..... . 462

Scope of the Responsibility .................. . 462

The Headquarters and Field Organizations ........... . 465

Setting Up the Supply Program ................ . 472

Contracting Procedures and Aid to Contractors .......... . 481

Production Schedules and Controls ............... . 490

Maintenance and Spare Parts ................ . 499

Progress in Technical Matters ................ . 507

Summary of Successes and Failures .............. . 513

xii
Chapter Page

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .......... . 517

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... . 52 6

GUIDE T O FOOTNOTES .................... . 52 9

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS .............. . 531

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... . 53 4

INDEX ............................ . 54 3

Tables

No.

1. Army Passengers Moved by Commercial Rail and Bus in Organized

Groups on Routings Provided by the Central Routing Authority in

Washington: December 1941-December 1945 .......... . 30

2. Analysis of Army Passenger Traffic Moved by Rail in Organized Groups

on Routings Provided by Central Routing Authority in Washington:

December 1941-December 1945 ................ . 3 0

3. Railroad Cars Used by the Army in Moving Organized Groups and

Their Impedimenta Routed by the Central Routing Authority in

Washington: December 1941-December 1945 .......... . 37

4. Passenger Train Cars Owned or Leased by the Carriers at the End of Each

Year: 1940-1945 ...................... . 3 8

5. Army Reservation Bureau Activity: April 1943-December 1945 ... . 65

6. Operations of Army Hospital Cars and Medical Kitchen Cars: 1944-1946. 71

7. Classification of Troops Embarked at U.S. Ports of Embarkation for

Oversea Commands: May 1944-December 1945 ......... . 88

8. Percentage of Troops Embarked From U.S. Ports in Vessels Under British

and U.S. Control: May 1944-December 1945 .......... . 89

9. Passengers Embarked by the Principal Army Ports: December 1941-

December 1945 ....................... . 10 0

10. Passengers Embarked by the Army for the Several Oversea Areas: Decembe r 1941-December 1945 ................... . 10 1

11. Time Spent at the Staging Areas by Troops Embarked at New York

During 1944 ........................ . 11 2

12. Capacities of Troop Staging Areas and Intransit Troops Staged: 1-28

January 1945 ........................ . 11 3

13. Army Hospital Ships Entering Service During World War II .... . 219

14. Patients Evacuated From Overseas by Water and Debarked at Army Ports

in the United States: 1943-1945. ............... . 224

15. Percentage of Patients Debarked by the Army From Troopships, Hospital

Ships, an d Aircraft: 1943-1945 ................ . 22 5

xiii
No. Page

16. Freight Shipped on War Department Bills of Lading by Army Procuring

Services and Commanders of Troop Organizations: December 1941-

December 1945 ....................... . 24 2

17. Means of Transport Used for Freight Moved on War Department Bills of

Lading in the Zone of Interior: December 1941-December 1945 . . . 249

18. Carloads of Freight Released by Traffic Control Division for Shipment to

Ports: July 1943-June 1945 . ................. . 275

19. Carloads of Export Freight Unloaded by the Railroads at U.S. Ports:

1939-1945 ......................... . 28 1

20. Warehouse, Shed, and Open Storage Space at Holding and Reconsignment

Points: 31 May 1945 .................... . 288

21. Percentage of Filled, Booked, and Free Space at Holding and Reconsignment Points on Designated Dates ............... . 290

22. Short Tons of Freight Handled In and Out of the Holding and Reconsignment Points: 1942-1945 ................. . 29 1

23. Average Tons Per Car Shipped on War Department Bills of Lading by the

Several Shipping Agencies: December 1941-December 1945 .... . 305

24. Tons of Less-Than-Carload Freight Consolidated by the Army-Navy

Consolidating Stations: July 1942-December 1945 ........ . 310

25. Annual Savings Through Rate Adjustment and Classification Activities

of the Traffic Control Division ................ . 325

26. Tons of Cargo Shipped by the Army by Water From the Zone of Interior

to the Several Oversea Areas: December 1941-December 1945 . . . 328

27. Tons of Cargo Shipped to Oversea Destinations by the Principal Army

Ports: December 1941-December 1945 ............. . 332

28. Tons of Cargo Shipped by Water to Oversea Destinations by the Respective Procuring Services: December 1941-December 1945 ..... . 333

29. Aircraft Dispatched to the Army Air Forces Overseas, by Sea and by Air,

Crated and Uncrated: January 1942-July 1945 ......... . 365

30. Army Aircraft Transported Overseas Under the Cognizance of the Committee on Aircraft Transportation: March 1943-April 1945 .... . 366

31. Motor Vehicles Transported to the Oversea Commands: January 1943-

June 1945 ......................... . 37 0

32. Special Army Piers and Backup Storage Facilities for Export Ammunition

a n d Explosives ....................... . 38 1

33. Army-Procured Ammunition and High Explosives Shipped Overseas From

Army-Controlled Piers at U.S. Ports: December 1941-August 1945 . . 390

34. Cargo Returned From Overseas and Discharged at Army Ports in the

United States: 1942-1946 .................. . 41 0

35. Port Units in Oversea Areas: 31 March 1945 ........... . 436

36. Transportation Corps Troop Units Activated During World War II ... 437

37. Troops of Other Services Trained at Transportation Corps Installations:

1 August 1942-1 September 1945 ............... . 452

38. Estimated Value of Transportation Corps Equipment and Supplies

Accepted: Calendar Years 1942-1945 ............. . 466

xiv
No. Page

39. Budget Estimates for Transportation Corps Equipment and Supplies: Fiscal

Years 1942-1946 ...................... . 46 7

40. Quantities of Major Items of Transportation Equipment Constructed and

Accepted in the Zone of Interior ................ . 502

Charts

1. Army Passengers Moved Monthly by Rail and Bus in Organized Groups

on Routings Provided by the Central Routing Authority in Washington:

December 1941-December 1945 ................ . 3 1

2. Revenue Passenger-Miles Accomplished in Pullman-Operated Sleeping

Cars and Parlor Cars: 1939-1945 ............... . 41

3. Passengers Embarked Monthly by the Army at U.S. Ports for Oversea

Destinations: December 1941-December 1945 .......... . 98

4. Passengers Embarked by the Army at U.S. Ports for the Several Oversea

Areas: December 1941-December 1945. ............ . 102

5. Forecast of Troop Redeployment, Prepared by the Chief of Transportation, as of 11 July 1945 . ................... . 198

6. Passengers Debarked Monthly by the Army at U.S. Ports From Oversea

Commands: 1943-1946. ................... . 20 6

7. Passengers Debarked by the Army at the Respective U.S. Ports: 1945-

1946. ........................... . 20 7

8. Freight Moved Monthly by Rail and Other Domestic Carriers on War

Department Bills of Lading: December 1941-December 1945 ... . 254

9. Monthly Tonnage of Less-Than-Carload Freight Consolidated by the

Army-Navy Consolidating Stations: July 1942-December 1945. ... 311

10. Army Cargo Shipped Monthly From the Zone of Interior to Oversea

Destination: December 1941-December 1945 .......... . 329

11. Basic Plan for Filling Requisitions From Oversea Commands for Army

Service Forces Supplies .................... . 34 4

12. Army-Procured Ammunition and High Explosives Loaded at ArmyControlled Piers for Delivery Overseas: December 1941-August 1945 . 391

Illustrations

Specially Designed Government-Owned Troop Sleepers ........ . 23

80th Division Troops Arriving at Camp Forrest ............ . 36

Planning Routings and Assignments of Rail Equipment......... . 45

Preparing Food in a Converted Baggage-Kitchen Car ......... . 52

New Troop Kitchen Car Equipped With Modern Facilities . ...... . 53

Special Reservation Bureau for Military Personnel........... . 66

New Self-Contained Army Hospital Ca r ............... . 72

xv
Page

Three Types of Troop Transports .................. . 92

Training Facilities at Camp Stoneman. ............... . 118

Staging Area Recreational Facilities ................. . 122

Individual Equipment Ready To Be Carried ............. . 126

Army Nurses Entraining at Camp Kilmer .............. . 128

Troops Leaving Camp Myles Standish. ............... . 129

Night Embarkation ........................ . 13 3

Red Cross Workers Waving to Troops ................ . 134

Crowded Accommodations Aboard a Troop Transport ......... . 140

Impromptu Entertainment Aboard Ship ............... . 142

Processing Troop Equipment .................... . 15 3

German Prisoners of War Debarking at a U.S. Port .......... . 168

USS Wakefield Landing Troops ................... . 172

USS West Point Embarking Troops at Naples ............. . 184

86th Division Troops Arriving at New York .............. . 185

The Queen Mary Arriving at New York ................ . 186

U.S. Army Hospital Ship St. Mihiel ................. . 214

USS Comfort Off Los Angeles Harbor ................ . 223

Ward Room on the Army Troopship Monterey ............ . 228

Dispensary o n th e Monterey ..................... . 22 9

Litters Ready To Receive Patients .................. . 230

Engineer Pontons Loaded on Flatcars ................ . 246

76-mm. Gu n Motor Carriages ................... . 24 7

Locomotives Shipped as Railway Freight............... . 270

Holding an d Reconsignment Point ................. . 28 4

Outdoor Storage Space ...................... . 29 3

Two 21⁄2-Ton Trucks Loaded on Each Flatcar ............. . 300

Sixteen 1⁄4-Ton Trucks Loaded on a Flatcar .............. . 301

The Consolidated Ca r Service ................... . 308

Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger and Maj. Gen. William M. Goodman . . . 341

Crated Freight Loaded on the SS William S. Clark ........... . 360

Ten Railroad Tank Cars on the Forward Deck ............ . 361

Transporting Aircraft on Deck ................... . 367

Mail on Trucks at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation ....... . 376

Sorting Mail at the New York Port of Embarkation .......... . 377

Special Explosives Loading Pier................... . 385

Barricaded Storage Track ..................... . 38 6

U.S.-Built Broad-Gauge Locomotives for the USSR .......... . 413

Maj. Gen. Frederick Gilbreath ................... . 42 7

Training Transportation Officers .................. . 42 9

Port Companies i n Training .................... . 43 4

Training Troops for the Military Railway Service ........... . 443

Amphibian Truck Company Troops in Training............ . 447

Port Company Troops....................... . 45 8

Troops Practice Going Over the Side ................ . 459

xvi
Page

U.S.-Built Locomotives for Service Overseas ............. . 464

Vessels Procured by the Transportation Corps............. . 474

Boats for Harbor and Inshore Work ................. . 487

Seagoing Steel Barge Under Construction .............. . 500

Revolving Floating Crane ..................... . 50 1

Processing and Crating Shop .................... . 506

Marine Rope in Storage ...................... . 507

Illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for the

following:

Southern Pacific Railroad: page 23.

Santa Fe Railroad: pages 52, 53.

U.S. Maritime Commission: page 92 (middle).

Association of American Railroads: page 270.

Life Photo, Peter Stackpole: page 300.

American Locomotive Company: page 464.

xvii
THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

MOVEMENTS,

TRAINING, AND SUPPLY

Introduction

One of the facts stamped indelibly on

the minds of military men by World War

II is that transportation plays a key role

in global warfare. In a conflict fought on

foreign soil, success is absolutely dependent

on the number of soldiers and the quantity of matériel that can be moved to the

oversea commands and the timeliness

with which they are delivered.

The primary consideration is transoceanic transportation, for in wartime the

capacity needed to move troops and cargo

far exceeds the capacity required for

peacetime traffic. But traffic within the

zone of interior also expands rapidly

under a war economy, and means must

be found for handling military movements promptly while at the same time

accommodating essential civilian traffic. In the oversea areas where the forces come

to grips with the enemy, the ports of entry

and the inland lines of communication

must be kept operative, notwithstanding

the efforts of the enemy to destroy the facilities and the uncertain value of local

civilian labor.

The shipping problem was an especially

vital one in World War II, as in the previous great conflict, because while the

Allies were heavily dependent upon ocean

transport, Germany was not. The Germans, who under the Allied plan of strategy were to be defeated before the war

effort was turned fully against Japan,

struck heavy blows at Allied shipping in

the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the

Mediterranean. Their submarines were

so effective for a time that serious doubts

arose in the minds of Allied leaders

whether a sufficiently large fleet of troop

and cargo vessels could be built up to

meet the requirements of victory in a

multifront war. Such a fleet was achieved

nevertheless through the unprecedented

performance of the United States in constructing new vessels, the increasingly

effective Allied campaign waged against

the U-boat, and the economies effected by

bringing virtually all shipping available

to the Western Allies under the control of

the British and U.S. Governments and

closely co-ordinating the operations of the

two pools. The shipping situation began

to improve perceptibly in the spring of

1943; yet up to the time of Germany's surrender there never was a surplus of vessels. In fact, there never was enough

shipping to satisfy those who were directing the expanding Allied war effort.

Although excellent results in the effective employment of the Allied cargo fleets

were accomplished through the co-ordinating work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board,

1

 This brief explanation of the background of the

Transportation Corps, the fundamental problems that

confronted the Chief of Transportation, and the

establishment that functioned under his command is

essentially a recapitulation of information presented

in Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951). Many of the problems and relationships

will be referred to again in the last chapter of this

volume, where some observations and conclusions regarding the activities and accomplishments of the

Transportation Corps in connection with movements,

training, and supply will be presented.
4 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

individual vessels were not always used to

capacity. During the early years of the

war when the production of military supplies in the United States was lagging,

sufficient cargo was not always delivered

to the ports to fill the ships that were

destined for low-priority theaters. Even

when matériel was available at depots,

camps, and manufacturing plants, the

process of assembling at the ports highly

diversified cargoes from many sources in

such a manner as to avoid port congestion

and yet have the cargoes ready for loading in accordance with theater priorities

and convoy schedules was a complicated

one, and some supplies did not arrive as

planned either because of late shipment

or because of unexpectedly long time in

transit. The preponderance of bulky and

light items over compact and heavy items

in Army cargoes frequently made it impossible for the ports of embarkation to

load vessels to their dead-weight capacities, even though their cargo spaces were

full.

The most serious waste of shipping

came about through holding cargo vessels

idle in the theaters. While such detentions

sometimes were caused by unforeseen

military developments, too often they

were attributable to the failure of theater

commanders to keep the tonnages that

they sought to have delivered at particular ports within the capacities of the ports

to receive, or to the deliberate use of vessels

as floating warehouses. This problem became especially acute in the fall of 1944,

and it was not cleared up until the President peremptorily directed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to bring the situation under

control.

According to prewar plans the Navy

was to operate all ocean-going vessels

needed by the armed forces if the United

States should become a belligerent. The

Army actually began turning over its

transports to the Navy in the spring of

1941, but it soon became apparent that

the Navy was not in a position to provide

enlisted crews for a large number of merchant vessels because of the heavy demand for combatant crews. Soon after

Pearl Harbor, therefore, the two services

agreed that the Army should man and

operate the vessels that it owned or controlled under bareboat charter and call

directly on the U.S. Maritime Commission for the allocation of such additional

vessels as it might require. During the ensuing year efforts were made to achieve

an arrangement under which either the

Navy or the Army would control all military shipping, since that was recognized

as more economical than the operation of

separate fleets, but the two departments

could not agree on a plan. The bulk of the

shipping was therefore operated by agents

of the War Shipping Administration,

which took over the operating responsibilities of the Maritime Commission in

February 1942, and the vessels were allocated to the Army and the Navy in accordance with their requirements. Under

subsequent agreements the Navy manned

a considerable number of vessels that

were to be employed by the Army in the

forward areas, and the two services freely

interchanged ship space for both troops

and cargo moving between the zone of interior and the theaters.

The Maritime Commission was the

agency designated by the President to

procure the additional shipping required

for the war effort. Its achievement in developing new shipyards and expanding

old ones to produce a total of 55,000,000

dead-weight tons of new vessels was outstanding. Since most of these vessels were
INTRODUCTION 5

intended for military use, close collaboration was necessary between the military

authorities and the Maritime Commission

to insure that the right balance was maintained between troop capacity, dry cargo

capacity, and bulk oil capacity. During

the latter part of the war, with extensive

amphibious operations against the Japanese in prospect, many specialized vessels

were built to transport troops and cargoes

in assault actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

represented the armed forces in determining military shipping requirements. In

order to facilitate collaboration a representative of the Maritime Commission

was designated an associate member of

the Joint Military Transportation Committee, which worked out programs to

provide the numbers and types of vessels

required to support future military undertakings. Because adequate shipping was a

prerequisite to victory, the shipbuilding

program was given a high priority in the

allocation of steel and other scarce materials and components.

Since the Army depended heavily on

the War Shipping Administration (WSA)

for the allocation of ships to carry its

troops and cargoes overseas and to move

them between bases within the theaters,

the working arrangements between the

Army Chief of Transportation and the

War Shipping Administration were of

high importance. After an unsatisfactory

start, during a period when procedures

were being worked out and the supply of

vessels was critically short, this relationship developed into a very successful collaboration. On the operating level, where

ships and cargoes were matched, an efficient working arrangement was achieved.

The Army frequently did not get the

number of vessels it asked for, and it sometimes complained vigorously regarding

the number of ships the WSA allocated to

transport lend-lease cargoes and to support the British import program, but the

policies governing these allocations were

set by the President and the WSA had

little latitude in carrying them out.

The most acute disagreement between

the WSA and the Army came to a head

in December 1942, when the civilian

shipping agency obtained an order from

the President directing it to assume control of the loading of military cargoes at

U.S. ports. The purpose of the order was

to utilize ship capacities more fully by

loading a mixture of military and lendlease cargoes, thus obtaining a better balance of light and heavy items. The Army

and the Navy saw serious objections to

placing the loading of military freight in

the hands of a large number of civilian

agents of the WSA and were successful in

having the order shelved. The Army

recognized the merit of the War Shipping

Administration's objective, however, and

arranged to co-operate with that agency

more fully in mixing military and lendlease shipments.

The domestic carriers were required

under the Interstate Commerce Act to

give military traffic precedence over all

other types of traffic upon demand of the

President. No such formal demand was

made, but there was general recognition

of the fact that military traffic should not

be delayed. The railroads, which carried

the bulk of the Army's personnel and

freight, worked in very close co-operation

with the Chief of Transportation and took

extraordinary measures to move Army

shipments promptly and to expedite them

when necessary. Transportation Corps

officers concerned with troop and freight

movements frequently complained of delayed deliveries and unsuitable equip-
6 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ment, but they recognized that the railroads were confronted with severe wartime

operating problems and with an unprecedented volume of civilian and military traffic.

There was a less sympathetic attitude

toward the Office of Defense Transportation (ODT), which the President established soon after Pearl Harbor to exercise

a broad control over all domestic transportation. The Chief of Transportation

felt that the ODT was not sufficiently

aggressive in arranging for the construction

of additional rail and motor equipment to

meet the wartime need, and that it was

too slow in curtailing regular railway

passenger services in order to make available more adequate transportation facilities for troops. The Director of Defense

Transportation, on the other hand, censured the armed forces for their unwillingness to allow a larger amount of scarce

materials to be diverted from the military

programs to the construction of transportation equipment for domestic services.

When the war began there was a notable absence of established methods of cooperation between the Army and the

Navy. Aside from the plan to place all

military shipping under naval operation

in the event of war—a plan that was not

carried out—virtually nothing had been

done to co-ordinate the transportation activities of the two services. Agreement was

even lacking as to the assignment and

equipment of vessels for joint amphibious

operations. The Naval Transportation

Service and the Army Transport Service

were being operated entirely independently and were competing with each other

for additional ships. Separate port establishments were being maintained. There

was no co-ordination of domestic movements of personnel and supplies beyond

that which was provided by the railroads

in their own interest. Floating equipment

and marine supplies were procured separately and little information was exchanged. During the war considerable

progress was made in the orderly allocation of vessels to meet strategic needs, the

joint use of ships and ship repair facilities,

the harmonization of marine procurement

programs, and the reduction of duplicate

supply shipments to the theaters, but at

the end of hostilities separate steamship

services were still being maintained and

virtually nothing had been accomplished

to synchronize domestic troop and supply

movements or to eliminate duplicate port

operations. The traditional independence

of the Army and the Navy, the fact that

the control of Army shipping operations

and inland traffic movements was more

centralized than was the case with the

Navy, and the difficulty of adopting new

procedures while working under wartime

pressures limited the co-operation that

the two services could develop after the

war had started.

The fact that the Army transportation

service, established in March 1942 and

converted into the Transportation Corps

in the following July, was a wartime creation had a definite influence on its relations with other elements of the War

Department. Aside from the necessity of

developing an adequate organization in

the face of wartime manpower shortages

and establishing procedures to govern all

phases of the wartime transportation activity, the Chief of Transportation had to

define and defend his position as the chief

transportation officer of the new Services

of Supply (later renamed Army Service

Forces).

World War I had demonstrated the

need for a unified Army transportation
INTRODUCTION 7

service, and strong recommendations were

made for the continuance of such a service

after the war was over. But the hope that

there would be no more great wars and

the desire to cut government spending led

Congress to disregard this recommendation when enacting the National Defense

Act of 1920. As a result, World War II

found transportation responsibilities scattered among several Army agencies—the

Supply Division (G-4) of the General

Staff, The Quartermaster General, the

Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and the ports of embarkation. The

creation of a Chief of Transportation in the

War Department reorganization of 9

March 1942 did not mean that all transportation functions were placed under his

control, but it did provide greater concentration of responsibility than had existed

previously, and the scope of his authority

was extended as the war progressed.2

In assuming the office of Chief of Transportation, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)

Charles P. Gross had two broad objectives—to establish a service that would

embrace as many of the transportation

functions of the War Department as circumstances would permit, and to maintain unbroken control of troop and supply

movements from their points of origin at

camps, depots, and factories in the zone of

interior until their arrival at the oversea

ports of debarkation. There obviously was

a close interrelationship between these

two purposes.

The first objective was largely but not

completely accomplished. After the first

year of the war the Chief of Transportation was responsible for all arrangements

with the commercial rail, highway, and

water carriers in the zone of interior, and

for the provision of shipping and the operation of ports of embarkation adequate for

the Army's oversea traffic. He was responsible also for the training of troops

and the procurement of equipment and

supplies required for marine and rail

operations in the oversea commands. The

Chief of Transportation did not have control of traffic by air, which was regulated

by the Army Air Forces (AAF); he found

it necessary to accord to the AAF a large

degree of independence in controlling its

domestic freight traffic by surface carriers. The design and procurement of

motor vehicles for oversea highway services remained with the Chief of Ordnance,

and the organization of troop units for the

operation of motor vehicles as well as the

establishment of training programs and

doctrine for such troops remained with

The Quartermaster General.

The second objective—unbroken control of troop and supply movements from

domestic origins to the oversea ports of

discharge—was attained with but one exception, that is, movements by air, which

were regulated by the Army Air Forces.

Troop and freight movements by rail,

motor, or water to the ports of embarkation and thence overseas by water were

under the control of the Chief of Transportation at all points. Several proposals

were made that would have disrupted this

control, but the Chief of Transportation

was able to block them. He held consistently to the position that continuity of

control was necessary to enable his organization to co-ordinate movements to

the ports of embarkation with ship schedules, and thus assure the effective loading

and prompt dispatch of the vessels as well

as the observance of theater priorities.

2

 Although from April to July 1942 this official

was known as the Chief of Transportation Service,

the title Chief of Transportation is used uniformly in

this history.
8 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Chief of Transportation held a

unique position in the Army Service Forces

(ASF) organization because of the breadth

of the staff responsibilities that he had in

addition to technical and operating responsibilities. The extent of his staff functions was the natural result of the position

that the Transportation Corps had in the

military structure—all other arms and

services depended on it for mass movements of men and materiel within the

zone of interior and to the oversea commands, and to a considerable extent for

movements within the oversea areas. This

meant that from the beginning of strategic

planning the Chief of Transportation, having knowledge of the means of transportation likely to be available and their capabilities under various circumstances, held

the key to many important military decisions. It meant also that his concurrence

was a prerequisite to any adjustments that

might have to be made in strategic plans

because of unforeseen developments. The

Chief of Transportation built up a strong

Planning Division to aid him in performing his staff functions, and he firmly and

successfully opposed a proposal put forward in the fall of 1943 to transfer that

division to ASF headquarters.

The staff functions that the Chief of

Transportation performed and his insistence on maintaining direct contact with

the Operations Division (OPD) of the

General Staff in regard to the oversea

troop movements that OPD had ordered

or was planning to order brought him into

conflict with the ASF Director of Operations, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, on numerous occasions. This is understandable since

the latter was charged with co-ordinating

all ASF activities pertaining to troop and

supply movements. But the Chief of Transportation was unwilling to be confined to

the technical and operating aspects of

transportation; or rather, he believed that

his organization would not be fully and

properly performing its mission if it did

not bring its practical knowledge of transportation to bear on the staff work pertaining to movements. Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, commanding the Army Service

Forces, recognized the merits of the positions taken by both parties to the argument, and he sought to strike a practical

balance between the two rather than to

rule arbitrarily against one or the other.

This was fairly well accomplished, both

sides yielding on some points.

The fact that the office of the Chief of

Transportation was not established until

March 1942 affected not only the Chief of

Transportation's relations with other elements of the War Department but also his

relations with the theater commanders.

He had no direct responsibility for transportation operations within the theaters,

but he was responsible for furnishing the

oversea commanders with capable transportation officers, troop units adequately

trained for transportation tasks, and marine, port, and rail equipment correctly

designed for theater needs. Starting out

with small resources and very limited advance planning, the Chief of Transportation found the early problems in fulfilling

these responsibilities formidable. Beyond

the difficulties encountered in supplying

personnel and materiel, the new Chief of

Transportation was handicapped by an

early lack of standing with the theater

commanders. It took time to acquaint

them with his place in the scheme of

things, the ways in which he could be of

help to them, and the ways in which they

could co-operate with him. General Gross

devoted much time and energy to building

up a satisfactory entente with the com-
INTRODUCTION 9

manders of the forces overseas, and in the

end he felt that his efforts had paid good

dividends. A more difficult problem was

that of persuading some theater commanders to accord their chief transportation officers sufficient authority to enable

them to function effectively. On this point

there was still room for improvement in

the European theater in late 1944, and a

satisfactory situation was not obtained in

the Southwest Pacific until the summer of

1945.

For the fulfillment of his responsibilities

in the zone of interior the Chief of Transportation built up, in addition to a headquarters organization of about 3,100

military and civilian personnel, an extensive field establishment, which in the

winter of 1945 embraced personnel (not

counting personnel assigned by service

commands and attached troop units) totaling over 180,000. The headquarters staff

dealt chiefly with the establishment of

policies and procedures and the supervision of activities in the field. The field

installations were the agencies through

which policies and procedures approved

in Washington were carried into effect

either through direct operations, as at the

ports of embarkation and the holding and

reconsignment points, or through close

relationships with the common carriers

and industry, as in the case of the zone

transportation offices. The procedures approved at headquarters were in large measure based on the operating experiences of

the field agencies.

The port installations constituted by far

the largest segment of this field establishment. The eight ports of embarkation

(Boston, New York, Hampton Roads,

Charleston, New Orleans, Los Angeles,

San Francisco, and Seattle), the three

cargo ports (Philadelphia, Baltimore, and

Searsport, Maine), and the three subports

(Portland, Oregon; Prince Rupert, British

Columbia; and Juneau, Alaska), which

were active at the end of 1944, employed

more than 171,000 military and civilian

personnel. The New York installation

alone employed more than 55,000. The

activities of the ports of embarkation were

multifarious; they included the operation

of shipping terminals, the operation and

maintenance of Army-owned and chartered transports and harbor boats, the

repair and conversion of vessels, the operation of staging areas for the housing and

processing of intransit troops, the operation

of storage and processing facilities for

equipment and supplies, the regulation of

the flow of troops and supplies to the ports

in accordance with the ports' ability to

transship them and with due regard to

movement orders and theaters requisitions, and certain training activities. The

cargo ports and subports had more limited

functions.3

Nine zone transportation officers, as

representatives of the Chief of Transportation, supervised a variety of field activities.

These included holding and reconsignment points to provide intransit storage

for equipment and supplies destined for

oversea areas, freight consolidating stations

and distributing agencies to handle lessthan-carload shipments, reservation bureaus to obtain accommodations on

regular trains for military personnel, railroad repair shops for the repair of Armyowned locomotives and rolling stock, and,

until 1945, such procurement and depot

activities as were not carried on directly

by the Office of the Chief of Transportation. The zone transportation offices, the

3

 See Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 95-1 10, for an explanation of the different types of port installation

and more detailed personnel data.
10 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

district transportation offices, which were

subordinate to the zones, and the port

agencies (which toward the end of the war

became district transportation offices) also

represented the Chief of Transportation in

keeping movements of troops and supplies

under observation and in expediting the

flow of traffic when circumstances required it.4

The training of officers and enlisted

men constituted a third group of field

activities. In the early months of the war

all such training was given at the ports of

embarkation, but the greatly increased

requirements soon necessitated the establishment of special schools and training

centers. Although the Chief of Transportation believed that he should command all

such training installations, under a policy

adopted by ASF headquarters in 1943

some of the centers where Transportation

Corps troops were trained were operated

by the service commands.

A number of field procurement offices

were set up in the fall of 1942 with direct

responsibility to the Chief of Transportation. Before the end of the year, however,

field procurement activities, as well as

depot activities, were placed under the

supervision of the zone transportation officers. This arrangement continued until

near the end of the war; then, with the

procurement program largely accomplished, these activities were detached from

the zones and were placed under the direct

supervision of the Chief of Transportation.

4

 For a fuller discussion of transportation zones,

see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 111-23.
CHAPTER I

Army Passenger Traffic

in the United States

The tremendous upsurge in military

passenger traffic that took place during

the war was apparent to everyone who

traveled. The difficulty of obtaining seats

in railway coaches and buses, the scarcity

of sleeping car accommodations, and the

throngs of uniformed men and women encountered in transportation terminals

were unmistakable evidences. Yet the

ordinary traveler had no contact with the

most significant part of the military traffic—that which moved directly from

installation to installation in special trains.

Nor could he have any conception of the

extent and complexity of the problems

involved in moving large numbers of military personnel in a prompt, orderly, and

economical manner by common carriers

and in making the available railway and

motor equipment perform maximum

service.

In approaching the discussion of the

Army's passenger traffic, two facts must

be borne in mind. The first is that civilian

as well as military travel increased as a

result of the war. The booming industries

called for increased business travel, and

the greater income of wage earners gave

rise to more travel for personal reasons.

The rationing of gasoline and tires caused

many owners to lay up their automobiles

and use public transportation instead. Although some of the less essential passenger

services were eliminated or curtailed and

efforts were made to obtain a voluntary

abstinence from pleasure travel, no positive restriction was placed on the citizen's

right to use the services that were offered.

As a result, the 1944 railway passenger

traffic, measured in passenger-miles, was

334 percent greater than the annual average for the years 1935-39, and intercity

motorbus traffic was 192 percent greater.

The second basic fact is that the carriers

were able to make only a limited increase

in services after the war began. The building of new equipment and structures was

severely limited by the scarcity of materials and the higher priority given to military items. Maintaining adequate transportation operating personnel was made

difficult by the manpower requirements of

the armed forces and the inducements

offered by other industries. Because of

these limitations on the ability of the carriers to increase their services, the increased demand for passenger accommodations had to be met chiefly by a more

intensive use of existing facilities.1

Nature and Volume of the Traffic

Army passenger traffic fell into several

categories, each involving special prob1

 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,

Organisation, and Operations, pp. 309-49.
12 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

lems and requiring special procedures.

There were the larger organized troop

movements, usually involving units and

their organic equipment, which for the

most part moved in special trains. There

were the smaller organized groups that

traveled chiefly on the regular rail and

bus services. Military patients being transferred between hospitals or from ports of

embarkation to hospitals were moved on

both regular and special trains. Prisonerof-war groups for obvious reasons were

transported chiefly in special trains or special cars. The military and civilian personnel of the Army traveling as individuals

on War Department transportation

requests naturally used the regular services of the common carriers.2

 The same

was true of most military personnel traveling while on leave or furlough, although

some of this traffic was handled by special

trains. The Army also arranged for the

travel of military personnel of Allied

nations passing through the United States

and for the initial movements of persons

of Japanese descent from the Pacific coast

for relocation.

The number of military passengers

moved by the carriers in World War II far

exceeded the number moved during any

earlier period. This was necessarily true

because the number of men in uniform

was far greater and the plan of training

required more travel.3 Specific data are

available for only certain categories of

passengers. During the first eighteen

months of World War II—that is, through

May 1943—statistics were prepared on all

passengers moved by rail, motor, air, and

water on War Department requests. The

total for that period was 24,490,707, and

the peak month was October 1942 with

2,068,533 passengers.4 Thereafter, as an

economy measure, transportation officers

in the field were no longer required to

report the number of passengers moved on

requests that they had issued; hence the

only data covering the entire war period

pertain to passengers moved in the organized groups routed by the central routing

authority in Washington. During the

forty-nine-month period from December

1941 through December 1945, such traffic

totaled 35,848,700 passengers; the peak

month was August 1945, when 1,207,100

passengers were moved.5 Neither set of

figures includes the travel of Army personnel while on furlough or leave, which

was at the individual's own expense and

by his own arrangement.

Since complete data for troop travel

were not compiled, the exact percentage

of the whole that military traffic constituted is not known, but some indicative

estimates are available. For the year 1943,

the Office of Price Administration estimated that the uniformed personnel of the

armed services—Army, Navy, Marine

Corps, and Coast Guard—constituted 25.3

percent of the total number of passengers

moved (excluding commuter travel) and

2

 The transportation request is an order on a carrier

to furnish transportation to persons for official travel

at government expense. 3

 During the nineteen-month period May 1917-

November 1918, the railroads moved 8,875,000 passengers on WD requests on special and regular trains;

during a corresponding period, December 1941-June

1943, such passengers numbered 21,754,000. See Rpt,

Transportation, Comparative Data, World War IWorld War II, p. 24, prepared by Contl Div OCT,

Jul 43, OCT HB MPR. 4

 OCT HB Monograph 20, p. 2 and App. I.

Roughly 83.8 percent of this traffic moved by rail, 16

percent by highway, and 0.2 percent by air and water. 5

 See Table 1 and Chart 1, pp. 30, 31, below. Routing procedures are explained below, pp. 25-30.

Groups routed by the central routing authority in

Washington were estimated to constitute between 50

and 60 percent of the total traffic moved on WD

transportation requests.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 13

that this military traffic accounted for 39.5

percent of the total passenger-miles accomplished.6

 In September 1943 the Office of

Defense Transportation and the Office of

War Information jointly released data indicating that, of the total number of passengers traveling on regularly scheduled

trains and buses (that is, excluding special

troop trains and buses), 20 percent consisted of servicemen and servicewomen in

uniform traveling under orders or on

leave. Of the remaining 80 percent, it

was estimated that 55 percent represented

essential civilian travel and 25 percent

nonessential travel.7

Carefully worked out techniques and

procedures were required to get the greatest possible use out of the rail and motor

equipment available to the Army. Although considerable progress had been

made with such techniques and procedures before the United States entered the

war, much remained to be done to adapt

them to the large and closely timed movements that then became frequent. The

field maneuvers held in 1940 and 1941

gave the Army an opportunity to try out

its own procedures and its working arrangements with the railroads, and also to

determine how far commercial motor

vehicles could be used for this purpose.

The precipitate entry of the United States

into a war involving action in both Atlantic and Pacific areas put these arrangements and procedures to the acid test. The

results were gratifying, as General George

C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, later

testified.8 There remained, nevertheless,

many features to be developed and refined

in order for the Army to execute the heavy

troop movements of 1943 and 1944 with

smoothness and efficiency. As an indication of the size of this undertaking, the

Chief of Transportation stated that during

the period of heavy traffic in the spring of

1943 a special troop train was started for

every six minutes in the twenty-four-hour

day.9

The system under which troops were

inducted and trained was expensive in

terms of transportation. In World War I

the typical draftee made three basic

moves—from home to cantonment, from

cantonment to specialized training camp,

and thence to port of embarkation. In

World War II he made at least five

moves—from home to induction station,

and thence to reception center, replacement training center, unit training center,

and port of embarkation—and, in addition, most soldiers were moved to specialized training centers and to training

maneuver areas. Induction stations, reception centers, and replacement training

centers were numerous and scattered. Specialized training centers were widely dispersed, and some training was phased,

with each phase taking place at a different

station. Troops and their equipment frequently were transported all the way

across the continent in order to meet the6

 Exhibit A-68, before ICC, Ex parte 148, October

23, 1944, reproduced as App. II in OCT HB Monograph 20. As the percentages indicate, the average

haul for military passengers was longer than that for

the traffic as a whole. 7

 ODT Press Release 349, 3 Sep 43, OCT HB Topic

ODT. These figures were released in connection with

the campaign for a voluntary reduction of nonessential

travel. 8

 In the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1,1941 to June 30,1943 . . . ,

the Chief of Staff stated that the movement of almost

600,000 troops and their impedimenta by rail during

the first five weeks of the war had been accomplished

"in an extremely efficient manner." See also, Memo,

Marshall for the President, 3 Mar 42, sub: Troop and

Cargo Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5. 9

 Statement in NBC radio broadcast, based on data

from Military Transportation Section AAR, reported

in Railway Age, May 15, 1943.
14 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ater requests for certain types of units

promptly, The Passenger Branch in the

Office of the Chief of Transportation estimated that men shipped overseas made on

the average between six and seven moves

at Army expense before sailing.10

Many criticisms were leveled at the

Army because of what appeared to be excessive troop movements. These criticisms

originated with other government agencies, railroad officials and shippers, and

soldiers who wanted fewer moves and better travel accommodations. The Army defended its troop movements and system of

training and, in the beginning, denied that

unnecessary moves were made. Later, the

Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, and his Chief of Transportation

became convinced that the number of

moves could be reduced without military

disadvantage and requested the commanders of the Army Ground Forces and

the Army Air Forces to give the subject

their attention.11 The War Department

also endeavored to eliminate unnecessary

official travel by individuals and to reduce

group meetings, in line with requests made

to all government agencies by J. Monroe

Johnson, the Director of Defense Transportation, and James F. Byrnes, the

Director of War Mobilization.12

Several officials and divisions in the

Office of the Chief of Transportation were

concerned with passenger traffic. The

Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, had

an over-all co-ordinating responsibility.

The Movements Division, headed first by

Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Andrew F. McIntyre and then by Col. Donald E. Farr, was

concerned especially with the movement

of troops and troop equipment destined for

oversea areas, and the co-ordination of inland transportation with staging arrangements at the ports of embarkation and with

troop transport schedules. The Rail Division, headed for a time by Mr. Gustav

Metzman, then by Col. (later Brig. Gen.)

John A. Appleton, and finally by General

McIntyre, represented the Chief of Transportation in his endeavor to help the railways meet their equipment and manpower

problems so that adequate services could

be maintained. The Highway Division,

under the leadership first of Col. Frederick

C. Horner and then Col. Lacey V. Murrow, performed a similar service for the

bus operators. The Traffic Control Division was responsible for arrangements with

the carriers regarding group and individual travel, for instructing transportation

officers in the field concerning their responsibilities and assisting them when

necessary, for the routing of organized

movements of more than one carload, and

for controlling special troop movements.

Under the Chief of Transportation the

day-to-day task of arranging transportation for and supervising the movement of

the Army's passenger traffic was charged

to the Traffic Control Division, which was

headed by Mr. (later Brig. Gen.) William

J. Williamson. Under The Quartermaster

10

 Memo, CofT for C of Adm Svs SOS, 22 Jan 43,

OCT 357 New Orleans; Memo, Sp Sv Div for CofT,

11 May 43, OCT 511; Memo, Col Edmund C. R.

Lasher for Gross, 1 Sep 43; Interv with Col I. Sewell

Morris, 15 Aug 50 (unless otherwise indicated, all interviews were conducted by the author); last two in

OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. 11

 See Wardlow, op. cit., p. 348. Memo, CG SOS for

CofT, 20 Jan 43, sub: Use of Rail Trans, OCT 511

Co-ordination of Troop Mvmts; Memo, CG ASF for

DCofS USA, 10 Aug 43; Memo, ACofS G-3 for

DCofS, 10 Aug 43; last two in WDCSA 370.5. 12

 Memo, ODT to All Government Agencies, 20

May 44; WD Memo W 55-44, 27 May 44, sub: Reduction of Unnecessary Travel; Ltr, SW to Johnson,

19 Jul 44; Ltr, Actg SW to Byrnes, 1 Feb 45; Memo,

TAG for CG ASF, 5 Feb 45, sub: Curtailment of Pass

Traf; all in G-4 510.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 15

General, who managed Army traffic during peacetime, this function had been performed by the Commercial Traffic Branch,

headed by Capt, (later Col.) Edmund C.

R. Lasher. When responsibility for transportation and traffic was transferred from

The Quartermaster General to the Chief

of Transportation in March 1942, the personnel of the Commercial Traffic Branch

was also transferred and it became the

foundation on which the Traffic Control

Division was built. Lasher then became

Williamson's deputy.13

Working Arrangements With the Carriers

The collaboration of the common carriers and the Army was an outstanding

example of team work between private

industry and government in a national

emergency. It was especially noteworthy

because, unlike many other industries that

were wholly or partially withdrawn from

the civilian field in order that their capacity might be devoted to war work, the

carriers continued to meet an expanding

civilian demand while also filling the military need. The carriers and the Army did

not always see eye to eye in regard to operating and traffic matters, but in the major

endeavor—moving troops and military

supplies swiftly and safely to their destinations—they achieved a high degree of

understanding and co-operation.

In his negotiations with the carriers on

operating and traffic matters the Chief of

Transportation dealt, so far as possible,

with agencies representing the respective

branches of the industry, rather than with

the individual lines. This not only was advantageous from the standpoint of conducting negotiations and arriving at uniform agreements, but it also facilitated the

pooling of the equipment of many carriers

to meet the large military requirements.

Fortunately the railroads, which carried

the bulk of the Army's passenger traffic,

were well organized for this purpose. The

Association of American Railroads, with

headquarters in Washington, represented

lines controlling 97.5 percent of the total

railroad mileage. Its Car Service Division,

with Warren C. Kendall as manager, exercised a broad influence over the distribution and employment of the passenger

cars owned by those lines. The Military

Transportation Section of the Car Service

Division, managed during the greater part

of the war by Arthur H. Gass and later by

John J. Kelly, was designed to deal exclusively with the requirements of the armed

forces, and during the war it was conveniently located adjacent to the Traffic Control Division in the Pentagon. In passenger

traffic matters the railroads were represented by seven territorial passenger associations — New England, Trunk Line,

Central, Southern, Southwestern, Western,

and Transcontinental—and by the Interterritorial Military Committee on which

each territorial association was represented. This committee, with Hugh W.

Siddall as chairman, maintained headquarters in Chicago and was the channel

through which most rate and traffic matters were handled between the Army and

the railroads.14

The common carriers by bus were not

as fully or effectively organized as the railroads since they constituted a much newer

branch of the transportation industry and

many small operators were concerned

only with local business. The National

13

 Williamson had been general traffic manager of

a large mail-order house and was one of a number of

civilian experts who were brought into the TC organization to give it the benefit of their experience with

transportation and traffic. 14

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 312-14.
16 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Association of Motor Bus Operators, with

headquarters in Washington, and the National Bus Traffic Association and National

Bus Military Bureau, located in Chicago,

were convenient channels through which

the Army could negotiate with the operators, but their memberships were limited

and they were much less influential than

the corresponding organizations in the

rail field. The use of the commercial airlines for military passenger traffic was

small enough that no special organizations

to deal with such traffic were needed.15

The working arrangements regarding

traffic by rail were incorporated in two

basic agreements that were negotiated

annually between the territorial passenger

associations and the armed forces. The

Joint Military Passenger Agreement was

the more comprehensive. In addition to

fare reductions (called allowances in the

agreement), it covered arrangements

relating to special cars and special trains,

the transportation of military baggage

and impedimenta, the transportation of

the bodies of deceased military personnel,

the use of baggage cars as kitchen cars for

troop trains, and the routing of traffic.

The Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement, which was effective concurrently with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement and considered a part of

it, committed carriers that were not required by law to allow 50 percent landgrant deductions from commercial fares in

favor of military passengers to allow equal

deductions on corresponding routes, with

specified exceptions.16 The so-called landgrant rates, a much controverted subject,

had their origin in the Land Grant Acts

by which federal lands were ceded to the

railroads during their developmental

period. The allowances other than landgrant deductions, applicable to both landgrant and non-land-grant routes, were

made by the carriers under Section 22 of

the Interstate Commerce Act. A few

coastwise steamship lines with which the

railroads had through-booking arrangements were parties to both agreements.

The Joint Military Passenger Agreement included separate fare provisions for

military traffic and nonmilitary traffic.

Military traffic embraced chiefly commissioned officers, warrant officers, nurses,

and enlisted personnel of the U.S. armed

forces on active duty, and the allowance

on such traffic was 5 percent from the

commercial one-way fares for all classes of

travel between points between which no

land-grant deductions were applicable,

and 3 percent from the one-way net fares

on routes that were subject to land-grant

deductions. Nonmilitary traffic included

several categories of persons who were not

on active military duty but whose transportation was paid entirely by the U.S.

armed forces, and the allowance on such

traffic was 5 percent from one-way commercial fares in all classes.

The several classes of transportation

affected by the fare reductions accorded

by the Joint Military Passenger Agreement were designated first class (standard

sleeper and parlor car), intermediate class

(tourist sleeper), coach class, and mixed

class (combination of coach and sleeper).

Since the Army's policy was to accomplish

overnight troop movements in tourist

sleepers rather than in standard sleepers,

15

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 102, 197, 203, 265. 16

 The last agreements during the war were JMPA

22 and JMPEA 22, both effective 1 July 1945. For the

historical background of these agreements, see Comments Prepared by Representatives of the War Department, Navy Department, and Marine Corps,

October 15, 1930, on Senate Bill 4447, 71st Cong., 1st

Sess., OCT HB Topic Mil Pass Agreements.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 17

it benefited from the railroads' agreement

to accept intermediate-class fares on many

routes west of the Mississippi on which

such fares were not ordinarily available.

The railroads did not accept the intermediate-class fares east of the Mississippi, but

collected the first-class fare for all troops

moved in sleepers, standard or tourist,

subject of course to the agreed allowances.17

One of the advantages that the railroads gained under the Joint Military

Passenger Agreement was the privilege of

suggesting the routes on which the traffic

of the armed forces should move. This

enabled them to distribute the traffic on a

basis that the carriers accepted as equitable. The Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement enabled the territorial

passenger associations, which were responsible for the satisfactory distribution of

such traffic, to perform that function

without the complications that would

have arisen if it had been necessary to

take land-grant and non-land-grant fares

into consideration in working out each

routing. The equalization agreement also

eliminated the necessity of routing traffic

on circuitous land-grant routes in order to

meet the government's insistence on the

lowest net fare, and in that respect was

advantageous to both the carriers and the

armed forces. To the carriers the routing

privilege was an essential feature of the

agreement, and they sometimes referred

to it as the justification for the fare allowances that they made. The armed forces,

however, had the right under the agreements to reject a suggested routing when

it appeared to be unduly circuitous or

otherwise disadvantageous from a military

standpoint.18

Another important feature of the Joint

Military Passenger Agreement from the

standpoint of the railroads was the clause

that defined the conditions under which

the armed forces might use carriers other

than those parties to the agreement. In

peacetime and for a period after the

United States began to rearm, this clause

committed the armed forces to using the

services of the railway and coastwise

steamship lines for all movements except

when those services were "inadequate to

meet the military necessity of the Government." As long as this clause was in effect,

the possibility of moving troops by com-

-mercial bus or air lines was exceedingly

limited. Effective 1 July 1941, the clause

was modified to permit the armed forces

to use motor and air carriers whenever

they were able, in the judgment of the

officers arranging the transportation, to

provide "more satisfactory service to meet

the military requirements of the Government." But even under the modified clause

the railroads were in a preferred position

with respect to military traffic.19

Fare concessions were the key feature of

the Joint Military Passenger Agreement

from the Army's standpoint. The Army

started negotiations for "greater concessions from the railroads soon after the

emergency began. Whereas the railroads

always had contended that the routing

privilege was the feature that justified fare

concessions beyond the land-grant deductions, the Army traditionally had stressed

the volume and character of its traffic as

the justification for such concessions.

At a conference in December 1940,

when the renewal of the agreement for the

17

 OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; WD CTB 6, 27

Jun 44, pars. 3, 4, 5, 6; JMPA 22, Sec. 7(4). 18

 JMPA 22, Sec. 27. 19

 JMPA 17, effective 1 Jul 40, Sec. 6, par. 3; JMPA

18, 1 Jul 41, corresponding par. See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 183-93, for circumstances leading to this

change.
18 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

next fiscal year was being discussed, the

Army representative requested an increase

in the allowance on fares affected by landgrant deductions from 3 to 12 percent,

and on other fares from 5 to 15 percent.

The Army's arguments were that military

traffic had increased many times since the

beginning of the emergency, that this

traffic came to the railroads without the

usual expense of solicitation, and that

troop movements permitted the use of

railway cars with an intensity that was

not possible in regular traffic. The carriers

did not accede to this request. They contended that, while troop traffic permitted

them some economies, it also entailed

special arrangements and extraordinary

expenses.20

The Chief of Transportation continued

the effort to obtain greater fare allowances

from the railroads to the end of the war,

but without success. The last move in that

direction—made in September 1945—

was aimed at the situation east of the

Mississippi, where the railroads collected

first-class fares for troops moving in either

tourist or standard sleepers and where

land-grant deductions were applicable to

only a limited number of lines. General

Gross argued that the railroads should

not get a greater revenue from a sleeper

carrying soldiers than from one carrying

civilians. He pointed out that, although

the Army placed 40 to 50 percent more

passengers in a car than was possible with

civilian traffic, the reduction allowed to

the Army under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement was only 5 percent.

He accordingly instructed General Williamson to undertake a renegotiation of

fares on the basis of that principle.21 Williamson left the Army during the following month, and Gross retired at the end of

November 1945, up to which time the fare

allowances under the Joint Military Passenger Agreement remained unchanged.

Before the end of 1945 Congress took action to abolish land-grant deductions, and

an entirely new military rate agreement

then had to be negotiated.

The abolition of land-grant rates came

as the culmination of a struggle in which

the War Department and the railroads

were on opposite sides. The carriers long

had contended that the government's

grants of land to western and southern

lines in the third quarter of the nineteenth

century to encourage the extension of rail

facilities and the settlement of new territories no longer justified the deduction of

50 percent from normal charges when

government passengers and freight were

hauled.22 The War Department was

reluctant to assume the added transportation expense that the discontinuance of

the deductions would entail.23 This attitude was reflected in the Transportation

Act of 1940, which abolished land-grant

deductions for other types of government

traffic but retained them for "military or

naval property of the United States moving for military or naval and not for civil

use," and for "members of the military or

naval forces . . . traveling on official

duty."

 24

The question of total abolition of landgrant rates again came before Congress

during the war, and again the War Department opposed such action. It cited 20

 OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 204-07; and 21, pp.

28-31. 21

 Memo, CofT for Williamson, 5 Sep 45, sub: Passenger Rates for Mil Travel, OCT HB Gross Day File. 22

 For the railroads' position, see Robert S. Henry,

"The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History Texts," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,

XXXII, September 1945, pp. 177-94. 23

 Ltr, Actg SW to Chm House Com on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 11 Jun 38, G-4/24801-2. 24

 PL 785, 76th Cong., Title III, Pt. II, Sec. 321 (a).
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 19

the favorable financial position of the carriers resulting from the heavy wartime

traffic, as well as the huge additional cost

to the Army, which the Chief of Transportation estimated would be about

$200,000,000 on passenger and freight

traffic during a war year. The War Department, however, indicated that "at

another time and under other conditions"

a different situation might obtain, and

when the question came to a decision soon

after the end of hostilities the department

acquiesced.25 The abolition of land-grant

rates, effective 1 October 1946, considerably simplified the arrangements between

the armed forces and the railroads regarding transportation charges, and in the

Joint Military Passenger Agreement that

became effective concurrently with the

new law, the fare reduction allowed to the

armed forces was 10 percent from commercial fares in all classes.26

Although the armed forces did not obtain greater percentage allowances on

railroad passenger fares during the war,

they were successful in adding to the categories of passengers eligible for the allowances.27

 The scope of the term "military

traffic" was broadened to include enlisted

reservists recalled to active duty, certain

female personnel of the Medical Department of the Army, and members of the

Women's Army Corps. The coverage of

the term "nonmilitary traffic" was extended to include (when traveling on

transportation requests of the armed

forces) retired and discharged military

personnel returning to their homes, personnel of the American Red Cross, officers

of the Army Specialist Corps, student

nurses (civilians), military personnel of

nations receiving aid under the LendLease Act, and alien enemies, prisoners of

war, and other interned persons.28

The allowances granted under the

Joint Military Passenger Agreement applied only to railroad fares, not to space

rates in Pullman cars. The Pullman Company was not a party to this agreement

but separately made certain concessions

to the armed forces. It agreed to provide

standard sleepers for group movements of

enlisted men when no tourist sleepers

were available and to accept tourist

sleeper berth rates in such cases. It permitted tourist sleepers to operate and

tourist berth rates to apply in the eastern

and southeastern territories, even though

there were no regular tourist sleeper services in those territorities. The Pullman

Company permitted the drawing rooms

of tourist sleepers to be occupied at the

regular berth rates when the cars were

being used for military movements. It also

accepted the berth rate for the shortest

route between two points when troops

were routed over a longer route under the

Joint Military Passenger Equalization

Agreement.29

Since the Army aimed to move troops

by special trains whenever practicable,

the conditions under which such arrange25

 Ltrs, SW to Chm House Com on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce and Chm Senate Com on Interstate Commerce, 6 Apr 44, AG 500 (6-2-37)(1) Trans

by Rail; Memo, CofT for USW, 2 Aug 44, OCT HB

Gross Day File; Senate Com on Interstate Commerce

and House Com on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

Hearings on HR 4184, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., March

16-23, 1944; Ltr, SW to Chm Senate Com on Interstate Commerce, 3 Jul 45; Ltr, SW to Dir Bur of

Budget, 6 Dec 45; last two in AG 500 (26 Mar 45)(1);

PL 256, 79th Cong., approved 12 Dec 45. 26

 JMPA 23, 1 Oct 46, Sec. 6(1). 27

 OCT HB Monographs 6, p. 206; and 21, pp. 3-5.

The voluminous correspondence regarding changes in

JMPA is filed in OCT 551.1 JMPA. 28

 JMPA 22, Secs. 3, 4. 29

 OCT HB Monograph 21, p. 27; Ltr, DC of Traf

Contl Div OCT to Pullman Co., 26 Jul 45, and reply,

2 Aug 45, both in OCT 510 Trans of Parties; WD

CTB 6, revised 9 Jun 45, Sec. V.
20 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

merits would be made by the railroads

were of considerable importance. At the

beginning of the war the carriers' tariffs

required a minimum of 100 first-class

fares, or equivalent revenue, for the operation of a special train. This meant more

than 100 fares when the troops were moving in coaches or tourist sleepers, and the

Chief of Transportation sought a reduction. The result was that during the

greater part of the war the minimum for a

special train was 75 first-class fares where

no land-grant deductions were involved,

and 90 first-class fares on land-grant

routes.30

Conditions relating to the furnishing of

special cars on regular trains were not incorporated in the Joint Military Passenger

Agreement but were covered by informal

arrangements. The minimum requirement for special sleepers for military

movements was fifteen passengers. The

Army requested the railroads to make the

same arrangement for special coaches and

also sought to have this feature covered in

the JMPA, but was only partially successful. The railroads declined to commit

themselves without qualification to furnish

special coaches; however, they agreed to

do so for the handling of prisoners of war

and internees for whom special coaches

obviously were necessary and stated that

they would furnish special coaches for

troops to the extent of their ability. The

minimum requirement for special coaches

was fixed at twenty-two and a half fares.31

The arrangements concerning the

movement of troop impedimenta were

evolved in practice rather than fixed by

agreement. The railroads agreed to equalize the land-grant freight rates so that

impedimenta could move with troops at

the lowest net freight charge, but no

agreement was reached with regard to

special trains for this purpose.32 The

Army found it advantageous when large

units were moving to ship the personal

baggage and the organizational equipment in advance by special freight trains

and the troops in special troop trains,

rather than to move both in mixed trains.

But the Army did not accept the railroads' contention that the payment for a

special impedimenta train should be on

the same basis as for a mixed train—that

is, a minimum number of passenger fares

in addition to the appropriate freight

charges. When negotiations became deadlocked, the Army announced that it no

longer would request special trains for

troop impedimenta but would allow the

carriers to determine whether they could

best handle the impedimenta in mixed

trains with troops, or in regular freight

trains for which only freight charges

would be assessed.33 As it worked out,

most separate impedimenta trains moved

as regular freight trains, and in emergency

cases where the Army requested special

freight train service, it paid the usual additional charge for such service.

The Army and the railroads also were

at odds concerning liability for the personal effects of troops—principally barracks bags, bedrolls, and foot lockers—

which were carried as baggage. When

troops used regular trains, such baggage

up to 150 pounds per person was checked

in the usual manner and the railroads as- 30

 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 47-51; JMPA 22,

Sec. 18(3). 31

 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 61-62; WD CTB

22, 29 June 44, Sec. 1. 32

 OQMG Cir Ltr 157, 16 Jul 41, sub: Equalization

of Rates on Trans of Imped; Memo, IMC for CofT,

et al., 22 Jun 42, OCT 551.2 Mil Imped. 33

 Ltr, IMC to CofT, et al., 29 Jun 43; Ltrs, OCT to

IMC, 2 Sep 43 and 12 Oct 43; all in OCT 551.1

JMPA 20.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 21

sumed the usual liability. When larger

movements took place, the baggage was

transported in bulk (unchecked) in unattended baggage cars, and in such instances the carriers objected to assuming

full liability. They proposed that a clause

be inserted in the Joint Military Passenger

Agreement limiting their liability to

$25.00 per person on unchecked baggage,

with a total liability of $2,500 per baggage

car, unless additional liability was assumed under an insurance arrangement.

The Army refused to accept this tender,

and no such limitation on the carriers'

liability was included in the wartime

agreements.34

Providing meals for troops traveling by

rail gave rise to a number of problems

after heavy movements began. The first

problem involved the question whether

troops using regular trains should be provided with cash or with tickets to cover

their meals when rations in kind (food

boxes) were not furnished. Both the carriers and the Traffic Control Division in

Washington favored the use of tickets,

since troops often spent the subsistence

allowance in other ways and the railroads

found that they had provided food for

customers that did not appear. The War

Department, while directing that tickets

"ordinarily" would be used, nevertheless

left it to the officer ordering each movement to determine whether tickets or cash

should be provided, on the ground that

there were occasions when it was inadvisable or impracticable to use meal tickets.35

This meant that there was lack of uniformity in regard to movements originating with field installations, and the impractical method of giving troops a cash

allowance to cover meals en route continued in use.

A more serious problem involved the

decision whether troops would use the

regular dining car service or would be fed

from troop kitchen cars attached to regular trains. Although the subsistence of

troops was a Quartermaster function and

the subject was covered in the Quartermaster series of War Department regulations, the Chief of Transportation took an

active interest because of the bearing that

the question had on troop morale and

discipline. In the early part of the war

when the decision whether or not to

attach troop kitchen cars to trains was

left to the commanding officers of the installations originating the movements, it

often happened that provision was not

made for kitchen cars when large numbers of troops were moving and that the

regular dining cars were unable to accommodate both civilians and soldiers. Under

such circumstances there was likely to be

a disorderly scramble for food at each stop

along the route. The regulation accordingly was changed so that kitchen cars

were required for all movements of 100 or

more military personnel involving a journey of twenty-four hours or more duration.

They might be used for movements of

smaller size or shorter duration if the railroads could provide them.36

At the outset the Army had no special

kitchen cars. The railroads therefore

agreed to furnish without charge, for each

250 troops or fraction thereof (but not for

less than 100), an empty baggage car in

which the Army could install kitchen

equipment. The early practice was to re34

 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 92-93; JMPA 22,

Sec. 23. 35

 WD Cir 209, 6 Oct 41; AR 30-2215, 1 Feb 44,

par. 2; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 256-68. 36

 AR 30-2215, 14 Jun 43, par. 2; AR 30-2215, 1

Feb 44, par. 2, and Changes 2, 27 Jul 45; OCT HB

Monograph 21, pp. 81-83.
22 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

move the kitchen equipment at the end

of each trip and ship it back to the station

of origin and to return the car to the railroad. When troop movements became

a constant operation, the installation and

removal of kitchen equipment was found

to be both time-consuming and costly,

and the wear and tear on the cars was

considerable. The establishment of a permanent pool of converted baggage cars

was then proposed, but the need for

cars in regular baggage service placed

limits on the execution of the plan. The

situation was relieved when the government began to acquire special troop kitchen cars. Nevertheless, baggage cars were

needed for kitchen purposes to the end of

the war, and the somewhat complicated

arrangements concerning their employment were detailed in the Joint Military

Passenger Agreement.37

Special arrangements were necessary in

connection with the operation of the government-owned troop sleepers and troop

kitchen cars that began to enter service

late in 1943. The first order for 1,200

troop sleepers and 400 troop kitchen cars

was placed by the Defense Plant Corporation in March 1943, and a duplicate order

was placed in May 1945.38 The troop

sleepers provided berths for thirty persons,

in ten tiers of three berths each, arranged

crosswise. Although the cars were of simplified design and the facilities were utilitarian, the troop sleepers were adequate

and they were far preferable to coaches

for overnight travel. The troop kitchen

cars also were of simplified design, but

they were well equipped and were a great

improvement over converted baggage

cars. The underlying purpose in the construction of both types of cars was to provide additional troop train equipment

with a minimum expenditure of scarce

materials and production time.39

The operating arrangements pertaining

to these government-owned cars were covered by interlocking contracts between

the Defense Plant Corporation and the

Pullman Company, and between the Association of American Railroads and the

Pullman Company.40 Briefly stated, the

arrangements were as follows: The railroads paid a mileage rate and the Pullman Company paid a rental fee to the

Defense Plant Corporation for the use of

the cars. The Pullman Company operated

and maintained the troop sleepers in

much the same manner as it operated and

maintained its owned equipment. The

Pullman Company assigned the troop

kitchen cars to service in accordance with

the needs of the armed forces, and was responsible for their maintenance as railroad equipment at the expense of the

Defense Plant Corporation; the armed

forces provided and maintained the kitchen equipment, provided the kitchen supplies and mess crews, and were responsible

for interior cleaning.

The principal traffic arrangements

between the armed forces and the carriers

regarding the use of troop sleepers and

troop kitchen cars were included in a spe37

 WD Cir 181, 27 Aug 41, Sec. III; AR 55-135, 31

Aug 42, par. 2; JMPA 22, 1 Jul 45, Sec. 24; OCT HB

Monograph 21, pp. 51-58. 38

 Circumstances leading to the placement of these

orders are discussed in Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 333-34. 39

 These special sleepers and kitchen cars were of

all-steel construction, 54 feet-2 inches long over the

bumpers, and had no vestibules. They had two

4-wheel high-speed trucks and were equipped for

operation in regular passenger train service. For further technical details, see file OCT HB Rail Div

Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars. 40

 Both contracts were published in a pamphlet,

Special Troop Car Contracts, OCT HB Rail Div

Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 23

SPECIALLY DESIGNED GOVERNMENT-OWNED TROOP SLEEPERS and

troop kitchen cars en route to a port.

cial agreement published each year in

connection with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement but not as a part of it.41

For transportation in troop sleepers the

armed forces paid the railroads fares equal

to two thirds of the normal one-way firstclass fares, except that when such fares

were greater than the net military fares

under JMPA the lesser fares were applicable.42

 For Pullman service the armed

forces paid the Pullman Company a troop

sleeper berth rate equal to one third of the

sum of the lower and upper berth rates

applicable to tourist sleeping cars. The

agreement provided that the Pullman

Company would assign troop sleepers only

when tourist sleepers were not available,

but because of the urgent need both types

were continuously in use.

To cover the movement of kitchen cars,

the armed forces paid the carriers (railroads and Pullman Company) a rate of

six cents a mile regardless of whether the

cars were moving in service or out of service. In addition, members of the military

mess crews of kitchen cars paid fares

according to the class of the cars in which

they had passenger accommodations. Requests for the assignment of kitchen cars 41

 Joint Agreement T 3, 14 Apr 45, published with

JMPA 22, embraced changes to date in original agreement of 11 March 1943. 42

 Troop sleeper railroad fares were applicable

throughout the country, although tourist (intermediate) fares applied only west of the Mississippi.
24 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were made to the Pullman Company by

the several armed services when they

arranged for coaches or sleepers to move

their troops. An Army officer was detailed

to the Pullman Company headquarters in

Chicago to co-ordinate these requests and

eliminate unnecessary deadhead mileage.

By agreement among the armed services a

deadhead movement of a kitchen car was

charged to the service for which the last

in-service movement of the car was made.43

During the war the Army built up a

fleet of 320 hospital cars and 60 medical

kitchen cars, and separate arrangements

were made covering the operation of this

equipment over the carriers' lines and the

fares to be paid for the transportation of

patients and attendants.44 The terms that

the Chief of Transportation accepted after

long negotiation and after some of the

hospital cars were already in service were

not satisfactory to him, and he made repeated efforts to have them modified. He

argued that the railroads should not get a

greater revenue from the governmentowned hospital cars than for moving patients in Pullman cars. The railroads were

unwilling to meet his proposal that they

either pay a mileage rate to the government or reduce the fares, but they finally

agreed to assume certain routine servicing

charges retroactively.45 After the war special arrangements were made between the

Army and the railroads concerning the

use of 118 government-owned mortuary

cars, which were employed for transporting the remains of World War II dead

after repatriation from overseas.46

Early in the emergency the railroads,

acting on their own initiative, granted reduced rates to members of the armed

forces traveling at their own expense while

on furlough, leave, or pass. Initially the

reductions varied in the different territories

and they were offered only for limited

periods. The War Department urged the

railroads to adopt uniform rates and to

make the reductions effective for the entire

war period. Eventually this was done.47 A

round-trip coach fare of one and a quarter

cents a mile, good for thirty days from

date of sale, was allowed to members of

the armed forces traveling in uniform and

holding furlough fare identification certificates. This fare was less than the average

that the government paid for troops making official moves.48

 Several bills were introduced in Congress proposing greater

reductions on furlough tickets, but they

were not passed. The War Department

considered the fares adopted voluntarily

by the railroads to be equitable and did

not favor forcing the carriers to furnish

this service at a loss. The department also

opposed a plan to have furloughees pay

one cent a mile and the government pay

the remainder of the tariff fares.49

43

 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 32-36, 74-80. Concerning requests for assignment of kitchen cars, see

Memo, CofT for 6th ZTO, 30 Jun 43, OCT 531.2

Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars. 44

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 381-91; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 36-38; WD Memo W 55-33-43, 10 Aug

43, sub: Trans of Hosp Cars and Trains. 45

 Ltr, DC of Traf Contl Div to W. C. Kendall,

Chm Car Service Div AAR, 31 Jul 43, OCT 080

AAR; Ltr, CofT to John J. Pelley, Pres AAR, 10 May

45, OCT 531.4 Hosp Train; Ltrs, C of Rail Div OCT

for Charles H. Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 16 and 30

May 45, OCT 080 AAR; Ltr, AAR to C of Rail Div

OCT, 30 Jun 45, OCT HB Rail Div Hosp Cars. 46

 Ltr, IMC to CofT, 3 Sep 47, OCT HB Rail Div

Mortuary Cars. 47

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 210-13. 48

 Ltr, SW to Sen H. Styles Bridges, 30 Jun 41; Ltr,

Adm Asst to SW to Sen W. Lee O'Daniel, 1 Apr 42;

both in OSW Trans 501-800; WD Cir 350, 28 Aug

44, Sec. VIII; WD Cir 103, 3 Apr 45, Sec. V. 49

 Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, 14 Jul 41; Ltr,

SW to Sen Burton K. Wheeler, 10 Mar 42; both in

OSW Trans 501-800.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 25

The question was raised whether under

Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce

Act the railroads had authority to allow

fare reductions to members of the armed

forces when they were traveling at their

own expense. This question was removed

by an act of Congress, passed in September

1944, which authorized special furlough

fares.50

The general policy of the bus lines was

to allow special furlough fares, but there

was no uniformity in the fares available in

different sections of the country because of

the varying rate structures. The War Department accordingly instructed servicemen and servicewomen to apply to local

representatives of the motor carriers regarding the availability and the amount

of furlough fares.51

The railroads transported most of the

troops and the working arrangements between them and the armed forces were

complicated; only the basic features have

been mentioned. No simple set of rules

could cover the many departures from

regular tariffs and regular operating practices that were involved in the handling of

military traffic. The arrangements also

fluctuated because the underlying circumstances changed radically when the United

States undertook a large rearmament program in 1940, and again when the nation

became engaged in a global war. Although

there were many disagreements between

the carriers and the Army regarding terms

and conditions, these disagreements did

not affect the actual movement of military

personnel. From that standpoint the Chief

of Transportation, representing the Army,

and the Military Transportation Section,

representing the railroads, literally worked

side by side and were in constant contact

on all matters affecting movements, so

that these matters were dealt with

promptly, and in the great majority of

cases satisfactorily for the Army.52

Army Policies and Procedures

The Army's policy regarding the management of its passenger traffic was essentially one of centralization. The regulations

and instructions covering all aspects of

this traffic were issued by the War Department, and they reflected chiefly the experience and doctrine of the Chief of

Transportation. He was responsible for

all negotiations with the carriers relating

to services, charges, and other traffic arrangements. All agencies of the War

Department in Washington were directed

to apply to him for information on such

matters and to avoid maintaining duplicate staffs.53

 All of the larger organized

groups of Army personnel were routed

under the supervision of the Chief of

Transportation, and he arranged with the

carriers for the necessary equipment and

controlled the timing of the movements

within limits allowed by the movement

orders. This policy of centralization was

maintained throughout the war despite

objections in some quarters and proposals

to modify it.

The efforts to alter the policy came from

two sources. During the summer of 1942 a

50

 PL 436, 78th Cong., 27 Sep 44. Ltr, Armed

Forces to IMG, 8 Nov 46, OCT 551.1 Furlough Fares,

reviewed development of furlough fares and requested

continuance. 51

 WD Cir 350, 28 Aug 44, Sec. VIII, par. 2. 52

 The methods of this collaboration and the major

difficulties will be discussed in later sections of this

chapter. 53

 AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 2. Essentially the

same policy was followed concerning freight traffic,

as will be seen in Ch. IV, below.
26 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

survey of the service commands, conducted by the Control Division of the

Services of Supply headquarters, disclosed

a sentiment in favor of delegating certain

authorities from Washington to the field,

including the authority to route group

movements. The Chief of Transportation

successfully opposed the decentralization

of routing; he argued that central control

was necessary to insure the economical

use of the carriers' equipment, to obtain

an equitable and practical distribution of

traffic among the carriers, to facilitate the

control and diversion of movements en

route, and to permit a national program

to be formulated and timely notice to be

given to the carriers concerning prospective requirements for their services.54

 The

Army Air Forces, which late in 1942 had

obtained a delegation of authority from

the Chief of Transportation to control its

own domestic freight movements, suggested that a similar arrangement be made

with regard to passenger traffic. This suggestion was made informally on a number

of occasions to the Traffic Control Division, but it received no encouragement

from that quarter and probably for that

reason it was not put forward on a higher

level.55

The regulation relating to the size of

groups to be routed in Washington was

changed several times during the emergency. Initially all groups of fifteen or

more were routed by The Quartermaster

General. When the Selective Service Act

was passed in September 1940, it was foreseen that group travel would increase

greatly. The regulation was therefore

changed so that only groups numbering

fifty or more would be routed in Washington. The primary purpose of this change

was to remove the possibility of delay in

the movement of the smaller groups while

routings were being obtained from Washington, and to lighten the burden on The

Quartermaster General. In January 1943

the regulation was changed again, and

routings for groups of forty or more were

thereafter provided by the Chief of Transportation, who in the meantime had taken

over this responsibility from The Quartermaster General. Under the Army plan of

berthing, up to thirty-nine passengers

could be accommodated in a sleeping car,

and the last change was prompted by the

desire to have centralized routing for all

movements involving more than one carload. When a group was not sufficiently

large to require routing in Washington, the

Army transportation officers at the originating stations made arrangements for the

shipments with local representatives of the

carriers.56

Routings provided by the Chief of

Transportation were established by his

Traffic Control Division on the basis of

proposals made by the territorial passenger associations of the railroads. These

associations had representatives in Washington attached to the Military Transportation Section of the Association of

American Railroads. As has been indicated, the main purpose of the associations

in proposing routings was to insure proper

distribution of the traffic among the rail

lines. When the Army regulation was

54

 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 24 Jul 42, sub: Decentralization of Actions; Memo, C of Traf Contl Div

OCT for CofT, 30 Jul 42; both in OCT 323.3 SvCs. 55

 Interv with Morris, 26 Jun 50, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Pass. 56

 AR 30-930, 6 Nov 30, par. 8; WD Cir 101, 12

Sep 40, Sec. II; AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8; WD

Cir 28, 22 Jan 43, Sec. IV. The commonest type of

sleeper had twelve sections and one drawing room,

and the total of thirty-nine resulted from placing three

enlisted men in each section and three in the drawing

room.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 27

changed in September 1940 to permit the

local routing of groups comprising up to

forty-nine men, rather than up to fourteen,

the railroads protested on the ground that

permitting this considerable traffic to be

routed by local Army transportation officers would result in an inequitable distribution of business. As a result of this

protest, arrangements were made that,

when moving groups of from fifteen to

forty-nine, the local transportation officers

would obtain suggested routings from

designated representatives of the carriers

located at or near their installations, who

in turn would be governed by instructions

from the responsible associations.57 Frequently this representative was the nearest

agent of a railroad serving the installation, but full-time agents of the territorial

passenger associations were assigned to

stations where traffic was especially heavy.

The arrangements under which the territorial passenger associations proposed

routings for the larger group movements

relieved the Chief of Transportation of a

heavy responsibility, but they also created

a problem. The Chief of Transportation

could reject a proposed routing if he considered it unsatisfactory from the military

standpoint, in which case the association

concerned endeavored to meet his objection.58

 More often the objection originated

with the Military Transportation Section

because it anticipated difficulty in providing equipment. If the association resisted

changing the route, the Traffic Control

Division was placed in the cross fire of an

argument between the two agencies of the

railroads representing the operating and

the traffic points of view. Col. I. Sewell

Morris, who was in charge of the Passenger Branch of the Traffic Control Division

during the greater part of the war, expressed the opinion that when such a situation arose the manager of the MTS

should have had authority to decide the

issue for the railroads, since the prompt

execution of the movement was the

primary consideration.59

Differences between the operating and

traffic interests of the railroads came out

in another connection. The Army stated

as a general principle that passengers

would be forwarded by the "most economical usually traveled routes."

 60

 The

primary purpose was to insure that advantage would be taken of land-grant rates

wherever they were applicable. In peacetime there was no occasion for deviation

from the principle, but during the war

there were times when the most economical routes were congested and other

routes were more favorable to expeditious

movement. The Military Transportation

Section urged the avoidance of congested

routes and the Chief of Transportation

supported that view. The territorial passenger associations, on the other hand,

favored the "usually traveled routes,"

partly because their plans for the distribution of traffic among the lines were worked

out on the basis of such routings, and

partly because the railroads could not collect higher fares from the government

when they proposed other routes. Here

again the Traffic Control Division contended that, when the operating and

57

 Ltr, OQMG to IMC, 28 Sep 40; Ltr, IMC to

TQMG, 19 Oct 40; both in OCT 511 (AR 30-930). 58

 The associations did not always take such rejections without an argument. See Memo, Morris for Siddall, Chm IMC, 2 May 44, OCT 511; OCT HB

Monograph 21, pp. 17, 18. 59

 See Colonel Morris' monograph, Adequacy of

Transportation Facilities in the United States to Handle Troop Movements of the Military Establishment

During a War Emergency, submitted to the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, 25 Feb 49, p. 52; hereafter cited as Morris monograph. 60

 AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 4a.
28 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

traffic interests of the carriers were in conflict, the operating point of view should

govern.61

Decision as to the type of carrier to be

used in moving military personnel was

made by the routing authority—the

Traffic Control Division for the larger

groups, and post transportation officers

for smaller groups and individuals. Guiding principles for such decisions were set

forth in instructions issued by the War

Department and the Chief of Transportation. In the summer of 1941 the railroads

had reluctantly consented to the change in

the agreement between the armed forces

and the railroads that permitted greater

use of the bus lines and airlines than had

been possible previously. Afterwards they

complained repeatedly when they had

reason to believe that the new clause in

the agreement was being misapplied to

the advantage of the motor carriers. These

complaints involved chiefly routings by

local transportation officers, and late in

1941 railway representatives suggested

that these officers be instructed to confer

with the rail agents near their stations before using any other type of transportation. The Army transportation officials in

Washington refused to go along with this

suggestion, but they investigated each

specific complaint made by the railroads

and in general endeavored to see that the

spirit of the agreement was carried out.62

The question of bus versus rail routing

was particularly acute in connection with

the transportation of selectees. Soon after

the passage of the Selective Service Act in

September 1940, the Army and the Selective Service System agreed that the latter

agency would be responsible for the transportation of men from their homes or

draft boards to the induction stations,

while the Army through its regular transportation machinery would control subsequent movements.63

 The traffic into the

induction stations consequently did not

come under the Joint Military Passenger

Agreement between the armed forces and

the railroads. Buses were well adapted to

handle it since the groups were small and

the distances usually were short. Selective

Service therefore entered into an agreement concerning such movements with

the motor carriers through the National

Bus Traffic Association. Meanwhile, to facilitate rail movements from induction

stations to reception centers, the Interterritorial Military Committee of the railroads established blanket routings, which

dispensed with the necessity of obtaining

a routing for each group. Close collaboration between Army transportation officers

and the Selective Service System was

necessary in order to keep the selectees

moving promptly through the induction

stations. As a result of this collaboration,

groups that the railroads believed should

have been routed by rail were routed out

of the stations by bus. In this case, as in

others, the Chief of Transportation issued

instructions designed to promote strict

observance of the agreement with the rail

carriers.64

The Army's use of commercial buses

increased steadily after the United States

entered the war. There were many points

that were not served directly by rail.

Moreover, routing by highway was en61

 Interv with Morris, 28 Jun 50, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Pass. 62

 OCT HB Monograph 21, pp. 13, 14, 16. See also

Ltr, Western Mil Bur to CofT, 16 Feb 44, sub: Use of

Buses versus RRs, and subsequent correspondence,

OCT 511. 63

 See AR 615-500, 1 Sep 42, par. 12. 64

 OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 264-69; 20, pp.

58-63; 21, pp. 20-25.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 29

couraged by the Traffic Control Division

when short hauls were involved because

of the quicker delivery given by the motor

carriers, their flexibility due to freedom

from fixed terminals, and the limited supply of railroad passenger equipment. The

use of buses for long trips and for large

groups was not favored because of the

lack of sleeping facilities, problems of

messing en route when troop units were

being moved, and the limited space available for baggage that accompanied the

troops. It was the general policy that, except under emergency conditions, routings by highway would be limited to trips

that started after 6:00 A.M. and ended

before the following midnight.65

Use of commercial airlines for military

travel was limited by the scarcity of space

and by the requirement that the most

economical route be used. More than half

of the commercial aircraft in operation in

the zone of interior when the United

States entered the war were requisitioned

by the Army, and the airlines discontinued a 5 percent reduction that they

had been allowing to military personnel.

The Army then made provision for the

use of commercial aircraft, despite the

higher fare, when time or other exigencies

of the service did not permit travel by

other means and military aircraft were

not available or could not be used economically.66

 When the Army began returning requisitioned aircraft late in the

war, some of the airlines reinstated fare

reductions. Since air rates were fluctuating at that time and the reductions were

not uniformly applicable, local transportation officers found it difficult, in cases

not covered by the emergency provision,

to determine when the air route was the

most economical. To overcome this difficulty, the requirement that the most

economical route be always used was temporarily lifted. Late in March 1945, with

a view to the needs of the redeployment

period, transportation officers were instructed that commercial air passage

could be furnished if the cost to the government did not exceed the lowest airline

tariff in effect on 1 March 1945 between

the points involved.67

Of the total traffic moved on War Department transportation requests, for

which data are available only for the

period December 1941 through May

1943, 83.8 percent moved by rail, 16.0

percent by motor, and the remainder by

air and water.68 Of the traffic that moved

in organized groups under routings provided by the central routing authority in

Washington, data for which are available

throughout the period December 1941-

December 1945, 97.25 percent moved by

rail and 2.75 percent by bus. (Tables 1 and

2 and Chart 1) The fact that travel by bus

constituted a considerably larger percentage of the total traffic than of the organized

group traffic routed in Washington reflects

the policy of using buses only for travel by

individuals and small parties and for the

shorter trips.

The Army-owned motor vehicles included in the organic equipment of troop

units were used in executing troop movements so far as practicable, but the relief

that they afforded the commercial carriers was not great. Organic vehicles were

trucks and hence not well adapted to

65

 OCT Cir 18, 12 Jun 42, par. 9a; WD Cir 358, 4

Sep 44, Sec. IV, par. 2c. 66

 AR 55-120, 26 Apr 43, sub: Trans of Indiv,

par. 3b. 67

 Ltr, Fiscal Dir ASF to Comptroller Gen of the

U.S., 22 Mar 43, AG 584.1 (24 Mar 45); WD Cir 95,

27 Mar 45, Sec. I; OCT HB Monograph 21, pp.

18-20. 68

 See n. 4, above.
30 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 1—ARMY PASSENGERS MOVED BY COMMERCIAL RAIL AND Bus IN ORGANIZED GROUPS

ON ROUTINGS PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON:

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945

 a

a

 Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed In Washington, thereafter groups of forty or more.

b

 Figures for bus traffic are number of passengers routed; the number actually moved was slightly less, but data are not available.

Source: Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume

of this series, now in preparation.

TABLE 2—ANALYSIS OF ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC MOVED BY RAIL IN ORGANIZED GROUPS

ON ROUTINGS PROVIDED BY CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON: DECEMBER

1941-DECEMBER 1945

 a

a

 Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington, thereafter groups of forty or more. b

 Includes only sleepers and coaches through June 1945; hospital cars are also included beginning in July 1945.

Source: Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume

of this series, now in preparation.

long, continuous troop hauls. Problems of

bivouac and messing were involved in

making long trips by motor, and delays

en route for these purposes made such

movements slow compared with those accomplished by rail. When troops were

being transferred without their equipment, the round trip of the vehicles, with

empty backhaul, was an expensive mode

of transportation. During the early part of

the war Army regulations sanctioned the

use of organic vehicles for movements up

to 500 miles at the discretion of the agency

initiating the movement order; in April

1943 the distance was reduced to 350

miles, but within a few months it was extended again to 500 miles for administrative movements and 600 miles for training

movements in or out of maneuver areas.

The latter action was taken in order to
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 31

CHART 1—ARMY PASSENGERS MOVED MONTHLY BY RAIL AND Bus IN ORGANIZED GROUPS

ON ROUTINGS PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON:

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945*

* Up to January 1943 all groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington; thereafter groups of forty or more. Rail

figures are passengers actually moved; bus figures are passengers routed, some of whom did not actually move.

Source: Data originally compiled by Traffic Control Division, OCT, and reworked for a statistical volume of this series,

now in preparation.

afford as much relief as possible to the

railroads.69

The many types of passengers moved

under Army auspices necessitated rather

elaborate regulations regarding the types

of railway accommodations to be furnished. In brief, the following arrangements were in effect: standard sleeping

car accommodations or parlor car seats

(designated in the transportation requests

as first class) were furnished to commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers

of the first three grades, nurses, and dependents of military personnel making a

permanent change of station; noncommissioned officers below the third grade and

enlisted men were furnished tourist sleeping car accommodations (intermediate

class) if the journey exceeded twelve hours

and ended after midnight, otherwise they

were furnished seats in day coaches (coach

class).70 Tourist cars were the older types

of standard sleeping cars for which the

same fare was charged as for coaches, plus

a berth rate smaller than that for standard sleeping cars. The carriers did not 69

 WD Cir 193, 16 Jun 42, par. 2; WD Cir 102, 15

Apr 43, par. 2; WD Cir 189, 21 Aug 43, Sec. IV, par.

2. These regulations ostensibly applied also to movements by commercial buses, but in that respect the

Traffic Control Division considered them in conflict

with the Joint Military Passenger Agreement and did

not give them effect. See Memo, Traf Contl Div for

Adm Div OCT, 17 Feb 43, par. 6, OCT 511; WD Cir

233, 10 Jun 44, Sec. IV, par. 2; Interv with Morris,

20 Jul 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. 70

 AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, sub: Sleeping Car and

Similar Accommodations, par. 2; WD TM 55-525,

June 1945, Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations.
32 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

make enough sleepers available to accommodate all the troops entitled to them

under the regulations. When a shortage of

sleepers occurred at a particular point,

those available were assigned to the troops

making the longer journeys.

Except under circumstances specified

in the regulation, transportation requests

were to call for through transportation for

the entire journey directed in the travel

orders. The purpose of this requirement

was to prevent the "splitting" of transportation requests—issuing one request for

coaches for the day portion and another

for sleeping car accommodations for the

night portion of the same trip—a practice

that would have wasted transportation

equipment. The railroads objected to the

splitting of transportation requests also on

the ground that it deprived them of revenue—that is, sleeping car rates for the

entire journey.7l

When groups of enlisted men traveled

in tourist or standard sleeping cars, two

men were assigned to each lower berth

and one to each upper.72 This in effect increased the capacity of a car by 50 percent as compared with regular traffic. The

Navy assigned only one enlisted man to a

lower berth during the greater part of the

war, although an effort was made in the

fall of 1942 to have it adopt the Army

practice. After redeployment began and

the need for sleeping accommodations for

long hauls became exceptionally heavy,

the Director of Defense Transportation

proposed that four servicemen be assigned

to each section. The Army declined to go

along with this proposal on the ground

that it was not "practical" to place two in

every berth since double berthing was not

satisfactory for large men. It objected also

to the application of such a rule to the

armed services while civilians were permitted to engage a berth for one person.

The Army again appealed to the Navy to

place two enlisted men in each lower

berth, but the Navy again declined on

grounds of "health, morals, and comfort."

The issue between the Army and the

Navy was resolved in July 1945, when the

Office of Defense Transportation ordered

that three men be assigned to each sleeping car section in all organized military

movements.73

When groups of enlisted men were

moved in day coaches, the Army used as

many of the seats as was considered feasible. On day trips 90 percent of the seating

capacity was used for passengers, the remainder being reserved for their personal

equipment. In the beginning, when overnight trips were made in coaches, only

one soldier was assigned to each double

seat in order that the men might obtain as

much rest as possible. Later, when the

shortage of passenger cars became acute,

the practice was changed and three men

were assigned to two double seats. When

coaches with reclining seats were made

available for overnight trips, the 90-percent rule was applied. While as a general

practice Army transportation officers and

railroad officials were governed by these

standards, heavier or lighter loading

sometimes occurred when conditions required it.74

Individuals traveling first class at government expense were entitled, under an

act of Congress, to transportation "not to

71

 AR 55-110, 22 Jan 43, sub: Trans Requests, par.

l0a; OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 44. 72

 AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, par. 2c(1). 73

 OCT HB Monographs 20, p. 54; 22, p. 86; Ltr,

ODT to USW, 30 Jun 45, and reply, 4 Jul 45, OCT

HB Gross ODT; Ltr, SW to SN, 5 Jul 45, and reply,

13 Jul 45; both in G-4 510, Vol. III; Memo, Col Luke

W. Finlay for Gross, 17 Jul 45, pp. 2, 3, OCT HB

Gross Day File; ODT GO 56, 20 Jul 45. 74

 AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par 6b; Changes 1, 26 Apr

43; Ltr, Lasher to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 18 Dec 43,

OCT 511.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 33

exceed the lowest first-class rate." The

Comptroller General had interpreted this

to limit accommodations to lower berths

or parlor car seats on trains to which the

standard first-class fare applied. During

the war these requirements worked a

hardship on officers who were traveling

under closely planned schedules, since

they either had to forego the use of extrafare trains with consequent delays or had

to pay the difference from their per diem

allowance. To remedy this situation, the

Army obtained from the Comptroller

General a revised ruling that permitted

the use of extra-fare trains when it was

determined by the authority directing the

travel that the mission could not be accomplished by the use of regular-fare

trains. Officers using extra-fare trains

were limited to lower berths when the

trains offered such accommodations, or to

the lowest cost accommodation on trains

that offered only superior accommodations. Provision was made for couriers carrying secret documents as hand baggage

to occupy superior accommodations when

this was considered desirable from the

standpoint of security.75

The problems connected with the transportation of Negro troops constitute a very

broad subject, and no attempt will be

made here to discuss them in detail.76 It

was an Army policy that there should be

no discrimination between whites and

Negroes, and the Chief of Transportation

endeavored to enforce that policy to the

extent of his ability. On special trains and

buses operated under Army control enforcement was not difficult, but a different

situation prevailed when the regularly

scheduled services of the carriers were involved. In certain states the laws required

segregation, and the Army took the attitude that such laws should be obeyed

when military personnel used public conveyances for official or personal travel.

Efforts by carriers' employees to enforce

the laws, sometimes tempered by personal

prejudices, created many unpleasant situations for Negro servicemen. Complaints

received by the War Department, sometimes directly and sometimes through

members of Congress or civic groups, were

investigated carefully to ascertain the facts

and to correct abuses. The railroads were

requested to use special care to supply

Negro troops with equal accommodations.

Service commanders were requested to

see that equal treatment was provided by

bus operators serving Army installations

and were informed that vehicles would be

made available from the Transportation

Corps' bus pool to assist them. These and

other measures only partially met the situation since the Army had no means of offsetting the segregation laws or of counteracting sectional attitudes.77

The railroads were committed to providing special sleepers whenever a group

75

 AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 8a; Changes 12, 2

May 44; Changes 14, 15 Dec 44. Documents relating

to Army efforts before and during the war to change

the "lowest first-class rate" rule are in AG 500

(6-2-37)(l) and AG 510 (1 Dec 42). See also OCT HB

Monograph 20, pp. 46-48. 76

 Problems connected with transportation of Negro

troops are dealt with in Maj. Ulysses G. Lee, Jr., The

Employment of Negro Troops in World War II, a

volume in preparation for this series. 77

 An indication of the relation of the Transportation Corps to this subject is given in the following: Ltr,

Gross to Joseph B. Eastman, ODT, 23 Nov 42, OCT

HB Gross Day File; Memo, Finlay for Gross, 13 Aug

42, sub: "Jim Crow" Laws; Memo, Gross for ASW, 19

Jul 43, sub: Trans Facilities for Negroes; Ltr, Gross to

Pelley, Pres AAR, 19 Jul 43, and reply, 21 Jul 43; last

four in OCT 531.7 Discrimination; Memo, Maj Gen

George Grunert for Somervell, 19 Jul 43; Ltr, CofT

for CG 4th SvC, 30 Jul 43 (and similar ltrs to other

SvCs); last two in OCT 510 Negro; Memo, Maj Gen

Wilhelm D. Styer for CofT, 13 Apr 44, sub: Trans

Facilities for Negro Troops, and related correspondence, OCT 511.
34 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of fifteen or more soldiers was to be

moved. As a measure of economy in the

use of transportation the Army endeavored to ask for special cars only when all

berths could be filled. The Chief of Transportation preferred movements in special

cars to movements in cars that were available to the public and encouraged post

transportation officers to combine small

groups whenever possible so that special

cars would be justified. Similarly, movements by special trains were preferred to

movements by special cars attached to

regular trains. When special troop cars

were added to regular trains the public

facilities were likely to be overcrowded,

especially the dining cars, and this situation was a source of dissatisfaction and

disorder. Also, the assignment of administrative and medical staffs to special troop

trains and the use of troop kitchen cars

simplified the problems of control and

discipline. Special trains, moreover, could

be routed from Army post to Army post,

whereas when troops were moved by regular trains the Army was obliged either to

furnish motor transportation to and from

the railway terminals or to pay switching

charges for the transfer of special cars between Army posts and railway terminals.78

Procedures within the War Department

for the accomplishment of troop movements involved a number of agencies. The

authority to initiate movement orders was

different for different types of moves.

Domestic movements necessitated by permanent changes of station might be

ordered by the Operations Division of the

War Department General Staffer by the

commanding generals of the Army

Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, or

the Army Service Forces for troops of their

respective commands. Domestic movements called for by temporary changes of

station might be ordered by OPD, by the

commanding generals of the AGF, the

AAF, the ASF, and the defense commands, or by subordinate elements of

those commands acting within policies

established by the respective commanders.

Orders for movements to ports of embarkation for shipment overseas always

originated in OPD, which acted in accordance with strategic decisions of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and in collaboration

with the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF. The

Mobilization Division of ASF headquarters, in addition to preparing movement

orders for ASF troops, prepared the supply and transportation sections of movement orders relating to AGF and AAF

troops. The Mobilization Division also

acted as a co-ordinating agency between

OPD, the commanders of the forces, and

the Chief of Transportation with regard to

the actual movement of troops and their

equipment.79 The Chief of Transportation,

however, maintained direct contact with

all these agencies from the earliest stages

of their planning in order to advise them

on transportation matters and to obtain

information on impending movements as

far in advance as possible.

The transportation officers at Army

posts where troop movements originated

had an exacting role, and the Chief of

Transportation saw to it that they were

fully instructed.80 They obtained routings

78

 AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, sub: Sleeping Car and

Similar Accommodations, par. 2a(2); Interv with

Morris, 4 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. 79

 WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 1; WD Cir 358, 4

Sep 44, Sec. IV; ASF Manual M 301, 31 Jan 44, Sec.

201.04 Mob Div. 80

 For appointments and duties of local transportation officers, see AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 3, and

Changes 13, 22 May 44, and 14, 15 Dec 44; AR 55-5,

5 Oct 42, par. 5; WD Cir 229, 24 Sep 43, par. 6.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 35

and ordered transportation equipment for

individuals and small groups traveling

from their posts, and they administered

the arrangements made by the Chief of

Transportation for the movement of larger

groups, thus working closely with local

railway officials and bus operators. They

collaborated with the transportation officers of the units to be moved to insure

that both personnel and impedimenta

were ready for shipment and loaded according to plan. They were responsible for

providing adequate tracks, ramps, and

other transportation facilities at their stations. In addition to the War Department

regulations and circulars pertaining to

passenger traffic, the Chief of Transportation prepared a "commercial traffic bulletin," which was issued from time to time

"by order of the Secretary of War," to

provide detailed instructions for local

transportation officers.81 He also endeavored through field conferences conducted

by his Traffic Control Division and frequent visits by representatives of his zone

transportation offices to keep the post

transportation officers fully informed

regarding the detailed instructions emanating from Washington and the reasons

for the procedures prescribed.

The policies and procedures pertaining

to Army passenger traffic were necessarily

complex. Throughout the war the Chief

of Transportation despite some opposition

was able to maintain the key policy—that

of centralized control over the routing and

movements of groups of more than one

carload. The Chief of Transportation also

had a good measure of success in the basic

task of obtaining a high level of performance from the many local transportation

officers, although lack of experience on

the part of some of those officers and the

fact that he had no command authority

over them imposed handicaps.

Mobilization and Conservation

of Railroad Equipment

Obtaining rail equipment promptly

and using it in the most effective manner

were basic problems that confronted the

Transportation Corps throughout the war.

Obviously these were matters in which

thorough co-operation between the military authorities and the carriers was

necessary.

When troops were moved in small

groups in regular train service or in special

cars attached to regular trains, the railroads' task of providing the necessary

equipment was relatively simple, but

when large movements were to be accomplished a different situation obtained.

Large movements were made in special

trains and the troops' organic equipment

was usually transferred at the same time,

so that in addition to sleeping cars and

coaches, baggage cars, kitchen cars, and

freight cars were required. In divisional

movements hundreds of cars of all types

had to be assembled at the station of

origin, and this sometimes meant drawing

on numerous railroads and deadheading

the cars for considerable distances. When

heavy troop movements suddenly became

necessary following the attack on Pearl

Harbor, one of the railroads' biggest problems was that of gathering the required

equipment at the training camps

promptly. Many of the camps were far

removed from railway centers where cars

81

 The bulletin was discontinued for a period for

economy reasons but was reinstated by WD Cir 305,

22 Nov 43, Sec. II. WD TM 55-205, 25 Aug 44, sub:

Trans in ZI, was primarily for the guidance of local

transportation officers.
36 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

80TH DIVISION TROOPS ARRIVING AT CAMP FORREST, Tennessee, June 1942.

usually were accumulated for commercial

purposes. As the war progressed ways had

to be found of solving this problem.

The number of cars required for divisional movements varied according to the

type of the division and the circumstances

under which the move was made. In the

summer of 1942 the following equipment

was used in moving a triangular infantry

division: 442 tourist sleepers, 48 standard

sleepers, 89 baggage cars, 90 kitchen cars,

1,124 flatcars, and 89 boxcars. The total

of 1,882 cars moved in 63 trains. At about

the same time, the equipment needed for

moving an armored division embraced

382 tourist sleepers, 23 standard sleepers,

1 baggage car, 67 kitchen cars, and 1,748

flatcars. These 2,221 cars moved in 69

trains.82 It is obvious even to the layman

that the assembling of so many cars and

the required number of locomotives, as

well as the prompt loading and orderly

movement of so many trains to a single

destination, was a feat that required careful planning and meticulous execution.

Divisional movements, although many

of them were made during the war, were

not an everyday occurrence. Most movements by special train involved smaller

troop units or groups of replacements, and

many such movements were started each

day of the war. As already stated, during

the spring of 1943, when organized troop

movements were especially heavy, the

Chief of Transportation reported that special troop trains were departing from their

loading points at intervals of about six

minutes throughout the twenty-four-hour

day. More significant, perhaps, are the

82

 See author's Memo, 6 Aug 42, sub: Rail Equip

for Moving a Division, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 37

TABLE 3—RAILROAD CARS USED BY THE ARMY IN MOVING ORGANIZED GROUPS AND

THEIR IMPEDIMENTA ROUTED BY THE CENTRAL ROUTING AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON:

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945 a

a

 Up to January 1943 groups of fifty or more were routed in Washington; thereafter forty or more. Figures are estimated through

August 1942. b

 Includes standard sleepers, tourist sleepers, and government-owned troop sleepers. c

 Flatcars were lumped with boxcars in 1945. d

 Indicates increased use of hospital cars and kitchen cars.

Source: Data originally compiled by Traffic Control Division, OCT, from reports of Association of American Railroads, and reworked

for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

figures given in Table 3, which indicate

that in one month (April 1943) a total of

36,598 passenger and freight cars were

used by the Army in special troop trains

or as special cars attached to regular

trains, and that the monthly average during 1943 was 28,815 cars. These figures, it

should be noted, do not comprehend troop

movements made in regular train service

or troops traveling on furlough, leave, or

pass and do not include personnel of the

other armed services.

The amount of equipment at the

disposal of the carriers to meet the military need and the heavy civilian demand

was relatively constant throughout the

war. Although a special effort was made

to keep all cars in serviceable condition,

some had to be retired, and the ordering

of new equipment was severely limited by
38 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 4—PASSENGER TRAIN CARS OWNED OR LEASED BY THE CARRIERS AT THE END OF

EACH YEAR: 1940-1945

a

 Includes coaches, combination coaches, parlor, sleeping, dining, club, lounge, and observation cars. b

 Includes government-owned special troop sleepers and kitchen cars, as well as standard and tourist sleepers and parlor cars.

Source: Association of American Railroads, Railroad Transport, A Statistical Record, 1911-1948 (Washington, November 1948), p. 21.

the demand that the military program

made on steel and other strategic materials. Under these circumstances the increase in the total number of passenger

cars, including those built for the government, was modest indeed. (Table 4) Steps

were taken to eliminate some of the less

essential travel. The carriers themselves

combined or "pooled" certain of their

services to resort areas in order to release

equipment for other purposes. They converted more than 800 lounge and parlor

cars into the more necessary sleepers and

coaches. The Office of Defense Transportation stopped the operation of special

trains for conventions and sporting events

and limited the operation of extra trains

and extra sections on the heavily traveled

routes.83 A campaign was undertaken to

encourage the voluntary curtailment of

unnecessary travel. Despite these measures

the increase in traffic far outstripped the

increase in passenger accommodations,

and the wartime demand was met chiefly

through a concerted effort for the more

efficient and intensive employment of the

equipment on hand.

Responsibility for assigning adequate

railway equipment to troop movements

and for enforcing economy in its use rested

primarily with two agencies representing

the Army and the railroads respectively.

The Army's interests were the responsibility of the Traffic Control Division in the

Office of the Chief of Transportation, and

more particularly the Passenger Branch of

that division. While the chief of the division and his deputy dealt with matters of

policy and participated in conferences relating to especially large movements, the

Passenger Branch handled the day-to-day

arrangements. It maintained contact with

the carriers, gave them information regarding contemplated troop movements

and the numbers and types of cars required, and checked to insure that the

proper equipment was promptly provided.

It dealt with local Army transportation

officers to insure that arrangements were

made for the prompt entrainment and

detrainment of troops and that the cars

83

 For a summary of these controls, see Office of Defense Transportation, Civilian War Transport (Washington, 1948), pp. 81-86.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 39

were fully loaded and eventually turned

back to the railroads in good condition. In

the fall of 1942 the Car Service Section

was established in the Passenger Branch to

review all prospective troop movements

and prepare co-ordinated plans that would

avoid deadheading equipment so far as

possible. The staff of this section consisted

of specialists who had been employed by

the Pullman Company or the railroads.84

The Military Transportation Section,

Car Service Division, Association of American Railroads, represented the rail carriers in these matters. All requests for

equipment and train schedules, as well as

complaints regarding the railroads' handling of movements, were channeled

through it. The fact that the MTS office

was located adjacent to the Traffic Control

Division in the Pentagon facilitated the

constant interchange of information and

the joint planning in which the two agencies engaged. While the MTS dealt directly with the individual railroads to a

large extent, it was aided in the performance of its functions by thirteen district

offices of the Car Service Division whose

jurisdictions covered the entire United

States.

Although the Military Transportation

Section had no direct authority over the

employment of the carriers' passenger

equipment, the railroads followed its instructions because those instructions were

based on military requirements. For the

same reason the Pullman Company endeavored to provide the cars requested by

the MTS. This voluntary co-operation

worked satisfactorily until the redeployment of troops began after the surrender

of Germany. Then, because it was evident

that much heavier demands would have

to be made on the carriers in order to satisfy the military need, the Office of Defense

Transportation assumed control over the

employment of all passenger, baggage,

and express cars of the railroads. W. C.

Kendall, chairman of the AAR Car Service Division, was appointed agent to administer this control, subject to the general

supervision of the Director of the ODT

Railway Transport Department.85

The co-operation of the Pullman

Company in supplying equipment remained on a voluntary basis. Control

over the distribution of its equipment was

exercised by a superintendent of car service at the company's headquarters in Chicago. He was aided by branch offices

scattered throughout the country, which

kept him informed of the location of equipment and the prospective demand in their

localities. The Military Transportation

Section made daily reports to the Pullman

Company regarding the future needs of

the armed forces for sleeping cars in the

various districts. On the basis of these reports, Pullman equipment was assigned to

six regional distribution points, which

controlled its further assignment. In July

1945, in view of the extraordinarily heavy

demand for sleepers on the Atlantic seaboard for troops being redeployed and repatriated from Europe, the car service

superintendent of the Pullman Company

placed a representative in the office of the

MTS to obtain information regarding

requirements as early as possible and to

co-ordinate the actual assignment of

equipment.

The usual procedure by which equipment was obtained for a troop movement

was as follows: As soon as the Traffic Control Division had definite advice that a

group was to be moved, it obtained full

information regarding the composition of 84

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 33-36, 81-84. 85

 ODT GO 55, effective 17 Jul 45.
40 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the group from the Army transportation

officer at the station of origin. This information included the unit designations, the

number of officers and enlisted men involved, the weight and measurement of

the impedimenta, the anticipated time

and place of entrainment, and the types of

rolling stock desired.86 After the route had

been established, in the manner already

described, the Traffic Control Division requested the Military Transportation Section to arrange for the execution of the

movement. The MTS notified the Car

Service Division manager in the district in

which the movement was to originate and

also the originating railroad. The rail line

then began assembling the required

coaches, baggage cars, and freight cars

and notified the appropriate Pullman

Company representative of the number of

sleepers needed. If the required number of

sleepers was not provided, the rail line

undertook to provide coaches instead. If

the railroad found it difficult to obtain

sufficient equipment to meet the need, the

district manager of the Car Service Division was called on for help. If he was unable to overcome the difficulty, he asked

for aid from the MTS, which could bring

heavier pressure to bear on the carriers

serving the area.87

A special procedure was adopted by the

Traffic Control Division when an exceptionally large port-bound movement—a

division or an equivalent number of

troops—was to be made. The assembling

of so much equipment inevitably posed a

difficult problem for the carriers, and

strict compliance with schedules was of

great importance. In such instances the

Traffic Control Division sent a representative to the station of origin, where all

arrangements for the movement were

worked out in conference. This conference

was attended, as circumstances required,

by representatives of the post transportation officer, the commander of the port of

destination, the G-4 of the division to be

moved, the Military Transportation Section, the Car Service Division district

office, the territorial passenger association,

the Pullman Company, and the railroads

involved. The conference took place soon

after the movement order was issued, usually several weeks in advance of the departure date. The requirements for passenger

and freight equipment were studied, the

sources of the equipment were agreed on,

the make-up and loading schedules of the

several trains were planned, and train

schedules from point of origin to destination were established. These arrangements

were considered tentative, but changes did

not often become necessary.88

Despite the close co-operation of all

parties and the measures taken by the

Army to ease the carriers' problems, there

were delays in furnishing equipment.

During the greater part of the war about

25 percent of the railroads' 14,000 linehaul coaches were in military service, and

after redeployment began the percentage

was larger. The railroads understandably

endeavored to protect the regular services

that the Office of Defense Transportation

permitted them to maintain, while at the

same time trying to meet the military requirements. The demand for coaches

being what it was, this policy called for

exceedingly close calculation and careful

management, and sometimes the available

equipment could not be made to meet all

needs promptly. When the departure of

movements was advanced by the Army

86

 AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8b. 87

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 38-46. 88

 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 41

CHART 2—REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES ACCOMPLISHED IN PULLMAN-OPERATED SLEEPING

CARS AND PARLOR CARS: 1939-1945*

* Military traffi c includes the personnel of all armed forces moved in organized groups in special cars and special

trains/ regular traffic includes civilian and military personnel who traveled in regularly scheduled trains. Includes traffi c

hauled in government-owned, Pullman-operated troop sleepers.

** Distribution between regular and troop traffic not available for 1939 and 1940.

Source: Annual Reports, Pullman, Incorporated.

ahead of the time originally contemplated,

the problem was intensified.

The Pullman Company frequently

failed to supply the sleepers required by

the Army. Beginning early in the war all

of its tourist sleepers—about 2,200 in

number—were regularly assigned to movements of the armed forces, and a varying

number of its 4,000 standard sleepers were

so utilized. Late in 1943 the new government-owned troop sleepers began to enter

its fleet. At the end of 1944 the Pullman

Company indicated that about half of its

sleeping car equipment had been steadily

engaged in troop transportation. A few

days before Germany surrendered, the

company stated that since Pearl Harbor it

had transported more than 26,000,000

members of the armed forces in organized

groups.89 Yet in each year the passengermiles accomplished in regular Pullman

services (sleeping car and parlor car) exceeded the mileage accomplished in handling organized movements for the armed

forces. (Chart 2) Like the railroads, the

Pullman Company endeavored to protect

its regular services while complying with

requests from the military authorities.

It was understood that if the Pullman

Company could not supply sleepers as requested, the railroads and the Traffic Control Division would be notified not later

89

 Annual Rpts, Pullman Incorporated, 1944, p. 5;

1945, p. 6; AAR, Interesting Facts About the Railroads, 3 May 45; all in OCT HB Topic Pullman

Company.
42 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

than 5:00 P. M. on the second day before

the contemplated departure. In such a

case, the originating railroad undertook,

with the aid of the Association of American Railroads when necessary, to provide

coaches in substitution for sleepers. If it

was found that coaches could not be

made available, such information was to

be given to the Traffic Control Division

not later than noon of the day preceding

the movement. In this event, the division

in consultation with the military authority

that had ordered the movement determined whether that movement should be

postponed or the equipment obtained by

deferring another movement of lower priority.90

 The Traffic Control Division impressed upon the carriers, however, that it

would not be satisfied simply with notification that sleepers or coaches were not

available. It took the position that, while

postponements might become necessary,

there should be relatively few and that the

carriers should make extraordinary efforts

to avoid this necessity.

No purpose would be served by presenting in detail the many complaints

registered by the Chief of Transportation

because sleepers or coaches were not supplied as requested or by reviewing the

explanations offered by the carriers. General Gross and his staff sometimes felt that

the carriers had been negligent, either in

not providing equipment or in not giving

sufficient advance notice that requests for

cars could not be met. In most cases the

carriers believed that there were justifying

circumstances.91

While pressing the carriers to meet its

requests for equipment fully and promptly,

the Army undertook to improve its own

procedures and so alleviate the shortage of

cars. One of the problems during the early

part of the war was the short notice given

the Chief of Transportation by the commands ordering troop movements and the

consequent short time allowed the carriers

to assemble cars. An inquiry covering a

period of ninety days showed that in about

56 percent of the cases the notice was less

than forty-eight hours ahead of actual

starting time.92 Beginning early in 1943

corrective measures were taken, under

which the Chief of Transportation was informed regarding prospective movements

as soon as the plans began to take definite

shape and was notified of actually ordered

movements at least seventy-two hours in

advance in all except emergency cases.93

Through frequent contacts with the

agencies that issued troop movement

orders, the Passenger Branch was able to

gather information that enabled it to visualize the requirements for railroad equipment far ahead. When sizable movements—regiments or larger—were being

planned, the branch was given an opportunity to look over the equipment situation

and the progress of movements already

scheduled, and then to indicate to the

90

 See WD CTB 35, 10 Jul 45, sub: Troop Mvmts—

RR Equip. 91

 The following documents illustrate the complaints filed by the Chief of Transportation: Ltr,

Morris to Gass, 7 Dec 43, OCT 511 Main 64884; Ltr,

Morris to Gass, 19 Feb 44, OCT 511; Ltr, Morris to

Gass, 27 Apr 44, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts;

Ltr, Morris to Trunk Line-Central Pass Assn, 30 Aug

44, OCT 511 Fort Meade (Main 20363); Ltr, Morris

to Western Mil Bur, 30 Sep 44, OCT 511; Ltr, Lt. Col

Bert E. White to Pullman Co., 27 Feb 45, OCT 531.7

Train Service. 92

 Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report

(hereafter cited as ASF MPR), May 43, p. 60. Such

short notice was more likely to occur with the smaller

than with the larger units. 93

 Memo, CG SOS for CGs All SvCs, COs All Posts,

et al., 8 Dec 42, sub: Co-ordination of Troop Mvmts,

AG 370.5 (11-24-42); WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par.

2b(4); WD Cir 358, 4 Sep 44, Sec. IV, par. 2b(1);

OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 71-81.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 43

commands concerned on what dates additional movements could be best handled.

As soon as such movements were tentatively fixed, they were posted on a control

board in the Passenger Branch from which

the branch worked in its endeavor to

avoid scheduling too much traffic from a

particular area during a particular period.

This board sometimes showed divisional

movements six months in advance of their

departure.94

Another important Army measure

affecting the employment of rail equipment was the investing of the Chief of

Transportation with authority to change

the departure time of troop movements

when the equipment situation warranted.

Such authority was given his office in

April 1943 for movements routed in Washington—that is, groups of forty or more—

and the same authority was soon given to

post transportation officers in regard to

the smaller groups that they routed.95

Emergency movements naturally were

excepted from these arrangements. Under

this procedure the orders covering nonemergency movements gave approximate

dates of departure or dates between which

the movements should be made, and the

Chief of Transportation or the post transportation officers could advance or retard

the time of departure within the limits

stated. Thus a movement destined for a

particular installation could be put forward or delayed so that the same equipment could be used for a movement leaving

the same or a nearby installation. The

ability to adjust the time of departure also

facilitated the consolidation of small

groups to insure the full utilization of car

space.

The advance information received by

the Chief of Transportation regarding contemplated movements and his authority

to advance or retard the actual time of

departure brought very substantial results

in the conservation of railway equipment.

The most spectacular example was the

utilization of the same railway equipment

to move seven divisions from seven different installations with only a small amount

of deadhead mileage. The Car Service

Section of the Passenger Branch, on the

basis of its day-to-day planning to improve

the utilization of passenger cars, calculated that between the time of its establishment in November 1942 and the end

of hostilities it enabled 41,000 sleeping

cars to make trips that otherwise could

not have been made. This meant additional berths for at least 1,400,000

soldiers.96

The Army also undertook to eliminate

practices at camps and other installations

that were wasteful of car time. Before the

United States entered the war, post transportation officers frequently called in railroad equipment as soon as a unit received

warning of an impending move. This gave

the carriers opportunity to draw equipment from sources where it could be most

readily spared and also enabled the post

transportation officer and the commander

of troops to inspect the cars thoroughly

and to entrain at their convenience. During the war this leisurely method of using

equipment could not be permitted. Soon

after Pearl Harbor all agencies issuing

warning orders were directed to include in

such orders a stipulation that delivery of

94

 Interv with Morris, 16 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Pass. 95

 Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 19 Mar

43, sub: Change in WD Cir 193; Memo, C of Traf

Contl Div for C of Adm Div OCT, 29 Jul 43; both in

OCT 511; WD Cir 102, 15 Apr 43, par. 26; WD Cir

229, 24 Sep 43, pars. 1 and 2. 96

 Morris monograph, cited above, p. 40; Interv

with Morris, 16 Aug 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Pass.
44 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

railroad cars would not be requested until

the actual time for departure had been

fixed.97 Cancellations of movement orders

or deferments of movements shortly before

departure time also were wasteful of

equipment, since the assigned cars were

kept idle until they could be reassigned.

The Chief of Transportation undertook to

impress upon military authorities the necessity of avoiding last-minute changes in

movement orders so far as possible.98

In its efforts to improve the utilization

of railway equipment and bring about

closer co-ordination in handling military

movements, the Traffic Control Division

supplemented the written instructions to

the field with regional conferences. Following the inauguration of new procedures

for troop movements in the spring of 1943,

Colonel Morris, as chief of the Passenger

Branch, held a series of conferences

throughout the country, which were attended by the transportation officers of

Army installations and representatives of

the Association of American Railroads,

the territorial passenger associations, and

the individual rail lines. Regional conferences held in the headquarters cities of the

nine service commands and at San Francisco in February and March 1944 were

attended by Colonels Williamson and

Lasher, chief and deputy chief of the

Traffic Control Division, and by the heads

of their traffic branches. Army transportation officers and railroad representatives

were informed explicitly concerning the

performance that was expected in the accomplishment of troops movements. They

were given full opportunity to ask questions, make complaints, or otherwise present their problems. Similar "field forums"

were held at later dates. The consensus

was that excellent results were achieved in

this way—results affecting not only troop

movements but other aspects of the Traffic

Control Division's work as well.99

Although the efficient employment of

passenger cars was the chief problem,

attention also had to be given to the economical use of freight cars in moving troop

impedimenta. This was true particularly

of flatcars, which were required for many

large items, such as trucks, tanks, and

artillery. Early in the war the Chief of

Transportation put forward the idea that

a considerable saving of freight cars could

be accomplished by permanently assigning heavy organic equipment to training

centers instead of moving this equipment

each time a unit was moved. The system

was tried first with motor vehicles and

later with other equipment. It not only

saved railway cars but also spared the

government heavy freight costs. In April

1943, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, commanding the Army Ground Forces, reported that, in moving four armored divisions, two motorized divisions, and one

infantry division, the new system had reduced the requirement for rail equipment

by 8,743 cars and had saved the government more than $2,500,000 in transportation charges. He also reported substantial

savings in the movement of smaller

units.100

At some Army training camps the

inadequacy of rail facilities on the reservations and the limited capacity of the connecting rail lines hindered dispatch of

97

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS G-3, 9 Jan 42, sub:

Ordering RR Equip, G-4/33739-5. 98

 Memo, CofT for TAG, 23 May 44, sub: Mvmt of

Units, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts. 99

 Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 15 Jun 43; Memo,

Williamson for CofT, 16 Jun 43, sub: Confs at SvC

Hq; both in OCT 511; ASF Cir 167, 29 Dec 43, sub:

Conf, Mvmt of Troops, Etc; Rpt, Traf Contl Conf, 3

Feb-6 Mar 44, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Misc; Rpt,

Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, pp. 4-5, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Rpts. 100

 Ltr, Gen McNair to CG ASF, 6 Apr 43, sub:

Saving Rail Trans, OCT 511 Co-ordination

Mvmts.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 45

PLANNING ROUTINGS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RAIL EQUIPMENT

(From left) Col. Edmund C. R. Lasher, Col. William J. Williamson, and Col. I. Sewell

Morris of the Traffic Control Division, with Arthur H. Gass of the Association of American

Railroads.

passenger and freight cars and caused a

loss of car time. This was often true of new

installations that were built early in the

emergency without due regard to transportation requirements.101

 The situation

at the California-Arizona Maneuver Area,

located in a remote region on branch rail

lines, was an outstanding example of the

difficulty, and at one time the accumulation of cars became so heavy that a fourday stop order was placed on further

shipments into the area. Soon after the

United States entered the war a general

survey of Army installations was made to

determine whether additional trackage,

loading ramps, or other facilities were

necessary to insure prompt dispatch of

railway cars, and later similar action was

taken whenever the movement of traffic

at an installation was found to be

sluggish.102

The combined efforts of the Transportation Corps and the carriers to utilize

101

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 316-17; Morris monograph, p. 49. 102

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofE and OQMG, 17 Jan

42, sub: Rail Facilities, G-4/33821; Memo, CG SOS

for CofT, 31 Aug 42, sub: Rail Facilities for Emergency Mvmts; Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for CofT,

8 Oct 42; last two in OCT 531.7 Gen.
46 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

railway passenger equipment with utmost

effectiveness met with a large measure of

success. Yet there were occasions when the

numbers of cars or the desired types were

not provided as requested by the Army.

While late requests sometimes were responsible, failures were attributable

chiefly to the endeavor of the carriers—

the railroads and the Pullman Company—to maintain their regular services

as fully as possible while also meeting the

demands of the armed forces. No urgent

troop movements were postponed for lack

of equipment, but the Chief of Transportation protested any delay that in his

judgment could have been avoided. He

also protested the failure to provide sleeping cars and the consequent transportation of troops in day coaches on long trips,

and he felt that both the Pullman Company and the Office of Defense Transportation were at fault in not withdrawing

more sleepers from regular services. The

situation became especially acute after redeployment began, even though much

larger numbers of both sleepers and

coaches were placed in military service.103

Special Troop Trains

The troop train was not merely a mode

of transportation, it was an institution.

Extensive planning preceded its departure, and thorough organization and careful control were necessary throughout. Its

punctual departure and arrival were matters on which the Chief of Transportation

placed great stress. Each train was given

a "main" number, or symbol, and until it

had delivered its load at the destination it

was as much a military entity as the installation from which it started. This was

true whether the train carried troops only

or was a mixed train of troops and impedimenta. Special troop cars attached to

regular passenger trains also received

main numbers and were closely controlled, but for obvious reasons the control

could not be as broad as in the case of the

special troop train moving on its own

schedule.

The war brought changes in the size

and make-up of troop trains. While maximum length was desirable from the standpoint of conserving locomotives and train

crews, it was necessary to avoid making

trains so long that they created operating

problems and delays. Early in the emergency the Army rescinded a regulation

limiting mixed trains to twenty-five cars,

and took the position that when it became

necessary from a military standpoint to

disregard certain state laws limiting the

length of trains this should be done.104

The Army authorized the railroads to

consolidate trains en route provided no

delay or compromise of military security

was involved. It also authorized the railroads to operate long trains from points of

origin and to split them en route, on the

condition that the military authorities

were informed in advance so that when

the trains were cut each section would be

self-sustaining.105 The arrangement of

cars in a train was determined finally by

railroad officials, but the desires of the

military authorities were complied with

as far as possible.106

103

 See below, Ch. III. 104

 WD Cir 130, 5 Nov 40, Sec. II; Wardlow, op.

cit., p. 349. A typical troop train consisted of 12 to 15

coaches or sleepers, 2 baggage cars, and 2 kitchen

cars. A typical mixed train consisted of 6 to 8 coaches

or sleepers, 1 or 2 baggage cars, 1 kitchen car, and 25

to 30 freight cars. 105

 Memo, Morris for MTS, 16 Sep 42, sub: Consolidations; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 15 Jan 44; both in

OCT 511. 106

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 90-94.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 47

The Army imposed various safety requirements with respect to troop trains.

In view of the shortage of equipment it

was not feasible to insist on all-steel cars,

so that cars with wooden bodies on steel

frames were accepted, but all cars were

required to be in good operating condition, with secure platforms and steps.

Passageways between cars were to be

guarded by diaphragms or safety chains.

The Chief of Transportation accepted

chains only as a temporary expedient and

urged the installation of diaphragms as

promptly as possible. Troop train commanders were directed to issue orders before departure forbidding troops to ride

on platforms or on the tops of cars, to

move from car to car unnecessarily, or to

leave the train without specific authority.

The commanders were also instructed to

take whatever additional steps might be

essential to safety.

A peacetime prohibition against the

shipment of explosives in the same train

with troops had to be lifted during the

war, but any such shipments were subject

to strict regulation. Explosives, excluding

small arms ammunition, in addition to

being handled in accordance with the

safety regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, were placed in cars at

the rear of the trains and were separated

front troops by at least one "buffer" car.107

Cars bearing explosives were sealed and

were under guard at all train stops.

As soon as rail equipment was delivered to an installation from which troops

were to be moved, it was inspected by the

post transportation officer, the troop train

commander, and a representative of the

originating railroad.108 The inspections

dealt with the structural condition of the

cars and with their cleanliness. The intensity with which the cars were used and

the shortage of labor in railroad shops and

yards made careful inspection necessary.

No record has been found of the number

of cars rejected after inspection, but it is

obvious that with equipment scarce and

with every effort being made to avoid delays a considerable tolerance had to be

exercised. Thus it was that during the

demobilization period, when the shortage

of equipment was being most severely felt,

the commander of the San Francisco Port

of Embarkation authorized certain officers of his organization to reject cars that

they considered unfit, but at the same

time he cautioned them that in so doing

they should consider not only the types

and condition of the cars and the length

of the journey but also the backlog of

troops waiting to be moved out of the port

and the scheduled arrival of additional

troops from overseas.109

At the end of a trip troop train equipment was again inspected by the troop

train commander and by representatives

of the railroad and the Pullman Company. This inspection had the dual purpose of determining how satisfactory the

service rendered by the carriers had been

and whether the carriers had a claim

against the government because of damage inflicted on their property by the

troops.110

The Chief of Transportation was especially concerned about the condition of

107

 2d Ind, TQMG for 8th Corps Area, 3 Feb 41,

OCT 435 Steel Pass Equip; AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42,

par. 14e, and Changes 1, 19 Dec 42; Memo, Pass Br

OCT for MTS, 28 Oct 45, sub: Kitchen-Baggage

Cars, OCT 080 AAR. 108

 AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 4. 109

 Memo, CG SFPE for COs Camp Stoneman,

Camp Knight, et al., 16 Nov 45, sub: Rail Equip for

Main Trains, OCT 511. 110

 AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14l; Ltrs, Lasher to

Buford, 22 Jan 44 and 29 Apr 44, OCT 511 (AR

55-145).
48 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

railway cars used in moving troops to the

ports for oversea shipment since this had a

bearing on morale. In the spring of 1944

he directed the commanders of the New

York and San Francisco Ports of Embarkation to appoint inspectors to examine

all trains arriving at the staging areas

under their control during June and to report on both the condition of the rail

equipment and the service rendered en

route. Such reports were to be entirely independent of those rendered by the troop

train commanders. Out of the 250 trains

inspected, unsanitary conditions were

found in twenty cases and in a few instances the supply of drinking water had

been insufficient. On the basis of this information, the continuance of these inspections was ordered. The inspectors

were instructed not to concern themselves

too much with the absence of up-to-date

facilities, although this might cause some

inconvenience to the troops, but to deal

chiefly with conditions that were likely to

affect soldier morale.111

Since all requests for rail equipment for

troops routed in Washington were made

to the Military Transportation Section, all

complaints by the Army regarding such

equipment were channeled through that

office, with copies to the respective territorial passenger associations, and to the

Pullman Company when its equipment

was involved.112 Such complaints were

usually based on reports by the train commander or the staging area inspector, but

they sometimes originated with the troops

themselves. Each complaint was investigated by the carriers concerned, who reported the circumstances through the

MTS to the Chief of Transportation. As

has been indicated, there was not much

that could be done to avoid the employment of old or badly used cars. In his response to one complaint the manager of

the MTS stated: "I am convinced that the

best available equipment was furnished

for this main, but it is obvious that the

best was none too good."

 113

 The Chief

of Transportation understood the situation, but he filed his protests nevertheless

to insure that the carriers did not let down

in their efforts to provide the best cars

available. Complaints regarding poor

service—lack of cleanliness, water, or

heat, for example—were in a different

category. The Chief of Transportation felt

that these were conditions that could and

should be avoided.114

While pressing the carriers to fulfill

their responsibilities, the Chief of Transportation recognized that the military

authorities on trains often were lax in enforcing sanitation regulations. As late as

the summer of 1944 following a discussion

of the situation with his field representatives, General Gross reported to General

Somervell: "This condition is not only a

discredit to the Army, but also reflects on

the railroad companies."

 115

 He recommended that renewed and emphatic instructions be issued to all branches of the

service, and this was done promptly. Train

commanders were directed to give special 111

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 99-100; ASF

MPR, Jun 44. Sec. 3, p. 56. 112

 Memo, DC of Traf Contl Div for C of Pass Br,

28 Nov 44, sub: Complaints, OCT 531.7. 113

 Ltr, Gass to C of Traf Contl Div, 6 Jan 44, sub:

Main 56123, OCT 080 AAR. 114

 The following documents illustrate complaints:

Ltr, Lasher to Western Mil Bur, 24 Mar 44, and

reply, 29 Mar 44; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 13 Jul 44, and

reply, 22 Sep 44; Ltr, AAR to Lasher, 25 Sep 44, and

reply, 6 Oct 44; all in OCT 531.7 Unsanitary Conditions on Trains. 115

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

6-9 Jul 44, Mtg of Port and Zone Trans Offs, 7 Jul 44,

pp. 4, 5, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Memo,

Gross for Somervell, 13 Jul 44, sub: Unsanitary RR

Equip, OCT 531.7 Unsanitary Conditions on Trains;

WD Cir 334, 16 Aug 44, Sec. III.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 49

attention to the matter and to enlist the

co-operation of all personnel under their

control. Despite these efforts, however,

maintaining sanitary conditions on troop

trains remained a constant and annoying

problem. The psychology of the troops,

manpower shortages on the railroads, and

the intensity with which the cars were

used were the principal contributing

factors.

The loading of a troop train was an operation for which the post transportation

officer and the commander of troops

shared responsibility. The post transportation officer, having established the rail

equipment required for the move, checked

to see that the equipment actually provided conformed to the requirements,

prepared transportation requests upon the

carriers covering the troops and bills of

lading for the freight, and endeavored to

adjust any differences that arose between

the commander of troops and the representatives of the railroads. The commander of troops appointed an entrainment officer, who planned the loading and

supervised the operation to insure that it

was accomplished promptly and correctly.

The entrainments at training camps during the weeks immediately following Pearl

Harbor revealed a lack of familiarity on

the part of transportation and entrainment officers with the problems involved,

and this led to mistakes and delays. Units

of the field forces in the zone of interior

were therefore directed to prepare loading

plans and have them ready at all times

and to hold practice entrainments for

both personnel and impedimenta.116

A train commander, who was usually

assigned by the commander of the unit

being moved, was in charge of each troop

train.117 His command began with the

departure of the train and ended with the

delivery of the troops and their impedimenta to the commander of the new station. Broadly stated, the train commander's mission was to insure that the personnel and property placed in his charge

were moved safely and in an orderly

manner. As commander of the troops on

the train he was responsible for their discipline and for the maintenance of sanitary conditions en route. He controlled

the relationship between the military personnel and the representatives of the railroad and the Pullman Company on

board. Sometimes he was outranked by

other officers on the train, in which case

tact was necessary in asserting his authority. The troop train commander had

under his supervision a train transportation officer, who handled the passenger

requests and bills of lading and prepared

such other papers and reports as were

necessary; a train medical officer, who

looked after the health of the troops and

the sanitary condition of the train; a train

quartermaster, who was responsible for

the kitchen cars and the adequacy of their

equipment and supplies; a train mess

officer, who supervised the preparation

and serving of meals; and a baggage

officer when needed. In addition, there

was a car commander in each sleeper or

coach to maintain order and discipline.

Within this broad field the duties of the

troop train commander were varied and

exacting. In most instances an officer

served in this capacity only once and

hence took up his responsibilities without

116

 Memo, Lasher for C of Trans Div OQMG, 14

Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts from Fort Bliss,

G-4/33700; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, et al.,

19 Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts (Rail); Memo, TAG

for CG Field Forces, 24 Dec 41, sub: Troop Mvmts by

Rail; last two in AG 370.5 (9-10-41), Sec. 1. 117

 AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 14.
50 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

previous experience. Usually the time

available for studying the regulations and

preparing for the task was short. The regulations were scattered and were inadequate in some respects. Under these circumstances and because of the pressure

under which the carriers were working,

conditions aboard troop trains often fell

short of the standards that the Chief of

Transportation desired. Some improvement was achieved by assembling the

regulations and instructions in two pamphlets, making them more accessible and

understandable.118 During redeployment

and repatriation it was possible to appoint

commanders to serve regularly on troop

trains operating between the ports of debarkation and the reception stations, and

these officers gained competence through

experience.

The feeding of troops from converted

baggage cars and from the new government-owned kitchen cars presented numerous problems. The baggage-kitchen

cars were makeshifts, and aside from the

fact that the railroads could not spare

enough of them to meet the Army's need,

they were difficult to keep in sanitary condition and lacked adequate refrigeration.

Consequently, when it was decided to

build government-owned troop sleepers in

the spring of 1943, the advisability of constructing specially designed troop kitchen

cars at the same time was apparent. Four

hundred such cars were ordered by the

Defense Plant Corporation at that time

and four hundred were ordered two years

later. These kitchen cars, although simply

designed and faulty in some respects, were

a great improvement over the baggagekitchen cars because the kitchen equipment was more nearly complete and more

suitable as well as permanently installed.119

Even with better equipment, the problem

of keeping kitchen cars clean remained.

The crews, which were newly assigned for

each trip, were often careless in using the

facilities and disposing of waste, and, unless very closely supervised, tended to shirk

the work of putting the cars in order

before releasing them to other movements.

Sometimes the cars had to be released so

quickly that there was not time for proper

cleaning.120

In the early part of the war troops fed

from kitchen cars were given the regular

garrison ration, but later they were provided with a special troop train ration

better adapted to their inactive life while

traveling. Since the supplies placed in kitchen cars at the beginning of trips often

proved inadequate and the railroads were

able to provide only limited quantities, a

chain of emergency supply points was

established at Army installations along

the principal routes.121 Thereafter the

railroads were called upon only for ice. Although the subsistence of troops was a

function of the Quartermaster Corps, the

Chief of Transportation took an active interest in it and in all other arrangements

affecting the welfare of troops en route.

118

 WD Pamphlet 20-7, 14 Mar 44, and second edition, 20 Oct 44; WD Pamphlet 20-14, 16 Apr 45. 119

 WD Memo W 30-7-42, 21 Oct 42, sub: Supplies

for Kitchen Cars; OCT HB Monograph 22, pp.

108-19; Morris monograph, pp. 54-55; Min of Port

and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, afternoon session, 7 Jul 44, pp. 4, 5, OCT HB PE Gen

Port Comdrs Conf. 120

 E.g., see: Memo, 3d SvC for CofT, 21 Feb 44;

Ltr, Morris to Gass, 25 Mar 44, and reply, 29 Mar 44;

Ltr, Pullman Co. to Morris, 29 Mar 44; Ltr, IMC to

AAR, 2 May 44, and incl; Memo, CofT for BuPers,

6 Jul 44; Ltr, Defense Plant Corporation to Morris,

24 Aug 44; all in OCT 531.3 Kitchen Cars. 121

 WD Cir 31, 2 Feb 42, Sec. IV; WD Cir 219, 20

Sep 43; WD Cir 341, 29 Dec 43; WD Cir 400, 11 Oct

44; WD SB 10-63, 4 May 44; TC Pamphlet 22, 27

Sep 44.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 51

Discipline on troop trains was essentially a problem of command, just as it

was at an Army post. The responsibility

rested with the train commander and the

car commanders serving under him, and

railroad personnel called upon them when

lack of discipline threatened damage to

railroad property or interference with

train operation. Since the entrainment

usually took place at an Army installation, there was slight opportunity for the

troops to carry liquor on the trains; every

effort was made to prevent them from

obtaining it en route, for it frequently

was the cause of unruliness and insubordination. Disciplinary problems were

intensified when troop trains were sidetracked for long periods while other trains

passed through, and when troops making

long trips in day coaches came alongside

other passengers ensconced in the comforts of Pullman cars.122

 Yet the enforcement of discipline was simpler on special

troop trains, where there was adequate

military authority, than on regular trains

when individual servicemen were traveling in large numbers.123

A railroad escort was assigned to each

troop train by the originating carrier in

addition to the conductor and other members of the train crew and the Pullman

conductor and porters. The escort had no

operating duties. He was a seasoned railroader who had usually had experience

with troop traffic and was therefore able

to be of considerable assistance to the

train commander. When friction arose

between troops and railroad officials, as

it did on numerous occasions, the escort

might provide the word or the act to calm

the situation. Troops were sometimes

boisterous, dissatisfied with their accommodations, careless of railroad property,

and disrespectful of railroad authority.

Conductors, with a regard for the interests of their employers and sometimes with

impatience bred of long hours of continuous service, might be short-tempered.

There frequently was need for a diplomatic but firm intermediary, and the

escort played that role. The Chief of

Transportation described the escorts as

"indispensable," yet toward the end of the

war when the manpower shortage made

it difficult for the railroads to place such

officials on all trains, he had no alternative but to agree to their omission on the

shorter daylight trips.124

The railroads were responsible for the

maintenance of train schedules, but the

Chief of Transportation kept this matter

under close observation. Train commanders were required to telegraph the Traffic

Control Division the time of departure,

the time of arrival at destination, and any

unusual delays or incidents en route. The

railroads telegraphed similar information

to the Military Transportation Section

and also reported each time a troop train

passed an interchange point—that is,

passed from the tracks of one railroad to

those of another. If a train fell seriously

behind schedule, these agencies were in a

position to act, but the initial action frequently came from the train commander.

When a delay occurred his first step was

to approach the train escort or the train

conductor in an effort to correct the situation. In the early part of the war if this

course failed to get the desired results, the

122

 See SFPE, Summary of Problems Handled by

Troop Train Comdrs, 8 Oct 45; NYPE, Summary of

Troop Train Comdrs Rpts—Camp Kilmer, 12 Oct

45; both in OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. 123

 See below, pp. 67-70. 124

 Ltr, to Richard C. Morse, Vice Pres Penn RR,

31 May 44, OCT 531.7 PRR Sp Train Sv; OCT HB

Monograph 22, p. 104.
PREPARING FOOD IN A CONVERTED BAGGAGE-KITCHEN CAR
NEW TROOP KITCHEN CAR EQUIPPED WITH MODERN FACILITIES
54 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

train commander communicated with the

division superintendent of the railroad.

This procedure did not work out satisfactorily for the Army, and the train commanders were directed to telegraph a

report to the Traffic Control Division,

which then sought the aid of the Military

Transportation Section in overcoming the

delay.125

During the early part of the emergency

the railroads complained that their efforts

to maintain train schedules were sometimes thwarted by requests of the train

commanders for unscheduled stops to enable troops to get rest or exercise. The

carriers pointed out that most of the

schedules requested by the Army made

no provision for such stops, although they

were recognized as necessary on long trips.

An attempt to correct this situation by

warning the officers concerned to be

realistic in arranging schedules failed to

overcome the difficulty. Soon after the

United States entered the war, therefore,

train commanders and other officers in

the field were forbidden to approach the

railroads regarding unscheduled stops

and were required to direct their requests

to The Quartermaster General, who at

that time had general responsibility for

the routing and delivery of troops, or to

the Western Defense Command when

trains were destined for points in that

area.126 After the techniques of arranging

and executing troop movements had been

perfected through practice, the demand

for unscheduled stops ceased to be a problem.

Departures from schedule attributable

to the railroads required the attention of

the Chief of Transportation throughout

the war. When trains arrived at Army installations ahead of or behind schedule,

arrangements for the reception and accommodation of the troops were upset,

and sometimes seriously so. Delays might

also disturb plans for using the cars in

other troop movements. Early arrivals

were not common, but they occurred; late

arrivals were more frequent. Operating

conditions became more difficult for the

carriers as the traffic increased without

commensurate increases in facilities and

personnel. Recognizing this the Chief of

Transportation allowed the railroads some

latitude, but he maintained a firm attitude toward what appeared to be excessive or unnecessary delays. This was particularly true of trains destined for staging

areas at the ports of embarkation, and

such trains were placed under special

controls.127

When objectionable delays occurred,

the facts as reported to the Traffic Control

Division were placed before the Military

Transportation Section, which in turn obtained the railroads' side of the story. In

some cases it was apparent that the carriers concerned had not exercised sufficient care or foresight, and in such cases

the MTS took further steps to emphasize

the necessity of maintaining schedules. In

other cases, the MTS believed that the

criticisms of the Traffic Control Division

were unduly harsh, since in the handling

of long movements under difficult operating conditions situations were likely to

arise that could not be foreseen or prevented. Nevertheless, the division was

unrelenting. It recognized that on the

whole the railroads were giving the Army

excellent service, but it also knew that the

railroads were under heavy pressure with

125

 AR 55-145. 30 Sep 42. par. 14d, and Changes 5,

14 Mar 44: OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 57-59. 126

 Ltr. IMC to TQMG. 4 Apr 41, AG 511

(1 1-3-34) AR 30-945; WD Cir 149, 24 Jul 41, Sec. I;

WD Cir 273. 31 Dec 41. Sec. II. 127

 See below. Ch. II.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 55

regular trains frequently running behind

schedule, and the division's tactics were

designed to keep the carriers constantly

alert to the Army's requirements and their

responsibility for putting military traffic

through promptly.128

Maintaining secrecy regarding troop

train movements was a constant and difficult problem. Secrecy was important because of the danger of sabotage on the

railroads and because the movement of

large troop units into a port was indication of an impending movement by ship

from the port—information of value to

enemy U-boats. Yet the possibilities for

"leaks" were numerous. The troops themselves found a prospective move interesting news to pass on to their relatives and

friends. Certain information had to pass

between home stations, the Traffic Control Division, the stations of destination,

and the carriers in order that the movements might be properly executed, and

there was always danger that the messages

would get into unauthorized hands or

that some one who had received the information properly would use it carelessly.

Three months after Pearl Harbor G-2

reported that leaks had been traced to institutions that provided free rest rooms to

servicemen, civic organizations and telegraph companies that sent representatives

to meet troop trains, police radios reporting the movement of military motor convoys, and crowds assembled in railroad

yards when troop trains were passing

through.129

The problem of secrecy was encountered during the prewar emergency and a

tightening of the regulations was begun.

Military personnel were warned against

making public any information relating

to troop movements. Instructions were

issued requiring that all identification

markings placed on passenger and freight

cars, such as those indicating the unit

moving or the destination, be removed

before the departure of the cars from the

military reservation. Movements were

classified as secret, confidential, or restricted, and all communications and

information pertaining to such movements had to be classified in the same

way. Commanding officers were reminded

of their responsibility for making all personnel under their control familiar with

security regulations.130 Despite these steps,

violations of security continued even after

the United States became an active belligerent. Fortunately there were no untoward events traceable to this lack of

secrecy, and, with the added measures

taken by the Army, the situation gradually improved.

After Pearl Harbor steps were taken to

increase troop train security. Explicit instructions were issued to transportation

officers in the field and to the personnel of

the Traffic Control Division regarding the

handling of messages relating to routings.

In the case of secret and confidential

movements, coded messages by teletype,

telegraph, or radio were to be used when

time permitted; when there was not sufficient time for such communications and

telephone or uncoded telegraph communications were necessary, the movements

128

 AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, par. 1. For typical complaints, see Memo, C of Traf Contl Div for CofT, 7

Aug 42, sub: Late Arrivals at Camp Shelby, OCT

511; Ltr, Morris to Gass, 5 Apr 44, and reply, 20 Apr

44, OCT 511 Rail and Motor Mvmts; Ltr, Maj

Samuel N. Farley to Mr. Kelly, 24 Oct 45, and reply,

15 Nov 45, OCT 531.7 Train AV. 129

 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 3 Mar 42, sub: Compromise of Mil Info; Memo, TAG for CG AAF, et al., 13

Mar 42; both in AG 350.05 (3-3-42)(3). 130

 AR 380-5, 18 Jun 41, Sec. VIII; WD Cir 198,

22 Sep 41, Sec. I; WD Cir 242, 22 Nov 41, Sec. V.
56 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were to be identified only by reference to

the movement orders, and information as

to the date, size, origin, and destination

was to be omitted.131 The railroads were

required to make sure that information

regarding troop movements became available only to employees requiring it, that

only the information necessary to the performance of their duties was given, and

that the employees were carefully instructed in safeguarding such information.132

 The Traffic Control Division,

while pressing the railroads to use utmost

care, opposed suggestions that the carriers

be required to put all communications

regarding secret movements in code or to

send them by registered mail, since such

restrictions would have interfered with

their operating efficiency.133

In the effort to limit the opportunity for

improper dissemination of information, a

broad prohibition was set up against giving information regarding troop movements to representatives of nonmilitary

agencies and against permitting visitors to

go aboard troop trains. The Army declined to authorize the Association of

American Railroads to give regular information to the Office of Defense Transportation regarding troop movements, contending that this should be done only

when a military purpose could be

shown.134 Representatives of foreign governments were denied such information,

except certain officers who were working

with the Combined Staff Planners.135

News agents, vendors of merchandise,

and representatives of charitable organizations were not to be given advance information regarding the arrival of special

troop trains or to be permitted to board

such trains, and this prohibition was

interpreted as applying to the American

Red Cross despite the good work it was

doing on behalf of troop comfort and

morale.136 Railroads were not permitted

to use secret or confidential trains for

deadheading railroad personnel who were

not performing duties on those trains.137

Military security as well as rapidity of

transmission would have been improved

if all communications regarding troop

movements could have been sent over

Army-controlled cryptographic teletype

equipment. Late in 1942 the Chief of

Transportation recommended the installation of such connections between his

office and all Army installations concerned with troop movements. The proposal was approved by Services of Supply

headquarters, but not enough equipment

could be obtained to carry it out. Private

teletype communications were established

only between the Traffic Control Division,

the ports of embarkation, and the Army

regulating stations on the transcontinen131

 Memo, Morris for All Routing Personnel, 7 Jun

42, sub: Telephone Conv—Classified Troop Mvmts,

OCT 000.72 Gen; AR 55-130, 4 Jun 43, Changes 2,

par. 8b(1). 132

 Memo, Lasher for Gass, 13 Dec 41, OCT 080

AAR; Memos, Gass to All RRs, 14 Dec 41, and 12

Jan 42; Memo, Gass for Lasher, 22 Jan 42; last three

in OCT 370.5 Secrecy; WD Cir 193, 16 Jun 42, par. 4;

Ltr, Williamson to Western Mil Bur, 20 Jul 42, OCT

511.

133

 1st Ind, CofT for Army Regulating Off, El Paso,

Tex., 15 Apr 42, OCT 000.72 Gen; Memo, Traf

Contl Div for Mvmts Div OCT, 15 Feb 43, sub: Safeguarding Mil Info, OCT 370.5 Secrecy. 134

 Ltr, Gross to Eastman, ODT, 26 Apr 42, OCT

511.

135

 The Combined Staff Planners was the committee primarily responsible for assisting the Combined

Chiefs of Staff in planning the strategic conduct of the

war. It consisted of three British officers, Army, Navy,

and Air, and four U.S. officers, Army, Navy, Army

Air, and Navy Air. 136

 WD Cir 191, 15 Jun 42, Sec. V; Ltr, Lasher to

MTS, 11 Jul 42, OCT 080 AAR; Ltr, Morris to Western Mil Bur, 1 1 Mar 44, OCT 531.7 Gen; WD Cir

314, 26 Jul 44, Sec. VI. 137

 1st Ind, CofT for PMG, 1 Nov 43, OCT 511

Rail and Motor Mvmts.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 57

tal rail lines. Consequently, commercial

teletypes and telephones were used extensively, necessitating the restriction on the

content of messages.138

Although an Army regulation of September 1942 appeared to favor the use of

mixed trains, the Chief of Transportation

did not. The inclusion of both passenger

and freight cars in the same trains subjected the passenger equipment to hard

treatment and necessitated more frequent

lay-ups for repairs. Mixed trains moved

more slowly than passenger trains, a fact

that meant a loss of service from the passenger cars. The decision on using mixed

trains, however, was left largely to the

commanders of troops, and in many instances they adhered to the old doctrine

that troops and their organic equipment

should not be separated. The procedures

that were developed during World War II

for separate movements of troops and

their impedimenta and the fact that the

country was in no danger of invasion after

the early weeks of the war invalidated this

doctrine, yet the use of mixed trains continued.139

When impedimenta were moved separately from the troops to which they pertained, either in solid trains or in cars

attached to through freight trains, the shipments were given MI (military impedimenta) numbers, were moved from origin

to destination with the least possible delay,

and were controlled en route in the same

manner as troop trains. Such shipments

were exempt from the diversion orders of

an agent of the Interstate Commerce

Commission who had authority to reroute

transcontinental freight traffic when he

found this necessary to keep the principal

railroad gateways free from congestion.

Markings on troop equipment destined

for oversea areas that might reveal the

identity of the unit, its destination, or the

ship on which it was to be transported

were forbidden. Guards were provided for

equipment in transit whenever the unit

commanders considered them necessary.140

The close attention that the Chief of

Transportation gave to the operation of

troop trains and the importance that he

attached to the observance of schedules

and the maintenance of order and cleanliness were based on sound military principles. The carriers sometimes felt that his

insistence on the observance of schedules

went beyond the point of military necessity, but unquestionably delays en route

magnified the problems of troop train administration, and late arrivals were disturbing to the installations of destination.

There were some, including military men,

who believed that the Army's requirements of secrecy in connection with train

movements were stricter than the circumstances warranted, but the rules were

dictated by consideration of the heavy

cost that might result from less strict

security measures. Within the limits of

practicality, the Chief of Transportation

acted on the theory that a troop train was

a military installation pro tern, and

should be operated with corresponding

regard for schedules, discipline, sanitation, and security. Although the results

often fell below his expectations, for reasons that have been stated, these standards

were achieved in large measure.

138

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 64-65. 139

 AR 55-145, 30 Sep 42, par. 1b(2)(d); Interv with

Morris, 24 May 43, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass;

Morris monograph, pp. 53-54. 140

 OCT HB Monograph 22, pp. 51-57, 63; Memo,

TAG for CG Field Forces, et al., 20 Jan 42, AG 370.5

(12-20-41), and Memo TAG for CG Field Forces, et

al., 28 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (1-25-42).
58 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Official and Furlough Travel

on Regular Trains

While troops moving in special trains

constituted the most important element

from a military standpoint, the other types

of Army passenger traffic added up to a

considerable volume and involved certain

unique problems. Chief among these

types were military personnel and civilian

employees traveling on War Department

transportation requests, either as small

groups or as individuals, and military personnel traveling at their own expense

while on furlough, leave, or pass. This

traffic was handled by regular train and

bus services, which also handled the heavy

traffic of civilians traveling on private

business missions or for pleasure. The

mingling of military and civilian passengers and the crowded conditions of the

trains, buses, and terminals gave rise to

many of the passenger traffic problems

with which General Gross and his Traffic

Control Division had to deal.

As has been indicated, persons traveling

on War Department transportation requests (official travel) were routed by the

Traffic Control Division when they numbered forty or more, regardless of the

point of origin, while local Army transportation officers routed smaller groups

and individuals traveling from their respective stations. The problems involved

in the issuance of transportation requests

for such traffic and the fulfillment of

financial arrangements between the carriers and the government were numerous

and sometimes vexatious. These administrative details are not dealt with in this

discussion, which is confined to the strictly

transportation aspects.141

The necessity of utilizing railroad

equipment with utmost economy gave rise

to two arrangements, mentioned earlier,

affecting the official travel of individuals

and small groups. At the request of the

railroads, the Army had agreed that local

Army transportation officers would consult local railroad representatives before

routing parties of from fifteen to thirtynine, inclusive. This procedure enabled

the railroads not only to work out the

routing of this considerable traffic so as to

use their equipment to best advantage but

also to make an equitable division of the

business among the several rail lines.

Upon the recommendation of the Chief of

Transportation, local transportation officers, in order to utilize railway cars as

they became available and thus reduce

deadheading, were authorized to advance

or delay the departure of troops that they

had routed. These arrangements complemented each other and aided the

Army transportation officers and the railroads in their joint effort to avoid idle car

time and wasted car space.

Army personnel engaging accommodations in Pullman cars were not subject to

the usual rules regarding the reservation

and surrender of space. For many years

Army regulations had provided that

transportation requests for Pullman space

would be surrendered after boarding the

train, rather than exchanged for tickets

before boarding as in the case of requests

for rail transportation. This arrangement

was convenient for officers and enlisted

men whose time of departure was subject

to sudden change, but it also meant that

reservations could be held until train time

141

 The administrative rules are covered in AR 55-

110, 22 Jan 43, sub: Trans Requests; AR 55-120, 26

Apr 43, sub: Trans of Indiv; AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43,

sub: Sleeping Car and Similar Accommodations; ARs

of the 35 series, 4810 through 4895. For a discussion

of administrative problems, see OCT HB Monographs 6, pp. 232, 259-61; 20, pp. 6, 7, 30-57.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 59

and then not be used, and it permitted the

holding of reservations on a number of

trains simultaneously. In an effort to

check the waste of Pullman space, the

Office of Defense Transportation early in

the war requested the Army and other

federal agencies to change their procedures to conform to the rules applicable to

the public at large.142

The Chief of Transportation did not

agree to the proposal since it would have

hampered officers in performing duties involving travel, but in September 1942 he

entered into an agreement with the Pullman Company that brought considerable

improvement to the situation. Under this

agreement Pullman space that had been

reserved forty-eight hours or more in advance was held for military passengers

until twenty-four hours before train time,

or it was held until train time if the reservations had been made within fortyeight hours of departure. To meet the

problem encountered by officers whose

travel orders were changed just before departure, the Pullman Company permitted

those who had already exchanged their

transportation requests for Pullman tickets

to use those tickets on other trains, and

when the tickets could not be used at all,

refund was made.143

When a party of troops required only

part of a sleeping car, the Army practice

was to use as many lower berths as were

required, placing two men in each lower

berth and using upper berths only if there

was an odd man in the party or after all

lowers had been filled. The railroads complained that this practice was inconsiderate of other passengers who might travel

in the same car and proposed that the

Army assign its personnel section by section as the Navy did, thus leaving more

lower berths available for civilians or

members of the other armed services. The

Chief of Transportation rejected this proposal and the Army practice remained

unchanged. He pointed out that the Navy

placed only one man in a lower berth (up

to July 1945), and that the Army's method of using Pullman space actually was

the more economical.144

Furlough travel—a term covering the

travel of soldiers on furlough, leave, or

pass—created special problems because

soldiers used the same facilities as civilians

and because the peaks of furlough and

civilian travel—week ends and major

holiday periods—tended to coincide. No

actual count of furlough tickets was made,

but the railroads estimated that from 1

January 1942 through 31 December 1945

approximately 200,000,000 reduced-rate

furlough tickets were sold to men and

women of the armed services.145

Early efforts were made to hold furlough travel within limits because of the

strain under which the carriers were

working. Furlough travel was in competition with official military movements for

transportation equipment, and overcrowded trains were conducive to disorder. Against these practical reasons for

limiting furlough travel, the Army had to

142

 Concerning loss of space due to commercial and

governmental practices, see Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Third

Annual Report (Washington, March 4, 1944), pp. 116-

17.

143

 Ltr, Pullman Co. to CofT, et al., 17 Jun 42; Ltr,

ODT to Gross, 4 Jul 42; Ltr, Lasher to Pullman Co.,

13 Jul 42; Ltr, Brig Gen Theodore H. Dillon, OCT, to

ODT, 17 Jul 42; Ltr, Pullman Co. to OCT, 29 Sep

42; all in OCT 531.2; AR 55-1 10, 22 Jan 43, sub:

Trans Reqmts, par. 4b; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp.

32-35. 144

 AR 55-125, 9 Jan 43, par. 2c; Ltr, Lasher to

IMC, 8 Apr 43, OCT 531.2 (AR 55-125). 145

 Ltr, Earl B. Padrick, Chm IMC, to author, 8

Dec 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.
60 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

weigh both the popular argument that men

in training for oversea duty should be

afforded an opportunity to visit their

homes as often as the training schedule

would permit and the morale value of

such visits.

In the fall of 1941 the prospect of heavy

furlough travel during the Christmas holiday season caused anxiety to the railroads,

The Quartermaster General, and G-4.

Not only had the size of the Army greatly

increased since the preceding holiday season, but permission had been given to

commanding officers to authorize furloughs up to 50 percent of their enlisted

personnel at any one time during this

period, rather than the usual 15 percent.146

The railroads proposed among other

things that holiday furloughs begin not

later than 12 December; that the War Department establish schedules so as to

spread the traffic more evenly over the entire period; that the railroads be given advance notice of the numbers scheduled to

move each day; and that official troop

movements be suspended between 12 December and 14 January, except in case of

extreme emergency.147 The War Department accepted these proposals in principle, but the Japanese attack on our Pacific

bases and the ensuing declarations of war

against Japan and Germany necessitated

a complete change of arrangements. Limitations on official troop movements could

not be observed. Furloughs were first limited to 25 percent of unit strength and

then restricted to cases of emergency and

cases where the railroads could give assurance to camp commanders that official

troop movements would not be affected.148

In April 1942, in order to lighten the

pressure on the carriers over week ends,

commanders of Army installations were

directed to arrange so far as practicable

for furloughs to start and end on Tuesday,

Wednesday, or Thursday. Commanders

were also directed to schedule furloughs

throughout the year and to avoid concentrating them in certain months.149

 The

Christmas-New Year holiday period at

the end of 1942 threatened to produce unusually heavy travel, and explicit instructions covering furloughs granted between

12 December and 12 January were issued

limiting the number to 10 percent of the

strength of the post, camp, or station;

passes issued for shorter periods were also

restricted. Post commanders were instructed to co-operate with local railroad

officials in deciding how much furlough

travel could be moved from their commands and when it could be most readily

handled.150 When information reached

the Chief of Transportation that some

commanders were not observing these instructions, he sent messages to all service

commands requesting that measures be

taken to enforce them. The Office of Defense Transportation, which had been

deeply concerned over the prospective

congestion at this period, reported that 146

 WD Cir 200, 25 Sep 41. 147

 Memo, TQMG for ACofS G-4, 16 Oct 41, sub: Christmas Furloughs; and subsequent correspondence

leading up to issuance of Memo, TAG for CGs All

Armies, et al., 7 Nov 41; all in AG 220.71 (12-28-39)

AR 615-275; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies, et al.,

4 Nov 41, sub: Curtailment of Troop Mvmts, AG

370.5 (10-27-41); Memo, TAG for CofS GHQ, et al.,

5 Nov 41, sub: Induction of Men During Holidays,

AG 324.71 (9-23-41); Memo, TAG for CGs Corps

Areas, et al., 10 Nov 41, sub: Curtailment of Repl Tng,

AG 324.71 (11-4-41). 148

 Memo, TAG for CofS GHQ et al., 8 Dec 41,

sub: Furlough Travel; Memo, TAG for CGs All

Armies, et al., 24 Dec 41, sub: Curtailment of Leaves

and Furloughs; both in AG 220.7 1 (12-28-39) AR

615-275. 149

 Memo, TAG for CG AGF, et al., 30 Apr 42,

sub: Annual Leaves, Furloughs, and Vacations, AG

230.54 (4-24-42). 150

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 6 Oct 42, OCT HB

Gross Day File; WD Cir 348, 19 Oct 42, Sec. II.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 61

the measures taken by the Army with

regard to furlough travel had enabled the

carriers to handle the seasonal traffic

smoothly.151

While the holiday seasons presented the

greatest difficulty, the Chief of Transportation emphasized that excessive furlough

travel was a year-round problem. In July

1943, speaking before a service commanders' conference, General Gross

argued against the tendency of post commanders to grant furloughs every time enlisted men changed stations and expressed

the view that a visit home about once

every six months would meet morale

needs. He also urged greater restraint in

issuing passes to visit nearby places since

local rail and bus services were overwhelmed.152

Simultaneously the Traffic Control Division proposed a revision of the basic

Army regulations on furloughs, making

the number of furloughs and passes issued

at any post dependent at all times on the

availability of commercial transportation

equipment, and requiring post commanders to reduce their quotas of furloughs and passes whenever transportation considerations dictated. Army Service

Forces headquarters approved the revision

as it related to passes but not with respect

to furloughs, contending that furloughed

Army personnel should not be penalized

while there was no restriction on travel by

personnel of other governmental agencies

or by the public at large. G-1 opposed

even the limitation on passes, because it

affected Army personnel only and because

of the difficulty of equitable enforcement.

The entire proposal accordingly was

dropped.153 Special instructions regarding

travel during the Christmas-New Year

holiday season were issued in the fall of

1943, as in earlier years.154

Complaints regarding the inadequacy

of transportation available to men on furlough and the crowded condition of trains

and buses led to the introduction of a bill

in the U.S. House of Representatives in

June 1944 to direct the Secretary of War

and the Secretary of the Navy to give

priority to furlough traffic. The War Department opposed the bill on the ground

that furlough travel would be given precedence over organized troop movements

regardless of the urgency of the latter. In

placing itself on record against this measure the War Department expressed the

belief that arrangements recently made

with the railroads for handling furloughees in special trains, together with

the reduction in furlough travel resulting

from the reduction in the number of

soldiers remaining in the zone of interior,

would bring about an appreciable improvement in the transportation situation.

The proposed bill was not enacted into

law.155

The arrangement to move furloughees

on special trains was an extension of a

plan that had been in effect earlier. Under

Army regulations a large percentage of

the troops shipped to oversea replacement depots and ports of embarkation

were entitled to furloughs before sailing

151

 Rads, 15 Dec 42, OCT 551.1 Furlough Fares;

Ltr, Eastman to Gross, 1 Jan 43, OCT HB Traf Contl

Div Pass. 152

 Remarks by Gen Gross at SvC Conf, Chicago,

22-24 Jul 43, p. 113, JAGO Library. 153

 Memo, OCT for CG ASF, 17 Jul 43, sub: Regulating Furloughs, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass;

Memo, Mil Pers Div ASF for CG ASF, 19 Aug 43;

Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS USA, 29 Sep 43, sub:

Travel on Pass; last two in AG 220.71 (12-28-39) AR

615-275; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 117-18. 154

 WD Cir 215, 16 Sep 43, Sec. VI. 155

 HR 5116, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 Jun 44; Ltr,

SW to Rep Andrew J. May, Chm House Com on Mil

Affairs, 24 Aug 44, OCT 511 Priorities for Servicemen.
62 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

overseas, and the transportation lines

serving the training centers frequently

were unable to accommodate this traffic.

To relieve the situation, commanders of

training centers were instructed to provide

the men with official transportation on

special troop trains to their new stations,

and to allow those who would benefit by

such an arrangement to leave the trains at

convenient gateways and proceed to their

homes at their own expense. When their

furloughs were over, they returned to the

gateways and boarded special troop trains

for the completion of their journeys. Under

this arrangement the furlough trip was

shorter than it would have been if the

soldiers had purchased furlough tickets

from their stations to their homes and

back again. Thus a considerable saving of

transportation was effected and, in addition, the men were relieved of the necessity of making long journeys on crowded

regular trains. In the summer of 1944 this

plan was extended so that whenever a carload of men traveling on furlough tickets

from a training center or other installation

could be routed through the same gateway, they were moved in a special car to

the gateway, from which point they dispersed to their homes. The operation was

repeated in reverse when the men returned to their stations.156

 During the last

half of 1944 about 216,000 troops on furlough were moved as organized groups in

special cars, and during 1945 about

329,000 were so transported.157

This method of handling furlough

traffic, while it had definite advantages,

required very careful administration at

the stations from which the troops were

moving, and gave rise to numerous complaints from the railroads. The difficulties

arose from the fact that the number of furloughees leaving their stations by rail

often was less than the number for which

cars had been ordered and from the failure of all men to return to the gateways in

time to take the special cars that were to

carry them back to their stations.158

The armed forces proposed in the summer of 1944 that servicemen and servicewomen in uniform be allowed to pass

through the gates at railway terminals or

board trains in advance of civilian travelers. The primary purpose was to facilitate

the travel of furloughees who held coach

tickets; they had limited time for their

journeys and often were delayed in getting

aboard trains because of the volume of

nonessential civilian traffic. In response to

this proposal, the railroads stated that

many of them already were following the

practice at stations where there were facilities for controlling traffic and where the

granting of preference was considered expedient, and they did not favor the adoption of the plan as a general rule.159

It often happened that enlisted men

who were entitled to a furlough before

going overseas were without funds with

which to purchase transportation. The

Army Emergency Relief and the Red

Cross had found it necessary to limit loans

to servicemen to cases of sickness or death

156

 AR 615-275, Changes 3, 20 May 43, and

Changes 5, 30 Sep 43; Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 3

Jul 44, OCT 511 Furlough Travel; WD CTB 25, 10

Aug 44; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 139-41. 157

 Data originally compiled by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, to be

published in a statistical volume of this series, now in

preparation. 158

 Ltr, Siddall to CofT, 11 Aug 44; Ltr, Morris to

Siddall, 19 Aug 44; both in OCT 511 Furlough

Travel; Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 29 Sep 44; Ltr,

White to Siddall, 5 Jan 45; Memo, Gass for White, 10

Feb 45; last three in OCT 511 Furlough or Delay En

Route. 159

 Ltr, Armed Forces to AAR and IMC, 11 Aug

44, and reply, 24 Aug 44, OCT 510 Trans of 15 or

Less.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 63

at home. The Army accordingly arranged

with the railroads and the bus lines for the

issuance of official transportation requests

for round-trip furlough tickets in such instances, with the understanding that the

cost of this transportation would be

charged against the account of the enlisted man and would in no case be borne

by the government.160

In addition to the other measures he

took to improve travel conditions for military personnel using regular trains, the

Chief of Transportation assisted in obtaining reservations for sleepers, parlor cars,

and reserved-seat coaches. The difficulty

that members of the armed forces experienced in obtaining reserved space led first

to the establishment of government reservation bureaus (GRB's) operated by the

railroads, and later to the establishment of

Army reservation bureaus (ARB's) to

complement these special railroad offices.

Government reservation bureaus were

the outgrowth of an arrangement between

the Passenger Branch in the Office of the

Chief of Transportation and certain of the

railroads that operated trains out of Washington, under which a limited amount of

space was held at the disposal of the

branch to meet its emergency needs. The

arrangement proved so helpful that the

Passenger Branch proposed that it be extended to other cities. The railroads were

agreeable, and the approval of the Office

of Defense Transportation was given with

the provision that the space held by the

railroads should be available to all of the

armed services and also to the War Production Board and the Office of Price

Administration. Organized on this basis,

the first GRB began functioning in Washington late in June 1942. Space was sold

to the several government agencies in the

order of application, and any space not

taken up by these agencies within the time

set by the railroads was made available to

the public.

Plans for the extension of this arrangement to other cities were worked out at

meetings between representatives of the

government agencies and the railroads in

the fall of 1942. Recommendations for the

establishment of additional GRB's usually

originated with the Passenger Branch, but

the decision as to their actual establishment rested with a committee representing the major rail lines. The operation of

each bureau was the responsibility of a

committee of local railroad representatives. The government agencies authorized to use the GRB's were required to

designate a single office in each city

through which all requests for reservations

would be made.161 The offices that the

Army designated for this purpose became

known as Army reservations bureaus.162

The scope of this activity was steadily

increased. Although it was part of the

original plan that reservations would be

requested only for individuals on official

travel and not for groups, the rule was

modified, against considerable railroad

opposition, to permit the ARB's to make

reservations for groups up to fourteen.163

The railroads and the Office of Defense

Transportation also objected to the exten160

 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 145-46; WD Cir

22, 18 Jan 45, Sec. II. 161

 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 83-85; Memo,

Lasher to Wylie, 10 Nov 42, OCT 531.8 GRBs; WD

Cir 40, 4 Feb 43, Sec. I; Standard Operating Procedure for GRBs issued by CofT, undated, OCT HB

TZ Gen ARB. 162

 Memo, Lasher for CofT, 2 Aug 43, sub: GRB

Status Rpt, OCT 531.2 GRBs. 163

 Ltr, Armed Forces to AAR and IMC, 11 Aug

44, and replies, 24 Aug 44 and 11 Sep 44, OCT 510

Trans of 15 or Less.
64 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

sion of the arrangement so that the reservation bureaus could serve personnel

traveling on furlough and leave, but eventually both accepted the Army's recommendation. The carriers also agreed to set

aside space in their larger terminals so

that the Army reservation bureaus located

at Army installations in those cities could

operate branches in locations more readily

accessible to transient service personnel.

At the end of hostilities the Army had

forty-four reservation bureaus and they,

in turn, maintained a total of forty-eight

branches. General supervision of these

offices was a responsibility of the Traffic

Control Division. More detailed supervision was given by the zone transportation officers, who also negotiated with the

railroads regarding increased allotments

of reserved space to the government reservation bureaus in their respective territories.164

The chief problem in the operation of

Army reservation bureaus was to get the

carriers to allocate sufficient space on

trains to the government reservation

bureaus to meet the military need. The

Chief of Transportation kept pressing for

larger allocations and some lines responded, but others evidently were reluctant to hold back large blocks of space

from the general public.165 Although the

Army emphasized that the reservation

bureaus were operated solely as a convenience to military personnel and did not

imply any priority in favor of military

over civilian travelers, the fact remained

that while space was under allocation to

the GRB's it was not available to the

public. On the Army's side it could be

pointed out that civilians could and did

make reservations far in advance, whereas

this frequently was not possible with military personnel, and that some large business concerns bought up blocks of space on

important trains and never relinquished it

even though some of the accommodations

might not be used.

Despite the competition for reserved

space, the results obtained by the Army

reservation bureaus were substantial.

During the early months of operation the

percentage of requests that could not be

filled was high, reaching a peak of 13.3

percent in August 1943, but rapid improvement followed. In several later

months the percentage of failures was as

low as 2.1. Activities of the ARB's from

their inception in April 1943 through 1945

are summarized in Table 5.

The Chief of Transportation considered

this traffic so important that in order to

supplement the regular sleeper services he

assigned to it a considerable number of

the cars that had been allotted to handle

organized troop movements. These cars

were placed on routes where the travel of

military personnel on official business and

on furlough was especially heavy, and

they were designated military sleeping

car lines. When the need became apparent to the Traffic Control Division, the

division requested the railroad concerned

and the Pullman Company to study the

situation and to arrange for the operation

of such a line. When on days of peak

travel the traffic exceeded the capacity of

regular sleeper services and the military

sleeping car line, the officer in charge of

164

 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 77-82, 85-98;

WD Memo W 55-40-43, 24 Aug 43; WD Cir 396, 7

Oct 44, Sec. I; WD CTB 23, 8 May 45, includes a list

of ARB's and their branches and the rules governing

their operation. 165

 Ltr, Gross to Maj Gen Sanderford Jarman, 23

Jul 43, OCT 531.8 GRBs; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 17

Aug 44, OCT 531.2 SF; 1st Ind, 8th ZTO for CofT,

1 Jan 45, and related correspondence, OCT 531.2

New Orleans.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 65

TABLE 5—ARMY RESERVATION BUREAU ACTIVITY: APRIL 1943-DECEMBER 1945

Source: Data based on Army Reservation Bureau Activity Report, received by Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for publication

in a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

an Army reservation bureau was authorized to arrange with the carriers for the

assignment of overflow sleeping cars.

These also were to be taken from the military allotment. Since the establishment of

military sleeping car lines meant that so

much less equipment was available for organized troop movements, the Traffic

Control Division weighed very carefully

the circumstances affecting each case.

While these lines were intended primarily

for military personnel for whom reservations had been made by the ARB's, any

space not sold by the release time was

made available to the public. In May

1945 there were seventy-six such lines in

operation.166

Although the Army reservation bureaus

initially served only Army personnel, their

services eventually were made available

to personnel of the Navy, the Marine

Corps, and the Coast Guard. The Navy

also set up a number of reservation bureaus that could be used by personnel of

all of the armed services. Toward the close

of the war both the Army and the Navy

reservation bureaus were advertised as

military reservation bureaus, but in most

places the management continued to be

by the Army or by the Navy. Early in

1945 the ARB's at San Francisco, Los

Angeles, and Seattle became joint bureaus

and were operated under the control of

committees representing all of the armed

services.167

As soon as hostilities were over the carriers undertook to terminate the operation

of both government reservation bureaus

and military sleeping car lines promptly.

In this they had the support of Mr. Johnson, Director of Defense Transportation,

who on 4 September 1945 informed the

armed forces that overflow sleeping cars

would be discontinued at once, and that

the GRB's would be canceled on 15 October "in order that sleeping cars may be

made available for commercial use on a

parity with government travel." General

Gross and his colleagues in the other

branches of the military establishment immediately entered a protest against this

action, pointing out that the military population of the country would be large for

many months to come and that military

personnel returning from overseas would

be in special need of these services. The

protest was successful. The government

reservation bureaus were continued, on a

diminishing scale, until August 1946.

While some military sleeping car lines

were discontinued, others were inaugu166

 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 97-100; WD CTB

23, 8 May 45, p. 12. 167

 Memo, CofT for 9th ZTO, 28 Oct 44, OCT

531.8 GRBs; Interv with Col Morris, 11 Oct 50, OCT

HB TZ Gen ARB.
66 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

SPECIAL RESERVATION BUREAU FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL in the

station concourse, New Orleans, Louisiana.

rated during the period of heavy demobilization.168

The number of officers passing through

Washington to domestic and oversea assignments was large, and the Chief of

Transportation provided a complete travel

service for their benefit. This service,

established in November 1942, replaced

similar services set up by The Adjutant

General and by other agencies of the War

Department. Operated as a section of the

Passenger Branch, Traffic Control Division, the travel bureau had its main office

in the Pentagon and a branch in the

Munitions Building. Complementing the

activities of the Army reservation bureau

(formally set up in April 1943), the travel

bureau rendered assistance in preparing

mileage and expense vouchers, aided in

filing applications for pay allotments and

insurance, gave advice on obtaining

168

 Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 21 Aug 45; Ltr, Johnson

to Gross, 4 Sep 45; Ltr, Armed Forces to Johnson, 5

Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Armed Forces, 10 Sep 45;

Memo, McIntyre for Gross, 12 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson

to Gross, 20 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr,

IMG to Johnson, 8 Jan 46, OCT 531.7 Sleeping Car

Lines.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 67

financial assistance and making wills,

issued transportation requests upon presentation of travel orders, prepared itineraries, provided information regarding

conditions in foreign countries, processed

applications for passports and visas, made

reservations for air and rail travel, and obtained hotel accommodations in other

cities. Consolidated ticket offices maintained by the rail, bus, and airlines were

domiciled with the travel bureau. The

bureau's services were available to both

the civilian and the military personnel of

the Army, and for group as well as individual travel. After the war its activities

were transferred to the Military District of

Washington.169

Although the commanders of Army installations in the zone of interior were also

instructed to establish travel information

booths to enable officers and enlisted men

to complete arrangements without having

to visit the crowded ticket offices of the

carriers, the travel bureau established in

Washington was unique both in size and

in scope. The nature and extent of its principal activities are indicated in the following summary of services performed during

the fiscal year ending 30 June 1945:

 170

Services Number

Military travel orders issued ............. . 19,262

Civilian travel orders issued............. . 4,967

Transportation requests issued ........... . 116,640

Mileage vouchers prepared ............. . 23,608

Pullman reservations made. ............ . 164,251

Air reservations made.................. . 44,654

Hotel reservations made ................ . 10,533

Passports obtained..................... . 6,680

Visas obtained........................ . 8,363

The value of ticket sales for the fiscal year

1945 were as follows:171

Railway. .......................... . $3,370,774

Airline............................ . 853,884

Bus. .............................. . 12,750

The hotel reservation service performed

by the Chief of Transportation's travel bureau was based on an arrangement made

with the American Hotel Association

early in 1943 under which members of the

Association agreed to reserve rooms,

against letters of recommendation written

by the travel bureau, either in their own

hotels or in others of similar class. Travelers presented copies of these letters when

claiming their accommodations. The success of the plan led to its extension to some

of the Army reservation bureaus in the

field. The travel bureau in Washington

and the ARB's made only out-of-town

reservations. Late in the war the service

commands set up bureaus in the principal cities that made hotel reservations

only in their respective localities. Then it

was arranged that when any of the Chief

of Transportation's bureaus wanted to

make reservations in cities in which there

were service command bureaus, they

would do so through the latter bureaus

rather than directly with the hotels.172

Discipline of military personnel traveling on regular trains became a problem as

soon as the build-up of the armed forces

began in 1940. Train officials were reluctant to exercise the same authority over

soldiers that they did over civilians, military authority was frequently lacking, and

169

 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 102-14; SOS

Adm Memo 65, 9 Nov 42, sub: Discontinuance of

Travel Assistance Functions; SOS Memo, 13 Nov 42,

sub: New Location of Travel Offices; WD Memo

55-45, 22 Oct 45, sub: Estab of Oversea Travel

Office, MDW; ASF Cir 128, 24 May 46, Sec. VI. 170

 WD Cir 77, 17 Mar 43, Sec. IV; Annual Rpt,

Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 31, OCT HB Traf Contl

Div Rpts. 171

 Ibid.

172 OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 114-114b; ASF

Cir 77, 2 Mar 45, Sec. II; ASF Cir 174, 17 May 45,

Sec. I.
68 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

young men temporarily relieved from the

restraints of the military reservation were

often guilty of rowdyism and irresponsible

acts. Complaints made by passengers and

train officials indicated that the excessive

use of liquor was a contributing factor in

many cases. The railroads therefore inquired whether it was the desire of the

Army that they refuse to sell liquor to

service personnel. The Adjutant General

replied in the negative, stating that discrimination against service personnel on

public trains was undesirable and that enlisted men who were drunken or disorderly

were subject to trial and punishment by

court-martial under the Articles of War.173

Although the commanding officers of

camps and other installations were directed to enforce the regulations strictly

and to co-operate with railroad officials in

dealing with disciplinary problems, the

complaints against misconduct continued.

The carriers then proposed that the Army

place its representatives on trains carrying

large numbers of furloughees to enforce

discipline. The Army at first rejected this

proposal, in part because of the lack of

appropriations, but later accepted it when

the railroads offered free transportation

for such representatives. In September

1941 station commanders were authorized to designate military police to ride

such trains when the railroads requested

them to do so.174

After the United States entered the war

and travel by servicemen on regular trains

increased, further measures were required.

As a first step, post commanders were

again directed to deal vigorously with

cases of misbehavior on trains, but the

need for more effective control was soon

evident.175 The next step was to assign to

the commanders of corps areas (later redesignated service commands) full responsibility for placing military police on regular passenger trains whenever large numbers of military personnel were being

carried.176 In the beginning this arrangement was not wholly successful because

many of the men assigned as military police were inadequately trained and were

not always assigned to the trains where

they were most needed. In November

1942 General Marshall, the Chief of Staff,

complained that the control of discipline

on trains was not effective, and the Provost

Marshal General then appointed thirty

inspectors to make investigations throughout the country and to coach military police in the proper performance of their

duties.177

The effectiveness of the military police

increased steadily after these measures

were taken. As the reports of difficulty became less frequent some of the service

commands, in view of the growing scarcity

of military police, began withdrawing

them from certain trains. In the summer

173

 Ltrs, IMC to TQMG and Other Armed Forces,

4 Mar 40, and 29 Jun 40; Ltr, IMG for TQMG, 31

Jul 40; Ltr, TAG to IMC, 5 Aug 40; all in OCT 250.1

Misconduct of Mil Pers, Vol. I. 174

 Memo, IMC for TQMG, et al., 26 Feb 41;

Memo, TAG to CGs Corps Areas, et al., 1 May 41,

sub: Conduct of Mil Pers on Trains; Ltr, IMC to

TAG, 12 May 41; Ltr, TAG to IMC, 10 Jun 41; Ltr,

IMC to TAG, 15 Jul 41; Memo, TAG to CGs Corps

Areas, et al., 26 Sep 41, sub: MP on Furlough Trains;

Ltr, TAG to IMC, 4 Nov 41; all in AG 250.1 (2-26-

41)(1). 175

 Memo, TAG for CG AGF, et al., 12 Apr 42,

sub: Conduct of Mil Pers on Pub Carriers, AG 250.1

(3-25-42). 176

 Memo, TAG for CG AGF, etc., 21 Jul 42, sub:

Misconduct on Pub Carriers, AG 250.1 (7-14-42);

SOS Memo S 190-1-42, 24 Sep 42, sub: MPs Assigned

to Pub Carriers. Concerning general responsibility of

service commands for conduct of military personnel,

see WD Cir 77, 17 Mar 43, Secs. I and III. 177

 Memos, CofS for PMG, 4 and 17 Nov 42;

Memo PMG for CofS, 23 Nov 42; Memo, PMG for

CGs of SvCs, 1 Dec 42; all in PMG 250.1; WD Memo

W 190-1-43, 5 Jan 43, sub: Size and Composition of

MP Details on Carriers; WD Memo, W 190-2-43, 13

Sep 43, sub: Assignment of MPs to Extra Sections;

ASF Cir 224, 18 Jul 44, Sec. III.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 69

of 1943 the railroads protested vigorously

against this action and the Chief of Transportation supported their position. As a

result, ASF headquarters reminded the

service commands of their responsibilities

and directed them not to withdraw military police from trains unless a careful

survey showed their services were not

needed.178

In addition to quelling disturbances and

performing other duties of a disciplinary

nature, military police checked the papers

of each soldier to make sure that he was

traveling with proper authority and that

he was on the right train. At the end of

July 1945, out of a total of 10,640 military

police engaged in the enforcement of discipline in the United States, 3,401 were

policing railroad stations and trains.179

In the early months of the war the

Army's military policemen and the Navy's

shore patrolmen devoted their attention

entirely to men of their respective services.

Later, under an agreement made in 1942,

they were authorized to take corrective

measures against servicemen of any of the

armed services when their actions were

reprehensible. Military police and members of the shore patrol frequently served

on joint missions.180 One disadvantage of

the joint patrols, as the Provost Marshal

General pointed out, was that shore patrolmen were all petty officers while only

a small proportion of the military police

held comparable grades.181

The matter of serving liquor to Army

personnel on regular trains came up recurrently. The railroads desired a definite

statement of policy from the Army, and

the Army apparently hesitated to take a

positive stand. Eventually, in September

1943, the railroads were informed that responsibility for this matter had been

assigned to the Chief of Transportation

and that certain steps had been decided

on. Railroad employees were requested to

refuse to sell liquor to soldiers whose actions indicated that an additional drink

might result in disorderly conduct. The

serving of liquor in dining cars was to be

stopped whenever such sale interfered

with the expeditious serving of meals. At

the same time the extensive conversion of

lounge and club cars into coaches already

had greatly reduced the opportunity for

soldiers to obtain liquor on the trains.182

The policy was therefore one of regulation

rather than of prohibition.

Transportation of members of the

Women's Army Corps (WAC) and enlisted men in separate cars was favored by

WAC headquarters. The Chief of Transportation agreed that this should be done

when practicable but pointed out that

complete segregation could not be assured

in view of the shortage of railway equipment. Segregation was easily accomplished

when enough servicewomen to fill a car

were traveling, but when smaller groups

were involved they were often placed in

the same cars with servicemen to avoid

wasting space. This procedure was in

keeping with the commercial practice, and

no unusual difficulties were experienced.

Each group of Wacs had a leader with

disciplinary responsibilities, as did the

enlisted men.183

178

 Memo, ASF Hq for CGs of SvGs, 2 Sep 43, OCT

531.7 MP on Trains. 179

 PMGO monograph, Military Policy Division,

Provost Marshal General's Office, 1 Sep 45, p. 44,

OCMH; WD press release, 7 Nov 46. 180

 WD Cir 380, 24 Nov 42. 181

 PMGO monograph, cited n. 179. 182

 Ltr, Wylie to Siddall, Western Mil Bur, 15 Sep

43, and preceding correspondence in OCT 531.7 Sale

of Liquor on Trains. 183

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 Dec 43; WD Cir

154, 18 Apr 44, Sec. III; Memo, CofT for CG 7th

SvC, 19 Jun 45; all in OCT 511 Mixed Groups of Enlisted Men and Women; Interv with Morris, 26 Jun

50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass.
70 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The problems that arose when military

personnel used regular transportation services were different from those encountered

when they moved by special troop train,

and in some respects they were more difficult to handle. The sources of difficulty

were the mingling of civilians and soldiers,

the overcrowding of trains and buses, and

the lack of military control over the facilities and of command authority over the

men. The Chief of Transportation did

much to relieve the uncertainties and inconveniences of travel by providing the

reservation bureaus, the military sleeping

car lines, and through other measures. As

to discipline, such measures were taken as

were considered feasible and the situation

improved, but it never became wholly

satisfactory. The need for military police

on all trains carrying substantial numbers

of servicemen was clearly demonstrated.

Movement of Patients

In moving patients, as in moving troops,

all suitable means of transportation were

used—the railways, air transport, and

motor ambulances.184 The employment of

aircraft developed gradually and ambulances were used chiefly for short hauls, so

that the railways were the major factor.

It was with the rail movements that the

Transportation Corps was primarily concerned.

In peacetime the small numbers of

patients that had to be moved by rail were

transported by regular train service using

sleepers, parlor cars, or coaches according

to the condition of the patients and the

length of the journeys. During the war the

Army found it advisable to build up a fleet

of specially constructed hospital cars to

handle the rapidly growing traffic, particularly the more serious cases, but the railroads' regular services and equipment still

were required.

Movements of patients fell into two

general categories. In the first category

were movements of patients being transferred to or between medical facilities in

the zone of interior. Such movements

were regulated by The Surgeon General,

who took into account the medical needs

of the patients and bed vacancies in the

respective hospitals. In the second category

were movements from the water ports and

aerial ports where patients were landed

after evacuation from the oversea theaters.

These movements followed a prearranged

pattern. In general, they were governed

by bed credits that the ports held at socalled debarkation hospitals located near

the seaboard. Usually the patients remained at the debarkation hospitals only

a few days pending determination of the

institutions to which they would be sent

for further treatment or for convalescence.

While there was a certain amount of traffic

involving patients stationed in the zone of

interior, the heavier movements resulted

from oversea evacuations, and the volume

was therefore on an ascending scale

throughout the war, reaching its peak soon

after the German surrender when evacuation from the European theater was being

pressed.

Close collaboration obviously was necessary between The Surgeon General, who

controlled the direction of the traffic and

supervised the medical services rendered

en route, and the Chief of Transportation,

who had over-all responsibility for providing the means of transportation. General

184

 See Clarence McKittrick Smith, The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1956), Chs. XIX-XXIV, for a detailed

discussion of the handling of patients, including their

transportation.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 71

TABLE 6—OPERATIONS OF ARMY HOSPITAL CARS AND MEDICAL KITCHEN CARS: 1944-1946

Source: Records of Passenger Branch, Traffic Control Division, OCT; monthly data from these records will be published in a statistical

volume of this series, now in preparation.

co-ordination was provided by the Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch of ASF

headquarters, but that was not enough;

direct collaboration was necessary on the

many details relating to the proper movement and adequate care of patients. This

was undertaken in the beginning through

the assignment of a medical liaison officer

to the Chief of Transportation, and later

by the attachment of a medical regulating

unit to the Chief of Transportation's Movements Division. This unit dealt with the

movement of patients from the theaters

and their handling at the ports, as well as

with their subsequent transportation

inland.185

Although the war found the Army

without any definite plans for the development of a fleet of hospital cars, 320 such

cars were acquired gradually for operation

in the zone of interior.186 Of these, 120

were former Pullman sleepers and lounge

cars that had been converted to hospital

cars with thirty-two berths arranged in

two tiers. The remaining 200 had been

designed and built as hospital cars with

accommodations for thirty-six persons in

three-tier berths. All cars had large side

doors to facilitate the handling of litter

patients. Some cars that were acquired

early in the war did not at first have

kitchen facilities, but later all were

equipped with buffet kitchens. Air conditioning was not installed in some of the

earlier acquisitions, but eventually it was

provided for the entire fleet. The Army

also built sixty medical kitchen cars,

which were of simplified design similar to

the troop kitchen cars but especially

equipped for feeding patients. The medical kitchen cars were needed principally

for use in connection with moving patients

in regular sleeping cars and coaches, because such cars had no kitchen equipment.

Summary data regarding the operation of

the hospital cars and medical kitchen cars

during 1944, 1945, and 1946 are given in

Table 6.

185

 The medical regulating unit will be discussed in

connection with evacuation by water. See below, p.

213.

186

 On the build-up of this fleet, see Wardlow, op.

cit., pp. 385-89.
NEW SELF-CONTAINED ARMY HOSPITAL CAR. Three-tier berths accommodating thirty-six patients (above); the kitchen (below).
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 73

Since hospital cars served as both

medical facilities and transportation facilities and were staffed and supplied by the

Army, responsibility for their construction,

maintenance, and operation was divided

among several Army agencies. These responsibilities were worked out after the

United States entered the war, and for a

time the division of authority was not entirely clear. But by the time the movement

of patients became heavy, responsibilities

had been clarified.187 The Surgeon General and the Chief of Transportation collaborated in establishing car designs that

would meet both medical and transportation requirements. The Chief of Transportation supervised the maintenance of the

cars as railroad equipment—such maintenance was provided by the railroads—

assigned them to the service commands in

accordance with the requirements of the

respective areas, made general arrangements with the carriers for the movement

of the cars over their lines, and in certain

cases provided routings. The Surgeon

General supervised the maintenance of

the medical equipment and the staffing of

the cars with medical personnel. The service commands were directly responsible

for staffing, supplying, and cleaning the

cars and for their assignment to load at

ports of embarkation and hospitals in accordance with the number of patients to

be moved from the respective installations.

The Army policy was to move as many

patients as possible in hospital cars, since

they were more satisfactory from the

standpoint of facilities than regular passenger equipment and the latter was sorely

needed for civilian and troop traffic. It

was necessary, nevertheless, to call on the

carriers for many sleepers for litter patients and their attendants as well as for

parlor cars and coaches to accommodate

ambulant patients. Because The Surgeon

General desired that litter patients be

moved in air-conditioned cars, the sleepers

assigned to this traffic were mostly of the

standard type rather than tourist-class

cars. The special Army troop sleepers were

not used for patients because of the lack of

air conditioning and other refinements.188

In the early part of the war the Chief of

Transportation had less control over the

routing of movements of patients and the

ordering of equipment from the railroads

than he had over troop movements, but

his control increased as the war progressed.

Under instructions issued by SOS headquarters in the summer of 1942, the service

commands were authorized to deal directly

with the railroads regarding sleepers,

coaches, and dining cars for the transfer

of patients, as well as routings, when the

movements were wholly within their territorial jurisdictions.189

 This procedure continued until June 1943, when it was

changed to conform to the policy already

in effect for other traffic—groups of forty

or more would be moved under arrangements made by the Chief of Transportation.190

 In the spring of 1945 in anticipation of heavy patient traffic at the end of

the war in Europe and the consequent

desirability of consolidating movements as

much as possible in order to conserve rail

equipment, the Chief of Transportation

187

 SOS Pamphlet, Military Hospitalization and

Evacuation of Patients, 15 Sep 42, in OCT HB Rail

Div Hosp Gars; WD Cir 316, 6 Dec 43. 188

 Morris monograph, p. 56; Memo, SG for CofT,

6 Dec 43; Memo, CofT for GAO, 1 Oct 45, par. 6;

last two in OCT 531.4 Hosp Train. 189

 Memo, CG SOS for CGs SvCs, 26 Aug 42, sub:

Control of Hosp Trains, par. 4, OCT 531.4 Hosp

Trains; SOS Pamphlet, Military Hospitalization and

Evacuation of Patients, cited n. 187. 190

 AR 55-130, 28 Dec 42, par. 8b, and Changes 2, 4

Jun 43.
74 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

requested authority to control all movements involving fifteen or more patients

and attendants. This authority was

granted in June 1945. Smaller movements

were arranged for by local transportation

officers through representatives of the railroads attached to their installations.191

The Chief of Transportation also increased his control over the utilization of

Army hospital cars as the patient traffic

became heavier. Because of his close contacts with The Surgeon General and the

railroads, as well as his control over routings, he was able to avoid deadheading

and other uneconomical practices much

more effectively than the service commands. Consequently, early in 1944 the

Chief of Transportation's Traffic Control

Division began to assign hospital cars to

specific movements, request railroad

equipment for integration into hospital

trains, establish schedules, and determine

what stopovers and diversions could be

made en route. Similar supervision was

exercised over the employment of the

medical kitchen cars. In December 1943,

with this increased control in prospect, the

Passenger Branch had established an

evacuation unit to deal exclusively with

the movement of patients. This unit was

responsible for advance planning as well

as day-to-day operations.192

The evacuation unit kept each movement of patients under observation and

complained to the railroads whenever

their services did not appear satisfactory.

It emphasized the importance of the

smooth handling of hospital trains and

cars and requested that buffer cars always

be placed between locomotives and cars

occupied by patients.193 The apparent inclination of some lines to handle hospital

movements "at their leisure," with resulting poor connections at junction points

and long delays for the patients, was

strongly criticized.194 As in the case of

complaints regarding troop trains, the

Military Transportation Section transmitted the reported failures to the individual rail lines and eventually relayed the

lines' explanations to the Chief of Transportation.

Despite the effort to move patients in

groups of a carload or greater, it frequently

was not possible to do so, and arrangements for the transportation of individuals

and small groups on regular trains were

necessary. Although such arrangements

were made by the local transportation

officers, the Chief of Transportation used

his close relations with the railroads to

insure prompt handling. The principal

problem was to obtain accommodations

without delay. Patients traveling on regular trains usually required room space,

and such space generally was sold or

reserved far in advance. Sometimes travelers who held space could be persuaded

to relinquish it in favor of patients whose

cases were urgent, but this was not always

true. The railroads were requested, and

they agreed, to have such situations referred to their general passenger offices,

191

 WD Cir 234, 12 Jun 44; Ltr, Morris to IMC, 2

Aug 44, and reply, 31 Aug 44, OCT 511; WD Cir

405, 14 Oct 44; Ltr, IMC to CofT, 9 Feb 45; Memo,

CofT for SG, 14 Feb 45, sub: Routing Hosp Train

Travel, par. 3; last two in OCT 531.4 Hosp Cars;

Memo, CofT for ACofS G-4, 16 May 45, OCT 511

(AR 55-130); WD Cir 177, 15 Jun 45, Sec. II. 192

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, pp. 23-24, OCT

HB Traf Contl Div Rpts; ASF Cir 328, 30 Sep 44,

Sec. VIII. 193

 Ltr, Morris to MTS, 13 Nov 44; Ltr, AAR to

Morris, 20 Nov 44, and atchd instruction to RRs; both

in OCT 510 Patients. 194

 See Memos, White to MTS, 21 Apr 45, OCT

531.4 Hospital, and 9 Aug 45, OCT 511 Starke Gen

Hosp.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 75

which usually held some accommodations

in reserve. Unfortunately, this procedure

did not fully meet the need. The next step

was a more formal arrangement between

the Army and the railroads under which

Class I patients—those requiring immediate transportation—were certified in writing by the responsible medical officers and

the carriers designated special officers to

deal with these cases.195

In June 1944 the Office of Defense

Transportation, recognizing the difficulties of the situation, requested the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to

direct the carriers to cancel reservations

and, if necessary, to require regular passengers to vacate accommodations that

were needed for patients of the armed

forces and the merchant marine.196 The

ICC service order that was issued in response to this request specifically named

the railroad passenger agents and the

train conductors concerned with each case

as its agents for enforcing the priority

arrangement. The Chief of Transportation

refused to recognize a narrow interpretation of this order and maintained that,

when the necessity of evicting regular passengers was certified by an authorized

Army officer, all agents of the carriers,

including the Military Transportation

Section, were obligated to take any action

within their competence to obtain the

desired accommodations.197 Both the

Chief of Transportation and the railroads

agreed, however, that eviction should be

resorted to only when other means of

accommodating patients had failed, and

in practice such evictions were rarely

necessary.

Providing meals for patients traveling on

regular trains was a problem for the railroads from the beginning of heavy movements. One of the reasons was that there

were not sufficient dining cars for all such

trains. When large movements were

started from ports and general hospitals

in hospital trains, dining cars—or medical

kitchen cars after they became available—

were assigned, but frequently these trains

were broken up en route and the cars

bearing patients were attached to a number of regular trains for the onward journey. If the regular trains did not customarily carry diners, the railroads were

confronted with two alternatives: they

could attach special diners, which was difficult because of their scarcity, or they

could serve box meals, which The Surgeon

General did not consider satisfactory for

patients.198

In trying to solve the problem, the

railroads requested the Chief of Transportation to notify them at the time hospital

movements were routed of the specific

trains for which they would be expected

to provide dining cars. The Chief of Transportation did not feel that this was necessary and took the position that, when a

route had been established showing the

initial, intermediate, and terminal carriers,

he had done all that he reasonably could

to forewarn the railroads, and that the

responsibility for meeting dining car re195

 WD Cir 234, 12 Jun 44; WD Cir 405, 14 Oct

44; OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 63-67. 196

 ODT, Civilian War Transport, p. 84; Ltr, ODT

to CofT, 19 Jun 44, and reply, 20 Jun 44, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Pass; ICC Sv Order 213, effective 27

Jun 44; WD Cir 405, 14 Oct 44, par. 5, 197

 Memo, Gass for Morris, 7 Oct 44, and reply, 10

Oct 44, OCT 510 Patients. 198

 Memo, MTS for McIntyre, OCT, 7 Apr 44,

OCT 453.9 Hosp Cars; Memo, IMC for CofT, 18

Sep 44, and reply, 27 Sep 44, OCT 531.7 Train

Service.
76 THE TRANSPORTATION CORP

quirements then rested with the carriers.

It was the consideration of this problem,

as well as the preference for meals prepared under medical supervision over

those served from regular dining cars, that

led to the inclusion of buffet kitchens in

the 200 new hospital cars built by the

Army and the eventual installation of

buffet kitchens in the converted cars.199

Hospital cars and hospital trains were

staffed by the service commands to which

they were assigned, and the instructions

regarding the composition and responsibilities of the medical staffs were issued by

those commands, subject to the approval

of The Surgeon General.200 A senior medical officer, who had over-all responsibility

for administration, messing, discipline,

sanitation, and care of patients, was in

charge of each hospital train. The grades

and numbers of medical personnel on

hospital cars moving in regular train service depended on the type of patients and

the length of the journey. Close co-ordination obviously was necessary between the

service command personnel and the Medical Corps and Transportation Corps officers in Washington and at the ports who

were concerned with the movement of

patients. In anticipation of heavy evacuation from overseas, meetings of such officers were held on the east and west coasts

in 1945 to discuss problems and to review

and refine the procedures.201

Data are available only for patients

routed by the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Throughout the war individuals and small groups were routed locally,

and during the early part of the war some

larger groups were so routed. The first

recorded routings by the OCT were for

the month of December 1942, when the

groups totaled 375 patients and attendants. During the next four years the totals

were as follows:202

Patients and

Year Attendants

1943. ............................... . 85,705

1944. ............................... . 165,121

1945. ............................... . 440,864

1946. ............................... . 50,767

The peak month was May 1945, when

concentrated efforts were being made to

evacuate the sick and wounded from the

European theater, and in that month

more than 58,000 patients and attendants

were routed by rail.

The demand for cars to transport patients was heavy not only because of the

number of patients to be moved but also

because of the length of the journeys. The

long trips resulted from the necessity of

sending patients to distant hospitals for

specialized treatment and the policy of

placing patients in hospitals as near their

homes as possible. Patients landed at west

coast ports were likely to make especially

long trips because the majority of the hospitals were in the east. In planning patient

movements and the utilization of hospital

cars, The Surgeon General and the Chief

of Transportation naturally gave attention to shortening the trips whenever pos199

 WD Cir 480, 22 Dec 44, Sec. I, gave comprehensive instructions regarding subsistence on Army

hospital cars and trains. 200

 See Ltr, Col Edgar S. Linthicum, 1st SvC, to Col

Harry D. Offutt, SGO, 22 Jul 43, and atchd SOP,

OCT 531.4 Hospital. 201

 Hospital Train Conf, Miller Field, New York,

15-18 Feb 45; Hospital Train Unit Commanders

Conf, San Francisco, Calif., 10-13 July 45; both in

Hist Div SGO. During repatriation Navy patients

were transported in Army hospital cars in emergencies, and railroad cars with Navy patients were attached to Army hospital trains. For procedures, see

ASF Cir 441, 11 Dec 45, Sec. V. 202

 Data from reports prepared by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for publication in a statistical volume of this

series, now in preparation.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 77

sible and reducing deadhead mileage.

Incident to the study of the transportation

of patients from the ports to hospitals of

definitive treatment during the latter part

of the war, the following data were compiled on the utilization of rail equipment

in such movements:203

Number of

Round Trips

Average Miles Per Car

Debarkation Port Per Trip Per Month

Boston. ................... . 1,175 3.4

New York................. . 1,058 4.0

Hampton Roads. ........... . 1,105 3.6

Charleston ................. . 1,145 3.5

Los Angeles ............... . 2,320 1.7

San Francisco.............. . 2,409 1.7

Seattle. ................... . 2,630 1.5

In reviewing the Army's experience

with the movement of patients by rail

during the war, two facts are noteworthy

from the standpoint of the Chief of Transportation. First, although such movements

were accomplished without serious delay

or inconvenience, the situation would

have been improved by earlier decision as

to the number of hospital cars to be procured. The Pullman cars used when hospital cars were not available were not as

satisfactory as the hospital cars from the

medical standpoint, and they had to be

taken out of other services where they

were constantly needed. The last 100 hospital cars were not ordered until January

1945, and some of them had not yet entered service when the war ended. The

delay was occasioned chiefly by the difficulty of estimating the extent of battle

casualties and the incidence of disease in

a war being waged in many widely scattered areas and under a great variety of

conditions. Uncertainty concerning the

evacuation policy on removal of patients

from the theaters to the zone of interior

was another factor in the delay. Second,

the original plan of delegating a large

measure of authority to the service commands for routing groups of patients and

for utilizing hospital cars and regular railroad equipment proved unsatisfactory.

The Chief of Transportation's authority in

these matters was therefore considerably

broadened as the traffic became heavier.

Thus the experience with the movement

of patients confirmed the position that the

Chief of Transportation had consistently

taken with respect to troop movements—

that centralized control was necessary in

order to obtain the most efficient utilization of equipment and a proper distribution of traffic.

Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens

The transportation of more than 400,-

000 prisoners of war (POW's), evacuated

from the theaters to the zone of interior,

was an unwelcome responsibility added to

those already resting on the Chief of

Transportation and the railroads. This

traffic was difficult to handle not only because of the over-all shortage of passenger

equipment, but because security requirements dictated that prisoners of war be

removed from the seaboard areas as

promptly as possible; ship arrivals could

not be predicted precisely; advance information regarding the size and composition of POW shipments was sometimes

inadequate or inaccurate; the railway cars

used for handling this traffic had to be

specially prepared for the purpose; and

the internment camps were scattered

throughout the country. When large 203

 History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and

Medical Regulating Service SGO, section on hospital

trains, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv, cited

hereafter as Hist Med Liaison Off. The period to

which the data apply is not stated, but the context

indicates the latter part of the war.

Prisoners of War and Enemy Aliens

The transportation of more than 400,-

000 prisoners of war (POW's), evacuated

from the theaters to the zone of interior,

was an unwelcome responsibility added to

those already resting on the Chief of

Transportation and the railroads. This

traffic was difficult to handle not only because of the over-all shortage of passenger

equipment, but because security requirements dictated that prisoners of war be

removed from the seaboard areas as

promptly as possible; ship arrivals could

not be predicted precisely; advance information regarding the size and composition of POW shipments was sometimes

inadequate or inaccurate; the railway cars

used for handling this traffic had to be

specially prepared for the purpose; and

the internment camps were scattered

throughout the country. When large 203

 History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and

Medical Regulating Service SGO, section on hospital

trains, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv, cited

hereafter as Hist Med Liaison Off. The period to

which the data apply is not stated, but the context

indicates the latter part of the war.
78 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

groups of prisoners of war arrived at U.S.

ports, the railroads were hard put to meet

the requirements for equipment in addition to the other demands regularly made

on them, and it was sometimes necessary

to delay other military movements of low

priority in order to move prisoners of war

to internment camps without delay.204

Prisoners of war received in the United

States were mostly Germans and Italians

captured in North Africa and in Europe.

At the end of May 1945 there were 371,-

000 Germans and 50,000 Italians in our

internment camps, while at the end of the

hostilities in the Pacific there were only

5,400 Japanese prisoners of war in the

United States.205 The burden, therefore,

fell largely upon the eastern ports and the

eastern rail lines. In 1943, when the handling of POW's from the Mediterranean

was adversely affecting military movements along the Atlantic seaboard, the

War Department considered the advisability of setting up staging areas near the

ports for the temporary detention of new

arrivals, in order that the flow from the

ports to the internment camps might be

leveled off and the carriers relieved of the

necessity of assigning so much equipment

to this traffic at one time. The inadvisability of holding prisoners in heavily

populated seaboard areas argued against

the proposal, and sufficient success was

achieved in co-ordinating the water and

the land movements to cause the project

to be dropped.206

The railroads still found this a difficult

and undesirable traffic. In the fall of 1944,

after wrestling with the problem for more

than a year and with heavy additional

shipments from Europe in prospect, the

Association of American Railroads recommended that no further prisoners of war

be brought to the United States. In response, General Gross was able to inform

the AAR that the Army already had instructed the European theater to that

effect.207

The restraint was only temporary, however, for in the spring of 1945 further

large shipments of German prisoners were

received. In the beginning the purpose of

removing prisoners of war from the theaters was to relieve the theater commanders

of the burden of housing, feeding, and

guarding them, and this argument remained a strong one from the theater

standpoint. As the war progressed, the

growing labor shortage in the United

States and the success with which POW's

were being employed in industry and

agriculture created another persuasive

argument for bringing captured Germans

to the zone of interior.

From the time prisoners of war were

placed aboard trains at the ports where

they landed they were in the custody of

the Provost Marshal General. His office

and that of the Chief of Transportation

kept in close touch regarding prospective

arrivals at the ports and subsequent transfers. In matters affecting the inland transportation, internment, and employment

of POW's, the Provost Marshal General's

authority was largely delegated to the

service commands. When groups of forty

or more were to be transferred from ports

or internment camps, the service com204

 Memo, Gass for Morris, 2 Sep 43, OCT 511 Rail

and Motor Mvrnts. 205

 PMGO monograph, Prisoner of War Operations, Feb 46, pp. 31-35, copy in OCMH. This monograph covers many aspects of the subject that cannot

be treated here. 206

 Ltr, SW to SN, 27 Sep 43, OSW 453 (9-8-43)(l). 207

 Ltr, Buford to Gross, 30 Oct 44, and reply, 1

Nov 44, OCT HB Gross Rail.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 79

mands passed this information to the

Chief of Transportation, who arranged for

the railroads to execute the movements.

When smaller groups were transferred,

the transportation arrangements were

made by the commanders of the ports or

the internment camps from which the

movements started. The service command

in which a movement originated was responsible for providing escorts, mess personnel, and medical attendants, as well as

for furnishing the supplies required by the

prisoners en route.208

The utmost effort was made to move

prisoners of war in special trains and special cars, rather than in regular train service where they might be brought in contact with the public. It frequently happened that this was not possible because

of the wide distribution of the internment

camps. At the end of August 1945 there

were about 155 base camps and over 500

branch camps for prisoners of war located

in forty-five states. The dispersion of

camps was necessary to serve the many

areas in which POW labor was used.

Transfers between camps were numerous

because of fluctuations in the demand for

this type of labor, particularly the seasonal demand for agricultural workers.

Under an agreement between the War

Department and the War Manpower

Commission, all requests for the assignment of POW's to industrial or agricultural employment were channeled through

the War Manpower Commission, which

had a broad view of the labor situation

throughout the nation.209

As with other types of passenger traffic,

data are not available for prisoner-of-war

movements routed in the field but only for

groups for which transportation arrangements were made by the Traffic Control

Division in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation. From the time when

prisoners began arriving in the United

States from North Africa until the bulk of

the repatriation movement was accomplished, the annual totals of POW's and

guards routed by the division were as

follows:210

Year POW' s and Guards

1942 (December only) ................. . 1,975

1943................................ . 216,651

1944................................ . 487,270

1945. ............................... . 546,052

1946 (Seven months) .................. . 378,298

Prisoners of war were transported in

the lowest-class transportation available—

that is, coaches—except in certain cases.

Generals were furnished accommodations

in sleepers or parlor cars upon request of

the Provost Marshal General to the service command making the transfer. Prisoners who were physically or mentally

disabled were moved in sleepers or hospital cars. When it was more economical,

because of the smallness of the group, to

move prisoners of war in regular train

service than to engage a special coach,

they were accommodated in enclosed

space (compartment, drawing room, and

so forth) so that they could be more readily guarded.211

 When sleepers were required in special POW trains, tourist-class

cars or troop sleepers were used; in regu208

 For summary of responsibilities, see ASF Memo

S 580-1-43, 13 Jul 43, sub: SOP for Transfer of POW;

see also instructions from the Provost Marshal General to the service commands regarding numerous

transfers in OCT 383.6 (1943). 209

 PMGO monograph, cited n. 205, pp. 59, 102. 210

 Data from reports prepared by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, compiled for a statistical volume of this series, now in

preparation. 211

 WD Cir 471, 15 Dec 44; WD Cir 222, 23 Jul 45.
80 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

lar trains they might be standard, tourist,

or troop sleepers. When a special car for

prisoners of war was included in a regular

train, it was placed ahead of other cars so

that there would be no contact between

prisoners and other passengers.

The coaches in which prisoners of war

were transported were specially prepared

for this service by the railroads in accordance with instructions issued by the War

Department.212 Such cars were to contain

no partitions that would obstruct the view

of the guard in one vestibule to the guard

in the vestibule at the other end. The

doors of washrooms and other enclosures

were to be removed, and windows were to

be blocked to prevent their being open

more than eight inches.213 Cabinets containing fire-fighting equipment were to be

covered. As further safeguards the officers

arranging transfers were directed to notify

the railroads that the movements should

be expedited in every way possible, and

the railroads were requested to notify the

train commanders in advance of any

known or probable stops. The Chief of

Transportation consummated agreements

with the carriers covering charges for the

preparation and restoration of cars for the

transfer of POW's and charges for transportation and sleeping car accommodations.214

 Specially prepared cars were not

required for the transfer of captured

Italians who had volunteered to join

Italian Service Units and hence had

acquired a special status.215

Despite the effort made to consolidate

small movements of prisoners of war into

carloads so as to avoid the use of enclosed

spaces in regular cars, there was public

criticism of any use of superior accommodations for such passengers. In July 1945,

following a much publicized incident in

which U.S. soldiers making a long trip in

coaches were reported to have passed a

sleeper in which prisoners of war were accommodated, Army Service Forces headquarters issued instructions that thereafter

the transportation of prisoners of war

would be confined to day coaches, except

in the case of litter patients, and that

motor transportation should be used to

transport prisoners within service commands to permit consolidation of small

movements into carload shipments.216

The Army arranged for some movements of enemy aliens—that is, citizens of

enemy countries residing in the United

States when the war began—but they

were not extensive. The largest movement

of that nature was the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from strategic

areas on the Pacific coast, pursuant to

Executive Order 9066, 19 February 1942.

Approximately 110,000 Japanese and

Japanese-Americans were moved in trains

and bus convoys from exclusion areas to

nearby assembly centers, and thence to

relocation centers farther inland. The

Chief of Transportation arranged with the

carriers for the initial movements, but this

function was soon taken over by the Western Defense Command, which had general charge of the relocation project.

212

 WD Cir 420, 26 Oct 44. 213

 Windows of Pullman cars and Army hospital

cars transporting POW patients were not blocked

unless the service commander specifically requested

it; see Ltr, Maj Darrell T. Lane, OCT, to Gass, 5 Feb

45, OCT 383.6 Special Preparation of Cars. 214

 WD Memo 55-38-43, 21 Aug 43, sub: Trans of

POW; WD CTB 6, 27 Jun 44, par. 10. 215

 WD Cir 195, 18 May 44, Sec. VI. 216

 Memo, DCofS for SvCs ASF for PMG, CofT, et

al., 9 Jul 45, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. Further

details regarding this incident are given in Ch. III,

below.
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 81

Throughout the operation Lt. Col. Victor

E. Maston of the Traffic Control Division

was detailed by the Chief of Transportation to the Western Defense Command to

advise Lt. Gen. John L. De Witt on transportation matters.217

The Chief of Transportation and the

railroads would have welcomed relief

from the necessity of moving prisoners of

war. The policy of evacuating such prisoners from the North African, Mediterranean, and European theaters was dictated

by other considerations, however, and

transportation had to be provided even

though this increased the general stringency in railroad equipment. After procedures had been established and tested,

POW movements were accomplished

without difficulty beyond that incident to

the provision of the necessary railroad

equipment. There were only a few threats

of disturbance by prisoners being transported, and they were quickly quieted by

the guards.

A Job Well Done

Although Army traffic on the common

carriers included several other types of

passengers, the movement of troops was

the basic responsibility. This responsibility was carried out far better in World

War II than in World War I, despite the

fact that the military traffic was much

greater and the railroads had fewer units

of passenger equipment. Heavy troop

movements between training stations and

to the seaboard were for the most part

handled in a prompt and orderly manner.

There was no serious congestion at the inland gateways or the ports of embarkation to tie up cars and waste their work

potential. There were few instances of

light loading with wasted car space. The

results, in brief, gave evidence of careful

planning and a close control over operations.

Credit for this achievement belongs to

both the carriers and the Army. The

Association of American Railroads, established in 1934, had a much broader influence over the distribution and utilization of railway equipment than the

corresponding organization in World War

I. The industry was therefore better integrated and more readily responsive to

military needs. Although the railroads

had fewer units of equipment than in the

previous war, those units were larger and

capable of more work. The Army also had

centralized control from the beginning

over the routing and movement of all but

the smaller groups and so was in a position to plan its traffic carefully on a nationwide basis and to spread the load. The

hand-in-glove manner in which the Army

Transportation Corps and the Association of American Railroads collaborated

in both the planning and execution of

troop movements indicated that they regarded these movements as joint undertakings.

This does not imply that the Chief of

Transportation and his staff were always

satisfied with what the carriers did or the

way in which they did it. These officers

believed that the railroads sometimes held

equipment in regular service when it

should have been made available for military movements. They protested because

the Pullman Company failed to withdraw

217

 For full account of this evacuation, see General

DeWitt's final report to the Secretary of War, Japanese

Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (Washington,

1943), pp. vii-x, 77-79, 356-62.
82 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

more sleepers from overnight commercial

runs, with the result that many soldiers

made long trips in coaches. They complained because at times the carriers appeared negligent in allowing troop trains

to fall behind schedule. They also believed

that the railroads should have given the

Army greater fare reductions and other

concessions, in view of the volume of the

military traffic. But despite these criticisms, the Chief of Transportation and his

associates recognized that in their over-all

performance the railroads gave the Army

excellent service, and they said so on

numerous occasions.

The reasons for the divergent views of

the Chief of Transportation and the railroads were obvious and understandable.

The Chief of Transportation had a single

objective—to move troops according to

War Department plans. The railroads'

situation was not so simple. They recognized their obligation to meet the requirements of the armed forces, but they also

wanted to maintain their regular services

as fully as possible. Because of this fact,

and also because of the limitation on the

construction of new railroad equipment

and other operating difficulties that the

carriers encountered during the war, it

was inevitable that the service given the

Army should have fallen short of the Chief

of Transportation's expectations on some

occasions. As to fares, the lean years

through which the railroads had passed

just before World War II undoubtedly

strengthened their resistance to requests

for larger concessions on wartime military

traffic, and that was especially true of

those lines whose revenues were already

reduced by the land-grant deductions.

With increases in railroad equipment

and operating personnel severely limited

by other wartime demands, the only way

to relieve the pressure under which the

railroads were working and to assure the

armed forces that all troop movements

would be executed as they desired was to

further curtail the regular services. The

Chief of Transportation believed that such

curtailment should have been carried

further than it was, and he made his

opinion known to the Director of Defense

Transportation, who had the requisite authority. A considerable percentage of the

civilian travel was admittedly unnecessary. But the Director of Defense Transportation evidently believed that the

military needs were being adequately

met, and it was not until the repatriation

of troops from Europe was well under way

that he yielded to requests for further cuts

in the regular services. The additional

problems that arose, after Japan had surrendered and the repatriation of troops

from the Pacific had begun, involved the

line-haul capacity of the western railroads,

as well as the amount of equipment

assigned to military service.

It is noteworthy that in addition to his

efforts to make effective arrangements for

the movement of troops, patients, prisoners of war, and other passengers who

moved on War Department transportation requests, the Chief of Transportation

did much to ease the problems of military

personnel who traveled as regular passengers while off duty. Such traffic was heavy,

and the difficulties encountered in getting

reservations and utilizing overcrowded

trains had a direct bearing on soldier

morale. The fact that the Chief of Transportation was willing to have railroad

equipment assigned to the so-called military sleeping car lines, which were used

by men on furlough or leave as well as in-
ARMY PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES 83

dividuals traveling on official business,

indicates the importance that the Army

attached to this traffic, for there never was

a time when the equipment could not

have been used advantageously to accomplish organized troop movements.

The motor carriers moved a relatively

small percentage of the total military passenger traffic, but they performed an essential service. Their capacity was limited

when compared with that of the railroads,

and they could not offer some of the features—notably sleeping and messing

facilities—that were considered essential

in moving large numbers of troops over

long distances. But for the transportation

of individuals and small groups over the

shorter distances, the motor carriers had

distinct advantages, and the Chief of

Transportation saw to it that their services

were used whenever they met the Army

requirements. The movement of troops by

motorbus had the added virtue of relieving the hard-pressed railroads.
CHAPTER II

Troop Movements

to the Oversea Commands

Since all combat areas were overseas,

efficiency in the execution of transoceanic

troop movements was of primary importance to the military authorities. From

that fact sprang the significance of the

problems involved in such movements,

and these problems were magnified by the

proportions that the war assumed from

the outset, far exceeding anything contemplated in prewar planning.

Lack of preparation for heavy troop

movements was evident from the day the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and

plunged the United States into a twoocean war. The Army ports of embarkation on the west coast had neither the

facilities nor the personnel required for

the prompt and orderly transshipment of

the troops and supplies that had to be

rushed to our Pacific outposts. There were

not enough ships to meet all requirements

and a satisfactory procedure had not yet

been worked out for allocating the nation's vessels to the uses for which the need

was most urgent. Adequate arrangements

had not yet been adopted by the Army

and the Navy for the joint use of troopships and joint troop-priority lists. Within

the Army itself the procedures governing

the shipment of troops and their organizational equipment from home stations

to the ports of embarkation had not yet

been fully adapted to wartime requirements. The procedures for handling troops

at the port staging areas still needed

refinement. Progress toward the solution

of these and related problems had only

begun when the Army installed a Chief of

Transportation as the head of the new

transportation service in March 1942.

Ocean transportation entered vitally

into military planning from the inception

of each undertaking since it was a persistent limiting factor. When President

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill were projecting the broad lines of Allied strategy, they

necessarily took into account the shipping

resources that would likely be available.

When the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the

British-American military co-ordinating

agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

corresponding agency for the United

States, undertook to implement the strategic plans with arrangements for the deployment of Allied military forces, the

availability of sufficient troop and cargo

vessels was a basic consideration. The

Army's Chief of Transportation maintained an active Planning Division,

headed during the greater part of the war

by Col. Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., and con-
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 85

tributed heavily to the long-range estimates of shipping capability upon which

such decisions turned.1

A number of transportation agencies

were involved in the actual movement of

troops to the theaters, and co-ordination

was therefore one of the Chief of Transportation's major functions. The Army

operated few vessels of its own and most

troopships were obtained from the U.S.

War Shipping Administration, the U.S.

Navy, and the British Ministry of War

Transport (BMWT). Troops were moved

from their home stations to the seaboard

by commercial carriers. The transshipment of the men and their impedimenta

from the inland to the ocean carriers took

place at Army ports of embarkation,

which were military stations under the

direct supervision of the Chief of Transportation. Each phase of a movement had

to be co-ordinated with every other phase,

and each movement had to be kept in

conformity with the general plan incorporated in the movement order. The coordinating responsibility rested ultimately

with the Assistant Chief of Transportation

for Operations, General Wylie, and his

deputy, Col. Richard D. Meyer. A large

share of this responsibility was delegated

to the Movements Division, which worked

closely with the Operations Division of

the General Staff, the appropriate elements of ASF headquarters, the Traffic

Control and Water Divisions in the Office

of the Chief of Transportation, and the

ports of embarkation.2

The ports of embarkation had a key

role, as the ensuing discussion will show.

Linking the inland and ocean carriers,

they had to function with speed and precision in order to avoid congestion, confusion, and delay. The port commanders

specified the time when each movement

should reach the seaboard. They provided

accommodations for troops during periods

ranging from a few days to a few weeks,

and during this interval gave both the

men and their personal equipment a

thorough processing to prepare them for

service overseas. They stored, processed,

and repaired organizational equipment

before dispatching it to the theaters. They

were responsible for the prompt and

orderly embarkation of troops and for the

proper equipping, staffing, and administration of troopships. The Chief of Transportation recognized that the success of

the entire troop movement program could

be disrupted by failure at the ports of embarkation, and he therefore selected the

port commanders with care and kept their

operations under close observation.

While the Chief of Transportation was

concerned principally with the movement

of Army combat and service troops, other

types of passengers were accommodated

on the troopships. Naval personnel were

moved on vessels sailing under Army control, just as Army troops were moved on

the Navy's vessels. Numerous special missions, which were nonmilitary in nature

but usually embraced both military and

civilian personnel, were transported to

oversea areas. Employees of contractors

engaged in the construction of military

facilities overseas sailed on Army transports. Some military personnel of Allied

1

 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,

Organization, and Operations, pp. 18-22, discusses longrange planning. 2

 For more detailed description of the functions of

the Movements Division and its relations with other

offices, see OCT Pamphlet 1, Organizational Manual; Memo, Farr for Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, 1

Aug 44, sub: Projected Troop Moves; Min of Junior

Officers' Meetings, 27 Sep 44, 4 and 11 Oct 44; and

Memo, C of Mvmts Div for C of Hist Unit OCT, 20

Jun 45, sub: History of Mvmts Div; last five in OCT

HB Mvmts Div Gen.
86 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

nations were moved on these vessels, and

representatives of various American and

Allied civilian agencies, including members of the diplomatic corps, were transported under Army auspices. In 1944 the

Army began to send prisoners of war back

to their native lands, and soon after the

fighting was over the Army transported

dependents overseas to join military personnel stationed there.

Of a total of 7,639,491 persons embarked by the Army from December 1941

through December 1945, 7,157,966 (93.7

percent) were troops of the Army, 261,525

were personnel of the U.S. Navy, and

220,000 were in other categories. Of the

last figure, 93,301 were prisoners of war

shipped from the United States in 1944

and 1945.3 While the great bulk of this

traffic moved from U.S. ports, some passengers were embarked at Canadian ports.

Categories of Troops Moved

The troops transported to the theaters

fell into several categories, each of which

involved peculiar transportation problems. First, there were troops moving as

units (prescribed military organizations)

or detachments therefrom. Second, there

were replacements, or individual soldiers,

needed by the theater commanders to replace men lost from units because of

battle casualties, sickness, accidents, or

transfers. Third, there were fillers required

by the theater commanders to complete

the personnel of units that had been

understrength when they were dispatched

from the zone of interior. Fourth, there

was rotational personnel, or soldiers traveling pursuant to the Army's policy that

men who had seen lengthy service

abroad—especially those who had served

in isolated or unhealthy areas—should be

returned to the zone of interior and other

personnel sent overseas to take their

places. Finally, there were so-called temporary-duty groups that were returned to

the United States for short periods and

eventually sent back to their stations overseas. The last category included men

traveling on leave or furlough obtained

for personal reasons and men sent back

by their commanders for rest and recuperation.

The troop units moved overseas ranged

in size from divisions downward, and the

problems encountered varied according

to the size, type, and maturity of the organization, as well as to the completeness

of its training and equipment. The movement of a division, involving up to 14,000

men and great quantities of matériel, required meticulous planning and detailed

supervision throughout. The most spectacular achievement in moving large units

was the transfer of thirty-six divisions to

Europe between August 1944 and February 1945. Twenty-five were infantry divisions, nine were armored divisions, and

two were airborne divisions. These organizations, aggregating 458,416 officers and

men, were embarked at the New York

and Boston Ports of Embarkation in 126

troopships, using most but not all of the

space. Their organic equipment and initial supplies totaled more than 1,500,000

measurement tons and required the major

part of the capacity of 260 large cargo

vessels.4 The last two divisions, dispatched

3

 Figures for the period December 1941 through

December 1944 are from ASF Statistical Review, World

War II (Washington, 1946), pp. 121-22; figures for

1945 are from reports by the ports of embarkation to

Movements Division, OCT, all reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in preparation. 4

 Summary, Divisions—ETO, prepared by Maj

Welman H. Ouderkirk, Mvmts Div OCT, 30 Jun 45,

in binder, European Divisions, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Gen. See also Rad, SHAEF London to WD, 9 Aug

44, S 57189, and Rad, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11

Aug 44, WAR 79344.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 87

in February 1945, had been earmarked for

the Pacific, but when plans were changed

they were rushed across the United States

by rail and embarked at New York on fast

ships to bolster General of the Army

Dwight D. Eisenhower's forces in the final

drive against Germany.5

During the early part of 1943, replacements and fillers constituted about 20 percent of the total outbound troop movement, but beginning in the fall of that

year the percentage showed a marked increase.6

 The number of replacements sent

to Europe during the heavy fighting that

followed the invasion of the Continent

raised this traffic to a new high level in

July 1944. That level was exceeded, however, during the following winter. December 1944 found General Eisenhower's

combat divisions badly depleted, and the

German counteroffensive in the Ardennes

brought the situation to a crisis. Expedited

movements were arranged from replacement training centers and replacement

depots to the ports; the troops were embarked without delay and upon arrival at

French ports were entrained immediately

for the advanced areas. In January 1945,

replacements and fillers constituted more

than 40 percent of the total troop movement to the theaters. In March, when the

movement of units to the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA),

had been virtually stopped, replacements

and fillers made up over 60 percent of the

total. The effect of the impending German

collapse on the proportion of troops

shipped as units, fillers, and replacements,

as well as the effect of the realignment of

forces after the German surrender, is reflected in Table 7.7

Although rotational personnel and

temporary-duty groups never constituted

a large percentage of the total outbound

movement—usually well under 10 percent—they were nevertheless a matter of

concern to the Chief of Transportation.

The more such passengers he had to accommodate on transports, the less space

he had for units, replacements, and fillers.

Early in the war General Gross urged that

the rotational policy be kept within limits

because of the tight shipping situation,

and he continued to urge this point of

view.8 Late in 1943 the War Department

presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a

proposal for the conversion of twenty-four

cargo vessels, in addition to those already

being converted to troopships, to provide

space for rotational traffic. This proposal

was predicated on a policy of returning

1 percent of the total troop strength each

month from the South Pacific, the Southwest Pacific, and the China-Burma-India

theaters. The JCS requested the Maritime

Commission to convert sufficient vessels to

provide 34,000 additional troop spaces.9

These vessels after conversion were absorbed in the Army troopship pool; they

were not operated exclusively for rotational troop traffic since that would have

involved a waste of ship space. The rotational policy was also applied to other

5

 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United

States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30,1945 (Washington,

1 September 1945), p. 106. 6

 ASF MPR, Jul 44, Sec. 3, p. 30. 7

 For a discussion of the replacement crisis in the

ETO, see Report of Activities, Army Ground Forces,

10 Jan 46, pp. 10, 11. Concerning the AGF's problem

in providing replacements, see Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947) pp. 246-51, and Maj William R. Keast,

Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Study 7, Historical Section AGF, 1946, pp. 16-19, 28-36. 8

 Memo, Gross for C of Pers Div SOS, 22 Mar 42,

sub: Regular Relief of Pers at Oversea Sta, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 22 Jun

44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944. 9

 JCS 595, 2 Dec 43, and subsequent reports and

correspondence; Ltr, JCS to Mar Com, 22 Mar 44; all

in OPD ABC 322 (2 Dec 42).
88 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 7—CLASSIFICATION OF TROOPS EMBARKED AT U.S. PORTS OF EMBARKATION FOR

OVERSEA COMMANDS: MAY 1944-DECEMBER 1945

Source: Data based on reports from ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, compiled for publication in statistical volume

of this series, now in preparation. A breakdown for earlier months is not available.

theaters. Initially the number of men returned to the zone of interior had depended on the requests of theater commanders

and the availability of transportation to

move replacements, but later the War

Department established monthly quotas.10

The problem of moving personnel to

oversea areas was always accompanied by

the problem of moving equipment and

supplies. Troop units had to have their

organizational equipment and initial supplies when they arrived in the theater or

they were virtually useless. Thereafter a

steady flow of maintenance supplies was

necessary so that the men would be properly fed and clothed and adequately provided with ammunition and other

expendable military items. Early in the

war it was recognized that the maximum

force that could be sent to a particular

theater was the force the War Department could confidently expect to maintain there.11

 This doctrine, which was the

10

 Unnumbered WD Cir, 28 Jun 43, sub: Rotation

and Return of Mil Pers as Individuals; Rad, OPD to

SWPA and SOPAC, 12 Nov 43, CM-OUT 5527,

paraphrase in OCT 000-370.5 POA; WD Cir 58, 9

Feb 44; WD Cir 8, 6 Jan 45. 11

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 21 Dec 41, sub:

Estimate of Shipping Available, p. 4, OCT HB Gross

Day File.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 89

TABLE 8—PERCENTAGE OF TROOPS EMBARKED FROM U.S. PORTS IN VESSELS UNDER

BRITISH AND U.S. CONTROL: MAY 1944-DECEMBER 1945

Source: Movements Division, OCT, Outbound Classification Summary, Pt. A, reworked for publication in a statistical volume for this

series, now in preparation. Data for earlier period not available.

opposite of that followed in sending the

American Expeditionary Forces to France

in 1917-18, developed logically from the

fact that troops in most oversea areas

would have to be equipped and supplied

entirely or almost entirely from the zone

of interior and that shipping would be a

limiting factor. A corollary of this doctrine was the necessity of maintaining a

balance between troopship capacity and

cargo-ship capacity—a matter that required the constant attention of the Chief

of Transportation.12

The larger units naturally presented a

greater challenge from the standpoint of

providing adequate facilities for their

movement, of maintaining the integrity of

the organizations en route, and of delivering the troops and their equipment

overseas at the times and places that would

permit them to be brought together without great delay. From the standpoint of

administration and control, however, the

smaller units and detachments and the

replacements and other individuals traveling in temporary groups posed a greater

variety of problems for the Transportation

Corps because of their less adequate organization and leadership.13

Troopships and Sailing Schedules

The ships used in transporting Army

personnel to the theaters were obtained

from various sources and were operated

by various agencies. Broadly speaking,

they were under either American or British control. The British group, which included many vessels under the registry of

other friendly nations, was integrated into

one fleet under the operational control of

the British Ministry of War Transport.

The operating arrangements relating to

the vessels of the American group, which

also included some of foreign registry,

cannot be so simply stated. Table 8 shows

the several types of operating arrangements and the percentage of troops em12

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 161-62. 13

 These problems will be discussed later in this

chapter in the sections, Troop Staging at the Ports,

Embarkation Procedures, and Troop Ship Administration.
90 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

barked at U.S. ports on vessels of each

category during the latter part of the war.

The vessels on which American troops

were moved to the theaters were of many

types, for the extreme need of troop lift

necessitated the use of all available passenger ships and many freighters. An important element of the troopship fleet

consisted of the prewar passenger liners

that had been requisitioned and converted

to increase their capacities. Notable

among these vessels were the British liners

Aquitania, Britannic, Empress of Scotland,

Mauretania, Queen Elizabeth, and Queen

Mary; the French liners Ile de France and

Pasteur; the Dutch liner Nieuw Amsterdam;

and the American ships Argentina, Brazil,

Edmund B. Alexander, George Washington,

Hermitage, Matsonia, Monterey, Monticello,

Mount Vernon, President Coolidge, Uruguay,

Wakefield, and West Point. Two of the

American vessels, the Army transports

Edmund B. Alexander and George Washington,

were built before World War I and carried many U.S. troops to Europe in 1917-

18, but they also served well in World War

II after extensive reconditioning. All of

the above foreign-flag vessels and some of

those of American registry had sufficient

speed to enable them to proceed independently of convoys. The troop capacities ranged from about 2,000 to 15,000—

the latter number being the capacity of

the "Queens" in favorable weather.14

Only a limited number of ships designed expressly as passenger carriers was

built during the war because of the length

of time required for construction; instead,

a policy of converting the more quickly

constructed cargo types to troopships was

followed. Nineteen vessels of the U.S.

Maritime Commission's wartime passenger design (P-2) were completed, named

after generals and admirals, and operated

by the Navy on Army schedules. These

were vessels of about 17,800 gross tons and

19 knots speed, with accommodations for

well over 5,000 troops. Thirty of the Maritime Commission's largest standard cargo

type (C-4) were converted to troop carriers and operated by the Navy on Army

schedules. These vessels, also named after

generals, were of about 13,000 gross tons

and 17 knots speed and had troop capacities ranging from about 3,000 to 4,000.

Cargo vessels of the other standard types

(C-1, C-2, and C-3) were converted to

troopships and operated by agents of the

War Shipping Administration, mostly on

Army schedules. Notable among such

troopships were the "Marine" series

(C-4's), the "Sea" series (C-3's), and the

"Cape" series (C-1's). The principal wartime cargo design, the Liberty ship, also

was used as a troop carrier to meet emergency requirements.15

While all luxuries and many comforts

had to be omitted from vessels in wartime

service in order to obtain the maximum

troop capacity, the only type that gave

rise to serious criticism was the converted

Liberty. This was an emergency cargo

type of 11 knots speed. It was designed for

quick construction and the shipyards

made deliveries rapidly. Accordingly,

when it became necessary to move large

numbers of prisoners of war from North

Africa to the United States in the spring

of 1943, the Army decided to install temporary facilities in about 250 Liberty ships

and to use them for this purpose. Some

were equipped to accommodate 300 prisoners of war, and others 500. Late in the

14

 For a description of the ships and an account of

their service, see Roland W. Charles, Troopships of

World War II (Washington, 1947). On a few trips the

Queens carried more than 15,000 troops. 15

 On cargo ship conversions, see Wardlow, op. cit.,

pp. 300-301.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 91

summer the need for additional troop lift

to the Mediterranean became acute, and

OPD authorized the use of these vessels

to meet the situation with the understanding that the accommodations would be

improved.16 This action was subsequently

brought before the Combined Chiefs of

Staff and approved by that agency as an

emergency measure.17

Many cargo ships normally had accommodations for a limited number of passengers and these were used whenever

possible.18 In the spring of 1942 British

and American military representatives

discussed this subject, and the Joint Military Transportation Committee initiated

a proposal to install accommodations for

fifty or more passengers on a large number of the cargo vessels then being built,

including Liberty ships. Execution of the

proposal was delayed, however, because

of the failure of the War Shipping Administration, the Army, and the Navy to

agree on plans and the WSA's insistence

on having Presidential authority before

undertaking such installations. The project was dropped in the summer of 1943,

for by that time the program of converting standard cargo vessels to troop carriers

and of installing temporary passenger accommodations on Liberty ships had deprived the earlier proposal of its importance.19

 Nevertheless, all available

passenger space on freighters of both the

British and the American pools was used

when required, and such space was particularly valuable in moving reinforcements to the European theater during the

critical winter of 1944-45.20

The transportation of troops on freighters brought up the question of moving

personnel and explosives on the same vessel. After a heavy loss of life in the sinking

of a Liberty ship carrying both, large

quantities of explosives were no longer

placed in ships carrying troops, and the

loading of small quantities was subject to

the approval of the Operations Division

of the War Department General Staff.21

The vessels converted to combat loaders—attack transports (APA's)—for operation by the Navy had troop occommodations that, when utilized on voyages from

U.S. ports to the theaters, added appreciably to the outbound troop lift. In order

to utilize these accommodations to best

advantage, the Army proposed late in

1942 that combat loaders thereafter be

assigned to particular operations by the

JCS, rather than by the Navy, so that the

Army would be informed regarding their

movements.22 In accepting this proposal,

the Navy stated that it had always obtained the concurrence of the Army before

deciding upon the operation of combat

loaders and pointed out that such vessels

16

 The problems that resulted from this makeshift

arrangement are discussed below, pp. 145-48, 17

 CCS 121st Mtg, 1 Oct 43. For further documentation, see notes 179 and 180 below. 18

 Memo, CofT for CGs of PEs, 10 Jun 42, sub:

Maximum Utilization of Pass Space; Memo, CofT

for CofS USA, 4 Sep 42, sub: Transport of Troops on

Cargo Vessels; both in OCT 541.1 Small Groups. 19

 Ltr, Wylie to WSA, 30 Mar 42, OCT HB Wylie

Staybacks; JMTC 8th Mtg, 23 Apr 42, and occasional

mtgs through 34th Mtg, 25 Mar 43; Memo, Wylie for

CofT, 18 May 42; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 2 Sep

42; Memo, CofT for CofS USA, 4 Sep 42, sub: Conversion of WSA Cargo Ships to Carry 50 Troops or

More; last three in OCT HB Gross Troops on Cargo

Ships. 20

 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 30 Jan 45, OCT

HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Maj Ouderkirk for Capt

Robert L. Zellman, 11 Apr 45, par. 6, bound in

Mvmts Div Hist, Mar 1945, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Gen.

21

 Memo, Farr for Gross, 27 Apr 44, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 15 May 44,

ASF Hq Trans 1944; Memo, CofT for OPD, 31 May

44, sub: Pass Shipts on Cargo Vessels, OCT 370.5. 22

 Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 26 Nov 42,

OPD 370 (3-6-42) Army Transports; JCS 158/2, 14

Dec 42; JCS 46th Mtg, 15 Dec 42, Item 2.
THREE TYPES OF TROOP TRANSPORTS. The James Parker, a converted

prewar passenger liner (top); the Maritime Commission's P-2 type, designed and built as a

troopship (middle); a naval transport, combat loaded for the assault on Sicily (bottom).
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 93

were required by the Navy for amphibious

training as well as for actual assault operations. In September 1943 the Chief of

Transportation, acting on a report that a

combat loader had sailed from San Diego

with naval personnel of low priority, instructed the Army port commanders to

make sure that the agreed arrangement

was fully carried out at the ports under

their respective jurisdictions.23 The Army

also sought to have any passenger space

that might be available on aircraft carriers, LST's (landing ships, tank), or other

combatant vessels sailing from the United

States utilized for personnel on the joint

troop-priority list.

With the variety of types of ships used

in moving troops it would be interesting

to know what percentage of the total

movement traveled on vessels of various

capacities. Unfortunately such an analysis

is available only for the month of December 1943, but that was a period of heavy

outbound traffic and the data are therefore significant. The total of over 273,000

passengers (mostly troops) embarked on

312 vessels was distributed as follows:24

Percentage

Number of of Total

Size of Shipment Ships Used Passengers

Total. ................. . 312 100.0

Up to 199. ................. . 178 2.1

200-999................... . 64 10.3

1,000-1,999. ............... . 23 13.2

2,000-4,999. ............... . 33 37.9

5,000 and over. ............. . 14 36.5

The allocation of troopships to serve

particular oversea areas depended on

strategic decisions arrived at by the President and the Prime Minister at their occasional conferences, by the Combined

Chiefs of Staff when inter-Allied relations

were involved, and by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff when only the U.S. armed forces

were concerned. The deployment of shipping to implement these strategic decisions

was planned and supervised by the Combined Military Transportation Committee

on the international level and by the Joint

Military Transportation Committee on

the American level. The allocation and

reallocation of specific ships, however,

were normally matters for direct dealing

between the Office of the Chief of Transportation on the one hand and the Naval

Transportation Service, or the War Shipping Administration, or the British Ministry of War Transport on the other.

Negotiations with the British usually resulted in quick understanding regarding

the employment of troopships, and the

rate attained in moving American soldiers

to the European theater was possible only

because of the use of the large British

liners.25 The troopships operated by

agents of the War Shipping Administration were committed to military service

and hence were deployed in accordance

with decisions of the military authorities.

The task of allocating and reallocating

American troopships therefore rested

largely with the Army and the Navy, and

they sometimes found it difficult to agree.

The basic cause of disagreement

stemmed from the fact that the Navy's

chief interest was in the Pacific, whereas

the Army's principal effort was in the

Mediterranean and European theaters.

Under the Allies' plan of strategy the

Mediterranean Theater of Operations

(MTO) and the European Theater of Op23

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug-1 Sep

43, pp. 113-14, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 24

 Memo, Finlay for Gross, 21 Feb 44, OCT HB

Gross Troops on Cargo Ships. 25

 Agreement concerning the use of British ships became more difficult after V-E Day. On the general

subject, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 220-27.
94 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

erations (ETO) were to have priority over

the Pacific areas until Germany had been

defeated. The disagreements, which were

particularly acute with respect to the employment of the large, fast troopships operated under charter by the Navy, came

to a head in the late summer of 1943,

when the Army protested vigorously

against the unilateral action of the Navy

in transferring certain of these vessels to

the Pacific.26 About this time it became

necessary to decide upon the allocation of

the new troop carriers then being constructed by the Maritime Commission. As

a result, the Joint Military Transportation Committee appointed a troopship

subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Naval Transportation

Service, and the War Shipping Administration to assign transports by name to the

various theaters and to major areas within

the theaters.27 The OCT representatives

were General Wylie and Colonel Farr.

Following the appointment of this subcommittee, allocations were made in a

more orderly manner after careful study,

and the problem itself was lessened somewhat by the delivery of new troopships

and the temporary conversion of Liberty

ships to carry troops. Nevertheless, the

differences between Army and Navy interests remained, and the difficulty of

reaching agreement regarding the employment of troopships was never entirely

removed.28

The procedures for scheduling troopships—that is, fixing loading berths and

sailing dates for specific voyages—were

not the same in the Atlantic as in the

Pacific. Since the Army's interest predominated in areas served from U.S. Atlantic ports, sailings from those ports were

scheduled by the Movements Division in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation,

subject to arrangements with the Convoy

and Routing Section of the Navy Department and the policies of the British Ministry of War Transport regarding vessels

under its control. A different method was

used in scheduling sailings from Pacific

coast ports. There were a number of

reasons for this—the large requirements

of the Navy for troop lift, the length of the

transpacific voyages, the frequent detention of vessels overseas for intratheater

operation, the unusual delays at home

ports on account of repairs, the fact that

most vessels sailed independently rather

than in convoy, and the distance of Pacific

coast ports from headquarters in Washington. Because of these circumstances the

troopships in the Pacific were considered

a pool for the joint use of the Army and

the Navy, and their utilization was governed by joint committees with headquarters at San Francisco. This decentralization of control over troopships and troop

movements was an expedient that the

Chief of Transportation accepted reluctantly.29

Close collaboration between the Office

of the Chief of Transportation and the

26

 Memo, Styer for Marshall, 9 Aug 43, sub: Employment of Troop Lift in Atlantic and Pacific, OCS

570; Memo, Meyer for CofT, 13 Sep 43, sub: Use of

Navy-Controlled Unescortees in Atlantic, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks. 27

 Memo, Dir NTS for CofT, 18 Sep 43, sub:

Transport Assignment to Ocean Areas, and reply, 28

Sep 43; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; JMTC51st Mtg, 14 Oct 43, Item 2. 28

 Memo, Vice Adm Frederick J. Home for Lt Gen

Joseph T. McNarney, 19 Nov 43, sub: Trans of Army

Engineers to India, and related documents in OPD

560 (24 Jan 44); Ltrs, Farr to Stokes, 19 and 21 Nov

43 (Stokes was then attending the inter-Allied conference in Cairo); Memo, CofT for Brig Gen Carl A.

Russell, OPD, 24 Aug 44; last three in OCT HB Farr

Staybacks. 29

 See below, pp. 161-62.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 95

Operations Division of the War Department General Staff was essential to the

co-ordination of ship movement and troop

movement plans. On the basis of estimates

of theater troop requirements obtained

from OPD, corresponding data obtained

from the Navy, and forecasts of troopships

likely to be available, the Movements

Division prepared a statement of the potential troop lift to each theater for each

six-month period. A revised statement was

prepared at the beginning of every

month.30 The OCT frequently indicated

to OPD how adjustments could be made

in the plans for troop movements to the

respective theaters to make better use of

the available vessels.31 When emergency

troop shipments were necessary, the OCT

calculated how they could be accomplished with the least disturbance to

movement plans and ship schedules

already set up.32

Changes in troop movement plans

necessitating adjustments in shipping

schedules created serious problems for the

Chief of Transportation. Cargo-ship schedules as well as troopship programs often

had to be adjusted. When such changes

were occasioned by strategic developments

or were ordered by the President as the

result of top-level decisions or international agreements, there was no cure for

the difficulty. But the Chief of Transportation believed that the shuffling of movements by "higher echelons" of the War

and Navy Departments went beyond that

which was necessary and indicated a lack

of foresight and a failure to appreciate the

shipping problem involved. He also objected to efforts by superior headquarters

to have specific vessels assigned to specific

movements or particular areas. This was

a matter, he felt, that should be left

entirely to the transportation organization

if waste of troop lift was to be avoided.33

As the strategic situation became more

stabilized and planning procedures were

improved, changes in movement programs were less frequent, but in view of

the scope and nature of the war some such

adjustments were inevitable.

The Chief of Transportation believed

that the obvious advantages of thorough

co-ordination between troop movement

plans, as developed by OPD, and troopship movements, as planned by his office,

could best be accomplished by direct collaboration between these offices. He

therefore protested against any intervention by the Mobilization Division, ASF,

and refused to allow that division to influence his plans for the employment of

vessels, which he believed to be based on

the best available information and expert

technical knowledge. The primary function of the Mobilization Division was to

co-ordinate supply and troop movements,

and it was expected to follow developments to insure that such movements were

effectively executed. Close collaboration

between the Chief of Transportation's staff

and the Mobilization Division obviously

was necessary, but General Gross considered inadmissible any intrusion of the

30

 See Memo, CofT for OPD, 4 Apr 43, sub: Forecast of Shipping; Memo, CofT for OPD, 26 Nov 43,

sub: Six-Month Requirements; both in OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF,

8 Dec 44, and other dates, OCT 370.5. Copies of these

statements were furnished to ASF headquarters as

well as to OPD. 31

 Memo, CofT for OPD, 8 Jun 43, sub: Troop Lift

to India, OCT 370.5 India; Memo, CofT for OPD,

13 Nov 43, sub: Effect on Shipping of Proposed

Movement to Pacific, OCT 000-370.5 POA. 32

 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 13 May 42, sub: Paratroopers, OCT 000-900 Queen Elizabeth. 33

 Memo, CofT for CofS for Opns SOS, 23 Jan 43,

sub: Issuance of Mvmt Orders; Memo, CofT for Dir

NTS, 10 Aug 43, sub: Troop Deployment Program;

both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.
96 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Mobilization Division into transportation

operations or into the relationship between

the OCT and OPD. During 1943 there

was sharp disagreement on the subject between General Gross and General Lutes,

Director of Operations, ASF, under whose

direction the Mobilization Division functioned. General Gross did not relax his

position, and General Lutes' proposal to

establish a transportation co-ordination

section in the Mobilization Division was

not carried out. While opposing the extension of the division's activities to transportation, the Chief of Transportation gave it

warm praise as a movements co-ordinating agency.34

Since Colonel Farr as chief of the Movements Division had a central role in the

effort to fit troop movement plans and

ship movements neatly together, his views

on the mission of the Chief of Transportation in this matter are of interest. Fanfound that the several Army staff agencies

concerned with programming oversea

movements did not always agree, nor did

the Army and the Navy. When these authorities were at odds on what troops should

be moved, the Chief of Transportation felt

that it was his duty to tell them what could

be moved—that is, what deployment of

troops would accomplish the most effective use of the available troop lift. This

procedure gave rise to the accusation that

the Chief of Transportation was endeavoring to determine strategy. On the contrary, Farr maintained, the Chief of Transportation's purpose was to serve the higher

authorities of the War Department and

the theater commanders, and the Chief of

Transportation believed that he was performing such a service when he indicated

how the limited shipping resources could

be used to obtain maximum results.35

The need for getting the maximum

service from troopships dictated a policy

of turning them around at the ports as

rapidly as possible. This policy was a major consideration with the Movements Division in preparing schedules for the Atlantic. It frequently met with opposition

from the operators of the vessels, who desired more time for repairing, storing, and

fueling the ships, even though the pressure

for delivery of troops to the theaters was a

compelling argument. The Army ports of

embarkation and the War Shipping Administration usually could be persuaded

to accept the Movements Division's schedules with respect to the vessels under their

control, but the Navy held more rigidly to

its operating standards. The Movements

Division, as has been stated, did not have

the same control over the dispatch of

vessels from west coast ports, and it often

complained about the time taken to complete repairs on troopships employed in

the Pacific. There were several explanations for the extensive lay-ups—the long

periods that the ships spent away from

their home ports, the lack of repair facilities at most ports in the Pacific areas, and

the fact that west coast repair yards were

heavily engaged with naval work of top

priority—but their effect on the execution

of planned troop movements is obvious.36

34

 Memo, Lutes for CofT, 26 Mar 43, OPD 381

(120-140); Memo, CofT for Lutes, 3 Apr 43, OCT

HB Meyer Staybacks; ASF Cir 23, 28 Apr 43, sub:

Troop Mvmt Co-ordinating Center; Memo, Lutes for

CG ASF, 22 Oct 43; Memo, Finlay for Wylie, 26 Oct

43; last two in OCT HB Ex Co-ordination with Staff

Agencies ASF; ASF Adm Memo S-96, 20 Nov 43,

sub: Mvmt Co-ordinating Center; Memo, Gross for

Lutes, 16 Mar 44, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 35

 Ltr, Farr to author, 15 Nov 49, OCT HB Mvmts

Div Gen. 36

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Troopships, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair

and Conversion; Memo, CofT for Mil Pers Div ASF,

13 May 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Ouderkirk Staybacks; Interv with Farr, 28 Apr 51, OCT HB Mvmts

Div Gen; Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 183-84.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 97

The Movements Division kept account

of the status of all vessels carrying or committed to carry U.S. troops or their equipment. During the latter part of the war

these records embraced upwards of a

thousand troopships and freighters. A type

of record was needed that would disclose

at all times the locations of the vessels,

their speeds and capacities, and their

prospective sailing dates, destinations, and

arrival dates. The first such record, known

informally as "slipstick," was a set of flexline sheets on which the vessels were posted

according to routes or convoys. These

sheets could be changed readily as new information was received and photographed

for distribution to all concerned as often as

circumstances required. The effectiveness

of this device as a basis for planning troop

movements was dependent on the adequacy and the accuracy of the information received from the oversea commands. Time was required to bring theater commanders to an appreciation of the

need for this information, and advices

concerning ship movements in the Pacific

were inadequate during the greater part

of the war. By early 1945, however, the

receipt of ship movement reports had improved to a point that justified the erection of an electrically controlled position

board, which by the operation of switches

could be made to show the location of a

particular ship or the ships in a particular

port. This visual aid was supplemented by

a set of vessel cards giving full information

on the ships themselves, their capacities,

and their movements. The system, though

not used until late in the war, proved of

value in controlling the huge fleet on

which troops were transported during the

redeployment and repatriation periods.37

Although advance planning was necessarily tentative because of the constantly

changing troop requirements and the uncertainty of ship movements, the Chief of

Transportation considered it essential to

his task of making the best possible use of

the ships. One phase of this planning was

the six-month estimate of troop lift on the

several routes that was furnished by the

Chief of Transportation to OPD and ASF

headquarters. Beginning early in 1944

these estimates, prepared under the supervision of General Wylie, Assistant Chief of

Transportation for Operations, were elaborated in charts called transportation

operational projections. The primary purpose of these projections was "to provide

the key planning and operating personnel

of the Transportation Corps with graphic

data reflecting the future movement of

troops and cargo between U.S. ports and

oversea theaters, and with the measure of

achievement in meeting forecasts." The

basic charts showed for each theater, for

each month of the past six months, the

number of troops made ready to move

during the month in accordance with

theater priorities and the number carried

forward as a backlog from the preceding

month. The sum of these constituted the

"effective target" for the month, against

which were set the actual embarkations.

A continuation of these charts reflected

the estimated embarkations for each of the

ensuing six months. Supplementary diagrams were prepared to show the fluctuations in the advance estimates of troop

requirements prepared by OPD, and how

37

 Memo, Opns Div OCT for Water Div OCT, 4

May 42, sub: Slipstick Plan, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Ltr, Farr to CofT ETOUSA, 5 Oct 43; Memo,

Lt Col Carl E. Berzelius, Mvmts Div OCT, for Wylie,

16 Mar 45, sub: Problems in POA and SWPA;

Memo, Farr for C of Contl Div OCT, 14 Jan 46; last

three in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Ltr, Farr to author,

14 Feb 50, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. Copies of slipstick in OCT HB Ex File.
98 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CHART 3—PASSENGERS EMBARKED MONTHLY BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FOR OVERSEA

DESTINATIONS: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945*

* Atlantic areas include North and Latin America, Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom, continental Europe, Medi- terranean, Africa, and the Middle East. Pacific areas include western Canada, Alaska, Central Pacific, South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, western Pacific, India, Burma, Japan, and Korea.

Source: Monthly reports by ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of

this series, now in preparation.

actual embarkations compared with these

estimated requirements and with the

number of troops on the theater priority

list that were ready to move. The charts

gave the Office of the Chief of Transportation a basis for studying the results of

planning and operations during preceding

months and for drawing conclusions for

guidance in the future. There were similar

charts for the shipment of Army cargo to

the theaters.38

The growth of the Army's troop lift is

illustrated by the fact that G-4, a few days

after Pearl Harbor, estimated the capacity

of the ships then available for Army troop

service to be about 65,000 troops, whereas

at the end of hostilities the troop capacity

of the vessels serving the Army was ten

times that figure.39 The Army embarkations in December 1941 totaled 29,800

passengers, while in January 1945, when

the outbound movement reached a peak,

295,100 were embarked. (Chart 3) The increase was brought about through the exploitation of all practicable means—increasing the capacity of existing passenger

vessels, building new troopships, converting cargo ships, using the limited pas- 38

 Copies of the transportation operational projections for August and September 1944 are in OCT HB

Dir of Opns. 39

 Study, Trans Br G-4 WDGS, 10 Dec 41, sub:

Analysis of Passenger Shipping, OCT HB Gross Day

File; ASF MPR, Aug 45, p. 50.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 99

senger accommodations on unconverted

cargo ships, and employing British and

other foreign troopships. Yet from the

standpoint of the military authorities concerned with planning strategy, the troop

lift never was large enough. The Chief of

Transportation, moreover, repeatedly

found that embarkations fell somewhat

short of the target he had helped to set.

The latter fact is explained chiefly by delay in the work of converting cargo ships

on which the Chief of Transportation

counted heavily in his planning.40 The unforeseen retention of vessels in the theaters

and the extensive repairs required by

vessels returning to U.S. ports, particularly those returning from long voyages in

the Pacific, also upset the forecasts.

The statement that the troop lift was

never large enough requires some qualification with respect to the period from

June 1944 onward. The build-up offerees

in the United Kingdom for the invasion of

the Continent, the pressure of the campaign in the Mediterranean, and the effort

to increase troop strength in the Pacific

and Asiatic theaters as rapidly as possible

kept the demand for troop lift strong on

both Atlantic and Pacific coasts until after

the invasion of France had been launched.

Then, because battle casualties and the

demand for replacements were not as high

as had been expected, the troop shipping

situation in the North Atlantic became

perceptibly easier. This made it possible to

release some of the temporarily converted

Liberty ships from troop service, to release

part of the space on British ships, and to

relax somewhat the practice of "overloading" transports—that is, loading them

beyond the normal troop capacity. The

troop lift deficit continued in the Pacific,

but the Chief of Transportation decided

against transferring vessels from the At1antic because an early end of the war

against Germany was anticipated and

maximum capacity would then be required for redeploying troops from Europe. The decision was fortunate, because

with the launching of the German counteroffensive in December 1944 the movement of troops to Europe again became

heavy and all available space was required. This stringency was soon over,

however, and from February 1945 until

redeployment began there was a surplus

of troop lift in the Atlantic. The commitment of so many additional troops in Europe in the winter of 1944-45 reduced the

number available for the Pacific and relieved somewhat the demand for troop lift

at west coast ports.41

The Ports of Embarkation

The long-range planning and the dayto-day adjustments in projected oversea

troop movements and ship movements,

which were accomplished in Washington,

were carried into effect by the ports of

embarkation. The port commanders controlled the movement of troops and their

equipment from home stations to the seaboard, inspected and processed both

troops and equipment to insure that they

were ready for oversea service, prepared

40

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 207-08, 305-07; Memo,

CofT for PEs, 26 Aug 43, sub: Vessels Repair Info,

and atchd rad to oversea commanders; Memo, Farr

for Wylie, 4 Oct 43; last two inOCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo, Farr for Maj Gen John M. Franklin,

14 Mar 44, OCT 564 Troop Transports. 41

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Jun 44, sub:

Ship Capabilities, ASF Hq Shipping 1944; Min of

OCT Opns Mtg, 13 Jul 44, p. 3, OCT HB Dir of

Opns; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 1 Aug 44, sub: Troop

Mvmt Trends, OCT HB Farr Stay backs; Memo,

Wylie for Somervell, 20 Dec 44, sub: Troop Transport Position, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo,

Farr for Gross, 17 Jan 45, sub: Briefing; Memo, CofT

for Traf Div AAF, 27 Feb 45; last two in OCT 370.5.
100 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 9—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE PRINCIPAL ARMY PORTS: DECEMBER

1941-DECEMBER 1945 a

a

 Figures include military personnel of the Army, Navy, and Allied nations, civilians, and prisoners of war. Embarkations by cargo

ports and subports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts are combined with embarkations at the ports of embarkation to which they were subordinate. When embarkations at these subordinate ports were reported separately, they are stated in footnotes, but such figures may not

be complete. b

 Number of passengers embarked at Halifax, a subport of Boston, is not available. Boston was a subport of New York until July 1942. c

 Includes 225 passengers embarked at the Philadelphia cargo port in 1943, and 250 in 1944. d

 Includes 295 passengers embarked at the Baltimore cargo port in 1942, 1,044 in 1943, 84 in 1944, and 11 in 1945. Hampton Roads

was a subport of New York until June 1942. e

 Charleston was a subport of New York until January 1942. f

 Includes 751 passengers embarked during 1942 at Miami, Key West, and Galveston. g

 Los Angeles was a subport of San Francisco until October 1943. h

 Includes 17,048 passengers embarked at Portland, as a subport of San Francisco, through August 1944. i

 Includes 4,838 passengers embarked at Portland, as a subport of Seattle, September-December 1944. Seattle was a subport of San

Francisco until January 1942. j

 See notes h and i concerning embarkations prior to 1945. Portland continued as a subport of Seattle during 1945, although its embarkations are shown separately. k

 Prince Rupert was a subport of Seattle.

Source: Monthly reports of ports of embarkations to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in

preparation.

billeting plans for the transports, moved

the troops from staging areas to shipside

and embarked them, and provided for

their comfort, control, and entertainment

on board.42

Each port of embarkation was assigned

primary responsibility for one or a few

oversea areas, but also made shipments to

other areas, so that the over-all pattern of

movements was complex. Moreover, the

port responsibilities were subject to adjustment as conditions changed. In the

latter part of the war the port of embarkation at Boston served the North Atlantic

bases and northern Europe; New York

was concerned principally with movements to northern Europe and the Mediterranean; Hampton Roads shipped

chiefly to Africa and the Mediterranean;

Charleston embarked troops to various

destinations but served principally as the

42

 AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, par. 10, gives a broad

outline of port commanders' duties. See also Memo,

CG SOS for Dirs and Gs of Staff Divs, et al., 1 Jul 42,

sub: Procedures for Booking Individuals and Small

Groups, OCT 541.1 Small Groups.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 101

TABLE 10—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE ARMY FOR THE SEVERAL OVERSEA AREAS:

DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945 a

a

 The grouping into Atlantic and Pacific areas indicates that the passengers were embarked mainly but not exclusively at Atlantic and

Gulf ports or at Pacific ports. b

 Includes bases in Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland, and Bermuda. c

 Includes Panama Canal Zone, Caribbean, South America, and South Atlantic. d

 Includes North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. e

 Middle East includes Egypt, Red Sea, and Iran. f

 Includes Iceland, United Kingdom, and continental Europe. g

 Includes Alaska and western Canada. h

 Central and South Pacific were combined into Pacific Ocean Areas in 1944. i

 Includes embarkations for western Pacific, Japan, and Korea after those areas were occupied by U.S. forces. j

 Includes India, Burma, and China.

Source: Monthly reports by ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series, now in

preparation.

home port for Army hospital ships assigned to the Atlantic; New Orleans handled troop traffic to the Panama Canal,

Latin America, and the Pacific bases;

San Francisco was a transshipment point

for troops proceeding to all of the Pacific

areas; Los Angeles served the Asiatic and

Pacific theaters; and the Seattle Port of

Embarkation was responsible for shipments to Alaska and western Canada and

also served the Central Pacific.43 The

numbers of troops shipped from the subports and the cargo ports, each of which

functioned under the control of a port of

embarkation, were relatively small. More

than 45 percent of the passengers embarked by the Army during the war period were destined for the European

theater, and more than 42 percent were

embarked under the jurisdiction of the

New York Port of Embarkation. (Tables 9

and 10, and Chart 4)

The ports of embarkation were advised

by the Chief of Transportation as far in

advance as possible concerning the troops

43

 ASF MPR, Jan 44, Sec. 3, p. 46, graphically

shows "troop relationships" of U.S. ports and theaters, October-December 1943.
102 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CHART 4—PASSENGERS EMBARKED BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FOR THE SEVERAL

OVERSEA AREAS: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945 *

a

 Includes a small number of passengers embarked in Canada. b

 Includes Alaska and Canadian Pacific ports. c

 Includes North, Central, and South America, Greenland, Bermuda, and South Atlantic islands. d

 Includes South and Central Pacific. e

 Includes North and Central Africa, Sicily, Italy, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. f

 Includes western Pacific. g

 Includes troops for China, Burma, India. h

 Includes Iceland, United Kingdom, northern Continent, southern France.

Source: Reports from ports of embarkation to Movements Division, OCT, reworked for a statistical volume of this

series, now in preparation.

and organizational equipment that they

would be expected to embark during succeeding months. In the beginning such information was irregular, but later a definite procedure was followed. The first advices, usually given six months in advance,

included an estimate of the troop spaces to

be available during each month and the

types of troops to be moved. These estimates enabled the port commanders to

enlarge or reduce their staffs and their

facilities according to the prospective load.

Frequent changes in the forecasts were

necessary as theater priority lists were revised and as firmer estimates of the shipping situation became possible. When

movement orders for specific units, replacements, or fillers were issued indicating the ports through which they were to

move and the dates on which they were to

be ready to leave their home stations,

copies were sent to the port commanders.

As rapidly as specific ships could be

named to sail on specific dates, the ports

were notified. The troops and their equipment were then called forward by the port

commanders in accordance with the priority lists, the ability of the port facilities

to accommodate them, and the availability of ships to move them.44

44

 Memo, CofT for HRPE and SFPE, 16 Apr 43,

sub: Priorities for Late April, OCT 370.5 South Pacific; Msg, CofT to NYPE and HRPE, 11 Jul 43;

Memo, CofT for BPE and NYPE, 26 Jan 44, sub:

Vessel Allocations; Ltr, Gross to CG NYPE, 1 Jul 44,

summarizing procedures; last three in OCT HB Farr

Staybacks.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 103

The port commanders were responsible

for notifying the theater commanders

when troops were shipped overseas. The

Operations Division of the General Staff

kept the theaters informed regarding War

Department actions on their priority lists,

but such advices dealt only with types of

units and tentative departure dates. The

first advice from a port of embarkation to

a theater of destination was the "loading

cable," which was dispatched about a

week or ten days before the sailing. The

loading cable identified the troops that

were expected to be embarked on a particular ship for sailing on a particular day.

From such messages the theaters were

able to make preparations for the handling of the ships and the disposition of the

troops and their equipment. As soon as

possible after a ship or convoy had sailed,

the port sent a "sailing cable," which gave

the actual time of departure. Passenger

lists and cargo manifests were forwarded

to the theaters by air mail in order to arrive in advance of the vessels. Because of

the unusually heavy movements to the

European theater and the careful planning that was necessary in advance of the

troops' arrival, that theater was notified in

the sailing cable of any changes that had

been made in the troop list after the loading cable had been dispatched. In the early

part of the war the theaters complained of

the failure of the ports of embarkation to

give them full and prompt advices, but

the system was steadily improved. This

improvement was facilitated by frequent

exchanges, between ports of embarkation

and the theaters they served, of liaison

officers for short tours of duty.45

The preparation of the loading plan,

showing the troops that were to be embarked on a particular ship, was usually

left to the port commander, who was

governed by the approved priority list for

the theater concerned. But sometimes

when the sailings to an oversea area were

infrequent, or when the theater's requirements were especially urgent, the Chief of

Transportation indicated that certain

units were to sail on certain vessels.46

Loading plans were often upset by late

changes in priorities. In some instances

units for which movement orders had

been issued were not able to pass inspection by the scheduled readiness dates because of shortages of personnel or equipment or deficiencies in training. In this

situation OPD designated other units of

the same type if they were available, or,

as was often the case, the port commander

substituted troops that were already at the

port staging area, following the theater

priority list as nearly as possible. Every

effort was made to avoid letting a ship sail

with empty spaces when the theater was

in need of troops.

The organizations at the port for handling troop movements were not uniform.

Early in 1944 the Chief of Transportation

issued a "typical organization chart" for

the ports and requested them to follow it

so far as practicable, but because of different conditions in the several localities

and personal preferences on the part of the

port commanders organizational differences persisted.47

 There were, however,

several groups of related functions to be

45

 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for CGs of PEs, 12

Jan 42, sub: Sailing Info to Oversea Comdrs, G-4/

29717-114; Ltr, Col Frank S. Ross, CofT ETOUSA,

to Wylie, 15 Aug 42, OCT 319.1 England; Memo,

CG SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments

and Handicaps, OCT HB SFPE Gen. 46

 Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 2 Jan 43, sub: Sailing

of West Point for Middle East, OCT 353.01-400.93

Middle East; Memo, CofT for CG CPE, NYPE, etc.,

15 Aug 43, sub: Priorities for Asiatic Theater, etc.,

OCT 370.5. 47

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 100-102.
104 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

performed at all ports. The ships had to be

made ready for the embarkation of troops

and their impedimenta. Arrangements

had to be made for the transportation of

troops and impedimenta into and within

the port area. The enforcement of theater

priorities and War Department movement orders, the calling of troops to the

ports, and the planning of embarkations

constituted another group of related activities. Control of the movement, processing, and loading of the equipment and

supplies that accompanied troops, or were

marked for particular units though moving separately, made up another functional field. In addition, the port commanders were responsible for regulating

the flow of maintenance supplies for the

support of troops after their arrival overseas. In the typical plan issued by the

Chief of Transportation, these five groups

of functions were assigned to five divisions,

designated Water Division, Port Transportation Division, Troop Movement Division, Initial Troop Equipment Division,

and Oversea Supply Division. This fivedivision organization was actually employed only at New York; at other ports

movements of troops and equipment were

supervised by the same division, and there

were other departures from the typical

plan.

Because of the close co-operation that

was necessary between the Office of the

Chief of Transportation, the ports of embarkation in the zone of interior, and the

oversea theaters, the communication systems by which these agencies were linked

were of utmost importance. Exchanges of

information and adjustments in programs

had to be made quickly as sailing dates

approached, and the transmission of messages had to be secret as well as fast. Both

teletype and telephone connections were

used. Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger,

who commanded the New York Port of

Embarkation until V-E Day and then became commander of the San Francisco

Port of Embarkation, remarked that the

daily teletype conferences that the ports

held with the chiefs of transportation in

the theaters were of "inestimable value."

Colonel Farr, expressing the view of the

Office of the Chief of Transportation, corroborated that opinion. To emphasize the

point, he stated that during the redeployment period the information received

from the European theater was unsatisfactory because the theater did not permit

its port commanders to communicate directly with the zone of interior, and that

there were usually omissions and delays

when messages regarding troops sailing

from European ports had to be relayed

through the theater headquarters.48

Maintaining secrecy in communications between the Office of the Chief of

Transportation and the ports was a constant problem. Messages transmitted over

the Transportation Corps teletypewriter

network were coded and hence were considered safe, but urgent business could be

transacted much more satisfactorily by

telephone. Although telephone conversations were "scrambled," the Intelligence

Division (G-2) of the General Staff did not

regard this as providing adequate security.

Accordingly, the transmission by telephone of certain information such as sailing dates, names of vessels, identification

48

 Memo, CofT for All PEs, et al., 9 Aug 42, sub:

Secret Communications, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen;

Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps, par. 6, OCT HB SFPE

Gen; Memo, Farr for Finlay, 19 Sep 45, sub: Lessons

Learned, p. 2, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 105

of units, and destinations was forbidden.49

Breaches of these security rules were

sometimes risked in order to get business

of great urgency transacted. Such breaches

when detected by G-2 caused embarrassment to the officers involved, but there is

no evidence that the enemy was ever

benefited.

Movement to the Ports

Preparations for the movement of troops

to the ports began with instructions issued

by OPD to the AGF, the AAF, or the ASF,

directing that necessary steps be taken to

prepare specific types of troops for shipment to stated oversea theaters, and setting

approximate dates on which the troops

were to be ready to leave their home stations. These instructions normally were

issued about six weeks before actual movement. Specific units, or groups of replacements, were designated and alerted as soon

as possible. As the date approached for the

departure of a unit from its home station,

a movement order was issued by The Adjutant General at the request of the AGF,

the AAF, or the ASF, giving complete instructions regarding the strength of the

unit, authorized equipment and supplies,

the port for which the movement was

destined, and the latest date for arrival at

the port. The movement order included a

shipment number that was used thereafter in identifying the troops and their

impedimenta in order to obviate reference

to their military designations. The movement order also included any special instructions required by the unit commander or the commander of the port at

which the troops were to be staged and

embarked. These instructions were issued

only after a careful study had been made

of theater requirements, shipping capabilities, the training status of troops, and the

readiness of equipment. Such study represented the combined efforts of the Operations Division of the General Staff, the

Operations Division of Army Service

Forces headquarters, The Inspector General, and the Chief of Transportation.50

The process of making troops ready for

shipment to the theaters and moving the

men and their impedimenta to the ports

in an orderly and timely manner involved

a number of Army agencies—the major

commands (AGF, AAF, and ASF) to

which the troops belonged, the corps areas

(later service commands), the commanders of home stations, the unit commanders,

the chiefs of technical services who provided equipment and supplies, and the

ports of embarkation. During 1940 and

1941 it became increasingly apparent that

co-ordination between these agencies

lacked effectiveness and that more adequate definition of the duties of each was

necessary. Late in 1941, at the request of

the Chief of Staff, The Inspector General

49

 OCT Adm Memo 116, 7 Oct 42, Sec. 1; Memo,

CofT for Agencies Listed, 30 Jan 43, sub: TC Priority

Teletype, OCT 676.2; TC Cir 45-6, 24 Jul 44, sub:

Communications Security; Memo, CofT for PEs, 5

Aug 44, sub: Communications Security Course, OCT

000.72/TC Misc; TC Cir 50-14, revised 31 Jan 45,

sub: Ships' Port Serial Numbers. 50

 Procedures and responsibilities for priority lists

and movement orders are dealt with in the following:

Memo, TAG for CG AGF, et al., 5 Jan 43, sub: Org,

Tng, and Equip of Units, AG 320.2 (1-2-43); Memo,

DCofS USA for ACofS G-1, G-3, G-4, OPD, 5 Aug

43, sub; Mvmts to Theaters; Memo, ACofS OPD for

Theater Group, et al., 12 Aug 43, sub: OPD Co-ordination of Pers, Troop and Matériel Matters; Memo,

OPD for DCofS, 10 Nov 43, sub: Troop Mvmt Projection; last three in WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); WD

Pamphlet 29-3, 24 Oct 44, Oversea Travel Orders for

Casuals, Replacements, and Individuals (short title,

OTO).
106 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

made a study of the problem in connection with troops moving through the ports

of embarkation at New York, San Francisco, and Seattle, and his report provided

a basis for corrective action.51 This action

was spurred by the outbreak of war with

Germany and Japan and the prospect of

vastly increased troop shipments. It took

the form of more explicit instructions in

the movement orders and the issuance of

separate instructions covering standard

procedures that could be referred to in

movement orders.

The separate instructions, eventually

published in pamphlet form, became the

"bible" of officers concerned with troop

movements. The basic document, entitled

Preparation for Overseas Movement (short

title, POM), was issued first in February

1943 and was later greatly expanded and

reissued as experience accumulated. It

was supplemented by pamphlets entitled

Additional Preparation for Overseas

Movement for AAF Units (short title,

AIR-POM), Identification of Organizational Impedimenta (short title, IOI), and

Preparation for Overseas Movement of

Individual Replacements (short title,

POR).52 The publication of standard procedures was a great boon to the Chief of

Transportation, whose headquarters was

responsible for all transportation arrangements, and whose port organizations had

ultimate responsibility for the condition of

troops and impedimenta when they were

dispatched overseas. His staff naturally

had played an important role in formulating these procedures.

Detailed instructions regarding the

preparation of troops at home stations

before their movement to the ports were

included in POM. In general, the objective was to have units at full strength, completely trained and equipped, before

entrainment, and to establish a complete

understanding between the unit commander and the port commander regarding the personnel and the matériel being

shipped. The periods normally allowed

between the dates when units were alerted

and the dates when they were to be ready

to move were theoretically adequate to

allow shortages of personnel and equipment and deficiencies in training to be

overcome, but frequently this proved not

to be the case. Especially during the early

part of the war, when the production of

equipment and supplies was slow and

training programs were lagging, the port

commanders were obliged to assume exceedingly heavy burdens in correcting

such deficiencies at the staging areas. The

Chief of Transportation, while encouraging his port commanders to take all possible measures to meet the responsibility,

kept up a constant campaign for more

complete compliance with the provisions

of POM on preparations at home stations,

but his effort was only partly successful.53

It was logical that the movement of

both troops and impedimenta from home

stations to ports of embarkation should be

controlled by the port commanders. They

were in possession of approved priority

lists and of movement orders indicating

the dates when specific units were to be

ready to go forward; they also knew more

accurately than anyone else when the

staging areas would be able to receive

additional troops and when the ships

51

 Memo, TIG for CofS, 19 Nov 41, sub: Supply

and Mvmt of Units, G-4/33098. 52

 Author's Memo, 22 Feb 44, sub: Instructions Regarding Preparation of Troops and Impedimenta for

Movement Overseas, summarizing actions taken, with

documents attached, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Mvmts

to Port. 53

 See below, pp. 117-19.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 107

would be ready for loading.54 The control

authority vested in the port commanders

applied to replacements as well as to troop

units. As a general practice the port commander's summons, which became known

as a call, was issued at least five days before

the troops were expected to entrain. It

stated the staging area to which the troops

were to be delivered and the date of their

arrival.55 The Chief of Transportation received a copy of each call, and his Traffic

Control Division took immediate steps to

establish a rail routing for the shipment

and to arrange for rail equipment to be

available at the home station on the

departure date.56

The actual date of departure from the

home station frequently differed from the

date contemplated when the movement

was initiated. Changes in the priority lists

approved by OPD and adverse reports by

The Inspector General on the condition of

units often caused movements to be delayed. Usually such delays were counterbalanced by the advancement of other

movements. The port commanders sometimes called troops to the staging areas

slightly ahead of their readiness dates.

Such advancements might be the consequence of other units being deferred or of

adjustments in the sailing schedules for

troop transports. In either case the units

advanced were needed to fill available

ship space. Because such advancements

sometimes drew protests from the major

commands concerned, the Chief of Transportation arranged that, in cases where a

major command decided that a unit was

not in condition to comply with the port

call and there were no other units on the

priority list suitable for substitution, the

facts would be presented to OPD for a

decision that would, if possible, avoid a

waste of ship space.57

When port commanders were not able

to call troops by the readiness dates given

in the movement orders, they were expected to propose new readiness dates as

promptly as possible. But the port commanders were instructed to keep departures from readiness dates, whether

advancements or deferments, to a minimum.58

 To assist port commanders in determining when calls should be issued, the

Chief of Transportation supplied them

with data regarding the time in transit to

be allowed from the respective service

commands to the respective ports for troop

trains, freight trains, and mixed trains.59

The movement of troop impedimenta

to the ports gave rise to special problems

because the shipments flowed from many

sources. A considerable part of the equipment and supplies was not shipped from

home stations but from technical service

depots and from manufacturing plants.

Matching these numerous shipments with

the troops for which they were intended

was an intricate problem at the ports. Although the instructions on the subject were

explicit, information furnished the port

commanders concerning such shipments

was often inadequate or arrived too late to

54

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 1 Jan 42, sub: Entrainment of Troops, G-4/33700; Memo, TAG for

GofAAF, et al., 2 Jan 42, AG 370.5 (1-1-42); Memo,

TQMG for Trans Br G-4, 12 Jan 42, sub: Overseas

Troop Mvmts, G-4/33700. 55

 In the beginning some ports referred to these calls

as movement orders, but this was stopped because of

confusion with movement orders issued by TAG; see

Memo, Dir of Plng ASF for CofT, 28 Oct 43, sub: Call

Issued by PEs, OCT 523.06 Follow-up of Shipments. 56

 TC Cir 100-6, 5 Oct 44, sub: POM, and changes,

concerning distribution of copies of calls. 57

 Memo, CofT for CG AGF, 25 Jan 43, OCT 370.5

Readiness Dates. 58

 Msg, CofT to Port Comdrs, 10 Aug 43, OCT HB

Farr Staybacks. 59

 TC Cir 100-4, 20 Jun 44, sub: Troop and/or

Impedimenta Mvmt by Rail to Ports.
108 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

be of service.60 Shipments of impedimenta

were usually called to move from home

stations ahead of the troops because of the

longer period required en route. Both the

AGF and the ASF complained that not

enough time was allowed to prepare

equipment for shipment, and the port

commanders were instructed to issue calls

as early as possible. However, the port

commanders were limited in this respect

by conditions at the ports and by the fact

that many units were not cleared by The

Inspector General until near their readiness dates. To meet the latter situation, the

Chief of Transportation arranged with

OPD that when the readiness date for a

unit drew near and the port commander

had not yet received clearance on the

training status of the troops, he might nevertheless call the unit's equipment forward,

since there was reasonable assurance that

the troops would be cleared soon.61

Troops usually were unacquainted with

the ports through which they were to move

and the procedures they were likely to encounter there. Several measures were

adopted to offset this unfamiliarity. Each

port commander issued a pamphlet containing information for the guidance of

incoming troops, which described the facilities of the port and its staging areas, the

organization of the port commander's staff,

and the practices relating to the staging

and embarkation of troops, the processing

of equipment, and port security. These

pamphlets were intended to be of service

to unit commanders both before and after

arrival at the staging areas.62

Whenever a large unit was scheduled

for movement overseas, an advance detail

was sent to the port of embarkation to coordinate matters relating to the handling

of troops and equipment. The larger the

unit the more time was required for this

advance work. The port commanders encouraged the early arrival of such details

and the assignment of adequate personnel,

but unit commanders did not always make

satisfactory arrangements. When especially large units were to be moved, the

port commanders sent their representatives to home stations to assist the units

with their planning. As a further aid to

unit commanders, the New York Port of

Embarkation prepared a motion picture

portraying the execution of important

procedures prescribed in POM.

The bulk of the troops arriving at the

staging areas traveled by rail because the

railways afforded the most satisfactory

service for large groups making long journeys and simplified the problem of enforcing discipline and security regulations.63

The railway terminals at the larger staging areas were capable of accommodating

eight to twelve troop trains at the same

time. Some troops were transported to the

ports from nearby stations by motor, but

the number was small compared with the

total delivered by rail. Individuals and

small groups sometimes were dispatched

to the ports by air in order not to miss the

ships on which they were scheduled to sail,

60

 Memo, TAG for Supply Arms and Services, 17

Jan 42, sub: Shipments to PEs, AG 523.01 (1-17-42);

Memo, CofT for PEs, 28 Nov 42, sub: Task Force

Shortages; Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns SOS, 14

Dec 42; last two in OCT 400.61 Shortages 1943. 61

 Memo, CofT for Col Calvin De Witt, Jr., NYPE,

18 Apr 43, sub: Release of Org Equip; Memo of

Record by Col Farr, 26 Apr 43; both in OCT HB

Farr Staybacks. The problem of getting impedimenta

shipped so as to be available to the troops soon after

their arrival overseas had many facets. See below, pp.

148-61. 62

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 May 43, sub: Info

Concerning PEs, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43; Procedures for Overseas Movement Through the New

York Port of Embarkation (short title, NYPE POM),

1 Jan 44, OCT HB NYPE Troop Mvmts to Port. 63

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 357-58.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 109

but here again the percentage of the total

was slight.

During the early months of the war

there was some speculation as to the feasibility of moving troops from their home

stations directly to shipside rather than

sending them to port staging areas for

periods of from one to several weeks before

embarkation. To develop information on

this subject, the Chief of Transportation

requested The Inspector General to send

representatives to observe the movement

of several units through the Charleston

Port of Embarkation. The reports of the

observers indicated that the proposed procedure was feasible under certain conditions but also disclosed that there were

formidable problems in getting troops and

their equipment fully ready for shipment

overseas before they left their home stations.64

 By the time the investigation was

finished and the reports studied—summer

of 1942—experience had established that

the port staging areas had an intricate and

indispensable mission to perform, and the

question of eliminating them from the

standard troop movement procedure was

never again given serious consideration.

During a period of heavy troop movement through a particular port it was

advantageous to have some of the larger

and better organized units staged at their

home stations and moved from there either

to shipside or to a staging area for an overnight stop before embarkation. In such

cases the port commanders sent processing

teams to the home stations. Also, some

groups of replacements were staged at replacement depots. But the bulk of the

troops received their final processing at

port staging areas. In all cases the essential

point of doctrine—that movements to the

ports should be made only on call of the

port commanders—was observed.

Troop Staging at the Ports

The staging areas at the ports of embarkation served a dual purpose. The basic

conception was that they should serve as

temporary stations where troops destined

for shipment overseas could be assembled

and organized so that they could be embarked as soon as the transports were

ready to receive them. Since there was a

critical shortage of ships and many troop

transports moved in convoys with closely

calculated departure dates, it was important that vessels not be held in port waiting for troops to arrive from inland stations. The second conception of the staging

area was that of a station where troops

could be processed—that is, given the final

attention necessary to make them ready

for oversea service. The processing included bringing units to authorized strength

and correcting deficiencies relating to the

physical condition, the personal equipment, and the training status of the individual soldiers.65

 The latter role proved to

be highly significant and more time consuming than had been foreseen. It was intended, of course, that troops returning

from overseas would pass through the staging areas for some of the processing that

was necessary in connection with their

repatriation. In addition to processing

U.S. Army personnel, including nurses

and Wacs, the staging areas carried out

whatever processing was necessary for

personnel of the U.S. Navy, troops of

64

 Memo, TIG for Trans Div SOS, 3 Jun 42, sub:

Mvmt of Task Forces, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43;

Interv with Col Farr, 18 Feb 44, sub: Troop Mvmts

Overseas, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures. 65

 TC Pamphlet 7, Guide for Org and Opn of

Staging Areas, 7 Feb 44, and revision, 16 Dec 46,

deal with mission, functions, and organization. See

also appropriate sections of PE Org Manuals, in OCT

HB files for respective ports.
110 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Allied nations, and civilians who were

sailing on troopships.

In peacetime somewhat similar functions had been performed by the oversea

discharge and replacement depots located

at the ports, but in wartime much more

extensive and complete facilities were required. This need was felt during 1941,

and the ports of embarkation then in operation arranged for the assignment of space

for troop staging at nearby Army installations. It was recognized, however, that the

space procurable in this way was limited

and that entirely new staging areas would

have to be constructed if the United States

should enter the war. Another consideration was that some of the established

installations available for staging purposes

were located at considerable distances

from the ports, whereas the port commanders found it advantageous to have

such facilities near to, though not within,

the port areas. Plans for the construction

of staging areas were initiated late in 1941,

and during the month following the Pearl

Harbor attack new facilities in the vicinity

of New York, New Orleans, and San

Francisco were authorized. Later in 1942

approval was given to the construction of

staging facilities near Boston, Charleston,

Hampton Roads, Los Angeles, and Seattle,

as well as a second large staging area near

New York. Eventually staging facilities

were constructed at Portland, Oregon, and

Prince Rupert, British Columbia.66

The Chief of Transportation and his

port commanders kept the staging capability under constant review in the light of

projected troop movements to insure that

it would be adequate for the needs as they

arose. The specially designed staging areas

were more satisfactory for staging troops

than other Army installations, and the

policy was to make them adequate to handle the bulk of the movement. However,

several of the older stations were used for

staging purposes throughout the war. The

fluctuation in theater requirements, the

convoy system in the Atlantic, and delayed

ship movements made the flow of troops

through the ports uneven, and the staging

facilities had to be capable of handling the

peak load.67

Higher headquarters did not always

agree with the Chief of Transportation's

estimate of staging area requirements, and

he found it necessary to resist efforts to

radically reduce the physical capacity of

the staging areas as well as the station

complements. He succeeded in maintaining what he considered an adequate staging capability by emphasizing that the

determining factor was the possible peak

load and by pointing out the role that

these installations would have in repatriation and demobilization. Nevertheless,

the staging capacity was considerably reduced as the war progressed and the prospective need could be more clearly

foreseen.68

The ability of the staging areas to

handle peak movements naturally depended on the intensity with which the

facilities were used. For a time the usual

66

 OCT HB Monograph 8, pp. 35-44. 67

 Memo, CofT for Dir of Opns ASF, 11 Sep 43,

sub: St Area Reqmts; reply, 23 Sep 43; Memo,

ACofT for Mob Div ASF, 10 Oct 43; Chart, St Area

Loading Forecast NYPE and BPE, Sep 43-Apr 44;

all in OCT 680-900 NY 1943. 68

 Memo, Farr for McIntyre, 4 Nov 43, sub: St Area

Work Load Analysis, OCT HB Farr Staybacks;

Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 29 Jan 44, sub: Utilization

of Posts, Camps, and Stations, AG 323.3 Trans Gen;

Memo, ACofT for PEs, 24 Jun 44; Memo, CofT for

Dir Mob Div ASF, 28 Jun 44; last two in OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Dir Plans and Opns ASF

for CofT, 18 Aug 44, sub: Closing Certain St Areas;

1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 23 Aug 44; last two in

OCT 323.3 Utilization of Comd Facilities.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 111

allowance of sixty square feet of floor space

per enlisted man was cut to forty square

feet, but this was found undesirable as a

permanent arrangement.69 Various means

were used to avoid holding troops for excessive periods in the staging areas, not

only because a slow turnover reduced the

number that could be handled over a

given period but also because it adversely

affected morale and increased the security

problem. The port commanders closely

co-ordinated the movement of troops to

the staging areas with troopship schedules.

Home stations were admonished to do a

more complete job of processing and training troops so as to lighten the task of the

ports. For a time the port commanders

were required to report any units which,

because of changed priorities or other circumstances beyond their control, remained at the staging areas more than

forty-five days so that steps could be taken

to have them removed.70

Early in the war when theater requirements were uncertain and priorities subject to frequent change, units were

sometimes held at the staging areas for

many weeks. This situation improved during 1942, and early in 1943 the War

Department instructed the port commanders to avoid so far as possible holding

units at the staging areas more than two

weeks.71 While that objective could not be

attained in all instances, a good measure

of success was achieved. Data are not

available to show the over-all result, but

the figures given in Table 11 for troops

staged by the New York Port of Embarkation during 1944 indicate that, during the

six months for which the data are available, well over 75 percent of the troops

that sailed had spent less than fourteen

days at the staging areas, and that in each

month of the year the average was well below that figure. The exceptionally low

average for the month of May 1944 must

be viewed in the light of the extraordinary

effort made at that time to get troops to

Europe before the invasion of the Continent began.

The rated capacity for staging intransit

troops fluctuated greatly. These fluctuations were due to the acquisition or release by the port commanders of staging

space at training camps or other stations

not normally under the control of the port

commanders, the construction of new barracks or the diversion of housing to other

uses, and changes in the amount of floor

space allotted to an individual. The largest

recorded capacity for staging intransit

troops was 248,653 in May 1943. At that

time several installations that would soon

be released because of the completion of

new facilities were still listed as staging

areas, and the allotment of space per enlisted man had been reduced to forty

square feet. During the first seven months

of 1944, when the invasion of Normandy

was the primary military consideration,

the staging capacity averaged 224,000 and

the peak number of troops on hand was

187,000. In August 1944 the allotment of

space per enlisted man was again placed

at sixty square feet, and this together with

other adjustments reduced the rated

capacity considerably. During the last

year of the war the capacity figure fluctuated between 131,000 and 141,000. Dur69

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 7 Jan 44, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 29 Jan

44, par. 2a, AG 323.3 Trans Gen; WD Cir 321, 3 Aug

44, Sec. V. 70

 Memo, AGF Comd Gp, Fort Dix, for CG ASF,

20 Feb 43; 3d Ind by CG NYPE, 3 Mar 43; 8th Ind

by CofT, 1 Apr 43; all in OCT 322 Ord Cos; TC Cir

50-55, 9 Oct 44, sub: Units in St Areas Over 45 Days. 71

 Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, et al., 5

Jan 43, sub: Org, Tng, and Equip of Units for Oversea Sv, AG 320.2 (1-3-43).
112 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 11—TIME SPENT AT THE STAGING AREAS BY TROOPS EMBARKED AT NEW YORK

DURING 1944 a

a

 Includes units and casuals staged at Camp Kilmer, Camp Shanks, Fort Slocum, and Fort Hamilton. b

 Data not available.

Source: January-June figures are from Rpt, NYPE Progress and Activities, for respective months; July-December figures submitted

with Ltr, NYPE to Mil Plng & Int Div OCT, 31 Oct 52, OCT HB NYPE St Areas Gen.

ing December 1944 and January 1945,

when the outbound troop movement was

especially heavy because of the military

situation in Europe, the peak number of

troops on hand at some staging areas exceeded the rated capacity, but the excess

was readily absorbed. In view of these

fluctuations, no month can be considered

typical. Table 12 gives a spot picture of

the staging situation in January 1945,

which witnessed the heaviest outbound

movement of any month of the war.72

The staging areas were under the command of the port commanders throughout

the war, but vigorous action on the part of

the Chief of Transportation was necessary

to keep them in that status. When the

service commands were established in

July 1942 as successors to the corps areas,

there was a strong sentiment in SOS headquarters for the transfer of staging areas to

the service commands, and an organizational manual was drafted on that basis.

This sentiment was predicated on the fact

that the equipping and training of troops,

which were important aspects of the staging process, as well as housekeeping at the

staging facilities were normal functions of

the service commands, whereas the ports

of embarkation were essentially transportation agencies.

General Gross attacked the proposal

from many angles and won General Somervell's decision to leave the staging areas

as they were.73 The basic argument against

the proposed change was the advantage of

continuity in the control of troops from

72

 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, gives an analysis of staging

each month, based on weekly reports from port commanders. 73

 Memo, Opns Off OCT for Gross, 26 Jul 42, and

atchd papers, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Facilities;

Min of Conf of CGs SOS, 30 Jul 42, App. to record

of afternoon session, Question 40, OCT HB Ex Files.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 113

TABLE 12—CAPACITIES OF TROOP STAGING AREAS AND INTRANSIT TROOPS STAGED:

1-28 JANUARY 1945 a

a

 Table does not include a number of facilities used for staging earlier in the war. b

 Rated gross capacity based on allowance of 60 square feet per enlisted man and 120 square feet per commissioned officer in housing

in active status at end of month. c

 Rated staging capacity was gross capacity less space required for station complement, troops in training at the port, and other nonstaging purposes. d

 Total troops arrived includes 225,446 destined overseas and 32,596 returned from overseas. e

 Total troops departed includes 238,872 embarked for overseas and 34,339 shipped to stations in the zone of interior. f

 When peak number exceeded rated staging capacity, the excess was accommodated by reducing the space allowance or by using tents. g

 These were entirely new facilities. The new staging area built at New Orleans (Camp Plauché) was being used entirely for training.

The new staging area at Charleston was no longer required because that port was being used almost entirely for receiving patients from

overseas. h

 These were Regular Army installations improved or enlarged to provide staging facilities.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, January 1945, Sec. 3, p. 16.

their arrival at the seaboard until they

had been embarked. Throughout this

period the closest possible co-ordination

was necessary to insure that the troops

were fully processed by the scheduled embarkation dates, that last-minute changes

in priorities were accomplished without

delay to the vessels or waste of ship space,

and that organic equipment was processed and shipped at the proper time. As

long as the port commander had direct

control of all of these operations he was in
114 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

a position to deal with problems as they

arose through command decisions. If he

should have to negotiate with the service

commanders in such matters, the directness and speed of command decisions

would be lost. Mutual understanding between the officers in charge of the staging

areas, the ships, and the embarkation

operation was necessary, and the Chief of

Transportation was convinced that this

could be best achieved if they were all

under one command.

Although the port commanders' control

of the operation of the staging areas was

thus established, uncertainty still existed

regarding the command of troops while

they were being staged. The AGF and the

AAF wanted to retain command of troops

while they were at the staging areas, particularly because of the training that might

have to be carried on there and the disciplinary problems that arose, and G-3 concurred in this view. The Operations Division and SOS headquarters supported the

view of the Chief of Transportation that

such an arrangement would create confusion and hamper the port commanders in

their task of processing the troops. The

latter view prevailed and in September

1942 the Chief of Staff issued appropriate

instructions. Under these instructions all

units upon arrival in the staging areas

were to pass to the command of the port

commanders and of their representatives,

the commanders of the staging areas. The

Chief of Transportation was to establish at

each staging area separate "small permanent command groups" for the AGF, the

AAF, and the SOS to assist in controlling

units smaller than divisions with respect

to discipline, security, and training. These

command groups were to provide liaison

between the major command headquarters and the troops being staged; it was

clearly stated in the instructions, however,

that they were not independent of the

port commanders but were included

among the command echelons through

which the port commanders exercised

control.74

The issues at stake were not entirely

resolved by the establishment of command

groups. The AGF continued to express

dissatisfaction with the command setup,

although the complaints abated as the

number of units held at the staging areas

for abnormally long periods decreased and

the training facilities and methods were

improved.75 The AAF alleged that the

command groups were being restrained

by the port commanders from communicating with their headquarters and so were

not fulfilling their purpose. As late as July

1943 some staging areas had not been

provided with command groups. The

Director of Military Training, ASF, accordingly instructed the Chief of Transportation to take immediate measures to

insure that such groups were established

in all staging areas requiring them and

that liaison between the groups and the

major command headquarters was not

obstructed.76

The Chief of Transportation endeavored

to enforce this policy, although it was not

74

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS, 4 Sep 42, sub:

Comd of Units Ordered Overseas; Memo, CofS for

AGF, AAF, and SOS, 12 Sep 42, sub: Control of Units

in St Areas; both in WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); Memo,

CG SOS for CofT, 21 Sep 42; Memo, CG AGF for

Subordinate Comds, 5 Oct 42; Memo, CofT for Port

Comdrs, 20 Oct 42; last three in OCT 370.5 Control

of Units of St Areas. 75

 Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R.

Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat

Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 573-77. 76

 Memo, Dir Mil Tng ASF for CofT, 21 Jul 43,

OCT HB Mvmts Div St Area Policies and Procedures.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 115

popular with either his Movements Division or his port commanders. They believed, on the one hand, that the staging

area complements were able to provide

adequately for the training and other

needs of troops during their short stay at

the ports before embarkation and that the

command groups were therefore unnecessary. They found, on the other hand, that

there was a tendency among the command

groups to communicate with their headquarters regarding matters that were

strictly the responsibility of the port commanders, and that these activities resulted

in "a great deal of minor aggravation"

and some interference with the processing

of troops."

The problems obviously stemmed from

an overlapping of interests. The major

commands had a natural interest in what

happened to their units up to the time

they left the zone of interior. The port

commanders were anxious to avoid any

developments that would cause confusion

or delay in the final processing of troops

for oversea service since this processing

was usually done under great pressure

and with deadlines established by convoy

or ship sailing dates. The basic difficulty

was one of establishing a clear understanding with the command groups regarding the matters that they should take

up directly with the port commanders and

those on which they should maintain liaison with their command headquarters. In

September 1945, the War Department

made a final effort to clarify the situation

by defining in detail the functions of the

groups—then redesignated liaison sections—and re-emphasizing that although

these sections were under the command of

the port commanders the liaison with their

respective headquarters should not be

impaired.78

When troops detrained at a staging area

they were immediately taken in charge by

the billeting officer. He was prepared with

a billeting plan, based on advance information from the unit commander regarding the composition of the unit and a

study of the housing available. In most

cases enlisted men were accommodated in

mobilization type or theater of operations

type barracks, but in the early part of the

war when staging was done at permanent

Army installations, the use of tents sometimes was necessary. The larger staging

areas were divided for administrative purposes into regimental areas, each of which

accommodated about 3,000 men and was

served by a billeting team. So far as possible units were billeted in adjacent barracks, since that arrangement facilitated

processing and aided morale and discipline. White and Negro troops were separated. Enlisted men with their personal

equipment were conducted from the train

to their quarters by members of the billeting team. Under ordinary circumstances

processing was started almost immediately.79

The processing of troops at staging areas

required attention to many details, and it

was an especially onerous task because of

the frequent failure of home stations to

fully prepare the men for oversea service.

There were many reasons for such failures

during the early part of the war including

77

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, p. 62, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf;

Memo, Farr for Finlay, 19 Sep 45, sub: Lessons

Learned, par. 10, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 78

 WD Cir 193, 16 May 44, Sec. I; WD Cir 270, 8

Sep 45, Sec. V; Memo, CG AGF for AGF Liaison Off

SPE, 14 Sep 45, sub: WD Cir on Port Liaison Secs,

OCT HB Ex PE—AGF Liaison. 79

 On staging area operations, see lecture by Col

Cecil L. Rutledge, comdr of Camp Kilmer, NYPE, at

Atlantic Coast TC Off Tng Sch, undated but probably 1943, in OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures.
116 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

shortages of equipment, shortages of training personnel, confusion as to command

and supply responsibilities, insufficient

time between the receipt of alert notices

and the movement dates, and failure of

commanding officers of units to follow the

prescribed procedures.80 Efforts to improve the situation included issuing POM

and related procedural instructions during 1943, and emphasizing the preparation

of complete and accurate unit status

reports showing the condition of personnel, training, and equipment before units

left home stations.81

The responsibility of the staging area

for the medical processing of troops was

threefold. First, it was required to weed

out those individuals who were unfit for

oversea service when unfitness was disclosed by the physical inspection made to

detect infectious or contagious diseases, by

the report of the individual on sick call, or

by reports of commanding officers. Second, it was expected to provide treatment

to qualify individuals for oversea shipment with their units, if possible, including medical and surgical attention, the

correction of dental defects, and the provision of eyeglasses. In addition, the staging area completed the inoculations

required for oversea service.82

In September 1943 the Chief of Transportation reported that over a period of

sixteen months the average number of individuals withheld from oversea shipments

by the port commanders because of physical defects had been one half of one percent.83

 The survey on which this report

was based disclosed that 10 percent of the

troops required dental treatment on arrival at the staging areas, and that 1 percent had defects that would have caused

their detention in the zone of interior unless corrected. While he desired that the

staging areas deal with such defects as

fully as their personnel and facilities

would permit, the Chief of Transportation

emphasized that the responsibility for the

physical condition of troops rested primarily with the home stations. When he

learned that some ports in their zeal to

correct defects were giving thorough

physical examinations to troops upon their

arrival at the staging areas and again

shortly before embarkation, he directed

them to discontinue the first examination,

which was not required by War Department instructions and was not necessary

when home stations fulfilled their responsibilities.84

The port commanders were responsible

for bringing units to full strength before

they left the staging areas for oversea service. Movement orders usually stated that

all vacancies were to be filled before the

units left their home stations, but that frequently was not accomplished.85

 In addition, there were the vacancies caused by

the withdrawal of men from units at the

staging areas for medical reasons. Not infrequently enlisted men went AWOL

during the staging period and hence were

lost to their units. In order to fill such

vacancies the port commanders maintained replacement pools at the staging

areas, to which they assigned soldiers who

had not been permitted to sail with their

units because they needed medical attention, returned AWOL's, and fillers who

had failed to arrive in time to sail with

80

 Memo, TIG for CofS, 7 Dec 42, WDCSA 370.5

(Secret). 81

 Memo, ACofS OPD for AGF, AAF, and SOS, 4

Feb 43, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret). 82

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 29 Dec 43, sub: Medical

Processing, OCT 370.5 POM 1944; TC Cir 120-3,

Changes 1, 1 Feb 44. 83

 Memo, CofT for Contl Div ASF, 25 Sep 43, OCT

HB Farr Staybacks. 84

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 21 Mar 44, sub: Physical

Exam and Insp at Ports, OCT 370.5 POM 1944. 85

 See POM, pars. 9 and 30a.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 117

their units. When these replacement pools

did not provide the classes of personnel

required, the port commanders called on

the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF for fillers.

In the early part of the war it was necessary to permit some units to sail understrength and to dispatch fillers on subsequent sailings, but as the replacement

pools at the ports were built up and the

replacement systems of the major commands were improved, this became unnecessary except on rare occasions when

certain types of specialists were in short

supply.86

It was War Department policy that

troops not be sent to the staging areas

until they had completed training and

had fired the course of marksmanship prescribed for the weapon with which they

were armed.87 These requirements were

not always met, however, and the deficiencies had to be made up at the ports.

Also, it was considered desirable to continue active training while troops were at

the staging areas as a means of preventing

deterioration of physical condition and

morale. Training personnel and training

aids were provided by the port commanders, and when suitable arrangements

could not be made for the use of firing

ranges at nearby installations such facilities were constructed at the staging

areas.88

In March 1945, with the demand for

troops for the European theater abated,

the War Department increased the minimum period of training required before

embarkation from thirteen to eighteen

weeks. At that time the port commanders

were relieved of responsibility for enforcing this requirement except in cases where

troops had received their basic training at

the ports.89 Training activities to keep the

troops in good physical and mental condition were continued, however, as was instruction in fields that fell peculiarly within the province of the staging areas, such

as conduct on transports and abandonship procedures. Troops also were instructed in tactics for evasion, escape, and

resisting enemy interrogation. The Chief

of Transportation objected to the inclusion

of the latter type of training in the port

commanders' responsibility because he

believed that the staging process should

be lightened as much as practicable, but

his objection was overruled.90

Probably the most troublesome part of

processing was the completion of the individual equipment of the troops. The

staging areas normally supplied certain

items, such as gas masks and impregnated

clothing, but by far the greater task was

providing equipment that the troops

should have had when they arrived. Each

of the technical services maintained a staff

and a considerable stock of supplies at 86

 Memo, CofT for TAG, 2 Apr 42, sub: Repl Pools

at PEs, OCT 320.2 Gen Trans; Memo, CofT for Mil

Pers Div ASF, 10 Apr 43, sub: PE Repl Pools, OCT

HB Farr Staybacks; WD Memo W 600-72-43, 23 Aug

43, sub: Overseas Repl System; unsigned article,

"Classification and Assignment at a Staging Area,"

A.G. School Bulletin, April 1943, p. 24. 87

 Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, et al., 5

Jan 43, sub: Org, Tng, and Equip of Units for Oversea Sv, par. 9, OCT 370.5 POM 1942-43; Memo, CG

SOS for CGs SvCs and Tech Svs, 4 Mar 43, sub: Basic

Tng for SOS Units, SPX 353 (2-26-43); Min of Port

Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, p. 60,

OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 88

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 26 Jan 43, sub: Training

Aids; Memo, CofT for Dir Tng Div SOS, 26 Feb 43,

sub: Rifle Range; both in OCT HB PE Gen St Areas

Facilities; Memo, ACofS G-3 for CG ASF, 9 Apr 43,

OCT 370.5 Contl of Units in St Areas. For the types

and extent of training at staging areas of the NYPE,

see monthly rpt, Progress and Activities, OCT HB

NYPE Gen. 89

 Memo by Overseas Troop Br of Mvmts Div, 9

Mar 45, in Mvmts Div Histories for Feb 45, OCT HB

Mvmts Div Gen. 90

 Memo, G-2 for CofT, 4 May 44; 1st Ind, CofT for

CG ASF, 7 Jun 44; 3d Ind, CofT for G-2, 23 Jun 44;

all in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, CG ASF for

Dir Int ASF and CofT, 12 Jul 44, OCT 370.5 POM

1944.
118 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TRAINING FACILITIES AT CAMP STONEMAN, staging area of the San Francisco

Port of Embarkation. Rifle range (above) and mock village for practice in street fighting (below).

each staging area; also, facilities were

maintained for repairing equipment that

arrived in bad condition.

Some of the reasons for the failure of

home stations to provide troops with full

equipment and to have it in good repair

have already been noted. Many items

were in short supply, especially during the

early part of the war, and the depots could

not make shipments promptly upon receipt of requisitions. Often the interval

between the alerting of a unit and its

departure from the home station was

brief. Unit commanders, home station

commanders, corps area commanders,

and the chiefs of the technical services all

had responsibilities in connection with the

supply of troops destined for oversea areas,

and co-ordination was sometimes faulty.

Unit commanders were expected to report
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 119

shortages to the technical services as soon

as possible, and the technical services were

expected to report to the port commanders which items would be shipped to the

ports and when they would arrive. Frequently this information was not received

at the ports, but they nevertheless had to

make up all deficiencies before the troops

embarked. Sometimes this was accomplished only by drawing heavily on the

port reserves that were maintained to

meet emergency requests from oversea

commanders.91

As a result of the efforts of the responsible agencies and the Mobilization Division in ASF headquarters, there was

gradual improvement in the equipping of

troops at home stations. The Chief of

Transportation employed various measures to secure this improvement. Early in

the war he directed his port commanders

to set up co-ordinating agencies at the

staging areas for the specific purpose of

maintaining close liaison with the unit

commanders and the chiefs of technical

services on supply matters.92 He also

urged that the commanders of home stations be held responsible for positive

action to insure that unit commanders

gave proper attention to the equipment of

their troops, since the former had an opportunity to learn from experience whereas the latter prepared for oversea movement only once.93

 A provision to that

effect was included in the second edition

of POM, which was issued in August

1943.

When the situation did not improve as

rapidly as he had hoped, the Chief of

Transportation in conjunction with The

Inspector General established a procedure

for reporting and tabulating the items of

clothing and other equipment issued to

soldiers at the staging areas in order to determine how far the respective home stations were falling short of their responsibility. A summary, based on data for the

period 15 May-31 August 1944 and listing the home stations individually, was

published by ASF in October and circulated to all concerned with the advice that

although some improvement had been

achieved the situation was still far from

satisfactory.94 Similar data for the period

16 September-13 December 1944 again

showed improvement, but not enough to

indicate a satisfactory supply performance

at home stations. During that period

729,060 troops arrived at the staging areas

whose authorized supplies and personal

equipment included 42,304,956 items, excluding those that were normally supplied

at the ports. The summary showed that

2,325,056 (5.5 percent) of these items were

missing and that 1,248,068 (2.9 percent)

were not in order for combat service. The

total deficiency therefore was 8.4 percent.95

At one time during the period when

91

 Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 17 May 42, ASF Hq

Opns Div 1942-43; Memo, Wylie for Gross, 9 Oct 42,

sub: Supply of Troops Going Overseas; 1st Ind, Lutes

for CofT, 4 Dec 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 11 Dec 42,

sub: List of Items Shipped to Ports; Interv with Col

Farr, 4 Sep 46, sub: Troop Mvmts, p. 5; last four in

OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures; Memo, CofT

for ACofS for Opns SOS, 14 Dec 42, sub: Task Force

Shortages, OCT 400.61 Shortages 1943. 92

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 12 Aug 42, sub:

Rpts on Status of Equip; Memo, CG ASF for Cs of

Tech Svs, 3 Oct 42, sub: Supply of Troops at PE; both

in OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures. 93

 5th Ind, CofT for CG SOS, 4 Nov 42; Memo,

CofT for DCofS for SvCs ASF, 31 Jul 43; both in OCT

HB Mvmts Div St Area Policies. 94

 Memo, Lutes for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 19

Jul 44, ASF Hq Dir of Plans and Opns; Memo, CG

ASF for Home Sta Comdrs and Agencies Issuing

Mvmt Orders, 31 Oct 44, sub: Processing Deficiencies of Troops at St Areas, OCT 370.5 POM 1944. 95

 Extract from Memo, TIG for DCofS, 8 Jan 45,

sub: Readiness of Units for Mvmt Overseas, OCT

370.5 Processing Deficiencies 1945.
120 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

constant pressure was being exerted to

have troops provided with full equipment

before they started for the staging areas, a

strong sentiment developed for eliminating the showdown inspection at home stations and placing the responsibility for

this inspection, as well as for making up

the shortages that it disclosed, solely on

the ports of embarkation. Representatives

of the service commands attending a

meeting held in November 1943 made a

definite recommendation to that effect,

pointing out the difficulties that home stations and technical services were experiencing in carrying out the existing regulation and the advantages that would accrue

from concentrating the responsibility at

the ports. The Chief of Transportation

was willing to assume the added burden,

but he indicated that it would involve a

substantial increase in personnel and

warehouse space at the staging areas. The

proposal was therefore dropped.96

Despite the showdown inspections at

home stations, the port commanders held

similar inspections as soon as possible after

the troops arrived at the staging areas in

order to establish definitely what items

were missing and what were in bad condition. The soldiers spread out their personal equipment before an inspection

team, usually in their barracks, and the

members of the team immediately took

steps to correct the deficiencies. Late in

the war, with supplies more readily procurable by home stations and with larger

stocks on hand at oversea bases, a revision

of the procedure for noncontrolled items

became possible. The change was made

late in 1944 and was incorporated in the

third edition of POM, issued in February

1945. The port commanders no longer

were responsible for conducting showdown inspections, and the technical services ceased shipping noncontrolled supplies to the ports earmarked for particular

units. The unit commanders conducted

the final showdown inspections at the

staging areas and informed the port commanders what items were needed to fill

shortages and replace unserviceable

equipment. The port commanders provided these items so far as possible by

withdrawals from their own stocks or by

calling on nearby depots. Requisitions for

items not supplied before the sailing date

were canceled, and the unit commanders

submitted new requisitions for these items

after arrival in the theaters.97 Controlled

items—those supplied in accordance with

the priorities assigned to the respective

troop units—continued to be shipped to

home stations or ports according to the

circumstances.

In addition to the larger tasks of overcoming deficiencies in personnel, training,

and equipment, the staging areas had

many other responsibilities in connection

with the final preparation of troops for departure overseas. Assistance was given in

handling such personal matters as insurance, pay allotments, purchase of savings

bonds, taxes, wills, powers of attorney,

and various aspects of domestic relations.

Service records were checked and brought

up to date. Payrolls were prepared and

wages were paid in full unless already

paid as of the last payday.98 Considerable

96

 Memo, Dir of Supply ASF for Dir of Plans and

Opns ASF, 13 Nov 43, sub: Suggested Revision of

POM; Memo, CofT for Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman,

Dir of Supply ASF, 30 Jan 44, sub: T/E 21 Showdown Inspection; both in OCT 370.5 POM 1944. 97

 See Memos, CofT for PEs, 22 Nov 44 and 23 Feb

45, sub: Proposed Supply Procedure, OCT 370.5

POM. 98

 Uncertainty as to the necessity of and the port's

responsibility for seeing that troops received their pay

before sailing was removed by WD Cir 106, 4 Apr 45,

Sec. III, and TC Cir 50-57, 10 Apr 45.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 121

attention was given to "special service"

activities, which included athletics, theatricals, motion pictures, concerts, libraries,

and clubs for the entertainment of the soldier, and lectures and discussions for his

orientation to the life that lay ahead. Each

of the larger staging areas published a

newspaper devoted chiefly to news of the

camp. The division of responsibility between the port commanders and the service commanders led to misunderstanding

and delay in providing facilities for special service activities at certain ports, but

a vigorous directive from General Somervell and a close follow-up by the Chief of

Transportation corrected this situation."

Other aspects of the staging operation

were given close attention because of their

bearing on morale. The staging period

was a trying one for many soldiers, particularly those with family responsibilities.

Much depended on the condition of the

unit when it arrived and the character of

its leadership, but in any case the staging

area had an important role in keeping the

soldiers' spirits up and holding disciplinary problems down.

With this in mind, the Chief of Transportation insisted that the staging installations be kept clean and operated in an

orderly and efficient manner. In line with

this policy, he directed late in 1943 that

the commanding officer at Camp Patrick

Henry, staging area of the Hampton

Roads Port of Embarkation, be relieved,

although he conceded that that officer

had been handicapped by physical conditions at the camp and too close supervision by the port commander. An officer

who had proved his qualification at

another staging area was assigned to the

post.100

Constant attention was given to stagingarea messes as factors affecting morale.

The Chief of Transportation wanted these

messes to provide "the best food in the

Army," but he found that in some instances they fell far short of that ideal.

Early in 1944 he arranged for the assignment of a food service specialist from the

Quartermaster Corps to aid him in correcting deficiencies by making regular

inspections and recommending improvements. The aim was to have the messes

operated entirely by the staging area complements, and port commanders were

under instruction to assign transient troops

to mess details only in emergencies.101

The processing of replacements was

similar to the processing of troop units, although it differed in some respects. In

1943 the growth in demand for replacements for the active theaters necessitated

a clear definition of the oversea replacement system.102

 Replacement training

centers were established by the AGF, the

AAF, and the ASF, and these commands

also set up replacement depots near the

seaboard where replacement troops were

received for classification, checking of

99

 ASF Cir 77, 14 Sep 43, Sec. IV; Memo, Somervell for Gross, 15 Jun 43, with Ind, Gross to NYPE,

OCT HB Gross St Areas; Ltr, Farr for Col James K.

Herbert, GO LAPE, 20 Feb 45, Oct HB Farr Staybacks; Remarks by Gen Groninger, CG NYPE, in

Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug-1 Sep 43,

p. 39, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 100

 Ltr, Gross to Brig Gen John R. Kilpatrick, CG

HRPE, 21 Dec 43, and related documents, in OCT

HB Gross St Areas. On the general subject see other

documents in this file; also ASF Staff Conf, 25 May

43, p. 2. 101

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 93-94, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs

Conf; TC Cir 120-3, 1 Jan 44, Sec. III; Memo,

ACofT for CG NOPE, 22 Jan 45, OCT HB Wylie

Staybacks. 102

 WD Memo W 600-31-43, 26 Mar 43, sub: Oversea Repl System; WD Memo W 600-72-43, 23 Aug

43, same sub. For a general discussion of the replacement system, see Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, op. cit.,

pp.169-239.
STAGING AREA RECREATIONAL FACILITIES for New York Port of Embarkation. An entertainment program is presented at the amphitheater, Camp Kilmer, New Jersey

(above); the library at Camb Shanks. New York (below).
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 123

qualifications, and formation into casual

detachments or companies for shipment

overseas.103 While the replacement system

was being developed, the question arose

whether replacement depots could be located at the ports as had been the case

during peacetime. The Chief of Transportation opposed any such plan because he

foresaw that the movement of replacements would be heavy and that all available facilities at the staging areas would

be needed for the regular staging operation.104

 Although the replacement depots

were responsible for the full processing of

replacement troops, the port commanders

nevertheless were required to make up

any deficiencies that existed when the

troops reached the staging areas.105

The casual detachments or companies

formed by the commanders of replacement depots were placed under the command and supervision of commissioned

and noncommissioned officer replacements who were part of the same shipment. This command arrangement continued while the troops were at the staging areas and until they arrived at their

oversea destinations. The staging areas

found that casual officers sometimes felt

little responsibility for control of the men

under them, thus throwing an unusual

burden of administration and discipline

on the staging area personnel. To rectify

this situation, the War Department stipulated that when shipments of replacements numbered more than 200 enlisted

men, the commanders of replacement

depots would assign officers from their station complements to act as escorts for the

shipments and assist with the processing

and administration of the troops throughout the journey overseas.106

Although they did not always complete

the job, the replacement depots relieved

the staging areas of much of the processing

that would have been necessary if the

troops had moved directly from replacement training centers to the ports. In some

instances, when requests for replacements

received from overseas commanders called

for quick dispatch, the port commanders

sent processing teams to the replacement

depots to aid in the preparation of the

troops so that they could be moved to

shipside without passing through the staging areas.107

The problems of maintaining secrecy in

troop movements was intensified while the

troops were at the staging areas. The

troops knew that they were on their way

overseas and speculation was rife regarding sailing dates and destinations. Sometimes details from secret orders were carelessly allowed to get into the hands of

persons who were not authorized to receive such information. Many measures

were employed to make soldiers realize

the importance of not giving out information that might be of value to the enemy,

but complete censorship could not be imposed. Because of the effect on morale, it

was not considered advisable to hold

troops incommunicado between the time

103

 WD Memo W 600-35-43, 12 Apr 43, sub: Opn

of ZI Pers Repl Depots; Changes 1, 11 May 43;

Changes 2, 7 Sep 43. 104

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug-1 Sep

43, pp. 232-33, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 105

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 9 Aug 43, OCT HB

Farr Staybacks; POR, 1 Oct 43, par. 3b. 106

 Memo, CofT for Mil Pers Div ASF, 18 Sep 43,

OCT 322 Activation of Units; Memo, TAG for AGF,

27 Sep 43, sub: Org of Casuals Prior to Staging, AG

320.2 (18 Sep 43); Wd Memo W 600-72-43, Changes

2, 12 Nov 43; WD Cir 317,31 Jul 44, par. 6. 107

 2d Ind. CofT for CG NYPE, 9 Sep 43, OCT HB

Farr Staybacks; Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf,

Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt,

and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, p. 13, OCT HB

PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.
124 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of their arrival at the staging area and the

date they were alerted for embarkation.108

Yet their conversation in public places,

their local and long-distance telephone

calls, their letters to friends and families,

and the visits of friends to the staging installations furnished constant opportunity

for the leakage of information on the time

and direction of prospective movements.

Information in the hands of the station

complements at the staging areas, which

included both military and civilian personnel, also had to be guarded. The many

aspects of this problem commanded the

constant attention of the intelligence

officers at the ports, the Intelligence and

Security Division of the Office of the Chief

of Transportation, The Inspector General,

and G-2 of the General Staff.109

The emotional state of troops about to

move overseas was conducive to irresponsible acts and disorder. Group disturbances were most likely to involve Negro

troops since Negroes comprised the largest group subject to racial tensions.110

 Although the Chief of Transportation tried

to forestall trouble by insisting that there

be no discrimination between races in the

assignment of barracks, mess halls, and

recreation facilities, the possibility of disorder was always present. Contributing

causes were lack of leadership on the part

of some unit commanders and the limited

number of military police available. Following two disturbances that occurred at

staging areas in 1944—one at Fort Lawton, Washington, and the other at Camp

Patrick Henry, Virginia—General Gross

instituted special measures for preventing

and handling such situations.111 He emphasized that the port commanders and

staging area commanders had primary

responsibility, and that they could not

delegate that responsibility to others. Adequate officer supervision of troops being

staged was to be assured at all times.

Daily inspections were to be made and

any evidences of racial tension promptly

reported. The commanding officers of

staging areas were to go immediately to

the scene of any serious disorder and personally take charge of the effort to quell it.

Immediate and thorough investigations

were to be made to apprehend the instigators and the participants, and appropriate disciplinary action was to be taken

against such persons "without exception."

These measures were effective, and no further disturbances of consequence occurred

at the staging areas during the war.112

The port commanders made regular reports to the Chief of Transportation on

staging area operations, and they in turn

108

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 3 Nov 42, sub: Measures

for Enforcing Secrecy, OCT HB PE Gen St Area

Procedures. 109

 The extent of the problem is indicated in the following: Memo, G-2 WDGS for Int Br OCT, 5 Feb

43, sub: Revealing Mil Info, and inds, OCT 370.5

Secrecy; Memo, CO Camp Myles Standish for CG

BPE, 28 Oct 43, sub: Censorship Violations at St

Area, OCT 000.900 Camp Myles Standish 1943;

Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 6 Mar 44, sub: Censorship

Instructions at St Areas, and atchd SOP for Censorship Contl Off at St Areas; Rpt of Base Censorship at

PEs, source not shown, for weeks in late 1943 and

early 1944; last two in OCT 000.73, 1943-45; Memo,

CO Camp Myles Standish for CofT, 14 Oct 44, sub:

Violations of Security, OCT 000.72 TC Misc. 110

 On the general question of disturbances involving Negroes, see Lee, The Employment of Negro

Troops in World War II, Chs. XIV, XV. 111

 Lack of preparation and alertness at Fort

Lawton were indicated in Memo, Asst IG SPE for CG

SPE, 28 Aug 44, sub: Prelim Rpt on Negro-Italian

Riot, 14 Aug 44, and later rpts; 2d Ind, CofT for CG

SPE, 7 Nov 44; all in OCT 291.2 Ft Lawton; for

resulting directive see Memo, CofT for Port Comdrs,

16 Nov 44, sub: Handling of Racial Disturbances,

OCT HB Ex Staybacks. 112

 The nature of the problems and the measures

adopted at Camp Kilmer are illustrated in Rpt, Special Committee to CG ASF, 12 Jan 45, sub: Insp of

Facilities for and Problems Relating to Negro Pers,

OCT 331.1 Camp Kilmer.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 125

obtained the reactions of the commanders

of units being staged. In the fall of 1944

the Chief of Transportation directed that

a report be obtained from each unit commander just before he sailed. For this purpose a single-page form was provided, on

which the unit commander was to place a

check opposite each of the listed activities

to indicate whether he considered the performance excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.113

 Although it was recognized

that this report would give the impressions

of an officer who had witnessed only a

small part of the staging operation and

had little knowledge of the conditions

under which that operation was carried

out, the Chief of Transportation believed

that a comparison of the reports would

provide a useful guide in working out further improvements in personnel, facilities,

and procedures. The Chief of Transportation sent a chart summarizing the reports

pertaining to each staging area to each

port commander monthly.114 Although

some unit commanders indicated that

they considered certain activities unsatisfactory, the preponderance of checks in

the "excellent" and "satisfactory" columns brought a strong commendation

from General Somervell for the over-all

success of the staging operation.115

This was the judgment on staging areas

late in the war. Earlier there had been frequent and sometimes severe criticism, and

the Chief of Transportation had been well

aware of the need for improvement not

only in the mechanics of staging but also

in maintaining morale and discipline.116

The complexity of the staging operation,

the mental state of the troops, and the

pressure under which staging usually was

done combined to make this phase of the

transportation task an especially difficult

one. In his efforts toward improvement

the Chief of Transportation was aided on

the one hand by the emphasis that his

superiors placed on the importance of the

activity, and on the other hand by the

close attention that the port commanders

gave the subject.

Embarkation Procedures

Preparation for embarkation began at

the staging area twenty-four to seventytwo hours in advance of the troops' departure. This preparation involved coordination between the Troop Movement

Division of the port, staging area officials,

and the commanders of the units or casual

groups involved. It included the formulation of a detailed plan covering the movements of the troops from the time they

left the staging area until they had been

installed in their quarters on the ship. The

passenger list, initially prepared at the

staging area with names arranged alphabetically, was the key document. From it

groups were set up and schedules were

established for transporting the troops to

the pier and for embarking and billeting

them. The usual practice was to chalk on

the soldier's helmet the number that appeared opposite his name on the passenger

list. This was done as soon as the unit was

alerted and the number indicated his

place in all movements that took place

subsequently. While the bulk of the troops

and their TAT (to accompany troops)

equipment were being organized for em113

 TC Cir 50-55, 9 Oct 44, sub: Units in St Areas

Over 45 Days; OCT Misc Ltr 14, 13 Jan 45, sub: Unit

Comdrs Rpt, OCT HB PE Gen St Area Procedures.

Completed reports filed under OCT 370.5 grouped by

staging areas. 114

 See Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 30 May 45, and

incl, OCT 319.1 Ft Lawton. 115

 Ltr, Gross to Kilpatrick, CG HRPE, 5 Sep 45,

OCT HB Gross Day File. 116

 See Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 20 Jan 44, sub:

Current and Anticipated Problems, problems 16 and

17, OCT 319.1.
126 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT READY TO BE CARRIED by soldiers en route to

the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, May 1942.

barkation, an advance party was already

on the ship preparing for their arrival.

This party included a loading detail, a

guard detail, a mess detail, and a medical

detail.117

Although organizational equipment

was shipped separately, the soldier was

accompanied on his journey overseas by

his individual equipment, the greater part

of which was placed in two barracks bags.

Usually the "A" bag remained in his possession throughout the voyage, while the

"B" bag was stowed in the ship's baggage

or cargo spaces. In addition to the A bag,

the soldier carried his weapon, helmet, gas

mask, and pack—all together a heavy load.

When barracks bags were inspected at the

staging areas an effort was made to eliminate from the A bag any equipment that

would not be required during the voyage,

but the tendency among enlisted men was

to put as much as possible in the A bag,

and they often encumbered themselves

further with musical instruments and

other personal possessions. Many officers

complained about the heavy burden the

men had to carry whenever they moved

and about the congestion that the A bags

created in the limited sleeping quarters

117

 Considerable information used in this section

has been taken from an address, "Troop Movement

Embarkation," by Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, Troop

Movement Officer, NYPE, at the Atlantic Coast TC

Officers Training School, Fort Slocum, N.Y., during

the spring of 1943, filed in OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures. Although practices differed somewhat at the

different ports, they followed the same general

pattern.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 127

on the troopships, but no substantial reduction was made in the load. The barracks bag was redesigned during the war

with the intention of making it more manageable. There were differences of opinion, however, as to whether the new bag

was an improvement over the old one

from that standpoint. In some instances,

when conditions at the oversea port of debarkation were favorable, both barracks

bags were stowed in the ship's hold and

the soldier carried something similar to a

small laundry bag, but this was not a general practice.118

The movement from the staging area to

the pier was arranged by the port transportation officer. The Traffic Control

Division in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation did not undertake to route

this traffic when it involved only a short

haul between two stations under the same

port commander. The movement was

made by rail, motor, or small boat according to the circumstances, and sometimes

by a combination of carriers. At New

York, troops leaving Camp Kilmer or

Camp Shanks usually were transported

by rail to Jersey City, where they were

transferred to ferry boats that discharged

them at the river end of the pier where the

transport was docked. Late in the war the

San Francisco Port of Embarkation experimented with docking a Liberty ship

at Camp Stoneman and embarking troops

there, but this did not become a practice

because of navigational difficulties.119 The

location of most staging areas rendered

this procedure either impossible or impracticable. Throughout the journey from

the staging area to the transport the troops

remained in passenger-list order, according to the numbers on their helmets.

The same order was maintained after

arrival at the pier. Generally there was a

short pause while units that had arrived

earlier were being checked at the gangway. During this interval refreshments

were served by Red Cross workers. When

a unit's turn came, the troops approached

the embarkation desk in single file and in

passenger-list order. In addition to the

personnel team, which was present to

check the men against the passenger list

and the service records, the unit commander or some other officer was there to

identify each individual. When a soldier's

name was called, he responded, received

his compartment number, and immediately boarded the ship. When no one responded to the name read, that name was

scratched from the passenger list and the

corresponding service record was withdrawn. Steps then were taken to account

for the individual's absence, and the information obtained was entered on the list

and the record. Usually absences were due

to late withdrawals of men from units on

account of physical or mental illness. Although the number of men who went

AWOL while at the staging area constituted a considerable problem, there was

little opportunity for this to occur after the

unit had been alerted for embarkation.

Company grade officers usually followed

their men into the ship immediately so as

to observe their billeting. Field grade

officers usually went aboard later.

The entire embarkation program was

timed so as to move the troops through

one phase to another with as little delay as

possible. As experience was gained the

ports succeeded in executing embarkations with remarkable precision. This pre118

 Remarks by Col Robert R. Litehiser at Mtg of

Port Opn, Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives,

8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and Zone Conf, OCT HB PE

Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 119

 Ltr, SFPE to author, 9 Feb 51, OCT HB SFPE

Camp Stoneman.
128 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ARMY NURSES ENTRAINING AT CAMP KILMER for the New York Port of Embarkation.

cision was especially necessary in moving

troops along the pier and into the ship,

because they all passed over one or two

gangways and there was a consequent

threat of congestion in the narrow passageways on the vessel. The danger that

this last phase of embarkation might become a bottleneck was reduced by careful

scheduling and by thorough instruction of

the loading and the guard details, which

had arrived in advance of the troops. In

the case of the British troopships Queen

Mary and Queen Elizabeth, which sometimes embarked as many as 15,000 soldiers on a single voyage, the loading was

accomplished in as little as five hours from

the time of arrival of the first troops at the

pier to the passing of the last man over the

gangway. When the U.S. Army began

using the Queens for moving troops to

England in 1942, the embarkations were

slowed by differences in British and American practices, but these differences were

soon adjusted through close co-operation

between representatives of the British

Ministry of War Transport in New York

and the New York Port of Embarkation.120

As soon as embarking troops crossed the

gangway they were taken in charge by

members of the loading detail and guided

to their quarters.121 Upon arrival at his

compartment the soldier was instructed to 120

 Interv with Lt Col Leo J. Meyer, 31 Jan 51,

OCT HB PE Gen Troop Embarkations. 121

 For instructions to loading officers, see Ship's

Regulations, USAT George Washington, 25 Jun 43,

par. 17, OCT 232-900 George Washington.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 129

TROOPS LEAVING CAMP MYLES STANDISH for the Boston Port of Embarkation.

arrange his equipment as snugly as possible in the limited space assigned to him

and then to get into his bunk and remain

there until announcement was made that

the embarkation had been completed.

Usually the men were glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to rest, and this

was particularly true when embarkations

were made late at night. Such movements

as were necessary were closely controlled

by the guard detail. These controls were

necessary because, if the troops already on

board had been permitted to move about,

the billeting of those arriving later in the

crowded compartments would have been

impeded.

The billeting plan was worked out in

advance by the port's embarkation staff

and was checked with the actual accommodations after the ship arrived in port.122

Since this plan was co-ordinated with the

transportation plan under which the

troops were moved from staging area to

shipside, last minute changes in billeting

were kept to a minimum. In billeting enlisted men the basic objective was to keep

units together, since that arrangement

aided the exercise of command and the

control of movement. To the same end

noncommissioned officers were billeted

with the enlisted men, and commissioned

officers of company grade were placed in

122

 WD FM 55-105, Water Trans, Ocean-going

Vessels, 25 Sep 44, p. 43. The billeting plan for the

large British transports was worked out in conjunction

with representatives of the BMWT and the master.
130 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

staterooms as near their men as possible.123

 Officers normally were assigned to

staterooms by the port commanders in accordance with their military rank. An

AAF proposal that length of combat service also be considered in making such

assignments was rejected by the Chief of

Transportation as "impracticable."

 124

The transport commander was authorized to consider complaints regarding

billeting and to take corrective action

when the objections were valid and

changes were possible. Such complaints

were inevitable despite the care generally

used in preparing the billeting plan, and

the plan was not always above criticism.125

The tactful transport commander usually

could appease dissatisfied officers by arranging an exchange of accommodations

or explaining why this could not be done.

On a heavily booked transport changes in

the berthing of enlisted men were virtually

impossible.

The number of troops placed on a

transport depended on the facilities that

the vessel provided, the urgency of oversea requirements, the season, and the

length of the voyage. Three capacities

were established for each vessel—normal

load, overload, and maximum load.126

The normal load was reckoned from the

number of berths normally available.

Overloading required that two men use

the same bunk alternately, and might involve the installation of additional temporary bunks. Maximum loading was overloading carried to the practicable limit.

The assignment of two soldiers to the same

bunk—generally referred to as double

bunking—did not mean that twice the

normal load could be carried, for the maximum load was usually determined by the

capacity of the messing facilities or by the

extent of the deck spaces and public rooms

available for recreation and other activities.127

 In all cases the total number of

passengers and crewmen was kept within

the capacity of the lifesaving equipment,

and the ports complied with other rules

pertaining to the safety of passengers

established by the Navy and the Coast

Guard.128

Overloading is necessary when large

forces must be moved overseas because the

normal shipping capacity does not equal

the emergency requirements. It is unavoidable in wartime and when properly

controlled does not impose a serious hardship on the soldiers.129

 The Transportation

123

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 18 Jul 42, sub: Rpt

of Investigation, Queen Elizabeth, OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks; Memo, CofT for PEs, 27 Dec 43, sub:

Combat Crews, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 124

 Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 19 Aug 44, sub:

Treatment of Crew Pers Returning from ETO, OCT

HB Farr Staybacks. 125

 To illustrate, see Memo, British Army Staff for

WD, 10 Jul 43, and CofT's reply, 20 Jul 43, sub:

Asgmt of Off; both in OCT 524-541.1 N.Y.; Memo,

Col M. Cordero for TAG, 19 Oct 44, and Memo,

CofT for CO LAPE, 10 Apr 45, sub: Shipt 2086; both

in OCT 333.7 General A. F. Anderson. 126

 Memo, Mvmts Div for Water Div OCT, 17 May

43, sub: Capacity of Troopships, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; TC Cir 80-12, 22 Jan 44, sub: Capacity of Pers

Transports, and atchd OCT Form 46, OCT HB PE

Gen Transport Capacity. 127

 Ltr, Farr to author, 14 Feb 50, OCT HB Mvmts

Div Gen. The first double bunking in World War II

was on the Siboney, the Thomas H. Barry, and the

Arthur Murray, which sailed from the NYPE for the

United Kingdom on 31 May 1942; Memo, Opns Off

for Water Div OCT, 15 May 42, sub: Increased Troop

Capacities; Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 20 May 42;

Memo, Col Claude E. Stadtman for CG NYPE, 9 Jun

42, sub: Overloading of Siboney; last three in OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks; Rpt, 11 Jun 42, by Lt Col Peter C.

Hains, CO of Troops, Thomas H. Barry, OCT HB PE

Gen Troop Embarkation. 128

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 17 Aug 42, sub: Maximum

Allowable Number of Passengers, and atchd Memo,

DCofS US Fleet for Dir Convoy and Routing Sec

USN, 15 Aug 42, sub: Limitations on Number of

Passengers, OCT 541.1 Small Groups. 129

 Memo, TIG for CofS, 9 Sep 42, sub: Overseas

Mvmts, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret).
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 131

Corps adapted the practice to the various

types of vessels, recognizing that some of

them were more suitable for overloading

than others. It took cognizance of the fact

that soldiers could endure conditions on

the shorter and cooler North Atlantic voyages that would become intolerable in the

tropics or on the long transpacific routes.

Cold or stormy weather, which made it

impossible to quarter troops on the decks,

necessitated limiting the load to the number that could be properly accommodated

within the superstructure and below deck,

where the capacity of the ventilating system often was a limiting factor.

From a medical standpoint it was preferable to limit troopship loads during the

winter months to the normal capacity,

but such a policy could not be applied

uniformly since it would have seriously retarded the build-up of military strength

overseas.130 When the demand for troops

in the European theater eased somewhat

during the late winter of 1944-45, the

Chief of Transportation authorized the

port commanders to avoid overloading so

far as possible and to distribute the troops

to be moved among the scheduled vessels

in such a way as to obtain maximum

comfort.131 During the summer and fall of

1945 overloading was again resorted to as

a means of redeploying and repatriating

troops as rapidly as possible.

Since troopship capacity usually was

less than the military authorities desired,

every effort was made to see that ships did

not sail with empty passenger spaces, but

full loading could not be uniformly accomplished. Late changes in priorities and

the failure of some troops to arrive at the

ports sufficiently early were among the

reasons for allowing ships to sail with

empty passenger spaces. The port commanders frequently had troops on hand

that could be substituted in such contingencies, but this was not always the case.

A ship sailing to several oversea ports with

small numbers of troops to be delivered at

each might sail with some of its bunks unoccupied. Cargo vessels, with limited passenger capacities, often were destined for

ports where no troops were needed. A

study of 187 ships that sailed from American ports under Army auspices in May

1944 produced some interesting data.

These data must be viewed with some

reservations because of the short period

covered and the elasticity of the rated capacities—it must be assumed that normal

capacities are referred to—but they nevertheless are significant. The troopships

with spaces for more than 2,000 men were

loaded to 99 percent of capacity. Vessels

capable of carrying not over 500 passengers were loaded to only 49 percent of

capacity. Taking the group as a whole, the

loading was 88 percent of capacity.132

Secrecy with regard to troop embarkations obviously was necessary, but there

were different opinions as to the measures

required to insure it. Some aspects of security pertaining to troops en route to the

ports and at the staging areas have

already been mentioned.133 The primary

purpose of secrecy was to avoid disclosing

sailing dates and unit designations. During the early months of the war instructions were issued to insure that information

pertaining to prospective troop movements and ship sailings was restricted to

the smallest practical numbers of persons,

130

 Memo, Port Surgeon for CG HRPE, 13 Dec 43,

sub: Overloads in Winter; 1st Ind, CG HRPE for

CofT, 14 Dec 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 131

 Msg, CofT for CGs NYPE and BPE, 13 Mar

45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 132

 ASF MPR, Jul 44, Sec. 3, p. 44. 133

 See above, pp. 123-24.
132 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

both in the War Department and at the

ports.134 Some months later the Chief of

Transportation announced that it would

be standard operating procedure at all

ports for embarkation to take place under

cover of darkness.135 But provision was

made for exceptions and the exceptions

were numerous, since it was recognized

that nighttime embarkation had limited

security value. Moreover, many ships that

were loaded at night sailed in broad

daylight.

The Army regulation on security of information effective in 1942 provided for

the exclusion of persons not having official

business from the piers and forbade the

playing of bands at embarkations. In

April 1943 the latter prohibition was withdrawn and port commanders were permitted to use bands when they believed

security would not be jeopardized.136

There was sharp difference of opinion in

the War Department on the application

of security rules to the use of bands and

Red Cross personnel. The Chief of Transportation believed that to have a band

playing while troops were entraining at

the staging areas and while they were embarking at the ports was an excellent

means of bolstering morale.137 He also

favored permitting members of the American Red Cross to distribute food to troops

while they were on the piers waiting to

embark. These views were concurred in

by General Somervell, OPD, and G-1, but

G-2 took an opposite stand.138

The matter came to a head in the summer of 1943, when the British Chiefs of

Staff entered a protest with the Combined

Chiefs of Staff against bands and Red

Cross activities on the piers so far as

they affected the larger British vessels,

and also against the admission of press

representatives to the piers during embarkations.139

 The Inspector General was directed to investigate the matter and his

conclusion was that the use of bands and

Red Cross activities did not constitute a

breach of security.140 General Marshall

then reported to the CCS that the presence

of the press at the embarkation that gave

rise to the British protest had been a

special occasion arranged by the Acting

Secretary of War and that newspaper

stories had not been published until after

the ship had reached its oversea destination. General Marshall further stated that

the use of bands and the admission of Red

Cross workers to the piers would be continued but that they would be strictly controlled.141

 This was the policy followed for

the remainder of the war.

Not all port commanders were agreed

on the practical value of dispensing food

on the piers, but the majority favored the

practice.142 There was general agreement

among them regarding the value of bands,

which they believed not only buoyed the

134

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 11 Feb 42, sub:

Dissemination of Info; Memos, C of Trans Br G-4 for

PEs, 14 and 25 Feb 42; all in G-4/29717-118. 135

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 1 May 42, sub: Security

and Secrecy Measures, OCT 000.72. 136

 AR 380-5, 28 Sep 42, par. 65a and b, and

Changes 10, 20 Apr 43. 137

 Memo, CofT for Col Fremont B. Hodson and

other officers of OCT, 3 Oct 42, OCT HB Gross Day

File.

138

 Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS, 12 Apr 43, sub: Use

of Bands, WDCSA 370.5 (Secret); Memo, G-2 for CG

ASF, 16 Jul 43, sub: Activities at PEs, CCS 371.2

(7-8-43). 139

 CCS 273, 8 Jul 43; CCS 273/1, 28 Jul 43. 140

 Memo, TIG for CG ASF, 21 Jul 43, sub: Security Arrangements During Emb, ASF Hq Somervell

File 1943. 141

 CCS 105th Mtg, 6 Aug 43, Item 8; Memo, CofT

for CG ASF, 11 Aug 43, OCT 370.5 Agencies at

Ports; Memo, CofT for PEs, 7 Oct 43, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks. 142

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 90-91, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs

Conf.
NIGHT EMBARKATION. Troops are checked with the passenger list at the embarkation

desk (above), and file over the gangway in numerical order (below).
134 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

RED CROSS WORKERS WAVING TO TROOPS aboard an Army transport leaving

the Boston Port of Embarkation.

morale of the troops but helped the embarkation officers to keep them in proper

order and moving briskly.

Immediately after each troopship departure the port of embarkation made a

full report to the War Department. Copies

of passenger lists as corrected at the gangway were sent to the Chief of Transportation and The Adjutant General, and

copies, of course, were given to the transport commanders. Various summaries

were required by the Chief of Transportation showing the passengers according to

shipment numbers, types of personnel

(units, replacements, fillers, and so forth),

and arms and services. The summaries

also showed the control status of each

ship—that is, whether it was under control of the Army, the Navy, and War Shipping Administration, or a foreign nation.143

Because of the submarine menace it was

considered desirable to notify relatives as

soon as soldiers arrived overseas. This was

accomplished in the beginning by having

"safe arrival cards" prepared before the

ship sailed, and mailing them from the

port of embarkation as soon as a message

was received that the vessel had arrived at

its destination. Early in 1943 the style of

143

 AR 55-385, 31 Dec 42; TC Cir 50-8, revised, 10

Apr 44, sub: Passenger Lists and Passenger Summaries; TG Cir 50-23, 27 Apr 44, sub: Classification

of Outbound Passengers.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 135

card was changed so that reference to safe

arrival was omitted and only the Army

Post Office (APO) number and the cable

address were given. Later in the same year

the procedure was again changed and a

V-mail form was provided. The V-mail

form was filled out at the port of embarkation or on the ship but was not mailed

until after the soldier had arrived overseas

and his APO number and cable address

had been definitely established. This procedure prevented the large amount of misdirected mail that had resulted from the

use of tentative APO numbers.144

In 1942 when many National Guard

units were being sent overseas, General

Marshall made it a practice to send personal letters of notification to the governors of the respective states as soon as

the arrival of the ships at destination had

been reported. While he intended that the

governors, through means at their disposal, should notify relatives of the members of the units, General Marshall pointed out that the code of wartime practices

would not permit the publication of this

information in the press.145

The great majority of the troops sent

overseas were not expected to land against

opposition and were therefore embarked

according to the regular procedures.

When task forces were embarked to assault hostile shores, the embarkation requirements were somewhat different. In

that case the entire personnel constituted

a combat team and their billeting was

governed by that fact. Also, so far as possible the organizational equipment and

supplies were loaded in the same ship with

the troops and were stowed in such a way

that they could be put ashore quickly and

in the order in which they would be

needed. The vessels in such operations

were said to be combat loaded; they were

small or medium types and were specially

equipped for the purpose. The billeting of

troops and the stowing of the impedimenta

were determined by the force commander,

although he usually made his plans in

consultation with the port commander.146

Although most amphibious assaults

were mounted in the theaters, a few were

mounted at home ports. The first large assault force loaded at a U.S. port during

the war was the Western Task Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton,

Jr., which participated in the invasion of

North Africa. The major elements were

loaded at the Hampton Roads Port of

Embarkation in October 1942. The time

for planning had been short and ideas regarding matériel requirements varied

greatly. There was considerable confusion

at the port because of the lack of established procedures and the difficulty of

achieving complete co-ordination between

the task force commander, the port commander, and the naval officer who commanded the expedition afloat. Through

attention to lessons learned from this experience, the embarkation of Maj. Gen.

Troy H. Middleton's force for the invasion

of Sicily, accomplished at Hampton

Roads in June 1943, proceeded much

more smoothly.147 The same may be said

144

 WD Cir. 191, 15 Jun 42, Sec. VII; WD Cir 36,

2 Feb 43, Sec. IV; WD Cir 197, 2 Sep 43, Sec. III;

Memo, Dir Army Postal Sv for AGO, 1 Jun 43, AG

311.1 (1-6-43) WD Cir 36. 145

 See file WDCSA 370.5 (Secret) for correspondence with governors. 146

 AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, par. 10c. 147

 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), Ch. XVI; OCT HB Monograph 13, pp.

50-59. See also articles by Brig Gen John R. Kilpatrick, CG HRPE, "Task Force A" and "Task Force

B," Army Transportation Journal, II, 6-8 (September

1946) and 26-28 (October 1946).
136 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

for the forces sent against Attu and Kiska,

which were loaded on the west coast in

April and July 1943.

The key to smooth embarkation was

thorough planning and procedures that

were fully developed and completely

understood by all concerned; improvization had to be reduced to a minimum.

Such procedures were fairly well worked

out during the first year of the war so far

as regular embarkations were concerned

by close co-ordination of the activities of

the staging areas and the several operating

divisions of the ports of embarkation, all

functioning under the supervision of the

port commanders. There were not enough

embarkations of assault forces at U.S.

ports to enable procedures to be developed

to anything approaching the same degree

of refinement, and the problem was complicated by the fact that the interests of

the task force commanders and the naval

commanders, as well as those of the port

commanders, had to be taken into

account.

sponsible for the passengers; and that of

the commander of the naval armed guard

or gun crew. Administration was further

complicated by the fact that the transports were operated under the control and

according to the standards of the U.S.

Navy, the War Shipping Administration,

and the British Ministry of War Transport,

in addition to the Army.

The transport commander was in

command of all personnel on board except the ship's crew and the naval armed

guard. He was the chief of the permanent

military complement on the vessel, and in

matters affecting the administration of the

ship his authority was superior to that of

the officers who were traveling as passengers, even though they might outrank him.

His relationship with the unit commanders

was that of a station commander to the

commanders of units bivouacked at his

station. During peacetime the chief of the

permanent military complement, then

known as the commanding officer of

troops, had been required to yield his

command whenever a line officer of superior rank was on board and to serve as a

member of that officer's staff. The arrangement was found to be impracticable after

troop movements by water became large,

and in 1942 the position of transport commander was created.148

 Most unit commanders had no experience in dealing

with the wartime problems of troopship

administration, and some of them, upon

assuming command of the personnel on

board, tried to revise the established procedures according to their own ideas. The

confusion that ensued emphasized the

need for transport commanders who would

Troopship Administration

The administration of a troop transport

was complicated by problems that did not

exist in other military commands. One

reason for this was the crowded and abnormal conditions under which the troops

lived while on board. Another was the

variety of passengers carried—uniformed

men and women of all of the American

armed forces, and usually military personnel of our Allies and some civilians. Yet

another reason lay in the fact that three

independent authorities were exercised

side by side—that of the master, who had

full responsibility for the ship; that of the

transport commander, who was solely re148

 AR 30-1130, 23 Jul 32, par. 1; WD Cir 109, 6

Jun 41, Sec. IV; AR 55-320, 7 Dec 42, Sec. I, and

Changes 1, 26 Jan 43; AR 55-315, 11 Nov 44.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 137

serve continuously in that office with

unbroken authority.149

The transport commander was assigned

by, and exercised his authority as a representative of, an Army port commander. In

the beginning port commanders were required to select line officers as transport

commanders, but because of the difficulty

of obtaining qualified men the limitation

was lifted and officers of the supply services assigned to duty with the Transportation Corps could be selected.150

 The ports

of embarkation maintained offices through

which the transport commanders received

their instructions and filed their voyage

reports and recommendations. The importance of the post and the need for uniform

instruction and over-all supervision caused

the Movements Division to recommend in

January 1944 that it be granted personnel

for the establishment of a new branch to

deal especially with transport commanders

and transport complements. Such a unit

was not activated, however, until May

1945, and uniform instructions for transport commanders were not published by

the Office of the Chief of Transportation

until after the war had ended.151

The duties of the transport commander

were varied and exacting. Before each

voyage he made a thorough inspection of

his ship and prepared a plan for utilizing

the facilities in a way that would best

serve the troops and other passengers who

were scheduled to embark. It was necessary to have instructions applicable to the

passengers ready for distribution and

guard details ready to enforce them when

embarkation began, otherwise confusion

would ensue. The location of billeting

areas, mess halls, recreation areas, latrines,

and passageways were charted. Emergency abandon-ship stations were assigned

to the troops in each billeting area, and

regulations covering fire and boat drills

and blackouts were posted. A plan was

prepared for feeding the troops, which in

the larger ships involved continuous operation of the galleys and mess halls. The location of guard posts to control traffic, protect stores, and insure discipline were determined. Orders were issued relating to

dress, general conduct, and sanitation.

Plans were laid for the recreation, instruction, and training of the troops. Off limits

and smoking areas were defined. Provisions were made for the administration

and security of the sales commissary. The

requirements for work details to be provided by unit commanders were determined, including details for the operation

of the messes, the handling of stores, and

the performance of guard and general

police duty. Throughout the voyage the

transport commander had to be constantly

alert to insure that all general and special

orders he had issued were enforced.152

The military complement, which functioned under the supervision of the trans149

 Interv with Col Herbert S. Duncombe, 26 Feb

51, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complement. Colonel Duncombe served as both commanding officer of

troops and transport commander, sailing out of New

York. 150

 AR 600-20, 1 Jun 42, par. 3a; Memo, CG NYPE

for CofT, 2 Dec 42; Memo, CG SOS for ACofS G-1,

22 Mar 43; last two in AG 210.72 (4-1-42) AR 600-20;

AR 600-20, Changes 2, 26 Jan 43, and Changes 3, 9

Apr 43. 151

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 31 Jan 44, OCT HB

Farr Staybacks; Memo by Lt Col Richard C. Marshall, 20 Jun 45, incorporated in Mvmt Div Hist,

OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen; TC Pamphlet 44, Transport Comdrs Guide, Mar 46. 152

 AR 55-430, 19 Sep 42, sub: Conduct of Passengers; AR 55-435, 1 Sep 42, sub: Routine of Passengers;

TC Pamphlet 44, cited n. 151; .NYPE, Instructions

for Transport Comdrs, 1 May 43, OCT HB NYPE

Transport Comdrs; Maj F. H. Mayne, Duties of a

Transport Commander, address at Atlantic Coast

TC Offs Tng School, OCT HB Fort Slocum Lectures;

SFPE Transport Comdrs Manual, May 45, OCT HB

PE Gen Transport Complements.
138 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

port commander, varied in size according

to the troop capacity of the vessel, and

eventually the number of members and

their ranks were specified by the Chief of

Transportation.153 This complement comprised personnel assigned to the office of

the transport commander, the office of the

transport surgeon, the office of the chaplain, and the signal section. The total

authorized personnel of these offices

ranged from four on vessels capable of

carrying 50 to 100 troops to thirty-two on

transports carrying 6,000 or more. In

addition, the transport commander supervised the ship transportation officer (initially called cargo security officer), whose

function was to prevent the mishandling

or pilferage of Army cargo, and the ship

transportation agent (civilian), who administered supplies and funds on vessels

operated by the Army.154 All members of

troopship complements were selected and

assigned by the Army port commanders

under whose jurisdictions the respective

vessels were placed by the Chief of

Transportation.155

In order to forestall jurisdictional disputes, the duties and relationships of the

masters of Army-operated transports, the

transport commanders, and the commanders of units traveling on such vessels

were clearly defined in Army regulations.156

 These regulations sufficed also for

vessels operated by agents of the War

Shipping Administration and allocated to

the Army. A more complex problem of

jurisdiction developed when large numbers of Army personnel began traveling on

transports operated by the Navy and on

WSA transports allocated to the Navy.

On such vessels the naval commanding

officers insisted on paramount authority

with respect to all passengers. There were .

frequent misunderstandings until a set of

rules was worked out by the Chief of

Transportation and the Naval Transportation Service that removed the principal

causes of discord.157 After these rules were

issued in the spring of 1944, no Army

transport commanders were placed on

troopships that were under Navy control,

and the military complements that supervised the Army personnel traveling on

such vessels were subordinate to the ranking naval officers on board. A corresponding relationship was established with

respect to naval personnel traveling on

vessels under the control of the Army.

Under arrangements with the British

Army Staff and the British Ministry of

War Transport, American military complements, headed by transport commanders, were placed on the larger British

vessels that carried U.S. troops regularly.158

 The British Army also placed

military complements on these vessels, and

the British officers in charge had authority over the American staffs. Although

their methods were different, harmonious

relationships prevailed between the two

groups, and during the period when U.S.

troops were utilizing most of the space on

these vessels, the British complements were

153

 TC Pamphlet 24, Ships' Complements and

Cargo Security Officers, 29 May 45, Sec. I and Tables

A and B. 154

 AR 55-320, 11 Nov 44; WD Cir 141, 12 May 45,

Sec. II. 155

 Memo. CofT for PEs, 7 Mar 44, Ports of Assignment of WSA Vessels, OCT 320.2, 1944 Gen. 156

 AR 30-1130, 23 Jul 32; WD Cir 109, 6 Jun 41-

Sec. IV; AR 55-320, 7 Dec 42. 157

 Memo, HRPE for CofT, 23 Feb 44, and 1st Ind

by CofT, 10 Mar 44, OCT 560.11 Hampton Roads;

Wardlow, op. cit., p. 208; WD Cir 167, 29 Apr 44;

WD Memo 55-44, 22 May 45, sub: Principles Governing Jurisdiction and Operating Procedure Aboard

Army, Navy, and Allocated Troop Transports. 158

 Memo, Wylie for Styer, 22 Sep 42, ASF Hq

CofS Trans; Memo, CofT for CofT ETO, 22 Apr 44;

1st Ind, CofT for CofT ETO, 22 Jun 44; last two in

OCT 320.2 ETO.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 139

greatly reduced and the American transport commanders were permitted to follow their own procedures. When considerable numbers of Canadian troops were

being carried, the Canadian Army also

placed transport commanders on board.

The principal problems encountered in

moving American troops on British vessels

stemmed from differences in facilities,

services, and food. The capacities of the

British vessels had been greatly increased

when they entered U.S. troop service, and

in some respects the facilities had not been

increased and improved correspondingly,

because of the scarcity of equipment and

the quick dispatch that the vessels were

given in British ports. When these deficiencies came to light in the prevoyage

inspection to which all troopships, American and foreign, were subjected by the

U.S. Army port commanders, immediate

steps were taken to correct them. British

troops traveling on U.S. vessels also complained about the facilities and the food.

It was not practicable to undertake to

eliminate all difference in standards, but

an agreement was reached regarding

the minimum standards to be provided

on British and American troopships,

respectively.159

The crowded condition of the ships,

even when only the normal load was being

carried, invariably involved inconvenience

and discomfort for the passengers, particularly the enlisted men. In severe winter

weather and in the tropics additional

hardships were encountered. The efforts

to offset these conditions by entertainment

and exercise were handicapped by limited

space. All that the transport commander

could do was to make the best possible use

of the facilities that were available. To this

end he made a daily inspection of the vessel, accompanied by other members of his

complement and by one of the ship's officers, to determine that the ventilating and

sanitary systems were working, that the

galleys and mess halls were being operated

properly, that the medical department

was fulfilling its responsibilities, and that

cleanliness and order were being maintained throughout. During these inspections the transport commander noted

repairs and replacements that should be

made on the next call at the home port

and also the improvements or additions to

the facilities that were needed. His recommendations on these points were submitted to the home port commander with

his voyage report.160

As an aid to morale the Chief of

Transportation endeavored to bring the

messes on troop transports to as high a

standard as could be attained with the

limited space available for galleys and

mess halls and the large number of passengers to be fed. Notwithstanding this

effort, the food service sometimes was unsatisfactory, particularly on ships that

were just entering service and those making long voyages through the tropics. During a considerable part of the war troops

bound overseas were given two full meals

each day, which was considered adequate

in view of the relatively inactive life that

the men were compelled to lead while at

sea. Even then the troop messes on some

ships had to be in continuous operation

throughout the day in order to take care

of the numerous shifts into which the men

were divided. Late in the war this policy

was modified so that two and one-half

meals were served—that is, full meals in

159

 Concerning this agreement, see Wardlow, op.

cit., p. 225. 160

 See NYPE, General Instructions for TransporfGomdrs, 1 May 43.
140 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CROWDED ACCOMMODATIONS ABOARD A TROOP TRANSPORT

the morning and in the evening, and a

light meal at noon.161

During 1943 there was some improvement in troopship messes resulting from an

ASF program to better the food service

throughout the Army.162 The special mess

adviser assigned by the Chief of Transportation to this task early in 1944 got good

results, but he was limited to vessels operated by the Army and by WSA agents and

had no jurisdiction over the messes on

troopships operated by the U.S. Navy or

the British. The Navy provided messes

comparable in general to those on Army

transports. As a rule, the American soldier

did not like the food on British troopships,

and when large numbers of U.S. troops

were traveling on British vessels, as was

the case between New York and the United

Kingdom, the Transportation Corps supplied the U.S. Army ration for those troops

and also provided American personnel to

supplement the British galley crews.

Because of the large number of troops to

be fed, it was necessary to serve them, dispose of the remaining food, and clean the

utensils as rapidly as possible. The service

was cafeteria style and the Army's first

plan was to have the soldier use his field

161

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 13 May 44, sub: Orientation Course in Transport Messing, OCT HB PE Gen

Transport Complements and Services; TC Cir 80-17,

25 Jan 45, sub: Troop Messing Aboard Vessels. 162

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 243-45.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 141

mess kit, eat while standing, and clean his

own equipment. This plan was adopted

early in the war because of the difficulty

in obtaining satisfactory compartmented

trays and the machinery for cleaning and

sterilizing them. The Navy on the other

hand favored the use of trays and sit-down

service. In 1944, in view of the large number of new troopships being used jointly in

the Pacific and the development of a suitable tray, the Army modified its policy.163

But troopships under Army control were

forbidden to utilize trays until proper

facilities for cleaning, sterilizing, and

drying them had been installed.164

The sales commissary was another aid

to morale since it gave the soldier an

opportunity to purchase cigarettes, candy,

soft drinks, and other items that contributed to his comfort and pleasure. During

peacetime a post exchange had been operated on each Army transport and had

carried a wide variety of commodities to

be sold to military personnel and their

families. Under wartime conditions so

varied a stock was not necessary and the

rapid increase in the number of transports

made the administration of post exchanges

burdensome. In the summer of 1942,

therefore, the post exchange was replaced

by the sales commissary, operated on a

more limited basis. The officer in charge

was a member of the permanent military

complement and functioned under the

general direction of the transport commander. In the beginning sales commissaries were maintained only on Army

transports and on WSA vessels allocated

to the Army, but later they were established also on British vessels that were

regularly engaged in the movement of

U.S. troops.165 The principal difficulty was

that only limited space could be allotted

to this activity, and the stocks frequently

did not prove adequate. As a result, some

transport commanders had to contend

with the "black market" problem.

Maintaining morale was the principal

aim of the so-called transport services

activities. When the soldier was occupied

with sports, theatricals, movies, and other

forms of entertainment he had less opportunity to think about the discomforts of the

voyage and the hazardous adventure that

lay ahead of him. Books, magazines, phonograph records, and Army News Service

broadcasts served the same purpose. While

some soldiers carried their own musical

instruments, the ports solicited donations

of instruments, which they repaired and

placed on the transports to encourage informal as well as organized musicales. The

transport services activities also included

informational and educational programs

to prepare the soldier for experiences in

the country for which he was destined and

assistance with the personal problems of

the individual and his family. Initially

these activities were in charge of the ship's

chaplain when there was one on board; if

no transport chaplain was on board, the

transport commander took the responsibility himself or assigned it to the ship's

transportation officer. Since all of these

officers had other responsibilities that prevented them from giving sufficient time to

educational and recreational activities, a

specially selected transport services officer

163

 For review of these developments, see OCT

HB Monograph 12, pp. 56-59. 164

 TC Cir 133, 19 Oct 43; TC Cir 80-16, 4 Apr 44,

and Changes 13, 20 Jul 44; Memo, C of Water Div

OCT for C of Ship Conversion Unit, 5 Jul 44, OCT

HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv. 165

 WD Cir 281, 22 Aug 42; Memo, CofT for

NYPE, 21 Dec 42, OCT 400.34 N. Y.; WD Memo W

55-17-43, 5 May 43, sub: Opn of Sales Commissaries;

1st Ind, CofT for TQMG, 28 Jan 44, sub: Canteen

Supplies for British Army Transports, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks.
142 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

IMPROMPTU ENTERTAINMENT ABOARD SHIP

was added to the permanent military complement late in the war. The organization

of each port of embarkation included an

officer to supervise these activities and provide the equipment that they required.166

The transport chaplain's principal duty

was to look after the spiritual and moral

welfare of the troops. Sometimes the chaplain was qualified to assume the additional

responsibility for recreation and entertainment that he had until late in the war, but

often he lacked the temperament as well

as the time needed to do it justice. This

was true even though the chaplain was

authorized to enlist the assistance of the

special services officers of units being

transported. The appointment of a transport services officer to take over this

responsibility was therefore welcomed.

Chaplains served regularly on the

troopships operated by the Army and by

WSA agents for the Army. When the

Navy began operating some of the new

troopships that had been built for the

Army, it was thought for a time that the

Navy chaplain on such vessels would

166

 TC Cir 167, corrected 17 Dec 43; TC Cir 35-11,

11 Jul 44; WD Cir 360, 5 Sep 44, par. 7; TC Cir 35-2,

22 Feb 45; TC Cir 35-14, 28 Mar 45; TC Cir 35-11,

28 May 45; TC Pamphlet 43, Transport Services Programs, 27 Jun 45; NYPE Pamphlet 1, 1 May 45, sub:

Transport Services Manual; all in OCT HB PE Gen

Transport Complements and Services.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 143

suffice. Experience showed, however, that

the Navy chaplain's time was devoted almost entirely to the crew and consequently

an Army transport chaplain was provided.

The transport chaplains received guidance from the chaplains of the ports to

which their vessels were attached.167

On the transports, as at the staging

areas, it was desirable to conduct some

form of training to keep the soldier physically fit, but the possibilities for training

were even more limited. Since space reserved for training reduced troop capacity,

the Chief of Transportation directed his

port commanders not to reserve such space

on voyages to North Africa, Europe,

Hawaii, and Alaska, which were only

slightly in excess of one week. On longer

voyages a space allowance was made. In

any case the prescribed training required

only a minimum of equipment. The aim

was to devote from thirty minutes to an

hour each day to training that consisted

chiefly of physical exercise. What actually was accomplished depended on the

weather and other circumstances of the

voyage, and to a considerable extent on

the ingenuity of the transport commander.168

 Some technical training was

also given on board, chiefly for radio

technicians, but that, too, was affected by

the limitation on equipment as well as by

the rules relating to radio silence at sea.169

The transport surgeon was a member

of the permanent military complement;

he was directly responsible to the transport

commander but was under the technical

supervision of the port surgeon. In addition to having charge of the ship's hospital, he gave attention to all matters affecting the health of troops, including the

maintenance of proper sanitation, cleanliness, and ventilation, and investigated the

cause of any sickness that might develop

during the voyage. It was readily recognized that overcrowding was a contributing cause to many illnesses, but the Chief

of Transportation was under such pressure

to meet the requirements of the theater

commanders for troops that overloading

was inevitable.170 He nevertheless desired

that troop movement officers always consult the port surgeons when heavy overloading was contemplated, and that

their recommendations be followed when

possible.171

Since troops received needed dental

attention at home stations and at the staging areas, no space on the transports was

assigned to dental equipment and dental

personnel. Emergency needs were taken

care of by the dental personnel of units

that were on board. There was a slight

modification of this policy after V-E Day.

Port commanders were then permitted to

install dental equipment on transports

provided it could be done without reducing the troop space and with the

understanding that no permanent dental

personnel would be assigned.172

167

 AR 55-355, 22 Aug 42; Memo, CofT for PEs,

13 Jun 44, sub: Asgmt of Army Chaplains, and

atchd documents, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 168

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 27 Dec 43, sub: Troop

Tng Aboard Transports, OCT HB Farr Staybacks;

Memo, ACofS G-3 for CG ASF, 28 Jan 44, sub: Physical Tng, OCT 353.5 Physical Tng; Digest of Rpt,

Maj George Ream, OCT, to ACofS G-3, 16 Mar 44,

OCT HB PE Gen Transport Complements. 169

 ASF Cir 108, 28 Oct 43. 170

 Medical service on troop transports will be

treated more fully in the discussion of evacuation of

patients from the theaters. See below, Ch. III. 171

 AR 55-350, 14 Sep 42; Memo, NYPE for CofT,

2 Oct 43, sub: Outbreak of Diarrhea Aboard Transport, OCT 680-900 New York; Min of Conf of Port

Surgeons and Troop Mvmt Offs, Ft Hamilton, N.Y.,

12-14 Oct 43, p. 40, OCT HB NYPE Port Surgeon. 172

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 28 Jul 45, sub:

Installation of Dental Equip Aboard Troopships,

OCT 564 Troopships.
144 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Replacements and other casual troops

when traveling in large numbers frequently created problems for the transport

commanders because they were not as well

organized and controlled as the members

of units. The designation of convoy or

escort officers by the commanders of the

replacement depots from which such

troops were shipped relieved the situation

considerably after that procedure was inaugurated late in 1943, but the problems

persisted. Some escort officers, being only

temporarily in command of the troops, did

not take their responsibilities seriously. On

the other hand, some transport commanders assigned these officers staff duties

that prevented them from giving proper

supervision to the troops in their charge.

When the latter situation came to the

attention of the Chief of Transportation,

he requested the port commanders to instruct all transport commanders regarding

the duties of escort officers toward their

troops and to warn them against unnecessary interference with the performance of

those duties. He nevertheless maintained

that casual escort officers must be ready to

assist the transport commanders, as was

the case with unit commanders.173

The transportation of nonmilitary passengers on troopships under Army control

was carefully regulated. All applications

passed through the Office of the Chief of

Transportation, which obtained clearance

from OPD before notifying the ports of

embarkation that the passengers could be

accepted. Nonmilitary passengers included

diplomatic personnel and others traveling

under the auspices of the State Department, representatives of other civilian

agencies of the federal government, officers

and employees of territorial governments,

employees of contractors doing work for

the armed forces in oversea areas, and representatives of such organizations as the

American Red Cross and the Young Men's

Christian Association.174 This kind of

travel was kept at a minimum not only

because the space was needed for troops

but also because the facilities and services

on the transports were not up to the standards that civilian passengers expected.

The regulations provided that women,

other than Army nurses and Red Cross

workers, would not be carried on troopships except on specific authorization of

the Chief of Transportation. He took the

position that the few women who were

sent abroad by civilian agencies should be

transported by air, since they had to be

assigned to separate compartments on

troopships, and this usually involved a

waste of space. The policy could not be

carried out uniformly, however, for OPD

sometimes found it necessary to assign

troopship priorities for civilian women,

and these priorities were binding on the

Chief of Transportation.175

During the voyages transport commanders issued debarkation schedules and

appropriate instructions in order that they

might be studied and plans might be

made to accomplish debarkations smoothly and quickly. These instructions were

drawn up in accordance with the established practices of the ports, and revisions

sometimes were necessitated by special

orders issued by the port commanders.

When calling at unfamiliar ports, the

173

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 12 Jan 44, and atchd correspondence; Memo, CG HRPE for Comdr of General

W. A. Mann, 7 Jun 44; Memo, CG HRPE for CofT,

18 Jun 44; all in OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 174

 AR 55-390, 16 Dec 42, Secs. II and IV. 175

 Ltr, SW to Secy State, prepared 15 Mar 43; 2d

Ind, CofT for ACofS OPD, 26 Nov 43; both in OCT

HB Farr Staybacks; TC Cir 80-13, 1 Jan 44, sub:

Mvmt of Pers.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 145

transport commander based his instructions on such information regarding port

procedures as he could obtain in advance,

and he sometimes prepared alternate instructions in order to be ready for several

contingencies. Upon completion of debarkation the transport commander sent a

message to the port from which he had

sailed, announcing his arrival overseas,

indicating any discrepancies that had been

discovered between the passenger list and

the troops actually on board, and giving

the names of any passengers that had been

injured or had become seriously ill during

the voyage.176

The key to successful troopship administration was the competence of the transport commander. New appointees found

themselves confronted with a maze of

unfamiliar problems. After an officer had

served as transport commander for a

number of voyages he could count on experience to guide him in many matters,

but no two voyages were alike. At all times

the responsibility was a heavy one. It required administrative skill in controlling

the activities and conduct of a large number of troops under difficult circumstances,

ingenuity in making the best possible use

of limited means, and diplomacy in dealing with ship's officers and unit commanders. The latter were usually conservative in their criticisms, but in some cases

their reports indicated that they had found

little to their satisfaction on the ships.177

A frequent handicap to transport commanders was their low rank. Under the

table of organization for military complements established by the Chief of Transportation, the transport commander on a

ship carrying 4,000 or more passengers

might be a colonel. On a ship carrying between 500 and 4,000 passengers he might

be a major, and on smaller ships a captain.178

 Often, however, officers of such

ranks were not available and officers of

lower rank had to be assigned. Regardless

of rank, some men had the necessary

qualifications and others did not. Careful

selection, constant instruction and supervision, and prompt relief of those who did

not measure up to the requirements enabled the port commanders to build up a

generally competent group of transport

commanders.

The Liberty Ship as a Troop Carrier

Special and unusually difficult problems were encountered in connection with

the use of about 225 Liberty ships that

had been temporarily converted to carry

troops. The Liberties, although slow and

designed solely as freighters, were used for

troop transportation because without

them the execution of strategic plans

would have been delayed.179 The original

conversions were hastily made by the War

Shipping Administration in order that the

vessels might join convoys to North Africa

without loss of time. The Chief of Transportation recognized that the Liberty

ships were far from ideal as troop carriers,

but he probably did not realize when they

first went into troop service in September

1943 how serious would be the complaints

from those who traveled on them. The

The Liberty Ship as a Troop Carrier

Special and unusually difficult problems were encountered in connection with

the use of about 225 Liberty ships that

had been temporarily converted to carry

troops. The Liberties, although slow and

designed solely as freighters, were used for

troop transportation because without

them the execution of strategic plans

would have been delayed.179 The original

conversions were hastily made by the War

Shipping Administration in order that the

vessels might join convoys to North Africa

without loss of time. The Chief of Transportation recognized that the Liberty

ships were far from ideal as troop carriers,

but he probably did not realize when they

first went into troop service in September

1943 how serious would be the complaints

from those who traveled on them. The

176

 AR 55-445, 19 Sep 42; NYPE, General Instructions for Transport Comdrs, 1 May 43, Sec. IV, OCT

HB NYPE Transport Comdrs; TC Pamphlet 44, Mar

46, pp. 14, 15. 177

 For example, Rpt on Shipment 2086, to TAG,

19 Oct 44, OCT 333.7 General A. E. Anderson. 178

 TC Cir 25-8, revised 13 May 44. 179 See above, pp. 90-91; Memo, Gross for Styer, 19

Nov 43, OCT HB Wylie Liberty Ship Conversions;

Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 31 Dec 43, sub: Emergency Use of POW Converted Liberty Ships, OPD

560 (24 Jan 44).
146 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

galley and mess facilities were very unsatisfactory. The sanitary installations

were inadequate. The food storage and

fresh water capacities were small. Insufficient space was allotted to the medical department and the sales commissary. Ventilation and heating were poor. The deck

spaces available for recreation were

exceedingly limited.180

Other conditions contributed to the difficulties encountered on the Liberties during the early period of their employment

as troop carriers. The responsibilities

assumed by transport commanders on

larger ships were assigned to cargo security officers, who in most instances were

lieutenants without experience to qualify

them for the task. The unsatisfactory

quarters, poor and sometimes insufficient

food, and lack of space for exercise often

created a recalcitrant spirit among the

troops resulting in poor discipline, pilferage of galley and commissary stores, and

indisposition to maintain order and cleanliness. Some of the ships' masters resented

the conversion of their vessels and the

added responsibilities the transportation

of passengers entailed. The troops embarked on these vessels usually were small

units or casuals and most of their officers

were young and inexperienced. The Chief

of Transportation observed that because

of the unusual conditions the more seasoned transport commanders were needed

for the Liberty ships, but they obviously

could not be taken from the regular

troopships.

Reports from early voyages of converted

Liberties in slow convoys to the Mediterranean made it clear that immediate steps

would have to be taken to improve their

facilities and operation. Measures for bettering the facilities were agreed upon between the Chief of Transportation and the

War Shipping Administration, and the

Maritime Commission was requested to

accomplish the work as promptly as possible.181

 In November 1943 an understanding was reached between the Chief

of Transportation and the WSA regarding

the division of responsibility for the comfort and safety of the troops. The WSA,

whose agents operated the vessels, agreed

to provide adequate steward personnel

and food, and to instruct the masters regarding their duties in connection with

the care of passengers and co-operation

with the transport commanders. The

Chief of Transportation agreed to establish

limits for the number of troops to be embarked, to arrange for the inspection of

the vessels before each voyage, to assign

transport commanders with adequate

military staffs, and to provide sufficient

medical and commissary supplies.182

These measures brought considerable

improvement, but the temporarily converted Liberties still lacked many desirable features, and their slowness was an

added disadvantage. The first plan was to

carry only 350 troops, but the demand for

space was so great that the limit was raised

to 500.183 By May 1944 the addition of

180

 See numerous documents in OCT HB Water

Div Converted Liberty Ships, and OCT HB Wylie

Liberty Ship Conversions; see also record of discussion

in Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan

44, pp. 95-102. 181

 Ltr, C of Water Div OCT for Dir Opns and

Traf, U.S. Mar Com, 18 Oct 43, OCT 564 EC-2

Vessels. 182

 Agreement Between the War Shipping Administration and the Chief of Transportation Regarding

EC-2 Hastily Converted Prisoner of War Ships for the

Transportation of U.S. Troops Outbound, 20 Nov 43,

OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memo, CG ASF for DCofS

WDGS, 10 Feb 44, sub: Final Rpt—Converted Liberty Ships, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 183

 Msg, Mvmts Div to NYPE and BPE, 4 Feb 44,

OCT HB Mvmts Div Farr Staybacks; Memo, WSA

New York for Col Raymond M. Hicks, 2 Mar 44,

OCT 565.2 WSA.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 147

more desirable types of vessels to the

troopship fleet made it possible to discontinue use of the temporarily converted

Liberties. Thereafter, only those that had

been provided with permanent facilities

for troops were used.184

The fact that the Combined Chiefs of

Staff had approved the use of temporarily

converted Liberty ships as emergency

troop carriers did not relieve the Army of

criticism. Because of the unsatisfactory

conditions on board, the Navy Department requested the Chief of Transportation not to place naval personnel on these

vessels. However, General Gross took the

position that, since the decision to use

them had been taken deliberately by the

CCS as a matter of military necessity and

with a realization of the problems involved, they should be used without discrimination in favor of any branch of the

military service. On the other hand, he

ordered that if possible the ports avoid

embarking civilian passengers on Liberty

ships.185

When a number of Liberties developed

structural cracks, the U.S. Coast Guard

recommended that vessels of this type be

withdrawn from troop service to the extent that troop commitments would permit. The commitments at that time were

so heavy that no troop lift could be spared.

The Chief of Transportation agreed that

strengthening alterations should be made

when the ships were laid up for other repairs, but he was unwilling for them to be

taken from service solely for that purpose

unless the cracks constituted a safety

hazard.186

In a report issued in June 1944 the

Senate Special Committee Investigating

the National Defense Program commented on the unsuitability of Liberty ships for

troop traffic and expressed the view that

greater foresight on the part of the military authorities would have obviated their

use. General Gross* nevertheless, maintained that they had served a useful purpose and recommended that they be kept

available as potential troop carriers

against the possibility that they might be

needed in connection with a further expansion of the military effort or for the

repatriation of troops after hostilities were

over.187 That plan was followed and in

the summer of 1945, in anticipation of the

heavy redeployment and repatriation

traffic, about 200 converted Liberties were

prepared to carry 550 troops each with

some improvements over their former passenger facilities.

Justification for the use of the Liberty

ship as a troop carrier rested solely on the

urgency of the need for additional troop

lift. In September 1943, when the decision

was made to employ this type of vessel for

moving troops overseas, the Allies were

still struggling with the problem of constructing enough ships to offset sinkings

by the enemy while adequately supporting the armies on the far-flung battle

fronts. The Liberty ship was being built in

a fraction of the time required to complete

184

 Msg, Mvmts Div to Port Comdrs, 21 Apr 44;

Memo, CofT for Port Comdrs, 29 Apr 44; both in

OCT HB Water Div Converted Liberty Ships. 185

 Memo, VCNO for CofT, 7 Dec 43, sub: Trans

of Naval Pers in Liberty Type Vessels; 1st Ind by

Gross, 14 Dec 43; both in OCT 569.3 Liberty Ships;

1st Ind, CofT for HRPE, 22 Apr 44, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks. 186

 Memo, USCG for Lt Col Otey Y. Warren,

OCT, 5 Feb 44; Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 11

Feb 44; Memo, Farr for Gross, 17 Feb 44; all in OCT

HB Farr Staybacks (Nos. 85 and 100). 187

 Senate Special Committee Investigating the

National Defense Program, additional report, Merchant Shipping, Rpt 10, Pt. 18, June 23, 1944; Memo,

Gross for Somervell, 30 Jun 44, sub: Comments on

Truman Committee Rpt, OCT HB Gross Troopships.
148 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

other types of vessels, and the installation

of temporary troop accommodations could

be accomplished between voyages without

loss of ship time. Appraisal of the use of

these vessels, therefore, must take into account the fact that they represented the

quickest way of achieving the additional

troop lift desired by the military authorities. The withdrawal of Liberty ships

from troop service as more suitable ships

became available indicates that the Army

regarded their use as an emergency or

stopgap measure. Their further employment during redeployment was essential

to the plan for bringing the war in the

Pacific to an early conclusion, and during

the repatriation period their use was a

concession to the popular demand that

the troops be returned home as quickly as

possible.

Movement of Organizational Equipment

While troop units moving overseas took

their personal equipment with them into

the staging areas and onto the ships, their

organizational equipment and initial supplies moved separately to and through the

ports. The term "organizational equipment" covered the vehicles, tanks, artillery, technical paraphernalia, housekeeping tools, and other items that the unit

would require in order to be an effective

fighting force when it arrived on a foreign

shore. Some of this equipment was loaded

in the same vessels with the units to which

it appertained, but most of it moved in

other vessels. Some was force marked—

that is, marked with the shipment numbers of the troop units to which it belonged—and some was shipped in bulk

and assigned to units after reaching the

theaters. The basic requirement was that

the troops should have their equipment

immediately or soon after their debarkation. Fulfilling this requirement involved

many problems for the Chief of Transportation. Numerous devices were tried in the

effort to meet these problems, and considerable improvement was achieved during

the war, but because of the many considerations involved and changing conditions

in the theaters a complete solution was

never reached.188

The amount of organizational equipment to be shipped varied according to

the types of units and the areas for which

they were destined. The equipment of an

armored force naturally had greater cubic

measurement per man than that of an infantry force or a service unit.189

 The quantity of equipment required in an area

where a great amount of construction or

reconstruction was necessary, or in an

area where no paraphernalia or supplies

could be procured locally, was greater

than elsewhere. The contrast between

World War I and World War II was striking in this respect. In World War I approximately 50 percent of the matériel

required by the American Expeditionary

Forces was obtained in Europe. In World

War II the Army not only shipped the

preponderance of its requirements from

the zone of interior, but also the bulk of

those requirements was much greater because of the increased number and size of

weapons, vehicles, bulldozers, and other

equipment.

In the spring of 1943 the Chief of Trans188

 The persistence of the problems is indicated in

Memo, Gross for Maj Gen Walter A. Wood, Jr., 12

Jan 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Ltr, CG NYPE to

Wylie, 15 Jan 45; Memo, Berzelius for Wylie, 20 Jan

45; last two in OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Memo, Wylie

for Franklin, 21 Jan 45, sub: Loading Troop Equip,

OCT HB Wylie Staybacks. 189

 For comparison, see Miscellaneous Shipping

Information, data on p. 58, 2 Mar 43, OCT HB Plng

Div Gen.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 149

portation calculated that the initial movement of equipment and supplies per man

averaged six measurement tons for the

Central and Southwest Pacific and the

Middle East, seven measurement tons for

North Africa and the United Kingdom,

and eight measurement tons for the South

Pacific and Central Africa. In January

1945, by which date oversea operations

had assumed a more stable pattern and

better methods of calculating requirements and of packing and stowing matériel had been developed, the average for

initial shipments to all theaters was five

measurement tons per man.190

The movement of troops and their

equipment in separate vessels was at the

root of many of the problems. During the

early part of the war there were persistent

requests from oversea commands, particularly those in the Pacific, that troops be

unit loaded—that is, loaded in the same

ships with their equipment. Such a procedure was unquestionably advantageous

to the theaters, since it insured arrival of

both troops and equipment at the same

port at the same time. From the standpoint

of the zone of interior, however, unit loading frequently was not practicable. Usually

it involved unbalanced cargoes and a

waste of ship space. Moreover, the vessels

that carried large numbers of troops had

relatively small cargo capacities. The extreme examples were the Queen Mary and

the Queen Elizabeth, which could carry up

to 15,000 troops but could provide space

for only 500 dead-weight tons of matériel.191

 Moving troops and their equipment in different ships therefore was not a

matter of choice but of practical wisdom.

Convoy loading—that is, forwarding the

troops and their equipment in different

vessels but in the same convoy—had only

limited application. The convoy system

was little used for sailings from the Pacific

coast, and even in the Atlantic fast troopships ran independently and those of

medium speed sailed in fast convoys, while

most cargo vessels moved in slow convoys.192

 The slow cargo convoys, moreover, were often broken up overseas and

the vessels assigned to different ports for

discharge.

A complaint heard often during the

early part of the war was that organizational equipment was scattered over too

many vessels and hence was difficult to

locate and consolidate after arrival in the

theater.193 There were several circumstances that contributed to this kind of

loading. Equipment reached the ports on

different and sometimes widely scattered

dates, and the simplest procedure was to

ship it out as it arrived. At a time when

shipping space was extremely scarce, the

ports desired to get the best possible stowage for each cargo vessel, and this often involved mixing organizational equipment

and maintenance supplies. The ports also

had to consider, especially through the

period of heavy submarine activity in the

Atlantic, the consequences of placing all

190

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 9 Apr 43, OCT HB

Wylie Shipping Requirements and Allocations 1943;

Ltr, SW to Sen Harley M. Kilgore, 10 Jun 43, OCT

500 Mobilization of Shipping Resources; Miscellaneous Shipping Information, 21 Jan 45, data on p. 54,

OCT HB Plng Div Gen. 191

 Memo, CofT for BAS, 25 Feb 43; Memo, Col

Llewellyn Wansbrough-Jones, BAS, for Farr, OCT,

6 Mar 43; both in OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 192

 4th Ind, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 4 Apr

43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 193

 As an extreme case, in September 1942 Maj.

Gen. Mark W. Clark reported that the organizational

equipment of a regiment had arrived in the United

Kingdom on 55 different vessels; Memo, CG SOS for

CofT, 26 Sep 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 4 Oct 42; both

in OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip; Memo, CofT for

HRPE, 9 Oct 42, sub: Troop Equip, OCT 475 Overseas Equip Left in U.S.
150 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

or most of a unit's equipment in a single

vessel if that vessel should be sunk.

Many other factors entered into the

rather complex situation. Movement

orders were not always issued sufficiently

far in advance of the actual movement,

with the result that shipments of impedimenta were late in reaching the loading

ports.194 Particularly during the early part

of the war when many items were in short

supply, units held the equipment they had

at home stations as long as possible in

order to complete their training. Sometimes the ports were not notified regarding the equipment that would be dispatched from technical service depots, or

when it would arrive. At the outset many

shipments of impedimenta to the ports

were inadequately marked, so that identification of particular items with particular

units was slow and sometimes impossible.

The processing of unboxed equipment at

home stations was inadequate or entirely

lacking, with the result that shipments

were damaged en route, particularly when

they were transported overseas as deck

cargoes. Packaging frequently did not

meet the test of transshipment at loading

and discharge ports. Advices from ports of

embarkation to the theater commanders

sometimes failed to give sufficient information regarding the equipment on a

particular vessel and the manner of its

stowage to enable the port of destination

to plan ahead for its discharge and

disposition.195

The efforts to cope with these problems

fall into two distinct categories. In the first

were measures taken toward better preparation in the zone of interior for handling

movements of impedimenta, including

clearer instructions to all concerned. In

the second category were adjustments

made in procedures to meet conditions

peculiar to the several theaters and the

changing strategic situation.

A vital factor in the zone of interior was

the control that port commanders exercised over the movement of troop impedimenta from home stations and depots to

the seaboard. Troops and their equipment

were alike in that respect—the port commanders were in the best position to know

when their facilities would be able to receive additional shipments, how long it

would take to prepare the shipments for

embarkation, and when the vessels would

be ready to receive them. Port commanders, and they alone, were in a position to

state when shipments should be made and

to which facilities at the ports they should

be delivered. Authority to control these

movements had been vested in the port

commanders in Janury 1942, as a result of

the confusion that followed the uncontrolled shipment of impedimenta to San

Francisco during the early weeks of U.S.

participation in the war.196

Complete understanding between port

commanders, unit commanders, and technical service chiefs regarding shipments of

equipment to the seaboard was sometimes

difficult to achieve. Unit commanders did

not always know in advance exactly how

much of their old equipment would be

taken overseas. The technical services

often were not given sufficient time to

make shipments from their depots, and

194

 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 23 Jan 43, sub:

Issuance of Mvmt Orders; Memo, CG SOS for CofT,

26 Jan 43; both in OCT 370.5 Mvmt Orders (1). 195

 Memo, TAG for Cs of Supply Arms and Svs, 17

Jan 42, sub: Shipts to PEs; Memo, TAG for CG Field

Forces, et al., 19 Jan 42, sub: Equip of Troops; Ltr,

CofS for CG WDC, 13 Mar 42; all in G-4/33889;

Memo, CofT for PEs, 12 Apr 42, Org and Trans of

Task Forces, OCT 370.5 (Jan-May 42). 196

 Memo, TAG for CofAAF, et al., 2 Jan 42, AG

370.5(1-1-42).
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 151

sometimes the requisitioned items were

not immediately available. In addition to

impressing upon unit commanders and

technical service chiefs the necessity of

providing the ports with prompt and full

information regarding all shipments, SOS

headquarters directed the Chief of Transportation to have his port commanders

maintain close liaison with the sources

from which equipment would move.197 In

some cases representatives of the ports

were sent to home stations to assist unit

personnel in organizing and loading their

impedimenta.

Early in 1943, when it was learned that

some units had sailed for North Africa

with elaborate office furniture, housekeeping supplies, and other nonessential items,

the Chief of Transportation recommended

that in view of the shortage of ships the

major commands examine the tables of

basic allowances and designate the items

that should be left behind when units

moved overseas. Some months later the

War Department took steps to regulate

the amount of station equipment that

might be shipped overseas on requisitions

from theater commanders.198

Automotive vehicles constituted a major

element of the organizational equipment

of most troop units. They also were a

troublesome element. By the time a unit

had completed training many of its vehicles were unfit for service in a theater of

operations and had to be repaired or replaced either at the home station or at the

port of embarkation. Also, when vehicles

accompanied troops they required extensive processing to prevent deterioration

during the voyage. After some months of

experience explicit instructions were

issued to deal with this situation.199 Units

ordered overseas were required, unless

otherwise directed in movement orders, to

turn in at their home stations all general

purpose and special purpose vehicles that

did not meet certain specifications as to

age and condition, and to notify the appropriate technical services by the fastest

means of communication regarding the

shortages to be made up. Units might receive vehicles to fill these shortages at their

home stations, at the ports of embarkation, or after arrival overseas. The chiefs

of the technical services were directed to

establish pools of vehicles in the zone of

interior and in the principal theaters for

this purpose. As it worked out, general

purpose vehicles were usually supplied to

the units after their arrival in the theaters.

This arrangement made possible the shipment of a considerable percentage of such

vehicles partially knocked down and

boxed, in which condition they required

only about one third as much space as

when they were fully assembled.200 Also,

when vehicles were shipped boxed the

ports were relieved of the task of processing them.

The processing of vehicles at the ports

to prevent deterioration during the voyage

became a large undertaking. Although

their authority was uncertain in the beginning, all ports found themselves doing

a certain amount of processing because

it had not been done at home stations or

depots. The San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which had bitter experience in

shipping unprocessed vehicles and tanks

197

 Memo, CG SOS for Cs of Tech Svs, 3 Oct 42,

sub: Supply of Troops at PEs, OCT HB Gross Ports. 198

 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 3 Feb 43, sub:

Imped for Overseas Troops, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; WD Memo W 210-24-43, 7 Sep 43, sub: Shipment of Post, Camp, and Station Equip. 199

 WD Memo W 850-19-42, 27 Nov 42, sub:

Supply and Distribution of Automotive Equip. 200

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 5 Dec 43, sub: Shipment of Boxed Vehicles, OCT HB Wylie Shipping

and Cargo for UK 1943-44.
152 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

to Pacific bases during the early months of

the war, took the lead in setting up a wellequipped processing plant at Emeryville,

on the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay

not far from the Oakland Army base. As

soon as the authority of the ports had been

definitely established, the Chief of Transportation requested the other port commanders to establish similar facilities.201

The initial purpose of processing was to

seal or insulate the machinery against rust

and corrosion and to board up the exposed glass surfaces against breakage.

When it was found that tools and spare

parts that should have accompanied the

equipment did not arrive overseas, either

because they were not shipped or because

they were removed en route, the ports

were instructed to establish the presence

of these items before processing and to box

them in so securely that pilferage would

be difficult.

Most of the equipment was procured by

the Ordnance Department, and the port

ordnance officers were in charge of the

processing plants. In the beginning these

officers were left largely to their own devices, and the Chief of Transportation

came to the conclusion that there was

overprocessing at some ports. In July 1943

he pointed out to the Chief of Ordnance

that, although the complaints from overseas regarding vehicles arriving in bad

condition had almost ceased, there was

still room for refinement in the methods

because of the differing conditions affecting equipment in the various theaters and

the differing requirements for shipments

stowed in the hold and on deck. The Chief

of Ordnance was therefore requested to

develop standards for processing that

would take these differences into account.202

Because of the heavy shipments to Europe, the port of embarkation at New

York passed the largest number of vehicles

through its processing plant, which was

located at Port Johnston on the New Jersey side of New York Harbor. The peak

was reached in May 1944, when 9,550 vehicles were serviced. From incomplete

records it appears that the same month

marked the peak at Emeryville, with

3,391 vehicles serviced.203 The plants operated on an assembly-line basis and, in

addition to processing vehicles for shipment, they made repairs within the capability of their facilities. The object was to

have the vehicles ready for service with a

minimum of attention after arrival in the

theaters.

Ports of embarkation kept meticulous

records of troop equipment, for they had

to know at all times what equipment was

being shipped for particular units, where

it was located, and when it would be

loaded into ships.204 Maintaining records

for these purposes was complicated by the

number of units moving simultaneously,

the great variety of impedimenta to be

handled, amendments to movement orders affecting dates of shipment, lack of

201

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 7 Oct 42, sub: Shipment

of Motor Vehicles, Memo, CofT for PEs, 21 Dec 42,

sub: Ordnance Maintenance at Ports; both in OCT

HB PE Gen Troop Equip; WD Memo W 850-19-42,

27 Nov 42, par. 12; WD Cir 14, 8 Jan 43, Sec. II; WD

Cir 150, 2 Jul 43, Sec. III; WD Cir 175, 30 Jul 43, Sec.

V; ASF Cir 76, 15 Mar 44, Sec. V. 202

 Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 22 Jul 43, sub: Standards of Performance; Memo, Meyer for CG NYPE,

31 Jul 43, sub: Preparation of Unboxed Vehicles; both

in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 203

 NYPE monthly report, Progress and Activities,

Jun 44, p. 64; (report also gives data for engineer vehicles processed by the port engineer); SFPE Quarterly

Progress Rpt, Oct-Dec 44, p. 53; these and similar

reports for other periods are in OCT HB files for

respective ports. 204

 Memo, CofT for Contl Div ASF, 7 Jun 43, sub:

Records of Org Equip, OCT HB PE Gen Troop

Equip.
PROCESSING TROOP EQUIPMENT before shipment overseas. Vehicles awaiting

attention at the motor inspection base, Emeryville, California (above); processing ramps at Port

Johnston, Bayonne, New Jersey (below).
154 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

information regarding the items actually

forwarded from home stations and depots,

and the inability of some unit commanders to state exactly what impedimenta

would accompany them overseas because

of changing tables of equipment.205 Gradually the Chief of Transportation developed a plan of complete and uniform

records for all ports that would show at all

times what was to be shipped and what

had been shipped.206 If part of the initial

equipment had not been dispatched when

the troops sailed, as was often the case, the

ports of embarkation were required to advise the theaters when the remainder

would be dispatched so that the theater

commanders would not submit requisitions for those items. The port commanders were also responsible for advising ASF

headquarters when further shipments of

equipment from the zone of interior

should be stopped and theater commanders requested to supply the outstanding

items.207

The Chief of Transportation investigated the possibility of relieving the main

ports through which the larger troop

movements passed of the necessity of handling all of the organizational equipment

for those movements. In shipping maintenance supplies, specific ports were

responsible for controlling all movements

to specific theaters, but they allocated the

actual loading of part of the supplies to

other ports, known as outports. The movement of troop equipment, however, involved a different set of circumstances.

The flow of the impedimenta for a particular unit had so many sources, extended

over so long a period, and was subject to

so many uncertainties that splitting the

movement among several ports and yet

maintaining complete and up-to-date records presented formidable obstacles. Split

shipments of equipment therefore were

avoided whenever possible.208

Both in the Office of the Chief of Transportation and at the ports of embarkation

special personnel was required to supervise the handling of troop equipment. The

Movements Division, OCT, set up a separate unit for this purpose in December

1943 and placed in charge an officer who

had had extensive experience with shipments of impedimenta at San Francisco.

This unit, which eventually became

known as the Troop Equipment Branch,

dealt with all aspects of the subject from

the time the movement orders were written until the equipment and troops were

brought together overseas.209 At the New

York Port of Embarkation, where the

traffic was heaviest, movements of impedimenta were supervised by the Initial

Troop Equipment Division, which was coordinate with the Troop Movement Division and other operating divisions. At San

Francisco and other ports, movements of

troops and troop equipment came under

the jurisdiction of the same division, but

205

 Memo, Wylie for Ross, CofT ETOUSA, 26 May

43, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Dir

of Opns ASF, 11 Jun 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 206

 TC Cir 15, 2 Feb 43, sub: Shipt of Task Force

Units; TC Cir 56, 27 Apr 43; OCT Cir 95, 26 Jul 43,

sub: Records of Ships; TC Cir 100-2, 4 Apr 44; TC

Cir 100-3, 4 Apr 44. 207

 SOS Memo S 700-1-43, 2 Jan 43, sub: Cancellation of Back Orders; Memo, CofT for PEs, 6 Sep 44,

sub: Clearance of Shipts from PEs, OCT 400.7. 208

 Memo, CofT for Col William E. Carraway, Plng

Div ASF, 4 Apr 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Memo,

CofT for CGs NYPE and HRPE, 17 Jul 43, sub: Forwarding of Equip; Memo, CG NYPE for Port Trans

Div, 26 Jul 43; last two in OCT 045.0 UGF 10; Remarks by Col Berzelius at Mtg of Port Comdrs and

Opng Representatives, 8 Jul 44, in Min of Port and

Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, p. 17, OCT

HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf. 209

 Remarks by Col Berzelius, C of Troop Equip Br,

at Junior Officers Meeting, Mvmts Div, 16 Oct 44,

OCT HB Mvmt Div Gen.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 155

separate groups of personnel were assigned

to perform the separate functions.210

Clear instructions to explain procedures

and establish the responsibility of all concerned were necessary to the efficient

movement of troop impedimenta just as

they were to the movement of the troops

themselves. The basic instructions were

included in the War Department publication, Preparation for Overseas Movement.

Further instructions were included in the

supplementary pamphlet, Identification

of Organizational Impedimenta, which

was issued in August 1943.211 The detailed

directions given in the latter pamphlet

emphasize the importance that was attached to the correct marking of such

shipments and to maintaining full and accurate records in accomplishing the

orderly flow of organizational equipment.

The second aspect of the problem of

moving troop equipment to the theaters

was to adapt the procedures to differing

conditions in the several oversea areas.

During the spring and early summer of

1942, when a feverish effort was being

made to build up American strength in

the United Kingdom against the possibility of an invasion of the Continent in

the fall, the movement of troop impedimenta was a major consideration. Many

items of equipment were in short supply,

and organizational equipment had to be

held until troops were about to leave their

home stations in order for them to complete their training. Unit loading was impossible because a large percentage of the

troops were dispatched in vessels that

had limited cargo capacity. The ships of

the convoys in which most of the equipment moved were distributed among the

British ports according to conditions at

the time of their arrival, so that it was impossible to plan in advance where particular vessels would be discharged. At this

period some items were not available for

shipment until long after the troops had

departed. Consequently, a considerable

amount of equipment was sent to depots

in the United Kingdom, where related

items were brought together before they

were assigned to troop units. Under these

circumstances from one to three months

often elapsed between the arrival of the

troops and their receipt of complete equipment.

With a view to correcting the situation

and at the same time utilizing some cargo

shipping that the British were expected to

provide, G-4 proposed that at least half of

the equipment of eight divisions scheduled

to sail during the summer be shipped in

bulk about a month in advance of the

troops. There were some objections to the

plan. The AGF was uncertain of the effect

of such an arrangement on the training

and morale of the divisions; the troop

basis was not considered firm; the theater

was fearful that placing so much equipment in its depots without unit marking

and issuing it to the troops from stock

might involve too much delay. OPD therefore did not concur in the proposal, and

strategic developments made it necessary

to use the British vessels elsewhere, so that

the plan—later known as preshipment—

210

 Remarks by Col Henry J. Amy, C of Initial

Troop Equip Div NYPE, at Mtg of Port Opn, Troop

Mvmt and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44, in Min

of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44,

pp. 39-45, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Preliminary Rpt, Control and Handling of Force-Marked

Equip at NYPE, 16-26 May 44; Rpt of Survey, Control and Handling of Force-Marked Equip at SFPE,

4-15 Jun 44; last two in OCT HB PE Gen Troop

Equip. 211

 Copies of POM and IOI are in OCT HB PE

Gen Troop Mvmt to Port.
156 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

did not go into effect in 1942.212

In the winter of 1942-43, when the

North African campaign held priority

over the build-up in the United Kingdom,

much the same condition prevailed with

respect to troop equipment. Many shipments were late in reaching the ports of

embarkation and consequently were late

in being transshipped overseas. The troops

and their impedimenta usually were

shipped in different vessels, and the problem of getting the two together in the

theater persisted. Officers in North Africa

felt that they were not being adequately

informed regarding the status of shipments of equipment. When General

Somervell visited the theater after the

Casablanca Conference, he heard strong

complaints on these matters and requested

an explanation from the Chief of Transportation. In response, the Chief of Transportation stated that every effort was

being made to get equipment to the ports

and ship it as promptly as possible, and to

notify the theater commanders when delayed items would be forwarded; he did

not consider it advisable, however, to give

such notification until the ship on which

the equipment would move had been

definitely nominated.213 No solution to the

problem was found during the North

African campaign.

Preshipment, or the shipment of organizational equipment and supplies in

bulk ahead of troops, became an approved policy in the spring of 1943, when

the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom was resumed in volume. Conditions

that had prevented its execution in 1942—

the scarcity of many items, the acute

shortage of cargo shipping, and the uncertainty of the troop basis—had by this

time been alleviated. The Chief of Transportation saw in preshipment the best

chance of solving this difficult problem.

There were still some who feared undesirable consequences from withdrawing

equipment from troops four to six weeks

ahead of their departure from training

stations. But the decision was turned in

favor of preshipment by the fact that in

April 1943 an adequate supply of cargo

space was assured and British ports were

then capable of handling increased shipments. It was realized, moreover, that the

accumulation of large stocks in the United

Kingdom during 1943 would relieve the

strain on shipping and on the ports that

would inevitably develop as the date for

the invasion of the Continent—then set

for the spring of 1944—approached. In

May 1943, therefore, preshipment on as

broad a scale as possible was decreed.214

212

 Memo within OCT, Lt Col Norman H. Vissering for Col Noble M. Coe, 5 Jun 42, sub: Shortage of

Equip, OCT HB PE Gen Troop Equip; Msgs, Marshall to USFOR London, 4 Jun 42, CM-OUT 0786,

and 17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 4300; Memo, ACofS OPD

for ACofS G-4, 10 Jul 42, sub: Shipts in Bulk, OPD

520; Rpt of ETO General Board, Study 128, sub:

Logistical Build-up in the British Isles, pp. 21-23;

Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., Ch. XIV, pp. 33-48. 213

 Memo, Somervell for Gross, 19 Feb 43, pars.

1(3)-(4); Memo, Gross for Somervell, 23 Feb 43, pars.

1e-f; both in OCT HB Ex File Somervell's Insp Trip

to Africa. 214

 The documentation is voluminous and the following citations are given chiefly to show the TC

position: 4th Ind, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 4

Apr 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Meyer

for Wylie, 9 Apr 43, giving review of developments to

date, OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Memo, CofT for Somervell, 9 Apr 43, sub: Data on Shipping, with attachment entitled Special Problems in UK Build-up,

OCT HB Wylie Shipping Reqmts and Allocations

1943; Memo, Gross for Styer, 12 Apr 43, sub: Visit of

Gen Lee, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Gross

for Lutes, 16 Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for

Gross, 17 Apr 43, sub: Cargo for UK, OCT HB Wylie

Shipping and Cargo for UK 1943-44; Memo, ACofS

for Opns ASF for Dir Stock Contl Div ASF, 17 Apr

43, sub: Cargo Ships to UK, OCT HB Wylie Cargo;

Rad, CG ASF for ETO, 20 Apr 43, CM-OUT 8165;

Memo, Farr for Gross, 1 May 43; Memo, Gross for
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 157

During the ensuing year the preshipment plan was found an effective means of

assuring that troops arriving in the United

Kingdom got their equipment promptly.

Gradually a larger and larger percentage

of the matériel was shipped to the ports of

embarkation by the procuring services

rather than by the units' home stations.

The Chief of Transportation maintained

an unrelenting pressure on these sources

to insure that shipments did not lag, and

on the War Shipping Administration to

insure that enough shipping to lift the

cargoes was allocated. His Water Division

reported almost daily on the outlook for

both ships and cargo, and this report was

the basis for aggressive action to keep the

two in balance.215 During 1943 the more

serious problem was to get sufficient cargo

delivered to the ports to fill the scheduled

ships, but after the priority of the European theater for both organizational

equipment and maintenance supplies was

raised at the end of that year, the problem

was essentially one of keeping the flow of

cargo to the seaboard within the capacity

of the available shipping.216

Although the practice of preshipping

organizational equipment and supplies

was admirably suited to the build-up of

strength in the United Kingdom, which

was a well-organized noncombat area, a

different system was required when the

forces moved to the Continent. In the

spring of 1944, with D Day set for early

June, the European Theater of Operations requested that all troop units arriving from the United States after D plus 90

be debarked on the Continent and be

ready to fight within fifteen days after

landing. This meant that the troop equipment would have to be accumulated and

consolidated in the zone of interior, then

convoy loaded so that the entire equipment of a unit would arrive in the theater

at about the same time and almost simultaneously with the troops.

Several possibilities were considered in

selecting a place where equipment could

be accumulated. The ports of embarkation were ruled out because they did not

have the necessary space. Home stations

were not considered favorably because

they were mostly in the south and southwest and much of the equipment would

have to be shipped to them from depots

and manufacturers in the northeast and

then backhauled to the North Atlantic

ports of embarkation. The Chief of Transportation therefore urged that the Elmira

Holding and Reconsignment Point in central New York be used for this purpose. In

addition to having adequate space, the installation was so situated that shipments

could be effected quickly to both New

York and Boston, the ports through which

the bulk of the equipment was to move.

This plan was approved by the War Department in the early summer.217

Somervell, 2 May 43; Memo, CG NYPE for CofT,

2 May 43; last three in OCT HB Wylie Cargo; AG

Memo 400.22 (5-16-43), 16 May 43, sub: SOP for

Shipments of Equip and Supplies to UK; AG Memo

400.22 (1 Jun 44), 2 Jan 44, sub: Change in SOP.

215

 Some of these reports are in OCT HB Wylie

Shipping and Cargoes for UK 1943-44. 216

 Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, a volume in

preparation for this series, Ch. III; Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I:

May 1941-September 1944, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. VI. 217

 Memo, Farr for Plng Div ASF, 27 Apr 44, sub:

Shipping of Units, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Remarks

by Col Farr at Mtg of Port Opn, Troop Mvmt, and

Equip Representatives, 8 July 44, in Min of Port and

Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, pp. 15-19,

OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Memo, Farr for

Wylie, 14 Jul 44, OCT 337 Elmira H&RP; Rpt

attached to Memo by Capt James M. Walls, 16 Jun

45, included in Mvmt Div Hist, OCT HB Mvmt Div

Gen.
158 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The purpose of the new project at

Elmira, which eventually became known

as the Northeast Equipment Staging

Area, was to "receive, document, assemble, consolidate, prepare for shipment,

and ship" to the ports the organizational

equipment and supplies forwarded to that

installation under War Department movement orders. Shipments to the ports were

to be made immediately upon receipt of

calls from the port commanders.218 The

matériel sent to Elmira embraced all items

procured by the Army Service Forces

(other than general purpose vehicles) that

could not reach the home stations of the

respective units before established deadline dates.

The task imposed upon the equipment

staging area proved to be a very considerable one, for among the several hundred

units that were dispatched to the European theater between August 1944 and

February 1945 were thirty-six divisions.

Frequently more than 150 carloads of

freight were handled (unloaded or loaded)

during a single day, and on several occasions the number exceeded 250 carloads.219

September 1944 proved to be the most

difficult month, for not only were the staff

and the procedures relatively untried at

that time but a number of large units, including two divisions, were required to

sail earlier than had been planned. During that month a considerable backlog of

cars developed, and as a result of the congestion some shipments did not reach port

in time for dispatch with the convoys for

which they were scheduled. This congestion had been cleared up by mid-October

through special efforts of the commander

of the Elmira Holding and Reconsignment

Point, who had charge of the equipment

staging operation, and the Movements

Division, OCT, which gave it general

supervision.

From the time it was established in the

summer of 1944 until February 1945 when

it was discontinued, the equipment staging area at Elmira handled matériel for

units embracing more than 700,000

troops. The liaison officers of some units

who went to Elmira to assist in identifying

and segregating the equipment of their

respective organizations reported that

there was considerable confusion during

September and early October resulting in

a "serious mixing of property." The

opinion was expressed that equipment

should be staged nearer the ports and

under the control of the port commanders.220

 Nevertheless, the equipment staging area served a useful purpose. It relieved home stations of the heavy task of

receiving, consolidating, and shipping this

equipment. It enabled technical service

depots to avoid congestion by dispatching

equipment as soon as it was ready rather

than holding it until the port call was received. It absorbed the shock that the

ports would otherwise have felt when the

sailing dates of units were changed. The

accumulation of equipment at a point

where shipments could be made equally

well to either New York or Boston as circumstances might require proved advantageous. After the difficulty experienced during the early fall, the operation

at Elmira proceeded smoothly and shipments to the ports were made promptly. 218

 TC Cir 5-20, 4 Nov 44, sub: Northeast Equip

Staging Area; Min of Mtg at Elmira, 5 Sep 44, sub:

Processing Troop Equip Under the Red Lists, OCT

HB Zones Gen Elmira H&RP; Memo, CofT for

NYPE, BPE, Elmira H&RP, 26 Oct 44, sub: Red List

Procedures, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 219

 A list of cars on hand, loaded, and unloaded will

be found in OCT HB Zones Gen Elmira H&RP. 220

 Memo, NYPE for CofT, 14 Oct 44, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 159

Indeed, Colonel Farr expressed doubt

whether the urgent requests from the

theater to advance the departure dates of

numerous units could have been fulfilled

without this equipment staging area.221

In order that troop units might be fully

equipped and ready to fight soon after arrival in the European theater, it was necessary to impress into service as many fast

cargo ships as could be spared from other

urgent tasks. These vessels, sailing eastbound in fast (14-knot) convoys, reduced

by several days the time required for the

delivery of equipment to British and

French ports in slow convoys. The turnaround of the ships was shortened by permitting them to make the homeward voyage unescorted. This fast service to the

ETO began soon after the invasion of the

Continent and continued until the heavy

movement of units to that theater had

been completed. In cases of special urgency, equipment was sent directly to the

ports of embarkation rather than through

the equipment staging area at Elmira. To

avoid delay in delivering equipment to

troop units after their arrival on the Continent, the impedimenta of a particular

unit was loaded in the fewest possible

ships even though this resulted in poor

stowage and sacrifice of cargo space. In

this instance military considerations required a sacrifice of the principle of good

stowage, which the Chief of Transportation otherwise endeavored to enforce.222

During the five-month period AugustDecember 1944, 108 vessels carrying

chiefly organizational equipment were

dispatched to the ETO; data for later sailings of this type were not found.223

The problems in the Pacific relating to

the shipment of organizational equipment

were similar to those in the Atlantic, but

there were certain basic differences. On

the one hand, a greater percentage of the

troops moved to Pacific destinations in

relatively small units and more of the

troopships had substantial cargo capacity,

making unit loading possible more often.

On the other hand, the military situation

in the Pacific was more fluid, and the

practice of diverting ships from their original destinations to widely scattered bases

was more disturbing to planned movements. After Generals Somervell and

Gross had visited the Pacific theaters in the

fall of 1943 and had listened to complaints

about the late arrival of organizational

equipment and the spreading of shipments over many vessels, increased efforts

were made to improve the procedures.224

In 1943 the Transportation Corps and

also General Somervell favored the preshipment of troop equipment to the

Pacific, but the ASF Supply Division was

already hard pressed to find enough matériel to carry out the program of preshipment to the United Kingdom and did not

want to assume this further obligation.225

Accordingly, improvement in the delivery 221

 Memo, Farr for Historical Unit OCT, 20 Jun

45, sub: History, par. 3, OCT HB Mvmt Div Rpts;

ASF Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1945 (Washington, 1946), p. 55. 222

 Memo, CofT for COMINCH US Fleet, 23 Aug

44, sub: Unescorted Fast Freighters, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF,

8 Sep 44, sub: Red List Procedures, OCT 322 Red

List Units; Msg, Lt Gen Thomas T. Handy to Hq

COMZONE ETO, CG AFHQ, Italy, CG NYPE, 1

Oct 44, WARX 39841; Memo, CofS ASF for Dir

Plans and Opns ASF, 26 Dec 44, ASF Hq CofS—Dir

of Plans and Opns. 223

 ASF MPR, Dec 44, p. 56; Memo, CofT for

Styer, 5 Feb 45, sub: Org Equip Ships, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks. 224

 Memos, Gross for Wylie, 26 Sep 43 and 6 Oct

43, OCT HB Wylie Ltrs from Gross. 225

 1st Ind, ACofT for CG ASF, 11 Oct 43; Memo,

Meyer for Wylie, 14 Oct 43; both in OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks; ASF Staff Conf, 6 Nov 43, p. 3, OCT HB

ASF; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 2 Dec 43, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks.
160 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of troop equipment to the Pacific areas

depended on the establishment of closer

liaison and better understanding between

the ports of embarkation and the theater

commands, and on the employment of

unit loading wherever possible. When an

equipment staging area was set up near

the east coast of the United States in 1944,

it was believed that a similar procedure

would be introduced eventually on the

west coast. This did not transpire, chiefly

because the situation in the Pacific never

called for as concentrated a movement of

troops and equipment as that which attended the invasion of the European continent. The western holding and reconsignment points, however, served in a

limited way as assembly points for troop

equipment destined for San Francisco,

Los Angeles, and Seattle for transshipment to the Pacific bases.226

The procedure for handling equipment

procured by the Air Service Command for

AAF units was somewhat different from

that for equipment procured by the Army

Service Forces. Throughout the war such

equipment was sent to AAF intransit

depots near the ports, where it was assembled and processed before being forwarded to the water ports of embarkation.

These intransit depots were justified by

the AAF on the ground that distinctive

Air Forces matériel required special handling and technical treatment.

The AAF complained repeatedly that

equipment and supplies procured by the

ASF technical services failed to reach AAF

units overseas promptly. These units were

expected to be ready for combat service

soon after arrival in the theaters and the

ASF endeavored to overcome the delays,

but some of the causes were not easy to

control. When stocks were short or shipping was inadequate for all needs, AAF

units, like all other units, had to be dealt

with according to the established priorities. Some delays were traceable to the

inability of the AAF to release equipment

to the ports sufficiently in advance of the

troops. When the theaters diverted ships

from the discharge ports for which they

were originally destined, there were

usually compelling local reasons. In the

spring of 1944 the commanding general of

the Army Air Forces proposed to the commanding general of the Army Service

Forces that matériel procured by the ASF

technical services for AAF units be routed

through the AAF intransit depots. The

ASF did not concur since it did not believe

that this change of procedure would overcome the difficulties.227

The task of getting organizational

equipment to the theaters so that the

troops could have it soon after their arrival proved a challenging one. A basic

difficulty was the impracticability from a

shipping standpoint of moving troops and

their impedimenta in the same vessels.

The frequent necessity of changing the

discharge ports of cargo vessels after they

had reached the theaters was a disturbing

factor. During the early part of the war

the situation was further complicated by

the scarcity of some items of equipment

226

 Memo, CofT for SFPE, SPE, LAPE, 30 Oct 44,

sub: Diversion of Certain Shipments to HRP, OCT

HB Meyer Staybacks. 227

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 23 Feb 43, OCT

HB Ex File Somervell's Trip to Africa; Memos, Farr

for Gross, 1 and 5 May 43; both in OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; Memo, CG AAF for CG ASF, 19 Jun 43,

and reply, 26 Jun 43; both in OCT 475 Oversea

Equip Left Behind; Memo, CG AAF for CG ASF, 1

Apr 44, and replies, 3 and 4 Apr 44; all three in OCT

HB Meyer Staybacks; 1st Ind, CG ASF for CG AAF,

6 Apr 44; Memo, C of Traf Div AAF for ACofT, 29

May 44, sub: Baylor Committee Findings, and reply,

1 Jun 44; last three in OCT 475 Oversea Equip Left

Behind.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 161

and the over-all shortage of shipping.

Gradual improvement was achieved

through the establishment of standard procedures, careful planning by the Chief of

Transportation's Movements Division and

the ports of embarkation, and close coordination between the port commanders,

the commanders of units, the technical

services, and the theaters. The most complete solution was recognized to be the

shipment of equipment to the theaters in

advance of the troops. This plan presupposed, however, a stable and well-organized base, such as existed in the United

Kingdom during the build-up of strength

for the invasion of the Continent, as well

as adequate equipment and shipping. Unfortunately, those conditions did not sufficiently apply to any other oversea areas to

warrant the adoption of a broad program

of preshipment.

Joint Use of Troopships

by the Armed Services

Since both the Army and the Navy

were constantly moving personnel to the

same theaters, economy of shipping dictated that all troop transports should be

available to the troops of both services.

Some of the problems that arose in connection with the allocation and scheduling

of the vessels because of joint utilization

have already been discussed.228 Other

problems in the joint use of troopships

concern principally the Pacific, for in that

area the command setup was more complex, the strategic situation was more

fluid, and the forces of the Navy and the

Marine Corps were larger than in theaters

across the Atlantic.

In the Atlantic, where the Navy used a

relatively small amount of troop space,

the troopship sailing schedules were determined almost entirely by Army requirements. The Chief of Transportation's

Movements Division, in consultation with

the Water Division and the ports of embarkation, endeavored to work out a program of sailings that would take care of

the Army personnel expected to move and

at the same time meet the Navy's needs.

When the Navy desired to move personnel

to an oversea station, the Naval Transportation Service filed a request with the

Army Chief of Transportation, who

allotted space on scheduled sailings in accordance with the approved priorities.229

Although adjustments in the schedules

were sometimes necessary because of the

Navy's requirements, this was not often

the case.

All troopships serving the Pacific areas

were regarded as a single pool and their

scheduling and utilization were under

joint management.230 This pool included

the owned and the chartered transports

operated by the Army or the Navy, the

transports assigned to the Army by the War

Shipping Administration and operated for

the Army by naval personnel, and those

operated by agents of the WSA and

allocated to the Army or the Navy. Acting in accordance with general plans and

instructions agreed on by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and the Joint Military Transportation Committee in Washington, the Joint

Army-Navy Surface Personnel Committee, with headquarters at San Francisco, determined the loading ports and 228

 See above, pp. 93-94. 229

 For example, Memo, CofT for NTS, 22 May 43,

sub: Trans of Naval Pers, OCT 370.5 Mvmt BLOT;

Memo, NTS for OCT, 22 May 43, sub: Oversea

Trans for Naval Pers, and reply, 31 May 43; last two

in OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 230

 Joint use of ships was practiced from the beginning of the war, but it increased after formal agreements were made during the first half of 1943; see

Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 170-72.
162 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

sailing dates as well as the assignment of

troop space. The Joint Army-Navy-WSA

Ship Operations Committee, also located

at San Francisco, determined such matters

as the utilization of piers, ship repair facilities, and labor. These west coast committees therefore exercised a broad control

over the employment of troopships and

the movement of troops and troop equipment.231

 The commander of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation represented the

Army or designated the representatives of

the Army in these joint activities.

Despite the fact that the joint committees functioned smoothly and with

considerable effectiveness, the Army Chief

of Transportation did not like the arrangement. The basic reason was that it involved a decentralization of control and

interfered with the plan of centralized

control on which the Transportation Corps

operated. General Gross favored the decentralization of technical operating functions and carried the doctrine into effect

by a broad delegation of operating responsibilities to his field representatives.

On the other hand, he regarded the exercise of central control by his office over

the employment of the means of transportation necessary to the economical use of

those means, and similar control of troop

and freight movements necessary to the

close co-ordination of inland and ocean

transportation and the avoidance of delays. Naval logistics was characterized by

greater decentralization, and the Navy

was unwilling to attempt to revamp its

system during wartime.232 The Army

refused to accord as much independence

to the west coast committees as the Navy

desired, but it found no alternative to

going along with the plan in general.

A number of specific complaints may

be cited as evidence of the general dissatisfaction in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation because of the lack of a

closely integrated control over the movement of ships and troops in the Pacific.

The OCT believed that troopships were

being detained on the Pacific coast longer

than was necessary, with not enough pressure being put on the completion of repairs and on quick turnaround at the

loading port.233 Sufficient advance notice

could not be obtained regarding the prospective sailings of APA's and other naval

combatant ships to permit arrangements

to be made for the full utilization of their

passenger capacities.234 The estimates of

troopship capabilities and requirements

prepared by the Army and the Navy were

difficult to harmonize because of the different approaches to the subject.235

 The

Navy's lack of central control over the

flow of personnel to the embarkation ports

created a demand for more staging capacity at the ports than otherwise would

have been necessary.236

Additional difficulties from the point of

view of the Chief of Transportation arose

from the independent action of the oversea commands, particularly the Pacific

231

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, sub: Control

of Shipping in the Pacific, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen;

Min of Mtgs of Joint Army-Navy Surface Personnel

Committee are filed in OCT 334 JANSPC. 232

 Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logistics in the

Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1947), pp. 229-33. 233

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, par. 7, cited

n. 231; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 16 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Troopships, OCT 565.2. 234

 See n. 23, above; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 31

Dec 43, sub: Basis of Allocation, OCT HB Wylie

Army vs Navy; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44,

par. 8 and summary 5, cited n. 231. 235

 Memo Meyer for Gross, 10 Jan 43, sub: Troopship Capacities, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 236

 Memo, Wylie for Wood, 24 May 44, sub:

Greenslade Rpt, and atchd comment on Appendix

E, Recommendation 3, OCT HB Port Capacity and

Utilization.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 163

Ocean Areas, in diverting troopships and

retaining them for intratheater use without approval from Washington.237

 Troop

lift was needed in the theaters for the assault and support operations that were

being mounted there, and the theater

commanders retained vessels that had arrived from the zone of interior in order to

make those operations successful. Such

retentions obviously were disturbing to

the planners in Washington, who were endeavoring to work out a balanced and

well-timed program of troop movements

from U.S. ports. Another disturbing factor

from the standpoint of central planning

and control was the lack of information

from the theaters in regard to the movements of troopships and their return to

U.S. ports. Here again the chief difficulty

was with Pacific Ocean Areas.

In view of these conditions and their

effect on the work of the Movements Division in planning troop movements and

supervising their execution, Colonel Farr

recommended in November 1944 that an

"advance echelon" of the Movements Division be set up at San Francisco to collaborate with the joint committees in

achieving the best possible use of troop

carriers and in policing the execution of

instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Joint Military Transportation Committee. As conceived by Colonel

Farr, this office would have been entirely

independent of the Army port of embarkation and would not have dealt with

operating matters; its principal function

would have been "to get information and

to be present when certain decisions are

made of an over-all nature that require

complete and thorough coordination with

the Navy." The proposal carried the implication that Army interests on the Pacific coast needed a type of supervision

that they had not been receiving. The

plan was given careful consideration in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation

and a tentative organizational chart was

drawn up, but in the end the creation of

such an office was disapproved because of

the possibility of conflict between it and

the San Francisco Port of Embarkation.238

In the beginning the joint utilization of

troopships in the Pacific was beset with

frequent misunderstandings because of

the lack of joint priority lists for the movement of Army and Navy personnel. Without such lists the assignment of troop

space and the distribution of the inevitable deficit in troop lift could not be equitably achieved.239

 In May 1943 the Army

and the Navy agreed that "a single joint

priority list for personnel for overseas

movement to all areas of the Pacific Theater except North Pacific and Southeast

Pacific" should be prepared monthly by

the two departments. The Operations Division of the War Department General

Staff represented the Army in the establishment of joint priorities.240

 To provide

the basis for negotiations in Washington,

the commanders of the Central, South,

and Southwest Pacific Areas were required to submit joint priority lists for

their respective commands. These were

consolidated into over-all joint priority

237

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Nov 44, par. 9 and

summaries 2 and 3, cited n. 231. 238

 Recommendation 1, Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15

Nov 44, cited n. 231; Memo, Farr for Wylie, 29 Jan

45, sub: West Coast Operation; Memo, Farr for

Meyer, 6 Feb 45, sub: Proposed West Coast Reorganization; last two in OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Ltr,

Farr to author, 20 Jul 50, p. 3, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Gen. 239

 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 13 Mar 43, sub:

Shipping for South and Southwest Pacific, and reply,

29 Mar 43; both in OCT 000-370.5 POA 1943.

240 Agreement, Gen Marshall and Admiral Ernest

J. King, 26 May 43, sub: Joint Priority Lists, OCT

000-370.5 POA 1943.
164 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

lists, which guided the Joint Army-Navy

Surface Personnel Committee at San

Francisco in its utilization of troopships

and in the dispatch of troops.241

The joint use of troopships also called

for the development of greater uniformity

in the shipping procedures used by the

Army and the Navy. This development

was slow, but in the spring of 1945, with

the prospect of an early shifting of emphasis from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a

comprehensive joint directive, Ocean

Shipping Procedures (short title, OSPRO),

was published.242 The primary object of

the publication was to establish uniform

procedures for regulating the preparation

and dispatch of shipping documents and

for reporting information regarding ship

movements, passengers embarked, and

freight loaded. These procedures applied

not only to vessels sailing between the

zone of interior and the theaters, but also

to those sailing between theaters, since it

was anticipated that the redeployment of

troops after the defeat of Germany would

involve substantial shipments from Europe

and the Mediterranean directly to Pacific

bases. In matters on which complete uniformity could not be achieved, the differing

procedures of the Army and the Navy

were explained, so that each service would

be informed regarding the other's methods.

The agreement provided for joint central

record control units in each theater and at

the principal U.S. ports to assist in the

administration of the plan. The establishment of such units, known as Army-Navy

Shipping Information Agencies (short

title, ANSIA's), had barely begun when

hostilities ceased.

The joint use of troopships was essential

as a means of insuring that full advantage

would be taken of the capacities of vessels

sailing under Army or Navy control and

that the priorities established by theater

commanders for the shipment of personnel

were observed. Differences arose over the

administration of the plan, and some of

the supporting arrangements, which obviously were desirable, were slow in developing. The misunderstandings and delays

were attributable chiefly to the differing

systems employed by the Army and the

Navy for controlling transportation and

movements and the fact that there had

been virtually no co-ordination on this

level before the war. By the end of the war

substantial progress toward such co-ordination had been made.

A Test of Method and Efficiency

Oversea troop movements provided a

real test of method and operating efficiency. The number of agencies concerned

with both the planning and the execution

phases was a complicating factor. The

many types of units belonging to the

Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the

Service Forces, and the loosely organized

groups of individual replacements implied

a wide variety of problems. The necessity

of shipping units and their organizational

equipment on different vessels in most

instances, yet in such a manner that the

troops could have their equipment soon

after arrival overseas, added to the difficulties. Co-ordination was the basic requirement, and in December 1941 the 241

 Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 27 Jul 43, sub: Priority Lists for Central, South, and Southwest Pacific,

OCT 000-370.5 POA 1943.

242 WD TM 38-412/OPNAV 39-H3, United States

Army and Navy Ocean Shipping Procedures (short

title, OSPRO); Monthly Vessel Utilization Summary,

Jul 45, OCT HB Topic Army-Navy Joint Logistics;

Memo, SFPE for CofT, 8 Oct 45, sub: Hist Record,

and incl entitled ANSIA, OCT HB Topic Port

Co-ordination.
TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS 165

machinery for this purpose was very

inadequate. Later, when the system had

been improved as the result of experience,

large shipments of troops were moved to

the seaboard, staged, and embarked with

commendable smoothness.

The formulation and publication of

detailed procedures was a prerequisite to

the satisfactory execution of troop movements. This was true because of the many

agencies involved and the multitude of

services to be performed in making troops

ready for movement to and service in the

theaters. The instructions dealing with the

preparation of units and individuals for

oversea movement covered every step of

the operation and fixed the responsibilities of each agency, and they were of inestimable value. Even then it was necessary for the port staging areas, in order to

have troops completely ready for embarkation, to perform many services that

should have been performed by other

agencies.

Assignment of a key role to the port

commanders was an important factor in

the successful regulation of the flow of

troops to the theaters. The control that

port commanders exercised over the departure of troops for the seaboard, the

processing and training at the staging

areas, and the embarkation on the transports enabled them to so co-ordinate all

stages of the operation as to avoid the congestion of port facilities, the waste of rail

equipment, and the delay of ship sailings.

The close contact—by teletype, radio, and

cable—maintained by the ports of embarkation with the theaters they served enabled them to administer theater priorities

effectively, to meet emergency requirements, and at the same time to keep the

theater commanders informed regarding

the status of the troops they had requested.

Like many other relationships, this coordination between the ports of embarkation and the theaters was developed only

gradually, and it was more successfully

accomplished in the Atlantic than in the

Pacific.

Wartime experience demonstrated the

value of the port staging area both as a

reservoir in which troops could be held

pending embarkation and as a place

where units that were under strength

when they left their home stations could

be filled, shortages of individual equipment could be made up, and minor deficiencies in physical condition and training

could be corrected. Although home stations gradually improved their performance in preparing units and individuals

for oversea service before shipping them to

the ports, they frequently fell short of that

goal. Their performance never supported

the theory, which was given some attention in the early days of the war, that even

in periods of heavy troop movement staging areas could be dispensed with and

troops could be moved directly from home

stations to shipside.

Troop movements were necessarily

tailored to fit the troopships that were

available. The situation that confronted

the Army during the early months of the

war was bleak indeed, but soon the increase in troop lift became rapid, permitting troop shipments to be increased

accordingly. The American capacity was

multiplied through the conversion of existing passenger ships to troop carriers, the

construction of additional passenger ships,

and especially through the conversion of

many new cargo ships to troopships. The

virtual pooling of the American and British troopship fleets to serve the Allied cause

greatly helped the U.S. Army, especially

in the North Atlantic. The pooling of
166 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Army and Navy resources in the Pacific

facilitated the movement of troops to the

Pacific bases. The intensive operation of

the troopships under Army control and

the plan of loading them to the maximum

practical capacity were additional measures employed to hasten the build-up of

strength overseas. In brief, every effort was

made to utilize the troop lift—admittedly

a limiting factor—to best advantage.

The movement of organizational equipment had to match the movement of

troops, but it was affected by different circumstances both in the zone of interior and

overseas. Special methods were adopted to

meet the exceptional requirements of the

European theater in 1943 and 1944, but

otherwise the task was essentially one of

insuring that equipment was properly

marked, getting it delivered to the ports of

embarkation at about the same time as the

troops, processing and shipping it as

promptly as possible, and keeping the theaters of destination informed regarding

the shipments en route and those that

were delayed. Many difficulties were

encountered and the performance was

uneven.

The salient fact regarding oversea movements in World War II is that, after the

transitional period immediately following

Pearl Harbor, there were no serious interruptions in the shipment of troops and

their equipment to the theaters in accordance with strategic plans. The inadequacy

of the early procedures, failure to execute

properly the improved procedures that

were in effect later, and other difficulties

inherent in so complex an operation resulted in some temporary annoyance and

confusion but did not disturb the military

program.
CHAPTER III

Redeployment and

Repatriation

The most complicated and in some

ways the most difficult phase of the war

from the standpoint of troop transportation came after the defeat of Germany.

Up to that time the movement of troops

had been mainly from the zone of interior to the oversea commands; traffic

between theaters and return traffic to the

United States had been on a limited scale.

The end of hostilities in Europe, followed

closely by the Japanese surrender, involved more than simply a change in direction for the major troop movement; it

involved broad changes in procedures and

the handling of a far greater volume of

traffic on land and on sea than had been

handled at any earlier stage of the war.

During the redeployment and the repatriation periods—that is, between V-E

and V-J Days, and after V-J Day—the

primary objective was to move the maximum number of troops. After the German

surrender heavy shipments were necessary

in order to transfer sufficient forces from

Europe to the Pacific to maintain an everincreasing pressure on Japan. The progress of the campaigns under General of

the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had exceeded

expectations; the Japanese strength obviously was deteriorating and no time was

to be lost in pushing the war to a conclusion. After the Japanese capitulation public opinion in the United States demanded

that the troops be brought home and demobilized with utmost dispatch. Providing transportation to meet these requirements proved to be a major task for the

Army.

The Army's transportation task included, in addition to returning troops,

heavy movements of patients from the

theaters to the zone of interior, and after

the fighting was over the repatriation of

the war dead. Both movements involved

peculiar problems and required special

procedures. The return of civilians, including the dependents of military personnel, also gave rise to special problems,

but this traffic was not allowed to interfere with homeward military movements.

While the bulk of the traffic was moved

by ship and by rail, air transportation was

used during the redeployment and repatriation periods to an extent that was

not possible earlier. However, the aircraft

so employed were under the control of the

Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Transportation was not responsible for such

movements.

Return Traffic Before V-E Day

Although the number of passengers

landed at U.S. ports from Army troop-
168 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR DEBARKING AT A U.S. PORT

ships before V-E Day was small compared

to the number embarked for oversea

areas, the volume of return traffic nevertheless became substantial as the war

progressed. The experience gained in handling this return traffic was valuable to

the Army in dealing with the larger problems that developed during redeployment

and repatriation.

The military element of the wartime

homeward traffic was made up chiefly of

rotational and temporary duty groups,

casuals returning on furlough or leave,

and patients. Very few units were returned to the United States before V-E

Day. The Army transported some personnel of the U.S. Navy and of the Allied

forces, and prisoners of war constituted a

considerable movement during the campaigns in North Africa and continental

Europe. Among the civilians debarked

were representatives of the nonmilitary

branches of the U.S. and Allied Governments, the employees of contractors who

had performed construction and other

work for the Army abroad, dependents

of military personnel who were overseas when the war began, and the brides

and children of soldiers who had married

while in foreign countries. Up to the time

of the German surrender the largest

monthly total of passengers debarked at

U.S. ports from ships under Army control

was 146,246 in September 1944. Prisoners

of war, chiefly from the European theater,

accounted for 41 percent of that number.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 169

There was some redeployment of units

from the less active to the more active

oversea commands before V-E Day. The

reduction of strength in Alaska, which

began in the late summer of 1943, resulted

in a number of units being returned to the

United States for reorganization and reassignment. A considerable transfer of

units from the South Pacific Area to the

Central and Southwest Pacific Areas took

place as Allied forces pushed the perimeter of the Japanese forces northward and

westward. During the early months of

1945 a number of units with their impedimenta were moved from the Persian Gulf

Command to the European Theater of

Operations and to China, and from India

to the Pacific Ocean Areas. These movements, however, required no extensive redistribution of shipping such as became

necessary after the German capitulation.

The increasing number of casual troops

returning to the United States during

1943 necessitated a clearer definition of

categories and a more explicit statement

on procedures. To this end consolidated

instructions were issued by the War Department in September in a document entitled, Procedures for the Return of Individuals (short title: PRI), and these instructions were revised and amplified in

August 1944.1 Although it dealt with

soldiers traveling as individuals, PRI contemplated that the majority of individuals

would be placed in rotational (RO)

groups or temporary duty (TD) groups

under group commanders. The groups

were to be organized in the theater so that

each would include troops destined for a

single reception station in the zone of interior. Such grouping was expected to

have advantages from the standpoint of

administration and discipline and also to

facilitate transportation arrangements.

The instructions stated the basis on which

rotational and temporary duty troops

were to be selected, the records that were

to be kept, the processing that was to be

done in the theaters, and the security indoctrination that was to be provided. Of

more particular interest to the Transportation Corps, PRI specified the information that was to be radioed to the zone of

interior by theater commanders when

troops embarked, the issuance and disposition of group or individual movement

orders, the procedures to be followed during the homeward voyage, the processing

to be given at the ports of debarkation,

and the manner of forwarding from the

ports to the reception stations. PRI also

covered the handling of troops at and

beyond the reception stations.

The prompt and orderly handling of

troops when they arrived at U.S. ports

depended to a considerable extent on the

degree to which the theaters fulfilled their

responsibilities regarding the movements.

In addition to organizing rotational and

temporary duty personnel into groups and

providing them with escort officers, the

theater commanders were required to

notify the Chief of Transportation each

month how many passengers were awaiting evacuation to the zone of interior.

They were also required to send a radio

message immediately after each troopship

departure giving the numbers and categories of passengers embarked.2

 Army

1

 Memos, TAG for CG AAF, CG AGF, CG ASF,

et al., 26 Sep 43, AG 370.5 (22 Sep 43); 16 Aug 44,

(10 Aug 44); 23 Dec 44, Supp. 1, (22 Dec 44); 17 Feb

45, Supp. 2, (17 Feb 45); 6 May 45, Supp. 3,

(25 Apr 45). 2

 Detailed information was given the theaters

regarding the capacities of vessels when carrying

various types of troops to aid them in planning embarkations. OCT Misc Ltr 28, 14 Jul 44; 1st Ind,

Mvmts Div for Contl Div OCT, 27 Nov 44; both in

OCT 569.5 Pers Capacity of Transports.
170 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ports in the United States were heavily

engaged with outbound troop movements,

and advance information regarding inbound movements was needed in order

that the ports might arrange for accommodations at the staging areas, the assignment of processing personnel, the reservation of hospital beds for patients, and the

provision of railroad equipment for the

onward journey. The theater commands

did not always provide the desired data.

As late as March 1945 the Movements Division complained that the Southwest

Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas

were not complying with the instructions,

since their advices often were entirely lacking or were not sufficiently explicit.3

 The

theaters, although they protested strongly

when full and prompt information was

not received regarding troops en route to

them, were themselves sometimes at fault

in not providing such information on

homeward-bound troops.

Maintenance of morale required close

attention on the part of transport commanders during the voyage back to the

United States. Men returning from overseas who were eligible for further military

service were inclined to take a gloomy

view of the future and to allow their spirits

to sag. To offset this tendency, transport

commanders were instructed to make the

maximum use of entertainment, exercise,

and orientation courses to keep the men

occupied.4 Early in 1945 an experiment

was undertaken at Hampton Roads to ascertain the feasibility of placing entertainers on vessels after their arrival in the

harbor to provide diversion for the soldiers

during the interval between arrival and

debarkation. Although the experiment

was an unqualified success as a morale

lifter and the results were brought to the

attention of other ports, the records do not

disclose the extent to which the plan was

adopted.5

The ports for which returning troopships were destined needed accurate information regarding the time of arrival in

order to make arrangements for the

prompt handling of the vessels and their

passengers and to prepare for any repairs

that might be necessary before the next

voyage. The work of the ports was so

closely scheduled that unexpectedly early

or late arrivals were disconcerting. To emphasize this fact the Army port commander at New York stated that when a

vessel with troops, patients, and other

passengers was about to arrive there were

forty-two agencies to be notified, and hospital cars and ambulances sometimes had

to be brought from considerable distances.6

 The cryptographic messages from

the ships were received at shore stations of

the Navy and at first were transmitted

"through channels" to the ports—a procedure that involved a loss of time. When

the return traffic from Europe began to

increase, direct communication between

the Navy's Eastern Sea Frontier and the

ports was authorized so that the ports

might have a maximum amount of time

3

 Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to Theaters, 30 Aug 44,

CM-OUT 23724; Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to POA, 2

Oct 44, CM-OUT 40317; Memo, Berzelius for Wylie,

16 Mar 45, sub: Problems That Concern Mvmts Div,

OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 4

 Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF, 7 Aug 44,

sub: Morale of Troops Returning From Overseas,

OCT HB Farr Staybacks; paraphrase of Msg to Theaters, 5 Dec 44, OCT HB PE Gen Troops Inbound.

Transport commanders also were instructed to enforce preventive maintenance on rifles and other

individual equipment during the voyage. 5

 Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 27 Mar 45, sub: Reception of Returning Pers, and atchd rpt from HRPE,

10 Mar 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 6

 Min of East Coast Port Comdrs Conf Relative to

V-E Day Activities, 11 Apr 45, p. 14, OCT HB TC

Gen Redepl.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 171

in which to arrange for debarkations.7 The

requirement that vessels keep the ports informed regarding changes in the estimated

time of arrival was in no sense burdensome, but uniform compliance was not

obtained.8 Failure of ships to notify ports

of changes in estimated arrival times became a much more serious problem after

redeployment began.9

The port commanders were instructed

to pass returning troops through their

establishments as quickly as possible.10

The soldiers heard a brief address of welcome immediately after debarkation, then

were forwarded at once to the staging

area, where they were to be processed.

The staging area commanders endeavored

to start the men on the next leg of their

journey within twenty-four hours. Physical inspections were made, primarily with

a view to preventing the spread of infectious diseases, except when there had

been similar inspections by the ship's surgeon before debarkation. Pay records were

checked and payments brought up to

date. Fresh clothing and equipment suitable for the onward journey were provided. The records of each rotational and

temporary duty group were examined to

insure that they were intact and in possession of the group commander and that the

entries were up to date. The movement

orders of these groups were checked, and

as soon as firm arrangements for rail

transportation could be completed the reception stations for which the groups were

destined were notified of the number of

personnel involved and the probable time

of arrival. Casuals that did not go to reception stations left the staging areas as

individuals, or as groups when practicable, after their travel orders had been

checked to verify the authority for their

movement to new permanent stations,

officer candidate schools, separation centers, or to other destinations when they

were on emergency furlough or leave.11

Observation of troops arriving at New

York from the European theater during

the winter of 1944-45 disclosed that the

morale of returning troops was being adversely affected by incorrect information

received in the theater regarding their

movements and responsibilities upon

reaching the zone of interior. Promises

made in the theaters and hopes thus built

up in the minds of returnees could not be

realized under the approved procedures.

The Information and Education Division

of the Army Service Forces was responsible for keeping theater commanders correctly informed regarding these matters,

but adequate dissemination of information

in the theaters was difficult because of the

fluctuating military situation and changing personnel. The information-education

organization in the European theater,

initially attached to the headquarters of

the Services of Supply, was transferred to

7

 Remarks of Maj Jerry A. Griffin, G of Returning

Troops Br, Mvmts Div OCT, at Mtg of Port Comdrs,

Opng Representatives, and Port Air Officers, 8 Jul 44,

in Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9

Jul 44, pp. 21, 22, OCT HB PE Gen. 8

 Memo, Farr for Gross, 29 Apr 43; Min of Mtg,

Oversea Troop Br, Mvmts Div OCT, 22 Jul 43; both

in OCT 370.5 Debarkation. 9

 See below, p. 189. 10

 This paragraph is based on PRI, 16 Aug 44, Secs.

XI, XII, XIII. See also Min of Port and Zone Comdrs

Conf, Chicago, 6-9 July 44, Mtg of Port Operating,

Troop Mvmt, and Equip Representatives, 8 Jul 44,

pp. 6-8, OCT HB PE Gen. 11

 Separation centers, the first of which was established in March 1944, and reception stations eventually were operated as components of the personnel

centers that were created at eighteen military posts in

the summer of 1944; the number of personnel centers

was later increased to twenty-two. WD Cir 113, 20

Mar 44, Sec. IX; WD Cir 292, 11 Jul 44; WD Cir 422,

26 Oct 44; WD press release, 1 Sep 44, sub: 18 Centers Announced for Discharging and Processing Army

Personnel, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.
172 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

USS WAKEFIELD LANDING TROOPS from the European Theater of Operations.

the staff of the theater commander in

order that it might operate more effectively. The port commanders in the zone

of interior were responsible for keeping

transport commanders supplied with correct information so that the orientation

given during the return voyage would

coincide with that given in the theaters.12

Rotational and temporary duty troops

made a number of trips in quick succession after leaving the ports of debarkation.

As has been noted, all proceeded first to

reception stations. While at the reception

stations rotational troops, which were to

remain in the zone of interior, received

orders to proceed to redistribution stations

but were allowed to take a furlough of

twenty-one days en route; at the redistribution stations they received assignments to new stations to which they proceeded at once.13

 Temporary duty troops,

which were to go back to their oversea stations after a thirty-day period of recuperation, returned at the end of that period to

the same reception stations; AGF and

ASF troops remained at the reception stations until called to the ports of embarkation, while AAF troops proceeded from

the reception stations to AAF redistribution stations and thence to the ports.14

Although considerable experience was

gained in handling returning troops before

Germany surrendered, the War Depart12

 Memos, CG NYPE for CofT, 27 Mar 45 and 14

Apr 45, sub: Info and Education for Returnees; 1st

Ind, CofT for CG NYPE, 26 Apr 45; all in OCT HB

Demob Plng Unit Gen Correspondence. 13

 WD Cir 303, 17 Jul 44; ASF Cir 235, 27 Jul 44;

ASF Cir 253, 7 Aug 44; ASF Cir 402, 9 Dec 44. 14

 PRI, 16 Aug 44, pars. 76, 77; TC Cir 100-5,

revised 20 Mar 45.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 173

ment foresaw that redeployment would

involve many adjustments in facilities and

procedures. Accordingly, it started early

and did a meticulous job in preparing to

handle the troops that would be brought

back to the United States after V-E Day.

Preparations for Redeployment

The task of redeploying its forces after

the defeat of Germany was recognized by

the Army as both gigantic and complex.15

A decision had to be made as to which

units would be shipped from Europe directly to the Pacific and which would be

returned to the zone of interior for either

reassignment or demobilization. An equitable basis had to be established for the

separation of some soldiers from the service and the retention of others. Means had

to be found to maintain the morale of

those who were being assigned to new

oversea stations. All possible shipping had

to be mobilized in order to effect redeployment with the greatest possible speed.

Yet the flow of troops to and through the

United States had to be regulated so as to

avoid congesting the ports and the railroads. Care had to be exercised also to

avoid glutting the limited number of ports

in the Pacific areas that were to serve as

bases for the invasion of Japan. The intricacy of the task was so apparent to the

War Department, and to the other agencies concerned, that the planning to meet

it was begun long before the invasion of

continental Europe.

The planning for redeployment proceeded on several levels and therefore

posed a broad problem of co-ordination.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into all aspects

of the subject extensively, including transportation.16

 The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, a high-level BritishAmerican civilian agency, dealt with the

employment of the shipping that was

available to the United Nations.17 The

War Department developed plans relating

to all phases of Army redeployment, to

which Army Service Forces headquarters

and the Chief of Transportation made

contributions in their respective spheres.

The Chief of Transportation joined with

the Naval Transportation Service and the

War Shipping Administration in planning

for the readjustments in the allocation

and operation of American vessels that

would become necessary after the defeat

of Germany. There also were discussions

between the Chief of Transportation, the

Office of Defense Transportation, and the

Association of American Railroads regarding the effect of redeployment on

domestic transportation. This brief review

can present only those aspects of the broad

subject that were of special interest to the

Chief of Transportation.

Since planning for redeployment went

hand in hand with planning for demobilization, such planning may be said to have

started in the War Department in June

1942, when an advisory board of officers

was appointed to initiate a study of the

postwar Military Establishment.18 Active

planning in the Army Service Forces

began in the spring of 1943. In July of that

15

 See minutes of ASF press conference held immediately after V-E Day, especially remarks of General

Somervell and General Gross, which relate to transportation, OCT HB Gen Redepl, 16

 Planning and TC participation is reviewed in

Memo, Plng Div for Exec OCT, 23 Jul 45, sub: Redeployment Plng, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 17

 See Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, p. 165, for the purpose and organization of the.CSAB. 18

 This paragraph based on Maj. John C. Sparrow,

History of Personnel Demobilization in the United

States Army, DA Pamphlet 20-210, July 1952, Ch. II
174 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

year a Special Planning Division was

established in the War Department Special Staff to deal with both the industrial

and the military aspects of demobilization.

In September 1944 the War Department

announced that the Army had "adopted a

plan for the readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany and

prior to the defeat of Japan calling for a

partial and orderly demobilization from

its present peak strength."

 19

 This plan

was subject to revision, of course, both

before and after the end of hostilities in

Europe, as further attention was given to

requirements and procedures and as the

circumstances of redeployment were more

clearly seen.

The War Department readjustment

regulations (RR) for personnel, in which

the results of the extensive studies were

crystallized, were published in a series of

six pamphlets, all of which bore directly

or indirectly on the responsibilities of the

Chief of Transportation.20 These regulations established four categories of troops:

Category I troops were those to be retained in the same commands; Category

II troops were those to be transferred from

one theater to another; Category III

troops were surplus units in the theaters

that were to be reorganized and reclassified as Category I or Category II; and

Category IV troops were units to be disbanded.21

Under the War Department's plan for

redeployment, enough troops were to be

shipped directly from Europe to the

Pacific—the quickest route—to maintain

maximum pressure against Japan. Consistent with that principle, as many as

possible were to be redeployed by the

slower route through the United States

with time out for furlough before being

reshipped to the Pacific. Some who returned to the United States were to be

retained in the service and assigned to

duty elsewhere than in the Pacific. As

many as qualified for discharge under the

Army's point system were to be returned

to the zone of interior for immediate separation from the service.22

 All of these men

would require ocean transportation—

some for the long voyage from Europe to

the Pacific, some from Europe to the

United States and thence to the Pacific,

and some only from Europe to the United

States. In addition to troop transports,

cargo shipping would be required for the

organizational equipment and supplies of

all troops destined for the Pacific. A basic

responsibility of the Chief of Transportation in connection with redeployment was,

therefore, the mobilization of the necessary

shipping.

The plans formulated by the Chief of

Transportation for the utilization of shipping during the redeployment period

19

 WD press release, 6 Sep 44, sub: WD Demobilization Plan After the Defeat of Germany; ASF Plan

for Redeployment, Readjustment, and Demobilization (Period I), 13 Sep 44, OCT HB Demob Plng Unit

Demob Plng WD Policies. 20

 These pamphlets, the latest revisions of which are

in OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Redepl Gen, were as

follows:

RR 1-1 Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel After the Defeat of Germany

RR 1-2 Procedure for Readjustment Movements

RR 1 -3 Athletic and Recreation Program

RR 1 -4 Army Education Program

RR 1-5 Procedures for the Readjustment of Officers, Warrant Officers, and Flight Officers After the

Defeat of Germany

RR 1-6 Standing Operating Procedures for the

Demobilization of Category IV Elements. 21

 RR 1-1. 22

 Detailed procedures for the zone of interior and

the theaters were published in AG Memo 320.2 (15

Feb 45), 27 Feb 45, sub: Policies and Procedures Governing the Redeployment of the Army; AG Memo

370.5 (25 Apr 45), 2 May 45, sub: Revision of

Annex B.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 175

were necessarily tentative until the strategy and the troop basis for the final thrust

against Japan had been determined.

Nevertheless, such plans were made and

remade with each change in the strategic

formula so that the shipping aspect would

always be assured of proper consideration. A member of the Chief of Transportation's Planning Division was transferred

to the Special Planning Division of the

Special Staff to work on the transportation phase of redeploy ment and to assure

mutual understanding between the two

offices.23

In February 1945, when redeployment

planning by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the Combined Chiefs of Staff was

taking final shape, General Gross contended that attention was being directed

too largely to the problem of moving the

troops and not sufficiently to the problem

of making them operational—that is, having them equipped for action. At that

time it was contemplated that over a

period of about twelve months approximately 405,000 troops would be shipped

from Europe directly to the Pacific and

some 875,000 via the United States to the

Pacific. General Gross urged that immediate consideration be given by all

planning agencies to a study recently completed in his office that presented some

essential data on the subject.24

The study presented an analysis of the

time required to move troops and organizational equipment from Europe to

the Pacific (Philippines), breaking down

the total period into the time likely to

elapse between the issuance of movement

orders and actual departure from Europe,

the time required for recuperation and

training either in the United States or in

the Pacific, and the time spent in travel

over sea and land. The calculations indicated that, assuming no delay on account

of equipment, 126 days would be required

for troops to be redeployed directly and

made operational; 179 days would be required in the case of troops redeployed

through the United States. In contrast,

177 days would elapse before equipment

shipped in unit assemblies direct from

Europe to the Pacific would reach the

troops, 187 days would elapse if equipment were shipped by the direct route in

bulk and placed in depots before being

issued to troops, and 262 days would

elapse in the case of equipment shipped

through the United States. From the calculations presented in this study, the Chief

of Transportation concluded that the

movement of equipment should be the

controlling factor in scheduling the redeployment of troops; that the units to be

redeployed directly should be nominated

as early as possible so that their equipment might be started ahead of them; that

so far as possible equipment should be

shipped in bulk rather than as unit assemblies; and that the Pacific commands

should be directed to establish equipment

staging areas to facilitate bringing troops

and their impedimenta together.

Although the poverty in troop lift,

which had been one of the chief handicaps

of the U.S. forces during the early days of

war, had been largely overcome by increasing the capacities of existing passenger vessels, constructing new troopships, and converting freighters to troop

carriers, as V-E Day approached this 23

 Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Ronald B. Shuman, who had

been with the OCT since its establishment, was transferred to the Special Planning Division soon after it

was set up in 1943. 24

 Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 26

Feb 45, sub: Logistical Implications; Study, Redeployment Transportation Implications, 26 Feb 45, and

appended Preliminary Revision of Redeployment; all

in OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.
176 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

greatly expanded capacity was seen as inadequate to the needs of the redeployment

period. Those needs involved not only the

speedy transfer of troops from Europe and

the United States to the Pacific, but the

repatriation of troops from numerous

areas that would become militarily unimportant with the surrender of Germany. A

full year before V-E Day, the Planning Division in the Office of the Chief of Transportation pointed out that the completion

of the troopship construction program for

1945 would not provide the troop spaces

required for redeployment and that the

conversion of further freighters would

therefore be necessary.25 A British-American study, submitted to the Combined

Chiefs of Staff in February 1945, recognized the danger of a substantial deficit in

American troop lift and outlined ways of

dealing with it. These ways included overloading of troopships, conversion of additional freighters, assistance from Allied,

neutral, and captured enemy shipping,

use of APA's and other naval vessels, full

use of combatant aircraft, and careful coordination of the employment of all vessels

under control of the Allied nations to

insure maximum utilization of their

capacities.26

Redeployment required co-ordination

between the Army and the Navy in scheduling the return of personnel to the United

States, and it was foreseen that such coordination would be even more important

when the large-scale repatriation offerees

from the Pacific began. A proposal to this

end was placed before the Joint Chiefs of

Staff by the Navy in November 1944.27

Under this proposal the preparation and

implementation of plans would have been

handled on the staff level, and the Transportation Corps and the Naval Transportation Service would have been charged

only with providing the means of transportation. Colonel Farr, as head of the Chief

of Transportation's Movements Division,

opposed the arrangement. He argued that

staff decisions frequently involve long discussions, and the loss of time would prove

a serious disadvantage in the effort to

return troops at the maximum rate and to

make maximum use of the transportation

facilities. He urged that, after the basic

policies had been established on the staff

level, all operating matters relating to

transportation be left to the appropriate

operating agencies. Colonel Farr's stand

was in harmony with the Chief of Transportation's protest, mentioned earlier,

against the interference of higher echelons

in technical matters. The Navy subsequently withdrew its proposal from the

JCS docket on the ground that a study of

redeployment policies had been undertaken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.28

The ports of embarkation, in addition

to responsibility for processing Category II

units (those being transferred from one

theater to another) and forwarding them

to reception stations, were given another

responsibility for the redeployment and

repatriation periods—that of inactivating

Category IV units (those to be disbanded)

and forwarding the members to personnel

centers for further disposition. For the latter purpose the port commanders were

25

 Memo, Stokes for Wylie, 8 May 44, sub: Proposals on C-4 Const Program, OCT HB TC Gen

Redepl. 26

 CCS 746/11, 8 Feb 45, title: Over-all Review of

Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for Remainder of

1945, Tab D to Annex B to Appendix B, p. 30. This

study, which represented the joint efforts of the

CMTC and the CSAB, assumed the defeat of Germany by 1 July 1945. 27

 JCS 1154, 6 Nov 44. 28

 Memo, Farr for Stokes, 8 Nov 44, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; JMT 83/2, 11 Jan 45.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 177

directed to establish disposition centers in

their staging areas, where the processing

involved in disbanding the units and preparing the soldiers for their onward journey was to be performed.29

 Early planning

in the War Department had contemplated

that units to be disbanded would be forwarded from the ports to redistribution

centers, where they would be inactivated

and the men reclassified before being forwarded to reception stations or separation

centers. The Chief of Transportation believed that the interposition of such redistribution centers involved an unnecessary

waste of time and transportation, and it

was for that reason that the inactivation

of units was eventually assigned to the port

commanders. For the same reason the

Chief of Transportation favored placing

reception stations and separation centers

at the same installations, and the logic of

this was recognized in the creation of personnel centers embracing both reception

and separation activities.30

The adjustments that the east coast ports

of embarkation would have to make when

redeployment began were discussed at a

conference held in New York on 11 April

1945. The chief problem was to retain

sufficient staging capacity in active status

and sufficient station personnel to handle

the returning troops. The ports, along with

other Army installations, had been under

heavy pressure for some time to reduce

personnel, and now they were confronted

with a substantial increase in work load.

Up to the time of this conference the port

commanders had been handicapped in

their planning by lack of information regarding the rate at which they would have

to handle returning troops. In an off-therecord discussion, they were given such

data as the Chief of Transportation possessed, and the estimate of the projected

load, although it was tentative, enabled

them to more competently compute and

defend their estimates of requirements for

personnel and facilities. The principal personnel needs were for clerks, typists, medical technicians, hospital ward attendants,

and cooks. The need for such labor was

abnormally heavy because returning

troops passed through the staging areas

very rapidly and usually were not available for kitchen, mess, or other work

details.31

The planning that preceded the defeat

of Germany did not neglect the Pacific

coast, which was to carry the chief logistical load for both the Army and the Navy

in the final drive against Japan. Care was

taken to prevent shipping facilities from

being diverted to nonshipping uses, and to

build up staging area capacity to the level

that would be required. Measures were

taken also to clear depots and holding and

reconsignment points of outmoded or excessive supplies in order that these installations might serve current needs more

adequately. But the principal limiting

factor was the capacity of the transcontinental railways. The Chief of Transportation had devoted much effort to helping

the western rail lines increase their rolling 29

 OCT Misc Ltr 133, 26 Oct 44, sub: Estab of Disp

Centers; RR 1-6, 16 Feb 45; TC Pamphlet 39, 1 May

45, Disp Center Org and Procedures; TC Pamphlet

40, 15 May 45, Processing and Movement of Category

II Units Returned from Overseas. 30

 Memo, Farr for Demob Plng Unit OCT, 24 Apr

44. OCT HB Mvmts Div Farr Staybacks; Min of

Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 July 44,

Mtg of Port Comdrs, Opng Representatives, and Port

Air Officers, 8 Jul 44, p. 27, OCT HB PE Gen. 31

 Min of East Coast Port Comdrs Conf Relative to

V-E Day Activities, 11 Apr 45; Min of Conf of Representatives of OCT and East Coast PEs on Handling

Returnees, at NYPE, 11 May 45; both in OCT HB

TC Gen Redepl; Memo, CofT for PMG, 6 Apr 45,

sub: German POWs; Memo, NYPE for CofT, 14 Apr

45. sub: Post-V-E Day Requirements; last two in

OCT HB Demob Plng Unit Gen Correspondence.
178 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

stock and improve their right of ways, yet

he recognized that Gulf and Atlantic ports

would have to be used to some extent in

supporting the forces in the Pacific.32

The processing of returning troops at

the ports of debarkation was geared for

speed. Early in the planning General Somervell pointed out that, whether they were

to be separated from the service or to be

sent on furloughs before being reassigned,

soldiers would be impatient to reach their

homes and any delay would increase the

problems of morale and discipline. The

Chief of Transportation therefore directed

that there be no civic demonstrations at

the ports; the brief receptions would be

strictly military in character.33 Under normal circumstances the processing of Category II units at the staging areas was to be

accomplished within twenty-four hours,

and the processing of Category IV units

within forty-eight hours.34 During the

processing period constant attention was

to be given to morale. Soldiers were to be

relieved of work details when possible. A

special meal was to be served to them soon

after their arrival at the staging areas.

Since a large percentage of the men would

be intent on making telephone contact

with their homes as quickly as possible,

special telephone facilities were to be installed in the sections of the staging areas

where the men would be housed, and

portable telephones were to be provided

in the hospitals for the use of bed patients.

Arrangements were made for each man to

have a thorough cleanup and to exchange

any unpresentable articles of clothing for

presentable ones.35 The plan provided that

while at the staging areas the troops would

be briefed on the necessity of safeguarding

military information and would be interrogated for information bearing on war

crimes.

The Ground Forces and the Air Forces

considered it necessary to maintain contact with Category IV troops while they

were at the disposition centers, and the

readjustment regulations provided for

such liaison activities on the part of the

major commands.36 While recognizing

that there were functions that the liaison

officers could perform during this period,

the Chief of Transportation and the port

commanders viewed the arrangement with

misgivings. This was particularly true

because of the breadth of the instruction

the AGF had issued to its liaison detachments. It was feared that the liaison activities would slow up the processing of troops

and delay the onward movement. Great

care had been taken to arrange for uniform and accurate information to be given

the soldiers on the transports and at the

ports of debarkation, and it was anticipated that the liaison detachments might

introduce conflicting information. Such

situations actually occurred during the

initial stages of redeployment, but they

were largely eliminated as the liaison

groups gained a better knowledge of

the responsibilities and methods of the

disposition centers.37

According to War Department planning, troops, after being processed at the

port staging areas, were to be forwarded to 32

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 179, 180, 323-28. 33

 Min of Conf of CGs of SvCs, Dallas, Texas, 19

Feb 44, p. 41, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Min of Conf

at NYPE, 11 May 45, p. 63, cited n. 31. 34

 Processing is defined in RR 1-1, RR 1-6, and TC

Pamphlets 39 and 40, cited notes 20 and 29. 35

 Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, pp. 37-46,

cited n. 31. 36

 RR 1-1, Chart I. 37

 OCT Misc Ltr 113, 5 Apr 45, sub: Liaison Detachments at PEs, and atchd Memo, AGF for ASF,

OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Min of Conf at NYPE, 11

May 45, pp. 7-16, cited n. 31; Ltr, Farr to author, 2

Jan 52, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 179

personnel centers located near their homes

for further processing before being separated from the service, or released on furlough before reassignment. The plan

provided that soldiers to be reassigned

would return to the personnel centers at

the end of their furloughs and be forwarded thence to assembly areas, where

they would be prepared for further service.38

 The Chief of Transportation emphasized the desirability of handling this

traffic in such a way as to minimize the

strain on the passenger services of the railroads. He wanted to keep the number of

trips that the men would make as low as

possible and to have them travel in organized groups whenever practicable. Group

travel in special cars or special trains, as

distinguished from individual travel in

regular trains, permitted more economical

use of railway equipment, reduced the

amount of ticketing and other paper work,

and enabled the Army to exercise better

control over the appearance and conduct

of the troops. The Chief of Transportation

had to combat numerous proposals that

would have violated these canons, and it

was not until early in 1945 that he was

rewarded by the adoption of a procedure

that conformed to his desires.39

An effort was also made to avoid adding

unnecessarily to the burden on the freight

services of the American railroads. Most

units returning to the United States in

Categories II and IV were to be accompanied by only minimum essential equipment.40

 Heavy equipment that was still

serviceable was to be shipped directly from

Europe to the Pacific, and additional requirements were to be supplied from the

United States. This would not only relieve

the domestic carriers of the transportation

of a large part of the impedimenta of

redeployed units, but would also relieve

U.S. ports of large transshipment operations. Equipment shipped to the Pacific

from Europe and the United States was

not to be marked for specific units, but

rather was to be shipped in bulk and

assigned to the units after their arrival at

the Pacific bases.

To insure that the domestic transportation provisions of the redeployment plan

were understood by all concerned, the

Chief of Transportation arranged for a

conference to be held in Chicago on 1 and

2 May. The first session was attended by

transportation officers from the service

commands, the transportation zones, the

ports of embarkation, and the personnel

centers, and the second session also included representatives of the carriers. In

addition to clearing up any misconceptions

regarding the plan of movement, these

meetings were intended to give warning of

the volume of traffic to be handled and the

necessity for utmost economy in the use of

railway equipment.41

It was anticipated that, despite the

carefully devised arrangements for handling redeployment traffic, the railroads

would encounter difficulties. Aside from

the increase in the over-all load, the concentration of debarkations from Europe at

38

 Remarks by Col Finlay in Min of SvC Conf,

Camp Grant, III., 28-30 Jun 45, pp. 199-206, OCT

HB ASF; charts showing movements of Category II

and Category IV troops, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 39

 For more detailed statement of the issues, see

OCT HB Monograph 20, pp. 136-41; Memo, CofT

for ACofS OPD, 20 Nov 44, OCT 370.5 Redpl of

Units and Equip; Handwritten Memo, Wylie for

Gross, 11 Jan 45, and atchd statement by Col Morris,

Traf Contl Div OCT, sub: Redeployment, OCT HB

TC Gen Redpl. 40

 RR 1-1, 15 Feb 45, par. 18; RR 1-2, 11 Apr 45,

par. 16; Min of SvC Conf, Camp Grant, III., 28-30

Jun 45, p. 206. 41

 OCT Misc Ltr 130, 16 Apr 45; Notes on TC

Conf, Chicago, 1-2 May 45, by Capt William H.

Schmidt, Hist Off of Traf Contl Div; both in OCT

HB TC Gen Redepl.
180 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

a few east coast ports and the uneven rate

of troop arrivals were expected to create

periods of unusual strain. The outlook was

discussed within the Army and by the

other governmental agencies concerned

with domestic transportation.42

In accordance with a suggestion of the

Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the domestic transportation implications of redeployment were considered

early in the spring of 1945 by a panel representing the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Department, the Navy

Department, the War Shipping Administration, the War Production Board, and

the War Food Administration.43 The ODT

representative was the steering member of

this panel. The statements submitted to

the panel by the Director of ODT, Mr.

Johnson, emphasized that, although the

over-all transportation load would not be

materially different from that handled in

1944, the cumulative strain of three years

of war, the insufficiency of the new equipment provided during these years, and the

inadequacy of manpower would result in

a shortage of transportation during the

period from V-E Day to V-J Day. Unless

the programs relating to new equipment

and manpower were revised, Mr. Johnson

foresaw the necessity of curtailing nonmilitary traffic and possibly also establishing priorities on the movement of goods

for war production. Although both passenger and freight traffic were considered,

the chief concern appears to have centered

about freight; yet the movement of troops

became the more critical problem after

redeployment began.

In formulating plans for redeployment

it was contemplated that the water lift

from the European and Mediterranean

theaters would be supplemented by airlift

for troops. The Army Air Forces estimated

that the normal airlift would not exceed

12,000 per month, including 5,000 patients

who were to have top priority. Shortly

before V-E Day, however, the Chief of

Staff directed the AAF to increase its

transatlantic capacity so that 50,000 could

be transported monthly, this figure to be

attained not later than 1 July 1945. Measures to add the necessary aircraft to the

services of the Air Transport Command

were undertaken at once.44 It was foreseen

also that a large number of AAF personnel

would be returned from the ETO and the

MTO in tactical aircraft. Although initially it was expected that this AAF personnel would be moved directly from the

aerial ports of debarkation to the places

where they were being sent for recuperation, before redeployment began it was

arranged that all troops landed at eastern

airports would be forwarded first to the

nearest water port staging area to receive

the customary processing and to be organized into groups for the onward journey.45

This arrangement avoided the necessity of

setting up machinery for processing troops 42

 Ltr, ICC to CofT, 30 Jun 44, OCT 511 Misc TC;

Min of ASF Staff Conf, 18 Jan 45, p. 10, OCT HB

ASF; ODT press release, 31 Jan 45, OCT HB Topic

ODT. 43

 OWMR Study V-E-9, sub: Transportation V-E

Day to V-J Day, undated, but apparently issued in

March or April 1945, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 44

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG AAF, 17 Apr 45,

sub: Return of Casual Mil Pers from Europe, OPD

370.9, Sec. IX-A, Case 145; Memo, CG AAF for

CofS, 22 Apr 45; Draft Memo, CofS USA for Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, 26 Apr 45, file copy

indorsed "not used—discussed by Gen Giles with

Adm Fitch"; Summary by G-4, 25 Apr 45; last three

in G-4 580; Memo, ACofS OPD for Marshall, 3 May

45, OPD 370.9, Sec. IX-A, Case 145. 45

 Min of Conf at NYPE, 11 May 45, cited n. 31;

Memo, ACofS OPD for CGs of AAF, ASF, etc., 12

May 45, sub: Return of Certain Aircraft and Crews,

AG 370.5 (10 May 45); Memo, TAG for CGs AAF,

ASF, etc., 21 May 45, sub: Disp of Individuals Returned under Green Project, AG 200.4 (18 May 45).
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 181

at the airports and furthered the Chief of

Transportation's aim to move troops in

groups of a carload or more to the greatest

extent possible.

The War Department plan for redeployment included procedures to govern the

disposition of troops and troop impedimenta that on V-E Day were en route to

theaters then becoming inactive and troops

that were under movement orders to proceed to those theaters. The intention, naturally, was to stop all outbound shipments

except those which would be required in

the theaters despite their inactive status.

Provision was also made for the disposition

of rotational and temporary duty troops

whose further employment might be

affected by the surrender of Germany.46

The Operations Division of the General

Staff was charged with over-all responsibility for co-ordinating the actual redeployment of troops. The commanders of

the AAF, the AGF, and the ASF each designated a liaison officer to work with the

Troop Control Section of OPD, and the

Chief of Transportation did likewise. The

specific responsibility of the OCT liaison

officer was to have on hand at all times information regarding the troops and the

impedimenta that were en route and the

location of all ships, as well as a plan for

rescheduling the ships when redeployment

began. Direct responsibility for controlling

the disposition of troops and supplies was

charged to the Movement Coordinating

Center, which had been set up in the Mobilization Division of ASF headquarters.47

In order to test the adequacy of the

procedures for redeployment and the readiness of the several agencies to carry those

procedures into effect, the War Department ordered a dry run on 25 March. The

actions that each agency would be required

to take on V-E Day were simulated. After

studying the results of the practice operation as it affected troop movements, the

Chief of Transportation reported that he

considered the prescribed procedures

basically sound. There were, however,

some details that required further attention. General Gross recommended particularly that each troop movement order

issued thereafter be specifically marked to

indicate whether the shipment would be

stopped on V-E Day or continued. This

arrangement already had been made in

connection with cargo and had been found

helpful. Accordingly the symbol "#" was

placed on the order opposite the name of

each individual who was to continue his

oversea trip despite the intervention of

V-E Day, and such troops were referred

to as having been "crosshatched." One of

the principal advantages anticipated from

this system of marking was that it would

enable the Transportation Corps, when

practicable, to assign only shipments of the

same classification to a troopship and thus

simplify the disposition of shipments at sea

on V-E Day.48

In the Office of the Chief of Transportation the planning for redeployment, as

well as for demobilization, was the direct

responsibility of each director and division

46

 Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, and ASF, 3

Apr 45, sub: Disp of Individuals in or En Route to

U.S. for Rotation or TD, AG 210.31 (31 Mar 45). 47

 ASF Cir 112, 24 Apr 44, Sec. VI; ASF MCC Sp

Memo 2, 7 Apr 45, sub: SOP for Sp Operation, OCT

HB Demob Plng Unit Redepl Policies and Procedures; Memo, ACofS OPD for CGs ASF, AGF, and

AAF, 9 Apr 45, sub: Procedure for Implementation

of Redepl, OPD 370.9 (9 Apr 45), and Tabs A-G. 48

 Memos for Record by Col Farr and Maj Ouderkirk, both dated 25 Mar 45, OCT HB Ouderkirk Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Lutes, 29 Mar 45, OCT 387

Trail Run of V-E Day Actions; Memo by Ouderkirk,

14 May 45, par. 9, included in Mvmts Div Hist, Apr

45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.
182 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

chief, so far as his particular activities were

concerned. Such planning involved many

individuals and units within the OCT,

and all proposals had to be co-ordinated

with the other War Department agencies

involved. In accordance with instructions

from the Commanding General, Army

Service Forces, to all technical services, the

Chief of Transportation established a Demobilization Planning Unit in his office

in November 1943. Headed by Col.

Halsey Dunwoody (Ret.) and supervised

by the OCT executive, Col. Luke W.

Finlay, this unit served as a co-ordinating

center for all Transportation Corps plans

affecting redeployment, readjustment, and

demobilization.49

Responsibility for the execution of

approved plans on behalf of the Chief of

Transportation also rested with the respective directors and division chiefs, or with

the commanders of Transportation Corps

field installations acting under their supervision. All actions to be taken by the

Transportation Corps relating to redeployment, readjustment, and demobilization

were described in detail in a pamphlet that

was issued first in May 1944 and revised

from time to time.50 Immediately after

V-E Day, as a further aid to those concerned with the redeployment of troops,

the Chief of Transportation issued a schedule briefly outlining the actions to be taken

and indicating the other War Department

agencies with which co-ordination was

necessary, the element of the OCT having

primary responsibility for each action,

and the other elements of the OCT

concerned.51

The careful preparations that were

made for redeployment, with respect to

both the formulation of procedures and

the assignment of responsibilities, reflected

the realization that V-E Day might come

suddenly and would call for a drastic

readjustment in troop and cargo movements. They also reflected the realization

that the smoothness and speed with which

redeployment was effected would have a

considerable bearing on the morale of the

troops and the rapidity with which the war

against Japan could be brought to a

conclusion.

Redeployment Between V-E Day

and V-J Day

When Germany surrendered on 8 May

1945 there were approximately 8,300,000

men and women in the U.S. Army in all

parts of the world. About 5,400,000 of

them were overseas, and some 3,500,000

of those were in the European and Mediterranean theaters. It was planned that by

discharging about 2,000,000, moving a

considerable number of troops from

Europe to the Pacific, and continuing the

draft about 6,968,000 men and women

would be in service at the end of twelve

months, a force considered necessary for

the early defeat of Japan. The War Department explained to the nation that,

although all physically fit soldiers who had

not yet served overseas would be assigned

to foreign service, it was still necessary for

many of the troops that had fought in

Europe to be redeployed to the Pacific.

During the winter of 1944-45 the demands

49

 Memo, CofT for Dir of Industrial Demob ASF,

24 Nov 43, OCT 387 Demob Plng—Matériel; OCT

Off Order 5-22, 25 Nov 43, sub: Demob Plng Unit;

Memo, CofT for Dirs and Div Cs OCT, 10 Apr 45,

sub: Responsibility for Preparing and Perfecting

Redepl, Readj, and Demob Plans, OCT 387 Demob

Plng. 50

 The first edition of TC Pamphlet 12 dealt only

with matériel demobilization; actions relating to personnel redeployment were added later. 51

 OCT Misc Ltr 153, 9 May 45, sub: WD Agencies

and OCT Divs Concerned with Redepl and Readj.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 183

of the European theater had been so heavy

that as V-E Day approached not a single

combat division and few smaller tactical

units remained in the United States. In

order to meet the timetable of the war

against Japan, about one third of the

troops being redeployed to the Pacific

would have to be shipped directly from

Europe. The remaining two thirds could

be redeployed through the United States

and given furloughs en route.52

A few days after the German capitulation, Generals Somervell and Gross summarized the transportation aspects of

redeployment as they then appeared.

Assuming that an occupation force of

about 400,000 would be left in Germany,

some 3,100,000 soldiers would have to be

transported from Europe during the ensuing ten to twelve months. It was estimated

that approximately 845,000 would be

moved during the first three months,

1,185,000 during the next three months,

and 807,000 during the third quarter of

redeployment. The Air Transport Command was expected to fly about 50,000

per month from Europe to the United

States and the remainder would be transported by water. The long voyages to the

Pacific, measuring up to 14,000 miles for

troops proceeding directly from Europe to

Manila, would necessitate an intensive

use of all available shipping. The shipping

problem was accentuated by the necessity

of using many vessels for the "roll-up" of

troops and supplies already in the Pacific

areas and the inadequate port facilities in

the Philippines and in other islands that

were to serve as bases for the attack on

Japan. They explained that, while the

major task of redeployment from Europe

to the Pacific was being performed, the

Transportation Corps would also have to

provide shipping to transport troops to

and from numerous other oversea areas in

order to carry out readjustments made

necessary by the change in the strategic

situation, and would have to transport

troop replacements and supporting supplies to all forces stationed outside the

United States.53

The effect of V-E Day on troopship

movements in the Atlantic was moderate

because the gradualness of the German

collapse had permitted numerous adjustments to be made in advance. No large

units had been shipped to Europe or the

Mediterranean for some weeks, and the

flow of replacement troops and combat

equipment had been reduced to the minimum.54

 A week before the German surrender steps were taken to check the return to

the theaters of temporary duty and furlough personnel that were in the United

States, except those designated for return

regardless of military developments.55 As

a result, so few troops were outbound when

V-E Day arrived that it was not necessary

to turn back any troopships then en route

to Europe; they were permitted to continue to their destinations in order to be

used immediately for redeployment.56

52

 Public statement by the War Department summarizing testimony given in executive session of the

House Committee on Military Affairs, issued 5 May

1945, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 53

 ASF press conf, 10 May 45, OCT HB TC Gen

Redepl. The transportation of about 90,000 American

RAMP's (Recovered Allied Military Personnel) from

Europe to U.S. had begun in April, and the bulk of

the movement was embarked in May and June. 54

 Memo, Ouderkirk for Farr, 27 Apr 45, sub:

Troops for May Shipment, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Ouderkirk Staybacks. 55

 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 May 45, CMOUT 75415; Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 2 May 45,

CM-OUT 76169. 56

 Memo, C of Mvmts Div for Hist Unit OCT, 20

Jun 45, par. 15, OCT HB Mvmt Div Rpts. In view

of the prospective reduction of supply requirements

in the ETO and the MTO, more than sixty cargo

ships were either turned back to U.S. ports while at

sea or were returned from Europe without unloading.
184 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

USS WEST POINT EMBARKING TROOPS AT NAPLES a few days after the

German surrender.

About a dozen ships that had sailed or

were about to sail to the United States

with prisoners of war were ordered to discharge their passengers at the ports of

origin so that they might embark troops

without delay.57

Redeployment got under way quickly.

The first troopships sailing from Europe to

the United States carried small units and

patients. The first large unit to arrive in

the United States was the 86th Infantry

Division, which reached New York on

17 June. By 7 July, within two months

after V-E Day, two more complete infantry divisions and parts of seven others were

back in the United States being prepared

for reshipment to the Pacific.58 The first

American troops to sail from Europe

directly to the Pacific left Leghorn, Italy,

on 8 June and arrived at Manila on

15 July. The shipment included 4,275

service troops, urgently needed at Manila,

whose relatively limited organizational

equipment made their early departure

possible.59

Co-ordination of the movement of

troops and equipment was the greatest

problem in direct redeployment. Although

57

 Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 12

Apr 45, sub: V-E Day Action; Memo, Col Griffin for

C of Mvmts Div, 9 May 45, sub: POW; Msg, Mvmts

Div OCT to theaters, 11 May 45, WARX 81054, and

appended note for record; all in OCT HB Mvmts Div

Griffin Staybacks. 58

 WD press release for 8 July 1945 lists divisions

scheduled for return to the United States by 31 December, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 59

 Memo by Maj Ouderkirk, 5 Oct 45, included in

Mvmts Div Hist for Jun 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Gen.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 185

86TH DIVISION TROOPS ARRIVING AT NEW YORK are met by the "Welcome

Home" boat.

a number of fast freighters were assigned

to lift the equipment, much of it had to

move in slow freighters, and in some instances the departure of troops had to be

delayed so that they would not arrive in

the Pacific too long before impedimenta

was available. The slowness in shipping

equipment was due chiefly to the inadequate facilities at European ports for processing vehicles for the ocean voyage and to

delays on the part of the Pacific commands

in naming destination ports.60

Various measures were taken to enlarge

troop-carrying capacity in order that the

rate of redeployment might be increased.

In anticipation of its need, the Army in

March had urged the Maritime Commission to expedite the delivery of troopships

then under construction.61 Work was

started soon after V-E Day on a program

to install temporary accommodations on

about 200 Liberty cargo ships to give them

a capacity of 550 each, and to convert 100

Victory cargo ships to carry 1,500 troops

each.62 Late in June the Chief of Staff

directed the Transportation Corps to "exploit every possible method of loading

troopships to the maximum, including

60

 Memo, CofT for OPD, 16 May 45, sub: Pacific

Destinations, OCT HB Farr Staybacks; Draft of Rad

to CINCAFPAC Manila, 3 Jul 45, and atchd memo

for record, OCT HB Ouderkirk Staybacks; Memo,

C of Mvmts Div for Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, par.

15, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts. 61

 Ltr, Somervell to Rear Adm Emory S. Land

(Ret), 28 Mar 45, OCT 561.4 Troop Transports. 62

 These Liberties had been equipped to carry up

to 500 troops in 1943-44; see above, Ch. II, pp. 90-91,

145-48.
186 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

THE QUEEN MARY ARRIVING AT NEW YORK with about 15,000 soldiers aboard.

converted cargo ships, not in excess of the

lowest acceptable standards."63 It was

anticipated that this would entail double

bunking, subnormal ventilation and sanitation, and the extensive use of dried and

prepared foods. Arrangements were made

with the Navy that whenever practicable

naval personnel returning from Europe

would be accommodated on combatant

ships in order that the troopship space

allotted to the Navy might be used for redeploying soldiers.64

 The discontinuance

of troopship convoys in the Atlantic on

4 June enabled the Army to quicken the

turnaround of vessels.

The plans for achieving a speedy

redeployment of troops included the continued use of vessels under British control

and the employment of such passenger

ships as might be surrendered by Germany. The British made their three largest

liners—the Queen Mary, the Queen Elizabeth,

and the Aquitania—available for the transportation of American troops from Europe

to the United States until the end of 1945.

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945,

seven vessels that had been under German

control were assigned to the United

States.65

With the vessels thus obtained and with

the aid of overloading wherever feasible,

63

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 28 Jun 45,

OPD 370.5 PTO (25 Jun 45). 64

 Msg, CNO to COMNAVEU, 16 May 45,

CM-IN 15801 (17 May 45). 65

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 225-26.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 187

the Chief of Transportation calculated that

by 1 October the troop shipping available

to the U.S. armed forces would accommodate more than 1,000,000 men.66

 He estimated that about 660,000 troops could be

embarked in all parts of the world in

August with the troop lift then available.67

Throughout redeployment the distribution of shipping was governed by plans for

the build-up of strength in the Pacific. Although in the beginning vessels aggregating about 200,000 troop spaces were

transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic,

it was intended that they should lift only

one shipment from Europe and then return

to the Pacific.68 Early in July OPD requested that the troop lift in the Pacific be

increased by 111,000 spaces. This request

was met by the reassignment of seventyfour Victory ships that had been designated for service in the Atlantic after conversion to troop carriers. By that time the

flow of troops from Europe to the United

States by water and air had so far exceeded expectations that the transfer of

this large number of vessels could be made

without prejudicing the ability of the

Transportation Corps to complete the removal of troops from Europe by 30 June

1946.69 Arrangements with the Navy

assured that all available space in combatant vessels sailing from the United

States to the Pacific would be used for

troops.70

Because of the intensity with which the

ships were used, close co-ordination was

necessary between the War Department

and the theater commanders, and this was

particularly true of the European theater.

Soon after V-E Day Maj. Gen. Frank S.

Ross, Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA,

and a group of officers came to Washington to work out the details of redeployment procedures. The Army Service

Forces sent a group to Europe, including

representatives of all technical services

and some of the staff divisions, to assist the

ETO and the MTO with their redeployment problems.71

 The Chief of Transportation kept the theater commanders informed regarding troopship schedules,

including anticipated arrival and departure dates at American and European

ports. Each theater commander was required to send a pre-embarkation message

to the War Department about five days in

advance of every homeward sailing giving

a summary of the troops to be embarked,

and to dispatch complete troop rosters by

air mail on the same day. Within twentyfour hours after a sailing the theater commander notified the War Department by

radio concerning any corrections in the

data previously forwarded.72

An observer from the New York Port of

Embarkation who was detailed to the

ETO during the greater part of the redeployment period reported that one of the

chief difficulties in the theater was to

reconcile the troop movement directives

received from OPD with the troopship

schedules and capacities provided by the

Chief of Transportation, since the former

consistently exceeded the latter notwithstanding the general practice of overload66

 Estimate by Water Div OCT, 10 Jul 45, OCT

HB TC Gen Redepl. 67

 Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 7

Aug 45, sub: Available Troop Lift, OCT HB TC Gen

Redepl. 68

 Memo by Maj Russell H. Nies, 14 Jun 45, in

Mvmts Div Histories, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 69

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 7 Jul 45, sub:

Increased Lift for Pacific, OPD 370.5 (7 Jul 45);

Memo, Wylie for Stokes, 9 Jul 45, OCT HB TC Gen

Redepl; Ltr, JCS to Adm Land, WSA, 28 Jul 45,

OPD 561, Sec. III. 70

 Min of OCT Opns Mtg, 25 Jun 45, OCT HB Dir

of Opns. 71

 Min of ASF Staff Mtg, 29 May 45, p. 16. 72

 Memo, Farr for Finlay, 24 Jul 45, OCT HB

Griffin Staybacks.
188 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ing the vessels to the maximum.73 This

difficulty suggests that the co-ordination

between OPD and the OCT regarding

homeward movements was less complete

than it had been during the period of

heavy outbound shipments.

The Army in its planning for redeployment attached considerable importance

to maintaining morale. The morale problem had to be met first in the theaters

while the troops were in a state of comparative idleness awaiting transportation.

The prime necessity was to keep the men

occupied, and this was done as far as possible by programs of athletics, recreation,

and education.74 Care was taken also to

provide correct information on redeployment objectives and procedures so that the

troops would not build up expectations

that could not be realized. Indoctrination

was not always accomplished before sailing, and the transport commanders were

accordingly directed to give the matter

special attention during the voyage.75 One

result of misinformation, which had to be

corrected, was that the troops believed

they were on leave from the time they left

the theater. Actually they were in duty

status until their furloughs started at the

reception stations.

When the fighting ceased the general

attitude of troops in Europe was that they

would willingly endure any discomfort on

the voyage homeward if that would

hasten their arrival, yet many voiced complaints after reaching the United States.

In a broad survey of soldier opinion on

the manner in which redeployment was

being accomplished, The Inspector General heard many criticisms of conditions

on the ships and the handling of the

troops.76 The difference in attitude before

and after the voyage is not difficult to

understand. In Europe the soldier was

filled with the desire to get home and

nothing else seemed important. Once on

the way, he was face to face with the abnormal conditions that inevitably attend

troop movements executed under pressure, and he found them not to his liking.

It is probable that some men registered

complaints when approached by press reporters after debarkation because they

believed that that was the only way to

make the news columns. It is clear, on the

other hand, that because of overcrowding

the ocean voyage could scarcely have been

a pleasant experience. Many of the complaints were from men who had returned

on the temporarily converted Liberty

ships. It would have been fortunate if the

use of these ships could have been avoided,

but they were needed to carry out the

timetable of redeployment, and their use

before and after V-J Day enabled 375,000

soldiers to reach home earlier than would

have been the case otherwise.77

Because of the increased number of

ships to be debarked at U.S. Atlantic 73

 Memo, Lt Col Milton Wallach for CofT, 5 Sep

45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 74

 Such programs were outlined in RR 1-3 and

RR 1-4. 75

 Memo, CofT for CG ETO, 23 Apr 45, sub: Orientation Before Embarkation at Oversea Ports, OCT

HB Griffin Staybacks; Memo, TAG for All Theaters,

27 May 45, AG 370.5 (24 May 45); Memo, CofT for

CGs of PEs 29 May 45, sub: Info for Returned

Troops, OCT HB Mvmts Div Troop Mvmts Inbound. 76

 Memo, TIG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 45, sub: Conditions Surrounding and Treatment Afforded American

Troops Being Returned to U.S.; 2d Ind, CofT for CG

ASF, 21 Aug 45, commenting on the various complaints; both in OCT 370.5 Returning Overseas Veterans. Cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe

(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company,

Inc., 1949), pp. 420-22, on attitude of RAMP's. 77

 Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Shipping in War, p.

22, OCT HB Topic Logistics Gen.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 189

ports during redeployment, careful planning was necessary for the most efficient

use of port facilities and rail transportation. Accurate information regarding the

time of arrival for each vessel was needed,

and this information was supplied by

radio reports from the ships to the Navy's

Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF). These reports

were relayed to the Chief of Transportation and the ports of embarkation. .After

V-E Day in order to assure the prompt

distribution of such information, the Chief

of Transportation arranged for the establishment of a liaison staff at ESF headquarters in New York. This staff, which

began functioning on 22 May, consisted of

an officer from the OCT and officers and

enlisted men assigned by the port commanders at Boston, New York, Hampton

Roads, and Charleston. It maintained a

twenty-four-hour watch and made one

comprehensive report to the port commanders each day in addition to such

special reports as might be found

necessary.78

With the arrival of V-E Day the adjustments that had been planned for the port

staging areas were placed in effect. The

procedures for the operation of disposition

centers for disbanding Category IV units

had been recently tested at the New York

Port of Embarkation, and such centers

were immediately placed in operation by

the port commanders at Boston, Hampton Roads, and New Orleans,79

 as well as at

New York. Redeployment areas were

established by these port commanders to

handle Category II troops, which were

being sent on to the Pacific. A section of

the staging area at the Charleston Port of

Embarkation, which handled a relatively

small volume of troop traffic, was designated to serve as a disposition center or

redeployment area as conditions might require. Since redeployment involved the

return of many seasoned troops from the

Pacific for demobilization, disposition

centers were set up also at San Francisco,

Seattle, and Prince Rupert. The basic

purpose in establishing disposition centers

and redeployment areas in the staging

areas at the ports was to segregate inbound troops completely from those en

route to the theaters in order that the different types of processing might be accomplished without interference or delay.

The plan to increase redeployment by

utilizing aircraft resolved itself into two

projects. The Green Project, which involved the assignment of additional transport planes to the Air Transport Command for transatlantic service, continued

until 10 September 1945 and transported

about 166,000 troops from the ETO and

the MTO to the United States. At its

height the undertaking exceeded somewhat the target of 50,000 troops per

month, but in August the Army began to

withdraw aircraft from it as part of a plan

to augment the flow of troops from the

United States to the western Pacific. The

White Project involved the transportation

of AAF crews and such other personnel as

could be accommodated in bombers that

were being returned from Europe to the

zone of interior. About 85,000 men were

returned in this manner.80

78

 Msg, Mvmts Div OCT to CG BPE, et al., 18 May

45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Griffin Staybacks; Rpts of

Returning Troops Br and Liaison Staff in Mvmts Div

Hist for Jun 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 79

 OCT Misc Ltr 159, 14 May 45; 1st Ind, NYPE

for CofT, 18 Jun 45; both in OCT HB TC Gen

Redepl. The latter document outlines readjustments

made at NYPE for handling inbound troops. 80

 WD press release, 23 Jul 45, sub: 125,370 Troops

Flown from Europe Since May 1; Memo, ACofS

OPD for CofS USA, 4 Aug 45, sub: AAF Plan for

Increasing Pacific Troop Lift, and other documents

in OPD 320.2 TS, Sec. V; data provided by Hist Br,

Int Div MATS, 19 Jun 51, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.
190 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The number of troops arriving in the

United States from the European and

Mediterranean theaters during June was

much greater than the number that had

been forecast. Early in May the Chief of

Transportation had estimated that June

arrivals by water would approximate

107,000; this estimate was later revised to

154,000 and actual arrivals were slightly

in excess of 236,000. The increase was explained by the Movements Division on

several grounds. The Navy's discontinuance of troopship convoys on 4 June permitted faster turnaround of the vessels.

The resort to maximum overloading on

all vessels ordered by the General Staff

added substantially to the capacity of each

ship. Several ships that had been scheduled for direct sailings to the Pacific were

used for one voyage in the North Atlantic.

The Army Air Forces also exceeded expectations by landing 56,000 troops in the

United States under the Green and White

Projects.81 The total of approximately

292,000 troops landed on the Atlantic seaboard by water and air in June was

exceeded by about 49,000 in July, when

341,00 were returned to the United States

from the ETO and the MTO.82

The impact of the unexpectedly heavy

influx of troops on the American railroads

was severe. All of the returning soldiers,

whether they were being redeployed or

demobilized, had to make a number of

trips in quick succession. The entire process was geared to speed, which gave no

opportunity to regulate the flow and level

off the peaks. Many of the troops arriving

from Europe and the Mediterranean were

destined for personnel centers in distant

western states. The traffic from the eastern

ports was largely one-way, so that a great

deal of deadheading of railway equipment

was involved. The demand for Pullman

equipment, which had been heavy

throughout the war, now became heavier,

and the new troop sleepers that had been

ordered after V-E Day were not yet

available.

The carriers were able to provide transportation for the heavy movements from

the ports, but they frequently were unable

to provide sleeping cars for soldiers who

were entitled to them under Army regulations. Many complaints were received

through Congressional and other channels because returning veterans were required to make long trips without proper

sleeping facilities. General Gross had already given the Office of Defense Transportation his opinion that a "firm denial

of transportation means to the public"

would be necessary and had suggested

ways of making more sleeping cars available for troops.83

 On 26 June the matter

was again presented to the ODT in a joint

letter from the Army, the Navy, the Coast

Guard, and the Marine Corps. The

armed forces expressed concern because

of "the inadequate response" made thus

far in the provision of passenger equipment for military personnel returning

from overseas. They stated that between

1 and 24 June, 143,000 Army troops had

traveled an average distance of 1,251

miles in coaches because sleepers were not

provided; meanwhile regular overnight

sleeping car services were being maintained for the general public. While

recognizing that the manner of meeting

the military need must be left to the ODT

81

 Ltr, Johnson, Dir ODT, to USW, 18 Jul 45, OCT

511; Memo, Finlay for Farr, 23 Jul 45, and reply 24

Jul 45, OCT 387 Demob Plng. 82

 Ltr, SW to Sen William F. Knowland, 30 Oct 45,

WDCSA 370.01, Sec. VIII, Cases 221-320. 83

 Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 30 May 45, OCT HB

Gross ODT.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 191

and the carriers, the armed forces suggested that Pullman equipment be withdrawn from all regular routes of 400 miles

or less and that reservations for sleeping

car space be restricted to a period of five

or six days in advance of the journey.84

Early in July the press carried the story

of a movement of 500 officers and enlisted

men from Camp Myles Standish in Massachusetts to Camp Beale in California

that had been made in day coaches. During the trip a rumor spread among the

troops to the effect that sleeping cars had

been passed that were occupied by German prisoners of war. The investigation

that followed disclosed that the cars assigned to this movement were entirely

unsuitable for so long a trip, but failed to

locate any member of the party who

claimed to have actually seen prisoners of

war in sleeping cars. In his news conference on 5 July, Under Secretary of War

Robert P. Patterson was requested to give

the facts concerning the matter. He stated

that the report regarding prisoners of war

was not true and that sleeping cars were

never used for such traffic except in the

few cases where prisoners were also hospital patients. Referring to the assignment

of day coaches, Mr. Patterson observed

that the War Department some weeks

previously had called the situation to the

attention of the railroads and the Office of

Defense Transportation and had urged

that sleepers be provided for long trips,

but that adequate relief had not yet been

forthcoming.85

The public statement by the Under

Secretary of War brought a vigorous response from the Director of Defense

Transportation and also some countercharges. Mr. Johnson denied that the cars

used for the trip from Camp Myles Standish to Camp Beale had been commuter

cars as had been reported; they were all

standard, steel day coaches. He objected

to the implication in Mr. Patterson's statement that the entire blame for the necessity of carrying soldiers across the continent in day coaches lay with the ODT

and the carriers. Rather, he contended,

the War Department had never consulted

the ODT regarding any of its troop movements and had not kept the ODT informed regarding the fluctuations in the

volume of its redeployment traffic. He referred particularly to the great increase in

troop arrivals from Europe and the Mediterranean during June compared with

earlier estimates, and the prospective increase in July arrivals. He stated: "If you

expect transportation to be furnished adequately, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Association of American

Railroads must be informed of any such

fluctuations."86

Mr. Patterson promptly answered these

charges. He asserted that whether or not

the cars assigned to the movement in

question were, strictly speaking, commuter types they were quite unsuitable for

transcontinental travel. He did not believe that lack of detailed information regarding projected movements justified the

failure to provide proper equipment. He

cited various occasions on which the ODT

and the railroads had been warned of the

heavy demand that would be made on

84

 Ltr, Armed Forces to Johnson, 26 Jun 45, OCT

HB Gross ODT. Concerning the Canadian Government's control of the use of rail equipment, see Ltr,

Thomas C. Lockwood, Canadian Transport Controller, to johnson, 15 Jun 45, and Ltr, Gross to Lockwood, 21 Jun 45, both in OCT HB Gross ODT. 85

 Memo for the press, 5 Jul 45, ASF Hq Control

Div 531.2. Reports and affidavits concerning this

troop movement are in OCT HB Wylie Troop

Mvmts. 86

 Ltr, Johnson to Patterson, 6 Jul 45, ASF Hq

Control Div 531.2.
192 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

them for equipment and the specific suggestions that had been made to increase

the number of sleepers available for troops.

He asserted that with regard to withdrawing additional sleepers from regular services the Army had observed a "hesitating

attitude" on the part of the carriers and a

"desire to escape a direct solution." The

Under Secretary added that in order to

meet the charge that the load had not

been adequately defined for the ODT, the

Chief of Transportation thereafter would

furnish the ODT with all forecasts and

any modifications that might become

necessary.87

The Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program

took cognizance of the complaints regarding the transportation furnished to returning troops and the controversy over responsibility for the situation. The committee's hearings gave Mr. Johnson an

opportunity to review his differences with

the armed forces and the circumstances

that he felt had intensified the problem.

He reiterated his contention that the

Army had failed to keep him properly informed regarding the volume of railway

traffic to be expected as a result of redeployment, and that in the absence of such

information adequate plans to meet the

requirements for equipment could not be

made. This, however, was only the immediate cause of the difficulty. Deeper causes

lay in the failure throughout the war to

make adequate provision for new railway

equipment and for the protection of railway manpower. These failures were

largely due to the heavy demands of the

armed forces for military equipment and

military manpower, and Mr. Johnson

stressed the point, which he had made

before, that it was inconsistent to make

extraordinary efforts to destroy the enemy's transportation system while at the

same time allowing our own to

deteriorate.88

Since General Gross was in Europe at

the time of the hearing, the Chief of Transportation's position was presented to the

committee by Maj. Gen. John M. Franklin, Acting Chief of Transportation, aided

by Colonel Finlay, Executive. Their statements indicated that the Office of the

Chief of Transportation, in accordance

with arrangements in effect throughout

the war, had furnished advance information regarding specific troop shipments to

the Association of American Railroads,

which then took steps to provide the required equipment. The OCT had provided the Director of Defense Transportation with forecasts of the number of troops

to arrive each month, but had not given

him further details because such details

had not been requested and he had no

apparent need for them. The failure to

keep Johnson currently informed regarding the increase of redeployment traffic

over forecasts was explained on the ground

that in the new undertaking to bring large

numbers of troops back to the United

States the excess of shipments over estimates became apparent only from day to

day. In the testimony on behalf of the

Chief of Transportation, the point was

87

 Ltrs, Patterson to Johnson, 9 Jul 45 and 26 Jul 45,

both in OCT 511 Redepl; Memo, CofT for Dir Opns

OCT, et al., 1 Aug 45, sub: Rpts of Troop Mvmts for

ODT, OCT 511 1943-45. In a letter to the Under

Secretary of War, Mr. Johnson denied that there had

been any disposition to withhold equipment from the

military services and attributed any such appearance

to lack of adequate information with which to work.

(Ltr, Div OCT to USW, 18 Jul 45, OCT 511 Redepl). 88

 Press release by the committee, 19 Jul 45, ASF

Hq Contl Div 032.3 Mead Committee; Senate Special

Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings, July 23 and 24,

1945.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 193

stressed that the problem was not one of

furnishing equipment for the movement

of troops, since that was already being

done, but one of providing sleeping cars

for those who were required to make long

trips.89

Reading the testimony and related correspondence, one cannot escape the conclusion that neither party was without

fault. If the Director of Defense Transportation, feeling that he was not being

kept properly informed, had requested

more up-to-date and detailed information,

he undoubtedly would have received all

the data that were available. He did not

do this, however, until eight weeks after

V-E Day, when the use of unsuitable

equipment to transport troops was receiving widespread publicity. On the other

hand, it is difficult to understand why the

Chief of Transportation, having repeatedly

asserted that the Director of Defense

Transportation was responsible for the

adequacy of transportation to meet the

Army's need, should not have voluntarily

provided that official with any and all information bearing on the extent of the

need.

Several weeks after the issue came into

the open, Under Secretary Patterson in a

letter to John W. Snyder, Director, Office

of War Mobilization and Reconversion,

stated that the failure to keep Mr. Johnson fully informed had been due partly to

inadvertence and partly to the lack of a

clear understanding of the type of information desired.90

 This no doubt is a fair

statement. More fundamental are the

facts that Johnson and Gross did not agree

regarding the extent to which civilian

travel should be curtailed in favor of military traffic, and that while in many

respects the two offices co-operated freely

the relationship between them on matters

involving this issue was not a sympathetic

one.

The contention of the Director of Defense Transportation that throughout the

war the requirements of the domestic

carriers for new equipment and manpower had been neglected because of the

heavy demands of the armed forces goes

to the heart of the problem of war production and manpower utilization. The

armed forces had been given certain strategic objectives, and their requirements

for soldiers, equipment, and supplies were

based on their estimates of what was

necessary to accomplish those objectives.

They did not fail to recognize the importance of the transportation industry in the

military effort and made certain concessions to aid the carriers, but those concessions were not sufficient to meet the ODT

point of view. In this connection two

aspects of the military point of view must

be understood. With regard to transportation equipment, the Army contended that

the military need could and should be met

with the available facilities by restricting

the civilian use of transportation for nonessential purposes. With regard to manpower, the Army believed that the

problems of both industry and the military forces could have been greatly eased

by a more judicious use of the nation's

labor force, possibly under a national

service law.91

As a result of the situation that developed in June and early July, several orders

were issued by the ODT to regulate the

89

 Hearings cited n. 88, July 27, 1945. 90

 Ltr, Patterson to Snyder, 30 Jul 45, OCT HB

Gross ODT. For a summary of the information given

the ODT, see TWX Conf, Gen Franklin, et al, in

Washington with Gen Gross in Berlin, 24 Jul 45, OCT

HB TC Gen Redepl. 91

 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 328-41.
194 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

use of railroad passenger cars. The carriers were directed not to reserve, allocate,

or sell reserve seats or sleeping car space

more than 120 hours in advance of the

scheduled departure of the train.92 The

measure was designed to check the practice adopted by some individuals and

business firms of tying up space for which

they did not have a specific or legitimate

need. The operation of sleeping cars on

routes of 450 miles or less was prohibited.

The ODT stated that as a result of this

order about 900 sleeping cars were withdrawn from regular service and placed in

a pool for use of the military forces.93 All

railway passenger coaches were placed in

a pool to be employed under the direction

of the ODT, and the chairman of the Gar

Service Division of the Association of

American Railroads was designated the

agent of the ODT to administer the

order.94 The armed forces were required,

when making organized military movements, to place three persons in each sleeping car section and corresponding coach

space. This requirement made uniform

the practice the Army had followed

throughout the war and brought to an

end the Navy's insistence on placing only

two men in a section.95 The ODT had

proposed that four soldiers be placed in a

section, but the Army refused to concur

contending that such crowding was "beyond practicable limits," and pointing

out the unfairness of requiring soldiers to

travel under such conditions when civilians "vacation-bent" could have sole

occupancy of berths.96

A number of measures were taken by

the Army to relieve the acute transportation situation. The War Department renewed its instructions on reducing official

military travel wherever practicable.97

Local transportation officers were directed

to consolidate small groups whenever

possible in order to conserve car space,

and officers ordering such movements

were directed to set dates between which

the movement might be made, rather

than specific dates.98 Local transportation

officers were again reminded that they

must give the carriers as much advance

notice of their equipment requirements as

possible.99 The passenger associations of

the railroads were urged to select the

shortest routes for troop movements so far

as practicable.100 The regulation providing that troops were entitled to sleeping

car accommodations for overnight trips

was temporarily suspended, and transportation officers were directed not to request

sleeping cars for trips of less than fortyeight hours.101

 The Chief of Transportation maintained a time record for each

movement, indicating each step in the

process of ordering equipment and moving troops, in order to ascertain where unnecessary delays were encountered.102

A plan of "rotational sleeping," which

92

 ODT GO 52, 29 Jun 45. 93

 ODT GO 53, 7 Jul 45; ODT, Civilian War

Transport, pp. 82. 83. 94

 ODT GO 55, 17 Jul 45. 95

 ODT GO 56, 20 Jul 45; Ltr, SW to SN, 5 Jul 45;

Ltr, SN to SW, 13 Jul 45; last two in G-4 510, Vol. III. 96

 Ltr, Johnson to Patterson, 30 Jun 45; Ltr, Patterson to Johnson, 4 Jul 45; both in ASF Control Div

531.2. 97

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS and SW, 3 Aug 45;

Ltr, SW to Dir ODT, 6 Aug 45; Ltr, Acting SW to

Dir ODT, 22 Aug 45; all in G-4 510, Vol. III. 98

 WD Cir 199, 3 Jul 45. 99

 WD CTB 35, 10 Jul 45. 100

 Memos, CofT for the respective passenger associations, 18 Jul 45 and 26 Jul 45, OCT 387 Demob

Plng—Redepl Traf. 101

 Msg, TAG for SvCs, 11 Jul 45; Memo, CofT for

TAG, 9 Aug 45, sub: Sleeping Car Equip, AG 510

(27Aug42)(2). 102

 Ltr, White to IMC, 25 Jun 45, OCT 531.7 Train

Service; Memo, MTS for White, 7 Aug 45, OCT 080

AAR.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 195

promised a substantial saving in sleeping

car space, was tried by the Transportation

Corps in July. The two trains that were

operated experimentally on this basis

were made up of both sleepers and

coaches. The troops that had occupied the

sleepers during half of the day were

moved to the coaches, and the troops that

had occupied the coaches were moved to

the sleepers. Theoretically the plan

seemed good, but in practice it presented

difficulties and accordingly was not employed further. Aside from the inevitable

disorder involved in changing cars, the

transfer of troops from air-conditioned

sleepers to non-air-conditioned coaches in

midsummer created more dissension than

if the men had been obliged to travel in

coaches all the way.103

The Director of Defense Transportation

requested the Army to ascertain whether

greater use could be made of airlift and

motorbuses in the effort to lighten the

load on the railroads. The Army Air

Forces determined that it would be practicable to release from seventy-five to

eighty transport planes and about 260

airline pilots then in the service, and to

place the equipment and personnel at the

disposal of the transcontinental commercial airlines for their use in transporting military passengers. This supplementary airlift was expected to provide

transcontinental passage for about 25,000

troops per month. The project was approved by the War Department late in

July, but the commercial airlines did not

begin moving troops until after the Japanese surrender.104

 The use of buses in lieu

of rail transportation was limited by the

agreement between the armed forces and

the railroads to cases where the highway

carriers could provide more satisfactory

service than the rail lines, but local transportation officers, particularly those at

personnel centers, were encouraged to

keep in mind the possibility of using the

highway carriers when they offered superior service.105

The Director of Defense Transportation

also recommended that the War Department endeavor to arrange a more even

flow of troops into the Atlantic coast ports.

He pointed out that during a ten-day

period in mid-July approximately 30,000

troops had arrived on each of two peak

days, whereas the daily average for the

period was less than 12,000. The War Department recognized that such heavy concentrations placed an unusual burden on

the railroads, but it stated that in order to

carry out the plan to return troops from

Europe as quickly as possible and to be in

a position to transfer ships to the Pacific

for a rapid build-up against Japan, it had

to make maximum use of the vessels. An

attempt to smooth out the inbound flow

of troops would involve retarding some of

the ships, which the War Department did

not consider feasible.106 It was evident also

that the measures taken had somewhat

improved the military sleeping car situation, for General Williamson was able to

report on 28 July that during the preceding ten days the carriers had provided

sleeping cars for all movements of forty or

103

 WD press release, 20 Jul 45; Interv with Maj

Farley, 24 May 51; both in OCT HB TG Gen Redepl.

Major Farley represented the Traffic Control Division, OCT, as an observer on one of these trips. 104

 See below, pp. 208-09; Memo, Maj William H.

Henderson, Jr., for ACofS G-4, 19 Jul 45, sub: Investigation of Air Lift; Memo, CG AAF for CofS USA,

27 Jul 45; Ltr, USW to Dir ODT, 31 Jul 45; all in G-4

510, Vol. III. 105

 Memo, CofT for ACofS G-4, 31 Jul 45, sub: Use

of Commercial Bus Lines; WD CTB 43, 23 Aug 45;

both in AG 537 (31 Jul 45). 106

 Ltr, Dir ODT to USW, 24 Jul 45; Ltr, USW to

Dir ODT, 31 Jul 45; both in G-4 510, Vol. III.
196 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

more troops when the travel time was

forty-eight hours or more.107

Because of the several categories of

troops that were in a sense competing for

the available sleeping car space, the

Traffic Control Division in the Office of

the Chief of Transportation had employed

an informal plan of priority throughout

the war. In August 1945 this plan was

elaborated and adopted by all of the

armed forces.108 The joint preference

agreement was applicable to all carload

traffic moving under the Joint Military

Passenger Agreement and to individuals

engaging sleeping car space through the

government reservation bureaus. First

preference was given to hospital and litter

patients regardless of the distance to be

traveled. Second preference was given to

troops moving to staging areas or replacement depots for shipment overseas. Third

preference was applicable to redeployed

troops moving from ports of debarkation

to personnel centers and from personnel

centers to assembly stations before embarkation for Pacific destinations, and also to

certain civilian technicians moving under

military orders. The remaining traffic was

covered by preferences four and five.

Within a preference category, priority was

given to the movement involving the

greatest number of nights of travel. This

joint preference agreement did not go as

far as the Chief of Transportation had

gone in directing that movements of less

than forty-eight hours should use coaches;

it provided instead that movements of 450

miles or less would not use sleepers unless

the cars otherwise would have to be deadheaded, and that movements involving

only one night en route would use coaches

if they were available. Probably the improvement in the sleeping car situation

that occurred in July and the prospect of

early delivery of the 1,200 special troop

sleepers on order influenced the decision.

The heavy and steady flow of troops

from port staging areas to personnel centers gave rise to some new problems in the

operation of troop trains. The number of

troop train commanders had to be greatly

increased, and many inexperienced officers had to be trained to perform the exacting duties; arrangements were made so

that they could shuttle back and forth

with as little delay as possible. In addition

to the train commander, the commander

of a staging area assigned a group supervisor for the troops destined for a single

personnel center, a car leader for each car,

and the required number of kitchen and

mess personnel. The Chief of Transportation issued a special pamphlet setting

forth in detail the responsibilities of the

staging area commanders and the troop

train complements.109 Pending the delivery of the new kitchen cars ordered in

May, arrangements were made with the

railroads for the assignment of additional

baggage cars to be converted to kitchen

cars. In July there were 500 baggage cars

in this pool.110

Although traffic calculations were necessarily tentative and were completely

upset by the early surrender of Japan, the

forecasts prepared in the Office of the

Chief of Transportation after two months

107

 Ltr, Williamson to ODT, 28 Jul 45, OCT HB

Gross ODT. 108

 Ltr, C of Traf Contl Div to AAR, 7 Aug 45,

OCT 531.7 Preference Plan; WD CTB 40, 13 Aug 45,

sub: Preference Plan for Ordering and Furnishing

Pullman Equip, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Pass. 109

 TC Cir 100-10, revised 13 Jun 45, sub: Mvmts

to Pers Centers; ASF Cir 253, 3 Jul 45, Sec. I; TC Cir

101-2, 11 Aug 45; TC Pamphlet 45, 11 Aug 45, sub:

TC Manual for St Area and Troop Train Comdrs. 110

 OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 124.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 197

of experience with redeployment are of

interest. They give an indication of the

rates at which troop withdrawals from

inactive theaters and the build-up of

strength in the Pacific were to have been

accomplished, and of the effect of this redeployment on troop travel within the

United States. According to these forecasts

the heaviest shipments of troops from inactive theaters would be in July, the

heaviest shipments of troops from the

United States to the Pacific would be in

November, and the arrivals of units in the

Pacific would reach a crest in December.

(Chart 5) The volume of Army rail traffic

in organized movements (forty or more

troops), which had attained a monthly

peak of 1,001,000 passengers in April 1943

and then had declined to slightly over

430,000 just before the German surrender

when the larger part of the Army was

overseas, was expected to reach almost

1,500,000 in some months in late 1945

and early 1946.111

Of the total force of somewhat more

than 400,000 troops that was to have been

redeployed directly from the European

and Mediterranean theaters to the Pacific,

approximately 155,000 had been embarked when the end of hostilities disrupted the redeployment plan. Of this

number, 117,000 were from the ETO

and most of them had been embarked at

Marseille. The 38,000 shipped from the

MTO had been embarked at Naples and

Leghorn.112

Repatriation After the Surrender of Japan

Although the Japanese surrender on 14

August 1945 came much earlier than had

been expected, plans for making the necessary adjustments in oversea troop movements had been worked out, and they

were placed in effect at once.113 The

records of the Chief of Transportation's

Movements Division, showing the position

of all ships and the troop units en route or

scheduled for movement, facilitated this

action. Eighteen troopships that were en

route between Europe and the Panama

Canal destined for the Pacific were diverted to U.S. east coast ports. Twenty

troopships at or en route to Marseille and

Naples to embark troops for the Pacific

were ordered to embark troops for discharge in the United States. Twenty-four

freighters carrying organizational equipment from Europe to the Pacific were diverted to U.S. east coast ports. The troop

movements scheduled to leave U.S. west

coast ports for the Pacific during August

were not greatly affected by the cessation

of hostilities. High-point men were

screened out, but otherwise units and replacements sailed as planned, and the

number of Army personnel embarked for

the Pacific in August (about 158,000) far

exceeded that of any previous month.

These troops, and the smaller numbers

shipped in subsequent months, were intended to relieve from occupational duty

troops that had already seen long service

overseas.114

111

 Chart prepared in Transport Economics Br,

Traf Contl Div, OCT, 4 Jul 45, OCT HB Gen

Redepl. 112

 ASF MPR, Oct 45, Sec. 3, p. 16. For a discussion of assembly areas and port staging areas for

troops being shipped from Europe as well as the work

of the Redeployment Coordinating Group, which

functioned in Europe, see Sparrow, op. cit., pp.

178-97. 113

 Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, et al., 14 Aug

45, sub: Procedure for Disposition of Units, etc., Upon

Surrender of Japan, AG 370.01 (13 Aug 45). 114

 Mvmts Div Hists for Aug, Sep, Oct 45, OCT HB

Mvmts Div Gen. Movements of cargo ships carrying

maintenance supplies were more extensively affected,

as will be explained in Ch. V, below.
CHART 5—FORECAST OF TROOP REDEPLOYMENT, PREPARED BY THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION, AS OF 11 JULY 1945

DEPARTURES FROM EUROPE AND OTHER INACTIVE THEATERS

* Since this diagram is intended to indicate monthly additions to strength in the Pacific, it does not include replacements.

Source: Charts A, C, and D, prepared by the Planning Division, OCT; copies in OCT HB TC General, Redeployment.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 199

When Japan surrendered the Army had

about 4,500,000 troops overseas. The size

of the occupational forces had not been

fixed, but it was calculated that more than

3,500,000 of these troops would have to be

repatriated as soon as possible. The Army

realized that there would be an insistent

popular demand for speedy demobilization and that regardless of the rate of

repatriation it could not be fast enough to

satisfy the desires of the soldiers and their

relatives. Nevertheless, the military authorities assured the nation that all resources would be utilized to bring the

troops home and return them to civilian

life. General Somervell and several members of his staff held a press conference on

16 August, in which many aspects of the

demobilization plans were explained. On

that occasion General Gross stated that in

the months to come the movement of soldiers to the United States would far exceed anything achieved during redeployment. He asserted that every available

ship would be used, and at the same time

emphasized that the load on the American railroads would be exceedingly heavy.

"All of us at home," he said, "must be

prepared to accept inconveniences in

order that the reunion of families in peace

may be accomplished as quickly as possible."

 115

 He meant, of course, that regular

railway services would have to be further

reduced in order to provide adequate and

suitable transportation for troops.

During August General Gross discussed

at length with the Association of American Railroads the heavy burden that

would fall on the carriers when repatriation from both Europe and the Pacific got

under way. AAR officials were confident

that by giving preference to military over

civilian traffic the railroads could transport inland all of the soldiers that the

Transportation Corps could land at the

ports. In order to shorten the rail haul as

much as possible, they suggested that

troops returning from Europe be regrouped at the oversea staging areas and

embarked on ships that would land them

at the U.S. ports nearest the separation

centers for which they were destined, and

also that troops returning from the Pacific be assembled at Hawaii and similarly

regrouped for discharge at the ports nearest their separation centers. General Gross,

while recognizing the merit of these suggestions from the standpoint of the railroads, saw only limited possibility of putting them into effect because the proposed

arrangements would interfere with the

operation of the point system—which was

being closely followed in determining the

order in which soldiers would be repatriated—and because they would involve an

"extravagant use of shipping capacity."

 116

The discussions between General Gross

and the AAR did not bring about a complete meeting of the minds regarding the

extent of military rail traffic during repatriation or the manner in which it would

be accommodated. General Gross wanted

a specific statement from the carriers as to

the number of troops they would be able

to handle. The response of the Association

of American Railroads was that the only

limiting factor would be the extent to

which civilian travel could be reduced, a

response that left the point unsettled. The

AAR wanted a firm estimate of the number of troops to be landed at U.S. ports

during succeeding months. General Gross

could only state that, while he had pro115

 ASF press conf, 16 Aug 45, OCT HB TC Gen

Demob. 116

 Ltr, Buford to Gross, 13 Aug 45, and reply, 17

Aug 45, both in OCT 387 Demob Plng.
200 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

vided and would continue to provide the

best possible estimates, the figures necessarily would be tentative for a period because of the suddenness with which the

war had ended and the necessity of completely revising troop movement and

shipping plans.117

The rate of repatriation from Europe

depended chiefly on the amount of shipping that could be assigned, but the rate

from the western Pacific was affected by a

number of factors. General MacArthur's

troops were scattered among many small

and widely separated bases, and it was

uncertain how quickly they could be

transported to assembly areas for embarkation on transpacific vessels.118

 The number of troops required for the occupation

of Japan was difficult to determine. Because of these imponderables, MacArthur

could not at once give a firm estimate of

monthly shipments, and his early figures

were considerably below those that he

submitted later.119 As a result, the removal

of troops from Europe, which had been

under way for three months and was

already well organized, made much better

progress during the early weeks of the repatriation period than did the return of

troops from the western Pacific. By late

September, however, the situation in General MacArthur's command had become

clearer and the deployment of shipping to

meet the requirements was well under

way.120

The early negotiations on rail transportation for repatriated troops again brought

out the differing attitudes of the Army and

the Director of Defense Transportation,

and these differences were sometimes expressed with more candor than diplomacy.121

 The root issue was still the division of railroad equipment, especially

sleeping cars, between military and civilian traffic. Although the joint preference

agreement made by the armed forces in

August allowed greater latitude, General

Gross had also agreed with the ODT that

Army personnel would use coaches for

trips of less than forty-eight hours unless

sleepers were available that otherwise

would have to be deadheaded, and he insisted that the latter agreement was being

honored. The ODT, on the other hand,

presented data to show that it was not

being uniformly carried out, and contended that the failure of the carriers in

some instances to provide sleepers for trips

of more than forty-eight hours was due to

their employment on shorter Army

hauls.122

Late in August the Army learned that

the railroads and the Pullman Company

desired to withdraw about 400 sleeping

cars from the military pool so that they

could be used in regular overnight services. The Army notified both the Director

of Defense Transportation and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion

117

 Ltr, Gross to Pelley, 2 1 Aug 45, and reply, 25

Aug 45, both in OCT 511, 1943-1945; Ltr, Gross to

Pelley, 31 Aug 45, OCT 080 AAR. 118

 Eleven such assembly areas were established to

relieve transpacific troopships of the necessity of calling at many small ports, thereby saving ship time. See

WD press release, 18 Oct 45, OCT HB TC Gen

Demob Trans. 119

 WD press release, 10 Sep 45, sub: Target Dates

for Return of Troops, OCT HB TC Gen Demob;

Memo, CofT for Dir Plans and Opns ASF, 2 Nov 45,

pars. 5 and 6, OCT HB Plng Div Mead Com. 120

 Rads between WD and CINCAFPAC, CMOUT 65131, 15 Sep 45; CM-IN 23948, 29 Sep 45;

CM-OUT 72042, 1 Oct 45. 121

 See last paragraphs of Ltrs, Gross to Johnson, 14

Aug 45, and Johnson to Gross, 17 Aug 45; both in

OCT HB Gross ODT. 122

 Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 29 Aug 45; Ltr, Johnson

to Gross, 29 Aug 45; Ltr, Gross to Johnson, 4 Sep 45;

Ltrs, Johnson to Gross and USW, 6 Sep 45; Ltr, USW

to Johnson, 10 Sep 45; Ltrs, Williamson to Johnson

and the Pullman Co., 19 Sep 45; all in OCT HB

Gross ODT.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 201

of its opposition, with the result that the

cars were not withdrawn.123 The Army's

view was that during repatriation more,

rather than fewer, sleeping cars should be

assigned to the military pool, which served

all of the armed services. At about this

time the Director of Defense Transportation took steps to abolish the government

reservation bureaus, which the railroads

had maintained primarily for the benefit

of military personnel traveling as individuals, but reconsidered the plan when the

armed forces made a joint protest.124

The Chief of Transportation evidently

believed that there was nothing to be

gained by entering into detailed negotiations with the ODT regarding rail equipment. Late in August Mr. Johnson appointed a committee representing his own

office, the Association of American Railroads, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and

the Army to study military requirements

and make recommendations to him. Col.

Joshua R. Messersmith, deputy chief of

the Traffic Control Division, was the appointee for the Army. When the time came

to approve the committee's final report,

Messersmith did not attend the meeting.

In explaining his absence he informed Mr.

Johnson, undoubtedly with the approval

of the Chief of Transportation, that since

the War Department had no control over

the distribution of equipment it would

neither accept nor reject any estimates

submitted by the AAR. He stated that the

War Department provided the railroads

and the Pullman Company with estimates

of its requirements and considered the

carriers responsible for meeting such requirements "with dispatch and the same

degree of efficiency and comfort as is

accorded the public."

 125

In his response Johnson made it clear

that whereas the Chief of Transportation

had requested the assignment of 200 additional sleeping cars to the military pool,

he (Johnson) was of the opinion that military traffic already was using a disproportionate share of the equipment. In support

of his contention, Johnson stated that on

12 September about 72 percent of these

sleeping cars were in military service,

leaving only 28 percent to serve the rest of

the nation. General Gross then presented

the following analysis from data available

to him:

Sleeping Cars Number Percent

Total. .................... . 8,034 100.0

Cars in regular service........... . 2,544 31.7

Cars in military service .......... . 5,090 63.3

Standard and tourist sleepers in

troop service. .............. . 3,705 46.1

Special troop sleepers in troop

service. ................... . 1,237 15.4

Standard sleepers in military

sleeping car lines. .......... . 148 1.8

Gars under repair............... . 400 5.0

Johnson took no exception to these figures,

but he stated that in his calculation of

cars in military service he had included

an estimate of the number of cars represented by the military personnel that used

the regular sleeper services.126

While the Chief of Transportation foresaw trouble in providing adequate rail

transportation after repatriation from the

Pacific got into full swing, the immediate

123

 Ltrs, USW to Dir ODT and Dir OWMR, 31

Aug 45; Ltr, Dir OWMR to USW, 5 Sep 45; Ltr, Dir

ODT to USW, 6 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT;

Ltr, Buford to Gross, 18 Sep 45, OCT 531.2 Troop

Sleepers. 124

 See above, Ch. I, p. 65. 125

 Ltr, Messersmith to Johnson, 4 Sep 45; Ltr,

Johnson to Messersmith, 7 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to

USW, 7 Sep 45; all in OCT HB Gross ODT. 126

 Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 12 Sep 45; Ltr, Gross to

Johnson, 18 Sep 45; Ltr, Johnson to Gross, 21 Sep 45;

all in OCT HB Gross ODT.
202 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

problem confronting him was the build-up

of shipping capacity. He tackled the job

aggressively, in co-operation with the War

Shipping Administration and the Navy,

and the results were gratifying.

On the day Japan surrendered there

were 282 American-controlled vessels in

U.S. Army troop service, including the

small number of Liberties and Victories

on which conversion work had been completed, and 5 vessels under British control.

The American pool was distributed 108 to

transatlantic and 174 to transpacific

routes.127

The repatriation fleet was rapidly increased. The program of Liberty ship and

Victory ship conversion was pressed. The

cessation of hostilities meant that naval

assault transports and naval combatant

ships could be used for repatriation to a

greater extent.128 As soon as they could be

released from patient evacuation, hospital

ships were employed as passenger vessels.

Passenger space on freighters returning to

the United States was used for troops

whenever practicable. For a time tankers

also were employed in this way, but the

practice had to be discontinued because

tankers were frequently diverted en route

and the troops were then landed at ports

where there were no facilities for staging

and processing them.129

In addition to increasing the repatriation fleet, other steps were taken to facilitate the return of troops. The staging

capacity at west coast ports, which had

been limited during the war, was enlarged.

Overloading was continued to the extent

weather permitted.130 A liaison office,

similar to the one established earlier on

the east coast, was set up in the headquarters of the Navy's Western Sea Frontier to

keep the respective Army port commanders informed regarding prospective arrivals of troopships.131

 A Ship Regulating

Branch was organized in the Movements

Division to control the flow of troops into

the several ports in accordance with percentages established by the railroads.132

Representatives of the Chief of Transportation and the Pacific coast Army port

commanders met at San Francisco early

in September for a full discussion of all

matters pertaining to repatriation.133

The task of simultaneously repatriating

Army and Navy personnel from many

scattered Pacific bases gave rise to new

policies regarding the use of transportation

facilities. Instead of the wartime policy of

considering Army and Navy troopships in

a single pool and using them jointly, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in September decided

that all troop-carrying vessels in the Pacific would be divided into two blocks, one

for the Army and one for the Navy. The

Joint Military Transportation Committee

was assigned the task of allocating specific

vessels to the respective blocks in accordance with the estimated requirements.

The vessels in each block were to be operated primarily to meet the needs of the

service to which they were allocated, but

they could be used jointly when this would

enable a larger number of passengers to 127

 Memo, Plng, Int, and Mvmts Div OCT for Hist

Unit, 16 Oct 46, sub: Hist of Mvmts Contl Div to 15

Aug 46, OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts. 128

 Memo, Farr for Wylie, 15 Oct 45, OCT HB

Farr Staybacks. 129

 Rad, WD to Theater Comdrs, 3 Oct 45, CMOUT 10998. 130

 Overloading of Liberties in the Atlantic was

stopped in October, but overloading of Victories continued through November. 131

 Hist of Returning Troop Br, 31 Oct 45, in

Mvmts Div Hist for Sep 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div

Gen. 132

 Hist of Ship Reg Br, 11 Dec 45, in Mvmts Div

Hist for Nov 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 133

 Summary of West Coast Port Comdrs Conf on

Returning Troop Mvmts, 6-7 Sep 45, OCT HB Wylie

Troop Mvmts.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 203

be embarked. The use of domestic transportation also was to be apportioned between the Army and the Navy according

to the number of troops to be moved

inland.134

Because of growing public criticism of

the rate at which troops were being returned, the Chief of Transportation decided in mid-November to issue a detailed

statement to show what had been accomplished and what was in prospect.135

 He

summarized the shipping then assigned to

the repatriation of military personnel as

follows:136

Type Number

Total. .............................. . 87 1

U.S.-controlled troopships .................. . 253

Converted Liberties. ...................... . 210

Converted Victories....................... . 87

Hospital ships............................ . 31

Naval assault transports.................... . 178

Naval combatant ships.................... . 111

British troopships......................... . 1

Of these 871 vessels with spaces for

1,370,479 troops, 400 vessels with 578,520

spaces were employed in transatlantic

services and 471 with 791,959 spaces were

employed in the Pacific. All of the naval

assault vessels and most of the combatant

vessels were in the Pacific. At that time

only about 45 percent of the troop space

on these ships was available to the Army,

but more was expected to become available as the Navy's repatriation program

progressed. The Chief of Transportation

further explained that only one British

vessel, the Queen Mary, remained in U.S.

troop service because the British themselves had a large repatriation task, and

that only two of the vessels that had been

surrendered by Germany were being used

because the others could not have been

rehabilitated in time to be of great value

in repatriation.

The complaints regarding the rate of

repatriation, the majority of which concerned the Pacific, alleged negligence on

the part of the Army in not using more

cargo ships to transport returning troops.

The Army carefully explained its position

in public statements and in private correspondence. It pointed out that the shipping facilities at the west coast ports were

operating at full capacity and that voyage

repairs required by ships returning from

the Pacific already were overtaxing the

yards that would have to make any further cargo ship conversions. Of the Liberty ships selected for conversion early in

the summer, the last had not been ready

for service until October, and the last converted Victory ship would not be ready to

sail until the end of November. Under

these circumstances and in view of the fact

that the peak of the repatriation movement would be reached in December, further cargo ship conversions were considered uneconomical. The Army stressed

the inadvisability of placing troops on

freighters that were not properly equipped

and explained why the hasty conversions

that had been made at Manila for the

return of troops to the United States had

been limited to a small number of

vessels.137

134

 JCS Policy Memo 27, 21 Sep 45. 135

 WD press release, 20 Nov 45, OCT HB TC Gen

Demob Trans. 136

 Conflicting statements have been made regarding the number of Liberties converted in 1945.

Charles, Troopships of World War II, pp. 356-60, lists

201 actually converted in 1945 to carry 550 troops

each. The figure of 210 may include some Liberties

that had been permanently converted. Ninety-seven

Victories were converted, but 10 were assigned to the

British in exchange for the Queen Mary; see Wardlow,

op. cit., pp. 226-27, 301. 137

 WD press release, 20 Nov 45, cited n. 135; letters

in answer to complaints are filed in OCT 370.5 Return of Troops from Overseas; messages regarding

conversions at Manila are in OCT 564 Cargo Vessels;

James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in
204 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Army further pointed out that in

November, despite the wide dispersal of

troops and the long voyages in the Pacific,

it was repatriating more than twice as

many troops as had been returned from

Europe during the peak month following

World War I. It also stated that, since the

removal of troops from the European and

Mediterranean theaters was so far advanced, beginning in December many

fast troopships would be transferred from

the Atlantic to the Pacific so that the rate

of repatriation from General MacArthur's

command would be accelerated.

These explanations did not convince

persons who were willing to accept at face

value the statements of soldiers that they

were eager to travel under any conditions

so long as they were allowed to sail, or

were intrigued by the slogan "get the boys

home by Christmas." Such persons could

view the matter from a purely personal or

sentimental standpoint, since they would

not be responsible for the hardships imposed, nor affected by the complaints that

would be made by many soldiers after

arrival in the United States. On November 27 maritime and longshore unions,

which were opposed to the policy of laying up American cargo ships or turning

them over to foreign countries, championed the cause of the soldiers who were

still overseas and threatened one-day

strikes to emphasize their position.138 On

the same day resolutions were introduced

in the House of Representatives to require

the War Department to submit a forecast

of troops that would be eligible for discharge within ninety days, and to require

the Army, the Navy, and the War Shipping Administration to give a full accounting of ships used and not used for repatriation purposes.139

 The War Department

was quick to provide such information as

it possessed, although the resolutions were

not formally adopted.

Air transport was used for the repatriation of troops after V-J Day, but not to

the extent that it had been employed during redeployment from Europe and the

Mediterranean. Two projects were set up

for repatriating troops by air. In the Rainbow Project transport planes were used

from the middle of September to the middle of November for the return of troops

from North Africa, South America, and

the Caribbean. This project had a total

lift during the two months of about 12,200.

In the Sunset Project bombers returning

from the Pacific transported as many

troops as they could accommodate.140

After the transport planes in the western

Pacific had played their role in the delivery of occupation forces to Japan, they

also brought troops back to the zone of

interior.

The heavy influx of troops at Pacific

coast ports during November and December and the unevenness of the flow meant

the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 473-75,

OCT HB Monographs. Numerous cargo ships were

hastily converted in the western Pacific to transport

soldiers from outlying bases to assembly ports, where

they were to be embarked for the long transpacific

voyage, and to repatriate Japanese soldiers to their

homeland.

138

 Transcript of radio address by Joseph Curran,

Pres, National Maritime Union, over Mutual Broadcasting System, 27 Nov 45, OCT HB Gen Demob

Trans; The New York Times, November 29, 1945,

"Ship Unions to Quit Over Troop Delays." 139

 H. Res. 420, 421, and 422, November 27, 1945;

Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, Chm House Com on

Military Affairs, 11 Dec 45, Legislative and Liaison

Division WDSS, file on H. Res. 421. 140

 Information furnished by the Hist Br, Int Div

MATS, 19 Jun 51, OCT HB Gen Redepl.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 205

that there were times when the railroads

had more traffic than they could move

promptly. The situation was more acute

on the Pacific coast than on the Atlantic

seaboard because the facilities of the western rail lines were not as great and because

a larger percentage of the troops arriving

at western ports had long rail hauls ahead

of them.141 During this period the problem

of providing sleeping cars for the troops

entitled to them gave way to the problem

of moving the traffic by any means. On

23 November the Chief of Transportation

indicated that numerous troops had been

held at the ports for four days, and a few

for more than seven days, rather than being cleared in the specified forty-eight

hours.142 Thereafter the situation became

progressively worse, and on 25 December

the number of troops held at Pacific ports

beyond forty-eight hours because of lack

of transportation reached a peak of 99,000.

The port staging areas and improvised

housing facilities were not able to absorb

the backlog so that as many as 40,000 men

had been kept on the ships overnight

rather than being debarked immediately

upon arrival.143 This situation existed despite the fact that additional rail equipment was assigned to the western lines and

that cars were deadheaded back to the

ports as quickly as they discharged their

loads at the inland personnel centers.

Early in November the armed forces

had made a final joint appeal to the Director of Defense Transportation for the

assignment of additional sleepers to troop

movements from the Pacific coast. They

had pointed out that the number of repatriated veterans who were required to

travel from coast to coast in coaches was

increasing daily. They had stated that,

while a further curtailment of regular

sleeper service was not a desirable action,

the heavy influx of troops was the direct

result of the public demand for speedy demobilization and therefore no criticism

could properly be made if the public were

deprived of sleeping cars on some of the

shorter routes in order to give veterans

proper accommodations on long journeys.

The armed forces accordingly had recommended that sleeping cars be withheld

from regular sleeping car services of less

than 500 miles—instead of 450 miles as

provided for in the existing regulation—

while the military need was so great.144

This recommendation was not placed in

effect, but about 1,000 additional day

coaches were assigned to troop service.

The effect of the peak repatriation

movement on the carriers is reflected in

two statements issued by the Association

of American Railroads. In mid-December

the AAR reported that the carriers' total

equipment embraced 10,217 all-steel

coaches suitable for long distance service,

and 8,200 sleeping cars of which 1,400

were government-owned troop sleepers.

More than one third of the coaches and

about four fifths of the sleepers were being

used in troop trains, and in addition large

numbers of military personnel were using

the regular trains.145 A few days later the

AAR announced that during the two

141

 In his public statement of 20 November, cited

n. 135, the Chief of Transportation stated that in

October 82 percent of the troops arriving at west

coast ports were entitled to sleeping cars as compared

with 34.5 percent debarking on the east coast. 142

 Memo, CofT for Legislative and Liaison Div

WDSS, sub: Delays of Troop Mvmts, OCT 511. 143

 ASF MPR, Dec 45, Sec. 3, p. 3; Hist of Returning Troops Br, 16 Jan 45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Dec

45, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen. 144

 Ltr, Armed Forces to Dir ODT, 8 Nov 45, OCT

510 Veterans. 145

 Ltr, AAR to Sen Joseph C. O'Mahoney, 17 Dec

45, OCT 510 Veterans.
206 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CHART 6—PASSENGERS DEBARKED MONTHLY BY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS FROM OVERSEA

COMMANDS: 1943-1946*

* Passengers include all Army troops debarked from ships under Army, Navy, and British control, plus naval, Allied

military, civilian personnel, and prisoners of war debarked from ships under Army control. The percentage relationship

that Army troops bore to the total was 47.4 in 1943, 61.1 in 1944, 95.6 in 1945, and 94.4 in 1946.

Source: ASF Statistical Review, World War II, pp. 126-27, through August 1945; later months from data compiled

for statistical volume of this series, From Recapitulation of Passengers Debarked and predecessor reports from the ports of

embarkation to the Chief of Transportation.

weeks that ended on 19 December the

railroads had moved a daily average of

thirty-six special troop trains from the Pacific coast, carrying slightly more than

19,000 servicemen; including those accommodated on regular trains, the daily movement of servicemen had been about

25,000. The AAR further stated that on

the basis of estimates furnished by the

Army and the Navy earlier in the fall it

had planned to handle about 14,000 servicemen per day at the peak.146

 The increased military load, it emphasized, was

being handled against a background of

heavy pre-Christmas civilian travel.

During the month of December 1945,

834,470 passengers arrived at U.S. ports

under Army auspices.147 More than 99

percent of these passengers were Army

troops, the remainder being naval personnel, military personnel of Allied nations,

and civilians. West coast ports received

387,130, while Atlantic and Gulf ports debarked 447,340. A comparison of arrivals

during this peak month with preceding

and succeeding months may be made by

referring to Chart 6. Passengers debarking

during the years 1945 and 1946 were distributed among the ports as shown in

Chart 7, and passengers debarking during

146

 AAR press release, 21 Dec 45, OCT HB Gen

Demob Trans. 147

 This figure may be compared with 343,786 debarked by the Army during the month of June 1919,

which was the peak of the repatriation movement

after World War I; see Annual Report of the Chief of

Transportation Service, 1919, p. 31.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 207

CHART 7—PASSENGERS DEBARKED BY THE ARMY AT THE RESPECTIVE U.S. PORTS:

1945-1946 a

a

 Concerning passengers included, see note to chart 6. b

 Boston was inactive during 1946. c

 New York includes a small number of passengers debarked at the Philadelphia cargo port. d

 Hampton Roads includes a small number of passengers debarked at the Baltimore cargo port. e

 New Orleans includes a small number of passengers debarked at Mobile and Miami. f

 Seattle includes a small number of passengers debarked at Portland during early 1945 and late 1946.

Source: Data compiled for statistical volume of this series from monthly report, Recapitulation of Passengers Debarked,

from the ports of embarkation to Chief of Transportation.

the month of December 1945 were

distributed as follows:148

Port Passengers

Boston............................... . 74,185

New York............................ . 261,778

Hampton Roads ...................... . 106,835

New Orleans......................... . 4,542

Los Angeles .......................... . 119,256

San Francisco......................... . 146,295

Portland............................. . 22,298

Seattle. .............................. . 99,281

Since the Army had stressed the need

for additional sleeping cars to handle the

heavy influx of troops, its experience in

securing sleeping cars in December 1945 is

of interest. During that month the Army

requested the assignment of 10,846 sleepers

for troop movements of forty-eight hours

or longer, including domestic as well as

repatriation traffic. The sleepers actually

assigned to these movements fell 2,824

short of the requests. As a result, 91,359

soldiers who were entitled to sleeping-car

space under the forty-eight-hour rule had

to be moved in coaches.149

The heavy repatriation traffic created

problems for the Army other than those of

clearing troops from the ports. The large

number of troop trains in operation, combined with the rapid rate of demobiliza148

 Monthly Rpt, PEs to OCT, Recap of Passengers

Debarked; data compiled for statistical volume of this

series, now in preparation. Figures for New York and

Hampton Roads include small numbers debarked

from freighters at the cargo ports of Philadelphia and

Baltimore, respectively. Boston debarkations were less

in December than in previous months and troop

movements through Boston were discontinued thereafter. Small numbers of troops had been debarked at

Charleston, South Carolina, and Prince Rupert,

British Columbia, earlier. 149

 Statistical Tabulation, Utilization of Sleeping

Cars, October 1945-March 1946, based on records

of Pass Br, Traf Contl Div, OCT HB TC Gen Demob

Trans.
208 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tion, made it difficult for the Chief of

Transportation to hold sufficient personnel to provide these trains with competent

commanders and crews. In order to speed

up the return of these men to the ports

after they had delivered troops to the personnel centers, special arrangements were

made for the immediate audit of their

accounts and for their return to the ports

by Army or commercial aircraft when

necessary.150 Immediately after the Japanese surrender the Army announced its

intention to increase the number of separation centers (components of the personnel centers) from twenty-two to twentyseven, but this was not done immediately.

As a result, some of the separation centers

became congested during September and

it was necessary to divert troop trains to

other centers thus increasing mileage and

delaying trains. To meet this situation 152

temporary separation facilities—44 of

them for AAF troops and the remainder

for AGF and ASF troops—were opened

on 24 September, and later 4 additional

separation centers were established. By

November this problem had been overcome despite the unexpectedly heavy rate

of demobilization.151

Beginning early in the repatriation

period the railways received appreciable

though not extensive aid from air transport. In July 1945 arrangements were

made for the use of military aircraft to

move repatriated soldiers east and west

across the continent.152 The aircraft were

assigned to commercial airlines, which

operated them under contract. These socalled TRANSCON services, which began 27 August, were from the Newark Air

Base in New Jersey, Mines Field and McClellan Field in California, and Paime

Field in Washington. The Chief of Transportation established special TRANSCON

Centers at staging areas of the ports of

embarkation at New York, Los Angeles,

San Francisco, and Seattle to receive,

process, and dispatch troops being forwarded by air.153

 The TRANSCON project, which was set up to move about 25,000

troops per month, continued through the

following March and lifted a total of

174,501 soldiers. The peak month was

January 1946, when 35,305 troops were

transported.154

After port congestion on the Pacific

coast became acute, the Director of

Defense Transportation took steps to

augment the eastbound airlift. On 20

November 1945, the ODT announced arrangements under which the commercial

airlines would make at least 70 percent

of the space on their regularly scheduled

flights from Seattle, San Francisco, Los

Angeles, and San Diego to the eastern seaboard available for repatriated military

personnel. This undertaking was known

as COM-AIR.155 In his effort to expand

the project beyond the facilities of the airlines, Mr. Johnson appealed to the Army;

he found it ready to provide additional

150

 ASF Cir 253, 3 Jul 45; ASF Cir 375, 4 Oct 45. 151

 ASF press conf, 16 Aug 45, statement by Maj

Gen Joseph N. Dalton; WD press release, 13 Sep 45,

sub: Temporary Separation Points and Bases; Ltr, SW

to Rep James C. Auchincloss, 26 Oct 45, WDCSA

370.01, Sec. VIII; Hist of Returning Troops Br, 6 Dec

45, in Mvmts Div Hist for Oct 45, OCT HB Mvmts

Div Gen. 152 Memo, Mobilization Div ASF for TAG, 11 Aug

45, sub: Mvmts of Pers under TRANSCON Project,

and atchd Memo for Record, AGO 370.5 (11 Aug

45).

153

 TC Cir 101-3, 24 Aug 45, sub: Org and Opn of

TRANSCON Centers. 154

 Statistical Tabulation, Passengers Moved by Air

Between East and West Coasts, based on monthly

troop records of Transport Economics Br, Traf Contl

Div, OCT HB Topic Air Transport Gen. 155

 WD CTB 53, 14 Dec 45, sub: Mvmt of Traf

Under COM-AIR Project.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 209

aircraft but unable to assign personnel "in

view of the necessity of releasing Army air

and ground crews in accordance with the

general demobilization plans."

 156

 COMAIR movements began on 3 December

1945 and continued into February 1946,

during which period a total of 23,156

Army and Navy personnel were transported.157

The Director of Defense Transportation

felt that neither the Army nor the commercial airlines had given adequate attention to the development of transcontinental airlift to relieve the rail lines, and he

said so early in December in a letter to

which he gave wide circulation. He had

argued for a total lift of 100,000 per

month, but this figure was never approached. In the peak month (January

1946) TRANSCON and COM-AIR together transported only 46,000 troops, and

during the entire period of operation the

combined lift was less than 200,000. Naturally neither the Army nor the Air Transport Association of America could accept

a charge of non-co-operation; each had its

peculiar problems and explanations. In

the light of the rail situation in December,

Mr. Johnson's chagrin at the limited results of the air projects is understandable.

Evidently the pressure for a large airlift

was not applied early enough. General

discussion of the use of aircraft in moving

repatriated troops within the United

States began in the spring of 1945. It

seems probable that if there had been a

realization at that time, or even in August,

that in a single month more than 800,000

returning troops would be landed at U.S.

ports with serious congestion on the Pacific coast, arrangements for a heavier

airlift could have been made.158

Since Mr. Johnson had stated frankly

that his letter regarding lack of co-operation in his effort to increase the airlift was

written primarily for the record, General

Wylie replied on behalf of the Chief of

Transportation in like manner, presenting

the broad aspects of the problem from the

Army angle. He pointed out that the

armed forces had been under heavy pressure from the public, the press, and the

Congress to speed up the return of troops

from overseas. Excellent results in providing water transportation had been accomplished with the aid of the War Shipping

Administration. The Chief of Transportation repeatedly had inquired of the railroads and the ODT whether they wanted

the inflow of troops retarded, but they had

expressed no such desire. The armed

forces then had requested the assignment

of additional sleeping cars to the western

lines because the need for sleepers was

especially great; this request had not been

granted, although additional day coaches

had been provided. The armed forces had

diverted ships from one port to another in

accordance with the desires of the railroads, but that action had not greatly alleviated the difficulty. A proposal that troops

from the Pacific destined for personnel

centers in the eastern states be routed

through the Panama Canal to Atlantic

ports had been considered, but the proposal had not been found acceptable because it would have involved a wasteful

156

 Memo, CofT for Mobilization Div ASF, 26 Nov

45; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 5 Dec 45, sub: COMAIR Lift; Ltr, SW to ODT, 5 Dec 45; all in OCT

584.1 COM-AIR Project. 157

 Statistical Tabulation, Passengers Moved by Air

Between East and West Coasts, cited n. 154. 158

 Ltr, Johnson to ATC, OCT, BuPers, and Air

Transport Assn of America, 6 Dec 45, OCT HB

Wylie Troop Mvmt; Ltr, Air Transport Assn of

America to Johnson, 10 Dec 45; Ltr, Johnson to

ATAA, 26 Dec 45; last two in OCT HB Gross ODT;

Ltr, Johnson to CofT, 26 Dec 45, OCT 584.1 COMAIR Project.
210 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

use of shipping and slower repatriation.

General Wylie reiterated the contention of

the armed forces that more sleepers and

coaches should be withdrawn from regular service to enable the western railroads

to handle returning veterans properly,

notwithstanding the fact that this would

mean a further cut in civilian travel during the critical weeks of repatriation.159

Replying to General Wylie's presentation, Johnson stated that the carriers had

not requested that the inflow of troops be

reduced and would not do so; he implied

that better regulation of the flow, not less

traffic, should be the Army's contribution.

He contested Wylie's statement that the

ODT and the railroads had been properly

informed regarding the peak loads to be

handled during recent weeks. He asserted

that the assignment of additional cars to

the western lines would not solve the

problem of port congestion; the line-haul

capacity of the seven single-tracked railroads that served the Pacific coast had

become the bottleneck.160

During December the Senate Special

Committee Investigating the National

Defense program again took cognizance

of the transportation situation, both ocean

and rail. Its inquiry into shipping was

directed particularly to the large number

of cargo vessels then idle, some of them

laid up at U.S. ports and some of them

held in the western Pacific under load

since V-J Day. Consideration of troop

transportation was incidental. The committee apparently was satisfied with the

statement of Capt. Granville Conway,

Deputy War Shipping Administrator, that

no American troopships had been diverted

from military service to resume commercial operations and that shipping was not

the bottleneck in demobilizing troops.161

The committee made a much more

thorough inquiry into the railway situation as it affected repatriation and demobilization. Despite the earlier complaints and countercomplaints, the

testimony given at the hearing on 21

December displayed no sharp differences

of opinion between the armed forces and

the representatives of the carriers. Mr.

Johnson, Director of Defense Transportation, Mr. Charles H. Buford of the

Association of American Railroads, Rear

Adm. James F. Holloway of the Navy,

and General Wylie, speaking for the

Army Chief of Transportation, seemed in

agreement that all had been done that

could have been done to meet the extraordinary situation. It was recognized that

peaks and valleys in the rate of arrivals at

west coast ports were inevitable since

"shipping can't be scheduled like trains."

The distribution of troop arrivals among

the ports had been carefully made in accordance with the desires of the railroads.

The assignment of more cars from the

eastern and southern lines to the Pacific

coast would not have substantially helped

the situation since the western lines already were handling the maximum traffic

that their track facilities and manpower

would allow. The airlift had been helpful

but had not moved the numbers that had

been hoped for. The relief afforded by the

use of buses had been limited because

only a few of the bus operators had facilities and personnel to handle transcontinental traffic. There was some question

whether greater use might not have been

made of the Canadian railway lines, but

it was recognized that they also had been 159

 Ltr, Wylie to Johnson, 12 Dec 45, OCT HB

Wylie Troop Mvmts. 160

 Ltr, Johnson to Wylie, 19 Dec 45, OCT HB

Wylie Troop Mvmts. 161

 Hearings cited n. 88, Pt. 32, December 12, 1945,

pp. 16227-29.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 211

heavily burdened in handling Canadian

traffic.162

When these hearings were held the

peak of repatriation traffic had been

reached and relief was in sight. In other

words, the situation was expected to improve rather than get worse. This fact no

doubt accounts for the equanimity with

which the situation was discussed by representatives of the armed forces, the ODT,

and the transportation industry, in contrast with their earlier disputations.

Some of the facts brought out in the

hearings are of interest. Because of the

bunching of traffic, the number of troops

landed on the Pacific coast on some peak

days in December (47,000-48,000) had

been nearly three times the average daily

arrivals forecast in September (17,000).

Although over a period in early December the railroads had moved a daily average of about 25,000 troops of all services

out of Pacific coast ports, it was not to be

expected that they could sustain this rate

during winter weather when more cars

would be in the shops and more delays

would be encountered on the right of

ways. A check of all trains from the Pacific

coast for the period 5-7 December disclosed that military personnel had utilized

89.1 percent of the total sleeping car space

and 90.4 percent of all coach seats. On

20 December, the day before the representatives of the armed forces and the carriers testified at the hearing, the Army had

about 70,000 returning troops in its west

coast staging areas and approximately

40,000 troops on ships in the ports, a total

of 110,000. On the same day the Navy

had some 17,000 at its Pacific port stations

and none were detained on board ship.

Only about 200 of the special troop sleepers ordered in May were in service in December because of a strike in the plant

manufacturing the beds; this strike had

just been settled.

It is clear that some of the difficulties

encountered during the repatriation

period stemmed from the facts that the

peacetime capacity of the western railroads had been limited, that the expansion of their facilities during the war had

been restricted by shortages of materials

and manpower, and that after V-J Day

these limitations could not be quickly

overcome. As to other factors, one can

raise questions but cannot provide definitive answers. Should the Army have disregarded the public demand for the

speediest possible demobilization to the

extent that was necessary to effect better

co-ordination between water and rail

movements? Could the peaks in the arrivals curve have been leveled off somewhat without seriously delaying the

movements of vessels? Should the Army

have made a greater effort to land troops

at the ports nearest the personnel centers

for which they were destined in order to

shorten the rail haul? Could the heavy

movement of troops in the Pacific have

been started earlier and the exceptionally

heavy arrivals in November and December have thus been reduced? Could more

materials and manpower have been devoted to building up the western railroads

during the war without deleterious effects

on the military effort? Could the ODT

have reduced regular sleeper services further without serious damage to the civilian economy? Each of these questions has

many facets and about all that can now

be said with conviction is that future military planners should give them full

consideration.

162

 Hearings cited n. 88, Pt. 32, December 21, 1945,

pp. 16279-302.
212 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Looking back at the repatriation period

after a lapse of years, one may wonder

why public reaction to the rate of repatriation and demobilization should have

been so unreasoning, and why the delay

of a few days at the debarkation ports

should have caused so much criticism.

The entire operation had proceeded with

a rapidity that had surpassed the hopes of

most Army officers.163 Possibly these reactions can be attributed in part to the

War Department's early assurances that

it would carry out demobilization with the

utmost dispatch and to the inadequacy of

its subsequent efforts to keep the public

informed regarding the results achieved

and the difficulties involved; yet it is

doubtful if any course of action would

have forestalled the criticism. After several years of war strain the national

temper was taut and individual feelings

were sensitive. Many troops had been

overseas for long periods and had undergone hardship and deprivation. The average citizen did not see the problem in its

larger context; he was aware only of the

delayed return of the soldier in whom he

was personally interested. Readiness to

accuse the government of needless bungling is not an uncommon trait. These are

circumstances that the military authorities will always have to take into account.

States entered World War II. The early

measures to provide hospital facilities

afloat were taken somewhat haltingly,

partly because it was difficult to forecast

the extent of the need and partly because of

differing opinions regarding the extent to

which hospital ships should be used. The

procedures were evolved gradually as the

result of experience. There were extensive

evacuation operations within the active

theaters from the forward areas to the rear

bases, but this discussion concerns primarily the removal of more than 500,000

patients from the theaters to the United

States.164

The regulations pertaining to the

movement of patients were changed in

many respects, but the following distribution of basic responsibilities was in effect

virtually throughout the war: Hospitalization and evacuation for the Army were

under the general direction of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces,

and his headquarters included a unit to

supervise these activities. The Surgeon

General was directly responsible for the

co-ordination and completion of evacuation plans; he controlled bed credits in the

general hospitals in the zone of interior

Evacuation of Patients

From Oversea Theaters

The wartime evacuation of sick and

wounded soldiers from oversea areas involves problems quite different from those

encountered in peacetime because of the

volume of the traffic and the abnormal

transportation conditions. Since the Army

had not made adequate advance plans,

much had to be done in developing facilities and procedures after the United

163

 In a lengthy statement issued to the press on 15

January 1946 designed primarily to apprise the nation

of our continuing military commitments overseas,

General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, stated that

approximately 5,000,000 members of the V-E Day

force in the zone of interior and overseas had been returned to civilian life; the demobilization since V-J

Day had exceeded the September estimate by about

1,665,000. Eisenhower said that, while the desire for

quick demobilization was understandable, he had not

anticipated that "this emotional wave would have

reached proportions of near-hysteria." 164

 For a month-to-month general review of evacuation, see appropriate sections of ASF MPR, Sec. 7,

Health. For a more detailed, discussion, see Smith, The

Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone

of Interior, Chs. XIX-XXIV.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 213

and was the chief medical regulator for

controlling the flow of patients from ports

to the hospitals; he made sure that the

medical personnel, equipment, and supplies for the care of patients being transported were adequate and made recommendations regarding the number of

hospital ships and hospital cars to be procured. The Chief of Transportation was

responsible for providing adequate shipping and rail facilities for the transportation of patients and for scheduling and

operating the ships; he was also responsible for the care of patients at sea, for the

debarkation of patients at U.S. ports, and

for their transfer to hospital trains or ambulances. Commanders of the service

commands staffed and operated the hospital cars and ambulances that were used

for the removal of patients from the ports

to hospitals. The Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, was responsible for the

development of plans and the actual

evacuation of patients by air from the

oversea theaters.165

Although the movement of patients by

water and rail was a responsibility of the

Chief of Transportation, he required technical advice and assistance from The Surgeon General in order to perform that

function properly. Close co-ordination between the two offices was necessary on

many details pertaining to the headquarters organizations in Washington, the

ports of embarkation, the ships, and suitable inland transportation. Although the

Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch

of ASF headquarters served as a co-ordinating agency, in May 1943 The Surgeon

General assigned a liaison officer to the

Chief of Transportation in order to effect

a closer working relationship.166 A year

later a medical regulating officer, who

took over the functions of the medical

liaison officer, was designated by The Surgeon General.167

 Col. John C. Fitzpatrick,

Medical Corps, who served first as medical liaison officer and then as medical

regulating officer, had his office in and

was virtually a part of the Movements

Division, OCT. In June 1945 his staff

included six officers and twenty-one civilians.168

As liaison officer Colonel Fitzpatrick

provided co-ordination between the Chief

of Transportation and The Surgeon General in matters relating to medical practices at the ports and on the vessels, the

suitability of shipping schedules to meet

evacuation requirements, and the adequacy of medical personnel and supplies

at the ports and on the ships. As medical

regulating officer he maintained records

of bed vacancies in medical installations

where evacuated patients were to be

treated, regulated the movement of patients from the ports to the respective

medical installations, and consulted with

the Chief of Transportation in regard to

appropriate transportation arrangements.169

The flow of patients from overseas was

governed by the War Department evacu- 165

 Memo, TAG for CGs AGF, AAF, et al., 18 Jun

42, sub: WD Hosp and Evac Policy, AG 704 (6-IT42); Pamphlet, Mil Hosp and Evac Opns, transmitted

with Memo, CG SOS for CGs of SvCs, PEs, et al., 15

Sep 42, SPOPH 322.15, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of

Patients; Memo, TAG for CGs All Depts, Theaters,

et al., 25 Jan 43, sub: Sea Evac of Patients, AG 370.04

(1-19-43); WD Cir 316, 6 Dec 43, sub: Hosp and Evac

of Pers; Memo, TAG for CGs of Forces in ZI and

Overseas, 8 Jan 44, sub: Procedure of Evac of Patients

by Water and Air, AG 704.11 (3 Jun 44). 166

 Hist Med Liaison Off, par. 1.8; 1st Ind, CofT to

CG ASF, 10 May 43, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 167

 ASF Cir 147, 19 May 44, Sec. II. For a discussion of the conditions that caused the establishment of

the medical regulating office, see Hist Med Liaison

Off, pars. 6.1-6.92. 168

 Hist Rpt, Mvmts Div, 20 Jun 45, par. 19, OCT

HB Mvmts Div Rpts. 169

 See extract from SGO Manual and Organization Chart of the Medical Regulating Office in Hist

Med Liaison Off, Preface and Incl 7.2.
214 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

U.S. ARMY HOSPITAL SHIP ST. MIHIEL

ation policy. The evacuation policy in

effect determined which patients were to

be treated in the theaters and which were

to be treated in the zone of interior.

Broadly speaking, this policy was expressed in terms of days—that is, patients

likely to be hospitalized for longer than a

specified number of days were eligible for

evacuation as soon as their condition

would permit. The number of days differed according to conditions such as the

hospital capacities in the respective theaters, the hospital space situation in the

zone of interior, and the ships available for

transporting patients. In August 1943 the

War Department, after consulting the

theater commanders, announced that its

policy of evacuation would be 180 days

for the European theater (except Iceland), China, Burma, and India; and 120

days for all other oversea commands.170

The effect of changing circumstances

on the evacuation policy is illustrated by

developments in the ETO. In the fall of

1944 with battle casualties mounting and

ship hospital facilities greatly increased,

the number of days was reduced from 180

to 120.171 Still later the policy was

changed to 90 days. In the spring of 1945,

in order to evacuate as many patients as

possible before hostilities ended and troopships were withdrawn from the transatlantic service, the policy was fixed temporarily at 60 days. In July 1945, with the

major part of the evacuation task completed, the 120-day basis was restored. In

recommending the last change General

Somervell pointed out that the Army at

that time was "long on hospital space in

Europe and crowded in the United

States," and that westbound ship hospital

space in the Atlantic had been greatly reduced by the transfer of vessels to the

Pacific.172

170

 WD Memo W 40-19-43, 28 Aug 43, sub: Policy

on Evac of Sick and Wounded. For a general discussion, see remarks of Col Fitzpatrick at Conf of Port

Surgeons and Troop Mvmt Officers, Fort Hamilton,

N. Y., 12-14 Oct 43, pp. 72-74, in OCT HB PE Gen

Evac of Patients. 171

 Memo, CG ASF for TAG, 30 Sep 44, and atchd

note for record; Memo, WD for CG ETO, 5 Oct 44;

both in AG 704 (25 Aug 43)(2). 172

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 18 Jul 45, sub:

Change in Evac Policy, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of

Patients.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 215

Since the great majority of patients

were evacuated by water, the rate of

evacuation was largely dependent on the

availability of ship hospital facilities. The

Army's aim was to have enough ship hospital facilities to meet evacuation needs as

they arose, but this aim was not entirely

fulfilled. The periodical estimates of

future needs were affected by the fact that

U.S. forces were engaged in areas and in

types of combat with which the Army had

had no previous experience, and in the

beginning the estimates proved to be conservative.173

 In view of the acute shortage

of troop lift in the early part of the war,

there was a natural reluctance to convert

troopships to hospital ships or to convert

troop spaces on transports to hospital

spaces to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary. In addition, there were

differences of opinion as to how far evacuation should be accomplished by hospital

ships protected under the Hague Convention X of 1907 and how far by regular

troopships. The time lost in deciding these

shipping questions delayed the Army's

preparations for meeting its evacuation

responsibilities.

In view of the early controversy over

the use of troopships and hospital ships for

evacuating patients, it is worth noting the

advantages and disadvantages that each

presented. When troopships could be

used, the evacuation operation did not require the sacrifice of a great amount of

outbound troop lift. On the other hand,

troopships were always subject to attack

by the enemy, a fact that created special

problems in providing for the safety of patients on board. The employment of

troopships was governed by the outbound

traffic, with the result that evacuation

needs at some oversea bases could not be

promptly met by this means. Sometimes

the hospital facilities on troopships did not

measure up to the desires of The Surgeon

General or of the theater surgeons, although they were greatly improved during the war. In contrast, hospital ships

could with reasonable assurance be considered safe from enemy attack; they had

but one purpose and could be employed

in the manner that would best serve that

purpose. They also provided the best facilities that the limitation of ship space and

the exigencies of war would permit. But

hospital ships once registered under the

Hague Convention could not be used for

any military purpose such as transporting

troops to and from the theaters.174

Army efforts to secure hospital ships

were blocked during the early months of

the war by uncertainty as to who should

pay for and who should operate such vessels. Although there was no unanimity

within the War Department on the subject, a proposal that six hospital ships be

built was taken by G-4 as a basis for preliminary action.175

 In January 1942 the

Army requested $36,000,000 for the construction of six hospital ships, but the

request was disallowed by the Bureau of

the Budget on the ground that the Maritime Commission should procure the vessels from funds available to it.176

 When

the Army approached Rear Adm. Emory

S. Land (Ret.), Chairman of the Maritime Commission, he took the position

that such ships properly came under the

cognizance of the Navy.177 His position 173

 Remarks by Col Fitzpatrick cited in n. 170. 174

 See Hist Med Liaison Off, par. 1.3; the Hague

Convention X of 1907, Art. 4. The Convention is included in AR 55-530, 30 Dec 43. 175

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 24 Jan 42, and

note for record, G-4/29717-100. 176

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 8 Feb 42,

G-4/33006-4. 177

 Ltr, CofS USA to Land, 12 Feb 42, and reply,

24 Feb 42, both in G-4/33006-4.
216 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

was predicated on a provision in joint war

plans that in case of hostilities the Navy

would operate all vessels required by the

Army.178 However, the Army and the

Navy had informally set aside the provision immediately after Pearl Harbor because of the Navy's inability to provide

crews for the Army's transports. The

Army, moreover, ascertained that the

Navy had no plans for operating hospital

ships under the Hague Convention.179

The Army therefore did not agree with

Admiral Land's view, and several months

elapsed before any further action was

taken. Finally, on 1 May 1942, the Secretary of War placed the situation before the

Secretary of the Navy and proposed a

conference of representatives of the two

services to resolve the problem. He pointed

out that the Army desired hospital ships

that were protected under the Hague

Convention and that naval hospital ships

ordinarily were not eligible for such protection since they operated tactically with

the Fleet.

At the suggestion of the Secretary of the

Navy the question was referred to the

Joint Staff Planners for study. From the

discussions by the Joint Staff Planners it

was evident that the Navy considered the

operation of hospital ships a naval responsibility; but being concerned primarily

with the forward areas of the Pacific and

having no assurance that the Japanese

would respect the markings on Convention hospital ships, the Navy intended to

rely on hospital ships operating with the

Fleet and evacuation ships (APH's),

which would carry troops and cargo outbound and would accommodate about

600 patients on the return voyage. Neither

type of ship met the Army's desire for protected vessels for use in repatriating its sick

and wounded.180

Consideration of the subject by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted in agreement

on two points—a tentative doctrine on the

use of troopships and hospital ships for

Army evacuation purposes, and the authorization of three hospital ships for

Army use. With a view to economy of

shipping, the JCS decided that evacuation

normally would be accomplished by using

troopships returning from areas that were

served more or less regularly by troopships. To provide for additional Army requirements in the Pacific, where many

small bases were involved, the JCS decided to request the Maritime Commission to provide three vessels for conversion

to hospital ships to be registered under the

Convention. These vessels were to be

fitted as hospital ships in accordance with

Army specifications, employed under the

direction of the Army, and provided with

medical complements by the Army; but

they were to be converted under the

supervision of the Navy and manned and

operated by naval personnel.181

The JCS action provided only half the

number of hospital ships that the Army

originally had asked for, and the conversion of these three vessels occupied a much

longer period than Army officers had anticipated. Since the conversion of troopships would have deprived the Army of

sorely needed troop lift, it was decided to

use cargo ship hulls (C-1B type) for the

hospital ships, and this meant that the

178

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 200-202. 179

 Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4 to WSA, 7 Mar 42, G-4/

33006; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, file copy undated,

sub: Hospital Ships, and atchd draft of Ltr, SW to

Adm Land, both in OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42),

Sec. 1. 180

 JPS 27/D, 6 May 42; Memo, ACofS OPD for

CG SOS, 9 May 42, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42); JPS

27/1, 16 May 42. 181

 JCS 16th Mtg, 25 May 42; JPS 27/2/D, 26 May

42; JPS 52/1, 29 Jun 42; JCS 22d Mtg, 30 Jun 42.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 217

superstructure and all accommodations

and hospital fittings had to be newly designed and constructed.182

 Commencement of the conversion work was considerably delayed by a misunderstanding as to

which service would provide the specifications for the machinery and the electrical

equipment. The Navy expected the Army

to provide these specifications, while the

Army believed that it was responsible only

for the specifications pertaining to hospital facilities and that since the Navy

would man and operate the vessels it

would provide all other specifications.183

The hulls were built and the conversion

work was accomplished on the Pacific

coast, where the shipbuilding and the ship

repair yards were heavily committed, and,

as the Army learned in September 1943,

the job was originally given a low priority.

These factors, together with the Navy's

usual insistence on the highest technical

standards, delayed the deliveries well beyond the time the Army had foreseen.184

The vessels, named Comfort, Mercy, and

Hope, did not enter service until June,

August, and September 1944, respectively.185

These three Army-controlled, Navyoperated hospital ships were earmarked

for service in the Pacific, and when the

Allies decided in July 1942 to invade

North Africa in the fall of that year the

question of additional hospital ships to

serve in the Atlantic was immediately

raised. General Eisenhower, who did not

favor heavy reliance on troopships for

evacuating patients, wanted five hospital

ships by April 1943 and an additional

hospital ship each month until a total of

ten or possibly more were in service. The

Surgeon General also favored ordering

more hospital ships, particularly for the

evacuation of patients from the smaller

and more isolated oversea bases not served

regularly by troopships. The Chief of

Transportation, while recognizing that

eventually such vessels would be required,

was opposed to immediate action. He

contended that emphasis should be placed

on using all available troopships for moving troops to the theaters rather than

withdrawing some of them from service

for conversion, a step that would be necessary if early delivery of hospital ships

was to be obtained. He pointed out that in

any event the major part of the evacuation from the active theaters would have

to be accomplished with troopships.

Finally, he argued that if the need for hospital ships should become urgent, troopships could then be converted very

quickly. Although the Commanding General, Services of Supply, was inclined to

follow The Surgeon General's recommendation that three additional hospital

ships be provided with the least possible

delay, further deliberation by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff resulted in a decision in

November 1942 to delay action and await

developments.186

In the spring of 1943 with the demand

182

 Memo, CG SOS for VCNO, 14 Jul 42, OCT HB

Wylie Hosp Ships; Memo, CG SOS for VCNO, 9 Sep

42, OCT 564 Hosp Ships; Memo, VCNO for

BUSHIPS and BUPERS, 12 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross

Hosp Ships. 183

 Memo, VCNO for CofS USA, 18 Dec 42;

Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 8 Jan 43; Memo,

CofS USA for VCNO, 11 Jan 43, sub: Comfort, Hope,

Mercy; all in OPD ABC 570 (2-14-42), Sec. IV. 184

 Memo, CG ASF for VCNO, 21 Sep 43, sub:

Missions for Hosp Ships to be Operated by USN, and

atchd Rad, Bradley for Ralph Keating, 13 Sep 43,

both in OCT HB Meyer Stayback. 185

 Hist Med Liaison Off, Tabs 7, 13, and 20. 186

 JPS 27/5/D, 24 Aug 42; 1st Ind, SG for DCofS

for Opns SOS, 23 Oct 42; 2d Ind, CG SOS for CofT,

28 Oct 42; Memo, CofT for Secretariat JPS, 2 Nov

42; last three in OCT 564 Hosp Ships; JPS 27/6, 6

Nov 42; JCS 52/3, 12 Nov 42; Memo, CG SOS for

CofT, 21 Nov 42, OCT 564 Hosp Ships.
218 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

for evacuation from the North African

theater increasing and further campaigns

in the Mediterranean and in Europe impending, The Surgeon General again proposed that additional hospital ships be

authorized. He made it clear that he

wanted these vessels for evacuation purposes, not for use as floating hospitals.187

The first result of this proposal was a decision to convert two small troopships, the

Acadia and the Seminole, to hospital ships

and to register them under the Convention.188

 The general question was referred

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the result

that an entirely new approach to the

problem was adopted.

In accordance with a recommendation

of the Army, the JCS decided in June

1943 that Convention-protected ships

thereafter would be considered the "normal means" for evacuating helpless patients, and that enough hospital ships

would be provided to implement the

policy. At the recommendation of the

Joint Military Transportation Committee

it was agreed that thirteen additional hospital ships would be provided by 31 December 1943, and six more by 31 December 1944. This program, together with the

three Navy-operated and two Army-operated vessels already authorized, would

give the Army twenty-four hospital ships

by the end of 1944. The Army indicated

its readiness to convert, man, and operate

these vessels, and the Navy agreed to that

arrangement. In order to provide early

additions to the hospital ship fleet, ten of

the smaller and slower troopships were to

be converted as soon as equivalent troop

lift could be provided by converting fast

cargo ships to troopships. The remainder

of the hospital ship program was to be

accomplished by the conversion of

freighters.189

The desire to place the majority of the

new hospital ships in service during 1943

was not realized. In fact, aside from the

Acadia and the Seminole, only one vessel

had sailed on its first trip up to the end of

the year. (Table 13) The delays were due

to general conditions prevailing in the

shipbuilding and ship repair industries—

heavily committed yards and shortages of

materials and labor—and to the initial

failure to obtain a sufficiently high priority for this work. In the spring of 1944

the Chief of Transportation reported that

he was feeling some embarrassment in his

effort to keep up with the evacuation program. The matter of obtaining a higher

priority was pressed through the War

Shipping Administration and the Coordinator of Ship Repair and Conversion,

and by the end of that year all but two of

the projected hospital ships had been

made ready for service.190

In the spring of 1944 the Joint Military

Transportation Committee estimated that

more hospital ships than had been projected would be needed, but no additions

to the program were authorized at that

l87

 Memo, Col Harry D. Offutt, Dir Hosp and Evac

Div SGO, for Brig Gen Larry B. McAfee, Asst to SG,

29 Mar 43, SGO 560.2 Hosp Ships; Memo, SG for

OPD through CG ASF, 30 Mar 43, OCT 564 Hosp

Ships. 188

 OCT HB Monograph 7, Army Hosp Ships in

World War II, pp. 22-32. The Acadia had been serving the North African theater as an ambulance ship—

that is, it was equipped to handle a large number of

patients inbound but was not registered under the

Convention and so could carry troops outbound. 189

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 11 May 43, OCT

564 Hosp Ships; JCS 315, 13 May 43; JPS 187/1,28

May 43; JCS 315/1, 30 May 43; Memo, Wylie for

Somervell, 31 May 43, OCT 564 Hosp Ships; Memo

by JCS Secretariat, 11 Jun 43, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-

8-42), Sec. 2. 190

 Memos, ACofT for Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, 19

May 44 and 5 Jun 44, sub: Hosp Ship Conversion,

OCT 564 Hosp Ships.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 219

TABLE 13—ARMY HOSPITAL SHIPS ENTERING SERVICE DURING WORLD WAR II a

a

 All listed vessels were previously passenger ships or troopships except those marked (*) which were war-built Liberty-type freighters,

those marked (**) which were war-built C-1B type freighters, and those marked (***) which were older freighters. In addition to those

listed, three vessels were selected for conversion to Army hospital ships in January 1945—the Armin W. Leuschner and the Howard A. McCurdy

on which conversion work was suspended in August 1945, and the Republic, which was completed but had engine trouble on her voyage to

the Pacific coast and did not enter hospital ship service until January 1946.

Source: History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and Medical Regulating Service SGO, Incl 3.0, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv.

For additional data, see Charles, Troopships of World War II, pp. 327-51. The data given by these sources do not always agree, but the

discrepancies are not serious.

time.191 In the following November consideration of the subject was given sharp

impetus by an urgent request from General Eisenhower, then supreme commander in the ETO, that additional

hospital ships be assigned to serve that

theater. The War Department did not approve this request; it replied that ten

hospital ships already were serving the

ETO and that the requirements of other

theaters prevented any transfers; it further pointed out that the ETO had not

191

 JCS 777/1, 2 Apr 44. For a re-estimate of patient load and facilities, see study by SGO, Feb 44,

sub: Hospitalization and Evacuation, in OCT HB

Gross Hosp and Evac.
220 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

been making full use of the hospital spaces

on homeward-bound U.S. troopships and

emphasized that this must be done; it

urged also that efforts be made to increase

the number of patients evacuated on the

large British liners. The War Department

informed the ETO that a study of the

over-all evacuation problem was under

way, but that even if additional hospital

ships should be authorized they would not

be available before March 1945.192

The study of the over-all evacuation

problem was being made by the Joint

Logistics Committee and the Joint Military Transportation Committee, and the

results were presented to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff in mid-December 1944. The announced purpose of the inquiry was to

determine the adequacy of existing evacuation programs of the Army and the Navy

for the maximum war effort. The commit -

tees found deficiencies for certain periods

and recommended that additional hospital ships with a total capacity for 5,500

patients be provided. They called attention to the heavy evacuation requirements

of the ETO and pointed out that evacuation from that area by troopships would

be reduced as the theater's need for additional replacements declined and troopships were transferred to the Pacific. In

the Pacific, the repeated amphibious assaults on Japanese-held bases were expected to create heavy and continuous

evacuation requirements. The committees' recommendation that these additional hospital ships be obtained by converting troopships was approved by the

JCS, and the JMTC promptly designated

five vessels to be converted and operated

by the Army.193

Twenty-nine hospital ships were thus

authorized for the Army, but only twentysix were in service when the war ended.

The conversion plans for two vessels were

changed upon cessation of hostilities, and

the ships were completed as troopships;

another vessel was completed as a hospital

ship in August but was delayed by machinery repairs after arrival at Los Angeles and did not enter service until

January 1946. The twenty-six vessels actually in service before V-J Day had total

accommodations for 16,755 hospital patients. As shown in Table 13, the patient

capacities ranged from 286 to 1,628. Most

of the vessels were relatively small and

slow. Only five had cruising speeds of 15

knots or more, and only one had capacity

for more than 1,000 patients. The largest

and fastest was the Frances T. Slanger, formerly the Italian liner Saturnia, which did

not enter hospital ship service until June

1945.194 In addition to these Army vessels,

the Navy, which initially did not plan to

operate hospital ships under the Convention, had twelve such ships at the end of

the war, and they sometimes carried Army

patients.195

The conversion and operation of hospital ships by the Army called for close collaboration by The Surgeon General and

the Chief of Transportation. The conversion work was done under the supervision

of the Chief of Transportation, but The

Surgeon General passed on the suitability

of the ships selected and determined the

conversion plans and specifications so far

192

 Msg, ETO to WD, 30 Nov 44, E 69073 (CMIN 101, 1 Dec 44); Msg, WD to ETO, 2 Dec 42,

WARX 72113. 193

 JCS 1199, 16 Dec 44; Memo, CG ASF for

ACofS OPD, 27 Dec 44, sub: Implementation of

Hosp Ship Program, OPD ABC 370.05 (2-8-42), Sec.

2; Ltr, C of Water Div OCT to WSA, 29 Dec 44;

Memo, C of Water Div for Lt Col William M. Day,

ASF Hq, 7 Feb 45; last two in OCT 564 Hosp Ships. 194

 For capacities and patients carried on each

voyage, see Hist Med Liaison Off, Incls 3.0 and 4.41. 195

 Ibid., par. 4.9.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 221

as-they affected the accommodation and

treatment of patients and the accommodation and equipment of the medical

staff.196 The Chief of Transportation was

responsible for the marking, equipment,

and operation of the vessels in accordance

with the Hague Convention.197

The Army employed civilian crews in

the deck, engine, and stewards departments of its hospital ships as on other

Army-operated vessels, but it used military personnel in all positions pertaining

to the medical care of patients. The relatively large amount of space assigned to

civilian crewmen under standards adopted

by the maritime industry was a matter of

concern to The Surgeon General, because

it reduced the patient capacities of the

vessels and sometimes forced medical enlisted personnel into undesirable space.

But an attempt to replace civilians with

military personnel in the stewards department met with labor union opposition and

therefore was carried out on only a limited

scale.198 Since the high rate of turnover

among seamen was not conducive to the

orderliness and esprit de corps essential on

hospital ships, the Chief of Transportation

made a special effort to induce crewmen

to stay with the vessels, but he obtained

no appreciable results.199

The medical staffs on hospital ships—at

first called hospital ship companies, and

then hospital ship complements—varied

in size with the patient capacities of the

vessels. According to the scale approved in

March 1945, the complement for a vessel

with capacity for 500 patients was 179

officers and enlisted men; a vessel with

capacity for 800 patients carried a complement of 251; a vessel with a capacity

for 1,000 patients carried a complement

of 306.200 Because of the scarcity of personnel, the complements employed during

the latter part of the war were somewhat

smaller than those authorized earlier. The

senior medical officer permanently stationed on board was designated hospital

ship commander; in addition to medical

duties, he had responsibilities similar to

those of the transport commander on a

troopship.201 Utilization of both military

and civilian personnel on Army hospital

ships necessitated the issuance of explicit

instructions on matters of jurisdiction, and

for the three ships that were operated by

naval crews these matters were covered by

an Army-Navy agreement.202

The Chief of Transportation assigned

direct responsibility for the operation of

Army hospital ships to the commanders of

the vessels' home ports. The port commanders provided the civilian crews, put

on board the supplies and equipment

those crews required, supervised the performance of maintenance and repairs, and

196

 Memo, SG for CofT, 31 Dec 42; Memo, SG for

Col Fitzpatrick, 30 Jun 43; both in SGO 560.2 Hosp

Ships. SGO file 632.1 BB for the years 1940-45 includes extensive correspondence on this subject. 197

 AR 55-530, 30 Dec 43, sub: Hosp Ships; TC

Pamphlet 16, 4 Apr 45, sub: U.S. Army Hosp Ship

Guide. 198

 Memo, SG for CG ASF, 13 Nov 43, par. 6, sub:

T/O 8-537, AG 320.3 (20 Nov 43)(2); Memo by Col

Achilles L. Tynes, 30 Jan 45, and atchd statement,

Data for Hist Record of Constr Br, in Hist Records

SGO; Memo by Maj Howard A. Donald, 18 Jun 44,

sub: Plans for Conversion of SS Dorothy Luckenbach,

SGO 632.1 BB; Smith, op cit., Ch. XXIII, pp.

420-21. 199

 Ltr, Gross to Groninger, 26 Jun 43, OCT HB

Gross Hosp Ships; Memo, CofT for CG CPE, 9 Dec

44, OCT 231 Hosp Ships. 200

 T/O 8-537, 1 Apr 42, Hosp Ship Company;

T/O&E 8-537T, 7 Dec 43, Hosp Ship Complement;

T/O&E 8-537, 3 Mar 45. 201

 See above, Ch. II; Instruction to Hosp Ship

Comdrs, issued by CPE, 4 Feb 44, OCT HB CPE.

202 OCT Cir 164, 10 Dec 43, TC Cir 80-14, revised

15 May 44; ASF Cir 36, 31 Jan 45; Principles Applying to Army-Staffed and Navy-Manned Hospital

Ships, undated, OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships.
222 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

issued the necessary operating instructions.

The port commanders also were responsible for placing on each vessel the required

number of medical personnel and the required quantities of medical supplies. The

medical staff and their activities on board

were under the technical supervision of

The Surgeon General.

Preparing hospital ships for their voyages and making preparations for the debarkation of patients were specialized

jobs. For that reason, it was decided in

1943 that so far as practicable the hospital

ships serving in the Atlantic should be operated out of the Charleston Port of Embarkation.203

 There was an advantage in

having such vessels sail from and discharge

their patients at a port that was not burdened with heavy troop or cargo movements. Also, as pointed out by Brig. Gen.

James T. Duke, the port commander at

Charleston, the experience gained in regularly handling a number of hospital ships

enabled port officers to deal more expertly

with the problems of personnel and

supply that were continually arising.204

The deployment of Army hospital

ships was determined chiefly by combat

operations. They were employed mainly

in evacuating patients to the United States

from North Africa, the Mediterranean,

the United Kingdom, continental Europe,

the Southwest Pacific, and the western

Pacific, and in evacuating patients from

forward to rear bases in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.205

 Voyage assignments were made by the Chief of Transportation in accordance with reports of

patients awaiting evacuation and estimates

of casualties likely to result from impending military actions.206

 As shown in Table

13, the twenty-three Army-operated hospital ships made their first voyages to the

transatlantic theaters. Some of them were

transferred to the Pacific before and some

after the Japanese capitulation, and others

were decommissioned as hospital ships

after they were no longer needed for evacuating patients from Europe.207

 The three

Navy-operated hospital ships served entirely in the Pacific, a considerable part of

their time being spent in moving patients

within the southwest and western Pacific

areas.

Regardless of the number of hospital

ships in service, the greater part of the patients evacuated by water to the United

States was moved by troop transports—97

percent in 1943, 75 percent in 1944, and

74 percent in 1945.208 (Tables 14 and 15)

In September 1942 the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, instructed the

Chief of Transportation to provide hospital beds equal to 5 percent of the troop

berths on Army-owned transports and 4

percent on "chartered" transports.209

These percentages were later increased to

8 and 7, respectively.210 Not all patients

required hospital beds, and during the

203

 Memo, CofT for SG, 22 Sep 43, OCT 353-370.5

Africa. 204

 Hosp Ship Opns, by Gen Duke, undated, OCT

HB Wylie Hosp Ships. 205 British hospital ships were also used for U.S. intratheater evacuation in the Mediterranean and between the Continent and the United Kingdom. 206

 See Memo, SG for Somervell, 23 Dec 43, and

Memo, CofT for Somervell, 11 Jan 44, in OCT HB

Farr Stay backs. 207

 Concerning the schedule of transfers to the Pacific and delays in making necessary improvements

in ventilation, see Memo, Farr for Wylie, 14 Jul 45,

OCT HB Wylie Hosp Ships. 208

 Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00. 209

 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 8 Sep 42, sub: Ship

Hosp Facilities, AG 704 (6-17-42) (1). The term

"chartered" covered WSA troopships allocated to the

Army. 210

 Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, et al., 8

Jun 44, sub: procedure for Evac of Patients by Water

or Air, Incl 1, AG 704.11 (3 Jun 44).
USS COMFORT OFF LOS ANGELES HARBOR. Army medical personnel and Navy

crew members of the ship on deck.
224 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 14—PATIENTS EVACUATED FROM OVERSEAS BY WATER AND DEBARKED AT ARMY

PORTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1943-1945 a

a

 Includes Army, Navy, and Allied military patients debarked at Army ports indicated. In addition 168 patients were debarked at the

Baltimore cargo port in 1943 and 1 in 1944.

Source: History, Medical Liaison Office to OCT and Medical Regulating Service SGO, Sec. 7.00, in OCT HB Mvmts Div Med Reg Sv.

heavy evacuation operation of 1945 many

troopships carried more than a thousand

patients. A few of the larger U.S. troopships accommodated 2,800 patients, and

the larger British vessels exceeded that

number. The "safe" patient capacity of

each vessel was determined by a survey

team representing The Surgeon General,

the Chief of Transportation, the master of

the vessel, and the transport commander,

and the oversea commanders were kept

informed of the current capacity of each

vessel for each class of patients.211 Changes

in hospital facilities were effected through

the co-operative efforts of The Surgeon

General and the Chief of Transportation,

and when such changes were of a nature

that would affect the patient capacity of

the ship a resurvey was made.212

Since the number of patients carried on

troopships varied widely from trip to trip,

it was necessary to devise a flexible and

economical method of assigning medical

personnel. The plan adopted was to assign

to each troopship a small permanent medical staff headed by a transport surgeon,

and to provide medical hospital ship platoons to be assigned to transport surgeons

as supplemental personnel when needed.213

 In the beginning these platoons

ranged in size from seven to eighty-eight

officers and enlisted men organized to

provide average care, when supplementing the permanent medical staff, for

groups of patients ranging from twentyfive to five hundred. Later, the size

of the platoons was reduced and nurses

were eliminated.214 Eventually it was

found feasible to standardize these units

211

 1st Ind, C of Mvmts Div OCT for C of Contl

Div OCT, 27 Nov 44; OCT Misc Ltr 28, 14 Jul 44;

both in OCT 569.5 Pers Capacity of Transports. 212

 General specifications for hospital areas on

troopships are given in Memo, SG for CofT, 26 Nov

42, and 1st Ind, SG for CofT, 4 Jan 43; see also

Memo, Col Tynes for SG, 3 Jul 43, sub: Rpt of Conf;

all in SGO 632.1 BB. 213

 On the transport surgeon, see AR 55-350, 14

Sep 42, Sec. II; see also Instructions for Transport

Surgeons, issued by CPE, 1 Dec 43, OCT HB CPE. 214

 T/O 8-534, 27 Oct 42, sub: Med Hosp Ship

Platoons Separate; T/O&E 8-534, 21 Oct 43.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 225

TABLE 15—PERCENTAGE OF PATIENTS DEBARKED BY THE ARMY FROM TROOPSHIPS,

HOSPITAL SHIPS, AND AIRCRAFT: 1943-1945 a

a

 A total of 2,390 patients was debarked in 1941, 9,240 in 1942, and 22,909 in 1946. The patients debarked were chiefly Army personnel,

but limited numbers of U. S. Navy and Allied personnel were included.

Source: Smith, The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior, Table 16.

on the basis of one medical officer, one

dental officer, and fifteen enlisted men to

care for one hundred patients.215

The personnel for hospital ship platoons, and also for hospital ship complements, after being trained at Medical

Corps schools, was placed under the control of the commanders of the ports of

embarkation. The port commanders were

responsible for the organization of the

required number of units and for providing such additional training as was necessary to enable the units to function properly on board.216

 At the end of June 1945

the 322 medical hospital ship platoons

then in service embraced 661 commissioned officers and 4,955 enlisted men, a

total of 5,616. On the same date there

were 481 commissioned officers, 29 warrant officers, 1,112 nurses, and 4,351

enlisted men—a total of 5,973—assigned

to hospital ship complements.217 The

training and technical supervision of such

personnel was a function of the port surgeon. The supervision of medical supplies

was charged to the port medical supply

officer. These officers were assigned to the

ports by The Surgeon General, but each

officer was responsible directly to the port

commander as a member of his technical

staff.218

Until late in 1944, medical hospital

ship platoons were assigned to service by

the commanders of the ports to which they

were attached; at that time they were

placed under the control of the Movements Division, OCT, which was in a

better position to direct their employment

in accordance with the over-all need. The

platoons were sent overseas for temporary

attachment to the theater commanders,

who placed them on returning troopships

as their services were required.219 Despite

215

 Memo, CofT for Mob Div ASF, 10 Jun 43,

OCT 322 Med Hosp Ship Platoons; Memo, CofT for

CG ASF, 1 Apr 44, Reorg of Med Hosp Ship Platoons, OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac; Memo, Mvmts

Div OCT for Hist Unit OCT, 20 Jun 45, par. 19,

OCT HB Mvmts Div Rpts. 216

 The extent of the medical training given personnel was determined by the Medical Corps. 217

 Tabulation, T/O Units Used on Ships as of 30

Jun 45, prepared by Dir of Pers OCT, in OCT HB

Dir of Pers. 218

 Memo,SG for CofT, 30 Apr 42; Memo, CofT

for PEs, 2 May 42; sub: Port Med Supply Off; both

in OCT 323.6 Duties of Med Off. 219

 Memo, TAG for CGs of Depts, Theaters, et al.,

25 Jan 43; sub: Sea Evac Opns, par. 2c, AG 370.05

(1-19-43); Memo, CofT for PEs, 5 Jun 43, sub: See

Evac of Patients, OCT 370.05 Plans, Policies, and

Procedures.
226 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the effort to use them as intensively as possible, there were not enough platoons to

meet requirements after evacuations became heavy, and oversea commanders

were directed to make maximum use of

medical personnel returning from the theaters on leave, rotation, or temporary

duty, by organizing them into provisional

platoons.220

The military operations in North Africa

and the Mediterranean in 1943 made

heavy demands on troopship hospital

facilities. The first Army hospital ships did

not become available until the summer of

that year; the patient capacities of the

troopships were small and not definitely

established; and full co-ordination between the theater and the zone of interior

had not been worked out. In June Col.

Thomas G. Tousey, a medical officer from

the New York Port of Embarkation, was

dispatched to North Africa to study the

situation, and his report disclosed many

shortcomings.221 He found that medical

hospital ship platoons were being held in

idleness in some base sections pending

assignment to troopships, whereas the individual members might have been assigned to temporary medical duties on

shore that would have provided training

and helped morale. This situation was

due in part to the attitude of some platoon

officers who did not consider their units

subject to shore duty. A definite plan for

the assignment of platoons to ships was

not being followed. The Army regulation

requiring that platoons be assigned as

units could not be uniformly enforced

without great waste of personnel because

it often happened that only a large platoon was available for assignment to a ship

with small patient capacity. Sometimes

the transport surgeons would not accept

as many patients, or as many of a particular class, as the oversea medical officers

desired to embark, and there were instances where patients were brought to the

dock and then taken back to the hospital.

Surgeons on naval transports refused to

accept Army nurses, with the result that

nurses had to be left behind when the rest

of the platoon sailed. Colonel Tousey reported also that not enough forethought

was being given to the proper kinds and

quantities of medical supplies to be

stocked on the respective transports.

While his findings contributed substantially to the improvement of procedures,

the insufficiency of ship hospital facilities

continued, and at the end of the year

there was a considerable backlog of

patients in North Africa.222

A backlog of patients also developed in

the European theater after the invasion of

Normandy. Reference has been made to

the instructions sent to ETOUSA early in

December 1944 that U.S. troopships

would have to be used to the maximum in

evacuating the sick and wounded and that

an effort should be made to use the British liners more extensively for this purpose. Such a program was necessary in

order to avoid accumulating a backlog of

patients that would require a long period

to liquidate after the Germans had surrendered and the majority of the troopships had been transferred to the Pacific.

220

 AG Memo, 8 Jun 44, cited n. 210, par. 146;

OCT Misc Ltr 111 to PEs, 3 Apr 45, sub: Med Hosp

Ship Platoons, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients;

Ltrs, CofT ASF for CofT ETOUSA and CofT

MTOUSA, 10 May 45, OCT HB Gross Hosp and

Evac; Rad, WD to ETOUSA and MTOUSA, 25

May 45, WARX 88847. 221

 Memo, Col Tousey for CG NYPE, 20 Aug 43,

sub: Rpt of Oversea Observer, OCT 370.05 Patients. 222

 Rad, Algiers to WD, 8 Nov 43, CM-IN 4781;

CMTC 76th Mtg, 2 Dec 43, Item 4; Memo, SG for

Somervell, 23 Dec 43; Memo, CofT for Somervell, 11

Jan 44; last two in OCT HB Farr Staybacks Jan 1944,

No. 35.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 227

In Washington the Chief of Transportation and The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen.

Norman T. Kirk, were in agreement on

this point, but it was evident that the same

understanding did not exist between their

counterparts in Europe. The theater medical staff had a strong preference for hospital ships and also regarded the rated

capacities of many troopship hospitals as

too high in view of the facilities. In October 1944 General Gross requested General

Ross, Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA,

to give particular attention to the matter,

and during a trip to Europe in December

Gross made the settlement of the question

one of his objectives. As a result, a much

better understanding was established between the Transportation Corps organization and Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, the

theater surgeon, and an agreement was

worked out with the British whereby the

number of patients to be accommodated

on the Queens was greatly increased. After

necessary improvements in facilities and

additions to the ships' medical personnel,

first priority was given to 3,500 U.S. sick

and wounded on each westbound trip of

the Queen Elizabeth and to 3,000 on the

Queen Mary.223

During the winter of 1945 General

Somervell continued to stress the policy of

evacuating patients from the ETO as rapidly as possible; he did not want a repetition of the slow evacuation following

World War I, which he termed "the scandal and disgrace of the military service."

 224

 In line with this policy the Chief

of Transportation instructed the port commanders on the Atlantic coast to resurvey

all troopships under U.S. control in order

to establish the greatest "practical patient

capacity," and he was careful to see that

full advantage was taken of the increased

patient capacities of these vessels and the

British Queens.225 Shortly before V-E Day

eighteen troopships were designated to

carry as many sick and wounded as they

could accommodate, and the number of

able-bodied troops to be transported was

correspondingly reduced.226

May 1945 was the peak month for

evacuation by water from the ETO and

the MTO, with 35,680 patients arriving

at U.S. Atlantic ports during that period.227

 Those theaters had also been

instructed to give top priority to patients

on the westbound airlift.228 Late in July

the War Department announced that its

plan to bring all transportable sick and

wounded soldiers home from Europe

within ninety days after V-E Day would

be accomplished.229

For the movement of patients from the

Pacific theaters the Army relied heavily on

troopships until after evacuation from the

ETO and the MTO had progressed to a

223

 Ltrs, Gross to Ross, 9 Oct 44 and 17 Nov 44,

OCT HB Gross Day File; Ltr, Ross to Gross, 28 Oct

44, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; TWXs between OCT ASF and OCT ETOUSA, 1035 of 27

Sep 44, 1137 of 17 Oct 44, 1149 of 19 Oct 44, 1176 of

24 Oct 44; Memo, SG for Wylie, 14 Nov 44, OCT

HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; Memo, Wylie for

Somervell, 15 Dec 44, ASF Hq Trans 1944; CCS

751/1, 3 Jan 45; CMT67, 16 Jan 45; Ltr, Wyiie for

CG NYPE, 1 Mar 45, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks. 224

 Memo, Somervell for Wood and Gross, 23 Feb

45, ASF Hq Trans 1945. 225

 Memo, CofT for BPE, NYPE, HRPE, 5 Feb 45;

Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 6 Feb 45; both in ASF Hq

Trans 1945; Memo, CofS USA for CG ETOUSA, 22

Mar 45; Memo, Farr for Gross, 19 Apr 45; last two in

OCT HB Gross Hosp and Evac. 226

 Memo, C of Mvmts Div for C of Water Div, 27

Apr 45, sub: Troopship Utilization, OCT HB Farr

Staybacks; Memo by Nies, 14 Jan 45, in Mvmt Div

Histories, OCT HB Mvmt Div Gen. 227

 Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00. 228

 Msg, G-4 to Hq COMZONE ETO, 4 May 45,

WARX 80042. 229

 WD press release, 23 Jul 45, sub: All Transportable Sick and Wounded in Europe Will Be Home

by End of July.
228 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

WARD ROOM ON THE ARMY TROOPSHIP MONTEREY

point that permitted the transfer of hospital ships from the Atlantic.230

 The Navy's

troop transports as well as those of the

Army were used throughout the war.

Some patients were moved on freighters,

and airlift also was employed when available. Because of the numerous widely scattered bases, a well-regulated utilization of

ship hospital spaces was difficult to attain;

some vessels returned to the United States

without patients, while others carried sick

and wounded in excess of their proper

capacities.231 The evacuations during 1943

and 1944 were substantial despite the

small number of hospital ships in the Pacific. The peak months for the arrival of

patients at U.S. Pacific ports were May

and October 1945, when the number exceeded 10,000.232

 By the end of the year

the evacuation of battle casualties had

been virtually completed.

Theater commanders provided the zone

of interior with full information regarding

prospective and actual evacuations. They

dispatched a radiogram on the first of

each month reporting the number and

classes of patients awaiting embarkation

from each port in the theater and the

number and classes expected to be eligible

for evacuation within the next thirty

230

 Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the

Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 407-11, OCT

HB Monographs. 231

 Memo, Meyer for Farr, 28 Jan 44, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks. 232

 Hist Med Liaison Off, Sec. 7.00.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 229

DISPENSARY ON THE MONTEREY

days.233 These reports enabled the Chief

of Transportation and his port commanders to adjust ship schedules to meet evacuation requirements so far as practicable

and to insure that the ships were adequately equipped and supplied; they also

furnished a basis for advance planning by

The Surgeon General and the service

commands for the use of hospital facilities

in the zone of interior.

When each ship sailed the theater commander sent a radio report to the port of

debarkation giving the number of patients

of each class on board and the expected

time of arrival.234 On the basis of these

advices, which were forwarded to all interested offices in Washington, the debarkations were planned, the debarkation

hospitals to which the patients were to be

forwarded were determined, the number

of hospital cars and other railway equipment needed to move the patients from

the ports was arranged for, and the service

commands were requested to provide the

number of ambulances required to make

the transfer from ship to train or from ship

to debarkation hospital.

233

 Memo, TAG for CGs of Oversea Comds, 16 Sep

42, sub: Essential Info Concerning Evac, AG 370.05

(9-15-42). For examples of reports, see Msg, Algiers

to WD, 11 Nov 43, CM-IN 6989 (12 Nov 43), and

similar messages in OCT 353-370.5 North Africa. 234

 Memo, CG SOS for TAG, 6 Jan 43, sub: Essential Info Concerning Evac, and atchd note for record;

Memo, TAG for CGs of Oversea Comds, 13 Jan 43,

same sub; both in AG 370.05 (1-6-43). For a time

these reports were sent by air mail, but deliveries were

found to be uncertain.
230 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

LITTERS READY TO RECEIVE PATIENTS as a hospital ship arrives at Charleston,

South Carolina.

The regulations provided that motor

vehicles would be used for patients only

when rail transportation was impracticable. Nevertheless, ambulances were used

extensively for moving patients from shipside, because at many ports trains could

not be brought to the docks and the debarkation hospitals frequently were in or

near the port areas. Moreover, all railway

equipment was urgently needed for longer

hauls where it could be more economically

utilized.235

Until late in the war patients received

from overseas were not sent to hospitals at

the port staging areas but were moved

directly to the general hospitals that had

been designated debarkation hospitals.236

A departure from this rule was made in

the early summer of 1945 when evacuation from Europe was especially heavy,

and temporary debarkation hospitals were

established in the staging areas of the east

coast ports.237

While patients were at the ports of debarkation, they were under the control of

the port surgeons. These officers were in

235

 WD Cir 316, 6 Dec 43; WD Cir 87, 28 Feb 44,

Sec. I; Interv with Maj Farley, 24 Sep 51, OCT HB

PE Gen Evac of Patients. 236

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 9 Nov 42, sub: Military

Hosp and Evac, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients;

ASF Cir 99, 11 Apr 44, Sec. IV. 237

 1st Ind, NYPE for CofT, 18 Jun 45, OCT HB

TC Gen Redepl; Min of Opns Mtg, 26 Jul 45, OCT

HB Dir of Opns.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 231

charge of the medical personnel of the

ports, and were assisted at shipside by

teams of enlisted men who were trained in

handling litters and otherwise helping the

incapacitated. Until April 1944 there

was no uniform rule regarding the point

at which responsibility passed from the

port to the service command. At that

time explicit instructions were issued

providing that, except when otherwise

agreed, the port surgeon's responsibility

ceased when the patients were placed in

ambulances or on trains for removal from

the docks; control then passed to the

service command, which staffed the

conveyances.238

Although the bulk of the patients evacuated from oversea areas to the zone of

interior were transported by water, the

number transported by air was substantial—more than 18 percent of the total in

1944, and more than 22 percent in 1945.

(See Table 15.) Air evacuation was speedy

and it was especially desirable for the critically wounded for whom proper treatment could not be furnished in the theaters. The Chief of Transportation had no

responsibility for patients evacuated by

air, but he worked in close co-ordination

with the Air Transport Command in

regard to plans and procedures.239

Generally speaking, the Army had a

good record in the evacuation of sick and

wounded from overseas. As in so many

other phases of the war effort, the advance

planning was inadequate for a conflict of

such scope, and after the United States

had become a belligerent time was required to provide the necessary facilities

and to work out proper procedures. The

delay in getting sufficient Conventionprotected hospital ships into service was

traceable mainly to the necessity of using

all available vessels for transporting troops

to the theaters, and to the heavy commitments at the shipyards that delayed the

conversion work after it had been authorized. The reluctance of some medical officers in the theaters to utilize the hospital

spaces on troopships as completely as the

War Department desired stemmed from

their differing opinions as to the adequacy

of the facilities. In its latter stages the

repatriation of sick and wounded proceeded smoothly, and the rapidity with

which the transportable patients were removed from the theaters after the end of

hostilities reflected not only the preparations that had been made, but also the

high importance the Army had attached

to this task.

Transportation of Soldiers' Dependents

An account of the repatriation of military personnel would not be complete

without a brief discussion of the movement of their dependents. The transportation of large numbers of military dependents on Army vessels has always been

fraught with trouble, giving rise to petty

grievances and numerous complaints.240

This was especially true during the war

and in the early postwar period when

shipping conditions were abnormal. The

Transportation Corps would have preferred not to handle this civilian traffic

while heavy troop movements were in

progress, but Army policy was dictated by

humanitarian and morale considerations.

Thousands of military dependents were

overseas when the United States entered 238

 ASF Cir 99, 11 Apr 44, Sec. IV, par. 5. 239

 Memo, CG ASF for CG AAF, 9 Nov 42, sub:

Evac Opns, OCT HB PE Gen Evac of Patients; WD

Cir 316,6 Dec 43, pars. 9c and 13b. 240

 Memo, Wylie for CO NYPE, 29 Apr 46, OCT

HB Ex Trans of Dependents.
232 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the war, notwithstanding the fact that the

War Department in June 1941 had prohibited further movements of this kind

and had provided for the return of dependents in advance of change of station

by military personnel.241 Immediately

after Pearl Harbor the return of dependents was pressed, but many could not be

moved promptly and throughout the war

this traffic continued to require the attention of the War Department and the Chief

of Transportation.242 It was Army policy

that the repatriation of dependents should

be strictly controlled by the theater commanders, who were to establish priorities

and insure that this traffic did not interfere with the movement of troops or delay

the dispatch of troopships.

Toward the end of the war a new type

of dependent travel developed—that of

the so-called war brides. Many American

soldiers had married while overseas, and

during 1944 and 1945 demand for the

movement of their wives and children to

the United States mounted steadily.243

Some were furnished transportation during that period but always subject to the

general policy regarding dependent travel.

After V-E Day the movement of war

brides from Europe, where the great majority of them were living, was virtually

suspended in order to leave all ship space

available for the redeployment of troops.

In January 1945 a joint resolution was

introduced in Congress under which the

Secretary of War would have been "authorized and directed" to assign shipping

space to these passengers. Early in August

when the passage of this resolution was

being sought, the Secretary of War pointed

out that he already had authority to move

such traffic but that it had been subordinated to the more important task of getting troops and military patients back to

the United States. He indicated also that

most ships, as a result of their conversion

for war service, were not suitable for the

transportation of women and children.

The Secretary objected to the resolution

because it would have deprived him of the

"freedom of action" necessary to insure

that the movement of dependents did not

interfere with the war effort.244 Congress

took cognizance of these arguments and

did not pass the resolution.

As a result of public and Congressional

pressure, the foundation for the program

of transporting war brides was laid in

1945, although the main movement did

not begin until early 1946 after the bulk of

the troops had been repatriated. Congress

authorized the expenditure of public

funds for the transportation of these passengers "by government or commercial

means"; President Truman issued an

executive order; and the Army published

rules to implement the directives.245

The Army rules indicated that the transportation of dependents would still be

subordinated to military requirements

241

 Ltr, SW to Rep Merlin Hull, 5 Mar 41, OSW

Trans 501-800; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 19 Apr

41, G-4/24499-178; Memos, TAG for CGs All

Armies, et al., 7 Jun 41, sub: Trans of Dependents and

Household Goods to Oversea Stations, AG 541.1 (5-

26-41), and 24 Sep 41, sub: Trans of Dependents and

Household Goods to Alaska, AG 541.1 (9-9-41). 242

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Cs of Supply Services, 18

Dec 41, G-4/24499-178; Memo, TAG for Theater

Comdrs, et al., 23 Nov 44, sub: Return of Dependents,

AG 510 (23 Oct 44). 243

 Ltr, Farr to Col Donald S. McConnaughy, OCT

ETOUSA, 30 Jan 45, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. The

shipment of war brides from Australia started as early

as April 44; see Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 301-

06, OCT HB Monographs. 244

 H.J.Res. 28, January 3, 1945; 79th Cong., 1st

Sess., Ltr, SW to Rep Andrew J. May, Chm House

Com on Mil Affairs, 3 Aug 45, G-4 510, Vol. III. 245

 PL 126, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 3, 1945; EO

9587, July 6, 1945, Fed. Reg., July 10, 1945; WD Cir

245, 11 Aug 45; WD Cir 294, 27 Sep 46.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 233

and would be strictly controlled by the

oversea commanders. The ships to be

used, in the order of preference, were

those operated by the Army and the Navy,

vessels of the War Shipping Administration, other American vessels, and vessels

of foreign registry. War brides were to

receive not only ocean transportation but

also inland transportation to their future

homes.

During the fall of 1945 the Chief of

Transportation made a careful study of

the war bride problem, including the

probable volume of the traffic, ways of

avoiding interference with troop movements, and preparation of troopships to

more suitably accommodate large numbers of women and children.246

 In January 1946 the War Department announced that it had arranged for vessels

to move more than 60,000 dependents

from Europe by the end of June, and

about 6,000 from Australia and New

Zealand.247 It indicated that the plans

had been made on the basis of information

obtained from the theaters, but that data

regarding the number of dependents

awaiting transportation and the dates of

their readiness were still undependable.

While it was believed that the great

majority could be accommodated during

the next six months, it seemed probable

that the movement would continue much

longer. Simultaneously the War Department issued a standing operating procedure to govern the processing and transportation of war brides in the theaters, on

the ships, and after their arrival in the

United States.248

About thirty vessels were designated to

handle this special traffic, and such

changes were made in their facilities as

were necessary for the new types of passengers. The majority of these vessels were

Army troopships or hospital ships; eight

were War Shipping Administration troopships.249

 The British agreed that the Queen

Mary should carry war brides on her westbound trips until May, and because of her

large capacity—up to 2,500 dependents—

and quick turnaround this ship had an

important role in the undertaking.250

The first ship to arrive from Europe

under the program was the Argentina,

which docked at New York on 4 February

1946 with more than 600 dependents.

The first ships carrying war brides from

New Zealand and Australia were the

Monterey and the Mariposa, which arrived

at San Francisco almost simultaneously in

early March with a total of more than

1,600 brides and children. Dependents

moved from other areas were accommodated in smaller numbers on such vessels

as offered suitable accommodations. Theater commanders were instructed not to

embark dependents on freighters unless

they were the only vessels available, since

freighters often docked at U.S. ports

where the Army was not prepared to

handle passengers properly.251

The preparation of vessels to carry war

brides required attention to many details,

some of which were without precedent in

Army experience. The military complements on the vessels were augmented with

additional medical personnel, nurses,

246

 Memo, CofT for OPD, 16 Oct 45, sub: Return

of Dependents, OCT HB Farr Staybacks. 247

 WD press release, 18 Jan 46, OCT HB PE Gen

Dependents. 248

 Memo, TAG for PEs, Theaters, et al., 19 Jan 46,

sub: SOP for Trans of Dependents from Overseas,

AGMP-M510 (17 Jan 46). 249

 Charles, Troopships of World War II, p. 361. 250

 Concerning the arrangement for the Queen Mary,

see Wardlow, op. cit., p. 227. 251

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 18 Mar 46; Ltr,

WSA to OCT, 20 Mar 46; both in OCT 5 10 Dependents.
234 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Wacs, and Red Cross workers. Cribs, high

chairs, play pens, and baby baths were

added to the equipment. Special laundry

and ironing facilities were installed for the

use of the women. A varied supply of

baby foods was placed in the ships' storerooms, and numerous items that were

not required on ships in troop service

were added to the sales commissaries.

Since at least 25 percent of the dependents were expected to be infants, it was

decided that disposable diapers would

have to be used, but as the Argentina was

preparing to sail on her first trip the decision had not yet been made whether

diapers would be furnished at government

expense or whether they would be placed

on sale.252 This was one of many minor

but vexing questions.

While the number of dependents

placed on a ship was restricted in order to

avoid any semblance of crowding, and

berthing was not more than two-high,

certain features remained that were reminiscent of the troopship. The large compartments were still there, and while an

effort was made to place mothers with

children in cabins, this could not always

be done. Although waiters were provided

to serve meals to mothers with children,

other women were required to serve themselves in cafeteria style. Because of the

limited number of stewards and stewardesses available, dependents were required

to make their own beds and clean their

quarters. This did not prove to be a felicitous arrangement, since some women

were either too seasick or too careless to

do their work properly. The transport

commanders were directed to give the

women proper guidance regarding the life

on board as well as the procedures they

would encounter on debarkation, but the

attempted "orientation" was not very

successful so far as the ocean voyage was

concerned.253

As was to be expected, many complaints resulted from the transportation of

war brides on troopships. The women and

their husbands did not want to wait until

more suitable accommodations became

available, but many were unhappy about

the treatment received. There were complaints that the ships were unfit for

women and children, that they were too

crowded, that there were not enough

stewards and stewardesses, that the ships'

personnel was unskilled and discourteous,

that the life on board was too regimented,

and so on. The Transportation Corps endeavored to provide for the needs of these

war brides and to make their first contacts

with things American a happy one, but

the attendant circumstances were not

favorable. Ocean travel was still affected

by conditions imposed by the war.

The chief concern of those responsible

for the transportation of war brides and

their children was to avoid epidemic. This

was a danger because of the presence of so

many infants and the fact that most of the

women were young and without experience in ocean travel. When a mother became seasick her standards of cleanliness,

even in the care of her child, were likely

to suffer. The nurses could give supervision, but there were not enough of them

to undertake direct child care. Arrangements were made for women who were

252

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 9 Jan 46, sub: Special Items for War Bride Program; Memo, CofT for

CG SFPE, 11 Jan 46, sub: Supplies and Standards for

War Bride Program; Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 11

Feb 46, sub: Additional Provisions Aboard Vessels

Carrying Dependents; all in OCT 510 Dependents. 253

 An INS dispatch from Sydney, Australia, reported that the crew of a WSA ship had threatened to

strike because the ship was "a floating slum." The

Washington Post, August 28, 1946, "MP's Quiet Crew

on GI Bride Ship."
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 235

traveling alone to take care of the children

of mothers who fell ill, but here again seasickness and inexperience presented hazards. No serious trouble was encountered

until the May voyage of the Zebulon B.

Vance. The outbreak of a disease described

as infectious diarrhea of the newborn resulted in nineteen infants being hospitalized when the ship reached New York,

and the ultimate death of six of them.

Three other infants from this ship were

reported to have died later. Following an

investigation by a board of inquiry, the

War Department directed that thereafter

no infants under six months of age should

be transported from Europe and that not

more than 25 percent of the passengers on

any ship should be under six years of age.

The restrictions were not made applicable

to other areas because of the small number of dependents yet to be embarked.

The inquiry into the Vance case disclosed

that some of the infants had been ill while

awaiting embarkation at Le Havre, and

oversea commanders accordingly were instructed to give close scrutiny to the physical condition of both women and children when they arrived at the ports. Some

changes were made in ships' facilities and

procedures. The board of inquiry did not

find that the Army had been negligent; on

the other hand, it found evidence of gross

carelessness on the part of some of the

mothers during the voyage.254

Not all the problems encountered were

on shipboard; the ports of embarkation

and debarkation also had to develop new

facilities and procedures and deal with

unusual situations. Several days before a

ship was to sail, war brides and their children were summoned to an assembly area

near the port of embarkation. There they

were given medical examinations, their

papers were checked for errors or omissions, their baggage was inspected, and

their local money was converted into

American currency.255 During this period

of processing the needs of the women and

children had to be met as they arose, and

many a soldier found himself detailed to

a task that was entirely new in his

experience.

A persistent problem was to get the

travelers to arrive at the ports at the time

scheduled—neither too early nor too

late—and to avoid having assembly areas

overrun with relatives that might interfere

with the processing. The U.S. 14th Major

Port at Southampton, England, which

embarked most of the British brides,

maintained two assembly areas—one at

the military post of Tidworth, and another at a large hotel in Bournemouth.

The U.S. 16th Major Port at Le Havre,

which handled most of the Continental

brides, processed them at Camp Philip

Morris, familiar to many soldiers as a

troop staging area. The same procedures

were followed at all ports of embarkation

whether the number of dependents to be

shipped was large or small. The theaters

were expected to provide the ports of

destination with full information regarding the passengers on each ship so that

plans could be made in advance for the

debarkation and forwarding of the travelers, but as in the case of homeward-bound

troopships the reports were often delayed

or incomplete.

At the ports of debarkation the war

254

 Transport Surgeon's Report of Voyage 3, 21

May 46, OCT 569.1 Zebulon B. Vance; Memo, SG for

CofT, 31 May 46, sub: War Bride Program, OCT 510

Dependents' Complaints; The New York Times, June

6, 1946, p. 23; WD press release, 7 Jun 46, OCT HB

PE Gen Dependents; Ltr, SW to Rep Henry M. Jackson, 17 Jun 46, OCT 510 Dependents' Complaints. 255

 Memo, SOP for Trans of Dependents, cited n.

248.
236 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

brides and their children were carefully

organized so that they might be cleared

by immigration, health, and customs officials with as little delay as possible. Husbands were encouraged to wait for their

brides at their home towns rather than to

meet them at the ports.256 The usual plan

was to transfer the passengers from the

piers directly to the trains by which they

were to proceed to their destinations, without any staging at the ports. When large

groups of dependents traveled on the same

train, a train commander was provided

and Red Gross personnel was assigned to

accompany them. In addition to notifying

the husbands when to expect their wives,

the ports of debarkation notified the service commands through which the trains

would pass. A special officer was designated by each service commander to give

attention to the affairs of dependents en

route, and these officers were able to provide helpful assistance, especially at points

where transfers were made from one train

to another.257 The Red Gross performed a

useful service throughout.

In the early stages of the movement

trains carrying large numbers of war

brides created a problem in public relations for the Army. Press reporters and

photographers went aboard at many station stops, and sometimes were overpersistent in their efforts to obtain stories for

their publications. Believing that the railroads might be encouraging the practice,

the Chief of Transportation requested the

carriers to control the situation so far as

possible. The service commanders were

instructed that, without interfering with

orderly news coverage, all agencies of the

War Department should endeavor to protect war brides from embarrassment and

the violation of their privacy.258

As had been anticipated, the movement

of war brides was far from complete at the

end of June, and the ships specially

designated to transport them continued in

this service for several months thereafter.

Early in September 1946, the Chief of

Transportation announced that the number of dependents to be moved across the

Pacific had been reduced to a point where

the further assignment of troopships to

this special traffic was no longer necessary.

Two months later the same action was

taken with regard to the Atlantic. Commercial ship space was then becoming

more plentiful.259

Up to 4 September 1946 war brides

and children brought to the United States

had totaled 56,214. That total included

41,502 adults and 14,712 infants; 48,408

were transported across the Atlantic and

7,806 across the Pacific.260 During the

year 1946 the total movement of dependents to the United States was 64,229; the

peak month was April, when more than

16,000 were debarked.261 The 1946 figures

include some dependents other than war

brides and their children, but these exceptions constituted a very small percentage

of the whole.

In the meantime the movement of military dependents from the United States to

oversea areas had been resumed.262 In the

256

 WD press release, 26 Mar 46, OCT HB PE Gen

Dependents. 257

 Memo, SOP for the Trans of Dependents, cited

n. 248. 258

 Ltr, Col Messersmith, OCT, to IMC, 25 Feb 46;

Memo, CofT for TAG, 15 Mar 46; both in OCT 510

Dependents. 259

 TC Weekly News Letter, 4 Sep 46; WD press

release, 18 Nov 46; both in OCT HB PE Gen Dependents.

260 TC Weekly News Letter, cited n. 259. 261

 Data compiled for statistical volume of this series

from monthly rpts, Recapitulation of Passengers Debarked, submitted by PEs to CofT. 262

 WD Cir 98, 30 Mar 46, gave the rules and procedures.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 237

spring of 1946 ships that had been hastily

prepared for war brides were used for this

traffic, although passengers were warned

that the vessels were in no sense "luxury

liners."

 263

 Later in that year transports

reconditioned for the Army's postwar fleet

began to enter service, and they were

much better equipped to accommodate

women and children. In August 1946 the

number of dependents embarked for oversea destinations exceeded for the first time

in the postwar period the number transported to the United States. Yet many

women who desired to follow their husbands were not permitted to do so at

once.264 The readiness of the Army to permit families to join soldiers of the oversea

forces depended not only on the availability of suitable transportation but also on

conditions in the foreign countries. Housing was a serious postwar problem in most

places, and the Army would not authorize the departure of families until it was

assured that the areas of destination could

accommodate them.265

During the period when the movement

of war brides was getting under way an

officer who had been wrestling with the

problems remarked that it was a simpler

matter to move a division of troops with

all their equipment than a shipload of dependents. This was a graphic way of expressing an attitude regarding dependent

travel in general that was shared by many

of his colleagues. The transportation of

women and children involves arrangements and procedures quite different

from those employed in the movement of

troops. Beyond that, ships that had received only minor rehabilitation after

being in wartime troop service were not

suitable for this traffic. Complaints by the

wives and protests from the husbands

were inevitable. Yet the War Department

doubtless would have been subjected to

even greater criticism if it had endeavored

to delay this traffic until the conditions

were more propitious.

Repatriation of the War Dead

Although the over-all responsibility for

the evacuation of the war dead from oversea areas and their reburial in the United

States rested with The Quartermaster

General, the Chief of Transportation

worked closely with him in arranging for

the movement of the remains by water

and by land.266 The Quartermaster General, as chief of the American Graves

Registration Service, had supervision over

the return of the remains of all Americans

who had died overseas during World War

II. The total fatalities were estimated at

359,000. Of this number, 280,835 remains

had been recovered up to 30 June 1951;

170,752 had been returned to the United

States, 109,866 had been buried in permanent U.S. cemeteries overseas in accordance with instructions from next of

kin, and the remainder had been buried

elsewhere.267 The first shipments of remains to reach U.S. ports under the

263

 WD press releases, 12 Mar and 9 Apr 46;

Memo, C of Water Trans Sv OCT for CofT, 25 Apr

46, sub: Dependent Vessels; all in OCT HB Wylie

Dependents. 264

 WD Progress Rpt, Sec. 3-A, 31 Jan 47, p. 7,

OCT HB MPR. 265

 Interv with Lt Col Horace F. McFeely, C of

Mvmts Contl Br OCT, 28 Oct 46, OCT HB PE Gen

Dependents. 266

 QMC Historical Studies, 21, The Graves Registration Service in World War II (Washington, 1951); Erna

Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, The Quartermaster Corps:

Organization, Supply, and Services, Vol. II, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), Ch. XII. 267

 Risch and Kieffer, op. cit., Ch. XII, pp. 402-04.
238 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

repatriation program arrived in October

1947. Arrivals during the years 1947-50

were as follows:268

Arrivals

Tear of Remains

1947. ............................... . 13,612

1948................................ . 101,117

1949. ............................... . 51,073

1950................................ . 4,347

In the early planning the Chief of

Transportation had contemplated that

most remains would be returned in mortuary ships specially equipped and devoted entirely to that purpose. The plan

called for ten modified Liberty ships,

previously used for the transportation of

assembled aircraft and tanks, to be prepared as mortuary ships by installing

racks to accommodate from 6,500 to 7,000

caskets. In addition, six small vessels were

to be similarly prepared with a capacity

for about 160 caskets and used on short

voyages within the theaters.269 Actually,

only three special mortuary ships were

placed in service. It was found that by

careful stowage the remains could be

transported without special racks, and

this meant that any ship could be used

that was in a position to load at one of the

oversea ports where remains were concentrated.270

Since special facilities and handling

methods were required, there was an advantage in using as few receiving ports as

possible; the plan therefore provided that

all shipments in the Atlantic would be

landed at New York and all shipments in

the Pacific at San Francisco. At each port

installation, space was set aside and adapted for the storage of remains awaiting

shipment to the inland distribution centers. The port commanders at New York

and San Francisco also provided facilities

and operated distribution centers for remains that were destined for cemeteries in

their respective areas.

The transportation of remains from the

ports of debarkation to the inland distribution centers was accomplished so far as

possible with special mortuary cars

equipped with racks and capable of taking from fifty to sixty-six caskets. The

Chief of Transportation provided 118 such

cars by converting Army hospital cars

that were not required after the heavy

movement of patients was over. Since the

remains usually arrived at the ports in

large shipments, it frequently was possible

to make up entire trains of mortuary cars.

The regular services of the railroads were

used on the occasions when only a few

remains were to be shipped.271

From the distribution centers remains

were forwarded to the places of interment.

All shipments to and from distribution

centers were accompanied by military

escorts of the branch of the service to

which the deceased had belonged. The

escorts stayed with the remains until they

had been delivered to the next of kin, or

until burial if so requested. In most cases

the escorts were the only representatives

of the military services to have personal

268

 Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster

Corps, 1950, p. 105. 269

 Memo. CofT for CG ASF, 11 Mar 46, sub:

Status of Plng—Repatriation of Dead, OCT 518, Vol.

I; Memo, Col Kenneth W. Gillespie for Wylie, 18

Apr 46, OCT HB PE Gen Return of Dead. 270

 Interv with Edgar C. Seward, 26 Sep 51, OCT

HB PE Gen Return of Dead. Mr. Seward, as a member of the Water Division, OCT, was charged with

the supervision of these matters on behalf of the Chief

of Transportation. 271

 Terms for transporting remains in mortuary cars

or baggage cars are given in tender by the carriers;

Return to Destination in U.S. of Remains of American Dead from Overseas Battle Areas, 3 Sep 47,

OCT HB PE Gen Return of Dead.
REDEPLOYMENT AND REPATRIATION 239

contact with relatives of the deceased and

their task was a delicate one. Consequently, they were selected with care and

were given special training to prepare

them for their mission.272

Results Under Pressure

The period between the surrender of

Germany and the end of 1945 was one of

especially heavy pressure on the Chief of

Transportation. He was under pressure to

obtain enough ocean transport to effect

first a quick redeployment of troops from

Europe to the Pacific and then a hurried

repatriation from all oversea areas. He

was under pressure throughout this period

and even into the next year to obtain

sufficient rail transportation to move returning troops promptly from the ports of

debarkation, and particularly to provide

sleeping car accommodations for those

making long trips.

The Army had done a comprehensive

job of planning for redeployment and

demobilization. It had made provision for

the facilities and procedures needed to receive returning troops and process them

for further assignments or for mustering

out of the service. The Chief of Transportation had made effective arrangements

for accomplishing the change-over from a

heavy outbound movement to a heavy

homeward movement of troops and

equipment. Precautions had been taken

against the withdrawal of troopships from

military service after V-E Day, and the

extent to which captured German vessels

might be used had been explored. But the

Chief of Transportation had relied on the

rail carriers to make the required amount

of equipment available as they had done

previously without having a definite

agreement with the Director of Defense

Transportation, and this proved to be a

mistake.

The mobilization of shipping for redeployment and repatriation was accomplished speedily. There were virtually no

commercial passenger services in operation at that time so that all merchanttype vessels could be devoted to the requirements of the armed forces. After V-J

Day many combatant vessels became

available for use in repatriating military

personnel. The collaboration of the Army,

the Navy, and the War Shipping Administration toward the achievement of early

demobilization was excellent. More troops

were landed at United States ports in one

month (December 1945) than had been

dispatched overseas in any three-month

period during the war.

The circumstances affecting the transportation of troops after their debarkation

at U.S. ports were less propitious. Civilian

traffic, which had not been greatly restricted during the war, continued to compete with troop traffic for rail service. The

expectation of the Chief of Transportation that enough rail equipment would be

diverted from regular passenger services

to meet the increased military requirements was not at once realized, chiefly

because the Director of Defense Transportation and the military authorities had

reached no understanding in advance and

held differing views on the subject. It can

scarcely be said that there ever was an

"understanding" between them on this

point, but gradually more and more railroad equipment was assigned to troop

272

 WD Pamphlet 21-40, July 1947, sub: Mil

Escorts—Return of WW II Dead; Memo, TAG for

CG Sixth Army, 1 Aug 47, sub: Pers Reqmts—WW

II Dead Program; Memo, TAG for CGs All Armies,

et al., 20 Feb 48; last two in OCT 293.1 Escorts.
240 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

traffic until four fifths of the sleepers and a

third of the steel coaches were so employed. In the late months of 1945 the

military traffic moved from Pacific coast

ports was limited by the line-haul capacity of the railroads rather than by equipment.

Because the public wanted the speediest

possible demobilization and the War Department had accepted this as a criterion,

judgment as to the success of the operation

must take into account first the fact that

the rate of repatriation and demobilization exceeded the expectation of even the

most optimistic Army officers. On the

other hand, it cannot be doubted that

credit for that success was somewhat

dimmed by the Army's failure to have a

clear-cut understanding regarding the

provision of additional rail equipment

and to regulate the flow of troops into the

debarkation ports to conform to the arrangements that the rail, motor, and air

carriers had made to move them inland.
CHAPTER IV

Freight Movements

in the United States

Between Pearl Harbor and the end of

1945, Army freight shipped over the transportation systems of the United States

totaled more than 340,000,000 tons.

(Table 16) This was a colossal load to

move under the supervision of a single

agency, the Office of the Chief of Transportation. During 1944, the year of

heaviest traffic, more than 105,000,000

tons were moved, as compared with 11,-

224,000 tons for which the Army issued

transportation orders during the fiscal

year 1919, when World War I traffic was

at its peak.1

The volume of Army freight traffic was

influenced primarily by the number of

men in the service, for whether the troops

were in the zone of interior or in the theaters of operations they had to be fed,

clothed, equipped, and otherwise provided for, mainly with supplies produced

in the United States. A secondary influence was exercised by strategic developments that might call for especially heavy

shipments during periods of military crisis.

Yet another factor was the amount of matériel that the War Department procured

for shipment to Allied countries under the

international aid programs. From a total

of about 1,600,000 tons in December

1941, the first month of the war, Army

shipments increased to a monthly peak of

10,900,000 tons in March 1945, when the

requirements of the forces in Europe

were still heavy and the build-up of

strength in the Pacific was being pushed

as rapidly as resources would permit.

These figures comprehend only shipments

made on War Department bills of lading;

they do not include shipments moved on

commercial bills of lading, such as raw

materials and components used in the

manufacture of military items and shipments by contractors working on construction projects for the Army.

The Chief of Transportation's task in

connection with freight movements was

heightened not only by the growing volume but also by many other circumstances inherent in the wartime transportation situation. The over-all increase in

traffic, which was substantially more than

100 percent in the case of rail and motor

carriers, put a heavy strain on both facilities and manpower and increased the

probability of delay, damage, or loss.2

1

 Annual Report of the Chief of Transportation Service,

1919, p. 67. Domestic traffic is measured in short tons

(2,000 pounds). 2

 Volume of traffic, equipment, and manpower are

discussed at some length in Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations,

Ch. IX.
242 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 16—FREIGHT SHIPPED ON WAR DEPARTMENT BILLS OF LADING BY ARMY PROCURING

SERVICES AND COMMANDERS OF TROOP ORGANIZATIONS: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER

1945

 a

(Short Tons)

a

 Matériel of the Medical Department was included with"Other" through December 1942, and that of the Transportation Corps through

June 1944. b

 Supplies and equipment accompanying troop organizations. c

 In addition to the Medical Department and the Transportation Corps matériel included in certain years, this class embraced matériel

of The Adjutant General and the Fiscal Director, post exchange supplies, personal property, and supplies shipped overseas for civilian aid.

Source: Monthly compilations of the Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, reworked for a statistical volume of

this series.

Army matériel included many items of

unusual size or composition that required

special handling and loading techniques.

Careful attention had to be given to routing, packing, marking, and documentation to insure prompt and safe delivery.

Provision had to be made for the economical movement of the Army's growing volume of less-than-carload shipments. The

rates and classifications of the carriers

were based on peacetime traffic and therefore required many adjustments to fulfill

the Army's wartime needs. A system to

control the flow of military and civilian

freight to the ports and through the

important inland gateways in such a way

as to avoid congestion and delay had to be

developed by the Army in conjunction

with the other federal agencies concerned.

Measures to meet these problems were

initiated during 1940 and 1941 when

transportation was a responsibility of The

Quartermaster General, but much remained to be accomplished after that

responsibility passed to the newly created

Chief of Transportation in March 1942.

The Chief of Transportation was responsible for the "direction, supervision,

and co-ordination of all transportation by

common carrier (except air carrier)."3

The fulfillment of this responsibility with

respect to movements was charged to the

Traffic Control Division; the Rail and

Highway Divisions gave attention to the

3

 AR 55-5, 5 Oct 42, par. 3a. The Chief of Transportation was also responsible for the use of contract

carriers.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 243

carriers' needs for additional equipment

and personnel; and a general co-ordinating supervision was exercised by the

Director of Operations.4

This discussion of Army freight movements in the United States relates only to

the freight shipments moved by common

and contract carriers on War Department

bills of lading. Some supplies were moved

in motor vehicles assigned to troop units

and Army installations, and some by utility railroad equipment operated on military reservations. Such traffic was small,

however, compared with that which

moved over the commercial transportation systems of the country, and it was

under the control of the commanders of

the respective units and installations, not

of the Chief of Transportation.5

Characteristics of Army Freight Traffic

Military shipments differed from commercial traffic in certain important respects, and the differences were responsible for some of the problems that

confronted the Chief of Transportation

and the carriers during the war. In many

cases it was necessary to formulate new

procedures and to develop new handling

techniques to solve the problems. At all

times the differences necessitated close cooperation between the Army and the carriers and between the Chief of Transportation in Washington and the transportation officers in the field.

Shipments of Army freight had many

points of origin and many destinations.6

This was a consequence of the large number of manufacturing plants, depots,

transit storage points, training camps, and

ports of embarkation that contributed to

the war effort. A calculation made in the

Traffic Control Division of the carloads of

freight shipped on War Department bills

of lading during the last five months of

1944 gave the percentage relationship of

the number of cars shipped from the

various types of establishments as follows:7

Establishment Percent

Total ............................. . 100.0

Commercial industrial plants .............. . 48.0

Army depots. .......................... . 26.4

Army-owned industrial plants ............. . 10.9

Holding and reconsignment points ......... . 2.1

Commercial warehouses.................. . 2.0

Army-Navy consolidating stations. ........ . 1.3

Miscellaneous Army installations .......... . 9.3

The fact that so large a percentage originated at commercial industrial plants,

where the shipping personnel was not

under the direct control of the Army, gives

an indication of the problems involved in

enforcing the Army's standards of car

utilization and its procedures relating to

packing, marking, and documentation.

An analysis of Army freight transportation in the United States during the first

six months of 1945 disclosed that about

two thirds of it was furnished in connection

with shipments to domestic destinations,

while about one third was furnished in

connection with shipments to the ports for

4

 See above, Ch. I, pp. 14-15, for the officers in

charge of these divisions. 5

 Although air freight traffic will be referred to from

time to time, such traffic was controlled by the Army

Air Forces, not by the Chief of Transportation. 6

 Although some of the data used in presenting the

characteristics of Army freight are taken from special

studies dealing with limited periods rather than with

the whole of World War II, they have a sufficiently

broad base to give them significance. 7

 Study by Transport Economics Section, Types of

Establishments From Which War Department Carload Freight Is Moved, 8 Mar 45, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Freight. The estimates were made from a

"representative sample" of War Department bills of

lading that accounted for 1,365,000 carloads of freight

and were therefore considered reasonably accurate.
244 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

export. The study that produced these figures was based on ton-miles of transportation and hence took into account length of

haul as well as tons shipped; the data

therefore cannot be compared with those

given in the preceding paragraph. The

study indicated that 67.3 percent of the

total ton-miles was accounted for by shipments from industries, 25.5 percent by

shipments from storage, and 7.2 percent by

shipments from other origins such as

Army posts and camps, consolidating stations, salvage centers, and ports.8

 The

analysis of shipments by origins and

destinations was as follows:

Origin and Destination Percent

Total ............................. . 100.0

Industries to domestic destinations. ......... . 51.1

Industries to ports for export.............. . 16.2

Storage points to domestic destinations ...... . 8.6

Storage points to ports for export........... . 16.9

Other origins to domestic destinations........ 5.9

Other origins to ports for export............ . 1.3

The origins of Army freight shipments

were well distributed geographically. Statistics are available only for carload rail

shipments, but such freight constituted

about 88 percent of the total. For the

period 1942-45 the Fifth and Sixth Service Commands, embracing large Midwest

producing areas, each originated 16 percent of the total carloads shipped on War

Department bills of lading; the Ninth

Service Command, which included the

Pacific coast and mountain states, originated 12.2 percent of the total. The proportion of freight originated in the Ninth

Service Command increased substantially

during this period—that is, from slightly

less than 10 percent in 1942 to 14.1 percent in 1944. The following carloads originated in the respective service commands

during the four years 1942-45:9

Service Commands Carloads Percent

Total ................. . 9,645,026 100.0

I ......................... . 217,058 2.2

II ........................ . 925,980 9.6

III ....................... . 1,106,679 11.5

IV. ....................... . 1,146,823 11.9

V ........................ . 1,558,546 16.2

VI. ....................... . 1,535,528 16.0

VII....................... . 958,844 9.9

VIII. ..................... . 1,012,914 10.5

IX ....................... . 1,182,654 12.2

The destinations of Army freight also

were well distributed. Comparison of the

above percentages of total carloads

shipped by rail in the several service commands with the percentages for destinations, given below, discloses that the First,

Second, Third, and Ninth Service Commands, in which the principal Atlantic

and Pacific ports of embarkation were located, received substantially more than

they shipped. The Fourth and Eighth

Service Commands, which embraced

large numbers of training camps and

therefore were heavy consumers of supplies, also received more than they

shipped. The large percentage destined

for the Ninth Service Command reflects

the fact that all Pacific coast ports, as well

as numerous training camps, were in that

area. The carloads of freight shipped during the four-year period 1942-45, classified according to the service commands

8

 ASF MPR, Nov 45, Sec. 3, p. 4. The analysis also

covered the months July-November 1945, but these

months were not typical of the war period. 9

 Summarized from data compiled in Transport

Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT,

reworked on a state-by-state basis for a statistical

volume of this series. The Transport Economics Section, which originated most of the statistics used in

this chapter, obtained the data from bills of lading by

a sampling process rather than by a complete study of

the document; the Traffic Control Division was convinced that the data so obtained were substantially

accurate.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 245

for which the shipments were destined,

are as follows:10

Service Commands Carloads Percent

Total ................. . 9,645,026 100.0

I. ........................ . 289,346 3.0

II ........................ . 1,425,844 14.8

III ....................... . 1,357,900 14.1

IV ....................... . 1,318,784 13.7

V ........................ . 872,549 9.0

VI ....................... . 608,699 6.3

VII....................... . 777,311 8.1

VIII. ..................... . 1,026,784 10.6

IX ....................... . 1,967,809 20.4

While much Army matériel was similar

to and could be handled in the same manner as commercial freight, many items

required special attention either because

of their characteristics or because of the

urgency of the movements. Supplies and

equipment of the Ordnance Department

constituted 36.4 percent of the total tonnage shipped; its tanks, armored vehicles,

trucks, and artillery required great numbers of flatcars, while its live ammunition

and bulk explosives called for special handling and security measures. Matériel of

the Quartermaster Corps, which accounted for 23.5 percent of the total

tonnage, included a large proportion of

packaged supplies and therefore did not

differ greatly from commercial freight.

The equipment and supplies of the Corps

of Engineers, comprising 18.7 percent of

the total tonnage, included bulky and

hard-to-handle items. Shipments of the

Air Forces, making up 10.6 percent of the

total, included many intricate and delicate assemblies that required careful

handling and in some cases specially

equipped cars. The radar and other technical equipment of the Signal Corps and

the liquids and gases of the Chemical

Warfare Service required special treatment. Some of the large items of Transportation Corps matériel, such as locomotives and boats, not only presented

problems in car loading but necessitated

careful attention to clearances on the

railroad right of ways.11

The average haul for the Army's railway freight shipments was much greater

than the general average. The Army

average was 625 miles in the first quarter

of 1942. As many new and widely dispersed industrial plants and military

installations came into operation and the

shipment of freight to the ports for transshipment overseas increased, the average

haul rose to 692 miles in the first quarter

of 1943, 720 miles in the first quarter of

1944. and 773 miles in the first quarter of

1945. After redeployment began the proportion of shipments from the industrial

East and Middle West to Pacific coast

ports and depots increased, and the Army

average advanced to 855 miles in June

1945.12 The average length of haul for all

railroad freight, which had been 351.1

miles in 1940, increased to 473.3 miles in

1944 and declined to 458.1 miles in 1945,

a year partly in the postwar period.13

Army freight traffic did not constitute

a major portion of the total tonnage

moved by the railroads, but it was a substantial part and the percentage grew as

the war progressed. The matériel shipped

on War Department bills of lading was 5.1

percent of the total rail tonnage in 1942,

7.6 percent in 1943, 9.3 percent in 1944,

10

 Ibid. 11

 Percentages are based on Table 16. Analyses of

Army freight by commodities were presented from

time to time during 1943 and 1944 in ASF MPR,

Sec. 3. 12

 Data compiled by Progress Br, Contl Div OCT,

4 Aug 45, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight; ASF

MPR, Jun 45, Sec. 3, pp. 6, 7. 13

 AAR, Railroads In This Century (Washington,

July 1947), p. 13.
246 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ENGINEER PONTONS LOADED ON FLATCARS for movement to the seaboard.

and 12 percent in 1945.14 Two points must

be borne in mind in considering these figures. The first, mentioned before, is that

the data do not include shipments of raw

materials and manufactured articles by

industrial plants before the completion of

military items for delivery to the Army.

The other point is that as a general matter

Army matériel, because of its distinctive

characteristics and the necessity of maintaining shipping schedules, required more

attention than a corresponding volume of

commercial freight.

Prompt delivery was an important factor in a large proportion of Army shipments. In the early part of the war when

the production of many items was behind

schedule, delayed shipments might deprive troop units of equipment or supplies

essential to their training and practice

maneuvers. While equipment was being

assembled at depots or ports of embarkation to accompany troop units overseas,

the lack of one item might delay the entire shipment. The movement of maintenance supplies to the forces already

overseas was carefully controlled by the

oversea supply divisions of the ports of

embarkation, and shipments against theater commanders' requisitions were carefully phased to meet convoy sailing dates

and theater requirements. Emergency

requisitions were not uncommon, and it

was essential that the closely scheduled

shipments from industrial plants, depots,

14

 Data compiled in Transport Economics Section

and published from time to time in ASF MPR, Sec.

3.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 247

76-MM. GUN MOTOR CARRIAGES delivered to shipside.

or holding and reconsignment points

should be executed without failure or

delay.

In order to assure prompt delivery,

Army shipments were routed in such a

way as to avoid congesting important terminals and to avoid sending additional

shipments through inland gateways or

ports that were already overburdened.

The progress of urgent shipments was followed from point of origin to destination,

and the carriers were called upon for special measures when such were necessary

to maintain schedules. When failures occurred investigations were made to determine the causes and prevent repetitions.

In all these matters the closest possible

co-operation was necessary between the

Chief of Transportation and the carriers,

particularly the railroads, which handled

the bulk of the traffic. In 1940 the Association of American Railroads established

the Military Transportation Section in its

Car Service Division to deal exclusively

with military freight and passenger traffic.

It was located first in the Office of The

Quartermaster General, and after March

1942 in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, in order to work hand in hand

with the Army's transportation organization in meeting the succession of problems

that each day presented.15 While close relations were also maintained with the

motor carriers, the volume and nature of

the Army's highway traffic did not require

15

 See above, p. 15. Basic relations between the

Army and the railroads are discussed in Wardlow,

op. cit., pp. 312-19.
248 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

as elaborate arrangements as its rail

traffic.

Distribution of Freight Among the Carriers

In planning the inland shipment of

Army matériel the first decision to be

made was whether it should move by rail,

motor, water, or air. Several factors had

to be considered. The first was whether

one mode of transport would meet the

military need better than the others. Then

there was the question whether at a particular time or on a particular route one

type of carrier was less heavily burdened

than the others. The matter of comparative costs always had to be kept in view.

The first two considerations were so important that as the war progressed military expediency sometimes outweighed

the cost factor in determining the routing

of particular shipments.

When the United States began to rearm

in 1940 and the volume of military freight

began to mount, it was evident that the

shipping officers of the Army had a pronounced predilection for rail transportation. The railroads were fast. Their services were regular and dependable. They

could handle all types of commodities and

no tonnages were too great for them to

move promptly. Beyond these considerations, Army shipping officers were thoroughly familiar with the facilities and

procedures of the railroads and had good

working relationships with railroad officials. As the pressure on the rail lines became increasingly heavy, however, the

advisability of making greater use of the

highways and the inland waterways became evident to the Army's transportation

authorities in Washington. It was then a

matter of educating those actually routing

shipments to take all carriers into account.

The Chief of Transportation and his

Traffic Control Division made a consistent

effort in that direction, and shipments by

motor and barge increased markedly as

the war progressed, but even then the railroads handled almost 90 percent of the

Army's tonnage in 1944 and 1945.

(Table 17)

All but a small percentage of the military freight transported by the railroads

moved in carload shipments. This was

basically a consequence of the great

volume of the Army's traffic, but there

were other contributing factors. Matériel

accompanying troop units naturally

moved in carload shipments. Coal, petroleum products, and chemicals normally

moved in bulk and hence in carloads. Explosives required special security measures, and it was therefore advantageous to

move them in quantity shipments. Many

items of military equipment were so large

that one item or a few constituted a carload. In the summer of 1942 the Army

inaugurated its own consolidated freight

service on certain routes, and this service

enabled it to bring together into carload

shipments many small consignments that

otherwise would have moved as less-thancarload lots. Shipments by railway express

were avoided if possible because of the

higher charges, and the need for speedy

deliveries was frequently met by expedited

rail freight service or by the use of the

highway carriers.

Restrictions on the use of railway express reflected not only the higher cost but

also the realization that the facilities of

the Railway Express Agency were limited

and that if they became overburdened the

chief advantage of express service, which

was speed of delivery, would be lost. Two

types of restriction were employed. First,
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 249

TABLE 17—MEANS OF TRANSPORT USED FOR FREIGHT MOVED ON WAR DEPARTMENT BILLS

OF LADING IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945

(Thousands of Short Tons)

a

 Shipments of 10,000 pounds or more were counted as carloads, but because of the severe shortage of cars few cars moved with so small

a load.

b

 Shipments by air were: December 1941, 73 tons; 1942, 1,392 tons; 1943, 1,103 tons; 1944, 1,409 tons; 194S, 1,170 tons; total, 5,147 tons.

Source: Summary of Freight Traffic on War Department Bills of Lading, by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division,

OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

the kinds of shipments for which express

was permissible were specified—currency,

valuable supplies that were subject to loss

by theft, delicate instruments, perishable

commodities, articles that would cost

more if moved by other means, and emergency shipments. Second, shipments aggregating 5,000 pounds or more required

an express transportation order issued by

the Chief of Transportation.16 During

1944 the latter restriction was relaxed

somewhat to permit shipments to be

diverted from air to railway express regardless of weight and without obtaining

an order from the Chief of Transportation; also, provision was made for the

issuance of blanket express transportation

orders for certain categories of articles for

which express shipment was especially

suitable.17 But while making these concessions in order to relieve shipping officers of burdensome procedures so far as

practicable, the Chief of Transportation

constantly reminded the technical services

that express shipments would have to be

held within limits.18

The Army Air Forces and the Ordnance Department were the heaviest users

of railway express.19 Express shipments

began a sharp rise late in 1944, because of

the urgent need of the armies in Europe

for certain supplies, especially ammunition. They jumped to a peak of over 80,-

000 tons a month in February and March

1945, largely because of heavy shipments

16

 AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, pars. 32 and 33. The size

of shipments requiring express transportation orders

was changed several times before being fixed at 5,000

pounds; see AR 30-955, 1 Jun 23, Sec. VII; WD Cir

130, 5 Nov 40, Sec. III; WD Cir 16, 20 Jan 42, Sec. I. 17

 Memos, CG AAF for CofT, 28 Apr 43, 22 Jul 44,

and 5 Aug 44, OCT 523 Freight Diverted From Air

to Ground; WD CTB 28, 2 Sep 44; WD CTB 33, 3

Nov 44. 18

 OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 27-28. 19

 Table, Summary by Technical Services and

Types of Carriers of Freight Moved on WD Bills of

Lading, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.
250 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of empty shell cases to loading plants in

the effort to recoup stocks that had been

depleted as a result of the Battle of the

Bulge and to comply with further heavy

requisitions from Generals Eisenhower

and MacArthur.20

Until September 1940 the Army's use

of commercial motor transportation was

severely limited by a War Department directive that required truck services to be

engaged "by means of an agreement" and

prohibited the use of the standard government bill of lading for truck shipments. At

the time this directive was issued the motor carriers had not been brought under

federal regulation and their rates and

practices varied greatly. There were also

other circumstances that militated against

the free use of truck services by the

Army. The number of common carrier

and contract truck operators was small

and their equipment was limited, so that

large Army shipments that had to move

on particular routes on particular days

could not be accommodated. State laws

limiting the sizes and weights of vehicles

using the highways varied considerably

and were the cause of delays at state

borders. The highway carriers could

operate only within the limits specified in

their permits or certificates. The trucking

industry was not as thoroughly organized

as were the railroads, and motor equipment could not be shifted from place to

place as freely as rail equipment. Landgrant deductions, which gave the Army

favorable rates on the railroads, were not

applicable to the highway carriers unless

special equalization agreements were

made. Beyond these considerations there

was the preference that Army transportation officers had for the railroads as a result of their long collaboration. Nevertheless, the advisability of extending the use

of commercial trucks was recognized

when military traffic began to swell as a

result of rearmament. The Transportation

Act of 1940 tightened the federal regulation of the commercial trucking industry,

and in September of that year the prohibition against the use of government

bills of lading for motor shipments was

lifted.21 In spite of the handicaps, Army

transportation officers in Washington immediately took steps to increase the volume of military freight moving over the

highways.22

After the United States entered the war

careful consideration was given to the

problem of using commercial highway

transportation to best advantage for the

movement of Army matériel. The Chief

of Transportation's Traffic Control Division had a section that gave exclusive

attention to this problem.23 Certain definite advantages in the use of highway

carriers were recognized. Truck services

were flexible, and pickup and delivery

practices could be adapted to suit the convenience of consignors and consignees.

Over short and medium distances the delivery time often was less by truck than by

rail. Shipment by truck was especially

suitable for certain commodities and

sometimes permitted a saving in cooperage and packing costs. Motor transport

could be used to relieve the railroads

when they became overburdened on par20

 ASF MPR, Apr 45, Sec. 3, p. 7; Summary of

Freight Traffic on WD Bills of Lading, by Transport

Economics Sec, reworked for statistical volume of

this series. 21

 WD Cir 108, 30 Sep 40, Sec. I; AR 55-105, 29

Dec 42, par. 9. 22

 A fuller discussion of the Army's use of the highway carriers will be found in Wardlow, op. cit., pp.

353-67. 23

 Functions of Motor Sec, Freight Br, 12 Mar 43,

OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 251

ticular routes or at particular gateways,

and could also be used to avoid the assignment of rail equipment to short hauls

where the production of ton-miles of

transportation was relatively low.24

Early in the war the Chief of Transportation considered the advisability of limiting the use of commercial trucks to distances under 300 miles.25

 The establishment of a fixed mileage limit was not

approved, however, and the wartime

policy was that, although as a general

matter the use of the highway carriers

would be confined to the shorter routes

and long-haul freight would be moved by

rail, the choice of a carrier for a particular

shipment would be made in the light of

all of the circumstances.

Army shipments by highway carriers

increased steadily during the war. (See

Table 17.) The total volume of motor

freight shipped between December 1941

and the end of 1945 was almost 28,000,-

000 tons. This accounted for only 8.2 percent of the total Army freight; nevertheless, the proportionate increase in tonnage

moved by highway was greater than that

in tonnage moved by rail.26 Matériel of

the Army Air Forces, the Quartermaster

Corps, and the Ordnance Department

constituted the largest segments of highway freight.27

A study of Army highway shipments

during the first half of 1944 disclosed that

California and Texas were the states originating the largest percentages of the total

(18.4 and 10.7 percent, respectively); they

also had the largest percentages with

respect to destination. Of the tonnage delivered in California, 89.8 percent originated in that state, and the corresponding figure for Texas was 75.5 percent. In

the eastern part of the United States more

shipments crossed state borders, but the

figures nevertheless emphasized that

motor freight was predominately shorthaul freight.28

 An analysis of the freight

shipped by highway during five scattered

months of 1943 disclosed that 75 percent

of the tonnage was handled by general

commodity haulers, 11 percent by bulk

petroleum haulers, 13 percent by automobile haulers, and 1 percent by freight

forwarders.29

Although after September 1940 the

movement of military freight by highway

carriers could be accomplished on War

Department bills of lading, shipments of

the household goods of military personnel

at government expense still required a bid

and contract procedure. As the Army increased, such shipments aggregated a

considerable volume and involved problems different from those encountered in

the movement of other freight. During

1941 the household van operators made a

persistent effort to obtain a change in the

Army regulation and the removal of what

they considered a discriminatory provision. The War Department, however, continued to require a special contract for

each shipment of household goods, since

that method enabled it to establish in advance definite transportation and assessorial charges, to make provision against

unsatisfactory practices such as transfer

en route and tail-gate loading, and to require performance bonds. Standard forms

24

 WD TM 55.205, 25 Aug 44, pp. 75-82, lists the

advantages and disadvantages of highway transportation. 25

 Gross Log, 1 Jul 42, OCT HB Gross Log; Min of

ZTO Conf, Washington, Sep 43, p. 67, OCT HB

Zones Gen. 26

 Index of Tonnages Moved on WD Bills of

Lading, ASF MPR, May 45, Sec. 3, p. 7. 27

 Table cited n. 19. 28

 ASF MPR, Jul 44, Sec. 3, p. 68. 29

 ASF MPR, Dec 43, Sec. 3, p. 65. The Army's use

of freight forwarders is discussed below, p. 306.
252 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

for such contracts were provided to transportation officers in the field, first by The

Quartermaster General and later by the

Chief of Transportation.30

The movement of explosives naturally

presented peculiar problems. This traffic

was closely regulated by state and federal

laws and by rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the railroads, and the

Ordnance Department. The regulations

were strictly enforced by the Association

of American Railroads' Bureau of Explosives, which functioned as an inspection

and enforcement agency.31 Before the rearmament program was begun such shipments were made almost entirely by railroad freight service, but the requirements

of an expanding Army necessitated modification of the practice. Until June 1941

approval of the War Department was required before shipments of explosives and

other dangerous articles could be made

by motor carriers, but at that time local

transportation officers were authorized to

make such shipments on their own authority provided the carriers certified that

all federal, state, and local laws and regulations would be observed.32

 After Pearl

Harbor the need for emergency shipments

of explosives was great, and the use of

railway express for less-than-carload lots

was authorized under certain conditions.

The precautions taken to avoid disasters

during the transportation of explosives

were especially severe in connection with

export shipments, which required transshipment at the ports.33

Use of the inland waterways for War

Department freight was negligible during

peacetime, and although efforts were

made to increase this traffic during 1940

and 1941 only limited success was

achieved.34 There were several drawbacks

to the extensive use of water services. Delivery was slow as compared with rail.

Few Army installations were served directly by water carriers, and this meant

that shipments had to be handled part of

the way by rail or motor. Through rates on

combination rail and water routes were

not uniformly available. Water rates were

not subject to land-grant deductions as

were rail rates on many routes. Army

transportation officers could not obtain

reliable information regarding water service as readily as they could regarding rail

service. On the other hand, water rates

sometimes were lower than land-grant

rail rates, and it was evident that the time

would come when use of the inland waterways would be desirable as a means of relieving the railroads. As soon as the

United States entered the war, therefore,

Army shipping authorities in Washington

took aggressive steps to increase the use of

the barge lines and instructed the transportation officers in the field to do

likewise.35

From monthly totals of a few thousand

30

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 381-88; Memo,

Wardlow for Col Douglas C. Cordiner, 11 Mar 41,

OCT HB Topic Household Goods; Ltr, SW to Sen

Sheridan Downey, 2 Apr 41, OSW Trans 500-800;

AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 9b. 31

 The Bureau of Explosives reported that during

the period 1940-45 the railroads handled about

50,000,000 tons of military high explosives, and that

with commercial shipments the total was over 65,000,-

000 tons. AAR press release, 15 Apr 46. 32

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 146-47, 166-67;

WD Cir 107, 3 Jun 41, Sec. I; AR 55-155, 27 Nov

42, Sec. IV; WD TM 55-205, 25 Aug 44, pp. 143-

50.

33

 This subject will be discussed further in Chapter

V, below. 34

 See Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 367-69, for a more

detailed discussion of this general subject. 35

 SOS Memo S 55-3-42, 23 Oct 42, sub: Utilization

of Domestic Carriers.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 253

tons in 1941, Army shipments on domestic water routes increased to more than

200,000 tons in some war months. The

annual total increased from 901,000 tons

in 1942 to 1,891,000 tons in 1944. The

total domestic water traffic from December 1941 through December 1945 was

4,110,000 tons.36 This traffic constituted

only 1.2 percent of the total Army traffic.

Waterborne tonnage could have been further increased if more barges and tugs

had been available.37 Some such equipment was built by the Office of Defense

Transportation during the war, but the

amount of new construction was limited

by the demand for steel for the military

program.

In large measure the increase in the

Army's domestic waterborne tonnage was

the result of the persistent efforts of the

Inland Waterways Section of the Traffic

Control Division. This section not only

undertook to insure that shipments were

routed by water when suitable services

were available, but also tried to see that

barges and tugs, whether publicly or privately owned, were so used as to handle

the maximum traffic.

During the years 1943 and 1944 petroleum products in bulk constituted about

82 percent of the total Army freight

routed on the inland waterways, and the

remaining 18 percent was made up of

general supplies and motor vehicles.38 In

1945 the Army shipped considerable

grain for European civilian aid down the

Mississippi in barges for transshipment at

New Orleans.

The Army made only slight use of commercial air service for its domestic shipments of matériel. During the entire war

period air shipments totaled only slightly

over 5,000 tons. (See Table 17.) There were

two reasons for this. Since the airlines had

not introduced cargo services in peacetime and early in the war had been required to surrender about half of their

passenger planes to the government, air

express capacity was exceedingly limited.39

 Also, the air express rate was so

high that the Army required that use of

this form of transportation be "confined

to the most extreme emergencies."

 40

 Express transportation orders issued by the

Chief of Transportation could not be construed as authorizing the use of air express

unless air express was specifically stated.

All commercial air shipments were subject to priorities issued by the Air Transport Command.41

 The effect of these restrictions in limiting the size of shipments

is seen in the fact that the 903 tons of

Army supplies moved by air express dur36

 Table, Army Traffic by Domestic Water Carriers and Air, 18 May 50, OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Freight. Wartime domestic water traffic moved on

the Great Lakes, rivers, canals, and intracoastal barge

routes; intercoastal and coastwise steamship services

were virtually discontinued because the larger ships

were needed elsewhere. 37

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug-1 Sep

43, p. 121, OCT HB PE Gen. 38

 ASF MPR, Jul 45, Sec. 3, p. 14. The figures for

"routings" in the MPR studies are considerably larger

than the figures for actual shipments given above,

since shipments routed by water did not always move

by that route. Wardlow, op. cit., p. 369, gives an estimate of 12 percent for nonpetroleum commodities

shipped by water during the entire war period. This

estimate took into account the fact that petroleum

shipments by barges did not begin until well into

1943. See ASF MPR, Feb 44, Sec. 3, p. 85. 39

 The development of air cargo services during the

war was modest and chiefly under military control.

For a brief history, see Department of Commerce,

Industry Report—Domestic Transportation, OctoberNovember 1946, pp. 7-13. 40

 AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, par. 34. 41

 WD Cir 385, 27 Nov 42, Sec. II, and WD Cir

369, 12 Sep 44, Sec. II.
254 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CHART 8—FREIGHT MOVED MONTHLY BY RAIL AND OTHER DOMESTIC CARRIERS ON WAR

DEPARTMENT BILLS OF LADING: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945*

* "Rail" includes carload, less-than-carload, and express/ "Other" includes highway, domestic waterway, and air.

Source: Summary of Freight Traffic on War Department Bills of Lading, by Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control

Branch, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

ing the first eight months of 1944 consisted

of 24,020 separate shipments.42

The domestic cargo service that the Air

Transport Command inaugurated with

military aircraft during the war lifted

limited quantities of emergency supplies

destined for the ports for transshipment

overseas by water. In addition to requiring priorities issued by the Air Transport

Command, air shipments of ASF and

AGF matériel exceeding 250 pounds required the approval of the Chief of Transportation.43

Although other types of transport handled a substantial part of the Army's

domestic freight traffic, the railroads carried an overwhelming percentage of it.

This is strikingly depicted in Chart 8,

which also shows the gradual growth of

the traffic to a peak in March 1945, and

the sharp decline after Japan surrendered.

The importance of the other types was less

in the volume they transported, although

that afforded appreciable relief to the

hard pressed railroads, than in the fact

that each served especially well for a particular kind of traffic—the highway carriers for short-haul movements, the barge

services for the transportation of nonurgent bulk commodities, and the airlines

42

 ASF MPR, Sep 44, Sec. 3, p. 69. 43

 WD CTB 9, 2 Feb 44, sub: Priorities for Shipments via ATC Domestic Cargo Service; ASF MPR,

Sep 44, Sec. 3, p. 69.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 255

for the speedy delivery of small emergency

shipments.

Routing and Related Practices

Central control over the routing of

Army freight shipments was a controversial issue during the greater part of the

war. The technical services and the transportation officers in the field frequently

were critical of the policy and of the manner in which it was administered. But

despite the criticism, the routing regulation was not only retained but broadened,

because the transportation authorities in

Washington believed that close central

control was necessary to insure the satisfactory movement of War Department

property and the economical utilization

of transportation equipment. It was found

possible, however, to exempt certain types

of shipments from the requirement without seriously disturbing its effectiveness.

The peacetime regulation provided

that, except for property accompanying

troops, shipments of two or more carloads

from a single point of origin to a single

point of destination should be covered by

a "route order" obtained from The Quartermaster General, and that the order

number should appear on the bill of

lading.44 During 1941 there was a marked

increase in the volume of War Department matériel moved to the ports for

transshipment overseas, including supplies shipped to Allied countries under

lend-lease as well as those shipped to our

own forces, and in order to provide a

means for preventing congestion at the

ports the regulation was changed to require that a "release and routing" should

be obtained for all port-bound shipments

of one carload (or the equivalent) or

more, whether moving by rail, truck, or

barge.45 This procedure gave the central

transportation authorities a measure of

control over the time of movement as well

as over the route.46

During this period The Quartermaster

General, who was then in charge of Army

transportation, conceded some of his

rights under the routing regulation in an

effort to reduce the work that the regulation imposed on transportation officers in

the field and on his own office. Where recurrent domestic shipments were common, as between manufacturing plants

and depots and between depots and other

Army installations, ninety-day "term

routings" were issued to cover the movement of specific commodities. Term routings were found especially useful in connection with the movement of Ordnance

Department matériel. A somewhat similar

arrangement was made in connection

with shipments of Quartermaster supplies

by certain contractors, the routing of all

shipments under the contract being included in the contract terms. But these

arrangements to reduce the number of

route orders requested and issued affected

only a minor part of the total tonnage

moved, and as soon as the United States

entered the war it became necessary to

cancel all term routings because of the

tightening transportation situation.47

As the war progressed the domestic

transportation situation became more and

more critical, and at the same time the

need for close control of Army shipments

increased. Also, it was found that transportation officers in the field, by breaking up

shipments into single carloads, were evading the regulation requiring them to obtain

44

 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, par. 15. 45

 WD Cir 182, 28 Aug 41, Sec. IV, par. 151⁄2; AR

55-105, 29 Dec 42, pars. 15 and 16. 46

 See below, pp. 267-73. 47

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 127-29; Memos,

TAG for CofCA and Cs of Supply Services, 29 Dec

41 and 2 Jan 42, sub: Cancellation of Blanket Routings, AG 500 (12-26-41)(1).
256 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

routing orders for all domestic shipments

of two or more carloads. Accordingly, in

April 1943 the Chief of Transportation obtained a change in the regulation, which

required routing orders to be obtained

from his office for domestic shipments of

one carload or more, unless the shipments

consisted of troop impedimenta or perishable subsistence.48

At this time—April 1943—the authority of the Chief of Transportation over the

routing of Army shipments was exceedingly broad. He routed export and domestic shipments of or equivalent to one

carload, with the exceptions previously

noted. He controlled shipments by express

if they exceeded 5,000 pounds. He controlled the routing of shipments by military aircraft, except Air Forces matériel,

if they exceeded 250 pounds. Furthermore, as the officer responsible for the

Army's freight consolidating service, he

controlled the movement of a large percentage of less-than-carload shipments.

Control of the routing of carload freight

obviously was the core of this responsibility. There were two types of orders. Route

orders for domestic shipments were issued

by the Freight Branch of the Traffic Control Division, and the branch's main

object was to select routes that would produce the best results for the Army and use

transportation equipment most economically. Release and routing orders for

export freight were issued by the Control

Branch, which obtained the routings from

the Freight Branch and, after consulting

the Water Division regarding the availability of water transportation, indicated

the dates on which the shipments should

move.49 During the forty-five months of

actual hostilities approximately 1,345,000

such orders were issued for domestic and

export shipments, involving about 6,412,-

000 carloads.50

The most common complaint against

central freight routing during the early

part of the emergency concerned the time

lost in getting shipments started because

of the necessity of first communicating

with Washington. When routings were

requested by mail, as was usually the case

at that period, the complaint had substance, although the Army transportation

authorities in Washington believed that

the advantages of central routing more

than offset the disadvantage of delay.51 In

August 1941 the use of radio or telegraph

in obtaining routings was authorized

when conditions warranted.52 The establishment of a teletype network connecting

Washington and the larger field installations also was helpful. After the United

States entered the war the proportion of

mail requests declined rapidly, and when

the use of long-distance telephone for obtaining routings was specifically authorized mail requests virtually ceased.53

Use of the telephone, together with methods that the Traffic Control Division developed for supplying routings promptly,

frequently enabled transportation officers

in the field to make requests and receive

routings in a single call. But under war

48

 Memo, CofT for TAG, 2 Apr 43, AG 510; AR

55-105, Changes 3, 28 Apr 43, par. 15. 49

 For release purposes any shipment of 20,000

pounds by rail or 10,000 pounds by highway was considered a "carload or equivalent." 50

 OCT HB Monograph 24, App. IV. In addition,

more than 29,000 express transportation orders were

issued for express shipments of 5,000 pounds or more. 51

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 117-22. 52

 WD Cir 182, 28 Aug 41, par. 15. 53

 OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 9-10; Rpt, Traf

Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 25, OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Rpts.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 257

conditions time frequently was required to

make telephone connections, and there

were occasions when complicated routings

could not be provided immediately.

There was criticism also of some of the

routings provided by the Chief of Transportation. These criticisms emanated from

transportation officers in the field and

from the headquarters of some technical

services. While occasionally admitting

that something had gone wrong, the Chief

of Transportation usually defended his

selection of routes. It is understandable

that there should have been differences of

opinion on this subject since there were

two entirely different points of view—that

of offices responsible only for specific shipments, and that of the office responsible

for Army traffic in general and for the

economical use of transportation equipment.

The principal difficulties experienced

by the Chief of Transportation originated

with two services that preferred to route

their own traffic and maintained organizations for that purpose. These were the

Army Air Forces and the Ordnance Department. In the fall of 1942 the Air

Forces, which during the war attained a

large degree of autonomy within the

Army, obtained a delegation of authority

from the Chief of Transportation enabling

it with certain limitations to route its own

domestic traffic. The Chief of Transportation granted this authority reluctantly

and later endeavored to recall it, but

without success.54 In the summer of 1942

the Ordnance Department asked for and

obtained special blanket route orders

covering all shipments between certain of

its installations. The Chief of Transportation soon concluded that the use of

blanket orders threatened the effectiveness

of traffic control on the routes concerned

and canceled them after a few months'

trial.55

Perceiving that his difficulties with the

Ordnance Department were largely due

to the facts that it had a staff of traffic

experts at its headquarters and that the

transportation officers at important Ordnance field installations were Ordnance

officers, rather than Transportation Corps

officers, the Chief of Transportation took

steps to change these conditions. Maintaining a traffic organization in the Ordnance Department was contrary to Army

regulations, and in October 1942 the

Commanding General, Services of Supply, directed that the regulations be

observed.56 The organization was accordingly dissolved and much of its personnel was transferred to the Chief of

Transportation's Traffic Control Division.57

 The Army regulations also provided that so far as possible the transportation officers at field installations should

be officers of the Transportation Corps,

and this requirement was fulfilled as

rapidly as the Chief of Transportation was 54

 See Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 59-62, on reasons for

the delegation and the Chief of Transportation's dissatisfaction with it. 55

 Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 25 Jun 42, sub: Ord

Field Sv Route Orders; Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 1

Jul 42, sub: Releases for Ord Freight Shipts; 4th Ind,

CofT for CofOrd, 28 Jul 42; Memo, CofT for CofOrd,

12 Aug 42, sub: Revision of Rail Routes; Memos,

CofT for William H. Atack, Ind Sv Ord Dept, 17 and

30 Sep 42, sub: Request for Routing; Memo, CofT for

CofOrd, 26 Sep 42, sub: Shipt of Boxed Vehicles; all

in OCT 523.091 Ord. 56

 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, and its successor, AR 55-

105, 29 Dec 42, par. 2f WD GO 38, 31 Jul 42; Memo,

CG SOS for Cs of Supply Svs, 17 Oct 42, sub: Clarification of Responsibility for Trans Functions, OCT

023 Ordnance. 57

 Memos, Lasher for CofT, 26 Dec 42, 15 Jan 43,

10 Feb 43; Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 20 Feb 43, sub:

Clarification of Responsibility; all in OCT 023 Ordnance.
258 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

able to supply the officers. These adjustments made a perceptible change in relations with Ordnance in the matter of routing freight; the relationship no longer

suffered from the handicap of too many

experts.

The Traffic Control Division, with the

full support of the Chief of Transportation,

fought stubbornly to maintain the integrity of its control over the routing of

freight against criticism of both the principle and the practice of such control. The

division presented a number of arguments

in support of its position. Two of the arguments—avoidance of congestion, and conservation of transportation equipment—

were closely related. Brig. Gen. William J.

Williamson, chief of the Traffic Control

Division, never lost an opportunity to

stress these points.58 They both stemmed

from the fact that transportation equipment was barely able to meet wartime requirements and had to be used with

utmost efficiency.

The Traffic Control Division had daily

contacts with Army installations and close

working relations with the headquarters

of the Office of Defense Transportation

and the Association of American Railroads. Through these channels the division was in a position to know whenever

excessive numbers of loaded cars had accumulated at particular points, and to

hold back the flow of additional traffic to

congested terminals, or to divert some

shipments that normally would pass,

through congested gateways. In this way

it was able to forestall immobilization of

large numbers of cars by congestion and

to insure that they were loaded and unloaded promptly. No other branch of the

War Department in Washington concerned with transportation and no field

transportation officer possessed such information on a nationwide basis. Even if

they had possessed it, they probably would

not have used it to best advantage, because their primary interest would have

been in the movement of particular shipments rather than in the effectiveness of

the transportation industry as a whole.

Other aspects of car conservation had a

direct bearing on the question of centralized routing. Through his contact with

the Car Service Division of the Association of American Railroads the Chief of

Transportation was able at all times to

know in what areas there were shortages

or surpluses of cars suitable for the transportation of particular commodities. Since

the Car Service Division had authority to

transfer freight equipment from place to

place regardless of ownership, its assistance could be obtained in building up the

car supply in areas from which important

Army shipments were expected to move.

The Chief of Transportation joined in the

Army-wide effort to reduce the crosshauling and backhauling that inevitably

entered into the procurement and distribution of supplies, and his work in providing routings helped him to ascertain

where such uneconomical practices existed

and to confront the technical services involved with concrete evidence.

His control over freight routings enabled

the Chief of Transportation to insure that

the routes most advantageous to the War

Department were used and that an equitable distribution of traffic among the

transportation lines was maintained.

Although the latter consideration was

58

 Arguments for centralized control presented in

this and succeeding paragraphs are based on Memo,

Col Williamson for Contl Div OCT, 30 Jun 43, which

is reproduced as App. V of OCT HB Monograph 24,

and his remarks in Min of ZTO Conf, Washington,

24-26 Sep 43, pp. 58-65.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 259

always kept in view, the former was of

primary importance. The most advantageous route from the standpoint of the

Army was the one that would insure

prompt delivery at the lowest rate. As has

already been stated, the exigencies of the

war often dictated that the cost factor be

subordinated to military expediency and

such procedure was authorized in the

regulations. This might involve giving a

shipment a rail routing different from that

which it normally would take, or transferring it to a highway carrier. Broad military considerations also required that

certain shipments be given priority over

others. All of these were matters to which

the Chief of Transportation, and he alone,

because of his broad knowledge of traffic

conditions and his close contacts with the

other agencies affected by these conditions, was able to give proper attention.

The contentions that zone or service

command transportation officers should

route shipments moving within their respective areas, and that local transportation officers should be permitted to route

short-haul shipments made from their installations, were countered with the argument that the objectives sought by the

War Department in handling its freight

traffic could only be achieved if dealt with

on a nationwide basis. Local or area transportation officers inevitably would compete with one another in their efforts to

move their own shipments promptly, and

World War I had produced glaring examples of the unfortunate results of such

competition. Moreover, short-haul routes

usually were segments of long-haul routes,

and unhealthy conditions on the former

were almost sure to adversely affect traffic

on the latter.

Since solicitation of Army freight by individual carriers worked contrary to the

Chief of Transportation's policies on routing, it was severely frowned upon. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Lt. Col. Richard

M. Boyd, chief of the Freight Traffic

Branch, solicitation was a constant problem at Army installations, because local

representatives of the carriers tried to increase their individual bookings even

though their lines might already be operating at capacity.59

The improvement in the Chief of Transportation's position with respect to routing, which was due partly to the force of

his arguments and partly to the strengthening of his field organization after the

Transportation Corps was created in July

1942, did not mean that criticism of central routing had ended. The change made

in the regulation in April 1943, giving the

Chief of Transportation authority to route

domestic carload shipments rather than

shipments of two carloads or more,

brought renewed protests from various

sources. Some of the zone transportation

officers were critical of the arrangement,

and some divisions of the OCT questioned

the advisability of making the requirement so broad. Doubt was expressed regarding the wisdom of having a staff in

Washington route such small shipments

when they were made wholly within a

zone or service command. It was argued

that, if local transportation officers were

permitted to route intrazone truck shipments, they would be able to take into account the possibility of obtaining return

loads and hence could increase the work

accomplished by the vehicles.60

59

 Remarks by Col Boyd, in Min of Port and Zone

Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, afternoon session,

7 Jul 44, p. 24. 60

 Remarks by Lt Col Raymond C. Stone, ZTO,

Eighth Zone, in Min of ZTO Conf, Washington, Sep

1943, pp. 54-57; OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 7, 8.
260 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

By September 1943 Williamson, who

was the most vigorous proponent of centralized routing, felt that the traffic situation was sufficiently stabilized and under

control to warrant some relaxation of the

requirements affecting domestic shipments; he was ready to sanction decentralization to the extent that it could be

done without sacrificing the advantages of

the system then in effect.61 A change in the

regulation issued in that month permitted

local transportation officers to route, in

addition to perishables and troop impedimenta, all domestic shipments of five carloads or less when they were not destined

for a depot or holding and reconsignment

point, and when they were not being

shipped over distances exceeding 200

miles, or when rail was the best means of

transport and only one rail route was

available.62 Local routing to depots and

holding and reconsignment points was

not permitted, because these installations

received shipments from many sources

and hence were specially susceptible to

the bunching of traffic and car congestion.

Shipments traveling less than 200 miles

were considered not likely to block gateways that were important to through

traffic. All such local routings had to be

reported to the Chief of Transportation in

weekly statements. As was the case previously, any single carload could be

routed locally when emergency conditions

did not allow time to obtain a routing

from Washington, but since the privilege

had been overworked the new regulation

required that confirmation of such routings be obtained immediately from the

Chief of Transportation.

The new regulation expressly authorized blanket routings as a means of relieving the field of the necessity of obtaining a

route order for each shipment in cases

where shipments between two points were

made repeatedly. The issuance of blanket

orders was entirely at the discretion of the

Chief of Transportation, as were also the

conditions imposed in each case. Such

orders were subject to cancellation or

revision at any time. Local transportation

officers were required to make monthly

reports to the Chief of Transportation

showing the shipments effected under

blanket orders during the period. These

reports were studied by the Traffic Control Division in order to ascertain whether

blanket routings, together with shipment

routings, were endangering the fluidity of

traffic at any installations or gateways.

Blanket route orders, in other words, reduced the amount of communication between local transportation officers and

Washington but left the control of routing

entirely in the hands of the Chief of Transportation. In operation this plan worked

out very satisfactorily. Among the various

technical services, the Ordnance Department made the most extensive use of

blanket routings.63

The technical services were concerned

not only with the routes over which their

matériel was shipped but also with the

speed with which it was delivered. During

the prewar emergency period expedited

service was desirable because production

was behind schedule and troops in training frequently were handicapped by

shortages of important items of supply.

The same condition existed for some time

61

 Memo, Williamson for Contl Div OCT, 7 Sep 43,

sub: Decentralization of Routing Authority, OCT 500

(AR 55-105). 62

 AR 55-105, Changes 7, 27 Sep 43. 63

 Remarks by Williamson in Min of ZTO Conf,

Washington, Sep 43, p. 68; Interv with Col Lasher, 15

Oct 51, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 261

after the United States entered the war,

and to it was added the heavy and often

unpredictable requirements of the active

theaters.

Late in 1940 the railroads complained

that they were being burdened by requests from many sources for extraordinary service, most of which could not be

honored. Sometimes contradictory requests were received pertaining to the

same shipment. Despite the efforts of The

Quartermaster General to have all such

matters channeled through his office, full

compliance by the supply services and the

field transportation officers was not obtained until after Pearl Harbor. Soon after

the United States entered the war the

Secretary of War ordered that all requests

for special service be directed to The

Quartermaster General's Commercial

Traffic Branch and not to individual railroads or to the Association of American

Railroads. An added reason for this order

was that G-4 during this period required

the Commercial Traffic Branch to furnish

it with daily location reports covering

shipments being rushed to the Western

Defense Command, the Pacific bases, and

certain Caribbean areas.64

With the creation of a Chief of Transportation in March 1942, control of requests for expedited service passed to his

office and was exercised by the Control

Branch of the Traffic Control Division.

These requests might involve arrangements for special freight trains, the transfer of shipments from freight to express, or

other special services that might disrupt

regular freight schedules.65 They were

made on behalf of domestic shipments but

more often pertained to export freight. The

demand for expediting became increasingly heavy as the war progressed, and the

critical military situation in Europe during the winter of 1944-45 brought such

cases to an all-time high. During the fiscal

year ending 30 June 1945 the Expediting

Section of the Control Branch processed

over 28,000 requests for special service, involving about 200,000 carloads of freight.

During the same year 420 special trains

were authorized, although more than 50

percent of the requests were refused. Special trains were not always the result of

requests from the field. The Control

Branch worked closely with the ports, and

when it was apparent that a special train

would be necessary to enable a large shipment to reach the port in time for loading

in a designated vessel or convoy, the

branch arranged for this service at the

time the release and routing order was

issued.66

Under an order issued by the Interstate

Commerce Commission in August 1943,

all special trains, except those transporting impedimenta moving with troops, had

to be approved by one of three ICC regional agents. As first issued this order

would have imposed additional routine on

the already heavily burdened Control

Branch and would probably have caused

some delays. At the request of the Army a

further order was issued designating the

manager of the Military Transportation

Section, Association of American Railroads, an additional ICC agent to issue

permits for special trains. Since the MTS

staff was located in the Traffic Control Division and the two offices worked virtually as one organization, the arrange64

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 315-19; Memo,

TAG for CGs All Armies, et al., 22 Dec 41, sub: Contact with AAR, AG 531 (12-16-41). 65

 See WD TM 55-205, 25 Aug 44, sub: Transportation in ZI, p. 71. 66

 Rpts, Traf Contl Div, 22 Jan 45, p. 12, and 27

Sep 45, Tab 3, p. 3; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p.

27.
262 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ment proved satisfactory to the army.67

The consignors and consignees of urgently needed freight frequently were

tempted to approach the carriers directly

to trace shipments and sometimes to divert them to new destinations. This practice, which gave increasing annoyance to

the carriers before Pearl Harbor, was forbidden soon thereafter with respect to all

shipments destined for the ports or for

transit storage for eventual shipment overseas. Field transportation officers were directed to make such requests to The

Quartermaster General, and later to the

Chief of Transportation, or to the Army

regulating stations on the transcontinental

rail lines in the case of shipments passing

those points.68 Requests for the tracing or

diverting of strictly domestic shipments

might be made directly to the carriers.

Central control of the diversion of portbound movements was especially important since uncontrolled changes in destinations might disrupt a carefully developed traffic pattern. During the fiscal

year 1945 the Control Branch of the

Traffic Control Division issued approximately 5,000 diversion orders.69

 Since

shipments destined for oversea areas frequently made close connections with ships

at the ports of embarkation, the Control

Branch delegated to the port commanders

authority to trace shipments destined for

their installations by direct approach to

the delivering carriers.70

In March 1943 the Ordnance Department requested that the Chief of Transportation establish an expediting unit in

its Detroit Tank and Automotive Center

for the specific purpose of tracing, expediting, and reconsigning export shipments

from that installation. Ordnance pointed

out that in many instances the center had

been unable to obtain prompt tracing

information through the Traffic Control

Division, and in several instances efforts

to expedite shipments had been improperly handled with the result that shipments

missed deadline dates at the ports. While

agreeing that there had been some delays

in obtaining adequate tracing reports from

the railroads and that some diversion orders had been bungled, the Chief of Transportation asserted that the establishment

of the proposed unit in Detroit would increase rather than lessen the difficulty.

One purpose of a central traffic control

office, he pointed out, was to co-ordinate

all expediting and tracing of oversea

movements. To establish a separate office

at Detroit would partially defeat that purpose. The Chief of Transportation therefore refused to go along with the proposal,

but he gave assurance that his office would

spare no effort to improve performance in

the delivery of tanks to the seaboard.71

Early in 1943, because of the growing

danger of congestion, the Interstate Commerce Commission at the request of the

Office of Defense Transportation placed

an agent in Chicago with authority to

divert or reroute traffic whenever conditions might warrant. Initially no military

freight was exempt from this control, but

soon immunity was granted to impedi67

 ICC Special Service Orders 150, 25 Aug 43, and

151,1 Sep 43; Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30

Aug 43, pp. 120-21, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs

Conf; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, 22 Jan 45, p. 12, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Rpts. 68

 WD Cir 273, 31 Dec 41; WD Cir 340, 9 Oct 42;

AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, Sec. VIII, and Changes 8, 25

Aug 44. 69

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 27, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Rpts. 70

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-

9 Jul 44, afternoon session, 7 Jul 44, p. 45, OCT HB

PE Gen Conf. 71

 Memo, DCofOrd for CofT, 30 Mar 43, sub:

Tracing, Reconsigning, and Expediting; 1st Ind, CofT

for CO Tank and Automotive Center, 10 Apr 43; both

in OCT 023 Ordnance.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 263

menta moving with troops. The Army,

however, objected to the diversion of any

military shipments, partly because such

diversions disturbed schedules that had

been carefully worked out between the

Army and the Association of American

Railroads, and partly because they involved delays to supplies urgently needed

at the training camps and in oversea theaters. After a long period of negotiation

the Chief of Transportation was able to

have all symbol (expedited) Army shipments exempted from the diversion orders

of the Chicago agent.72

Because of the large amount of oversize

equipment included in Army matériel,

constant attention had to be given to clearances in making routings and effecting

diversions. During the war period the

Traffic Control Division provided routings

for approximately 600,000 cars that presented clearance problems. Since some

carload freight was routed in the field and

local transportation officers did not always

give sufficient attention to clearances, it

was often necessary to make diversions en

route, and the Traffic Control Division

reported that during the fiscal year 1944

it had rerouted 3,600 cars for this reason.73

The large dimensions of Army equipment frequently necessitated the use of

routes not specified in the carriers' tariffs.

Early in the war the Chief of Transportation requested the Association of American

Railroads to arrange that rates applicable

to normal routings should be allowed in

such cases, since it was impossible to

change the dimensions of military paraphernalia. The AAR rejected the idea of a

general agreement on this point because

in many cases clearance routings were

costly and troublesome for the railroads,

but it indicated that the carriers would

consider the proposal with respect to particular shipments that did not impose

heavy additional obligations on them.74

The Traffic Control Division was able to

influence the design of some marine equipment procured by the Transportation

Corps so as to avoid the clearance problem, but it could not influence the design

of equipment procured by the other

technical services.75

Many considerations entered into the

routing of freight, and the Chief of Transportation endeavored to keep field transportation officers who routed small shipments informed on the subject. His Traffic

Control Division prepared material, which

was published from time to time in War

Department Commercial Traffic Bulletins,

interpreting and amplifying the directives

pertaining to traffic, including the routing

regulations. Commercial Traffic Bulletin 2

was unique in this series. It was a looseleaf document with a leaf for every Army

post, camp, and station in the United

States. In addition to information regarding the general location and the communication connections of each installation,

Bulletin 2 described the transportation

lines by which it could be reached and the

local transportation facilities and procedures.76

72

 ICC Service Order 99, 3 Feb 43; ODT, Civilian

War Transport, pp. 21-25; Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 372-

73. Shipments of military impedimenta were given the

symbol "M1" and other expedited military shipments

were given the symbol "MTX." 73

 Rpts, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, p. 8, FY 1945, p.

10, and 27 Sep 45, Tab 2, p. 2. 74

 Ltr, Traf Contl Div to Augustus F. Cleveland,

Vice Pres AAR, 16 Jul 42, and reply, 21 Jul 42, OCT

551.2. 75

 OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 54-55. 76

 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, par. 4c; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 122-24; OCT HB Monograph 24, pp.

53-54. See OCT HB Traf Contl Div Misc for pages

from Bulletin 2.
264 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The importance the Chief of Transportation attached to strong central control

over the routing and diversion of Army

freight was the result of his conviction that

this was the only way to insure expeditious

movement and efficient use of transportation equipment. That view was justified by

experience during the early part of World

War I and in 1940-41, when such control

was not exercised. Moreover, central control of the routing of Army shipments was

an essential part of the nationwide system

for controlling the flow of traffic to prevent

congestion.

Control of Traffic Flow

Control of the flow of freight traffic in

order to avoid congesting the transportation lines and terminals was a military

necessity. Such control involved not only

routing shipments so as to spread the

traffic but also regulating the time of

movement. The purpose was twofold: to

assure fluid traffic conditions and prompt

delivery of shipments, and to avoid the

waste of transportation equipment that

inevitably results from congestion. The

latter object was especially important because of the impossibility in wartime of

obtaining an amount of new transportation equipment commensurate with the

increase in the volume of traffic. Control

of both domestic and export shipments

was necessary, but export shipments created the greater problem because they

converged on relatively few ports and

their arrival at the seaboard had to be

co-ordinated with the departure of ships.

Several aspects of the control of domestic

freight movements have already been discussed. Mention was made of the placing

of an agent of the Interstate Commerce

Commission in Chicago to observe conditions on the western railroads and to divert

freight traffic when necessary to avoid

threatened congestion. The Office of Defense Transportation, on the basis of

reports received from the field, made a

close study of operating conditions on the

major rail lines throughout the country

with a view to taking corrective action

when and where it might be desirable.77

The Association of American Railroads

kept itself informed regarding conditions

in all areas, and through its control of the

distribution and utilization of freight cars

was able to guide traffic away from overburdened routes or gateways. The Chief

of Transportation's control over the routing of Army freight afforded a means of

directing military traffic to the carriers

best able to handle it. As a background

for this work the Traffic Control Division

made a daily study of conditions on all

important railroads, at all important

gateways, and at the larger Army installations.78

Embargoes against shipments to points

or areas where traffic congestion existed or

was threatened could be imposed by the

Interstate Commerce Commission or by

the Car Service Division of the Association

of American Railroads. Individual railroads could embargo shipments to points

on their respective systems.79 The Chief of

Transportation had authority to embargo

shipments to Army installations.80 The

embargo power was used when other

means of preventing congestion had failed,

or when labor disputes or weather conditions prevented the normal handling of

traffic. The congestion that arose in the 77

 See ODT, Civilian War Transport, pp. 17-19. 78

 See summary, Congested Railroad Gateways, in

ASF MPR, Mar 44, p. 67. 79

 See AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Division,

1945, pp. 16, 17. 80

 AR 55-170, 1 Sep 42.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 265

northeastern states during the winter of

1944-45 because of unusually severe snow

and ice conditions was dealt with by the

imposition of broad embargoes. For a

period of several weeks the railroads were

permitted to load only essential military

and civilian supplies for destinations in

that area.81 The embargo, which might

affect both domestic and export shipments,

stopped the movement of traffic and hence

was a measure of last resort. The other

control measures were designed to keep

traffic moving and to avoid the necessity

for embargoes.

The need for adequate control of portbound shipments was so strikingly demonstrated in World War I that it was not

forgotten during the interval of peace. In

1917 there was no effective machinery for

keeping the flow of export freight toward

the ports commensurate with the capacity

of shipping to carry it overseas. Each Army

supply bureau offered its freight to the

railroad that it had customarily used and

pressed for early forwarding. The railroads, competing for traffic as in peacetime, accepted the shipments and started

them on their way without regard to

traffic conditions at the ports of destination. The ports were not accustomed to

handling such volumes of freight; warehouse space was limited and shipping

space fell far short of the need. As a result,

more cars arrived at the ports than could

be unloaded. This continued until the

backlog of unloaded cars not only filled

the freight yards in the port areas but also

glutted the sidings far back from the

Atlantic seaboard.82 The cars so immobilized ceased to serve as transportation

equipment and became virtually storage

facilities. The supplies in them were kept

out of use even though they were urgently

needed by the forces in Europe. The ports

found it almost impossible to locate and

transship supplies that were of high priority and therefore loaded the ships with

what they had at hand. These conditions

existed throughout 1917 and into 1918.

They were corrected to a large degree by

the establishment of an effective release

system within the Army and the creation

of the United States Railroad Administration and the Shipping Control Committee.83

Capitalizing on their 1917 experience,

the railroads took steps to forestall similar

difficulties as soon as the threat of another

war appeared. They were in a much better

position to do this than they had been at

the outbreak of World War I because closer

integration of the industry had been

achieved with the creation of the Association of American Railroads in 1934. The

first step to protect the ports on the Atlantic seaboard from congestion was the

designation of a Manager of Port Traffic

with headquarters at New York. This

office, which began functioning in November 1939, kept traffic conditions at the

ports under constant observation and

undertook to co-operate with other transportation agencies in eliminating the

causes and forestalling the threat of congestion. The Military Transportation Section, which the AAR established in August

1940 and attached to the Army's transportation organization, had as its primary

function collaboration with the military

81

 For the effect on military shipments, see ASF

MPR, Jan 45, p. 14. 82

 William G. McAdoo, Director of Railroads,

Report to the President (Washington, 3 September

1918), states that on 1 January 1918, when the government took control of the railroads, there were

180,000 more loaded cars on the eastern lines than

was normal. 83

 For further discussion, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp.

29-31.
266 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

branches of the government in working

out proper routings for their shipments

and in obtaining prompt deliveries. Both

offices proved effective instruments in the

broad system of traffic control that was

developed after the United States entered

the war.84

The port authorities also were keenly

interested in arrangements to keep their

respective areas free from traffic jams,

which interfered not only with the flow of

export shipments but also with the receipt

and distribution of the large tonnages of

merchandise that metropolitan populations require. They were concerned primarily with the employment of local rail,

harbor, and storage facilities and the control of shipping terminals to prevent their

utilization for dead storage or other nontransportation purposes. At New York,

which was the first port to feel the effect of

the large British and French orders for

war supplies placed in the United States,

a joint railroad and steamship committee

was formed under the auspices of the

Maritime Association of the Port of New

York. This was an unofficial body that

undertook to forestall congestion by detecting unhealthy traffic conditions in the

early stages of development and by persuading those responsible for such conditions to take corrective action. Similar

committees were set up at other ports during 1940 and 1941. Yet it was recognized

that municipal authorities and civic organizations would be able to accomplish

only limited results in keeping the ports

fluid in wartime because the bulk of the

export traffic would move under the sponsorship of the federal government and

would be beyond the control of local

agencies. Although several federal offices

were vitally concerned with the problem—

including the Transportation Commissioner of the Advisory Commission to the

Council of National Defense, the Maritime Commission, and the Army—none

had sufficient authority at that time to

deal with it aggressively.85

Beginning early in the prewar rearmament period the Army kept port conditions under close scrutiny. The Office of

the Assistant (later Under) Secretary of

War interested itself in this subject as one

affecting its responsibility for the procurement of supplies.86

 The Quartermaster

General's Transportation Division was

constantly in touch with developments at

the ports and the activities of the civilian

agencies concerned. In April 1941 a

Traffic Control Branch was established in

the Transportation Division to study the

problem, to assist the supply services of the

Army in arranging for forthcoming freight

movements, and to recommend such additional control measures as might become

necessary.87 In the summer of 1941 steps

were taken to improve the facilities for

handling the Army's export traffic by

leasing a large pier in New York Harbor

for the loading of ammunition, and by

authorizing the construction of two large

transit storage facilities where export shipments that were to move through the

North Atlantic ports could be held until

84

 See Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 312-13. 85

 Memo, Wardlow for Dillon, 8 Aug 41, sub:

Co-ordination in Use of Port Facilities; Rpt on General Traf Conditions in the Port of New York; Ltr,

Wardlow to TQMG, 14 Oct 41; notes by author from

records of Ralph Budd, Transportation Commissioner, 28 Jun 43; all in OCT HB Topic Traf Contl

W W II (1); Wardlow, op. cit., p. 177. 86

 For a review of early developments, see Memo,

Brig Gen Harry K. Rutherford for Trans Commissioner, 16 Oct 40, sub: Plan for Organization of

Traffic Through Ports, OCT HB Topic Traf Contl

WW II (1). 87

 OCT HB Monograph 2 summarizes the work of

this branch.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 267

the ports were ready to receive and transship them promptly.88

During this period there were some who

favored placing the control of the Army's

port-bound shipments in the hands of the

respective port commanders, who would

make sure that adequate shipping space

was available before permitting the shipments to leave their points of origin. The

Quartermaster General, however, expressed the conviction that the control

should be exercised by his Transportation

Division. Numerous circumstances supported that position. The division had

direct contact with the General Staff,

which planned all troop and supply movements, established priorities, and authorized the necessary transportation facilities. The division controlled the employment of Army transports and engaged all

commercial shipping space. It had close

working relations with the inland carriers

and hence was in the best position to route,

divert, and expedite port-bound shipments. Control of the rapidly increasing

lend-lease traffic, as well as shipments to

the U.S. forces overseas, was necessary.

Since lend-lease freight moved over commercial piers and did not come under the

jurisdiction of the Army port commanders,

the control could best be exercised from

Washington, where the procurement and

shipping orders were issued. In fact, the

Commercial Traffic Branch of the Transportation Division already had in operation an informal release system for some

lend-lease shipments. This system, The

Quartermaster General believed, could

readily be expanded to cover all War

Department port-bound movements.89

The control plan proposed by The

Quartermaster General, and approved by

the War Department in August 1941, was

applicable to all carload export shipments

of the War Department, including lendlease freight but excluding freight accompanying troops. The chiefs of the arms and

services were required to apply to The

Quartermaster General for a shipping release and routing before starting any such

shipments to the ports. This requirement

was applicable to shipments from contractors' plants as well as those from Army

installations.90 After a routing had been

worked out and the Commercial Traffic

Branch had ascertained when vessels

would be available to load the freight, a

release was issued authorizing the shipment to go forward. The release expired

fifteen days after date of issuance unless a

longer period of validity was specified.

Shippers were required to send a "forwarding notice" to The Quartermaster

General when the shipments were started.

By arrangement with the Association of

American Railroads the originating carrier notified The Quartermaster General

by wire when each shipment left the point

of origin and the delivering carrier reported the time of arrival at port; abnormal delays en route were also reported.

Thus a fairly comprehensive plan to

control the Army's export shipments was

established before the United States entered the war. Until 7 December 1941,

however, requests for release and routing

had been filed for only a small proportion

88

 Ammunition piers and intransit storage installations (holding and reconsignment points) are discussed at length below, pp. 281-95, 376-91. 89 Memo, H. H. Bartlett for Lasher, 19 Aug 40,

sub: Control of Inland and Water Shipping; Ltr,

TQMG to Groninger, NYPE, 19 Jun 41; Memo,

Maston for Dillon, 17 Jul 41, sub: Conf Reference

British Shipping Problems; all in OCT HB Topic

Traf Contl WW II (1). See OCT HB Monograph 6,

pp. 271-85, for a fuller discussion of developments up

to August 1941. 90

 WD Cir 182, 28 Aug 41, Sec. IV, par. 151⁄2; OCT

HB Monograph 6, pp. 285-91.
268 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of the port-bound shipments. Time was

required to properly indoctrinate local

transportation officers in the requirements

of the new system, and this indoctrination

did not proceed as swiftly as might have

been the case because some of the supply

services were not in favor of vesting such

broad control in The Quartermaster

General.91

With the attack on Pearl Harbor the

need for tighter control of port-bound

shipments was at once evident. The Commercial Traffic Branch, working around

the clock, endeavored to keep the situation

in hand, but it was handicapped by the

great number of urgent shipments that

then became necessary, the unfamiliarity

of most transportation officers with the

requirements, the many shipments that

had to be stopped or diverted because of

the changed circumstances, and the fact

that the control was not sufficiently

comprehensive.

Prompt measures were taken to improve

the controls. Since the most urgent shipments were to the Western Defense Command and to the Pacific coast ports for

transshipment to Pacific bases and the

port facilities on the Pacific coast were

limited, regulating stations were established on the transcontinental railroads to

hold and divert shipments on the instruction of the Western Defense Command.92

With U.S. entry into the war supply shipments accompanying troops became an

important part of oversea traffic, and accordingly a clause was inserted in all

movement orders requiring transportation

officers to hold such shipments, as well as

the troops, until they were called forward

by the port commanders.93 Late in January 1942 the release and routing instructions were broadened to make them

applicable to shipments by all War Department agencies to any port or to any

general depot adjoining a port, whether

the supplies were for oversea or domestic

use, and to shipments by contractors on

commercial as well as on War Department

bills of lading.94

The Army recognized that control of its

own port-bound traffic, however complete, would not be enough to avoid port

congestion; over-all control was necessary.

The military authorities could not take

action concerning the movement of commercial export freight, but they could and

did seek to bring shipments of lend-lease

supplies by other government agencies

under some form of regulation. As the

result of conferences called by the Army,

the Treasury Department and the Department of Agriculture, which were supplying large quantities of lend-lease materials,

agreed that such materials would not be

shipped to the ports unless there was

assurance that they could be promptly

transshipped overseas; they also agreed to

honor any requests by the Army that it

deemed necessary to make the arrangement effective. Col. Theodore H. Dillon,

chief of the Transportation Division,

OQMG, was designated the agent of the

War Department through which such

requests would be made. He, in turn,

91

 See Memo for Record Only, attached to DF,

ACofS G-4 for TAG, 14 Aug 41, sub: Changes in AR

30-905, and pars. 6 and 8, AG 500 (5-27-29)(l),

Sec. III. 92 Memo, TAG for Cs of Supply Arms and Services,

13 Dec 41, sub: Designation of WDC as Theater of

Opns, AG 320-2 (12-13-41); Memo, TAG for CG

WDC, 13 Dec 41, same sub and file number; Memo,

TAG for CofAAF, CGs Armies, et al., 19 Dec 41, sub:

Regulating Stations, AG 320.2 (12-19-41). 93

 OCT HB Monograph 6, p. 297. 94

 Memo, TAG for CG Eastern Theater of Opns,

CG WDC, et al., 26 Jan 42, sub: Control of Freight

Shipments, AG 523.01 (1-24-42); Memo, Dillon for

Col Clarence H. Kells and Lasher, 2 Feb 42, same

sub, OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW II (2).
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 269

designated the chairman of The Quartermaster General's Transportation Advisory

Group to maintain day-to-day contact

with the transportation officers of the

Treasury and Agriculture Departments,

and also with the Maritime Commission

and the Association of American Railroads, to insure that the plan was carried

into effect.95 Although the arrangement

proved helpful in co-ordinating freight

movements to the ports with the availability of ships to load them, it did not

apply to commercial traffic and it did not

afford the positive control over the origination of shipments by Treasury and

Agriculture that the situation required.

Lack of adequate control over portbound traffic when the United States

entered the war resulted almost immediately in congestion at the two principal

ports, New York and San Francisco. At

New York, the number of railway cars on

hand with freight for water shipment—a

number that had been growing steadily

during the fall—increased from 9,445 on

5 December to a peak of 12,282 on 27 December 1941. The number of carloads of

freight held in railroad-controlled storage

also increased substantially. The problem

of congestion was intensified by the necessity of temporarily holding War Department lend-lease shipments at the port in

order to determine what matériel should

be withdrawn for the use of the U.S.

Army, by disturbed shipping schedules,

and by bad weather, which adversely

affected port operations. Because of the

extensive facilities of New York Harbor

and the corrective measures that were

taken, the situation did not become critical. But it was threatening and the Army

used all means at its disposal to prevent it

from becoming worse. The movement of

some War Department shipments was deferred; some freight already at the port

was moved to the new transit storage facilities (later called holding and reconsignment points), which were far enough

advanced to permit limited operations,

and to ground storage outside the port.

Some vessels that were to have loaded

lend-lease supplies at New York were

diverted to other North Atlantic ports.96

The situation at San Francisco was far

more serious and more time was required

to correct it. The rail facilities in the San

Francisco Bay area were less adequate

than at New York and soon became

jammed, but freight continued to pour in.

The need for equipment and supplies at

the Pacific bases was urgent. San Francisco was the supply center for the Western Defense Command and a general

depot was located there. The supply services were being pressed to make shipments

and gave little heed to conditions at the

port. Marking and documentation were

often inadequate causing confusion and

delay in transshipment. Time was required

to bring ships into position to load the

greatly increased volume of cargo. There

were no transit storage facilities back of

the Pacific seaboard as there were in the

East.

The number of loaded cars on hand in

the San Francisco Bay area reached a

peak of 3,208 on 12 January 1942, then

declined gradually. The improvement

was accomplished by stopping all oversea

shipments at the regulating stations until

95

 Two memos for record by Col Dillon, both dated

12 Dec 41, distributed to all agencies concerned, OCT

HB Topic Traf Contl WW II (2). 96

 Statements concerning the port conditions in

this and following paragraphs are based on the

author's general knowledge from his activities as

chairman of the Transportation Advisory Group and

on notes and data in OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW

II (1)and(2).
LOCOMOTIVES SHIPPED AS RAILWAY FREIGHT. Broad-gauge locomotives

moving to Portland, Oregon, to be assembled and shipped to the Soviet Union (above); boxed

diesel locomotives on flatcars (below).
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 271

they could be cleared by the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, and by moving

many loaded cars out of the port area to

cities where sidings were available. With

a view to the future, immediate steps were

taken by the Army and the railroads to

increase rail trackage at the port. Steps

were also taken to remove the general

depot from San Francisco so that the railroads in the port area would not be burdened with supplies intended for consumption in the Western Defense Command.97

While the danger of congestion at New

York and San Francisco caused the greatest

anxiety, the problem also arose at other

ports as additional ships were assigned to

them for loading. Soon after the decision

was made that lend-lease supplies destined

for northern Soviet ports would be loaded

at Boston, the accumulation of loaded cars

became troublesome. When this traffic

began moving through Philadelphia, that

port became so glutted that in early

March radical measures were necessary

to relieve it. One phase of the problem at

Boston and Philadelphia—and also at

New York, where most British lend-lease

shipments were handled—was that the

representatives of the nations receiving

such shipments wanted large "banks" of

well diversified freight in the ports at all

times so that there would never be delay

in loading ships with the supplies that the

receiving governments at the moment

considered of highest priority. But not all

of the difficulty was traceable to lendlease shipments. In February and March

the port of New Orleans became severely

congested with War Department freight

destined for the Caribbean bases and the

Panama Canal because the Maritime

Commission was not able to assign as

many vessels to these routes as had been

expected.98

As has been indicated, the basic cause

of the port congestion that developed immediately after Pearl Harbor was the lack

of a release system that could positively

control the port-bound movement of all

export freight—lend-lease and commercial, as well as military. Up to that point

no federal agency possessed the necessary

authority, and accordingly no plans were

laid for a full-fledged control system. Ten

days after Pearl Harbor the President invested such authority in the Office of

Defense Transportation, which he established at that time."

Although power to control traffic was

thus provided, time was required to establish adequate machinery. The Army

already had machinery in operation that

was proving increasingly effective in the

regulation of its own traffic, and it did not

want that machinery scrapped. Neither

did the Army want to turn the control of

its vital supply movements over to another

agency. Civilian agencies, on the other

hand, were afraid to allow the military

authorities to exercise over-all control.

During the early weeks of 1942, while such

means as were available were being

utilized to deal with the constant threat of

port congestion, representatives of the

Office of Defense Transportation, the

97

 Data and notes in OCT HB Topic Traf Contl

WW II; Hist Record, SFPE, 1941-42, pp. 88-90,

OCT HB SFPE Gen; Memos, CG SFPE for ACofS

G-4, 4 and 10 Jan 42, sub: Rail Congestion; Memo,

ACofS G-4 for TAG, 16 Jan 42, sub: Oversea Shipts

Through SF; Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 18 Jan 42,

sub: Diverting Shipts from SFPE and SFGD; Memo,

ACofS G-4 for TAG, 31 Jan 42, sub: Cessation

of Depot Activities; last five in G-4/33867-1. 98

 OCT HB Monograph 6, p. 314. 99

 EO 8989, 18 Dec 41, par. 3d, directed the ODT,

in co-operation with the Maritime Commission and

other appropriate agencies, to "co-ordinate domestic

traffic movements with ocean shipping in order to

avoid terminal congestion at port areas and to maintain a maximum flow of traffic."
272 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Maritime Commission (later, the War

Shipping Administration), and the Army

conferred repeatedly in an effort to devise

a comprehensive control system that

would satisfy all concerned.100

The principles of a control system were

approved by the Army, the War Shipping

Administration, and the Office of Defense

Transportation in mid-March.101 The

agreement recognized the War Shipping

Administration as the agency to allocate

vessels to meet the various military and

civilian requirements in accordance with

established priorities, and to determine, in

collaboration with the other agencies concerned, the ports at which vessels would

load. The Office of Defense Transportation, in collaboration with the other agencies, would determine the amount of

freight that might be shipped to the respective ports and issue releases for these

shipments. The War Department would

provide inland routings and shipment permits for its own freight and that of such

other government agencies as might

authorize it to do so. An agency would be

designated to issue permits for shipments

not covered by the War Department system. The joint interests of the participating agencies would be administered by a

committee of four consisting of an Army

officer and representatives of the Office of

Defense Transportation, the War Shipping Administration, and the British

Ministry of War Transport. A representative of the BMWT was included because

of the large number of ships that that

organization controlled and the large volume of cargo that was being forwarded to

the British Isles under lend-lease.

After several weeks of further planning,

the Office of Defense Transportation

issued instructions that established a release or permit system covering all carload,

truckload, or bargeload shipments to the

ports, whether the freight was for immediate export or for storage prior to transshipment and whether it was for government or private account.102

 These instructions, which were effective 1 June 1942,

placed upon the carriers the responsibility

of refusing shipments not covered by

permits.103 The railroads, through the Car

Service Division of the Association of

American Railroads, met this responsibility by placing an embargo on the loading

of all export shipments except those for

which permits had been issued, as evidenced by notation of the permit number

on the shipping document. The motor

and water carriers depended on individual action to enforce the permit requirement.104

The committee of four authorized in

the basic agreement became known as the

Transportation Control Committee and

was the agency through which the details

of the control system were worked out. It

was soon evident that the Navy should be

represented, and a fifth member accordingly was added. The Army representa100

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 12 Mar 42, sub:

Regulation of Defense Aid Trans at Ports; Memo,

Somervell for USW, 13 Mar 42; both in OCT HB

Topic Traf Contl WW II (2). 101

 Plan presented by Mr. Douglas (WSA) and

approved by Gen Somervell, 18 Mar 42, OCT HB

Wylie TCC. The approval of Mr. Eastman, Director

of the ODT, was obtained separately. 102

 For various memos for planning, see OCT HB

Wylie Trans Contl Com. 103

 ODT Instructions 1, 23 May 42, was superseded

by ODT GO 16, 6 Jul 42, which was modified from

time to time with respect to scope and details of procedure. See ODT GO 16-A, 10 Mar 44; ODT AO 17,

10 Mar 44; ODT GO 16-B, 12 Sep 44; ODT AO

17-A, 12 Sep 44; and ODT exception orders issued

from time to time; all in file labeled ODT Regulations Regarding Control of Traffic, in ODT HB Topic

ODT. For Army regulations see WD Cir 300, 4 Sep

42, Sec. II; AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 16; WD TM

38-415, 22 Jun 44. 104

 OCT HB Monograph 23, pp. 9, 10.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 273

tive was General Wylie, Assistant Chief of

Transportation for Operations. Col. John

E. Craig was designated executive officer,

and assumed responsibility for the detailed

management of the committee's affairs.

He was assisted by a small staff provided

by the Chief of Transportation. The Army

also provided office space for the activity.

After committee procedures had been

established, the members met almost daily

to consider information regarding traffic

conditions at the ports and at inland gateways, and to take any action that might

appear necessary in connection with the

general traffic situation or particular shipments. The committee's decisions on

measures necessary to maintain healthy

traffic conditions were placed in effect by

the participating agencies. General Wylie

followed the work of the committee closely

but did not attend the meetings; the

Army's interests therefore were represented by Colonel Craig, who was at all

times in close contact with Generals Gross

and Wylie.105

The first step in the control of portbound freight traffic was the issuance of

monthly block releases by the Transportation Control Committee. These releases

indicated the total tonnage that might be

moved during the month to each port by

each procuring agency. The tonnages

were determined by the committee after

consideration of the amount of export

freight that the procuring agencies expected to have available for shipment to

each oversea destination, the capacity of

the ships the War Shipping Administration and the British Ministry of War

Transport expected to have ready to load

at the respective ports, and the conditions

prevailing at railway and shipping terminals. These block releases, and any

changes in them that the committee might

find desirable, were issued with ODT authority and became binding on the agencies authorized by the ODT to issue unit

permits for individual shipments.106

Unit permits for individual shipments

were issued by several offices. By far the

largest volume of freight was permitted by

the Chief of Transportation's Traffic Control Division, which performed this function not only for supplies procured by the

War Department but also for those procured by other agencies of the federal

government, except supplies for the U.S.

Navy. Thus, under the new permit system

the great bulk of export shipments of federal property was brought under the

Army's release and routing system, which

had been established before the United

States became a belligerent. The Traffic

Control Division had experienced personnel, tested procedures, and private

telephone and teletype connections with

the ports and some other field installations. This machinery could not have

been duplicated by the Office of Defense

Transportation or any other agency without great expense and some delay. The

decision to entrust to the Traffic Control

Division the issuance of unit permits for

the bulk of the export traffic was therefore

both logical and practical. Permits for

shipments for the U.S. Navy were under

105

 The discussion of the work of the Transportation

Control Committee and related activities is based,

except as otherwise indicated, on two reports prepared

by Colonel Craig: Transportation Control Committee, Its Origin, Mission, and Performance, 29 Aug 45,

and Summary of Activities of the TCC, 24 Oct 45,

both in OCT HB Topic Trans Contl Com. The latter

report includes copies of ODT directives, working

papers of the TCC, and samples of minutes. Time

and space are not afforded for a study of the records

of committee's daily activities, which are incorporated

in OCT HB File. 106

 The terms "block release" and "unit permit"

were made official by ODT GO 16-A, 10 Mar 44,

but they were in use earlier.
274 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the control of the Navy Department, although authority for issuance was decentralized to the naval districts. Permits for

commercial shipments were issued initially by the War Shipping Administration and later by the Association of

American Railroads.107

Usually the Traffic Control Division

issued permits in response to requests from

the headquarters of the procuring services, which then transmitted the permit

numbers to the actual shippers so that

they might be entered on the bills of lading. In the beginning a permit established

only the date before which shipment could

not be made. It developed, however, that

the procuring services often were too

optimistic in estimating when specific

supplies would be ready to move, and

their arrival at the ports was long delayed.

Consequently, expiration dates were included in all permits issued after December 1942.108

 As explained by Col. H.

Gordon Randall, chief of the Control

Branch, under whose supervision permits

were issued, the spread between initial

and expiration dates varied according to

circumstances. In some cases the period

was as much as thirty days, but in other

cases only three or four days. The distance

between the point of origin and the port

had a bearing on the matter, but the relative urgency of the shipment and the condition of the port were the main considerations.109

Before unit permits were issued the permitting agencies received assurance from

the ports that shipping would be available

so that the cargo could be loaded

promptly. With respect to supplies destined for U.S. Army forces this assurance

took the form of a call from the Army port

commander at whose installation the

freight would be transshipped. The Traffic

Control Division maintained close contact with the port organizations and with

the Water Division in the Office of the

Chief of Transportation in order to insure

that the initial and expiration dates on

unit permits were realistic. Copies of the

permits were sent to the ports concerned.

With respect to lend-lease shipments, forwarding authorization serial numbers

(FAS's) were issued by forwarding corporations that were established by the War

Shipping Administration to assist the governments receiving lend-lease aid in moving such supplies overseas. The FAS's

proved less reliable than the Army port

calls, and the Traffic Control Division had

frequent occasion to check with Army

port agencies or with the War Shipping

Administration regarding the availability

of shipping space before issuing unit

releases for lend-lease freight.110

While the carloads of freight released

for shipment to the U.S. Army overseas

increased as the war advanced, lend-lease

shipments declined somewhat. During the

first half of 1945 shipments for the Army

constituted almost 75 percent of the total.

(Table 18)

The Transportation Control Committee

kept the traffic situation throughout the

country under observation from day to

day, not only with respect to the ports but

also with respect to the rail lines and the

important inland terminals. It undertook

to insure that the monthly block releases 107

 Special types of permits were issued for shipments to be stored in the port areas before being

exported and for shipments of export freight within

the port areas. See OCT Cir 78, 13 Nov 42, sub:

ODT Block and Storage Permits. 108

 OCT Traf Bulletin 4, 17 Dec 42, OCT HB

Topic Traf Contl WW II (3). 109

 Interv with Col Randall, 24 Oct 51, OCT HB

Topic Trans Contl WW II (3); OCT HB Monograph

23, pp. 24, 25. 110

 OCT HB Monograph 23, pp. 77-80.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 275

TABLE 18—CARLOADS OF FREIGHT RELEASED BY TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION FOR

SHIPMENT TO PORTS: JULY 1943-JUNE 1945

Source: Monthly Summary, WD and Lend-Lease Cars of Export Freight Released to Ports, prepared by Transport Economics Section,

Traffic Control Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

were not exceeded by the shipments for

which unit permits were issued. When

traffic conditions made it necessary, the

block releases were revised. Particular

shipments were diverted or held back,

and in some cases unit permits were canceled if the circumstances warranted. The

diversion of a shipment might involve a

change of destination port or rerouting to

one of the Army's holding and reconsignment points, of which there were eventually ten.111

 Diversions were made not only

to avoid congestion but also to comply

with changes in military or lend-lease

priorities. Hold or diversion orders on account of traffic conditions were issued by

the Transportation Control Committee

with great circumspection, and only after

consultation with the military and lendlease authorities concerned.

In their effort to keep the traffic that

flowed into the ports commensurate with

the capacity of shipping to outload it, the

Transportation Control Committee and

the Traffic Control Division endeavored

to take into account all circumstances that

might affect port operations. For example,

during the late fall of 1944, when a large

backlog of ships awaiting discharge at

northern European ports necessitated reducing the sailings from U.S. Atlantic

ports, releases of port-bound shipments

were reduced accordingly. Allowance was

made for the effect of the 1944 Christmas

holiday season on the supply of railway

and longshore labor at the ports. During

the severe weather that crippled rail and

port operations in the North Atlantic

areas in the early weeks of 1945, shipments to the ports were correspondingly

curtailed. The affect of V-E Day on the

movement of supplies through the North

Atlantic ports and the increase in shipments to Pacific ports after the end of the

war in Europe were taken into account in

planning port-bound freight movements.

Whenever a transfer of ships from the

more heavily to the less heavily burdened

ports could be worked out in collaboration with the War Shipping Administration, this was done.112

General Gross followed the activities of

the Transportation Control Committee

and the Traffic Control Division closely.

He believed that their procedures were

111

 Operation and utilization of holding and reconsignment points are discussed below, pp. 281-95. 112

 Interv with Col Craig, 15 Mar 45; Memos,

Craig for Williamson, 14 Dec 44, 31 Jan 45, 2 Feb 45;

all in OCT HB Topic TCC; Memo, Williamson for

Finlay, 26 Jul 45, OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW II

(3); Trans Contl Com, Its Origin, Mission, and Performance, Sec. II, p. 7, OCT HB Topic TCC.
276 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

sound and that they were capable of providing whatever regulation was necessary

to keep port conditions healthy. He particularly liked the flexibility of their control, and stressed the fact that they were

concerned as much with getting enough

freight to the ports to fill the ships properly

as they were with preventing the ports

from becoming glutted with cargo. He

accordingly opposed the use of embargoes

as a means of protecting the ports except

in extreme circumstances. Although he

recognized the difficulties experienced

with shipments to the Soviet Union because of changing priorities and also

believed that the British maintained unnecessarily large banks of cargo at the

ports, he did not consider the imposition

of embargoes against shipments of such

supplies to be the proper method of correcting the situation. General Gross also

opposed action by the ODT to reduce the

demurrage-free time for cars held at

North Atlantic ports; he felt that such an

effort to cut down the banks would not

improve conditions but would only increase the cost to the shippers.113

One aspect of the battle against congestion was the effort to reduce the number

of cars detained at the ports for exceptionally long periods. During the latter part of

1942 cars of export freight were held

under load at all ports an average of about

eight days. During the winter months of

1943 the average was about twelve days

because of increased traffic and adverse

weather. In August 1943, the Transportation Control Committee began a campaign to insure that the monthly average

of car detention did not exceed seven days

at any port. The goal was not attained at

all ports at all times, but in general the

effort was successful. After the goal was

set the all-ports average exceeded seven

days only in January 1944, when it was

7.2 days. The general improvement in car

detention can be illustrated by comparing

the all-ports averages for July in the respective years: in July 1942 it was 9.5

days, in July 1943 it was 6.3 days, and in

July 1944 it was 3.9 days.114

Throughout the war the Transportation

Control Committee gave special attention

to cars detained in ports longer than ten

days. It did not succeed in eliminating

ten-day cars, but a marked reduction was

accomplished. During the first nine

months of 1945 ten-day cars averaged well

under 10 percent of the total cars on

hand.115 Despite the general improvement

some cars were held under load thirty

days or more because of unusual circumstances.116

The campaign against car detention

was complemented by an effort to reduce

the bank or accumulation of export freight

in railroad hands at the ports. The bank

on a given day was measured by dividing

the number of carloads in port "on

wheels" and in railroad storage by the

daily average of carloads loaded into ships

during the preceding week. A five-day

113

 Ltr, Somervell to Eastman, Dir ODT, drafted

6 Aug 42, but not sent in view of conversation between Gen Wylie and a representative of the ODT,

OCT HB Gross ODT; Ltr, USW to Sen Harley Kilgore, 3 Nov 43, OCT HB Topic Kilgore Rpt; Ltr,

Gross to Johnson, ICC, 8 Mar 44, OCT 504; Ltr,

USW to Charles D. Young, ODT, 29 Mar 44; Ltr,

Gross to Johnson, ODT, 5 Apr 44; last two in OCT

HB Gross ODT. 114

 Trans Contl Com, Its Origin, Mission, and Performance, Sec. II, p. 4, and Ex. D, OCT HB Topic

TCC. 115

 Frequent studies in monthly issues of ASF MPR,

Sec. 3, 1944 and 1945; ASF Statistical Review, World

War II, p. 119. 116

 Study for 1943, ASF MPR, Dec 43, Sec. 3, p. 46;

Weekly Memos, Traf Contl Div for Contl Div, in

OCT 562.5 Cars on Wheels.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 277

bank was considered healthy by the Chief

of Transportation, and that level was

achieved for Army cargo but not for lendlease.

Reduction of the bank assumed special

importance at New York in the spring of

1944 because of the impending invasion

of the European continent and the possibility of greatly increased Army shipments through that port. Although some

progress had already been made, General

Gross insisted that the Transportation

Control Committee direct its efforts

toward further reduction of the British

and Soviet lend-lease banks and maintenance of a more consistent relationship

between the number of carloads permitted to arrive at the port and the capacity

of the shipping available to lift the cargoes. He used a study of operations at

New York, prepared at his request in

April, to support his position. The study

showed that month by month during the

past year the average Army bank had

been under or only slightly above five

days, while the British lend-lease bank

had never been less than ten days and the

Soviet bank had fluctuated widely. The

data indicated that the control of export

traffic flow had been more successful in

the case of Army freight than in that of

lend-lease, but the study also pointed out

that the Army had an advantage in keeping its bank low, because its port commanders had large warehouse and open

storage spaces in their establishments and

were therefore less dependent on the railroads for holding freight than were the

lend-lease agencies.117

There was a difference of opinion, even

within the Office of the Chief of Transportation, as to how large the banks could be

without endangering the fluidity of the

ports and how much they could be reduced without handicapping the British

and the Russians in getting the supplies

that their changing priorities called for

and in loading their ships to capacity.

The point ceased to be a critical one after

the invasion of Europe had been successfully accomplished. The average bank of

all export freight on wheels at the principal ports during certain months when

operations were not affected by bad

weather was as follows:118

Number Days'

Month of Ports Bank

September 1942 ................ . 16 8.5

March 1943. ................... . 17 5.8

September 1943 ................ . 13 5.6

March 1944. ................... . 19 4.9

September 1944 ................ . 19 4.5

March 1945. ................... . 19 4.3

July 1945...................... . 19 3.5

In policing the nationwide traffic situation the Transportation Control Committee was aided by the field organizations of all the participating agencies, as

well as those of the Association of American Railroads. Reports from the various

sources were co-ordinated by the executive officer and presented to the committee

at its daily meetings. Since the greatest

danger of congestion was at the seaboard,

AAR reports showing carloads of export

freight on wheels at the ports, carloads

unloaded, and carloads in railroad storage

were essential to the functioning of the

committee. Colonel Craig used the Army

port agencies extensively in his effort to go

back of the statistics to develop a reliable

117

 Analysis of Shipping and Export Freight at the

Port of New York From April 1943, prepared April

1944; Memo, Gross for Wylie, Craig, et al., 1 May 44;

both in OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW II (3). 118

 Trans Contl Com, Its Origin, Mission, and Performance, Ex. F; ASF Statistical Review, World War II,

p. 119. Monthly data segregating ports appear in certain issues of ASF MPR, Sec. 3, e.g., Dec 44, p. 30.
278 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

estimate of the actual and potential situation in any area that was threatened

with congestion. The port agency was the

successor to the commercial traffic

agency, which was introduced in the fall

of 1941 for the specific purpose of dealing

with lend-lease shipments at the ports to

insure that they were transshipped

promptly and in good order. The officers

in charge of the port agencies worked in

close co-ordination with all other transportation and traffic representatives at the

ports, and were members of the port conditions committees that were established

in many places. They therefore were informed on conditions affecting all traffic,

not merely lend-lease.119

The Army regulating stations on the

transcontinental rail lines were of great

service in maintaining fluid traffic conditions on the Pacific coast. When they were

established soon after Pearl Harbor, there

were no holding and reconsignment

points in the western states, and these stations were in a sense a substitute. But even

after holding and reconsignment points

were functioning in Washington and California, the regulating stations had an important role in protecting the seaboard

from congestion. In addition to the original stations at Spokane, Ogden, Salt

Lake City, Albuquerque, and El Paso,

substations were set up as required in

other cities on the transcontinental routes.

The Traffic Control Division furnished

the regulating stations with information

regarding shipments released for movement over the lines on which the stations

were located; consignors sent these stations

copies of bills of lading for such shipments;

and the railroads kept them posted on the

location of cars moving in their direction.

When cars passed the regulating stations,

the stations wired reports to the consignees so that they might prepare for

prompt handling of the freight. When so

ordered the regulating stations requested

the railroads to hold or divert cars. Hold

orders were issued at first by the Western

Defense Commands and later by the ports

of embarkation. For a short time the

Western Defense Command issued diversion orders in its own discretion. These

orders upset the traffic planning of the

Traffic Control Division, and early in the

war the Western Defense Command was

instructed not to change the destination of

shipments without the approval of the division unless a military emergency should

arise.120

After the hectic days that immediately

followed the outbreak of war, the regulating stations served primarily as agents

of the Traffic Control Division in diverting

shipments from port to port or to holding

and reconsignment points. Such diversions frequently were made at the request

of the Transportation Control Committee.121

 Troop cars and motor trucks came

under the cognizance of the regulating

stations, but railway freight was their

major concern. Regulating stations were

used to control Navy shipments as well as

Army and lend-lease shipments. During

the period of hostilities more than 3,300,-

000 carloads of freight were reported as

passing the regulating stations.122

119

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 111-12, 122; OCT HB

Monograph 23, pp. 80-81; numerous documents in

OCT HB TZ Gen Port Agencies. 120

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 326-31, discusses

the operation of regulating stations. 121

 Memo, TAG for CofAAF, et al., 19 Dec 41, sub:

RegSta, AG 320.2 (12-19-41) is the basic directive;

see also various directives and documents in OCT HB

TZ Gen Reg Stas. 122

 ASF MPR, Aug 45, Sec. 3, p. 12; monthly summaries, Freight Cars Passing Reg Sta, prepared by

Reg Sta Br, Traf Contl Div, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 279

While endeavoring to prevent an excessive amount of export freight from moving

into the ports, those concerned with the

problem of congestion gave their attention

also to the removal from the ports of socalled frustrated shipments. Much of this

cargo had accumulated as the result of

changed conditions following the outbreak of war in Europe, but there were

also shipments that had lodged at the

ports after the United States entered the

war as the result of the withdrawal of

steamship services to certain oversea areas,

the failure to obtain export permits, and

the changed lend-lease priorities. The

closing of the Burma Road in the spring of

1942 left a considerable quantity of Chinese lend-lease cargo stranded at Newport

News, Virginia. Some of the frustrated

shipments were held in rail cars, but most

of them had been consigned to port storage. In either case this dead freight occupied space needed for current exports; in

addition, some of the commodities were

needed by the war industries. The Army

began working on the problem immediately after Pearl Harbor, but many of

the shipments were not under its control.

In June 1942 the Office of Defense Transportation authorized its Division of Railway Transport to order the removal of

any such cargo from the ports. Later, the

ODT authorized its regional directors to

order the unloading of any cars that were

being used for storage purposes. These

authorizations covered both government

and commercial shipments, but unloading orders were not issued for government

freight until the appropriate federal

agencies had been consulted. A considerable amount of this frustrated cargo was

sent to Army holding and reconsignment

points until other disposition could be

made. The Transportation Corps' interest

in this matter was represented by the

Traffic Control Division at headquarters

and by the port agencies in the field.123

As has been indicated, the control system initially required permits for truckload and bargeload shipments to the

ports, as well as for carloads. The volume

of freight arriving by highway and water

did not justify the arrangement and it was

discontinued in September 1944.124 In the

meantime, however, trouble had been experienced with truck deliveries at the New

York Port of Embarkation, and local

measures had been taken to control this

traffic. The problems arose because of the

limited facilities for discharging trucks at

the piers, the difficulty of determining in

advance at which piers deliveries should

be made, and the street congestion in the

vicinity of the Army port facilities. To

meet the situation, special highway control

stations were set up in June 1943 along the

principal routes leading into New York

City, and a central control station was

established in the city. Truck drivers approaching the city stopped at the highway

control stations to telephone the central

station to obtain clearance before proceeding. This arrangement made it possible for the port authorities to prevent

vehicles from arriving before they could

be discharged and to provide definite information regarding the terminals at

which deliveries should be made. In many

cases police escorts were provided to insure prompt delivery of urgent freight.

Drivers using highways on which there

123

 Memo, CofT for Clay, 10 Jul 42, sub: Delayed

Traffic Awaiting Export, OCT 563.5; Rpt, NYPA,

Jul 42, OCT HB TZ NYPA; ODT GOs 12, 27 Jun

42. and 12-A, 5 Jan 43; SOS Memo, S 270-1-43, 5 Feb

43. sub: Clearance of Shipts; TC Cir 50-49, 9 Sep 44,

sub: Frustrated Cargo Report; OCT HB Monograph

23, pp. 14-15,86-93. 124

 ODT GO 16-B, 12 Sep 44.
280 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were no control stations were instructed to

make their calls from any telephones

available.125 Similar control of truck deliveries to the west coast ports was provided by the regulating stations.

In summing up his experience with the

Transportation Control Committee, Colonel Craig observed that there had been

little difficulty with military traffic;

although the committee had taken action

from time to time with regard to shipments by the Army and the Navy, in general their releases to the ports and disposition of cargo at the ports had been well

managed. The principal difficulties had

arisen in connection with lend-lease

freight. The ports through which this

freight was routed were changed repeatedly, necessitating extensive diversions of shipments. The British handled

their transportation arrangements efficiently, but their insistence on maintaining large banks of cargo at the ports was a

cause for concern. The Russians, unlike

the British, did not have an experienced

shipping organization in the United

States, and their practices in ordering

cargo forward and loading the ships were

often troublesome to those responsible for

maintaining fluid traffic conditions. Particular difficulty with freight for the Soviet

Union was experienced at Portland, Oregon, where most of the transpacific vessels

were loaded. In addition to other problems, the employment of old Soviet vessels,

whose arrivals and departures were uncertain, made smooth cargo operations difficult. Acting under instructions from the

President, the Transportation Control

Committee made special efforts to assist

the representatives of the USSR in moving supplies covered by the Soviet

protocols.126

A general estimate of the control of

port-bound traffic during World War II

must give a high rating to the plan and

the manner in which it was executed. The

principal cause for criticism was the tardiness with which over-all control was

established, for the system was not agreed

upon until three months after the United

States entered the war and additional

months were required to make it effective.

Although the number of carloads of export freight unloaded at all ports increased from less than 700,000 in 1939 to

more than 1,912,000 in 1944 (Table 19),

no serious congestion developed after the

control plan was in full operation. Each

foreseeable threat of congestion was taken

into account in the monthly block releases, and unforeseen developments were

dealt with by granting, withholding, or

canceling unit permits or by diverting

shipments to other ports or to the holding

and reconsignment points. These results

were accomplished through the constant

vigilance of all agencies concerned and

through their agreement, worked out in

the Transportation Control Committee,

on measures necessary to forestall or overcome difficulties. Maj. Gen. Edmond H.

Leavey, who succeeded to the post of

Chief of Transportation in November

1945, made the following estimate of the

traffic control system:

1. It utilized the combined information

and judgment of all agencies concerned with

large freight movements and with the pro- vision of shipping and railroad equipment.

125

 ASF Memo S 43, 29 Jun 43; ASF Memo S

55-20-43, 30 Jun 43; WD CTB 15, 23 Mar 45, sub:

Hwy Contl Stations; Memo, NYPE for CofT, 16 Jan

45, sub: Hist Record, OCT HB NYPE Port Trans

Office. 126

 Memo, Harry L. Hopkins for TCC, 21 Sep 42,

OCT HB Wylie TCC.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 281

TABLE 19—CARLOADS OF EXPORT FREIGHT UNLOADED by THE RAILROADS AT U. S. PORTS:

1939-1945

a

 Data not available.

Source: AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Division, 1946, p. 16.

2. It provided a means for the coordination of logistical requirements and transportation operations, and gave assurance that

military priorities would be observed.

3. It included both advance planning and

a flexibility of performance which made

possible whatever departures from the plan

might become desirable in view of changed

conditions.127

Transit Storage Operations

Transit storage facilities had so important a role in the protection of the seaboard from congestion, and the utilization

of the installations especially provided for

that purpose was so unique, that the subject merits some elaboration. The Army's

ten holding and reconsignment points

served as reservoirs where equipment and

supplies that could not be promptly

moved overseas were held until they were

called to the ports.128 In addition to preventing matériel from reaching the ports

too soon, they served as facilities where related items obtained from different sources

could be assembled before being sent

overseas, and provided stocks near the

ports from which commodities urgently

needed in the theaters could be quickly

delivered to shipside. Nothing of this kind

had existed in World War I, although

three general depots built during 1918 in

New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, were

designated to provide "storage space for

supplies en route to the seaboard," in

addition to performing the usual depot

functions.129

The Lend-Lease Act of March 1941

provided the impetus that brought the

holding and reconsignment points into

being. The President's policy of giving

maximum material aid to the Allies and

the implementation of this policy by Congress made it clear that a tremendous

volume of supplies would flow through the

127

 Ltr, CofT to Brig Gen Stanley L. Scott, Sv, Sup,

and Proc Div WDGS, 17 Feb 47, OCT HB Topic

Traf Contl WW II (3). The release system was canceled by ODT GO 16-C, 12 Oct 45, effective 15

Oct 45. 128

 In the beginning these installations were designated general depots and they were informally

referred to by a number of other names, but the term

"holding and reconsignment point" was officially

adopted in the spring of 1942. 129

 Annual Report of the Quartermaster General, 1918

(Washington, 1918), p. 53.
282 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Atlantic ports when the country's production effort got into full swing. With a shipping shortage already at hand it seemed

likely that supplies would become available more rapidly than they could be

moved overseas. Because military supplies would constitute a major part of the

lend-lease program and large shipments

would have to be made to the new Atlantic and Caribbean bases, the War Department would have a heavy interest in

keeping the Atlantic ports liquid. Transit

storage was visualized as an indispensable

element of any system that might be set up

for the control of port-bound traffic.

During the spring of 1941 the subject

was discussed repeatedly by officers of

The Quartermaster General's Transportation Division, the Transportation Branch

of G-4, and Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding

(Ret.), who was then attached to the Division of Defense Aid Reports, which was

later to become part of the Office of LendLease Administration. Since both military

and civilian storage space already was filling up, there was general agreement that

new installations would be needed. After

considerable preliminary planning, in

which a not very successful effort was

made by The Quartermaster General to

ascertain from the other supply services

how much space would be required for

transit storage, positive steps were taken

in mid-July 1941. Four leading eastern

railroads were requested to propose sites

about an overnight run from the seaboard

that would be available for the new transit

storage facilities. Two sites were chosen

from those proposed and plans for construction work were undertaken at once.

The properties were located at Marietta,

Pennsylvania, and at Voorheesville, New

York. The initial intention was that each

installation would provide about 1,000,000

square feet of warehouse space and about

2,000,000 square feet of hard-surface open

storage space.130

While these plans for new transit storage installations were being developed

with The Quartermaster General's Transportation Division taking the lead, the

same idea was being pursued by the Storage Unit, G-4, and the Depot Division,

OQMG. In an abortive effort to hasten

the availability of such storage, an old silk

mill at Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was engaged. When the Transportation Division

learned of this action, it notified G-4 that

from its standpoint the property was

wholly unsuitable. The multistoried

building had only 368,000 square feet of

warehouse space and was without adequate elevators; it was served only by

branch rail lines and was not well situated

for the quick movement of supplies to the

seaboard. The lease was signed, however,

and the Shamokin installation soon was

designated a general depot to serve as a

stopgap until new facilities were ready.131

Some weeks later the Shamokin facility

was redesignated a holding and reconsign130

 Draft of Memo, QMC for ACofS G-4, 25 Apr

31, sub: Regulation of Overseas Shipments, par. 6, not

used after getting comments of supply services; Memo,

Wardlow for Dillon, 27 Jun 41, sub: Storage and

Warehouse Facilities; both in OCT HB TZ Gen

H&RP; memo of conference to discuss establishing

"regulating stations," 16 Jul 41, G-4/32697-2; Memo,

Lt Col Frederick H. Black for Brig Gen Eugene Reybold, ACofS G-4, undated, reporting on meeting held

21 Jul 41, G-4/32697-2. 131

 DF, ACofS G-4 for TAG, et al., 28 Jun 41, sub:

Lease of RFC Property, G-4/32697-2; Memo, Wardlow for Col Cordiner, 17 Jun 41; Memo, C of Trans

Div for TQMG, 15 Jul 41; Memo for Record by

Wardlow, 15 Jul 41; last three in OCT HB TZ Gen

H&RP; 1st Ind, ACofS G-4 for TQMG, 23 Jul 41;

Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 8 Aug 41, sub: General

Plan for Shamokin; last two in G-4/32697-2; Memo,

TAG for Arms and Services, 20 Aug 41, sub: Defense

Aid Storage, AG 681 (8-14-41).
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 283

ment point, and the Marietta and Voorheesville installations—then in process of

construction—were made subordinate to

it. When operations began at Marietta

and Voorheesville the arrangement proved

unworkable, and in February 1942 those

installations were made independent. The

Shamokin facility was discontinued as of

1 June l942.132

During the fall of 1941 the Transportation Division developed a program for additional holding and reconsignment

points, which it believed would be needed

eventually. A few days before the Japanese attack on our Pacific outposts the division recommended that such facilities be

provided, as needed, near Richmond, Virginia, to back up the ports from Hampton

Roads to Charleston; in the vicinity of

Montgomery or Birmingham, Alabama,

to back up the ports between Charleston

and New Orleans; in the vicinity of

Shreveport, Louisiana, to support the

Gulf ports west of New Orleans; in California to back up San Francisco and Los

Angeles, and in Washington to serve the

Puget Sound ports and Portland, Oregon.133

 This program was approved, and

on 31 December the Chief of Engineers

was instructed to proceed with the selection of sites immediately.134

The program was subsequently extended. During the spring of 1942 authorization was given for an additional holding and reconsignment point at Elmira,

New York. This facility was considered

desirable because of the heavy use that

would be made of the North Atlantic

ports and because Elmira was served by a

number of good freight rail lines. In June

1943 the last of the ten holding and reconsignment points was authorized, to be

located at Auburn, Washington.135 The

need for this last facility grew out of the

increased use that was being made of the

North Pacific ports for lend-lease shipments and the relatively limited storage

capacity at the seaboard.

Although the original conception of a

holding and reconsignment point was that

of an installation with about one million

square feet gross of warehouse space and

two million square feet gross of open storage space, the plan was changed as circumstances required. The facility at

Shreveport was planned on a smaller scale

because shipments routed through western

Gulf ports were not expected to be heavy.

The capacities of other points were increased as the need arose. Larger open

storage space was found to be necessary in

most cases because of the heavy shipments

of equipment and other matériel that did

not require covered storage.

The facilities at Marietta and Voorheesville, started in the late summer of

1941, were far from complete when the

United States entered the war, but

Marietta already was being used to a limited extent and Voorheesville began to

receive freight for outdoor storage early in

1942.136 The availability of storage at

these installations during the early months

of the war was a considerable factor in

checking the congestion that threatened

the North Atlantic ports.

132

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 24 Oct 41, sub:

Command of Marietta and Voorheesville, G-4/

32697-2; Memo, TAG for CofEngrs, QMC, et al.,

6 Feb 42, AG 681 (1-14-42); Memo, ACofS G-4 for

CG Shamokin H&RP, 3 Mar 42, G-4/32697-2. 133

 Memo, TQMG for ACofS G-4, 4 Dec 41, sub:

Additional Trans and Stg Facilities, OCT HB TC

Gen New Facilities. 134

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 11 Dec 41, OCT

HB TC New Facilities; Memo, TAG for CofEngrs,

31 Dec 41, AG 600-12 (12-11-41). 135

 See full list of holding and reconsignment points

in Table 20, p. 288. 136

 OGT HB Monograph 8, p. 22.
284 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

HOLDING AND RECONSIGNMENT POINT at Pasco, Washington.

Choice of sites was made through collaboration between The Quartermaster

General's Transportation Division and the

Corps of Engineers. The Transportation

Division took particular care to insure

that adequate rail capacity was available

to afford a free flow of freight into and out

of the points. It was considered desirable

that the facilities should be far enough

away from the ports to avoid the heavy

metropolitan traffic but near enough to

insure that supplies called to shipside on

one afternoon could be delivered the next

morning. The aim was to have them located on main rail lines but away from

heavily trafficked industrial areas that

might become congested. In the winter of

1941-42, when sites for the western points

were being selected, word came from the

General Staff that they should not be located near the seaboard because of the

danger of bombing by the Japanese. As a

result, a holding and reconsignment point

was located at Yermo, California—a site

that proved unsatisfactory because of its

isolation and climate and the consequent
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 285

difficulty of obtaining sufficient labor to

carry on operations.137

In planning these facilities the advice of

a number of storage experts was obtained.

Among them were Mr. Harry D. Crooks,

a member of The Quartermaster General's Transportation Advisory Group, and

Mr. Leo J. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin later

was commissioned as a colonel, and served

during the war as chief of the Transit Storage Division in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation. The buildings decided on

were of one story, 960 feet long and 180

feet wide, with platforms for loading and

unloading rail cars running the full length

of each side and a platform for handling

truck freight at one end. The open storage

areas were provided with adequate tracks

so that freight could be unloaded from

cars with crawler or railroad cranes and

placed in the space it was to occupy without additional handling. At several points

a limited amount of shed space was provided. Because of their isolated locations,

some of the points had to provide housing

in addition to administrative buildings and

utilities. Excluding Yermo, the sites averaged about 600 acres; the Yermo site was

over 2,000 acres because of the unusual

character of the terrain.138 Although in the

preliminary conversations some attention

was given to refrigerated space and to storage for ammunition and explosives,

neither type of storage was included in the

holding and reconsignment points.

The larger part of the money for constructing the holding and reconsignment

points was provided from lend-lease funds.

In July 1941 when the first steps were

being taken toward the establishment of

these facilities, War Department funds

were not immediately available. In order

to avoid delay in starting construction

General Spalding suggested that lendlease funds be used. This was logical

since at that time it was believed that the

holding and reconsignment points, as well

as some other projected facilities, would

be used chiefly for the handling of lendlease supplies.139

 The suggestion was followed not only with respect to the installations at Marietta and Voorheesville but

also with respect to those that were undertaken later. Up to February 1944, lendlease funds totaling approximately $43,-

000,000 had been used in constructing the

holding and reconsignment points. This

amount constituted about two thirds of

the total cost.140

The holding and reconsignment points

had been conceived as facilities for the

storage of War Department shipments

destined for oversea areas, including shipments for the U.S. Army and shipments

under lend-lease. During the early months

of the war it was necessary to divert lendlease supplies procured by the Treasury

and Agriculture Departments into Marietta and Voorheesville in order to protect

the ports from congestion. The question

then arose whether this should be permitted as a regular procedure. The need

was obvious, and in view of the large

financial investment the Lend-Lease Administration had made in these installations there was little doubt as to the

answer. An additional argument was the

fact that, under the plan for controlling

137

 OCT HB TC Gen New Facilities contains documents that give a running account of the selection of

sites and the construction of facilities. 138

 OCT HB Monograph 8, p. 25.

Memo, Col Black for Gen Reybold, undated,

reporting on meeting held 21 Jul 41; Ltr, SW to Maj

Gen James H. Burns, Div of Defense Aid Rpts, 30

Jul 41; both in G-4/32697-2. 140

 1st Ind, CofEngrs for CofT, 17 Feb 44, OCT

HB TC Gen New Facilities. These figures do not include the cost of the Auburn Holding and Reconsignment Point, where construction was still in progress.
286 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

port-bound shipments adopted in March

1942, the Chief of Transportation was to

have control of the release and routing of

lend-lease supplies procured by Treasury

and Agriculture. Accordingly, all lendlease supplies were eligible for transit storage at the holding and reconsignment

points throughout the war.141

Time and effort were required to have

the holding and reconsignment points

recognized as essentially transportation

facilities and to bring their operation

under control of the Army's transportation officers. Initially, the points were

placed under the control of the Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-4, and were administered by his General Depot Service.142

The Quartermaster General's Transportation Division did not like this arrangement but accepted it. The part that the

installations at Marietta and Voorheesville played in relieving congestion at the

North Atlantic ports during January and

February 1942 served to strengthen the

arguments of the transportation authorities. When a Chief of Transportation was

created in March 1942, the operation of

the "reconsignment stations for oversea

shipments" was placed in his charge.143

Gradually it became established that not

only the operation of the points but the

control of the utilization of their space and

the flow of supplies in and out of them

were functions of the Chief of Transportation.144

Additional time and effort were required to establish the doctrine that the

holding and reconsignment points should

not be used for general storage purposes

but only for the temporary storage of

freight earmarked for oversea shipment.145

This doctrine was challenged in the

spring of 1942, partly because it involved

a new type of storage operation that many

Army officers did not understand and

partly because the general demand for

storage space was exceedingly heavy. The

Chief of Transportation considered the

holding and reconsignment points essential to the proper functioning of his

office and was unwilling to have their

utility as elements of the transportation

system compromised. He therefore opposed allotment of space to the supply

services, at least until it had become

evident that all space was not needed for

transit storage. The supply services accordingly were informed that the points

would be used only for shipments moving

to the seaboard for transshipment overseas, and that no shipments should be consigned to these installations without the

approval of the Chief of Transportation.146

After it became evident that space could

be used for other types of storage without

interfering with the basic function of the

holding and reconsignment points, this

141

 Memo, Col Henry B. Holmes, Jr., for Somervell,

4 Feb 42, sub: Control of Lend-Lease Shipments;

Memo, Col Robinson E. Duff for Gross, 8 Feb 42;

Memo, Wardlow for Dillon, 9 Mar 42; Memo, Dillon

for Gross, 21 Mar 42, sub: Relation Between Storage

and Transportation; all in OCT HB TZ Gen H&RP. 142

 Memo, TAG for Cs of Arms and Services, 20

Aug 41, sub: Defense Aid Stg and Trans, AG 681

(8-14-41); Memo, TAG for Cs of Supply Arms and

Services, 6 Feb 42, sub: Shamokin Gen Depot and

H&RP, AG 681 (1-14-42). 143

 Initial Directive for Org of SOS, 9 Mar 42,

par. 10c. 144

 Memo, Dillon for Gross, 21 Mar 42, sub: Relation Between Storage and Trans, OCT HB TZ Gen

H&RP; AR 55-25, 12 Oct 42, par. 1f; AR 55-155, 27

Nov 42, Sec. VIII, par. 38c. 145

 Memo. TAG for Cs of Arms and Services, 20

Aug 41, sub: Defense Aid Storage and Trans, AG 681

(8-14-41). 146

 Memo, CofT for Col Duff, 24 Apr 42, sub: Use

of Transit Depots for Stg, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks;

Memo, TAG for Cs of Supply Arms and Services, 11

May 42, sub: Trans and Stg of Lend-Lease Supplies,

par. 3, AG 486.1 (5-6-42); Memo, CofT for CofOrd,

20 Jun 42, sub: Proper Functions of H&RP, OCT

523.091 Ordnance.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 287

was arranged. The Chief of Transportation was unwilling, however, to allow any

space to get beyond his control or to be

incorporated in the Army general depot

system.147

In view of the heavy shipments of naval

supplies to Pacific bases and the limited

capacity of the Pacific coast ports, arrangements were made in the summer of

1943 for the Navy to use space in the

western holding and reconsignment

points. Experience had demonstrated that

Army and lend-lease supplies did not then

require the entire capacity of those installations. Also, the Army believed that

this arrangement would help to correct a

tendency on the part of the Navy to concentrate its supplies at the ports and fill

warehouse facilities so that space was not

available for emergency needs.148 In the

spring of 1945, when plans were being

made for the final thrust against Japan,

the question arose whether the Navy

should construct additional storage facilities or continue to use the Army's holding

and reconsignment points. General Gross

believed that the existing installations

could meet the needs of both services provided they were used only for transit storage, but he pointed out that up to that

time a considerable part of the naval supplies that had been admitted to the holding

and reconsignment points had remained

there for long periods. This was a violation

of the principle of transit storage, which

the Navy recognized and undertook to

correct.149

The largest withdrawal of space from

transit storage operations was made for

the Transportation Corps depot system,

which was inaugurated in February 1944.

Early in the war when procurement was

lagging, Transportation Corps equipment

and supplies were frequently assigned to

troops as soon as they were delivered by

the manufacturers, and those that passed

through the holding and reconsignment

points remained there a relatively short

time. As deliveries under the procurement

program improved and stocks were accumulated, a depot system became necessary. The holding and reconsignment

points were the only storage facilities operated by the Chief of Transportation, and

since they had sufficient space it was natural that the Transportation Corps depots

should have been located there. Initially,

depots were established at Marietta,

Montgomery, Lathrop, and Voorheesville, and later subdepots were set up at

Elmira, Yermo, and Auburn. In May

1945 these depot activities were occupying

2,785,000 square feet gross of closed space

and 15,082,000 square feet gross of open

space. (Table 20)

Numerous other allocations of space

were made by the Transit Storage Division

acting for the Chief of Transportation. In

such cases the footage required was relatively small and the allocations were made

with the understanding that they could be

withdrawn if the space was needed for

transit storage. The agencies whose supplies were thus accommodated at the

holding and reconsignment points included the British Ministry of Supply

mission, the Maritime Commission, the

147

 Memo, Dep Dir of Plans and Opns ASF for Cs

of Tech Svs, 1 Dec 43, sub: Distribution System Plan,

OCT 401 Distribution Plan; Memo, CofT for Dep

Dir Plans and Opns, 4 Dec 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 148

 Memo, Somervell for Adm Home, 1 Jun 44,

ASF Hq Navy 1942-44; Interv with Col Leo J.

Coughlin, 29 Dec 44, OCT HB TZ Gen H&RP. 149

 Min of Conf, Matériel Distribution Committee

OCNO, 5 Apr 45, pp. 7-11, OCT HB Topic Navy;

Min of First Session, Joint Army and Navy Supply

and Shipping Conf, Washington, 1-6 May 45, pp.

26-27, G-3 337 (1 May 45).
288 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 20—WAREHOUSE, SHED, AND OPEN STORAGE SPACE AT HOLDING AND RECONSIGNMENT POINTS: 31 MAY 1945

(Thousands of Square Feet)

a

 Net usable space was that portion of the gross space that could be used for storing matériel; it excluded space devoted to aisles, receiving and shipping, offices, and other nonstorage activities. b

 The Transportation Corps subdepot at Elmira, under jurisdiction of the depot at Voorheesville, had been authorized but was not yet

in operation.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, 31 May 1945, Sec. 2-H, Storage Operations, pp. 45-46.

Department of Commerce, the Treasury

Department, and various elements of the

Army that required storage space in particular areas.150

 The troop equipment

staging area, which was operated at the

Elmira Holding and Reconsignment Point

during the fall of 1944, assembled, processed, and held the equipment and supplies of particular troop units until the

matériel was called to the ports for "preshipment" to Europe. This undertaking

involved operations beyond those usually

performed for matériel stored in transit

and was therefore in the nature of an

"extracurricular" activity.151

The fact that space in the holding and

reconsignment points was available for

these other purposes was the result of the

effectiveness of the control over the routing

of freight to these facilities and the efforts

of the Transit Storage Division to prevent

150

 Rpts, Transit Stg Div, FY 1944, p. 7 and FY

1945, p. 12; TG Cir 50-13, revised 11 Aug 45. 151

 See above, pp. 157-59.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 289

supplies from remaining for indefinite

periods. Starting with the assumption that

supplies normally should not remain more

than thirty days and never more than sixty

days, the division undertook to have property that had remained beyond sixty days

removed by the procuring agencies. Later,

the policy of notifying the procuring agencies whenever shipments had remained

beyond forty-five days was adopted. Recognizing the difficulties created by changes

in oversea requirements and the scarcity

of storage space, the division did not actually demand the removal of the supplies,

but it kept the agencies reminded of their

responsibility.

The tendency of the procuring agencies,

particularly the Treasury Department, to

allow shipments for which they did not

have other disposition to remain at the

holding and reconsignment points indefinitely was a matter that required constant

attention. It was difficult for these agencies, and also for the Storage Division of

Army Service Forces headquarters, to fully

accept the fact that the holding and reconsignment points were transit storage facilities and not depots.152

 Nevertheless, during

the fiscal year 1945 the Transit Storage

Division succeeded in reducing the amount

of freight on hand in excess of sixty days

from 11,000 to 3,500 carloads.153

The effort to minimize "dead storage"

was in line with the Transportation Corps'

policy of keeping the percentage of occupancy at the holding and reconsignment

points low. This policy drew criticism from

other branches of the Army that were confronted with growing inventories and

crowded depots, but the Chief of Transportation insisted that ample free space

should always be maintained to permit a

fluid transit storage operation and to insure that emergency shipments could be

accommodated if necessary. In enforcing

this policy the carloads of freight actually

in storage and the carloads booked for

early delivery were totaled and the remainder of the capacity was considered

free space. The average amount of free

space was about 50 percent, taking into

account the space allotted to Transportation Corps depots as well as that used for

strictly transit storage operations. (Table

21)

During the four-year period 1942-45

the ten holding and reconsignment points

received shipments equivalent to about

293,000 carloads, including matériel for

storage in transit pending movement overseas and Transportation Corps depot

stocks. This added up to about 8,790,000

short tons.154 The great bulk of it arrived

in carload lots, although some came in

smaller shipments. The total freight handled in and out at the holding and reconsignment points was somewhat over

17,000,000 short tons. (Table 22)

The shipments handled at the holding

and reconsignment points were of three

types. Type A consisted of shipments that

had been released for movement to the

ports but had had to be diverted en route

or moved back from the ports because of

lack of shipping or change in movement

plans. Type B consisted of matériel intended for early movement overseas that

had been shipped directly to the holding

and reconsignment points to be held as

stockpiles upon which the ports could

draw to meet current ship-loading require152

 ASF MPR, Sep 43, Sec. 6, Analysis, pp. 97-103,

Flow of Traf Through H&RP; Rpt, Transit Stg Div,

26 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps,

p. 4, OCT HB Transit Stg Div. 153

 Rpt, Transit Stg Div, FY 1945, p. 7. 154

 The estimate is based on thirty tons to the carload, which was the average for Army matériel in

1944 and 1945.
290 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 21-

Source: Analysis of H&RP occupancy in monthly issues of ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec. 3. These analyses show separately

the several points, the several procuring agencies, and carloads in open and closed storage. Beginning in June 1944 TC depot stock and

TC matériel in transit storage are separated.

ments. Type C included supplies intended

for eventual shipment overseas but not

covered by current requisitions. Shipments

of the latter type, which in the beginning

were not expected to bulk large, became

considerable as production increased and

storage space at contractors' plants and

technical service depots became overcrowded. A large part of such shipments

consisted of Army supplies sent to the

holding and reconsignment points for

assembling into units before shipment

overseas.155

A simple system of inventory and accounting was desirable in order to relieve

the holding and reconsignment points of

as much clerical work as possible. In the

beginning technical service representatives

at the points kept depot records of the

property under their supervision. This

plan proved time-consuming and the detailed records were not found necessary.

In May 1943, therefore, formal accountability for supplies en route to oversea

destinations was terminated when the

shipments left the depots of the procuring

agencies, and accountability was not established for property shipped to the holding

and reconsignment points directly from

contractors' plants. The holding and reconsignment points, as well as the ports of

embarkation and the port agencies, thereafter maintained only carload identity,

supported by informal "jacket files" in

which copies of the bills of lading and any

diversion notices were placed, with appropriate cross-indexing. A formal accounting system was necessary for Type C

supplies since such shipments were usually

broken up before being forwarded overseas and identity could not otherwise have

been maintained.156

At the outset the Chief of Transportation's responsibilities in connection with

the holding and reconsignment points, including supervision of storage operations

and control of the utilization of space,

were; entrusted to his Transit Storage Division. In June 1942, in order to facilitate

operational supervision, the division established district offices at Philadelphia and

155

 Procedure Governing the Handling of Trans

and Accountability Papers on Shipts to H&RP, 10

Aug 42, OCT 140.2 H&RP; TC Cir 105-9, revised

11 Jun 45, sub: Standard Operating Procedure for

Storage in Transit; Rpt, Transit Stg Div, FY 1945,

pp. 4-5. 156

 Memo, Col Coughlin for Col Hodson, 25 May

42, sub: Accountability at H&RP; Memo, C of Transit Stg Div for Traf Contl Div, et al., 12 Sep 42, and

atchd Procedures; all in OCT 140.2 H&RP; WD Cir

127, 29 May 43, Sec. VI; WD Cir 275, 30 Oct 43, Sec.

III; WD Cir 431, 6 Nov 44, Sec. V.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 291

TABLE 22—SHORT TONS OF FREIGHT HANDLED IN AND OUT OF THE HOLDING AND RECONSIGNMENT POINTS: 1942-1945 a

a

 Transportation Corps depot stock included up to March 1944 but not thereafter. b

 Includes 52,950 tons handled during 1943 and 1944 at open storage yard at Ravena, New York, which was under the jurisdiction of

Voorheesville.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec. 2-H, Storage Operations, summarized for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

San Francisco and obtained authorization

for a third office in a southern city.157

When the nine transportation zones were

established in the following December,

supervision of operations was decentralized

to the zone offices and the district transit

storage offices were discontinued.

Although the zone transportation officers thereafter were held responsible for

detailed supervision of operations, the

Transit Storage Division continued to provide over-all supervision and co-ordination of procedures and to make such

inspections as were considered necessary.

The utilization of space was controlled

entirely by the division, since such control

required a knowledge of operations and

space conditions at all of the points and

close co-ordination between the Transit

Storage Division, the Traffic Control Division, and the Transportation Control

Committee in regard to the release of

shipments to the points and the diversion

of shipments already en route. In addition

to the holding and reconsignment points,

the Transit Storage Division supervised

storage operations at the railroad open

storage yards and at the ports of embarkation.158

The general scarcity of labor and the

isolated locations of the holding and reconsignment points created a manpower

problem that required constant attention.

The bulk of the operating personnel consisted of civilians directly employed. At

certain points contractors were engaged to

provide personnel for freight handling

and some accessorial services. The engagement of contractors and the contract terms

were closely controlled by the Transit

157

 Memo, CofT for C of Transit Stg Div, 1 Jul 42,

sub: Allotment of Officers, OCT 320.21 H&RP. 158

 TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, gives the organization and defines functions of the Transit Stg Div;

TC Cir 135-1, 4 Jan 43, sub: Inspection of H&RP,

and revision, 15 Jan 45.
292 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Storage Division.159 German prisoners of

war and Italian Service Units were used in

some instances. At Yermo, which was in

the most unfavorable position from the

standpoint of labor procurement, civilians

accounted for only one third of the staff on

30 April 1945. On that date the personnel

of the ten holding and reconsignment

points (excluding Transportation Corps

depot activities) was as follows:

 160

Type Number

Total.............................. . 6,305

Officers................................ . 24 9

Enlisted men........................... . 124

Civilians (direct hire).................... . 4,052

Contractors' personnel................... . 609

Prisoners of war......................... . 681

Italian Service Units..................... . 590

From the beginning the Army's technical services had representatives stationed

at the holding and reconsignment points

to supervise the storing of their property

and such assembling, processing, and accounting as might be necessary.161

 Since

these representatives were responsible to

the technical service chiefs, the commanders of the holding and reconsignment points did not have full control of

their activities and were sometimes handicapped by the arrangement. In October

1943 the technical service supply sections

were abolished, and the representatives of

the technical services thereafter were

responsible only to the commanders of the

installations.162

The holding and reconsignment points

were new installations and their operations

were somewhat different from those of

other storage facilities. The Transit Storage Division, therefore, gave constant

attention to their operating methods and

efficiency. The use of materials-handling

equipment was studied in order to assure

maximum service from this difficult-toobtain machinery. The use of pallets and

racks was exploited so far as practicable.

Improvements in packaging and crating,

which were developed by the technical

services during the war, aided in improving handling methods. The average number of tons handled per man-day by shipping and receiving labor was increased

from 11.03 in June 1943 to 16.02 in April

1945. The average number of tons handled per man-day by storage labor increased from 4.72 to 8.36 between these

dates.163 The division also studied the

utilization of space in order to reduce

wherever possible the footage used for

aisles, gear shops, and working areas.

Railroad open storage yards were used

to supplement the open storage space at

the holding and reconsignment points. The

railroads provided the yards and handled

and guarded the material under contractual arrangements with the Army. The

yards were under the supervision of The

Quartermaster General until October

1943 and then passed to the control of the

Chief of Transportation.164 Under the

Chief of Transportation, the zone transpor159

 Rpt, Transit Stg Div, FY 1945, p. 7. See OCT

Cir 108, 21 Aug 43, for approved contract form. 160

 ASF MPR, May 45, Sec. 2-H, Stg Opns; OCT

HB Monograph 16, p. 60. About 1,700 of these employees were assigned to holding and reconsignment

points by the service commands to operate the utilities

and to provide fire and police protection and medical

service. 161

 Memo, TAG for C of Supply Services, 11 May

42, sub: Trans and Stg of Lend-Lease Supplies, AG

486.1 (5-6-42). 162

 OCT Cir 126, 9 Oct 43, sub: Consolidation of

Technical Service Sections at H&RP. 163

 Rpts, Transit Stg Div, FY 1944, p. 8, and FY

1945, p. 13. Further improvements are shown by

Transit Stg Div Rpt, 26 Sep 45, Ex. A. Detailed

studies appear in monthly issues of ASF MPR, Sec.

2-H, Stg Opns. 164

 ASF Cir 89, 25 Sep 43, Sec. II.
OUTDOOR STORAGE SPACE at holding and reconsignment points (top and middle);

railroad open storage yard (bottom).
294 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tation officers were responsible for periodical operational inspections to insure that

proper storage methods were being used

and that adequate protection was being

given public property, but the Transit

Storage Division maintained general

supervision and booked all space.165

The number of railroad open storage

yards available and the number used by

the Army varied from time to time. On

24 June 1944, when the activity was near

its peak, forty-nine yards were available

with a total capacity of 46,837 carloads;

all but two were east of the Mississippi. Of

this number, thirty-seven yards with a

total capacity of 38,995 carloads were

actually being utilized by the Army;

17,521 carloads were on hand, 4,433 carloads were booked to arrive, and free space

was available for 17,041 carloads.166 From

October 1942, the first date for which figures are available, through September

1945 a total of 78,662 carloads were

received and 83,832 carloads were

shipped.167 Only matériel intended for

shipment overseas and moving in carload

lots was accepted. Having a large number

of widely scattered yards available enabled

the Transit Storage Division to assign shipments to yards near their sources, thus

reducing crosshauling and backhauling

when the shipments were moved to the

ports. Length of tenure was not as strictly

controlled as in the case of the holding and

reconsignment points.

The value of the holding and reconsignment points, supplemented by the railroad

open storage yards, was generally recognized during the war. They helped in protecting the ports from congestion, aided in

avoiding the uneconomical use of rail

equipment for storage purposes, relieved

the storage facilities of contractors and

procuring agencies, and provided stockpiles near the seaboard from which supplies could be quickly moved into the

ports. The chief of the Traffic Control

Division believed that they made a large

contribution to the war effort.168 The

Transportation Control Committee relied

on them constantly in its effort to relieve

strain on the ports and the railways. In the

readjustment of supply movements necessitated by the end of hostilities in Europe,

the holding and reconsignment points and

the railroad open storage yards accommodated large quantities of freight no longer

needed overseas.

No question arose regarding the justification for the holding and reconsignment

points that backed up the Atlantic and

Pacific ports. Failure to use the Gulf ports

as extensively as had been anticipated

gave rise in 1943 to questions regarding

the advisability of retaining the Shreveport

installation as a transit storage facility, but

the Chief of Transportation maintained

that this should be done as insurance

against future abnormal requirements. He

had in mind that as the effort against

Japan increased New Orleans would have

to load considerable cargo for the Pacific

theaters because of the limited capacity of

the west coast ports.169

It is evident, on the other hand, that the

holding and reconsignment points provided more space than was actually needed

165

 TC Cir 135-2, 11 Jan 44; ASF Cir 56, 23 Sep 44,

Sec. IV. 166

 Weekly Rpt of RR Open Stg Yards, 24 Jun 44,

OCT HB TZ Gen RR Opn Stg Yds. 167

 Summarization of Weekly Rpt of RR Open Stg

Yards, prepared by Transport Economic Sec, OCT,

reworked for statistical volume of this series. 168

 Remarks by Williamson, in Min of Port Comdrs

Conf, Boston, 30 Aug 43, p. 123. 169

 Memo, C of Contl Div OCT for C of Transit Stg

Div, 23 Jun 43, OCT HB Ex Staybacks.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 295

for transit storage. The effectiveness of the

release system in holding export shipments

at the source until shipping was in sight to

transport them overseas meant that a relatively small percentage of such shipments

had to be placed in storage en route to the

ports. This was a development that the

transportation officers of the Army and

the Lend-Lease Administration could not

foresee, and they took the safe course of

providing too much rather than too little

space at the holding and reconsignment

points. Such a policy seems justified in the

light of the harmful traffic congestion that

developed at and back of the ports during

World War I. As for the policy that maintained so large a percentage of free space

in these installations almost to the end of

the war, the justification is less apparent.

In retrospect it would seem that the Chief

of Transportation's insistence on a margin

of safety against possible emergencies may

have been carried too far.

Mobilization and Conservation

of Freight Cars

Utmost efficiency in the use of equipment was necessary if the railroads were

to meet the demands of wartime freight

traffic. The tonnage to be moved exceeded

all previous records. The number of cars

owned by the railroads had decreased

considerably since World War I, although

their average capacity was larger. The

amount of new rail equipment obtainable

during the war was severely limited by

the heavy demands made upon the nation's production resources by programs

for the construction of ships, aircraft,

tanks, guns, and other war necessities.170

Under these conditions it was mandatory

to get the greatest possible service out of

the cars that were available, and this was

a matter to which all the agencies concerned applied themselves assiduously.

While this discussion is concerned chiefly

with the measures employed by the Army,

note must be taken of the efforts of the

Office of Defense Transportation and the

railroads themselves.

The Office of Defense Transportation,

charged with maintaining adequate rail

service for war needs, imposed regulations

on shippers and carriers to overcome the

practice of light loading that had grown

up during peacetime. Shippers were prohibited from offering and the railways

were forbidden to accept carload shipments that did not equal in weight the

marked capacity of the cars or did not

utilize all practicable stowage space. This

regulation, together with other measures,

resulted in an increase in the average

loading of carload freight from 38.15 tons

per car in 1941 to more than 40 tons during the period 1942-45. Shippers of lessthan-carload freight were required to load

at least 10 tons in a car unless exceptions

were granted. The loading of such freight

increased from an average of 5.5 tons per

car in 1941 to about 9.5 tons during the

war period. The ODT made studies of

circuitous routings that were wasteful of

car time and found that the number of

cases of unjustifiable circuity was too small

to warrant the issuance of a general regulation. But shippers and carriers were

called to account when such cases were

discovered.171 In addition to these regulations, the ODT fostered a broad campaign

of education to keep shippers and carriers

170

 For a fuller discussion, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp.

319-23,328-33. 171

 ODT, Civilian War Transport, pp. 11-15, 96-97.
296 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

alert to the need for conserving equipment

by all possible means.172

The carriers conducted a constant campaign to promote the full loading and

quick dispatch of cars. The railroadsponsored shippers' advisory boards, which

functioned in the thirteen car service districts, kept the need for efficient car utilization actively before the men upon whose

interest and co-operation the success of

the effort depended—the shippers and

receivers of freight. About 600 car efficiency committees were organized to

police the situation locally. The annual

"perfect shipping month" represented a

special effort to bring the many aspects of

the problem forcefully to the attention of

all concerned and to stimulate efforts to

obtain better results. The carriers through

the Association of American Railroads

published loading rules covering the loading of specific commodities or the use of

specific types of cars. These rules, which

were based on experience and special tests,

provided the best known methods of obtaining uniform, safe, and economical

loading. The Army directed its transportation officers to observe the loading rules

and collaborated with the AAR in formulating or improving those that pertained

to military equipment.173

The plenary power that the Association

of American Railroads had over the freight

equipment of its members was a great aid

in enforcing efficient employment. The

Car Service Division could assign cars to

particular traffic or to areas where they

were needed regardless of ownership. In

peacetime this authority was used to meet

such abnormal requirements as that created by the annual grain movement. In

wartime it virtually placed the freight cars

of the nation in a single large pool that

could be drawn on for military shipments

as required.

The Military Transportation Section of

the Car Service Division worked with the

Traffic Control Division in the Office of

the Chief of Transportation to insure that

equipment for Army freight was available

when and where it was needed. For especially large or urgent movements the Military Transportation Section began planning the supply of cars when the routing

was issued. In other cases the transportation officer at the point of origin notified

the initial carrier of his requirements and

that railroad provided the cars from its

own supply or obtained them from a connecting line. If enough cars were not

obtained in this manner, the aid of the

district representative of the Car Service

Division was sought, or as a last resort the

Military Transportation Section was requested to overcome the deficit by ordering the required number of cars to the

loading point.174 At the request of the

Military Transportation Section each railroad designated a single operating official

to whom requests for cars could be directed

and gave him authority to comply with

such requests immediately. In fact, all

matters pertaining to military traffic were

handled through that official.175

Shortages of some types of cars were

encountered at certain seasons and in certain localities before the United States

172Joseph B. Eastman's address, "A Program for

War Transportation Efficiency," at a meeting of the

Pacific Coast Shippers Advisory Board, 9 December

1943, gives "do's" and "don't's" for shippers, receivers, and carriers of freight. 173

 AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, par. 6; ASF Cir 193, 30

May 45, Sec. III, lists AAR publications. 174

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 312-13; OCT HB Monograph 24, p. 73. 175

 Interv with J. J. Kelly, MTS, 16 Nov 51, OCT

HB Topic RRs MTS.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 297

became a belligerent, and thereafter they

steadily increased.176 Reports of shortages

and surpluses, which were received by the

Association of American Railroads weekly

from the member lines, together with information obtained from its district representatives, aided the Car Service Division

in utilizing the surpluses reported in certain districts or on certain lines to offset

shortages of cars of the same types reported

elsewhere. In its advance planning to

avoid shortages, the division was aided by

quarterly forecasts of freight car requirements compiled in collaboration with the

shippers' advisory boards.177

The shortages, although an increasing

cause for concern, did not become critical

enough to affect military traffic until the

winter of 1945. At that time the unusually

severe weather in the northeastern states

and the embargoes placed on shipments

into that area immobilized so many cars

that a widespread stringency was severely

felt for several months. During this period

the total of the reported shortages of boxcars far exceeded the reported surpluses.

Although military supplies were exempt

from the embargoes, the loading of some

of the Army's less urgent shipments was

delayed during this period.178

The Army as the nation's largest user of

rail transportation had a special interest

in and responsibility for the strict enforcement of economy in the utilization of cars.

The arrangements for the routing of shipments and the control of traffic flow, which

have been discussed, were major contributions to this cause. There remained the

necessity of overcoming a tendency toward

careless and wasteful use of cars at Army

installations. The effort in that direction

began during the rearmament period

when military traffic was increasing and

numerous new installations were being

established. Early in the war the Chief of

Transportation published the following

basic principles of car conservation, which

he urged all shippers and receivers of

Army freight to observe:

Load all cars to maximum carrying capacity or full visible capacity.

Do not detain cars beyond the minimum

time actually required for loading and un- loading. This should never exceed twentyfour hours except in the most unusual

circumstances.

Remove dunnage and debris from cars at

time of unloading to permit immediate reuse.

Do not order cars in excess of actual

requirements, nor hold empties for prospective loading.

Place orders for cars as far in advance as

possible, specifying type and size of car, time

car is required, commodity to be loaded, and

destination.

Use all possible precautions against dam- age or contamination of cars.179

The prompt dispatch of cars at Army

installations was an aspect of car conservation on which the Chief of Transportation placed strong emphasis.180

 Although

constant attention had to be given to the

176

 Report, Summary of Gar Surplus and Car

Shortage, issued weekly by the AAR, separated types

of cars, districts, and railroads. See study based on

these reports in ASF MPR May 43, Sec. 3, p. 76;

C. B. Peck, "Freight-Car Needs Exceed Supply,"

Railway Age, January 1, 1944, pp. 39-40. 177

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp.313-14. 178

 Wardlow, op. cit., p. 333; ODT, Civilian War

Transport, p. 311. Studies of surpluses and shortages

appeared frequently in. ASF MPR, Sec. 3; see particularly issue of July 1945, p. 15, concerning boxcar

situation.

179 OCT Cir Ltr 9, 15 Jun 42, sub: Demurrage and

Conservation of Trans Equip. 180

 Memo, CofT for CGs of SvCs and COs of

Installations, 21 Oct 42, sub: Daily Car Situation Rpt,

OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight; WD Memo W

55-1-43, 12 Jan 43; WD CTB 36, 14 Dec 44, sub:

Utilization of RR Cars; WD CTB 12, 10 Feb 45, Car

Detention and Demurrage.
298 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tendency of local transportation officers to

call in cars before loading could actually

be started in order to be sure that the

equipment would be on hand when

needed, the greater problem was to insure

that cars were unloaded and released

promptly by consignees. Scarcity of storage space, shortage of labor, and the general press of business created a strong

temptation to delay unloading. In order

to bring this condition under control, the

larger Army installations were required

to make daily reports on their car situation

by wire and more detailed monthly reports

by mail. This information, together with

reports received through the Association

of American Railroads, enabled the Chief

of Transportation to take whatever action

might appear necessary to prevent cars

from being used for storage or to relieve

congestion at an installation.181 During

the winter of 1944-45, when car shortages

were being reported throughout the nation, car detention reports were required

of all Army installations.

In order that Army installations receiving freight might prepare for the unloading and release of cars promptly on arrival,

consignors were required in the beginning

to notify the consignees by wire whenever

shipments of one carload or more were

started. After experience had demonstrated that these notices were not necessary on all shipments, the regulation was

modified and notices of carload shipments

were required only when the consignee

was a port of embarkation or an installation of the Air Forces, when the shipment

consisted of ammunition or gasoline, or

when the consignee had requested such

notice; in other cases wire notices were

sent when shipments of ten carloads or

more were made.182 When shipments of

twenty-five carloads or more were made

to depots, the consignors were required to

obtain clearance from the consignees before starting the shipments. This arrangement enabled the consignees to schedule

the arrival of the freight in accordance

with their ability to unload and store it, or

to request that the shipments be postponed. As has been noted, all shipments

to holding and reconsignment points were

cleared by the Transit Storage Division in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation,

which controlled the use of space at those

installations.183

Demurrage charges, which became

effective when cars were held beyond the

specified period (usually forty-eight

hours), provided an additional means of

enforcing car economy.184 Commanders of

Army installations that held cars beyond

the demurrage-free period were required

to justify the resulting charges to the Chief

of Transportation.185 Average-demurrage

agreements between the Army and the

carriers encouraged installations to earn

credits by unloading and releasing cars

quickly in order that these credits might

be set against debits incurred on cars that

181

 For examples, see correspondence between the

Association of American Railroads, the Chief of

Transportation, and the Chief of Ordnance regarding

the car situation at several Ordnance installations,

OCT 504 and OCT 504 Toledo Tank Depot. 182

 Memo, TAG for CGs of Corps Areas, et al.,

4 Mar 41, sub: Notice by Wire to Consignee, AG

523.01 (2-28-41); AR 55-105, par. 7, 29 Dec 42, and

Changes 3, 4, 8, 11; WD CTB 21, 22 Jun 44; WD

CTB 33, 2 Jul 45; OCT HB Monograph 24, pp.

68-72. 183

 WD Cir 419, 26 Dec 42, Sec. IV; WD Cir 63,

1 Mar 43, Sec. V; WD Cir 93, 24 Mar 45, Sec. VI;

Memo, Williamson for Wardlow, 19 Apr 45, sub: Rpt

of Shipts, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight. 184

 The ODT increased demurrage charges from

time to time to speed the release of types of cars in

especially heavy demand; see ODT, Civilian War

Transport, p. 314. 185

 WD Memo 55-23-43, 5 Jun 43, sub: Detention

of RR Cars, AG 531.5 (6-4-43).
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 299

could not be handled so promptly.186 The

general traffic weight agreement entered

into with the railroads and the Railway

Express Agency, authorizing the use of

weights given in the carriers' classifications

and tariffs or established by the Army by

means of tests, obviated the waste of car

time involved in track scaling or the

physical weighing of shipments in cars.187

The car situation reports from Army

installations were compared in the Chief

of Transportation's Control Division, and

monthly tabulations were prepared showing, in addition to over-all results, the

records of the several installations and

types of installations. These comparisons

were published for the purpose of creating

competition and encouraging the commanders of facilities whose records were

less satisfactory to increase their efforts.

The studies do not cover the entire war

period, but the available data indicate

that there was progressive improvement.

The following tabulation shows, for installations handling (loading or unloading)

fifty or more cars per month, the percentages of cars released before the end of the

first demurrage-free day, during the second demurrage-free day, and after the

forty-eight-hour free time had expired:

Proper loading was another basic principle of car conservation to which the

Chief of Transportation gave careful attention. It involved using car space to the

fullest possible extent and following the

prescribed rules relating to the loading of

particular items. Full loading, in addition

to getting the greatest possible service out

of the available equipment, had several

collateral advantages—it reduced the cost

of loading and unloading, saved labor, reduced switching operations, and conserved yard space. The loading rules published by the Association of American

Railroads and its Bureau of Explosives

were designed to insure safe transit for the

freight and protection of the cars from

damage and at the same time to afford

best utilization of car capacity. Many of

these rules dealt with the use of open-top

cars for such bulky and irregularly shaped

items as tanks, motor vehicles, artillery,

and boats.188

The Chief of Transportation impressed

upon the technical services the relationship of full and correct loading to car supply and the prompt movement of their

matériel.189 Toward the end of the war he

began circulating to transportation officers

in the field photographic records of inadequate and improper loading and illustra186

 AR 55-175, 24 Aug 42, pars. 4, 6; WD CTB 17,

15 May 44, sub: WD Master Average Demurrage

Agreement. 187

 WD Cir 284, 25 Aug 42; WD Cir 346, 15

Oct 42. 188

 The Ordnance Department also published loading rules for the equipment it procured since it did

not consider the AAR rules sufficiently complete and

clear; Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 12 Aug 44, sub: Proposed Ord Publications; 1st Ind, CofOrd for CofT,

9 Mar 45; both in OCT 505 Ord. 189

 Memo, CofT for TQMG, 3 Apr 43, OCT 505

QMG Heavier Loading, and similar memos to other

technical services; Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 28 Jan

44, OCT 505 Ord.
300 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TWO 21⁄2-TON TRUCKS LOADED ON EACH FLATCAR

tions to show how the more difficult items

should be stowed, blocked, and braced.

He directed the zone transportation officers to see that installations had copies of

the loading rules that were of interest to

them, and to assist local transportation

officers in making these rules effective.190

During the greater part of the war the

Chief of Transportation was handicapped

in dealing with the matter of correct car

loading by questions of prerogative. In the

prewar rearmament period when loading

rules were being developed for many

types of military equipment, the procuring services of the Army conducted their

own loading tests, dealt with the Association of American Railroads regarding the

publication of rules, and issued instructions to transportation officers at the installations they controlled. The Quartermaster General's Transportation Division

co-operated in an advisory way but was

not able to take the initiative.191 The same

condition prevailed after the Chief of

Transportation took office in March 1942,

although his responsibility under Army

regulations for the management of Army

transportation and for liaison with the

carriers seemed to carry with it final

responsibility for establishing and enforcing loading rules.192

The Chief of Transportation found this

situation unsatisfactory, and he also objected to a disposition on the part of the

Supply Division of ASF headquarters to

190

 Memos, CofT for ZTO Third Zone, 7 May 45,

sub: Gar Loading Rules; 14 May 45, sub: Gar Loading of 20-Ton Semi-Trailer; 17 Aug 45, sub: Maximum Loading; all in OCT 505 Third Zone. The

memorandum of 7 May 1945 lists published rules. 191

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 161-63. 192

 AR 55-5, 5 Oct 42, and AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 301

SIXTEEN 1⁄4-TON TRUCKS LOADED ON A FLATCAR by double-decking

exercise supervision over the procuring

services in these matters. His Traffic Control Division sponsored loading tests, recommended loading methods, and made

checks of bills of lading to determine how

well the loading rules were being observed, but it had to rely on persuasion

rather than direction to make its views

effective. In the spring of 1945 the division

took agressive steps to change the situation. The result was a declaration by ASF

headquarters that "direction and supervision over the application of the railroads' loading rules in connection with

War Department shipments, and liaison

with the railroads' representatives and

associations in connection with the revision of existing or the promulgation of

new loading rules or specifications by the

carriers" were duties of the Chief of Transportation.193

It was necessary to control wherever

practicable the types and sizes of cars

used for particular kinds of matériel. The

object was twofold: to use cars in which

equipment could be stowed with a minimum amount of lost space and to relieve

the demand for the types of cars in short

supply. The Army's need for open-top

cars—flats and gondolas—was especially

heavy and the supply was limited.194

 It 193

 Ltr, Williamson to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 29

Mar 45 and reply, 28 Apr 45; both in OCT 080

AAR; 2d Ind, CofT for CofOrd, 29 Mar 45, OCT

505 Ord; Memo, CofT for Maj Gen Frank A. Heileman, ASF Hq, 3 Apr 45, sub: Routing Shipment Surveyors Rpts; 1st Ind by Gen Heileman, 4 Apr 45;

Memo, Gen Sv Br for Transport Efficiency Sec, 28

May 45; last three in OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Freight; ASF Cir 193, 30 May 45, Sec. III; Ltr,

Buford for Messersmith, 30 Jul 45; Ltr, Williamson

to Buford, 8 Aug 45; last two in OCT 080 AAR; OCT

HB Monograph 24, 74-75. 194

 See ASF MPR, Jan 44, Sec. 3, p. 82, and Oct 44,

Sec. 3, p. 56.
302

was necessary therefore to avoid using

such cars for commodities that did not

definitely require them. The Army needed

many 50-foot boxcars with end doors or

wide side doors for shipping trucks, and

special measures were necessary to prevent such equipment from being ordered

for other commodities. The use of cars of

the wrong size not only wasted car space

but also involved additional freight

charges when the cars could not be loaded

to the specified minimum weight. Study

of bills of lading enabled the Traffic Control Division to detect when shippers,

through ignorance or carelessness, had

ordered improper cars and to bring these

errors to the attention of the responsible

officers.195

The conservation of refrigerator cars required special measures.196

 Most of these

cars belonged to owners other than the

common carriers and hence were not subject to the control the railroads had vested

in the Association of American Railroads

with respect to their own freight equipment. To meet this situation the Interstate

Commerce Commission, at the request of

the Office of Defense Transportation,

issued a service order that placed all refrigerator cars in a pool and designated

the manager of the Refrigerator Car Service Section of the AAR as the agent of the

ICC to control the movement of such cars

and to obtain the maximum service from

them. Ordinarily refrigerator cars were

subject to a great amount of deadheading, because the predominant movement

of frozen and chilled products was from

the western states to the east. In order to

avoid the loss, the railroads were permitted

to substitute refrigerator cars for boxcars

for the transcontinental movement of suitable nonrefrigerated commodities to the

states where heavy refrigerated shipments

originated. The Chief of Transportation

made extensive use of this arrangement in

connection with the westbound movement

of less-than-carload shipments. He also

investigated any reports of light loading

by Quartermaster market centers to determine whether there had been negligence.197

The Army relied entirely on the railroads for cars to move its solid freight

traffic, but it owned and operated a fleet

of tank cars for the transportation of

liquids. At its peak this fleet embraced

4,100 cars and hauled between 30 and 40

percent of the Army's traffic in gasoline

and other petroleum products, acids, and

chemicals. The decision to acquire a considerable number of tank cars was taken

on the basis of economy and as a precaution against the possibility that commercial tank cars, the greater part of which

were owned by private operators other

than the railroads, would be in heavy demand for vital nonmilitary traffic. Events

proved the wisdom of this decision, for in

1942 and 1943 when most oil tank ships

were withdrawn from the coastwise water

routes the burden of this traffic fell largely

on the rail routes. The operation of the

Army's tank cars was supervised by a

branch of the Traffic Control Division and 193

 OCT Cir 29, 13 Jul 42, sub: Limiting Use of

Open-Top Car; OCT Cir 63, 22 Oct 42, sub: Expediting Mvmt of Freight Cars; 1st Ind, CofT for ZTO

Third Zone, 15 Feb 43; 3d Ind, CofT for Detroit

Tank Automotive Center, 17 Mar 43; last two in

OCT 505 Chester Tank Depot; Memo, CofT for

CofOrd, 6 Jul 43, sub: Proposed Restrictive Use of

Type "A" and "B" Boxcars, OCT 53 1.4 Ord; TM

55-205, 24 Aug 44, p. 66. 196

 ODT, Civilian War Transport, pp. 27-34, discusses the general problem. 197

 Memo, CofT for TQMG, 28 Apr 43; Memo,

CofT for ZTO Ninth Zone, 4 May 43; Ltr, ODT to

CofT, 6 Oct 44; Ltr, CofT for ODT, 24 Oct 44; all in

OCT 531.4 Conservation of Refrigerator Cars; Memo,

CofT for ZTO, Third Zone, 30 Jul 45, sub: Service

Order 104, OCT 505 Third Zone.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 303

three regional offices. Their efforts to obtain maximum line-haul service and to

avoid the use of cars for storage purposes

increased the average daily mileage from

14.2 in 1941 to 81.9 in 1943.198

A limited number of boxcars were permanently equipped to transport military

items that required special fittings. The

railroads provided such cars during peacetime to move motor vehicle assemblies

such as engines and transmissions. Many

of them continued in service during wartime, although the number was reduced

in view of the reduction in automobile

production and the great need for boxcars

for general traffic. During the war about

400 cars were permanently equipped with

cradles for the transportation of aircraft

assemblies. The permanent assignment of

cars to this traffic and the transportation

of the heavy cradling devices on the round

trip free of charge were done under a special quotation by the railroads under Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act.199

Army carload freight loaded in 1944

and 1945 averaged 30 tons per car. This

represented gradual improvement from

24 tons per car in December 1941, 28 tons

in 1942, and 29 tons in 1943. It was considerably below the general average for

rail carloadings, which was somewhat

over 40 tons during the war years. There

were several reasons for this difference. A

large percentage of Army freight was

made up of items that were light in relation to the space occupied (notably vehicles and aircraft assemblies), while a

relatively small percentage consisted of

the bulk commodities that afforded compact and heavy loading (coal, ore, and

grain, for example). Some shipments were

made under pressure of time, particularly

those destined for oversea areas, so that full

attention could not be given to the conservation of car space. Many shipments required large numbers of cars, and the

carriers could not always supply the types

and sizes desired without wasteful deadheading and delay. The wide variation in

average carload weights as between the

several procuring services is shown in

Table 23. The significance of these averages can be visualized by considering

them in conjunction with the tonnages

shipped by the respective services as

shown in Table 16.200

A Car Service Section was set up in

Control Branch of the Traffic Control Division to give special attention to the

mobilization and conservation of freight

equipment. This section dealt with the

Military Transportation Section of the

Association of American Railroads on the

allocation of cars in sufficient numbers and

of proper types for particular shipments,

studied the daily car situation reports in

order to ascertain where remedial measures were necessary, and policed the observance of release dates by shippers. Considerable aid in dealing with these matters

was given by the Transport Economics

Section, whose statistical studies of car detention and car loading have been noted

before.201 The zone transportation officers

198

 for a fuller discussion, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp.

381-85. 199

 Memo, Capt Schmidt for Wardlow, 2 Oct 44,

sub: Special Handling of Airplane Parts; Interv with

J. J. Kelly, 23 Nov 51, sub: Permanently Equipped

Freight Cars; both in OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Freight. 200

 Weight of carloads of principal Army items and

savings of cars as between April 1943 and April 1944

are shown in ASF MPR, Jun 44, Sec. 3, p. 64. See

also ASF MPR, Aug 44, Sec. 3, p. 76. 201

 Concerning the studies of Transport Economics

Section, see rpts of Traf Contl Div, FY 1943, pp. 6-7;

FY 1945, p. 44; 27 Sep 45, Tab 7; all in OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Rpts.
304 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were called on frequently to investigate

conditions at installations where the car

situation was unsatisfactory and to suggest measures for improvement.202

 Representatives of the Traffic Control Division

discussed the problems with groups of

local transportation officers and railroad

representatives in order to impress upon

them through personal contact the importance of car conservation.203

Despite the attention given the matter

and the general progress made, the performance of Army installations in regard

to correct loading and the prompt dispatch of cars was uneven. The Association of American Railroads frequently

brought to the notice of the Chief of

Transportation reports from its field representatives indicating that particular installations had failed to observe the approved practices in connection with particular shipments. In some cases investigation of these reports developed that there

had been extenuating circumstances such

as bad weather or labor shortages that

delayed loading or unloading, or pressure

for prompt shipment that prevented the

exercise of the usual care in loading.

When it was evident that the complaint

was justified, the Chief of Transportation

requested the chief of the technical service

responsible for the operation of the installation concerned to take appropriate

corrective action. The investigations

sometimes showed that the railroads had

not been without fault.204

Conservation of freight equipment

through the avoidance of crosshauling and

backhauling received continuous attention. This was essentially a problem of

distribution and the Army's procuring

services were primarily responsible for

dealing with it, but the Chief of Transportation took an active hand because of the

waste of transportation that the practice

entailed.205 The early attack on the problem through distribution planning boards

within the several procuring services did

not prove highly effective, and in August

1943 the boards were dissolved. The responsibility was then taken over by the

Stock Control Division of ASF headquarters and corresponding units in the technical services.209

When studies of bills of lading and route

orders by the Transport Economics Section disclosed evidence of crosshauling, the

Chief of Transportation brought the facts

to the attention of the procuring services

concerned, but he had no authority to

pursue the matter further. In August 1944

his facilities for studying the situation were

broadened somewhat by a War Department regulation requiring transportation

officers at depots and other ASF installations to report to him any incidents of

crosshauling that came to their atten202

 On the handicaps of ZTO's caused by lack of

authority to take positive action at field installations

controlled by other services, see Wardlow, op. cit.,

p. 119. 203

 A series of conferences held during February

and March 1945 were attended by more than 2,000

Army officers, an equal number of rail representatives, and several hundred representatives of other

government agencies; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944,

pp. 4, 5; Memo for Record by Capt Schmidt, 30 Mar

44, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Misc. 204

 Ltr, Williamson to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 31

Oct 44, OCT 080 AAR. 205

 The Army defined crosshauling as "the shipping of materials and supplies into any area where

the items are, at that time, procurable or available at

a shorter distance than the contemplated point of

origin"; WD Cir 338, 18 Aug 44, Sec. VII. The most

difficult aspect of the problem was the shipment of

component parts to assembly points and their eventual backhaul in the completed articles. The WPB

and the ODT dealt with the matter on a nationwide

scale. 206

 Memo, CG SOS for ACofS Opns Div SOS, CG

AGF, et al., 24 Oct 42, AG 540(10-18-42); WD Cir

12, 7 Jan 43, Sec. VII, WD Cir 177, 3 Aug 43,

Sec. IV.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 305

TABLE 23—AVERAGE TONS PER CAR SHIPPED ON WAR DEPARTMENT BILLS OF LADING BY

THE SEVERAL SHIPPING AGENCIES: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945 a

a

 Compilation covers all cars loaded with 10,000 pounds or more, whether carload or less-than-carload shipments. b

 Included with "All Other."

Source: Monthly reports of Transport Economics Section, Traffic Control Division, OCT, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

tion.207 Although much time and effort

were given the matter, it was recognized

that, because of the complex processes of

procurement and distribution and the

high degree of specialization in industry,

crosshauling could only be reduced, not

eliminated. The feeling in the Office of the

Chief of Transportation at the end of the

war was that limited yet worthwhile

results had been accomplished.208

Consolidated Car Service

The consolidated car service, which the

Chief of Transportation established as part

of his wartime operation, was an unprecedented venture, since neither the Army

nor any other governmental agency had

operated such a service previously. It

proved valuable, not only for the Army

but also for the other armed services, in

expediting the delivery of small shipments,

conserving car space, reducing freight

charges, and keeping shipments under

control while they were en route.209

Although carload freight constituted

the great bulk of the Army's tonnage, lessthan-carload (LCL) freight accounted for

about 40 percent of the total number of

shipments. Transportation officers at Army

installations were required to consolidate

their small shipments into carloads when207

 WD Cir 338, 18 Aug 44, Sec. VII. Transportation officers at AAF installations did not report to

the Chief of Transportation but to the Traffic Division, AAF headquarters. 208

 for further discussion and documentation, see

Chronological Description of Developments in CrossHaul Economy Program of War Department, 11 May

44, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight, and Wardlow,

op. cit., pp. 344-45. 209

 OCT HB Monograph 15 discusses this service

in greater detail than can be undertaken here; the

author of this wartime monograph conferred frequently with the officers who were directly concerned

with the operation. AAR, Transportation in Wartime

(Washington, 1947), pp. 199-203, discusses the "merchandise," "package," or "LCL" services of railroads,

truck lines, and freight forwarders.
306 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ever possible, but in most instances the

accumulation of a carload of such freight

to move from one installation to another

installation could not be accomplished

without intolerable delay.

During prewar years transportation

officers had the choice of several routes for

their small shipments. Usually these shipments had. been dispatched by railroad

LCL service, which was more expensive

than carload service, yet rather slow. The

more urgent small shipments had been

forwarded by railway express, which was

speedy but much more costly. Some shipments had been routed over the highways,

but on long hauls the truck lines had

proved unsatisfactory. Furthermore, when

these services were used, the Army lost

control of the shipments while they were

in transit, and in wartime this was undesirable, particularly in connection with

supplies destined for the ports for transshipment overseas. When General Williamson, then a civilian, became chief of

the Traffic Control Division in the spring

of 1942, he saw an opportunity for the

Army to establish its own system for accumulating LCL shipments in areas from

which such shipments were heavy, consolidating them into carloads, and forwarding them at carload rates to distributing

points, where the carloads would be broken

up and the shipments reforwarded to their

respective destinations. Williamson's experience as general traffic manager for a

large mail-order house aided him in visualizing the advantages of such a system.210

A service similar to that contemplated

by Williamson was offered by commercial

freight forwarders. They performed the

assembling, consolidating, and distributing operations, charged their clients the

less-than-carload rate, and kept as compensation for their services the difference

between that rate and the carload rate

they paid the carriers. Under a prewar

regulation Army transportation officers

were forbidden to use freight forwarders

because they were not under the regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In peacetime the need for their services was limited, but in wartime they

could be useful. In March 1942, with legislation pending to bring freight forwarders

under federal regulation, the Army prohibition was lifted.211

 After the Army's consolidated car service was established,

freight forwarders were used only on

routes not covered by that service.212

The Army consolidated car service was

started on 1 July 1942, with a consolidating station at Chicago and distributing

agencies at Los Angeles and San Francisco.

The LCL shipments from Midwestern and

eastern states to California were heavy,

and assured a steady movement of consolidated cars. All transportation officers were

required to consign LCL shipments between the specified areas, with certain designated exceptions, to the Chicago station

for consolidation and onward movement.

The excepted shipments included explosives and other dangerous commodities,

perishables, household goods, items too

large for loading in side-door boxcars or

requiring the use of a crane, and livestock.

A section of a freight house of the Chicago

210

 Memo, Williamson for Gross, 15 Apr 42, sub:

Proposal for Estab Consolidated Car Opns, OCT

523.02 Freight; Remarks by Williamson at ZTO

Conf, Washington, 24-26 Sep 43, pp. 69-75, OCT

HB Zones Gen. 211

 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, par. 13, and Changes 1

and 2; Memo, Rail Br for CofT, 15 Mar 42, sub: AR

Pertaining to Freight Forwarders, AG 500 (5-27-

29)(1), Sec. III; WD Cir 91, 28 Mar 42, Sec. II; OCT

HB Monograph 6, pp. 133-34. 212

 The conditions under which commercial freight

forwarders were employed during the war are discussed below, pp. 312-13.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 307

Junction Railway was selected for the

consolidating station because it had a

large receiving platform for truck deliveries, adequate rail trackage and platforms, and satisfactory freight handling

and office space; it also had the advantage

of being near the Chicago Quartermaster

Depot, where many small shipments originated. The facilities for the delivery of

cars from the station to the trunk lines

were excellent.213 At San Francisco a railroad freight house was leased for the distributing agency, and at Los Angeles

arrangements were made with a freight

forwarding and trucking concern to unload and transship the contents of consolidated cars.214

The Chicago-California service, which

was started as an experiment, quickly

proved its value and additional consolidated car routes were opened. Each extension of the service was preceded by a close

study of the nature and volume of the

LCL shipments moving between the areas

involved. At the close of the war consolidating stations were being operated by the

Chief of Transportation at Chicago, New

York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Cleveland,

and San Antonio; distributing agencies

were located at Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane,

Portland, El Paso, and Atlanta. During

1944 two substations of the Chicago Consolidating Station were placed in operation, one in Chicago to relieve the parent

station of some of the truck deliveries that

were overtaxing its facilities, and another

in Detroit to collect LCL shipments from

the surrounding manufacturing area and

move them by truck to Chicago for

consolidation into carloads.

The buildings and other facilities for

these installations were rented from local

transportation or warehousing concerns.

The physical handling of freight at the

consolidating stations was performed by

railroads under published tariffs or special

contracts; at the distributing agencies it

was performed by local cartage companies

that also provided pickup and delivery

service.215

In addition to the above Transportation

Corps stations and agencies, consolidating

and distributing functions were performed

on behalf of the Chief of Transportation

by a number of installations operated by

other branches of the Army. These were

the Fort Worth Quartermaster Depot, the

Ogden Arsenal, and the ASF depots at

Ogden, Columbus, and Memphis. Existing facilities were adequate except at

Ogden and Memphis, where some additional construction was necessary.216

 The

commanders of the installations provided

personnel for the physical handling of the

freight.

In many cases it was found .feasible to

perform both consolidating and distributing functions at the same installation. The

Chicago Consolidating Station, for example, broke down and distributed carloads

that had been consolidated at New York

and Philadelphia. The Los Angeles Distributing Agency consolidated cars for

consignment to points east of the Mississippi. The Seattle Distributing Agency

consolidated cars for movement to Prince

Rupert, where the freight was reshipped

to stations in Alaska. This dual operation

was performed wherever it could be undertaken profitably; all consolidating stations

were also distributing agencies, but the

213

 Memo, Williamson for Gross, 23 May 42, OCT

532.02 Chicago; WD Cir 184, 12 Jun 42. 214

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 28-29. 215

 Rpts, Traf Contl Div, FY 1943, pp. 17-19; FY

1944, p. 34; both in OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts. 216

 OCT HB Monograph 15, p. 4.
THE CONSOLIDATED CAR SERVICE. The distributing agency at Los Angeles,

California (above); the loading platform of the consolidating station at Philadelphia (below).
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 309

reverse was not always the case.217 An

installation was called a consolidating station or a distributing agency according to

the activity that predominated.

Not all consolidated cars were consigned

to distributing agencies; about 30 percent

of them were consigned directly to the

installations for which the supplies were

destined. The consolidating stations were

encouraged to exploit the possibilities of

direct consignment, since this type of operation saved the handling cost at a distributing agency. Ports of embarkation and

large depots were the principal consignees

of such cars. On the same principle,

though on a smaller scale, arrangements

were made for originators of LCL freight

to consign carloads to Army distributing

agencies for breakdown and reshipment to

consignees within the areas served by

those agencies.218

As is evident from the preceding discussion, the basic purpose of the Army's consolidating and distributing enterprise was

to provide service between specific areas.219

Although this service took care of the

heavier LCL movements, there were many

routes in the intricate pattern of traffic

between Army installations and between

Army contractors and installations for

which it did not provide. In such cases the

LCL services of the railroads, the highway

carriers, and the commercial freight

forwarders were employed.

The number of consolidated car routes

that could be profitably maintained depended on the volume of the LCL shipments moving between particular areas,

and after the Chicago-California service

was started Williamson began negotiations

with the Navy to bring it into the project. Accounting difficulties interposed the

principal obstacle, but all obstacles were

overcome and Navy participation began

on 1 February 1943. The installations were

then redesignated Army-Navy consolidating stations and distributing agencies. The

Marine Corps was added in April 1943,

and the Coast Guard in February 1944.

Although the LCL shipments of all the

armed services were thus made eligible for

movement over the consolidated car

routes, responsibility for the operation of

the service remained entirely with the

Army Chief of Transportation. Operating

costs were prorated according to the tonnage handled.220

 Army shipments comprised about two thirds of the total tonnage

handled and shipments of the other armed

services about one third. (Table 24 and

Chart 9)

The consolidated car service worked

out very satisfactorily from the standpoint

of the railroads and transportation in

general. The average loading per car was

far heavier than the general average for

LCL loadings. It was long-haul traffic, the

average distance being about 2,500 miles.

Speedy delivery was the chief objective,

and the emphasis that the Chief of Transportation placed on prompt loading and

unloading, as well as his insistence that

consolidated cars of military freight be

moved in fast trains, promoted quick car

turnaround. Close supervision over the

217

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, p. 34. 218

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 8-9; Memo, Williamson for Finlay, 13 Oct 42, sub: Loading of Direct

Cars, OCT 505 Chicago. 219

 These areas are designated in the basic directives covering this service: WD Cir 184, 12 Jun 42;

WD Cir 255, 30 Jul 42; WD Cir 302, 7 Sep 42; WD

Cir 11, 6 Jan 43; WD Cir 49, 12 Feb 43; WD Cir 244,

7 Oct 43; WD Cir 165, 27 Apr 44; WD CTB 14, 14

Apr 44; WD CTB 19, 1 Jun 44; WD CTB 36, 16 Jul

45. See particularly maps in latter document. 220

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 147-60, App. V;

Memo, C of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts for

Commandants of Naval Districts, et al., 21 Jan 43,

OCT HB Zones Gen Consol Sta; OCT Cir 36, 3 Mar

43; TC Cir 60-1, 1 Jan 44, and revision, 23 Jun 44.
310 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 24—TONS OF LESS-THAN-CARLOAD FREIGHT CONSOLIDATED BY THE ARMY-NAVY

CONSOLIDATING STATIONS: JULY 1942-DECEMBER 1945

a

 First shipments in September 1942. b

 First shipments in July 1942. c

 First shipments in April 1944. d

 First shipments in July 194S. e

 Includes freight consolidated by distributing agencies.

Source: Monthly reports, Consolidating and Distributing Agencies Branch, Traffic Control Division, OCT, reworked for statistical

volume of this series.

loading and unloading operations resulted

in careful stowage, relatively little damage

to the freight, and cleanliness of cars when

they were released.

In January 1943, in an effort to relieve

the shortage of boxcars, the Interstate

Commerce Commission authorized the

use of refrigerator cars for suitable types of

dry freight on certain westbound routes

over which refrigerator cars usually were

deadheaded. The Chief of Transportation

gave full support to the program, and up

to the end of the war well over 45,000 refrigerator cars were loaded at the consolidating stations—about half of them at

Chicago. Since on the average about two

and a half refrigerator cars were required

to move the load of a boxcar, the number

of boxcars saved was about 18,000.221

Routings for consolidated cars were

worked out by the Consolidating and Distributing Branch of the Traffic Control Division, rather than by the Freight Branch.

By comparing the actual transit times over

various combinations of lines, the branch

determined which routings were the more

satisfactory. Blanket route orders were

issued for shipments from each consolidating station to each regular destination, the

routes to be utilized by the stations in such

a manner as to distribute the traffic equitably among the carriers. Although initially the cars dispatched each day from a

particular station were divided among the

approved routes, it was soon found profitable to give as many cars as possible to one

initial carrier, which hauled them to a

junction point where they were dispersed

to their respective destinations. This plan

often enabled the initial carriers to make

up a full train of merchandise cars that

moved on fast schedule; it also reduced

switching and thus relieved busy freight

yards and conserved motive power. The

221

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 14-17, 51, 52;

Memos, CofT for NY Consol Sta, 2 Feb 43 and 30

Aug 43, OCT 531.4 NY; ASF MPR, Aug 45, Sec. 3,

p. 7.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 311

CHART 9—MONTHLY TONNAGE OF LESS-THAN-CARLOAD FREIGHT CONSOLIDATED BY THE

ARMY-NAVY CONSOLIDATING STATIONS: JULY 1942-DECEMBER 1945*

* Includes freight consolidated by the distributing agencies. Navy freight includes that of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.

Source: Monthly reports, Consolidating and Distributing Agencies Branch, Traffic Control Division, OCT, reworked

for statistical volume of this series.

consolidating stations accordingly were

instructed to rotate the traffic among the

approved routes, at first on a weekly and

then on a fortnightly basis. The latter

arrangement enabled the railroads to plan

for the handling of military consolidated

cars over a period, and at the same time

maintained the principle of equitable

distribution.222

The routings were so carefully planned

and the deliveries so closely scheduled that

this service was appreciably affected by

the diversion orders of an agent of the

Interstate Commerce Commission who

was stationed in Chicago to reroute freight

trains whenever this became necessary as

a means of relieving congestion on a particular line or at a particular gateway.

After about a year of effort the Chief of

Transportation succeeded in having carloads of military freight moving under

symbols—that is, specifically expedited

shipments—exempted from such orders,

but he was never able to have consolidated

cars symbolized. In addition to the fact

that they involved delayed deliveries,

diversions also affected adversely the ability of the Traffic Control Division to furnish information regarding the location

and probable arrival time of shipments.

This was particularly serious in connection

with shipments to the ports for loading in

particular vessels or particular convoys.

222

 OCT HB Monograph 15, App. II, pp. 50-56.
312 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

When such cases arose, the division was

obliged to call upon the carriers for special

expediting service, a procedure it endeavored to avoid as much as possible because

of the disturbing effect on the carriers'

operations.223

The truck lines also derived benefit

from the consolidated car service. The

Chief of Transportation found that the

highway carriers gave faster service than

the railroads in moving LCL shipments

over the shorter distances from points of

origin to consolidating stations and from

distributing agencies to consignees, and he

urged that they be used whenever practicable. As a result, many truck operators

were able to obtain good return loads on

routes where this had not been possible.224

Certain motor carriers were willing to

enter into agreements allowing reduced

rates on movements from points of origin

to the consolidating stations in Chicago,

New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis in

view of the heavy and regular shipments

to those stations.225 As already stated,

trucks were used with great success in

moving LCL shipments from the Detroit

substation to the consolidating station in

Chicago, and the necessity of establishing

a consolidating station in Detroit was

thereby avoided. In some parts of the

country where rail rates were subject to

land-grant deductions, the highway tariff

rates were higher. When this situation

existed, the Chief of Transportation endeavored to obtain sufficiently fast service

from the railroads or to induce the truck

lines that had not already signed equalization agreements to do so. When neither

effort succeeded, the highway carriers

were used for urgent shipments despite the

higher rates.226

A considerable part of the freight delivered to the consolidating stations originated within the respective metropolitan

areas. Initially the Army regulation contemplated that such freight would be

delivered to the consolidating stations by

the consignors, but vendors whose contracts provided for delivery f.o.b. plant

were not bound to do so, and frequently

refused to bear the drayage charges. In an

effort to meet the situation, the regulation

was revised to require contracting officers

to place a clause in each contract with a

vendor located in a city where there was a

consolidating station providing for delivery f.o.b. consolidating station.227

 This

arrangement conflicted with current procurement practices, and was not found

workable by the technical services. The

requirement was dropped, therefore, and

when contractors for articles purchased

f.o.b. plant refused to pay the drayage

charges, the government did so.228 The

matter of local drayage at government

expense was simplified by contracting with

a trucking concern in each city to haul all

such traffic to the consolidating station,

and also to haul shipments received at the

consolidating station for distribution to

consignees in that area.229

The commercial freight forwarders were

not happy about the Army's consolidated

223

 Ltrs, Williamson to AAR, 23 May 44, OCT 080

AAR, and 1 Jun 44, OCT 523.091 AAR; OCT HB

Monograph 15, pp. 56, 57. 224

 Ltr, American Trucking Associations to Gross,

2 Nov 42, and reply, 4 Nov 42, OCT HB Gross Day

File. 225

 OCT Cir Ltr 36, 9 Nov 42, sub: Use of Motor

Carriers; WD Memo W 55-19-43, 16 May 43, and

Changes 1, 9 Oct 43. 226

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 64-67, 69-71. 227

 WD Cir 302, 7 Sep 42, pars. 7 and 14 of Secs. I,

II, III. 228

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 67-68; WD Cir

244, 7 Oct 43, par. 9 of Secs. I, II, III. 229

 See Ltr, ZTO Sixth Zone to OCT, 18 Sep 45,

p. 17, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps,

OCT HB Sixth Zone Gen.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 313

car service since it dealt with freight that

they otherwise might have handled. In

1943 they undertook to stop the allowance

of special rates by the carriers for the

movement of LCL shipments to consolidating stations and from distributing

agencies, but their appeal to the Interstate

Commerce Commission in this matter was

unsuccessful.230 In 1945 they opposed the

establishment of an additional consolidating station at Cleveland.231

 This does not

imply that the freight forwarders were excluded from military traffic. Freight forwarders could be used on routes not

covered by the Army consolidating operation, and they could be employed for

moving freight to the Army consolidating

stations when their service was advantageous to the Army. In order to establish

uniform and acceptable conditions in connection with the use of freight forwarders,

each such concern was required to sign an

individual agreement with the Chief of

Transportation. The names of the forwarders who had agreements were published from time to time, and Army transportation officers were directed to use only

those that were listed.232

When military shipments were turned

over to freight forwarders, the forwarders

became the shippers and consequently the

freight charges of the carriers were not

subject to land-grant deductions. This

difficulty was overcome by an agreement

between the railroads, the approved forwarders, and the War Department stipulating that when Army shipments that

had been consolidated by forwarders

moved over land-grant railroads, the forwarders making such consolidations would

give statements to the General Accounting

Office and the railroads so that land-grant

deductions could be taken on military

freight.233

The use of express for shipments to the

consolidating stations was limited as much

as possible not only because of the greater

cost but also because of a number of practical difficulties. The billing procedure of

the Railway Express Agency did not provide all the information needed by the

consolidating stations to accurately reforward shipments to their final destinations,

and express shipments usually reached the

consolidating stations considerably before

the bills of lading arrived by mail. Because

of the Railway Express Agency's nationwide service, its employees sometimes dispatched shipments to their ultimate

consignees rather than to the consolidating

stations. After unsuccessfully trying various expedients to eliminate these difficulties, the Chief of Transportation advised

shippers that, when they considered it

necessary to use express, they should forward their shipments by that means

directly to the consignees. The same advice

was given with respect to the use of parcel

post.234

The operations of the consolidating stations and the distributing agencies were

geared to the accomplishment of several

principal objectives: (1) speed in delivery

of shipments, (2) accuracy in the reforwarding process, (3) full utilization of car

space, and (4) avoidance of damage to the

merchandise. Most of the facilities used by

the consolidating service had been de230

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 84-85. 231

 Ltr, Freight Forwarders Institute to Gen Gross,

27 Apr 45; Memo, Williamson for Gross, 9 May 45;

both in OCT 323.3 Cleveland. 232

 WD Cir 293, 31 Aug 42, par. 8; WD Memo W

55-4-43, 3 Feb 43, sub: List of Approved Freight Forwarders; WD Memo W 55-35-43, 20 Aug 43; WD

CTB 26, 24 Aug 44, Utilization of Commercial

Freight Forwarders. 233

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1943, p. 35; WD Cir

50, 13 Feb 43, par. 1. 234

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 62-64.
314 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

signed for other purposes and, although

they were remodeled to some extent, they

fell short of the ideal. These shortcomings

and the scarcity of labor were offset wherever possible by the use of mechanized

equipment, notably fork-lift trucks and

gas-powered tractors. The Chicago Consolidating Station, which handled a considerable number of heavy items, had two

10-ton cranes. Through study of the results

achieved the procedures used at the several stations gradually were standardized.

In 1944 a checking system was introduced

to provide a means of verifying at any time

during loading that all packages stowed in

a car were for the same destination, and

this system considerably reduced misleading. At the request of the Chief of Transportation the Freight Claims Division of

the Association of American Railroads

sent representatives to the consolidating

stations at intervals to observe their

methods of handling and stowing freight

and to offer suggestions. The reports on

these inspections uniformly spoke well of

the methods used.235

As a procedure essential to the speedy

delivery of shipments, the Chief of Transportation laid down the policy that freight

must be forwarded from consolidating

stations and distributing agencies without

delay. At the consolidating stations there

frequently was conflict between the policy

of prompt dispatch and that of loading

cars to the maximum. The rule was that

shipments should not be held on the platforms or in the cars more than twenty-four

hours, except in unusual circumstances.

The Chicago station reported at the end

of the war that 93 percent of the freight

that it had consolidated had been dispatched on the day of receipt.236

While the Chief of Transportation

placed a military staff at each installation

to supervise the operation and handle the

administrative work, the freight handlers

were provided entirely by contractors.

Labor supply was a continuing problem

and the contractors had to employ unusual recruiting methods to maintain a

force of laborers, with or without experience, adequate to give the prompt dispatch to shipments that the Chief of

Transportation required. The Chicago

Junction Railway, following a practice

used extensively by the western railroads

during the war, imported about 250 Mexicans for this purpose. The use of wholly

unskilled workers for moving and stowing

freight placed a heavy burden on the

supervisory staff in its effort to minimize

the cost and inconvenience resulting from

the misdirection or improper loading of

shipments.237

The railroads' practices relating to

freight charges on consolidated cars presented a problem to the Army in its effort

to dispatch shipments promptly and at the

same time keep the charges as low as possible. Two general types of mixed carload

rates were available: the so-called Rule 10

mixture, under which freight charges were

based on the highest-rated article loaded

in the car and the minimum weight was

the highest applicable to any loaded article: and all-commodity point-to-point

235

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 92-102; Standard

Operating Procedures for Receiving, Balloting, Loading, or Billing Freight; TC Pamphlet 32, Standard

Operating Procedure for Handling Overages, Shortages, and Damages; WD CTB 8, 25 Jan 45, sub: Unloading Record; Outline of Organization and Operation of the Army-Navy Consolidated Car Service, 23

Nov 45; last four in OCT HB Zones Gen Consol Sta. 236

 Min of ZTO Conf, Washington, 24-26 Sep 43,

p. 72, OCT HB Zones Gen; Ltr, ZTO Sixth Zone to

OCT, 18 Sep 45, p. 15, OCT HB Sixth Zone. 237

 OCT Monograph 15, pp. 103-04; Ltr, Maj

James Sloss to ZTO Sixth Zone, 21 Apr 43, OCT 505

Chicago; Ltr, ZTO Sixth Zone to OCT, 18 Sep 45,

p. 18, OCT HB Sixth Zone.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 315

rates, which were subject to a designated

minimum weight. On its important transcontinental routes the Army was at a disadvantage in using the all-commodity

rates since they could be used economically only on higher-rated commodities.

Consequently, on the lower-rated articles

the Army was forced to follow the practice

of the commercial freight forwarders and

resort to bracket loading under Rule 10—

that is, bracketing together for loading in

a given car commodities taking approximately the same carload rates. This practice had drawbacks, for it required highgrade personnel to classify and segregate

the freight prior to loading, resulted in the

frequent shifting of packages from car to

car during loading, complicated platform

operations, and encouraged delay and

light loading. In order to remedy the situation the Army negotiated with the carriers for special all-commodity rates under

Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce

Act to eliminate the necessity for bracket

loading. Agreement on a quotation for

transcontinental cars was not reached

until February 1944. The quotation then

obtained was based on the average charges

paid on consolidated cars between specified points during agreed periods in 1943.

Section 22 quotations on other routes were

obtained subsequently.238

In setting up the consolidated car service Williamson recognized that expert

leadership would be necessary. With this

in view he arranged for the commissioning of James Sloss, who had been associated with him in a similar operation.

Major Sloss headed the Consolidating and

Distributing Agencies Branch of the Traffic Control Division throughout the war,

guided the expansion of the service, and

was responsible for many of the policies

and practices followed. The branch was

charged with technical supervision over

the operations of the consolidating stations

and the distributing agencies and with

such analyses of the traffic as might be

necessary to the improvement and extension of the service. Differing interpretations in Washington and in the field of

what constituted technical supervision

caused some difficulty.239

Each consolidating station and distributing agency was under the direct administrative and operational supervision of the

zone transportation officer within whose

territory it was located. This arrangement

was in line with the general policy of the

Chief of Transportation to decentralize the

control of field activities as much as possible. Major Sloss, while recognizing the

advantages of decentralization, felt that

in this instance the plan worked out disadvantageously in several respects. He found

a disposition on the part of some officers to

regard the installations as virtually autonomous rather than as part of a closely

integrated nationwide system. This was

particularly noticeable in connection with

the assignment of key military personnel,

the acquisition of facilities, and the negotiation of contracts for freight handling

and drayage. The misunderstandings that

arose, Major Sloss felt, resulted in a weakening of morale at the installations. In a

report made at the end of the war, he expressed the view that many of these misunderstandings could have been avoided

by a clearer definition of the responsibili238

 OCT HB Monograph 15, pp. 72-80; Ltrs, Maj

Sloss to author, 28 Feb 52 and 29 Oct 52, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Freight. 239

 TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual. For detailed

analysis of functions as conceived by Major Sloss, see

Outline of the Organization and Operation of the

Army-Navy Consolidated Car Service, 23 Nov 45,

OCT HB Zones Gen Consol Sta.
316 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ties of the Consolidating and Distributing

Agencies Branch.240

The consolidated car service was generally regarded as a successful and worthwhile undertaking. It handled more than

4,500,000 separate LCL shipments averaging about 1,000 pounds in weight and

covering a wide range of commodities,

some of which were not acceptable in

freight forwarder service.241 The delivery

time was better than that obtainable by

any other means except express and air,

both of which were much more expensive.

Deliveries to the west coast were about

forty-eight hours faster than those obtainable through freight forwarder service

and many days faster than by railroad

LCL service.242 By paying carload rates

on about 150,000 consolidated cars, rather

than freight forwarder charges or the carriers' LCL rates, the government was

saved about $15,000,000 net—that is,

after deduction of the cost of operating the

consolidated car service.243 The average

of about eighteen tons per boxcar loaded

at the consolidating stations was well

above the average for railroad LCL service and therefore represented a substantial

saving in car capacity.244 An important

advantage from the military standpoint

was achieved through the constant control

the consolidated car service provided over

individual shipments, and the superior

tracing system, which enabled diversions

and reconsignments to be made at the

request of the consignors.245

The Army-Navy consolidated car service was a wartime project resulting from

the heavy and frequently urgent shipments of military LCL freight and the

pressure under which the transportation

industry operated. Soon after hostilities

ceased plans for the demobilization of the

service were made, and the last installation was scheduled for inactivation on

1 February 1946.246

Freight Rates and Classifications

Freight charges constitute a technical

and an extremely complex subject and,

like some other subjects dealt with in this

volume, cannot be discussed in detail. The

Chief of Transportation in his relationships

with the common carriers and the Interstate Commerce Commission was continuously engaged in an effort to improve the

Army's position with respect to such

charges and thus save money for the federal government. This discussion can only

indicate in a general way the lines of his

endeavor and the measure of his success.

Before and during the early part of the

emergency Army transportation officers

were required by regulation to use "the

most economical route," except in unusual circumstances. In peacetime the

regulation was rigidly enforced, but during the war it was more and more frequently found desirable to use more expensive routes in order to meet delivery

requirements, to avoid burdensome as240

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, 27 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps, Tab 4, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Rpts. 241

 Rpts, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, p. 33, and 27

Sep 45, Tab 4, p. 2; OCT HB Monograph 15, p. 102. 242

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, p. 36; Memo,

Williamson for Gross, 9 May 45, pars. 2f, h, k, OCT

HB Gross Day File. 243

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, 27 Sep 45, Tab 4, p. 2;

WD press release, 28 Dec 45, OCT HB Zones Gen

Consol Sta. 244

 Memo, Sloss for Williamson, 1 Apr 43, OCT

523.02 LCL Consol Freight; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, 27

Sep 45, Tab 4, p. 2. 245

 Memo, Williamson for Gross, 9 May 45, pars.

2d-e, OCT HB Gross Day File. 246

 OCT Misc Ltr 387, 19 Nov 45, OCT HB Zones

Gen Consol Sta.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 317

sessorial charges, to avoid congestion on

the transportation lines or at Army installations, or to insure adequate security

or the use of suitable transportation equipment. In other words, wartime operations

required consideration of service as well as

cost, and the regulation was modified

accordingly.247

The Chief of Transportation emphasized that all types of carriers were to be

considered in routing shipments—rail,

water, and highway. The choice between

rail and motor routes gave considerable

trouble because the highway carriers were

used chiefly for the shorter hauls and most

of this traffic was routed in the field. Many

local transportation officers found it difficult to keep abreast of changes in rates,

which sometimes favored the motor lines

and sometimes the rail lines, and which in

some cases were subject to land-grant deductions and in other cases were not. Also,

some transportation officers were inclined

to adhere too rigidly to the principal of

economy and to overlook the advantages

of superior service.248

The Chief of Transportation had full

responsibility in rate matters, including

the provision of rate information to all

elements of the War Department and the

conduct of negotiations with the carriers.249

 During the prewar rearmament

period some of the procuring services had

endeavored to deal directly with the

Association of American Railroads in regard to rates on their matériel, but the

AAR had insisted that all such matters

be channeled through the proper War

Department agency, which at that time

was the Office of The Quartermaster

General.250 This tendency toward independent action cropped up during the war

with respect to highway rates. When The

Quartermaster General was informed that

some of his market centers were negotiating directly with the motor carriers, he

immediately directed that all such matters

should be handled through the Chief of

Transportation.25l

A similar situation with the Army Air

Forces was not so quickly settled. The

Chief of Transportation complained that

AAF field representatives were dealing directly with contract tank truck operators

for the movement of gasoline and that

these independent negotiations were prejudicial to his relations with the carriers.

While acknowledging that the Chief of

Transportation had general responsibility

in such matters, the AAF contended that

in emergency cases its transportation officers must have the privilege of making

contracts. After discussions extending over

several months, the matter was settled on

the basis that these emergency contracts

would be immediately submitted to the

Chief of Transportation for review, and for

readjustment if he should find them incompatible with the general rate structure.252

247

 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, par. 8b, and Changes 2,

1 Oct 37; AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par. 4, and Changes

5, 19 Jul 43, Changes 6, 20 Aug 43, Changes 13, 22

May 44, and Changes 14, 15 Dec 44. 248

 Memo, C of Traf Contl Div for CofT, 22 Jan 43,

sub: Differential, AG 510 (1 Dec 42)(1); Min of Port

Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30-3 1 Aug 43, p. 122; Min of

Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago 6-9 Jul 44,

afternoon session, 7 Jul 44, pp. 26-29. 249

 AR 55-105, 29 Dec 42, par 3.

250 OCT HB Monograph 6, p. 151. 251

 Memo, CofT for TQMG, 25 Nov 44, sub:

Freight Rate Adjustments; 1st Ind, TQMG for CofT,

1 Dec 44; both in OCT 551.2 Rate Adjustments Misc. 252

 Memo, CofT for C of Traf Div Office of AC of

Air Staff, 10 Jan 44, and reply, 20 Jan 44; Memo,

CofT for AC of Air Staff, 2 Mar 44; Memo, CG ASF

for CG AAF, 19 May 44; Memo, CG AAF for CofT,

24 May 44; Memo, CG AAF for CG ASF, 29 May

44; all in OCT 551.2 Rate Adjustments Misc; Interv

with Homer S. Paul, 7 Dec 51, OCT HB Traf Contl

Div Freight.
318 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The calculation of freight rates for all

branches of the Army involved a great

amount of detailed work by a staff of experts in the Traffic Control Division. In

addition to computing charges on "shipments moving currently, the division

quoted rates for the use of Army contracting officers of all services in comparing

bids for delivery f.o.b. plant with bids for

delivery f.o.b. destination, and in determining which of several f.o.b. plant

bids would work out most advantageously

for the War Department. During the fiscal

year 1943, which saw the peak of this activity, the division furnished 123,000 such

quotations after taking into account not

only the various types of transportation

but also the applicability or nonapplicability of land-grant deductions. The division was at that time maintaining a file of

more than 16,000 carriers' tariffs and a

land-grant index of about 178,000 cards

covering the principal commodities, classifications, and routings.253

Land-grant deductions of 50 percent

from tariff, which were applicable on

some routes and not on others, greatly

complicated the rate problem, but they

represented a large saving on military

freight as compared with commercial

rates. The Transportation Act of 1940

abolished these deductions for all traffic of

the federal government except military

and naval. The War Department traditionally had argued for the retention of

the land-grant benefits, and, during the

war when the question of total abolition

came before Congress, it opposed such action on the grounds that heavy additional

cost would be imposed on the government,

and that the railroads should not collect

commercial rates on the heavy wartime

military traffic that came to them not only

in unprecedented volume but also without the expense of solicitation and advertising.254

 The Chief of Transportation estimated that the abolition of land-grant

rates would deprive the War Department

of the benefit of deductions from commercial freight rates totaling between

$150,000,000 and $200,000,000 in a war

year, but that this amount might be reduced to $50,000,000 or less by obtaining

additional special rate quotations from the

railroads under Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act.255

 The land-grant

deductions remained in effect on military

traffic throughout the war, but soon after

the close of hostilities Congress abolished

them, effective 1 October 1946.256

Land-grant deductions were origmally

applicable only to the railroads to which

the federal government had ceded land in

order to encourage the development of

unsettled areas in western and southern

states. In time, the scope of the deductions

was extended by means of equalization

agreements to railroads that were in competition with the land-grant routes.257

 The

highway carriers were not requested to

equalize rates before World War II because the Army made relatively little use

of their services.258 During the rearmament period, however, in order to clear

the way for an expansion of shipments by

truck, the motor carriers were invited to

sign equalization agreements beginning in

253

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1943, pp. 43-44. The

division furnished 54,329 quotations during the fiscal

year 1944 and 69,378 during the fiscal year 1945. 254

 See above, pp. 17-20. 255

 Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on the

Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1946, p.

482.

256

 PL 256, 79th Cong., December 12, 1945. 257

 OCT Routing Cir 3, 1 Apr 43, sub: Freight

Land Grant Equalization Agreements, OCT HB Traf

Contl Div Freight. 258

 See above, p. 248.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 319

July 1941. Many of them did so, but

others declined. Truck operators who handled only a small amount of traffic could

not afford to forego part of the revenue on

military shipments. Some operators who

signed equalization agreements found the

resulting business unprofitable and sought

to be relieved of their obligations.259

From the beginning the carriers and the

War Department were in disagreement as

to whether land-grant deductions were

applicable to War Department shipments

to foreign countries under lend-lease.260

Reflecting the railroads' point of view, a

bill was introduced in Congress late in

1941 that would have limited the application of land-grant deductions to "property

necessary for the maintenance and subsistence of the armed forces of the United

States." The War Department opposed the

measure, contending that shipments of

lend-lease materials were vital to the defense of the United States and that, since

such freight was property of the Army until it was transferred to a foreign government at the loading port, it should take the

same transportation rates as supplies intended for the use of the Army.261

 The bill

was not enacted.

In a test case involving a shipment of

phosphate fertilizer to Great Britain on

lend-lease, brought by one of the railroads,

the circuit court of appeals found for the

carriers. The Army nevertheless continued to endorse bills of lading for lendlease shipments to indicate that they were

military. In 1947 the U.S. Supreme Court

upheld the circuit court decision. It maintained that a shipment of fertilizer was not

entitled to land-grant deductions under

the Transportation Act of 1940, which

provided that such deductions were applicable only to property "moving for

military or naval and not for civil use."

 262

At the same time the Supreme Court in

another test case held that shipments of

copper cable, lumber, and other materials

moving to an oversea base for the construction of buildings to be used for the

training and recreation of military personnel were eligible for land-grant rate

deductions.263 As an outgrowth of the firstmentioned decision, refunds were due the

railroads on many shipments made by the

War Department under the lend-lease

program, and possibly also on shipments

under the program for relief of civilian

populations of liberated and occupied

areas. Naturally there were many borderline cases to be cleared up by consultation

between the Association of American

Railroads and the General Accounting

Office.

In addition to his effort to preserve the

economies that the Army derived from

land-grant rates, the Chief of Transportation pursued other lines of action to reduce the charges paid on military freight.

Traditionally, rates have been established

by committees or bureaus representing

the rail or motor carriers in the several

territories. During the war in order to expedite consideration of the many requests

for readjustments in favor of the government, the railroads established a committee in Washington to deal with rates

affecting all parts of the country. The

259

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 155-61; OCT Cir

Ltr 29, 26 Aug 42; OCT Cir Ltr 33, 14 Oct 42; OCT

Routing Cir 4, 22 Jan 43; WD CTB 3, 1 Apr 44; WD

CTB 4, 1 Mar 45; last five in OCT HB Traf Contl

Div Freight. 260

 Ltr, AAR to OQMG, 14 Jul 41, reply, 22 Jul 41,

and other documents in OCT 551.6 Trans Act of

1940. 261

 Ltr, SW to Dir Bureau of the Budget, 10 Dec 41,

OSW Railroads. 262

 U.S. v. Powell, 330 U.S. 238. 263

 Northern Pacific Railway Company v. U.S., 330

U.S. 248.
320 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tariffs published by the carriers embrace

class rates, for which purpose the many

items are grouped into classifications, and

rates for commodities that for one reason

or another are not covered by the class

rates. All tariffs are filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is

charged by law with supervision of interstate rates to insure fairness and avoid discrimination, or with the corresponding

state agencies. In his endeavor to obtain

lower rates for Army matériel, the Chief of

Transportation first presented his requests

to the carriers; if he failed to obtain

satisfactory results in that manner, he

could then arrange for the Judge Advocate General to initiate formal proceedings with the Interstate Commerce Commission or with the state regulatory bodies.

Throughout the war the railroads were

threatened with prosecution by the Department of Justice on the ground that

their rate bureaus contravened the federal

antitrust laws. The Army joined with the

Navy and the Office of Defense Transportation in urging that actions of this nature

be limited to those necessary to eliminate

specific abuses, and that any general attack on the carriers' method of establishing rates be deferred until after the war.

This position was based on the conviction

that any actions that would divert the attention and energies of the officers of the

railroads from their transportation functions and involve them in a legal defense

of their rate practices would be harmful to

the war effort. The prosecutions were

deferred, although the matter was kept

alive by the Attorney General's office.264

A basic rate problem requiring the attention of the Chief of Transportation was

that of insuring that War Department

supplies and equipment were placed in

the proper classifications to obtain the

lowest applicable class rates. Out of what

was roughly described as "almost a million" military items that were placed in

the wartime stream of traffic, thousands

were entirely new and others had moved

in such small quantities that no question

had been raised previously regarding

their classification. General Williamson

stated that he began work on this problem

soon after he assumed office as chief of

the Traffic Control Division in March

1942. The task was twofold. The nomenclature applied to Army items by the procuring services, which often varied widely

from commercial nomenclature, had to be

translated into descriptions that when

entered in the bills of lading would place

the articles in the proper classifications.

The descriptions so developed were published by the Chief of Transportation in a

freight billing guide, use of which not only

assured that the Army would be billed by

the carriers at the proper rates but also

saved much time for the carriers and the

General Accounting Office in preparing,

auditing, and adjusting bills. The second

aspect of the task was to obtain, by application to the railroads' classification

committees, new classifications for Army

items that did not properly belong in the

classifications in which they had been

previously placed.265

264

 Joint Ltr, USW, Under Secy of Navy, ODT to

Atty Gen of the US, 6 Nov 42; Memo, CofT for Julius

H. Amberg, OSW, 8 Oct 42; Ltr, Pelley, Pres AAR,

to Gross, 21 Oct 42; Ltr, AAR to Gross, 7 Dec 42;

Ltrs, Johnson, ODT, to Byrnes, OWM, 9 and 10 Aug

44; Ltr, Atty Gen to SW, 18 Oct 44; all of above in

OCT HB Gross Rail; Memo, Gross for Amberg, 3

Apr 44; Ltrs, SW to Atty Gen, 14 Jun 44 and 14 Feb

45; last three in OCT 013.3 Anti-Trust Prosecutions. 265

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug-1

Sep 43, p. 122; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1944, p. 11;

Statements by Gross and Williamson, in Hearings on

the Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1945,

pp. 271-73, and Hearings cited n. 255, pp. 483-84,

488, 521-29.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 321

At the end of the war it was evident

that substantial further savings could be

effected by surveys to correct bills of

lading in which incorrect commodity descriptions had been entered. Some of the

misdescriptions had been used before the

billing guides were available and others

came about through failure to use the

guides. The surveys, which covered bills

of lading issued beginning 1 January

1943, started late in 1945. They were

made at the installations where the shipments had originated and where the documents necessary to correct the descriptions

were available. The Chief of Transportation had over-all responsibility for the

conduct of these surveys, but the work was

done under the direct supervision of the

zone transportation officers. In addition to

the monetary saving, the investigation

served a useful purpose in teaching transportation officers in the field the advantage and the method of using the billing

guides.266

Beginning in 1941 the Army made extensive transit arrangements with the

railroads under which shipments could be

halted at intermediate points for processing or storage, or both, yet move at

through rates rather than the higher local

rates. Such arrangements were customary

in commercial practice, and they were

especially important to the Army during

the war because so much of its matériel

destined for oversea areas was subject to

processing or storage en route. As was

noted earlier in this chapter, the Chief of

Transportation made extensive use of holding and reconsignment points and railroad

open storage yards for the temporary storage of export shipments in order to protect the ports from congestion. These

transit arrangements represented substantial savings for the Army, but the savings cannot be measured by the difference

between the through rates and the combined local rates. In the first place, the

railroads usually met the Army's requests

for transit privileges with Section 22

quotations that eliminated land-grant deductions. Secondly, the railroads based

their quotations on the so-called Ex parte

148 rate increases, which the Interstate

Commerce Commission had authorized

and then had suspended with the proviso

that the increases could be retained in

connection with special rates voluntarily

granted by the railroads to the federal

government.267 Protests by the War Department against the inclusion of these increases in the Section 22 quotations were

unavailing.268

The War Department encountered difficulty in obtaining satisfactory export

rates for supplies being shipped to Pacific

destinations. The regular export tariffs for

shipments to Pacific ports, which had been

established in peacetime to enable the

transcontinental railroads to compete

with the intercoastal water routes, incorporated a number of rules with which the

Army could not comply in wartime—

especially those requiring that oversea

266

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Omaha,

Sep 45, p. 63; ASF Cir 417, 14 Nov 45, Sec. VIII; Rpt,

Commercial Traf Sv, 15 Aug 46, p. 14, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Rpts. During 1946 the savings through

corrected descriptions totaled over $6,500,000; Army

Progress Report, 31 Jan 47, Sec. 3-A, p. 33. 267

 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 151-54; AR 55-

155, 27 Nov 42, Sec. IX, and Changes 7, 26 May 44;

OCT Traf Bull 6, 26 Dec 42, sub: Storage or Processing in Transit — Procedure at Transit Points; WD

CTB 16, 9 May 44, same subject; WD TM 55-205,

25 Aug 44, pp. 62-64; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945,

p. 13, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts; Rpt, William

B. Hammer, Charles E. Bell, Emory B. Ussery to Dir

of the Bureau of the Budget, 20 Oct 45, pp. 100-15,

OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight Rate Case. 268

 Memo, Williamson for Finlay, 16 Oct 44, sub:

Ex parte 148 Increases, OCT HB Traf Contl Div

Freight.
322 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

destinations be shown on bills of lading

and that the freight be continuously in the

possession of the carriers. Section 22 quotations that the carriers originally proposed eliminated the land-grant deductions and hence were not acceptable to the

War Department. The Ex parte 148 increases that the carriers insisted on including in such quotations were a troublesome

factor in the negotiations. Eventually,

after an appeal had been made to the

Office of Defense Transportation by the

War Department and other government

agencies, negotiations with the carriers

resulted in an agreement being reached

early in 1944, retroactive to the beginning

of 1942. The Section 22 quotation that

resulted from this agreement permitted

the War Department to use either the export rates without land-grant deductions

or the domestic rates with land-grant

deductions, whichever resulted in the

lower charge for shipments direct from

origin to port. For freight that was stored

in transit, the War Department could use

either the export rates without land-grant

deductions or the domestic rates with

land-grant deductions, the rate in either

case being subject to the Ex parte 148 increases. This agreement resulted in some

saving for the War Department, but not as

much as the Traffic Control Division considered proper; it was of more benefit to

the nonmilitary branches of the government, whose shipments were not eligible

for land-grant deductions under any circumstances.269

The War Department filed many requests with the railroads for lower rates on

specific commodities, especially those that

were moving in large quantities. While

the requests contemplated reduced tariff

rates that would have been further subject to land-grant deductions, the railroads frequently replied with Section 22

quotations that eliminated land-grant deductions. The War Department could

apply either the Section 22 quotations or

the tariff rates with land-grant deductions. In this way the land-grant roads

protected themselves from a double cut in

their revenues. The War Department had

the alternative of accepting such quotations or instituting formal proceedings

before the Interstate Commerce Commission to obtain more favorable rates.

During hostilities the War Department

initiated or participated in about seventyfive formal proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission to obtain

rate or classification adjustments. General Williamson considered it preferable

to handle such matters by informal negotiations with the carriers since that method

brought results more quickly, and he felt

that in most instances the adjustments

made by the carriers were more favorable

to the War Department than those that

could have been expected from the commission. Formal proceedings were employed, therefore, only when informal

negotiations failed to achieve acceptable

results.270 During the greater part of the

war the Traffic Control Division felt that

its measure of success before the commission was small. Later it began to "achieve

some degree of success" in the cases that it

brought to litigation.271

Two other circumstances militated

against the initiation of formal proceedings. One was the limited number of men

on the staff of the Traffic Control Division

269

 ASF MPR, Jan 44, pp. 88, 89; Rpt, Hammer,

Bell, and Ussery, cited n. 267, pp. 91-100. 270

 Hearings cited n. 255, p. 491. 271

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 15 Apr 46, sub:

Freight Rate Charges Incurred by WD, par. 6f, OCT

551.2 Rate Adjustments—Allegations of Proctor.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 323

who were qualified to perform the meticulous technical work necessary to the preparation of the cases. On 1 June 1945

there were only twenty officers and twenty

civilians actively dealing with rate adjustment and classification matters, and this

was the largest number so engaged up to

that time. General Williamson stated that

this staff was not adequate for the task

and that in June 1945 there was a backlog

of approximately 400 rate matters. Personnel ceilings on both officers and civilians, which the War Department imposed

on organizations in the zone of interior

because of the general manpower shortage

and the need for military personnel overseas, together with the scarcity of men of

proper qualifications, were given as the

reasons for this situation.272

The second circumstance adversely

affecting formal rate cases before the

Interstate Commerce Commission and

state regulatory bodies arose from the fact

that the proceedings were conducted

through counsel provided by the Judge

Advocate General.273 Although the Traffic

Control Division prepared the data and

assisted in all technical aspects, Williamson did not consider the arrangement an

effective one. He believed that the persons

presenting the War Department's position

to the regulatory bodies should have

specialized experience in such proceedings, familiarity with the principles and

practices that entered into the construction and adjustment of rates, detailed

familiarity with the evidence presented,

and full acquaintance with the policies of

the War Department in its negotiations

with the carriers. Counsel assigned by the

Judge Advocate General frequently did

not have these qualifications. In October

1944, when the Chief of Transportation

tried to rectify the situation, the Judge Advocate General maintained that he could

not relinquish his responsibility for representing the War Department in these

proceedings or permit representatives of

the Chief of Transportation to act as

co-counsel. Arrangements were worked

out at that time for closer collaboration

between the Chief of Transportation's rate

specialists and the legal personnel of the

Judge Advocate General's Office.274

The work of the Rate Adjustment and

Classification Section, Freight Branch,

Traffic Control Division, was under the

direct supervision of an experienced traffic

officer, who was designated for that specific

purpose, and under the general supervision of the chief of the division. In 1944 a

standing rate committee consisting of

specialists in various aspects of freight

traffic was established in the division to

review all proposals for adjustments

before they were submitted to the carriers.

The object of the committee was to insure

that no proposals were submitted that

might prove injurious in any way to the

War Department's interests, and to provide data to make the presentation of proposals as effective as possible.275

 The

Traffic Control Division appears to have

relied chiefly on its own efforts for the

initiation of these matters until late in the

war. In February 1945 the zone and local

transportation officers were requested to

observe traffic closely, and report to the

Chief of Transportation any circumstances

indicating that economies could be realized by rate adjustments, classification

272

 Hearings cited n. 255, pp. 471-81, 491. 273AR 410-5, 17 Aug 44, par. 1. 274

 Memo, Williamson for Finlay, 17 Oct 44, sub:

Ex parte 148 Increases, OCT 551.2 Ex parte 148;

Memo, Finlay for Williamson, 18 Oct 44, OCT HB

Ex Staybacks, Dec 1942-44. 275

 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 15.
324 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

revisions, transit arrangements, or changes

in railroad practices.276

During the calendar year 1944, the

charges by the domestic carriers for transporting Army matériel aggregated over

$1,300,000,000.277 This traffic involved

the movement of over 105,000,000 tons of

freight. Taking this wartime traffic as a

basis, the Traffic Control Division endeavored to calculate the extent of the savings

accomplished through its efforts to obtain

more favorable rates and classifications. It

estimated that the adjustments obtained in

1943 represented annual savings of about

$4,751,000; those in 1944, about $14,651,-

000; and those in 1945, about $40,153,-

000. On this basis the adjustments accomplished during the three-year period

represented total savings approaching

$60,000,000 a year with traffic at wartime

level.278 The division's activities in regard

to rate adjustments and classifications

during 1944 and 1945 are analyzed in

Table 25.

Although Generals Gross and Williamson believed that, considering the limitations imposed by wartime personnel ceilings and the scarcity of qualified men, a

good job had been done in getting fair

rates on Army freight, there were some

who did not share that view. Several persons employed in the Traffic Control Division expressed the opinion that the

Army was paying higher than reasonable

charges.279 Some members of Congress

feared this to be the case and requested

that the matter be thoroughly investigated.280

 As a result, the Director of the

Bureau of the Budget appointed a special

committee of three experts to make an

investigation.

The committee began its work in May

1945 and rendered its report five months

later.281 From information assembled during that period the committee concluded

that, while the Traffic Control Division

had obtained many changes in rates and

classifications that had saved the government large amounts, it had not begun its

study of possible adjustments as early as it

might have, nor had it carried its studies,

its negotiations with the carriers, and its

recourse to the official regulatory bodies

as far as might have been done; consequently, adjustments that might have

been obtained with large savings to the

government had not been obtained. While

the railroads had made numerous concessions in favor of the government, in

many instances they had declined requests

filed by the Chief of Transportation or had

refused to grant as great concessions as

had been sought. In submitting its findings the committee observed that the

Traffic Control Division's paramount responsibility was to get War Department

traffic transported promptly and efficiently, and that throughout the war the

section dealing with rate adjustment and

classification matters had been inadequately staffed.

The War Department accepted the

committee's conclusions only in part. It

agreed that its activity in this field had 276

 Memo, Lt Col Ingwald C. Olsen for Adm Asst

OCT, 16 Jan 45, sub: Adjustment of Freight Rates

and Classifications, OCT 551.2 Rate Adj Misc; WD

CTB 10, 8 Feb 45, sub: Reporting Info. 277

 Hearings cited n. 255, pp. 513, 518. 278

 Ibid., p. 491; Rpt, Traf Contl Div, 27 Sep 45,

Tab 2, p. 1; Army Progress Report, 31 Jan 47, Sec.

3-A, p. 33. 279

 Memo, C of Freight Br Traf Contl Div for C of

Contl Div OCT, 28 Aug 44; Memo, CofT for WD

Budget Officer, 22 Sep 44; Memo, CofT for SW, 6

Feb 46; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 15 Apr 46; all in

OCT 551.2 Rate Adjustments—Allegations of

Proctor. 280

 Ltr, Dir Bur of Budget to SW, 30 Apr 45, AG

551.2 (6 Dec 44)(1); Hearings cited n. 255, pp. 476-

97.

281

 Rpt, Hammer, Bell, Ussery, cited n. 267.
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 325

TABLE 25—ANNUAL SAVINGS THROUGH RATE ADJUSTMENT AND CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITIES

OF THE TRAFFIC CONTROL DIVISION a

a

 Corresponding data for 1942 and 1943 are not available. Figures include savings accomplished through rate and classification adjustments, and transit and export rate arrangements.

Source: Army Progress Report, 31 Jan 47, Sec. 3-A, p. 33; Interv with Homer S. Paul, IS Oct S3, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.

been restricted by staff limitation, but

denied that it had failed to pursue this activity vigorously. It pointed out that the

reasonableness of freight charges was not

something that could be mathematically

determined, but depended on extensive

analyses of transportation characteristics,

conditions, and principles pertinent to the

movement of specific commodities.282 The

War Department agreed, nevertheless,

that the Interstate Commerce Commission and any other regulatory bodies that

might have jurisdiction should be called

upon to review the rates established and

the charges paid on War Department

traffic, and it requested the Attorney General to initiate proceedings to that end

before the appropriate agencies.283 At the

suggestion of the Navy the scope of the

proceedings was extended to include the

traffic of other branches of the federal

government.

After investigation and preliminary

hearings before the Interstate Commerce

Commission, the Department of Justice

prepared briefs in support of seventeen

cases claiming reparations from the railroads on account of wartime freight

charges believed to have been excessive.

Broadly speaking, the premises on which

the Department of Justice based its claims

were the very large volume of freight that

the government shipped during the war

and the adjustments that it believed

private shippers would have claimed

under similar circumstances.284

At the time of this writing (October

1953) final disposition of these cases had

not been made. After an extended examination into the issues, the examiners for

the Interstate Commerce Commission

concluded that the rates, ratings, charges,

282

 Ltr, SW to Dir Bur of Budget, 2 Feb 46, and

inclosed Memo, CofT for SW, 23 Jan 46; both in

AG 551.2 (29 Nov 45)(l). 283

 Ltr, SW to Atty Gen, 28 Sep 46, AG 551.2 (29

Nov 45)(l). 284

 Interv with Frank Vesper, Dept of Justice, 17

Dec 51, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight Rate Case.
326 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

and tariff rules of the railroads that had

been assailed by the Department of Justice

had not been shown to have been unreasonable, and recommended that the complaints be dismissed.285

 The Department

of Justice is preparing and intends to file

exceptions, and further hearings will

probably be held before the commission

makes its final determination in the

matter.

The Measure of Accomplishment

The primary objective of the Chief of

Transportation in the transportation of

Army freight by the commercial carriers

was to have this freight moved promptly,

safely, and in an orderly manner. The

means he employed to that end were generally effective and accomplished their

purpose.

The greatest obstacle to the attainment

of the objective was the shortage of rail

freight cars, and the efficient use of cars

was therefore the core of the problem. The

working arrangements the Chief of Transportation had with the carriers, his policy

of controlling routings to the extent that

appeared desirable, his substantial contribution to the system of over-all traffic

control—which was established to avoid

congestion and the consequent immobilization of railroad equipment—and his

measures to promote the prompt dispatch

of cars at Army installations were clear

evidence of his appreciation of the problem and his determination to avoid the

pitfalls it presented.

Credit must be given to the Chief of

Transportation for two undertakings that

were innovations with the Army and important contributions to its plan of handling freight traffic. One was the establishment of the series of holding and reconsignment points, which effectively

protected the ports against the arrival of

more freight than they could properly

handle and performed other useful services. The other was the inauguration of the

consolidated car service, which facilitated

the delivery of small shipments and improved the utilization of car capacity. To

a large degree the success of these undertakings can be attributed to the fact that

they were placed under the direction of

men who had had extensive experience

with similar operations in civilian life.

While the Army controlled these two

undertakings, the other armed services

were permitted to share their benefits.

The most severe criticism directed at

the Chief of Transportation's handling of

freight matters concerned the charges paid

to the railroads. There are no definitive

standards by which to judge whether those

charges were reasonable or excessive. It is

a question to be determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exercise of the discretionary power vested in it

by Congress. The decision of the commission on the complaints filed by. the

Department of Justice will be of great interest to all parties, since such a sweeping

claim on behalf of the government has not

been made heretofore.

285

 Rpt of Examiners, Marion L. Boat and Howard

Hosmer, War Materials Reparations Case, 22 Jul

53; Interv with Frank Vesper, 15 Oct 53, OCT HB

Traf Contl Div Freight Rate Case.
CHAPTER V

Oversea Freight Movements

The ultimate test of the effectiveness of

the Transportation Corps was its ability

to deliver matériel to the theaters of operations in accordance with their requirements, since any failure in meeting those

requirements would have a direct influence on the success of the theater commanders in carrying out their military

missions. The responsibility involved not

only transporting sufficiently large tonnages overseas but also moving the many

types of supplies and equipment in accordance with theater requisitions and approved priorities. It also involved keeping

the flow of shipments under close control,

in order not to overburden the ports of

embarkation and the ports and storage

facilities in the theaters. The tonnages to

be transported were great because the

forces overseas were large, the standards

for equipping, feeding, and clothing

troops were the highest in military history,

the rate of destruction and attrition was

high, and the great bulk of the matériel

had to be shipped from the United States.

The task was intensified by the heavy

losses of ships and cargoes inflicted by enemy submarines and aircraft.1

The Army shipped more than 132,000,-

000 measurement tons of cargo overseas

by water in the period December 1941-

December 1945.2 During the year 1944

more than 48,000,000 measurement tons

were shipped, and during the peak

month of March 1945 the movement

totaled almost 6,000,000 measurement

tons. (Table 26 and Chart 10) Comparison

of these figures with a total of less than

9,000,000 measurement tons shipped

overseas by the Army during the

June 1917-November 1918 gives an idea

of how much greater the ocean transportation requirements were in World

War II than in World War I.3 A realistic

comparison of the tasks that fell to the

Army transportation service in the two

wars must take into account also the fact

that in the earlier conflict the bulk of the

cargo was shipped to a few well-developed ports in Europe, while in World War

II, with U.S. troops deployed virtually

around the globe, supplies had to be

moved much greater distances and in

many cases had to be discharged at primitive or wholly undeveloped ports and

beaches.

Many agencies contributed to the effort

to move supplies overseas in accordance

with theater needs. The Joint Chiefs of

1

 A fuller discussion of Transportation Corps responsibilities for the forces overseas is given in Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, pp. 1-27, 82-94. 2

 The relatively small amount of freight moved

overseas by air was not under the control of the Chief

of Transportation; hence it is not discussed in any detail in this chapter. Concerning the Chief of Transportation's loss of control of air traffic, see Wardlow,

op. cit., pp. 51-53, 67. 3

 OCT Rpt, Comparative Data, World War IWorld War II, July 1943, pp. 14-17, OCT HB

Monthly Progress Rpts.
328 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 26—TONS OF CARGO SHIPPED BY THE ARMY BY WATER FROM THE ZONE OF

INTERIOR TO THE SEVERAL OVERSEA AREAS: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945

 a

(Measurement Tons of Forty Cubic Feet)

a

 Includes cargo shipped to Army commanders overseas on vessels operated by or allocated to the Army, on vessels operated by or

allocated to the Navy, and on commercial vessels for the military forces or for civilian relief; also lend-lease supplies shipped on vessels operated by or allocated to the Army. Figures do not include lend-lease supplies procured by the War Department and shipped on vessels not

under Army control. b

 Latin America tonnage is combined with North America tonnage in 1945. c

 Central Africa and Middle East tonnage is combined with Mediterranean and North Africa beginning November 1944. d

 South Pacific tonnage is combined with Central Pacific beginning August 1944.

Source: Monthly reports by the ports of embarkation, Outbound and Inbound Cargo, tabulated for a statistical volume of this series

now in preparation.

Staff in conjunction with the Maritime

Commission developed a program for the

construction of sufficient vessels to insure

that the military plans adopted by the

JCS could be carried out. The War Shipping Administration arranged for the operation and allocation of most of the cargo

vessels required by the Army. The Navy

provided escorts for all convoys and also

carried some Army cargo in naval transports. The Army ports of embarkation

called supplies to the seaboard at the

proper time and arranged for the efficient

loading and prompt dispatch of the vessels. Within the Office of the Chief of

Transportation the Traffic Control Division was concerned with the transportation of freight to the ports; the Water Division was concerned with the provision of

adequate shipping and the smooth functioning of the ports; the Director of Operations was responsible for co-ordinating

the land and water phases, providing adequate port facilities for the transshipment

of cargo, and insuring that movements

were executed in accordance with direc-
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 329

CHART 10—ARMY CARGO SHIPPED MONTHLY FROM THE ZONE OF INTERIOR TO OVERSEA

DESTINATION: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945*

(Measurement Tons of Forty Cubic Feet)

* Atlantic areas include North and Latin America, Greenland, Iceland, United Kinsdom, continental Europe, Medi- terranean, Africa, and the Middle East. Pacific areas include western Canada, Alaska, Central Pacific, South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, western Pacific, India, Burma, japan, and Korea.

Source: Monthly reports by ports of embarkation to the Water Division, OCT, tabulated for statistical volume of this

series, now in preparation.

lives of the General Staff. It should be

borne in mind that the Army was only one

of several organizations making demands

upon the port facilities and the shipping

resources of the nation, so that close coordination with the federal transportation

agencies and the Navy was at all times

necessary.4

The need for ships to move military

freight to the theaters was on an ascending scale throughout the war. Looking

ahead to future requirements the Army

realized that nothing should be allowed to

interfere with the shipbuilding program

and the allocation of an adequate number

of vessels to Army service. In the summer

of 1943, after the military success in North

Africa and a favorable turn in the Allies'

antisubmarine campaign, it was feared

that there would be a letdown in the war

effort because of overconfidence. The production of military equipment and supplies was lagging, some ships were being

dispatched without full cargoes, and a cutback in the Maritime Commission's shipbuilding program was rumored.5

 At this

stage General Somervell sent the following note to General Gross:

4

 On the provision of ships and port facilities and

the control of their employment, see Wardlow, op. cit.,

pp. 18-23, 135-85. 5

 Statement by Lewis W. Douglas, Deputy War

Shipping Administrator, reported in The New York

Times, July 11, 1943; statement by Gen Somervell reported in Time, July 12, 1943.
330 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

It is essential that we get every ship we can

and that we fill these ships with men and

their equipment. I want you to scream your

head off to me whenever this program is endangered. It is about our most important job. You will have to look ahead if you are to

succeed.6

As matters developed, the shipbuilding

output of the United States for the year

1943 was the largest in history—almost

20,000,000 dead-weight tons—and by the

end of the year the lag in production of

military matériel was being overcome.

Analysis of Outbound Freight Traffic

The total of about 132,000,000 measurement tons of freight that the Army

shipped overseas during the war and up

to the end of 1945 consisted mainly, but

not entirely, of equipment and supplies for

its own forces. The Army transported

some naval cargo to Pacific areas in accordance with the arrangement whereby

ships operating under the control of one

service were utilized in the best interest of

the war effort as a whole, and it shipped

some naval supplies to transatlantic areas

where the Navy had small numbers of

personnel and operated few supply vessels.

The Army also shipped supplies to the

outlying bases, notably Hawaii, for the

use of the civilian populations. As the

Army occupied former enemy-held territory in North Africa, Italy, continental

Europe, and later in the Pacific, it assumed

responsibility for supplying the civilian

populations with food and other necessities in order to meliorate hardship and encourage co-operation. A limited amount

of lend-lease matériel was loaded on ships

allocated to the Army and is included in

the total tonnage figure. But the bulk of

the freight was intended for the use of

Army forces, and it was in connection

with the movement of such cargo that the

principal problems arose.

Roughly 60 percent of the cargo the

Army moved overseas went to transatlantic theaters and bases and 40 percent to

Pacific destinations. (See Table 26.) During the early months of the war the greater

volume was shipped to the Pacific in an

effort to check the expansion of Japanese

control in that area. (See Chart 10.) But

the Allied strategy called for the defeat of

the European Axis first, and the highest

priority soon was given to the North African theater and then to the European

theater, with the result that transatlantic

cargoes exceeded those shipped westward

beginning in the summer of 1942 and continuing until the surrender of Germany.

The curve representing shipments to the

Atlantic areas reflects clearly the rapid

build-up of matériel in the United Kingdom just before the invasion of Normandy; the heavy shipments directly to the

Continent after our forces had gained a

foothold there; the reduction of cargo

loading during the fall of 1944 because of

acute shipping congestion in northern

Europe; the resumption of the heavy outbound cargo movement as the congestion

began to clear up and the Battle of the

Bulge created a strong demand for ammunition and other materiel; and finally

it shows the peak movement of supplies to

Europe for the final drive into Germany.

When shipments to the European theater

could be reduced, the freight movement

to the Pacific began a sharp rise, but this

increase was soon checked by the Japanese surrender.7

The heaviest shipments were made from 6

 Memo, Somervell for Gross, 27 Jun 43, OCT HB

Gross Shipping Capabilities and Requirements. 7

 For a fuller discussion of ocean transportation in

relation to Allied strategy, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp.

5-8.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 331

eight ports of embarkation and two cargo

ports. Some of the ports of embarkation

had subports at which Army personnel

was regularly stationed, and occasionally

ships were loaded at other harbors where

no Army port organizations were maintained, but the great bulk of the cargo

was loaded at the ten ports listed in Table

27. This table shows that the San Francisco Port of Embarkation loaded the largest tonnage of any port in December 1941,

and it continued to do so for several

months thereafter. Seattle loaded cargo

chiefly for Alaska until the threat to that

territory was past, and then it began to

ship considerable tonnages to the central

and western Pacific. Los Angeles underwent gradual but substantial development

as a port for the movement of supplies to

the Pacific and Asiatic theaters. Boston

supplied the garrisons in Newfoundland,

Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, but

the heaviest movements through that port

were to northern Europe. New York,

which loaded about 29 percent of the total

tonnage, was the principal port for supplying the European theater; it also loaded

large tonnages for the Mediterranean and

smaller amounts for other destinations.

The Philadelphia and Baltimore cargo

ports and the Hampton Roads Port of

Embarkation shipped chiefly to the Mediterranean and Europe. Charleston carried

a light cargo load, its principal wartime

role being that of home port for the hospital ships serving in the Atlantic. New

Orleans was the main shipping port for

the garrisons at Panama and in the Caribbean, but it also shipped considerable

tonnages to Europe and the Pacific.8

To conserve shipping, cargoes for transatlantic destinations were loaded at U.S.

Atlantic ports and cargoes for Pacific destinations were loaded at U.S. Pacific ports.

There were numerous departures from the

rule, however, because vessels were sometimes transferred from one ocean to another, or ships or supplies were more readily available on one coast than on the

other. In the later stages of the war against

Japan, the Chief of Transportation deliberately planned to use Gulf ports, and if

necessary Atlantic ports, to supply the

forces in the Pacific, because the capacities

of the west coast ports and the transcontinental railroads were not sufficient to carry the entire burden of an all-out effort

against Japan. During the entire war

period New Orleans loaded almost 3,700,-

000 measurement tons of cargo and New

York loaded about 1,000,000 measurement tons for movement to Pacific destinations. The tonnages loaded at other

Atlantic ports for movement westbound

through the Panama Canal and at Pacific

ports for movement eastbound through the

canal were considerably smaller. The shipment of supplies to India for the Asiatic

theater was shared by Atlantic, Gulf, and

Pacific ports; during the early part of the

war, when the Mediterranean was closed

and the submarine menace in the Atlantic

was severe, such supplies moved westbound, but later the principal movement

was eastbound.9

The bulk of the cargo dispatched to the

theaters was procured and distributed by

the seven technical services of the Army

Service Forces and by the Army Air

Forces.10 The largest shippers were the

8

 Monthly reports by PEs, Outbound and Inbound

Cargo, tabulated for a statistical volume of this series,

now in preparation. 9

 Ibid.

10

 Army cargo included petroleum products

shipped in cans and drums but not bulk shipments;

bulk gasoline, etc., was moved in tankers under control of the Navy or the WSA; see Memo, Army-Navy

Petroleum Board for CofT, 14 Dec 43, ASF Hq Trans

1943.
332 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 27—TONS OF CARGO SHIPPED TO OVERSEA DESTINATIONS BY THE PRINCIPAL ARMY

PORTS: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945

 a

(Measurement Tons of Forty Cubic Feet)

a

 The ports shown are the eight at which the Army operated ports of embarkation and the two (Philadelphia and Baltimore) at which the

Army operated cargo ports. While the greater part of the cargo was loaded directly at these ports, some was loaded also at officially designated subports and at other ports located near and supervised by the principal ports. Of the unnamed ports, the larger tonnages were loaded

at Searsport, Maine (470,000 M. T.), a subport of Boston; Prince Rupert, British Columbia (950,000 M. T.), a subport of Seattle; and Portland, Oregon (1,800,000 M. T.), a subport of San Francisco through August 1944 and a subport of Seattle thereafter. For definition of cargo

included, see Table 26, note a.

Source: Monthly reports by the ports of embarkation, Outbound and Inbound Cargo, tabulated for a statistical volume of this series,

now in preparation.

Quartermaster Corps with 28 percent, the

Ordnance Department with 23 percent,

the Army Air Forces with 15 percent, and

the Corps of Engineers with 14 percent.

(Table 28) In addition to food, clothing,

and other supplies and equipment that it

procured for all Army forces, the Quartermaster Corps shipped considerable quantities of supplies for the relief of the civilian

populations of occupied areas. These shipments are included in Table 28 under

"Army—Miscellaneous." The large tonnages shipped by the Ordnance Department included not only weapons and

ammunition but also trucks and other

automotive equipment that were procured

by that department. A very large part of

the freight shipped by the Corps of Engineers consisted of machinery and materials

used in the repair and construction of

buildings, airfields, docks, railways, highways, and other facilities in the theaters. In

considering the Air Forces' tonnage, it

must be remembered that many aircraft

were flown overseas and that many AAF

supplies were moved to the theaters by

air.

Supply shipments to the theaters fell

into several categories, each of which had

peculiar implications for the Transportation Corps. "Initial supply" included the

supplies and equipment that accompanied

or were allotted to troop units when they

moved overseas. "Maintenance supply"
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 333

TABLE 28—TONS OF CARGO SHIPPED BY WATER TO OVERSEA DESTINATIONS BY THE

RESPECTIVE PROCURING SERVICES: DECEMBER 1941-DECEMBER 1945

 a

(Measurement Tons of Forty Cubic Feet)

a

 Concerning cargo included, see note a to Table 26. b

 Transportation Corps matériel included with "Miscellaneous" through 1942. c

 Includes lend-lease and civilian relief supplies shipped on vessels operated by or allocated to the Army, Coast Artillery Corps shipments,

troop baggage, household goods and other personal property of military personnel changing stations, Army Exchange and Special

Services shipments, and some other items. d

 Includes naval supplies shipped on vessels operated by or allocated to the Army. The Navy also transported Army matériel on

vessels operated by or allocated to it.

Source: Monthly reports by the ports of embarkation, Outbound and Inbound Cargo, tabulated for a statistical volume of this series,

now in preparation.

comprehended items required for the support of troops already overseas; this matériel was shipped automatically, or 

response to requisitions received from the

oversea commanders, or in accordance

with directives issued by the War Department. "Operational projects" covered the

requirements of future undertakings that

demanded extraordinary quantities or

unusual types of matériel. All of these categories of supply were planned in advance

so that the necessary procurement and

shipping arrangements could be made.

However, owing to unforeseen strategic or

logistical developments, emergency requirements sometimes arose that presented

especially difficult problems for the chiefs

of the procuring services as well as for the

Chief of Transportation.11

The amount of initial supplies to be

shipped for each soldier sent overseas and

the amount of maintenance supplies required for his support each month thereafter were carefully computed by the Chief

of Transportation's Planning Division,

taking into account the quantities and the

cubic measurements of the thousands of

items needed by the various types of troop

units. These tonnages were basic factors in

the planning of both the War Department

11

 See Memo, Vissering for Franklin, 28 Nov 42,

sub: Call and Release of Cargo to PEs, OCT 563.5

(1942)(1).
334 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for future

military operations, since the strength of

the forces overseas and the shipping available for their support had to be kept in

balance. The tonnage factors varied for

the different oversea areas according to

the nature of the military operations, the

amount of construction work required, the

climate, and the extent to which supplies

could be procured locally.

As the war advanced the tonnage factors

were reduced. Early in 1943 initial supply,

as computed for planning purposes, ranged

from 6 to 8 measurement tons per man;

for example, it was 6 tons for the Southwest Pacific, 7 tons for North Africa and

the United Kingdom, and 8 tons for the

South Pacific and Central Africa. In January 1945 an average of 5 measurement

tons per man was used in planning the

movement of initial supplies to all theaters.

Maintenance requirements early in 1943

ranged from 0.9 measurement tons to 1.8

measurement tons per man per month. In

January 1945 the maintenance supply

factor ranged from 0.5 measurement tons

for the Caribbean to 1.5 measurement

tons for Alaska; it was 0.8 measurement

tons for the more active theaters—that is,

Europe, the Southwest Pacific Area, and

the Pacific Ocean Areas.12 The reductions

in tonnages were made possible by the

completion of most construction work in

the theaters, the shipment of a larger percentage of vehicles in partially disassembled condition, the transportation of assembled aircraft on the decks of tankers

and aircraft carriers where they were not

charged against the available cargo space,

the more compact packing of supplies, the

dehydration of certain subsistence items,

and the ability to compute the tonnages

more precisely as the result of experience

at the ports.13

A system of keyed operational projects

was instituted in June 1943 to facilitate

long-range logistical planning.14 It was

then evident that large quantities of supplies and equipment would be required

for future military operations in excess of

those provided for in the Army's tables of

basic allowances and tables of equipment,

and that more definite planning for the

procurement and transportation of needed

matériel would be necessary than had

been undertaken up to that time. Where

adequate theater organizations existed,

the projects were developed by the theater

commanders and submitted to the War

Department General Staff for approval.

When there was no theater organization

ready to undertake such planning, projects

were originated in the War Department.

The latter procedure is illustrated by the

preparations for the final phases of the war

in the Pacific. In order to insure that matériel ad

would be ready, it was necessary to start

procurement before the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had assigned operations against Japan proper to any theater command.

Various projects were initiated by the

Planning Division, ASF, in collaboration with the technical services, and two

of these projects became the basis for the

OLYMPIC and the CORONET plans, which

12

 Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 9 Apr 43, and atchd

tabulation, sub: Initial and Maintenance Tonnages,

ASF Hq Shipping 1942-43; Ltr, SW to Sen Harley

Kilgore, 10 Jun 43, Question 5 and Table V, OCT

500 Mobilization of Shipping Resources (Kilgore

Report); Planning Div OCT, Misc Shipping Information, p. 54, OCT HB Plng Div Gen. These average

tonnage requirements took into account loss of shipping space due to broken stowage. 13

 Interv with Brig Gen Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., C of

Plng Div OCT during WW II, 16 Jan 52, OCT HB

Plng Div Gen. 14

 Rads, WD to Theaters, 1 Jun 43, CM-OUT

831-39.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 335

were to have been used in carrying the

war to the Japanese home islands.15

In a war of the scope and variety of

World War II, even the most perspicacious

planning could not forestall emergency

calls from theater commanders for supplies. Often the matériel could not be

immediately provided by the procuring

services, a circumstance that increased the

importance of fast transportation. To meet

such a circumstance the Chief of Transportation had to move the supplies from

depots or manufacturing plants to the seaboard in the quickest possible time and to

have the fastest available vessel or vessels

at the port ready for prompt loading.

These emergency operations were frequent. For example, in the summer of

1942, 300 medium tanks, 100 tank destroyers, and about 13,000 tons of ammunition were rushed by special convoy to

the Red Sea, via the Cape of Good Hope,

to help the British Eighth Army check the

advance of the German Afrika Korps

toward Suez and the Middle East. Although one vessel of the six-ship convoy

was sunk in the Atlantic, a replacement

cargo was loaded at New York on the fast

Seatrain Texas and was delivered with the

remainder of the shipment. Speaking before the Congress in May 1943, Prime

Minister Churchill said: "These weapons

played an appreciable part in the ruin of

Rommel's Army at the battle of El Alamein and in the long retreat which chased

him back to Tunisia."

 16

 In February 1943,

a shipment of 5,000 trucks and other

equipment, totaling 240,000 measurement

tons, was dispatched by special convoy to

North Africa. This shipment was made in

response to a radiogram from General

Somervell, who was then visiting the theater and had become impressed with the

handicaps imposed on General Eisenhower by the shortage of motor transport.17

In February 1945, when an urgent call was

received from the European theater for

plywood boats to be used in the assault

crossing of the Rhine, 556 such craft were

constructed in nine working days; some

were transported to the theater by air, but

the majority were moved by fast train and

fast ship. The return of General MacArthur's forces to Manila early in 1945

gave rise to an emergency request for

water purification equipment that was

moved in forty expedited carloads to San

Francisco, where a ship was held ready to

receive the cargo.18

In its general aspects, the Chief of

Transportation's task in moving supplies

to the oversea commands was a complex

one because of the volume and variety of

the cargo, the many ports of embarkation

and debarkation involved, and the frequent disruption of his plans by emergency

requests. The remainder of this chapter

will be devoted to some of the more

specialized aspects of the operation.

Regulation of Oversea Supply

Movements

Regulation of the movement of matériel 15

 See History of Planning Division, ASF, Vol. 2,

Ch. 13, for general discussion; Memos, CG ASF for

ASF Divs and for Cs of Technical Services, both

dated 27 Oct 43, SPX 400 (13 Oct 43); ASF Manual

M 415, 25 Aug 44, sub: Special Operational Supplies;

Memo, Oversea Opns Br, Plng Div, for Wardlow, 2

Oct 45, sub: TC Special Operational Supply; Memo,

Foreign Trans Facilities Br, Plng Div, for Wardlow,

11 Oct 45; all in OCT HB Plng Div Oversea Opns

Br.

16

 Pertinent documents in OCT HB Gross Tanks

to Egypt. 17

 Story of the Embarkation on Convoy 51⁄2, OCT

HB NYPE; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 116,

148-49. 18

 WD press release, 24 Mar 45; Memo, Water Div

for Wardlow, 12 Dec 45; both in OCT HB Water Div

Misc.
336 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

from the zone of interior to the oversea

commands was entrusted largely to the

Chief of Transportation. Fulfillment of the

responsibility was divided between the

Office of the Chief of Transportation in

Washington and the ports of embarkation

that operated under his supervision, but

the port commanders had the major role.19

This regulation was considered by some

to be more a supply function than a transportation function, and for that reason the

arrangement was not uniformly accepted

as a logical one, even though there were

practical considerations in its favor. When

the plan was adopted soon after Pearl

Harbor, it was apparent that for a considerable time there would be shortages of

shipping and of many types of military

supplies. Under these conditions the chief

problem would be to maintain a balance

between the supplies ready for loading at

the ports and the ships ready to lift them,

and to keep the cargoes actually shipped

as nearly in accordance with theater requirements as could be done with the

resources available. This involved day-today and almost hour-to-hour knowledge

of both cargoes and ships, and no other

agency was in as good a position to have

this knowledge as the ports where the

cargoes and the ships were brought together. There also was an advantage in

distributing the regulation of the flow of

supplies to the theaters among several field

agencies, in this instance the ports, since to

have concentrated the responsibility in the

hands of a single agency in Washington or

in the field would have imposed on that

agency an extremely heavy and highly

complex task. Looking after the supply

needs of a single active theater proved to

be a challenging undertaking.

The division of responsibility between

the Office of the Chief of Transportation

and the ports was clearly drawn. Basic

policies were worked out between ASF

headquarters and the Chief of Transportation and were communicated to the ports

by the latter. In broad outline the procedure for the movement of supplies was as

follows: The OCT transmitted to the ports

any information affecting supply movements to the respective oversea commands,

such as troop movement orders, troop

strength figures, and authorized levels of

supply, that it obtained from the General

Staffer ASF headquarters. On the basis of

this information and requisitions received

from the theaters, the ports calculated the

quantity of freight to be moved to each

oversea destination and the number of

ships needed for the purpose. In accordance with such calculations the Water

Division in Washington obtained allocations of vessels from the War Shipping

Administration to supplement any Army

or Navy transports that might be available. On the basis of the shipping so provided, the ports issued calls for specific

supplies to be delivered at the seaboard

during specified periods, thus clearing the

way for the Traffic Control Division in

Washington to issue permits for the movement of the shipments from their points of

origin. The ports kept a careful check on

the movement and receipt of such shipments, arranged for their loading into

ships, and notified the oversea commands

regarding the supplies en route to them.

The ports were the normal points of contact between the consuming forces over19

 Because of the many procuring agencies, ports of

embarkation, oversea commands, and types of matériel, the oversea supply system was complicated and

subject to revision in some details. The aim in this

section is not to unravel all the complications or to

trace all the changes but to give a general idea of how

the system worked.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 337

seas and the procuring services in the zone

of interior.20

Under this plan of regulation the ports

had the key role in scheduling the movement of supplies to the theaters. During

1942 and early 1943 the arrangement did

not work out to the satisfaction of General

Lutes, who, as ASF Director of Operations

(earlier Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations), was charged with staff supervision

of supply distribution. Although initially

he had favored placing the regulation of

oversea supply movements under the control of the port commanders, General

Lutes came to the conclusion that in the

execution of the responsibility the ports

were subordinating supply considerations

to transportation considerations, with the

result that ASF supply policies and theater

needs were sometimes disregarded in the

effort to load the ships with well-balanced

cargoes.

In the early part of 1943, when the machinery and procedures at the ports were

still undergoing development and numerous complaints were being received from

the theaters, ASF headquarters considered

two proposals to change the plan. The first

was that the oversea supply divisions

(OSD's) at the ports be made directly

responsible to the ASF Director of Operations rather than to the port commanders.

The second, which originated in the ASF

Control Division, was that an Atlantic

oversea service command be set up to

replace the oversea supply divisions of the

east coast ports and to function directly

under ASF headquarters. (Extension of

this proposal to other coasts was to be left

for later consideration.) The Chief of

Transportation vigorously opposed both

proposals, which he believed were contrary to the basic principle on which the

oversea supply plan had been founded—

namely, the co-ordination of supply

movements and shipping by the port

commanders.21

In order to settle the issue, Maj. Gen.

Wilhelm D. Styer, General Somervell's

Chief of Staff, made a personal investigation of the oversea supply operation. He

reported that there was no need for a radical change in the organization since he

found no weaknesses that could not be

corrected within the existing framework.

But Styer pointed out that General Lutes,

in order to fulfill his responsibility for

staff supervision of the supply aspect of

oversea supply (as distinguished from the

transportation aspect), would have to receive full information from the oversea

supply divisions at the ports, have direct

and free communication with the OSD's,

and issue instructions to them on supply

matters in emergencies. General Somervell accepted this solution, and General

Gross, who had indicated that he was

ready to make any changes that would

improve the effectiveness of the oversea

supply divisions, immediately instructed

the port commanders that the new arrangement was in effect.22

20

 This general statement is amplified hereafter. A

much more complete discussion than can be undertaken here will be found in OCT HB Monograph 27,

and ASF Hist Monograph, Development of Overseas

Supply Policies and Procedures. See also Leighton

and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943,

Ch. XIII. 21

 See OCT HB Monograph 27, pp. 152-70. The

"Lutes Diary" frequently cited in this monograph is

a file of documents still in General Lutes' personal

possession. See also Memo, Col Clinton F. Robinson,

C of Contl Div ASF, for CG ASF, 16 Mar 43; Memo,

Lutes for CofT, 27 Mar 43; Memo, Gross for Styer, 1

Apr 43; Memo, Gross for Lutes, 4 Apr 43; Memos,

Lutes for CofT, 10 and 13 Apr 43; all in OCT HB PE

Gen Oversea Supply. 22

 Memo, Styer for Somervell, 16 Apr 43; Memo,

Lutes for CofT, 23 Apr 43; Memo, CofT for PEs, 23

Apr 43; all in OCT HB Gross Oversea Supply.
338 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Chief of Transportation at the same

time took steps to expand the Oversea

Supply Branch in his office, which was

charged with studying and co-ordinating

the work at the several ports and with

developing effective procedures and controls.23

 General Styer had warned that this

branch should not be permitted to interfere with the work of General Lutes's office

in supervising the distribution of supplies,

and in practice it did not do so; it dealt

entirely with the organizations and procedures at the ports.

Underlying the controversy were two

distinct points of view. One emphasized

supply considerations and the timeliness

and orderliness with which matériel was

delivered to the theaters in response to

their needs. From that angle it was intolerable that shipments should be broken up

and loaded in different ships or different

convoys with the possibility that the segments might be landed at different oversea

ports. Deviation from the approved priorities also was objectionable, since it threw

theater stocks out of balance and led to a

general maldistribution of supplies. Such

disregard of the principles of supply procedure were described by General Lutes as

"shipping tonnage only."

 24

 The other

point of view was predicated on the shortage of shipping and the consequent undesirability of putting vessels to sea without

having loaded them as nearly "full and

down" as the available cargo would permit. General Gross was confronted with

the danger that failure to make the best

possible use of the ships the War Shipping

Administration had placed at his disposal

would prejudice his future efforts to obtain

sufficient vessels to move the ever-growing

volume of Army freight.

The plan adopted in April 1943 recognized the validity of the first point of view

by providing for direct supervision of the

oversea supply divisions in supply matters

by the supply staff of ASF headquarters.

It recognized the second point of view by

leaving the OSD's under the command of

the port commanders, who were in the

best position to co-ordinate supply and

transportation considerations in planning

cargoes and loading ships. On the whole

the plan worked well, although oversea

supply in the Pacific continued to be a

troublesome problem.

The oversea supply system that has

been outlined was not introduced until

after the United States had entered the

war and the existing plan had been found

inadequate. In peacetime and during the

prewar emergency period the procuring

services shipped supplies to the ports as

they became available, and the ports

shipped them overseas in accordance with

percentages established by the War Department—that is, a specified percentage

of the cargo space was used for the supplies

of each procuring service with such adjustments as might be found necessary

from time to time.25 Early in 1941, because

of the increased number of ships in Army

service and the increased number of oversea bases to be supplied, G-4 began issuing

a priority list to guide the port com23

 Hist Record, Oversea Supply Br, Jul 43-Jul 44,

OCT HB PEs Gen Oversea Supply. This activity began in the Port and Field Agencies Division, was

transferred to the Control Division, then moved back

to the former in May 1943. 24

 Ltr, Lutes to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 30 Mar

51, with notes on manuscript prepared by John D.

Millett, pp. 6-7, OCT HB ASF Gen. 25

 Memo, Col Cordiner, OQMG, for TAG, 1 Nov

39, sub: Change in Allocation of Cargo Space; Memo

of Record by Cordiner, 29 Mar 41, sub: Digest of

Activities—Transportation Division; pars. 31 and 33;

both in OCT HB OQMG Water Transport Br.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 339

manders in loading transports.26 A few

months later the Army set up a release

system in order to control shipments to the

ports and keep them commensurate with

shipping capacity. But this machinery had

been made only partially effective when

U.S. entry into the war multiplied the

pressure on the ports of embarkation.

The shortcomings in the existing arrangements were especially apparent in

connection with the supply of Pacific bases

through the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Commanders in the Pacific complained that they were not getting the

items that they most urgently needed;

that the cargoes were badly scrambled,

with component parts scattered and highpriority supplies buried beneath less

urgently needed shipments; that information regarding the make-up of cargoes

was not provided at all or arrived too late

to be of aid in unloading; that considerable cargo was damaged en route because

of improper processing or stowing; and

that troops and their equipment arrived at

different ports. These difficulties could not

be attributed wholly to deficiencies at the

port of embarkation or to the procuring

services; the commanders in the Pacific

contributed to the unsatisfactory situation.

They sometimes requested too much or too

little of particular items, were not certain

at which ports supplies should be delivered, and did not have the machinery for

administering the matériel in an orderly

and efficient manner after it had been

landed.27

These were conditions that had to be

corrected, and quickly. The new system,

which was announced in January, became

effective on 1 March 1942. In the initial

directive the new arrangement was presented schematically, and responsibilities

were clearly defined for the Secretary of

War and the General Staff—the Services

of Supply and the Transportation Corps

had not yet been established—the oversea

commanders, the port commanders in the

zone of interior, the chiefs of the procuring

services, and the zone of interior depots

designated to furnish supplies for the theaters. Although this system was amplified

and modified in some respects, its general

features continued in effect throughout

the war.28

It was a basic principle of the system

that the supply of each oversea command

should be the responsibility of a single port

of embarkation in the zone of interior.

While this so-called primary port had full

responsibility, it might direct that some of

the cargo be loaded at other ports known

as outports. The outport arrangement was

necessary because the primary ports were

not physically capable of transshipping all

the supplies required by the larger and

more active theaters, and because the use

of outports sometimes was more economical from the standpoint of domestic trans26

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 17 Mar 41; DF,

ACofS G-4 for TQMG, et al., 30 Apr 41; both in

G-4/32742; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CG NYPE, 1 Apr

41, G-4/32783. 27

 On the problems of the American Expeditionary

Forces in France in 1917-18 arising from similar difficulties, see John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the

World War, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes

Company, 1931), Vol. II, pp. 309-10. 28

 The basic directives on responsibilities were AG

Memos, 22 Jan 42, AG 400 (1-17-42); 28 Apr 42, AG

400 (4-27-42); W 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, AG 400 (10-

9-42), all entitled Supply of Oversea Departments,

Theaters, and Separate Bases. For procedures developed under the system, see TC Pamphlet 5, sub:

Standard Operating Procedure for Supply of Oversea

Theaters and Bases, first issued 27 Jan 44, and revised

1 Apr 44 and 1 Jun 45; ASF Manual M 411, 29 Jun

44, sub: Procedure for Processing Oversea Requisitions.
340 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

portation.29 Since the commander of the

primary port was responsible for the

proper movement of all supplies regardless of where they were loaded, he was

given command over the outports with

respect to such movements.30

The ports responsible for the supply of

the smaller oversea commands were

changed as conditions warranted, but

those responsible for the larger theaters

remained the same. From the standpoint

of geography, port capacity, and domestic

transportation it was natural that New

York should have been the primary port

for the United Kingdom and North Africa

in the early part of the war, and later for

the European and Mediterranean theaters; that Boston should have been the

primary port for the North Atlantic bases;

New Orleans for the Panama Canal and

the Caribbean bases; San Francisco for

the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific

Areas; and Seattle for Alaska. A primary

port might use as many outports as it

needed; all Atlantic and Gulf ports served

as outports of New York; all Pacific coast

ports, New Orleans, and sometimes

Charleston, Hampton Roads, and New

York served as outports of San Francisco.31

Assignments of primary responsibility to

the ports were made by ASF headquarters

in consultation with the Chief of Transportation; the utilization of outports was

worked out informally between the Chief

of Transportation and the primary port

commanders.32

Some months after the inauguration of

the new system, each port commander was

directed to establish a special unit in his

organization to administer his oversea

supply responsibilities. This unit became

known as the oversea supply division.33 It

was concerned solely with ASF matériel

moving to the oversea commands for the

maintenance of forces already there or

under approved oversea projects; it was

not responsible for the initial equipment

and supplies of troops being sent to the

theaters or for the supplies used in local

port operations. As subsequent discussion

will show, the task of the oversea supply

division was an intricate as well as a vital

one, so that a large organization was required at the ports responsible for the

supply of large oversea forces. In the beginning neither trained personnel nor

tried procedures were available, so that

much had to be learned through experience.

The Oversea Supply Division at New

York, which was headed from the beginning by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) William M. Goodman, developed the most

satisfactory organization and procedures,

and late in 1943 the other ports were

instructed to adopt the same system. At

that time General Goodman was sent to

San Francisco to assist that important port

in making the desired adjustments. A

meeting of the Chief of Transportation

and his staff with all port commanders

and their staffs at New Orleans in January

29

 Of the cargo shipped under the control of the

NYPE in the period December 1941-April 1945, that

port actually loaded 53.8 percent, and the outports

46.2 percent. See Summary NYPE, Dec 41-Apr 45,

pp. 2, 3, OCT HB NYPE Gen. 30

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, et al., 17 Feb 43;

Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, et al., 9 Feb 44; both in

OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply; TC Pamphlet 5,

1 Jun 45, defines functions of primary ports and outports. 31

 See schematic diagrams of oversea supply, 1 May

43, and 1 Oct 43, OCT PE Gen Oversea Supply; also

diagram in ASF MPR, 28 Feb 45, Sec. 3, p. 45, and

other issues. 32

 ASF Cir 175, 10 Jun 44, Sec. II. 33

 The first oversea supply division was set up at the

NYPE in July 1942. For functions of the OSD as

eventually defined, see TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Jun 45, Sec.

III.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 341

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM M. GOODMAN, Chief of the Oversea Supply Division at

New York receives his second star from Maj. Gen. Homer M. Groninger, Commander of the

New York Port of Embarkation.

1944 afforded an opportunity for detailed

discussion of the New York system.34

The oversea supply divisions were aided

by officers assigned to them by the several

technical or procuring services, and in

some cases by the theaters for which the

ports had primary supply responsibility.

The technical service officers and their

staffs were an integral part of the OSD

organizations and were responsible to the

division chiefs in matters relating to matériel procured by the services they represented and the efficiency with which that

matériel was moved to the ports.35 The

plan to have officers from the European

theater stationed at the New York Port of

Embarkation and officers from the Southwest Pacific Area stationed at the San

Francisco Port of Embarkation was inaugurated in 1942, when the oversea supply

operation was still in the developmental

34

 Memo, CofT for LAPE, 22 Nov 43, OCT HB

Gross Day File; Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, Jan 44, Vol. I, pp. 25-36, 51-54, 138-42; Vol.

II, pp. 1-14, Tabs A and B, OCT HB PE Gen Port

Comdrs Conf. For the organization of the OSD at the

NYPE, see Hist Record, OSD NYPE, 1943, Tab A-1,

OCT HB NYPE OSD. 35

 Lecture by Gen Goodman at Atlantic Coast

Transportation Corps Officers Training School, undated but apparently given late in 1943, pp. 6, 12,

OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply.
342 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

stage and when lack of understanding between the ports and the theaters was one

of the principal problems. It was a sound

and helpful arrangement, although General Gross felt it necessary to take precautions against theater representatives attempting to assume positions of authority

and so interfering with the work of the

oversea supply divisions.36 On the same

principle, representatives of the ports of

embarkation were sent on temporary duty

to the theaters to study their supply requirements and methods and to give theater supply officers a better understanding

of the procedures in the zone of interior.

Maintenance supplies shipped to the

oversea commanders fell into two broad

categories that involved different procedures. In the beginning, in order to relieve

the newly organized oversea commands of

part of the burdensome and almost impossible task of requisitioning everything they

needed, supplies that were consumed at

relatively constant rates and were standard for all areas—such as food and motor

fuel—were shipped by the ports automatically in accordance with the strength

of the oversea commands and the reported

status of their stocks. Other supplies were

shipped in response to theater requisitions,

adjusted by the oversea supply divisions

to reduce demands that appeared to be in

excess of normal requirements.37

While there were obvious advantages in

automatic supply, there were also dangers

due to variations in the rate of consumption, changes in troop strength at particular bases, and local procurement of which

the oversea supply divisions were not

informed.38 Shortages of items supplied

automatically could be corrected in time

by theater requisitions, but excesses had a

tendency to accumulate without anything

being done about them.39 The shipment of

excessive quantities of a particular item to

a particular oversea base might involve an

under supply of the same item at another

base, and it inevitably entailed a waste of

shipping.

In view of this difficulty and the developing ability of the theaters to determine

their own requirements, automatic supply

was gradually curtailed and the scope of

requisitioning was broadened. The first

step in this direction was the adoption of

a phasing arrangement. New commands

were to be supplied automatically until

they were able to set up inventory control

and other procedures essential to intelligent requisitioning. When a command

was sufficiently organized to requisition

some but not all of its requirements it

passed into the phase called semiautomatic supply. The third phase, known as

supply by requisition only, demanded a

thoroughly organized theater supply system and stabilized levels of supply.40

 Some

theaters were slow in attaining this status,

and full requisitioning for all theaters was

not decreed until the spring of 1945.41

When requisitions for supplies were received at the primary ports, the requests

for noncontrolled items procured by the

Army Service Forces were "edited" in the 36

 Telephone Conv, Gross with Groninger, 29 Dec

42, p. 3, OCT HB Gross Day File. 37

 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, et al., 24 May 42, sub:

Handling of Requisitions at PEs, SPX 400 (5-21-42),

OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply. For definition of

supply classes I, II, III, IIIa, IV, V, see ASF Manual

807, 25 Oct 44, Glossary, p. 13. 38

 That this danger had been foreseen is indicated

by Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 16 Jan 42, sub: Reduction of Surpluses in Oversea Departments, G-4/

33889. 39

 With reference to Quartermaster supplies, see

Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan, a volume in preparation for this series, Ch. IV. 40

 WD Cir 220, 20 Sep 43; WD Cir 203, 23 May 44. 41

 AG Ltr, 16 Mar 45, sub: Oversea Supply Rpts,

AG 400(13 Mar 45).
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 343

oversea supply divisions by representatives

of the technical services concerned. They

were edited first with respect to the correctness of nomenclature and stock numbers, marking instructions, and the

reasonableness of the quantities requested.

Editing as to quantity required the maintenance of extensive records at the ports,

based on the troop strength in the respective oversea commands, their authorized

levels of supply as established by the War

Department from time to time, published

tables of equipment and allowances for

the various types of troop organizations,

and matériel status reports showing the

supplies on hand in the theaters and en

route to them. Next the requests for particular items were considered in relation

to the stocks available in the zone of interior, and the depots from which they

should be drawn were determined. In this

the OSD's at the ports and the chiefs of

technical services collaborated closely.42

During the early part of the war requisitions were frequently found to be excessive; they called for either more than the

theaters apparently needed or more than

the zone of interior was able to supply.

The oversea commands sometimes did not

know what they already had on hand or

they calculated their authorized levels of

supply inaccurately.43 Reduction of the

requested quantities often entailed consultation between the ports and the oversea commands by telephone or teletype. If

agreement could not be worked out in this

manner, ASF headquarters was called on

for a decision. In 1944 the War Department directed the theater commanders to

establish stock inventory systems as

quickly as possible, and when ASF headquarters was satisfied that a theater had

an adequate system, the port of embarkation was authorized to omit the editing of

requisitions from that source as to quantity, unless the quantity requested was

obviously in error.44

The requisitions that oversea commanders submitted usually covered a wide

variety of items. After being edited they

were broken down into so-called extract

requisitions by the oversea supply divisions, and these extracts were forwarded

to the initial sources of supply. Extract

requisitions for noncontrolled items normally were forwarded to "filler depots,"

which had been designated by the respective technical services to serve particular

ports and had built up stocks for that purpose. Sometimes when the urgency of the

oversea requisitions made it desirable to

avoid the delay involved in processing extract requisitions through filler depots, the

oversea supply divisions could fill them

from the limited stocks of noncontrolled

supplies held at the ports, or from supplies

temporarily in storage at holding and

reconsignment points near the ports. Until

late in the war the usual procedure was to

send unedited extract requisitions for controlled items directly to the chiefs of technical services, who did the necessary editing and re-extracted them to the depots

that were best able to furnish the supplies.45

 (Chart 11) The list of controlled

items, which was issued by the War

Department from time to time, included 42

 Min of ASF Staff Conf, 11 Aug 42, p. 7; Memo,

CG ASF for C of Svs, 1 7 Aug 42, sub: Editing of

Requisitions, OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply;

OCT Cir 82, 19 Nov 42, sub: Proper Editing of

Requisitions. 43

 Concerning levels of supply, see Hist of Plng Div

ASF, Vol. 2, pp. 201-06. 44

 AG Ltr, 9 May 44, SPX 400 (5 May 44); AG

Ltr, 10 Oct 44; SPX 400.312 (10 Oct 44); WD TM

38-418, 1 Nov 45, sub: Oversea Requisitions. 45

 WD Memo W 700-35-43, 25 Jul 43, sub: Controlled Items of Equip; ASF Cir 88, 24 Sep 43, Sec. I;

WD Cir 191, 13 May 44; ASF Manual M 411, 29 Jun

44, pp. 1.05 and 1.06; WD Cir 65, 28 Feb 45.
344 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CHART 11—BASIC PLAN FOR FILLING REQUISITIONS FROM OVERSEA COMMANDS FOR ARMY

SERVICE FORCES SUPPLIES

those items in short supply or designed for

special or limited use that had to be distributed with unusual care. Beginning 1

May 1945, requisitions for critical items—

a classification that had superseded controlled items—were sent from the theaters

directly to the chiefs of technical services,

and information copies were sent to the

ports.46

The extent to which supplies for use in

filling oversea requisitions should be

stocked at the ports was a much controverted subject. Under the original plan

port commanders were authorized to

establish "port reserves" of noncontrolled

ASF supplies that might be used for this

purpose in emergencies. The intention

was that port reserves would be maintained on a very limited basis, but some

port commanders found it advantageous

to build up rather extensive stocks to insure their ability to fill urgent oversea

requisitions promptly and also to provide

cargo to fill ship space left available by the

failure of other supplies to reach the ports

as expected. In addition to requiring considerable storage space and operating

personnel, these port reserves ran counter

to the doctrine of centralized stock control

that General Lutes was endeavoring to

make fully effective. Consequently, after

considerable discussion, port reserves were

abolished in July 1943 and the port commanders were authorized to maintain instead only "port stocks," which would

include small quantities of selected fastmoving items to be used for supplying station complements and troops passing

through the ports. Port stocks were subject

to the stock control procedures that had

been established throughout the Army 46

 AG Ltr, 16 Mar 45, AG 400 (13 Mar 45).
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 345

Service Forces and could be drawn upon

by the chiefs of technical services when

necessary.47

The Chief of Transportation was satisfied with this ASF decision as it affected

the east coast ports, but he believed that

special consideration was required by the

Pacific coast ports because of their distance from filler depots and the principal

manufacturing areas and the limited

capacity of the western railroads. ASF

headquarters recognized the validity of

the argument and also the need of using

all possible means to speed up the action

on requisitions from Pacific theaters. Accordingly, the San Francisco Port of Embarkation was authorized to maintain

larger stocks of certain items and, when

advisable, to fill oversea requisitions from

these stocks without taking the time to call

on filler depots.48

The arrangement did not work out to

General Lutes' satisfaction, and in March

1944 he recommended that the depot in

the Oakland branch of the San Francisco

Port of Embarkation be transferred to

ASF control. Lutes did not believe the

OSD at this port was functioning properly—a view shared by others, including

General Gross—and he considered it

"fundamentally unsound" for ports of

embarkation to control large stocks. General Gross objected to the proposal, for he

saw "nothing but disadvantage to overseas supply" in it. The Oakland storage

facilities, he argued, were an integral part

of the port establishment and it was not

feasible to have them under separate

management. He pointed out that the

port frequently had experienced delay in

obtaining shipments from ASF depots on

extract requisitions, whereas port stocks

were immediately available. General

Somervell supported the position taken by

his Chief of Transportation, but he directed

that the deficiencies in the oversea supply

division be corrected at once.49

The ability of the oversea commands to

requisition supplies in an orderly and

accurate manner and the ability of the

oversea supply divisions to edit the requisitions properly depended on their understanding of the supply policies that the

War Department had laid down. As an

aid to such understanding, the OSD's

prepared monthly supply policy charts, in

which they endeavored to present in a

concise form all the basic factors governing the supply of a particular oversea

command with respect to each classification of matériel. The chart showed

whether supplies in a particular classification were to be shipped automatically

or in response to requisitions, the levels of

supply that the command was authorized

to maintain, the current troop strength

figures projected ahead for several months,

and exceptions or qualifications applicable to particular items within a classification. The authority for each statement in

the chart was shown.50 General Goodman

in explaining the advantages of this device, which had originated in his division,

pointed out that the supply policy chart

for the United Kingdom presented on a

47

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, et al., 24 Feb 43, sub:

Utilization of Port Reserves, OCT 400.23; Memo, CG

ASF for CofT, 21 Jul 43, sub: Stocks at PEs, OCT

400.2 Stock Control; OCT HB Monograph 27, pp.

43-51. 48

 1st Ind, CofT for Dir of Opns ASF, 30 Jul 43,

OCT 400.2 Stock Control; Memo, CG ASF for Cs of

Tech Svs, 29 Nov 43, sub: Stockage at SFPE, OCT

400.23. 49

 Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 21 Mar 44, sub:

Oakland Depot; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 23 Mar

44; Memo, Styer for Somervell, 25 Mar 44, with

Somervell's indorsement of same date; Memo, SFPE

for Gross, 8 Apr 44; all in OCT 323.3 Oakland. 50

 See typical chart in Hist Record, OSD NYPE,

1943, Tab I, OCT HB NYPE OSD.
346 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

single sheet, albeit a large sheet, information that had been assembled from fortyeight different directives and other

documents.51

Shipments of matériel to the ports had

to be carefully synchronized with planned

sailings, and to that end several devices

were used by the oversea supply divisions.

The first step was to prepare a shipping

period cycle chart, by which the total time

allotted for acting on requisitions and

loading the cargo in vessels was broken

down into five periods. At east coast ports

the shipping cycles were governed by the

sailing dates of convoys. The second step

was to prepare a cargo distribution chart,

which showed what supplies were expected to be available for loading at each

port (primary or outport) for each destination during each shipping cycle, with their

weight and cubic measurement. The

cargo distribution charts served as a basis

on which the port transportation divisions

could plan to bring cargoes into the ports

and the port water divisions could make

preliminary plans for loading the ships

that had been allocated and request additional ships if necessary. The first cargo

distribution chart for a particular shipping cycle was issued as soon as the depots

began processing requisitions for that

cycle, and several revisions were issued

thereafter until the supplies actually were

at the port.52 Finally, on the basis of cargo

at or about to arrive at the port, a master

loading plan was prepared for each shipping cycle. This plan was the work of a

loading committee that consisted of representatives of the port water division,

which was responsible for the berthing

and stowing of the vessels; the port transportation division, which arranged for the

movement of freight from rail terminals or

warehouses to shipside; and the oversea

supply division, which had information

regarding theater requisitions and priorities; together with such other officers as

the port commander might designate.53

Each of the five periods in the shipping

cycle chart had a terminal date, and it

was the responsibility of the oversea supply division to follow up each extract

requisition and determine whether these

dates were being observed. The terminal

dates were the cutoff date, by which oversea requisitions were to have been edited

and extract requisitions dispatched from

the ports; the initial date, by which the

sources of supply were to have notified the

ports of the availability or nonavailability

of the supplies requisitioned and to have

begun preparation for shipment; the limiting date, by which all supplies were to

have been made ready for shipment to the

port; the deadline date, by which all were

to have arrived at the port; and the last

shipping date, by which all were to have

been loaded and put to sea.54 Each port

technical service representative followed

up the supplies that his service procured.

The oversea supply divisions studied

the results of the follow-up procedure to

ascertain where delays were being encountered. ASF headquarters analyzed

the data each month, and the technical

services that had experienced difficulty in

51

 Remarks in Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, Vol. I, p. 27, OCT HB PE Gen. 52

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 4, 5, and Tab A, pp. 8, 9, OCT HB PE

Gen.

53

 TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Jun 45, pp. 8-10. 54

 Concerning follow-up responsibility and procedures, see WD Memo W 55-6-43, 9 Feb 43, sub: Responsibilities in Follow-up of Shipments to PEs; ASF

Cir 92, 29 Sep 43, Sec. IV; SOP Memo 6, OSD

NYPE, 1 Dec 43, Tab F, in Hist Record OSD NYPE

1943; TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Jun 45, Pt. I, pp. 11-13 and

Pt. III; TC Pamphlet 46, 1 Aug 45, sub: Procedure

for Follow-up of Extract Requisitions.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 347

meeting initial or limiting dates were required to investigate and determine the

causes.55 While delays were usually due to

procurement lags and the slow processing

of requisitions at technical service depots,

there were other contributing factors such

as delay in getting information necessary

to the editing of a requisition, inability of

the Traffic Control Division to give an immediate release for shipment because of

conditions at the loading or discharging

point, and difficulty in getting an immediate assignment of freight cars.

The crux of the matter from the standpoint of the theater commanders was the

time required for supplies to reach them

after requistions had been prepared. Several studies of what was termed the supply

turnaround cycle were made by ASF

headquarters. Since the traffic involved

many widely scattered ports of destination, several technical services, hundreds

of shippers, and a great variety of conditions affecting each segment of the turnaround, a satisfactory analysis was difficult to achieve and all generalizations and

comparisons were subject to qualification.

This statement also applies to the average

turnaround cycles for four principal theater commands given below. These figures,

which represent the average number of

days elapsed from date of requisitioning

to delivery of the supplies at oversea ports,

are based on shipments by all ASF technical services that were loaded at ports in

the United States during the three-month

period December 1944-February 1945:56

Theater Command Turnaround Cycle

(Days)

European Theater of Operations ....... . 133

Mediterranean Theater of Operations.... 115

Southwest Pacific Area ............... . 181

Pacific Ocean Areas.................. . 118

In order that the port oversea supply

divisions might know as early as possible

whether requisitioned items would reach

the port by the deadline dates, the initial

sources of supply were required for a time

to notify the OSD's whether the supplies

were immediately available, and if not,

what delay might be involved in getting

them from secondary sources or from

vendors. In October 1944 this requirement was modified, and thereafter the

ports were notified only of prospective delays or the nonavailability of particular

items. When it was evident that supplies

could not be shipped as desired, the primary port so informed the oversea command and endeavored to ascertain

whether substitute supplies were desired

or whether the requisitions could be canceled. These "notices of delayed items

and/or nonavailability" were important

both from the standpoint of meeting theater needs and from the standpoint of

planning the loading of ships. Yet the

technical services frequently were slow in

dispatching them or overlooked the responsibility entirely. To correct this deficiency, a policing system was established

early in 1945, under which the OSD's

prepared reports on violations of the regulation and the zone transportation officers

55

 Memo, CG ASF for Tech Svs and PEs, 4 Jun 43,

sub: Supply Procedure, SPX 400 (6-1-43); ASF Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1944, pp. 23-26; Memo,

NYPE for CofT, 13 Oct 44, OCT 563.5 Time Analysis Report for ETO Shipments; ASF Staff Conf, 29

Nov 44, pp. 10, 11; ASF MPR, 30 Apr 45, Sec. 6-B,

Review of the Month, pp. 33-36, and ASF MPR, 31

May 45, pp. 50-62. 56

 ASF MPR, 28 Feb 45, Sec. 6, Analysis, Turnaround Cycles—Oversea Supply, p. 2. The analysis

shows the average cycles for the supplies of each technical service and discusses problems affecting each

segment of the turnaround—that is, time for transmission of requisition from theater to primary port,

port editing time, time in the zone of interior depot

system, time en route to port of embarkation, and

time afloat.
348 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

made investigations at the implicated

technical service depots. This policing system brought some improvement, but the

plan never worked to the complete satisfaction of the ports.57

Detailed records were maintained to

enable the ports to exercise the close control that was necessary over the movement

and loading of supplies. At New York and

other large ports records were kept by machine methods. From these records the

New York Port of Embarkation prepared

five reports daily to show the status of

each carload of freight that had been

shipped to the port—one report covered

the cars en route; another, the cars that

had arrived at port rail terminals; a third,

the cars that had been ordered into lighters for movement to port shipping terminals; a fourth, the cars that had arrived at

shipping terminals; and a fifth, the cars

that had been unloaded at shipping terminals. These reports were the basis for

the master loading plan.

Two other reports were used by the

New York Port of Embarkation in its control of the oversea supply operation. Up

to the time the supplies were designated

for loading on a particular vessel, the OSD

regularly prepared a statement showing

the status of each extract requisition for

which it was responsible. This statement

disclosed the relative efficiency with which

the several technical services were meeting the shipping-cycle dates and served as

a basis for action to overcome unwarranted delays. The other report in terms

of commodities and measurement tons

showed the status of the cargo set up for

loading during each shipping cycle. From

this report the port was able to judge what

additional action was necessary in order

to fill the ships that had been scheduled to

sail.58

In scheduling the movement of supplies

to the seaboard and in planning cargoes

the OSD's were required to give careful

attention to two kinds of priorities—those

established by the War Department to

indicate the comparative importance of

the oversea commands, and those established by the oversea commanders to indicate the relative urgency of the need for

the various kinds of requisitioned supplies.59

 In the beginning considerable

difficulty was experienced because of the

failure of oversea commanders to insert

priorities on their requisitions, and because of changes in theater priorities after

the requisitions had been processed and

the shipping period cycle charts had been

set up. Changes in War Department and

theater priorities sometimes required the

removal of cargo from ships that were

being loaded in order to make room for

other supplies.60 It sometimes happened

that high-priority cargo for which ship

space was being held did not arrive in

time for loading, and the oversea supply

divisions then had to find substitute cargo.

While this might involve a disregard of

priorities, the Chief of Transportation con57

 TG Pamphlet 5, 27 Jan 44, p. 4; ASF Manual M

411, 29 Jun 44, pp. 1.05 and 1.06; ASF Cir 336, 7 Oct

44, Sec. I; ASF Cir 1, 2 Jan 45, Sec. III; TG Cir 50-2,

12 Jan 45, and revision 1 Jun 45; OCT Misc Ltr 242,

14 Jul 45, sub: Violation Reporting; all in OCT HB

PE Gen Oversea Supply. 58

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

6-9 Jul 44, morning session, 7 Jul 44, pp. 14-34, OCT

HB PE Gen. 59

 WD Memo W 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, pars. 2b and

5a(3); WD Memo for CG AGF, AAF, et al., 28 Nov

43, sub: Priorities for Oversea Shipments, AG 400 (25

Nov 43). 60

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 16 May 42, sub: Supply of

Oversea Bases, OCT 400.302 Oversea Bases; Memo,

Col Abbott Boone for Gen Wylie, 13 Apr 43, sub:

Priorities, OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply; Ltr,

CofT for Maj Gen John C. H. Lee, CG SOS

ETOUSA, 3 Apr 43; OCT 565.2 England.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 349

sidered it essential that ship space be filled

if at all possible.61

The difficulty of strictly following the

theater commanders' priorities was heightened at east coast ports by the convoy

system, which caused peaks and valleys in

the volume of cargo loaded.62 The priority problem involved frequent consultation between the oversea supply divisions,

the theaters, ASF headquarters, and the

Operations Division of the General Staff.

For a period OPD sent a representative to

the New York Port of Embarkation for

each convoy sailing to help with questions

of priority.63

One of the problems with which the

port loading committee had to deal was

that of getting component parts and

related items in the same ship in order to

insure their arrival at the same oversea

port at the same time. This presented

difficulties because supplies that were to

be loaded in the same ship or the same

convoy frequently were snipped to the

port from different sources, and hence arrived at different times and possibly at

different railway terminals. Inadequate or

inaccurate marking contributed to the

problem, particularly during the early

part of the war. The "marrying up" of

components was a procedure through

which the ports of embarkation could do

much to simplify supply operations overseas. On the other hand, it was desirable to

spread shipments of particular items or

assemblies over two or more ships, so that

if one vessel should be lost at sea the theater would still receive part of the quantity requisitioned. "Spread loading" was

particularly important in the case of critical items and other supplies that were

urgently needed in the theater.64

The primary ports were responsible for

keeping the oversea commanders informed

regarding the status of their requisitions

and the supplies actually shipped. Copies

of the edited requisitions, the cargo distribution charts, and notices of nonavailability were sent overseas as they became

available. Periodically the oversea commanders were informed regarding the

status of requisitions that were long outstanding and still unfilled. At the time of

each sailing a cargo summary was sent to

the theater by cable or radio, and copies

of the manifest and the stowage plan were

forwarded by air courier. When there was

doubt that the manifest would arrive sufficiently far in advance of the vessel, a

more detailed cargo cable was sent. The

Oversea Supply Division at New York

also prepared lists of the principal items

procured by each technical service and attached copies to the manifests. These lists

gave much more detailed descriptions

than could be included in the regular

shipping documents, and they were helpful to the theaters as well as to the technical services in the zone of interior.65

 The

problem of transmitting adequate and accurate cargo information to the theaters

61

 Telg, CofT to NYPE, 30 Dec 42, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks. 62

 Memo, Gross for Lutes, 4 Apr 43, sub: Cargo

Loading for UK and North Africa, OCT HB Wylie

Staybacks. 63

 Remarks by Gen Goodman in Min of Port

Comdrs Conf, NYPE, 18 Feb 43, p. 6, OCT HB Gross

Ports. 64

 Goodman lecture, cited n. 35, p. 19; Memo,

CofT for SG, 5 Nov 43, sub: Shipt of Med Assemblies;

Memos, CofT for NYPE and SFPE, 5 Nov 43; Memo,

Somervell for Gross, 23 Nov 44; Telg, CofT for East

Coast Ports, 24 Nov 44; last four in OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks. 65

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 8 Feb 43, sub: Instructions

Pertaining to Advance Copies of Ship's Papers, OCT

HB PE Gen Oversea Supply; OCT Cir 11, 25 Jan 43,

sub: Report to Oversea Commanders on Status of

Requisitions; Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, Vol. I, p. 32, OCT HB PE Gen.
350 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

was greatly simplified in late 1943 by the

introduction of a new shipping document.66

During the early part of the war the

theaters complained often and bitterly regarding the failure of the ports of embarkation to give them satisfactory information by cable or radio and to forward manifests and stowage plans early enough to be

of assistance in arranging for the discharge

of vessels and the clearance of cargo from

the ports. The early receipt of such information was particularly important to the

forces in the United Kingdom and the

Southwest Pacific, where the ports of discharge frequently were not determined

until after the vessels had arrived in theater waters. Time naturally was required

for the ports of embarkation to develop

the procedures and train the personnel

needed to insure prompt and accurate

compilation and dispatch of cargo information. In addition, the communication

lines were glutted, air courier service was

subject to interruption, and information

and documents were not always transmitted from the outports to the primary ports

on time. Yet it is surprising that the problem remained acute so long. In the early

part of 1943, after General Somervell visited a number of theaters where he encountered "general dissatisfaction" with

the way information was being received,

a concentrated effort was made to ascertain and correct the defects in the system.67

 Steady improvement followed in

the Atlantic, but the flow of information

to the Pacific theaters made less progress.

The theaters were not always without

fault in this matter, for cargo information

was sometimes received but not properly

distributed. General Goodman on visits

to the United Kingdom and North Africa

found that data forwarded by the New

York Port of Embarkation had reached

the theaters in good time but had not

reached the officers concerned.68

There were numerous occasions when

particular supplies were urgently needed

overseas and when specially expedited

service was furnished by both the procuring services and the Transportation

Corps.69 Fast cargo ships were assigned to

various routes at various times to aid the

Chief of Transportation in meeting urgent

theater requirements, but the first formal

express service was set up early in 1945.70

Speedy delivery of many types of supplies

was called for at that time by the European theater because of abnormal expenditures during the Battle of the Bulge

and the heavy requirements for the drive

into Germany. This led to the establishment of a continuous expedited service,

which was designated first by the code

name STRESS and then by the name REX.

When the theater indicated that such

service was required on particular requisi66

 See below, pp. 400-402. 67

 Memos, McIntyre for Wylie, 1 and 2 Feb 43,

OCT HB Wylie Urgent Matters; Memo, Somervell

for Gross, 19 Feb 43, ASF Hq Trans 1943. A more

detailed discussion will be found in Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, particularly the chapters on the United Kingdom, North Africa, and SWPA. Memo for Record,

OCT ETOUSA, 18 Jun 43, sub: Step-by-Step Flow

of Marine Intelligence and Ships Papers, OCT HB

PE Gen Oversea Supply, reveals the problem from

the theater standpoint. Numerous directives were

consolidated and published in WD TM 38-412, 21

Mar 44, sub: Standardized Supply and Trans Info. 68

 Ltr, Goodman to author, 11 Mar 52, with comment on various parts of draft of this section, OCT

HB PE Gen Oversea Supply. 69

 For procedures, see TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Jun 45, Pt.

I, Sec. IX. 70

 JMTC 11th Mtg, 4 Jun 42; Memo, Somervell for

Gross, 19 Feb 43, par. 11, OCT HB Wylie Urgent

Matters; Ltr, Wylie to Col Edward C. Rose, CBI, 24

Jul 44, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for

CNO, 15 Feb 45, sub: Fast Vessel Service to ICEBERG,

OCT 565.2 SF.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 351

tioned items, those supplies were shipped

to the ports by air or railway express,

were loaded on the first available vessels—

preferably fast ships that sailed unescorted—and were stowed in readily accessible spaces so that they could be unloaded

as soon as the ships had docked.71

General Lutes, who had conceived the

plan during a visit to Europe, recognized

that special service could be extended

only to items for which the theater's need

was really urgent. Theater supply officers

did not at first grasp this point, and some

of the requisitions marked REX could not

be justified or the amounts called for were

excessive. When the first requisitions

came in, the Chief of Transportation

pointed out that from the standpoint of

cost in manpower and transportation REX

shipments would have to be kept to the

minimum.72 During the period this plan

was in effect—7 February to 11 May

1945—REX shipments totaled 104,000

measurement tons.73

 Ammunition, vehicles, and spare parts figured prominently

in these expedited movements.

In order to assist the ports in dealing

promptly and effectively with their many

problems in connection with oversea supply, the customary requirement of communication "through channels" was set

aside. The oversea supply divisions were

authorized to communicate directly with

the chiefs of technical services and their

depots, and with the ASF Assistant Chief

of Staff for Operations and his Stock Control Division, regarding the availability

and shipment of particular supplies. All

communications relating to matters of

policy passed through the Office of the

Chief of Transportation. The privilege of

direct contact with the sources of supply

and the officers who controlled distribution served the oversea supply divisions to

good advantage, and they appear to have

used this privilege discreetly.74

Direct communication between the

oversea supply divisions at the primary

ports and the oversea commands was necessary to enable the OSD's to keep up to

date on the theaters' complex and changing requirements and to keep the theaters

informed regarding the progress made in

filling their requisitions. The New York

and San Francisco Ports of Embarkation,

which had primary supply responsibility

for the large and active theaters, held

daily consultations with theater supply officers. Telephone and radio were used for

this purpose until 1944, when teletype

connections were installed. The teletype

arrangement proved the most satisfactory,

since it afforded opportunity for a fast

two-way exchange of views and information and provided a complete record of

the discussion. Teletype conferences were

particularly valuable when preparations

were being made for assault operations

and the theaters were confronted with unusual and urgent needs for supplies and

equipment.75

71

 Rpt, Lutes to Somervell, sub: Mission to ETO, 4

Dec 44-19 Jan 45, pp. 251-59, ASF Somervell File;

Memo, CofT for PEs, 5 Jan 45, sub: STRESS Shipments, OCT 563.5 ETO; Msg, Planning Div ASF to

COMZONE ETO, 23 Jan 45, WARX 25930. 72

 Memo, CofT for Lutes, 23 Jan 45, sub: REX

Shipments, OCT 563.5 ETO. 73

 Memo for Record by author, 6 Jun 45, OCT HB

PE Gen Outbound Cargo. 74

 Memo, Lutes for Gross, 23 Apr 43; Memo, CofT

for PEs, 23 Apr 43; both in OCT HB Gross Day File;

Memo, Gross for PEs, 12 Jun 43; Memo, CofT for Cs

of Tech Svs, 12 Jun 43; last two in OCT HB Ex Staybacks; OCT Misc Ltr 16 to PEs, 15 Jan 45, sub:

Direct Communication, OCT HB PE Gen Oversea

Supply. 75

 Memo, Col Meyer, OCT, for Col E. Bennett

Whipple, SWPA, 5 Jul 44, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, p. 9,

sub: Report on Accomplishments and Handicaps,

OCT HB SFPE Gen.
352 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The AAF had an entirely separate system for distributing the supplies that it

procured, as distinguished from those procured by the Army Service Forces for use

by the AAF in common with the AGF.

This system included the Air Service Command (ASC), which procured technical

supplies and equipment peculiar to the

Air Forces; oversea air service commands,

which were responsible for the supply of

particular oversea areas; and intransit depots, which were located near the seaboard, where air technical supplies were

assembled and processed before being

shipped to the theaters. When these supplies were flown overseas they were forwarded from the intransit depots to ports

of aerial embarkation, which were operated by the Air Transport Command;

when they moved by water they were forwarded to the water ports of embarkation

operated by the Transportation Corps.

The existence of these separate AAF

agencies necessitated certain departures

from the procedures used in moving ASF

supplies through water ports of embarkation.76

Early in 1942, under the original plan

of oversea supply, requisitions for air

technical supplies were received and edited by the primary (water) ports and forwarded to the Commanding General, Air

Service Command, or to depots designated by him. Later in 1942 the ports

were directed to send requisitions for these

supplies to the ASC without editing, and

eventually the oversea commanders were

directed to send their requisitions for air

technical supplies, as well as certain other

equipment used by the AAF, directly to

the ASC. Priorities for this matériel were

to be worked out between the oversea

commanders and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. These changes

were in line with the growing autonomy

of the Air Forces in many fields.77 The

OSD's at the water ports notified the AAF

intransit depots regarding the space available to them on each convoy or during

each period, and gave them the dates

when their shipments should arrive for

loading. The intransit depots were responsible for delivering supplies in accordance with the priorities.78

 Shipments of air

technical supplies were not covered by the

shipping period cycle charts through

which the OSD's exercised detailed control over movements to the ports.

In the spring of 1944, the Army Air

Forces proposed that supplies procured by

the ASF for the use of AAF commanders

overseas be requisitioned and shipped in

the same manner as air technical supplies.

The proposal did not meet with the approval of ASF and it was not adopted.

The Chief of Transportation pointed out

that the proposed plan would further interfere with the control of freight movements to the ports, with cargo planning,

and with the efficient use of shipping. It

also would require the AAF to duplicate

organizations and facilities that the ports

had already established and developed

into a smoothly working system. Setting

up a separate system for all supplies mov76

 On the establishment of ports of aerial embarkation, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 51-53. For the operation of AAF intransit depots, see WD TM 38-415,

22 Jun 44, Secs. IV and IX. 77

 AG Memo 400 (1-17-42), 22 Jan 42, pars. 2c(2)

and 2d(9); AG Memo 400 (3-3-43), 6 Mar 43, pars.

5a(2) and 5b(9); WD Memo W 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42,

pars. 5a(2) and 5b(9), and Changes 1,12 May 43; AG

Memo 400 (25 Nov 43), 28 Nov 43, sub: Priorities for

Oversea Shipments, par. 2b(1). 78

 Notation on manuscript attached to Ltr, Goodman to author, 11 Mar 52, OCT HB PEs Gen Oversea Supply.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 353

ing to the AAF overseas would not overcome delays caused by the nonavailability of supplies, a problem that the Chief of

Transportation believed was at the root of

this proposal.79

All freight moved overseas by air was

subject to shipment instructions issued by

the Air Transport Command (ATC).80

The volume of matériel procured by the

ASF and shipped by air to the ground

forces and the service forces in the theaters was never great, but it gradually increased as the war progressed and combat

activities in the theaters created emergency requirements. When a theater commander requested air shipment of a particular ASF item, the oversea supply division of the primary port first confirmed

the availability of the item, then ascertained from the appropriate ATC office

when the shipment could move and

through which port of aerial embarkation, and finally passed this information

on to the source of supply with shipping

instructions.81 Initially, problems concerning the actual movement of ASF

shipments through ports of aerial embarkation were handled by liaison between

those ports and the nearest ports of water

embarkation. Beginning in October 1944,

the Chief of Transportation assigned officers—known as ASF air freight regulating

officers—to the ports of aerial embarkation to assist with the identification of ASF

shipments, to police their packaging,

marking, and documentation, and to expedite their movement.82

Certain other types of matériel supplied to the theaters were covered by

special procedures. Under the original

plan ammunition was to have been supplied by the ports automatically, but this

did not prove feasible because of continuing shortages in the zone of interior. Under the plan actually followed, the theaters submitted monthly ammunition status

reports that were carefully considered by

the Commanding General, Army Service

Forces, and the Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, who authorized the

quantities of ammunition to be shipped in

the light of the available stocks and the

world-wide military situation.83

The original plan to supply gasoline,

lubricants, and other petroleum products

automatically also proved unworkable.

After a period of confusion resulting from

uncertain responsibilities and competition

for supplies between the air, ground, and

naval forces, theater requisitions for these

products were channeled through the

Army-Navy Petroleum Board, which harmonized the demands in the light of the

available stocks and bassed the requisi79

 Memo, undated, prepared in the OCT regarding

proposal presented in a letter from Brig. Gen. Lyman

P. Whitten, AAF, on 1 April 1944; Ltr, Goodman to

Gross, 11 Apr 44, with attached comments on the

proposal; both in OCT HB Wylie AAF. 80

 WD Cir 211, 1 Jul 42, Sec. III; WD Cir 385, 27

Nov 43, Sec. II; Memo, TAG for CGs AAF, ASF, Cs

of Tech Svs, 28 Jun 43, sub: Shipmts of Supplies by

Mil Aircraft, AG 400.22 (26 Jun 43); Memo, CofT

for Dir of Opns ASF, 11 Aug 43, OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks; Memo, Dir of Opns ASF for ACofS G-4,

12 Aug 43, G-4 400.22, Vol. I; Rad, WD to Oversea

Comdrs, 21 Aug 42, CM-OUTs 9043-56. 81

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 20 Jun 44, sub: SOP in

Handling Air Shipments, OCT 581.2; NYPE Procedure Cir 63, 20 Feb 45, sub: Air Shipment Procedure,

OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply; ASF Cir 132, 13

Apr 45; ASF Cir 303, 9 Aug 45; WD Memo 700-45,

14 Jun 45, sub: Shipment of Supplies by Military Aircraft. 82

 Rpt, Port and Field Agencies Div, FY 1945, pp.

10-11, OCT HB P&FA Div Rpts; WD Cir 75, 8 Mar

45, Sec. II. 83

 Memo, AG 400 (1-17-42), 22 Jan 42, Incl 3; AG

400 (27 Apr 42), 28 Apr 42, pars. 2 and 7; WD Memo

W 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, pars. 2c and 6; Goodman lecture, cited n. 35, p. 9; Hist of Plng Div ASF, Vol. II,

p. 242.
354 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tions on to the supply agencies of the respective forces for their further action.84

So far as possible petroleum shipments to

the theaters were made in bulk in tankers

operated under Navy control; only petroleum products shipped in cans and drums

were transported by the Army.

Two other types of shipments involved

somewhat different procedures. When the

initial troop equipment and supplies specified in the War Department orders directing units to proceed overseas were shipped

to the ports, the shipments were regulated

by the troop movement divisions (the Initial Troop Equipment Division at New

York). These troop movement divisions

collaborated with the oversea supply divisions and the water divisions in working

out loading plans.85 When operational

projects—which required General Staff

approval—had been approved, the supporting requisitions, or bills of materials,

were sent to the ports of primary supply

responsibility, which prepared extract

requisitions and regulated the movement

of the supplies in much the same manner

as other requisitioned matériel.86

The primary purpose of the oversea

supply divisions at the ports was to assist

the Army Service Forces in keeping matériel flowing to the theaters in accordance

with theater requisitions and the approved priorities. Broadly speaking, this

purpose was accomplished, although

there were numerous shortcomings in the

day-to-day administration of the system.

Neither the OSD's nor an effective traffic

control plan was placed in operation until

several months after the United States entered the war, and their procedures had

to be worked out gradually and in a measure through trial and error. The emphasis

initially placed on filling the ships with

the cargoes that were ready for loading

contributed to building up unbalanced

stocks overseas. This situation obtained

until direct supervision of the operation

by the supply staff of ASF headquarters

was decreed in the spring of 1943. Despite

the effort devoted to strengthening the

OSD at San Francisco, improvement was

very slow and that division had to be entirely revamped in the summer of 1945.

Nevertheless, in certain basic aspects the

system proved its soundness. The movement of supplies to the ports was kept

commensurate with theater requisitions

and shipping capacity. Cargo planning

was based on an up-to-date knowledge of

priorities and reliable information regarding the availability of specific shipments

for loading. The records that the OSD's

kept on the progress of each requisition

furnished a basis for detecting unwarranted delay in any phase of the operation and for taking corrective action.

A secondary but important purpose of

the oversea supply divisions was to assist

the stock control officers of ASF headquarters and the technical services in

keeping theater stock inventories from becoming unnecessarily large. This purpose

was achieved in the sense that the theaters

were not given a free hand in accumulating supplies; their requisitions were edited

in the light of levels of supply and tables

of allowances authorized by the War De84

 OCT HB Monograph 27, pp. 9-15; WD Cir 220,

20 Sep 43, par. 11; NYPE OSD SOP for Setting Up

Packaged Petroleum Products, 25 May 43; Hist Record, OSD NYPE 1943 Tab E; SOP for Supplying

Packaged Fuel Lubricants, Grease, etc., Incl A to

Memo, ANPB for Caribbean Def Comd, et al., 7 Jul

44, OCT 334 ANPB. 85

 TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Jun 45, Pt. I, Sec. IV; Ch. II

above, pp. 148-61. 86

 TC Pamphlet 5, 1 Apr 44, par. 7; ASF Manual

M 415, 25 Aug 44, pars. 27 and 28; Hist of Plng Div

ASF, Vol. II, Ch. 13.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 355

partment. But the tendency of the commanders of active theaters fighting thousands of miles from their main source of

supply was to place heavy requisitions in

order to safeguard themselves against unforeseen supply requirements or an interruption in the line of communications.

Sometimes their supply officers did not

have an accurate record of the stocks on

hand. Since the OSD's could not drastically reduce requisitions for supplies that

the theaters insisted were necessary, and

even ASF headquarters had to be very

cautious in doing so, some oversea commanders accumulated larger stocks than

they could administer properly, a situation that resulted in congestion and confusion at their depots and dumps. This

situation, coupled with the willingness of

the theaters to detain vessels for long

periods and use them as floating warehouses, led the Chief of Transportation to

assert that the accumulation of unnecessarily large stocks overseas was "one of the

logistical mistakes of the war."

 87

 The theater commanders, he believed, should

have placed greater reliance on the supply and transportation systems of the

Army and scaled down their requisitions

accordingly.

The Pacific area commands and the

San Francisco Port of Embarkation gave

the greatest concern to those in the War

Department who were responsible for the

supply of the oversea theaters. The situation became critical immediately after the

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and

throughout the war it was adversely affected by a number of circumstances—the

great distances and the slow and irregular

turnaround of cargo ships, the limited

amount of shipping available in the Pacific because of the higher priority given

the transatlantic theaters, the many scattered and undeveloped bases that had to

be supplied by direct shipments from the

zone of interior, the rapidly developing

strategic situation that made it difficult

for commands to establish well-regulated

base operations, and the lack of direct

communication lines between some of the

bases and the primary supply port. In addition, stocks were persistently low at

western filler depots. Beyond that, and in

some measure as a result of these conditions, the Oversea Supply Division at the

San Francisco Port of Embarkation got

off to a poor start and improved slowly.

During 1942 and 1943 complaints from

the Pacific commands and from the technical services were frequent, and the OSD

at San Francisco was subject to a number

of investigations by ASF and Transportation Corps officers.88

 General Goodman,

whom the Chief of Transportation sent to

investigate the situation in November

1943, and again in April 1945, concluded

that the deficiencies could be attributed

in a large measure to the failure of the

port commander to properly evaluate the

mission of his oversea supply division and

to give it the authority and support it

needed. As a result, the division was undermanned, it did not have effective con87

 Final Report by Gen Gross, Nov 45 (hereafter

cited as Gross Final Rpt), p. 59. For the shipping

aspects, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 287-99. 88

 OCT HB Monograph 27, pp. 184-200; Survey of

Supply of Pacific Theaters, undated and unsigned,

ordered by Dir of Opns ASF, 12 Oct 43, OCT HB Ex

Supply of Oversea Theaters; Memo, Goodman for

CG SFPE, 16 Nov 43; Ltr, Gross for Maj Gen Frederick Gilbreath, CG SFPE, 1 Dec 43; last two in OCT

HB Ex Oversea Supply; Memo, CofT for Dir Plans

and Opns ASF, 13 Dec 43, sub: Follow-up of Survey,

OCT 523.06 Follow-up of Shipments; Memo, CG

ASF for Cs of Tech Svs, 30 Oct 44, sub: Congestion

of SWPA Shipments in Depots, OCT HB Wylie Supply and Shipping in Pacific 1944-45; Survey of

Pacific Supply, by Stock Contl Div ASF and Contl

Div OCT, 15 Jun 45, OCT HB SFPE OSD.
356 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

trol of the cargo that was loaded in vessels,

and it did not receive communications

from the theaters directly but through

port channels.89

In mid-1944 Maj. Gen. Frederick Gilbreath, who had commanded the San

Francisco Port of Embarkation up to that

time, was assigned to the South Pacific

Base Command and was suceeded at San

Francisco by Maj. Gen. Clarence H.

Kells. Kells had been in command of the

Boston Port of Embarkation and had developed a good oversea supply division

there, patterned on the one at New York.

When he was assigned to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Kells was instructed to give the oversea supply aspect

of the work his immediate attention. During his tenure of about a year at San Francisco Kells effected a number of improvements, but Pacific supply still was not up

to the desired standard.90 Accordingly, as

soon as Germany had been defeated General Groninger was transferred from the

command of the New York Port of Embarkation to command the San Francisco

Port of Embarkation, and with him went

General Goodman and about sixty-five

officers from his oversea supply division.

Kells replaced Groninger at New York.

This shift reveals the high importance

that ASF headquarters and the Chief of

Transportation attached to the successful

regulation of supply in the Pacific during

the final drive against Japan, as well as

the high estimate they placed on the services that Generals Groninger and Goodman had rendered at New York, where

they had had primary supply responsibility for the principal transatlantic theaters.

The Oversea Supply Division at the

New York Port of Embarkation, although

it was required to handle the greater volume of freight, had certain advantages

over its counterpart at San Francisco. The

movements of vessels in the Atlantic were

more regular than in the Pacific, there

were not so many scattered and undeveloped oversea bases to be served, and the

means of communications between the

port and the theater supply officers were

better. After the early months when the

emergency in the Pacific held the spotlight, the transatlantic theaters had higher

priority for both supplies and shipping.

Proximity to Washington made it possible

for the responsible officers in New York to

maintain close personal contact with ASF

headquarters and the chiefs of the technical services.

It is evident, also, that at New York the

function of the Oversea Supply Division

was more properly appraised. This is seen

in the high caliber of personnel initially

assigned to the division, the careful planning that was done to keep it abreast of all

requirements, and the freedom the port

commander gave it in maintaining direct

contact with ASF headquarters, the technical services, and the theaters. Operating

under these circumstances, the OSD was

quick to recognize mistakes and correct

them, and it was able to develop procedures that not only served its own purposes but became standard for all ports. It

also had effective support from the port

Water Division, headed by Col. Hans Ottzenn, and the Port Transportation Division, under Col. Krauth W. Thorn. In assessing the results, General Groninger

placed high value on the work of Brig.

Gen. Calvin DeWitt, Jr., Deputy Port

Commander, who was responsible for co89

 Ltrs, Goodman to author, 11 Mar 52, and to Lt

Col Leo J. Meyer, 18 Mar 53; both in OCT HB PE

Gen Oversea Supply. 90

 Ltr, Goodman to Gross, 9 May 45; Ltr, Gross to

Kells, 11 May 45; both in OCT HB Gross Day File.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 357

ordinating the work of these divisions so

that they functioned smoothly as a team

in bringing shipments to the port, planning the cargoes to be loaded, and dispatching the convoys on schedule.91

Transshipment of Cargo at the Ports

The smooth transshipment of cargo at

the ports of embarkation involved careful

long-range planning and efficient operation at the water front. The system for

regulating the flow of shipments to the

seaboard, which has been described, was

essential to maintaining fluid port operations. The Transportation Corps was responsible also for providing a sufficient

number of vessels of the required types to

transport the supplies and equipment that

the theaters needed. It was responsible for

having enough cargo at the ports to assure

the prompt and full loading of the vessels

when they came to berth. It had to work

out satisfactory methods of stowing the

many types of matériel in order to make

the best possible use of ship capacity and

to safeguard the cargo en route. In these

matters the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the ports of embarkation

worked hand in hand, and close collaboration was necessary with a number of

other agencies, both military and nonmilitary.

The effort to provide sufficient vessels

of the right types began well in advance

and had many ramifications. Since the

shipping resources of the Allied nations

were pooled to serve a common cause,

planning for future needs involved the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Combined

Military Transportation Committee, and

the Combined Shipping Adjustment

Board, all of which were British-American agencies. On the national level, separate planning by the U.S. Army and the

U.S. Navy was brought to a focus in the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and in its subsidiaries,

the Joint Logistics Committee and the

Joint Military Transportation Committee.

Such planning covered the number and

types of vessels to be built and the manner

in which the available shipping was to be

employed. Programs for building additional ocean-going merchant vessels to

meet military needs were co-ordinated

with the U.S. Maritime Commission,

which placed the contracts and supervised the construction work. Plans for the

allocation of merchant shipping under

U.S. control to lift military cargoes were

worked out in conjunction with the War

Shipping Administration, which under

Presidential authority controlled the operation of all such vessels, except the relatively few that were directly operated by

the military services. In the long-range

planning for both ship construction and

ship employment the Chief of Transportation's Planning Division had a leading

role. Early in the war this division developed methods and data for translating

projected military operations into terms of

shipping requirements, which served the

Army and other planning agencies to

good advantage throughout the war.92

The assignment of specific ships to load

Army cargoes at specific ports was accomplished through negotiations between the

Chief of Transportation's Water Division,

headed by Col. Raymond M. Hicks, and

the War Shipping Administration. On the

basis of information regarding mainte91

 Rpt, Status of Requisitions from European and

North African Theaters, 7 Feb 44, indicates the

strength of the system established at the NYPE and

also points out failures in administering the system;

Memo, Gen Groninger for Gen Ward, 23 Jan 53;

both in OCT HB PE Gen Oversea Supply. 92

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 18-23, 153-76.
358 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

nance and special-project tonnage to be

moved, obtained from the oversea supply

divisions at the ports, and information

concerning initial troop equipment to be

shipped, obtained from the Movements

Division in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation, the Water Division filed

with the WSA a monthly statement of the

number of vessels it desired for loading at

each port. Adjustments in the program

frequently were necessary because of the

limited number of vessels available and

other demands that the WSA had to meet.

After the number of ships had been agreed

upon, it remained for the WSA to nominate specific vessels to load at each port.

Here again adjustments were necessary in

order to avoid using ships uneconomically

or because of changes in the Army's cargo

situation. Nominations were worked out

in daily meetings between representatives

of the WSA, the Navy, and the Army.

Usually the Army was represented in

those meetings by the chief of the Ocean

Traffic Branch, Water Division.93 That

office was held by Col. Norman H. Vissering through 1943, and thereafter by Col.

Arthur G. Syran.

Just as each port was responsible for

advance planning to handle the cargo for

which it was responsible, so the Ocean

Traffic Branch was responsible for "cargo

planning" on a nationwide basis. The

branch balanced statements from the ports

regarding cargo on hand and en route

against shipping expected to be available

to the Army for loading at each port. If

the cargo in sight at any port fell short of

the capacity of the vessels designated to

load at that port, it initiated action to get

more cargo shipped by the technical services. If the shipping allocated or nominated to load at a particular port was

found to be inadequate to lift the cargo

scheduled to move through that port, the

branch applied to the WSA for more vessels. When it was found that the facilities

of a port were in danger of being overburdened, the branch took steps to divert

some of the cargo and shipping to less

active ports.

The "picture" was constantly changing.

Shipments of troop impedimenta sometimes were delayed because in the final

inspection the troop unit to which it belonged was found not ready for oversea

duty. The technical services frequently

were unable to ship material as early as

had been expected because of production

lags or unforeseen demands from other

sources. Ships nominated for loading at a

certain time were often delayed in arriving

because of weather or enemy action, or

were diverted to other employment because of changed priorities. The task of

keeping cargoes and shipping capacities in

balance with respect to numerous loading

ports and numerous oversea destinations

required a constant flow of information

into the Ocean Traffic Branch, skilled

analysis of that information, and quick

action to make whatever adjustments in

plans and schedules might become necessary.94

The War Shipping Administration often

was unable to nominate as many ships as

it had tentatively allocated to load Army

cargo at a particular port, and the Army

sometimes failed to provide as much cargo

as had been forecast. Shortage of shipping

was a chronic condition, for while the

93

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 195-96. 94

 See numerous memos by Colonel Vissering and

Colonel Syran, and weekly statement, Shipping Estimate and Cargo Set-up, in OCT HB Wylie Shipping

and Cargo to UK 1942-44. See also Wardlow, op. cit.,

pp. 171-72, concerning the work of the Joint ArmyNavy-WSA Ship Operations Committee on the Pacific coast.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 359

shipyards produced unprecedented numbers of vessels in 1943 and 1944, the

requirements for expanding military operations and for lend-lease shipments were

insatiable. Shortages of Army cargo were

usually of brief duration and affected only

a few vessels. During a considerable part

of 1943, however, there was a persistent

scarcity of cargo at east coast ports because

the production of many items of Army

supply had fallen behind schedule, whereas the output of new ships was setting records. This condition had been largely

overcome by the beginning of 1944, but

shortages of cargo still occurred occasionally when exceptional circumstances

arose.95

In controlling the flow of traffic to the

seaboard the Chief of Transportation's

Traffic Control Division issued a permit to

cover each shipment.96 Requests for permits were made by the shippers (usually

depots) either in response to calls from the

ports, as in the case of supplies shipped

against requisitions and initial troop

equipment, or on receipt of directives from

the Stock Control Division of ASF headquarters, as in the case of special operational projects. In instances where more

than routine shipments were involved, the

Control Branch of the Traffic Control

Division, before issuing the permit, obtained assurance from the Water Division

that ships would be available to load the

cargo promptly. When emergency shipments were involved, a somewhat different

procedure was employed in the interest of

speed. The ASF Stock Control Division,

after establishing that the desired supplies

were available, ascertained from the Water

Division when and at what port or ports

the supplies could be loaded, and then

directed the technical services to make

shipments by express or fast freight as the

circumstances might warrant. The technical services notified the Traffic Control

Division when the shipment would be

ready to move and from what depots. The

Traffic Control Division then issued a permit and arranged for the necessary transportation to the ports. The Water Division

kept the ports informed regarding such

shipments.97

Large emergency shipments usually

presented a number of special problems.

The dispatch of 241 General Sherman

tanks to North Africa in January 1943 is a

good illustration. On 30 December 1942

an urgent message from General Eisenhower requested that 125 tanks for the

British Eighth Army be shipped to arrive

before 1 February 1943. The British Army

Staff in Washington requested that this

number be increased to 242. The tanks

were to be accompanied by extra engines,

spare parts, and ammunition. Later,

ninety-six self-propelled gun mounts were

added to the shipment. A convoy was

scheduled to sail from New York to North

Africa on 10 January, and the Water Division calculated that by adding two vessels

to this convoy and rearranging loading

plans it would be possible to accommodate the additional freight. The War Shipping Administration was requested to

provide the vessels and it did so by speeding up repair work on two ships that had

been scheduled for a later convoy. Since

95

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 196-97; ASF MPR, Dec

43. Sec. 3, pp. 48-49; Ltr, WSA to Col Hicks, 13 Oct

44. OCT 563.5. Sometimes cargo shortages were due

to the late nomination of vessels for Army loading,

usually the result of reduced lend-lease or naval requirements. 96

 See above, pp. 267-73. 97

 Memo, CG ASF for Cs of Tech Svs, 12 Jul 43,

sub: Rush Shipments to PEs, SPMOT 370.5 (12 Jul

43); ASF Memo S 55-23-43, 28 Aug 43, sub: Procedure for Release of Shipments (carload lots) to PEs,

both in OCT HB PE Gen Cargo Shipts to Ports.
360 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

CRATED FREIGHT LOADED ON THE SS WILLIAM S. CLARK, Los Angeles

Port of Embarkation.

the addition of two ships increased the

number in the convoy beyond the maximum the Navy had approved, it was

necessary to secure the Navy's concurrence. A search for 242 tanks that could

be promptly shipped to New York resulted

in the allocation of 169 from the Chester

Tank Depot in Pennsylvania and 30 from

the Toledo Tank Depot in Ohio; 42 were

already at New York. Spare parts and

other accessories were located at the Rock

Island Arsenal in Illinois. Since waiting

for these shipments would delay the sailing

of the convoy by three days, the approval

of the Operations Division of the War

Department General Staff was necessary.

The Traffic Control Division arranged for

rail equipment to be immediately assigned

and for special trains to be run from Toledo

and Rock Island. It obtained a daily report on the status of all shipments and

their progress toward New York. By 5 January all tanks had arrived at rail terminals

in the port.98 The convoy sailed on

13 January.

Responsibility for the preparation of

stowage plans with a view to making the

best possible use of ship space and deadweight capacity rested with the water divisions at the ports. The loading of "balanced" cargo was a continuing problem.

Basically this was due to the fact that

Army freight included so many items that

were relatively bulky and light and so few

that were dense and heavy. Two devices

98

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 31 Dec 42, sub: Tanks

for UGF-4 and UGS-4, and related documents in

OCT HB Wylie North Africa.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 361

TEN RAILROAD TANK CARS ON THE FORWARD DECK of a Liberty ship;

an equal number was carried on the after deck.

were employed to offset this handicap.

Open deck spaces were used to the practicable maximum for both crated and uncrated equipment, although this device

involved the development of special lashing and blocking methods and special

processing for uncrated items. Wherever

the Army considered it feasible from a

military standpoint, heavy lend-lease

items such as steel and canned goods were

mixed with military freight on Armyloaded vessels, and bulky military equipment was shipped with lend-lease cargoes

on vessels loaded by the War Shipping

Administration and the British Ministry

of War Transport. Despite these arrangements and careful planning throughout,

Army-loaded vessels, although they might

be "full," usually were not "down"—that

is, their cargoes were not heavy enough to

take them down to their legal load lines."

The efforts to approximate balanced

cargoes were handicapped by the necessity of shipping the matériel that had to

go, rather than that which would stow

most satisfactorily. This was especially true

in the case of shipments made in response

to urgent requisitions from the theaters

and shipments of impedimenta that had

to accompany troops. A number of special

types of stowage were devised to meet special conditions in the theaters, and they

also were usually inefficient from the

standpoint of using ship capacity to good

advantage.100

99

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 272-79, discusses this problem.

100

 See below, pp. 372-74.
362 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

In stowing vessels the ports of embarkation not only had to aim at maximum use

of the space and dead-weight capacity but

also had to keep in view the conditions

under which the cargo would be discharged overseas.101

 In the early part of

the war the theater commanders complained frequently that high-priority cargo

was stowed beneath routine supplies and

hence was not immediately available. In

the Pacific, where vessels sometimes called

at two or more ports, the cargo for the first

port might be at the bottom of the hold.

These mistakes were the result of the pressure of time under which the cargo was

loaded, inadequate marking, and failure

to understand the theater's desires. As the

Army system of oversea shipment became

better organized there was less occasion for

such complaints. Ships destined for primitive ports where there were no cranes or

derricks could not carry items heavier

than the ships' gear could handle. The

quickest method of overcoming the handicap was to install heavier booms on the

ships, and this was done extensively. As

soon as they could be procured, floating

and stationary cranes were installed at the

oversea ports where they were most

needed. Some of the floating cranes could

lift as much as 200 tons.

The war called for the shipment of

many difficult types of cargo. Some specialized ships were built, but these could

be justified only when the freight they

were designed to accommodate moved

regularly and in large quantities. Ingenuity was therefore required at the ports of

embarkation to move some of the larger

items of Army equipment to the theaters.

During the spring of 1944, for example,

the New York Port of Embarkation

shipped a large quantity of floating equipment—barges, car floats, and tugs—to

Europe for use in the invasion of the Continent. Among the early shipments were

ten 169-foot composite barges, which were

too large to be placed on the decks of

freighters and were not sufficiently strong

to be towed across the Atlantic during

heavy weather. Consequently, these barges

were mounted on car floats, which were

towed across.102 Tugs were a critical item

in the invasion, and more than 100 of them

were sent from the United States. The

largest of these tugs was 85 feet long and

weighed about 200 tons; special cradles

and lashings were devised and eighty-four

were loaded on the after decks of Liberty

ships, two to each voyage.103 At the start

of the invasion, although much of the

equipment had not yet arrived, General

Ross, Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA,

wrote to General Gross: "It is no secret

here that the Transportation Corps' floating equipment . . . saved the day."

 104

The possible need for specialized vessels

to carry assembled aircraft, tanks, locomotives, and vehicles was discussed during

1941, but no concrete action was taken

until after the United States had entered

the war. The prototype of such vessels was

the so-called seatrain, five of which were

operated commercially before the war for

transporting loaded railway cars between

U.S. Atlantic and Gulf ports and to

101

 OCT Cir 85, 1 Dec 42, sub: Vessel Opns at PEs.

The difficulties experienced in the respective theaters

are discussed in Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas. 102

 Memo, Wylie for Meyer, 25 Jan 44, sub: Barges

for ETO, OCT HB Wylie Shipg and Cargo for UK;

Hist Record, NYPE, First Quarter, 1944, pp. 42-53,

describes in detail the preparation of these tows. 103

 Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul

44, Mtg of Supts of Water Divs, 7 Jul 44, OCT HB

Water Div Misc; OCT HB Monograph 19, p. 201. 104

 Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross Day

File.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 363

Cuba.105 Soon after Pearl Harbor the

Army arranged with the Maritime Commission for the construction of fifty standard C-4 freighters with alterations to make

them similar to the seatrain.106 The demand for other types of ships was so heavy,

however, that delivery of these vessels

could not be expected before 1944, and

other developments intervened so that the

C-4 conversions were never undertaken.

During the spring of 1943 arrangements

were made for the transportation of assembled aircraft on the decks of tankers,

a procedure that reduced the number to

be transported in other ways. Tanks, vehicles, and locomotives meanwhile were

being satisfactorily transported in the

holds or on the decks of regular cargo

ships. The military authorities decided,

nevertheless, to convert forty-eight Liberty

ships (EC-2 freighters) for this special

service, since Liberties were being built

rapidly in large numbers. Under the program eight ZEC-2's, which were intended

originally for the transportation of tanks

but were used chiefly for aircraft, were

completed in late 1943 and early 1944;

twenty-eight ZEC-5's, which had larger

hatches and were intended for aircraft,

were delivered during 1945. The conversion project was halted by the cessation of

hostilities.107

The oversea transportation of aircraft

was a formidable undertaking. The larger

types could be flown (ferried) to the theaters, but the remainder had to be moved

by water. Whether they were shipped

assembled or as crated parts, they were

bulky cargo that required special attention in handling and stowing. While disassembling and crating before shipment

simplified the transportation problem, it

involved the establishment of assembly

facilities overseas and a considerable loss

of time between arrival and readiness for

service. More than 85,000 aircraft were

delivered to the oversea commanders during the war; about 56 percent of these

were shipped by sea transport (both assembled and disassembled), and about 44

percent were flown to the theaters under

their own power. (Table 29)

In the effort to meet the requirements

for transportation by water, all possible

methods of accommodating aircraft on

ships were exploited.108 During the early

part of the war, since only a limited number could be carried on the decks of cargo

ships and no provision had been made for

stowing assembled planes below deck,

attention had to be given to the development of a system of crating that would be

satisfactory from the standpoint of handling and stowing and would also give

adequate protection to the aircraft parts.109

105

 OCT HB Monograph 18, pp. 57-68. During the

war two of these vessels were assigned to the Navy

and two to the Army. 106

 Ltr, Chm Mar Com to Col Gross, 23 Jan 42,

OCT HB Gross Seatrains; Ltrs, CofS USA to Chm

Mar Com, 2 Feb 42 and 26 Feb 42, G-4/29717-133;

JMTC 6th Mtg, 8 Apr 42; Memo, CofT for CofS

USA, 11 May 43; Memo, CofS USA for CNO, 14

May 43, last two in OCT 452.1. 107

 Memo, Col Hicks for Col Warren, 7 Aug 43,

sub: Alteration of EC-2 Cargo Vessels, OCT 564

EC-2 Vessels; Memo, Wylie for Styer, 30 Oct 43,

OCT 564 Army Vessels; Memo, CofT for SFPE, 4

Aug 44, OCT 565.2 SF; JCS 1062, 23 Sep 44; JCS

1062/1, 28 Oct 44; Ltr, JCS to Chm Mar Com, 1 Nov

44, OPD ABC 564 (23 Sep 44); Rpt, Water Div OCT,

FY 1945, p. 19, OCT HB Water Div Rpts. 108

 During the late 1930's experiments with the

transportation of assembled aircraft were undertaken,

but no plans for large-scale movements were made;

see Memo, CG SOS for CG ASC, 11 Mar 42, G-4/

29717-128. 109

 Memo, Somervell for Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, undated but evidently written in late December 1941 or

early January 1942, sub: Crating of Aircraft; Memo,

Trans Br G-4 for AAF, 19 Jan 42, sub: Crating and

Loading of Airplanes; both in OCT HB Topic AAF;

Memo, Gross for PEs, 23 Apr 42, sub: Stowage of Aircraft, OCT 452.
364 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

At the request of the Army Air Forces the

Chief of Transportation investigated the

possibility of using seagoing barges for

transporting assembled planes to West

Africa, but concluded that this method

was not practicable.110 As naval escort

carriers entered service to protect merchant ship convoys, the Chief of Transportation, acting in accordance with a decision

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arranged for

the transportation of assembled aircraft on

those vessels. The most productive method

was that of loading aircraft on the decks of

tankers, a method that came into extensive

use beginning in March 1943.

The matter of transporting aircraft had

become acute by the winter of 1942-43,

and the decision to equip the decks of

American and British tankers for this purpose was one of several features of an

action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

increase the movement of assembled

planes.111 Although several devices were

employed, the most satisfactory was the

"meccano" or false deck erected above the

main deck, which provided an unbroken

area for the stowage of aircraft and other

light equipment. A Committee on Aircraft

Transportation consisting of representatives of the Army Transportation Corps,

the Army Air Forces, the Navy, the War

Shipping Administration, and the British

Ministry of War Transport was set up to

implement all features of the JCS action.112

At the same time the Chief of Transportation established a committee within his

own office to deal with this and related

matters, and later a special branch was

established in the Water Division to handle aircraft transportation.113

 Difficulties

were encountered by the Chief of Transportation in establishing effective liaison

between his office, the Air Forces, and the

tanker-operating agencies (Navy, WSA,

and BMWT), and problems arose because

of the inability of some oversea ports to

discharge assembled aircraft and clear

them through the city streets, but on the

whole the arrangement worked out very

satisfactorily and the added transportation

capacity was a boon to both the Transportation Corps and the Air Forces.114

More than 600 tankers under American

and British control were equipped to carry

the smaller types of aircraft on deck, and

they transported more than 20,000 to the

oversea commands between March 1943

and the end of the hostilities.115 Although

the Committee on Aircraft Transportation

110

 Memo, CG ASF for CG SOS, 28 Aug 42, sub:

Seagoing Barges; 2d Ind, CofT for ACofS for Matériel

ASF, 10 Sep 42; both in OCT 561.1 Gen. 111

 JMTC 23d Mtg, 31 Dec 42; JCS 192, 11 Jan 43;

JMTC 25th Mtg, 14 Jan 43; Memo, Stokes for Wylie,

22 Feb 43, OCT 452.1; JCS 192/1, 3 Apr 43; JCS

192/2, 17 Sep 43; DF, ACofS OPD for CG ASF, 24

Sep 43, G-4 561. 112

 Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Curtis F. Bryan of the

Water Division, OCT, acted as executive secretary of

this committee. Concerning progress under this

action, see Memo, Maj Bryan for ACofT for Opns,

20 May 43, OCT 458.14 Army Vessels; Memo, CG

ASF for OPD, 7 Sep 43, sub: Oversea Shipt of Aircraft, ASF SP 452.1 (4 Sep 43). 113

 Memo, Wylie for Franklin, 12 Mar 43, sub:

Shipt of Fully Assembled Aircraft, OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks; OCT Office Order 5-15, 23 Jun 43;

Memo, C of Water Div to All Branch Chiefs, 14 Apr

44, sub: Aircraft and Troop Trans Br, OCT HB

Water Div Misc. 114

 Memo by Tanker Div WSA, 27 Apr 43, sub:

Trans of Fighter Planes, OCT HB Topic MC/WSA

Opns; Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 14 Aug 43, OCT

563.51-565.2 SF; Memo, CofT for CGs NYPE and

HRPE, 4 Oct 43, sub: Deck Loading of Tankers for

North African Discharge, OCT 563.51-565.1 Africa;

Memo, CofT for CGs SFPE and LAPE, 13 Nov 43,

sub: Deck Loading of Aircraft, and related documents

in OCT 563.31 Tankers; Memo, CG ASF for CNO,

30 Mar 44, sub: Nondelivery of Deck-Loaded Army

Planes, ASF Hq Navy; ASF Staff Conf, 27 Apr 44,

p. 2.

115

 Table compiled for statistical volume of this

series, based on data obtained monthly from the AAF

and published in ASF MPR, Sec. 3. See especially

ASF MPR, Apr 45, Sec. 3, pp. 42, 43.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 365

TABLE 29—AIRCRAFT DISPATCHED TO THE ARMY AIR FORCES OVERSEAS, BY SEA AND BY

AIR, CRATED AND UNCRATED: JANUARY 1942-JULY 1945

 a

a

 Data do not include aircraft assigned to other nations under lend-lease, which numbered over 44,000 according to statistics from the

Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, in OCT HB Topic Lend-Lease. b

 Includes 1,175 very heavy bombers dispatched in 1945.

Source: Data obtained from Office of Statistical Control, AAF, by Control Division, OCT, for ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec. 3,

Transportation, and republished in ASF Statistical Review, World War II (Washington, 1946), pp. 136-37.

exploited all other means, approximately

two thirds of the aircraft shipped under its

jurisdiction from March 1943 through

April 1945 were carried on tanker decks.

(Table 30) Comparison of the data in Table

30 with those in Table 29 will show that a

substantial number of the aircraft shipped

by water did not come under the cognizance of this committee; these were mainly

crated aircraft shipped on regular cargo

ships.

Although the transportation of assembled aircraft on the decks of tankers and

cargo vessels and by escort aircraft carriers

went a long way toward meeting the requirements so far as numbers were concerned, the most satisfactory method was

by specialized aircraft transport such as

the ZEC vessels. Below-deck stowage was

preferable to transportation on the open

deck because it obviated the danger of

weather damage. The aircraft transports

were equipped with shops and carried

technicians so that the aircraft could be

worked on during the voyage and landed

in virtually fly-away condition.116 Since

aircraft transportation was their primary

purpose, they could be sent wherever aircraft were needed, thus avoiding the handicap arising from the fact that the destinations of cargo vessels, tankers, and escort

aircraft carriers were determined by other

factors. These considerations were especially important in planning for the delivery of aircraft to the Pacific during the

final stages of the war against Japan; hence

the program for the acquisition of additional ZEC vessels during 1945 was undertaken. The ZEC-5's could take fighter

planes as large as the P-47 below deck in

116

 Memo, Maj Bryan for ACofT for Opns, 5 Aug

43, OCT 564 EC-2 Vessels; Memo, Wylie for Styer,

30 Oct 43, sub: Cargo Ship Conversion to Airplane

Carriers, OCT HB Water Div Aircraft Ships.
366 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 30—ARMY AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTED OVERSEAS UNDER THE COGNIZANCE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTATION: MARCH 1943-ApRiL 1945

 a

a

 The committee was established in March 1943 to exploit all means not previously used to the limit in order to increase the transportation of assembled aircraft overseas. b

 Crated aircraft shipped on cargo vessels did not come under the cognizance of the committee.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, April 1945, Sec. 3, Transportation, p. 42; study based on records of Water Division, OCT.

assembled condition by removing the

wing tips, propellers, and stabilizers.117

The Liberty ships converted to aircraft

transports could carry about 3,000 measurement tons of cargo in addition to

aircraft.

Tanks also were a type of cargo with

which the Army had had very limited experience. During the early months of the

war those shipped on deck suffered heavy

damage from the penetration of salt water

and salt air, and the complaints from the

oversea commanders were numerous. In

the fall of 1942 the Chief of Ordnance requested the Chief of Transportation to

avoid deck loading as much as possible,

and the ports of embarkation were so

instructed.118 Nevertheless, tanks had to

be carried on deck on some occasions because the number to be moved exceeded

the number that could be economically

stowed in the 'tween decks and the holds.

Below-deck stowage involved a sacrifice of

space because of the heavy blocking and

bracing required and the unused space

above the turrets. The amount of broken

stowage was reduced, when suitable cargo

was available, by placing a layer of solid

cargo below the tanks and by stowing light

packages around the turrets. In some instances false decks were built above the

tanks, on which light cargo could be

stowed, but this was not done extensively

because of the cost in time and material.

The feasibility of placing housing over

tanks that were carried on deck was investigated, but the plan was not found

practicable.119

As the war progressed the damage to

tanks shipped as deck cargo was minimized by more effective processing at the

Ordnance depots and final sealing at the

ports, yet more than 90 percent of those

shipped to the U.S. forces overseas were

117

 The number of aircraft of various types transportable below deck is given as computed for planning purposes in Misc Shipping Information, p. 14,

OCT HB Plng Div Gen. This document indicates

that thirty-nine P-47's could be carried below deck. 118

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 25 Sep 42, sub: Shipt of

Tanks; Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS, 10 Oct 42;

Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 1 Dec 42; Memo, CG SOS

for CofT, 11 Dec 42; Memo, CofT for PEs, 21 Dec

42; all in OCT 470.8. 119

 Interviews with Daniel J. McKenzie and Edgar

C. Seward, who were with the Stevedoring and Ship

Facilities Branch, Water Division, OCT, during the

war; see Memo for Record, 27 Feb 52, OCT HB PE

Gen Stevedoring.
TRANSPORTING AIRCRAFT ON DECK. Liberty ship leaves San Francisco with aircraft

as a deck load (above). A tanker arrives at an Irish port with P-47's lashed to a false deck (below).
368 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

carried below deck.120 Regular cargo ships

handled most of this traffic. The two seatrains in Army service were used only part

of the time for tanks. Although eight Liberty ships (ZEC-2's) were fitted with large

hatches and 30-ton booms to serve as specialized tank carriers, these vessels were

used almost entirely as aircraft transports

because the movement of assembled planes

was so urgent. The Navy's LST's lifted

some tanks from the zone of interior, but

their principal employment was within

the theaters.

The transportation of motor vehicles

likewise presented troublesome problems.

More than 1,500,000 were shipped overseas during the war—roughly one vehicle

for every five men. Efforts were made to

hold down the motor equipment sent to

the theaters, but the oversea requirements

seemed insatiable.121 Whether vehicles

were shipped fully assembled or partially

disassembled and boxed, they were bulky

in proportion to their weight and so contributed to the unbalance of Army cargoes. Although many vehicles were loaded

on deck, the great majority had to be carried below deck where they added to the

amount of broken stowage.

The theater commanders naturally preferred to receive vehicles that were fully

assembled, but the shipping space required

for transporting them in that condition

was more than could be allowed in view

of other requirements. The best method of

conserving vessel space was to ship motor

equipment completely knocked down

(CKD), but that method involved the

establishment of extensive assembling

plants in the oversea commands, and in

most instances this was not feasible. In

order to meet the problem several methods

of partially knocking down and crating

vehicles were developed that used less ship

space than fully assembled equipment and

at the same time lightened the task of the

theater commanders in putting the vehicles into serviceable condition. The

semi-knocked-down (SKD) or medium

knocked-down (MKD) method called for

partial disassembling and crating. The

single-unit pack (SUP) involved simply

placing the wheels in the vehicle and inclosing it in a crate. The twin-unit pack

(TUP) involved further knockdown and

the combining of the parts of two vehicles

in from two to five boxes. In considering

the relative advantage of these methods it

inevitably worked out that the greater the

saving of shipping space, the greater the

burden of reassembly imposed on the

oversea commanders.

The conservation of space by shipping

vehicles in the smallest practicable packages naturally found support in the Office

of the Chief of Transportation, and it was

strongly advocated by the Combined

Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB), a

civilian British-American organization established early in the war to assist in the

effective utilization of Allied shipping resources.122

 However, the determining

factor was the situation in the area of

destination—that is, the facilities for reassembling disassembled or partially

120

 OCT HB Monograph 19, p. 190; although not

expressly stated, the data used in the compilation unquestionably include armored and tracked vehicles

other than tanks. 121

 Memo, Marshall for Somervell, 23 Sep 42, and

reply, 24 Sep 42, both in ASF Hq CofS. 122

 Memo, ACofS G-4 for ASW, 5 Mar 42, sub:

Crating of Vehicles, G-4/33889; Memo, CSAB London for Chiefs of Staff, 19 Mar 42, OCT 563.5;

Memo, CG SOS for ASW, 19 Jun 42, sub: Shipment

of Vehicles, OCT 563.5; CGS Memo for Information

25, 10 Oct 42, and atchd Memo from CSAB Washington, 1 Oct 42; Memo, C of Water Div for Gross, 15

Oct 42, sub: Remarks on CSAB Memo, OCT HB

Water Div Vehicles and Tanks.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 369

knocked-down vehicles and the urgency of

the need for serviceable equipment. Late

in 1943 with large numbers of new ships

entering service, ASF headquarters notified the Ordnance Department that vehicles larger than the 21⁄2-ton truck could

thenceforward be shipped on wheels—

that is, unboxed. At that time the Chief of

Transportation pointed out that on the

average unboxed vehicles used three times

as much ship space as those that were

boxed.123 Economy in the use of freight

car space also was an important consideration. But the urgent need for service-ready

motor equipment in the European theater

in 1944 necessitated the shipment of many

vehicles on wheels or in single-unit packs,

and commanders in other theaters pressed

for the same consideration, with the result

that the transportation point of view was

largely overruled.124 The percentage of

unboxed vehicles shipped in 1944 and

1945 increased appreciably as compared

with 1943. (Table 31)

The ports of embarkation were responsible for processing all unboxed vehicles to

protect them during the voyage and to

obviate extensive reconditioning after arrival overseas.125

 The processing work,

which was under the direction of the port

ordnance officer, included cleaning and

lubricating the vehicles, tightening body

bolts, making necessary body and machinery repairs, spraying metal parts with

a preservative compound, taping machinery joints, replacing missing tools and

spare parts, and barricading the loose

items to prevent pilferage. Vehicle processing, like the processing of troops at the

staging areas, was a function that ordinarily would not have devolved upon the

port commanders. But as a practical matter it was found desirable for the vehicles

to be prepared for the ocean voyage after

their arrival at the ports and immediately

before they were placed on shipboard. In

addition to general and special purpose

wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles, tanks,

and artillery were processed. Used vehicles being shipped as troop unit equipment, as well as new vehicles, passed

through the processing plants.

No vessels were especially converted in

the zone of interior to transport vehicles,

although some special types of loading

were developed in order to move large

numbers of vehicles to the Mediterranean

and European theaters. The European

theater converted about 200 Liberty ships

to make each one capable of ferrying 120

loaded vehicles and tanks with their crews

across the English Channel during the invasion of the Continent.126

 The conversion

work on these so-called motor transport

vessels (MTVs), involving chiefly the installation of bunks and sanitary facilities

for the crews and some heavy lift booms,

was accomplished in the United Kingdom.

The 14th Port, stationed at Southampton,

loaded 127,000 vehicles and tanks into

MTV's between D Day and 31 January

1945. The number of such vessels in service naturally was reduced after the invasion

had been successfully launched.

Locomotives were among the heavier

items shipped to the theaters. Altogether

123

 Memo, C of Ocean Traf Br Water Div for CG

NYPE, 19 Nov 43; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 4 Dec

43, sub: Shipment of Boxed Vehicles; both in OCT

HB Water Div Vehicles and Tanks. 124

 Memo, CofT for Stock Contl Div ASF, 2 Jun 44;

1st Ind, CG ASF for CofT, 12 Jun 44; both in OCT

505 Ordnance. 125

 See above, pp. 151-52, for discussion and documentation. For detailed description of the processing

operation, see report on Emeryville Motor Depot,

OCT HB SFPE. 126

 Memo, Meyer for Gross, et al., 16 Feb 44, OCT

HB Meyer Staybacks; A Two-Year History of the

14th Port, Feb 43-Feb 45, p. 20, OCT HB 14th Port.
370 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 31—MOTOR VEHICLES TRANSPORTED TO THE OVERSEA COMMANDS: JANUARY 1943-

JUNE 1945 a

a

 Data for other war months not available. Motor vehicles shipped under lend-lease to Allied nations are not included.

Source: OCT HB Monograph 19, p. 182, based on data obtained from the Vessel Operations Analysis Branch, Water Division, OCT.

2,030 locomotives were dispatched from

U.S. ports to the forces overseas during

the war.127 The 2-8-0 Consolidation type,

which was the one chiefly used by the Military Railway Service, weighed about 70

tons; the large diesel locomotives sent to

Italy and Iran weighed as much as 127

tons. All were shipped as deck cargo except the small number moved on the seatrains. The transportation of locomotives

on deck required the use of cradles to

spread the load, heavy shoring in the

'tween decks, and shoring in the holds of

some vessels.128 The loading and discharging of steam locomotives was facilitated by the use of a lifting bar attached

to the dome and the front of the boiler,

which was a great improvement over the

conventional sling. Like tanks and vehicles

shipped on deck, locomotives required

thorough processing to prevent weather

damage. While much of the processing

was done by the builders and by the holding and reconsignment points where many

locomotives were stored before being

shipped overseas, the ports made a final

check to determine whether the equipment was adequately protected and corrected any deficiencies.129

Although the use of animals in theaters

of operations was greatly reduced by the

motorization of the ground forces, it was

not entirely eliminated. Some horses and

mules were procured in the theaters and

others were dispatched from the zone of

interior. No mounted cavalry units were

sent overseas; hence no horses were shipped

for that purpose. However, it was found

that pack animals, particularly mules,

could go places where the jeep could not

penetrate, and approximately 7,800 such

animals were shipped from the United

States during the war.130 Small shipments

were made to various oversea bases, but

the principal requirements were for use in

the jungles of Burma and in the mountains

of Italy. About 3,000 surplus horses and 127

 Data compiled for statistical volume of this

series, now in preparation. In addition, 3,700 locomotives were shipped under lend-lease. 128

 Instructions, Unboxed Locomotives, received

from NYPE, 26 Feb 43, OCT HB NYPE Water Div. 129

 Instructions, Preparation of Steam Locomotives

for Storage and Ocean Transit, undated, OCT HB

Rail Div MRS; TC Cir 75-1, 1 Jan 44. 130

 Risch and Kieffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Vol. II, Ch. X. In addition, 3,500 mules were shipped from the United States

to the United Kingdom under lend-lease. The 1,900

war dogs shipped overseas presented no transportation problems.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 371

mules were moved from Australia to Calcutta for the American and Chinese forces

during the last half of 1944.131

One chartered Dutch ship and seventeen American freighters were converted

to animal transports; two of them were

sunk, one in the Indian Ocean and one in

the Pacific. The standard capacity was

320 animals, but several of the vessels carried more; the largest capacity was 679.132

Stalls were erected on deck in some cases,

but most animals were shipped in 'tweendeck spaces. Temporary accommodations

were installed also for the personnel of a

veterinary detachment and for animal attendants. The New Orleans Port of Embarkation loaded most of the animals

shipped from the east coast; those shipped

from the west coast were loaded at San

Francisco and Los Angeles.

Refrigerator ship space fell short of

Army requirements throughout the

war.133 Although substantial amounts of

perishable foods were shipped to the forces

overseas, the freezer and chilled space

available did not enable the Army to dispatch the quantities of fresh meats, vegetables, fruits, milk, butter, and eggs that

its program called for. Additional ships

with full or partial refrigeration could be

provided only at the expense of more than

a proportionate amount of general cargo

space and the time required for conversion, and for those reasons the increase of

"reefer" space was held to a minimum

until late in the war. The shortage of cold

storage warehouse space in many oversea

areas resulted in vessels with perishable

supplies being held in ports for abnormally long periods, with a corresponding

reduction in their ability to deliver additional cargoes.134

 Civilian requirements

were substantial in some areas and competed with military requirements for ship

space.135 In the Pacific, where the problem

was particularly acute because of the

climate, the distances, and the absence of

refrigeration facilities on shore, there was

competition between the Navy's requirements for the Pacific Ocean Areas and the

Army's requirements for the Southwest

Pacific Area.136

The Army depended almost entirely on

the War Shipping Administration for

reefer space. The Navy had a considerable number of reefer ships under its control, but they were heavily committed.

Army commanders in the Pacific, the

Mediterranean, and the European theaters were constantly pressing for more refrigerator-ship capacity, not only for the

delivery of supplies from the zone of

interior but also for intratheater movements. Various devices were employed in

the effort to meet these requirements.

During 1941 the Army began to use refrigerator boxes with about 360 cubic feet

capacity that could be carried on the

131

 Ltrs, Col Hicks to WSA, 1 May 44, 21 Jul 44,

and 14 Sep 44; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 25 Jan 45,

sub: Equipment of Animal Carriers; all in OCT 454

India. 132

 List, Animal Transport Conversions by WSA

for Army Use, prepared by Water Division OCT, 7

Apr 47, OCT HB Water Div Misc. 133

 Memo, Col Syran for Col Bryan, 12 Oct 45,

OCT HB Water Div Reefer Ships; Memo, CG SFPE

for CofT, 18 Sep 45, p. 13, sub: Report on Accomplishments and Handicaps, OCT HB SFPE Gen. 134

 Msg, Casablanca to AGWAR, 8 Feb 43, CMIN 4017; Msg, Somervell to AFHQ, FREEDOM

Algiers, 11 Feb 43, CM-OUT 3982; Msg, CofT for

CG SOS NATOUSA, 1 Dec 43, CM-OUT 487. 135

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

6-9 Jul 44, morning session, 9 Jul 44, p. 29, OCT HB

PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; Ltrs, Col Hicks to WSA,

11 and 13 Jul 44, OCT 561.1 England. 136

 Memo, Gross for CNO, 9 Feb 44, sub: Reefer

Ships for SWPA; Memo, Gross for Rear Adm

William W. Smith, 17 Nov 44, sub: Reefer Vessel

Problem; both in OCT 565.4 Refrigerator Vessels.
372 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

decks of cargo vessels and put ashore at

destination. Use of such boxes was continued during the war, and larger portable

refrigerator "warehouses" were employed

in the same way.137 Small freight vessels

and barges were converted in the Pacific

area commands to carry perishable supplies to outlying bases.138

 The Chief of

Transportation built 100 steel nonpropelled reefer barges 112 feet in length, and

converted 5 larger barges.139 In the Southwest Pacific, where many of these barges

were in service, they were used as cold

storage warehouses at advance bases as

well as for transportation between bases.

In July 1944, on the assumption that the

major military effort would be turned

against Japan in 1945, the Joint Logistics

Committee reviewed the reefer-ship situation. The study disclosed that on 31 May

1944 there were 148 wholly or partially

refrigerated ocean-going vessels under

U.S. control, with a total of 15,601,000

cubic feet of reefer space.140 The program

at that time called for the addition within

the next twelve months of 218 fully or partially refrigerated vessels with a total of

8,475,000 cubic feet of reefer space. In the

light of estimated requirements of the

armed forces during 1945, the committee

submitted a recommendation, which the

Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, that the

Maritime Commission be requested to

provide an additional 1,200,000 cubic feet

of reefer space distributed among seven

large-sized and eight medium-sized

freighters to be completed in 1945. As late

as May 1945, with the fighting in Europe

finished, the need for general cargo ships

and the delay to delivery caused by the

installation of refrigerating equipment

were still factors in holding down the

number of new freighters to be converted

for the transportation of perishables.141

Aside from the problems of handling

and stowage resulting from the character

of Army cargo, shipping operations were

complicated by the use of a number of

special types of loading that were designed

to facilitate the unloading and distribution

of the cargoes overseas. The significance

of such special loading to the Transportation Corps lay in the fact that it involved

an unusual amount of broken stowage or

an unusual detention of the vessels in the

theaters, or both. These were disadvantages that had to be accepted in order to

give maximum support to military operations in active combat areas.

It was advantageous to have organizational equipment and supplies accompany

troops to their new oversea stations, and

the type of loading employed depended

on the use to be made of the troops upon

their arrival in the theaters. When it was

desirable only that the troops and their

impedimenta should arrive at the same

time, convoy loading or unit loading was

employed. Convoy loading implied only

that the impedimenta should move in the

same convoy with the troops, and it usu137

 Memo for Record, Col Cordiner, sub: Digest of

Activities—Transportation Division, 29 Mar 41, p.

10, OCT HB OQMG Water Transport Br; Msg,

SOS Hq, Washington, to FREEDOM Algiers, 11 Feb

43, CM-OUT 3754; Memo, CofT for CofEngrs, 11

Nov 44, sub: Reefer Warehouses on Liberty Ships,

OCT 568 Liberty Vessels. 138

 Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the

Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 394-402; Army

Port and SvC, Honolulu, TC Weekly News Letter,

15 Nov 44, OCT HB Central Pacific. 139

 Rpt, Army Small Boat Construction, 1 Jul 40-

31 May 45, p. 51, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats. 140

 JCS 966, 24 Jul 44. The total included 47 fully

refrigerated and 80 partially refrigerated merchant

vessels, and 21 naval provision ships; 102 were under

WSA control, 43 under Navy control, and 3 under

Army control. Vessels with 10,000 or more cubic feet

of reefer space were considered partially refrigerated. 141

 Ltr, JCS to Mar Com, 5 May 45, OPD 561,

Sec. III.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 373

ally called for no unusual methods of

stowage. Unit loading meant that the

troops and their impedimenta were loaded

in the same ship, and if the troops were

likely to see early action their vital equipment was stowed so that it would be

readily accessible. This type of loading

frequently resulted in unbalanced cargoes

and an unusual amount of broken stowage. Combat loading was employed when

units were to be landed in assault operations. Equipment and supplies required

in the assault were loaded in the same ship

with the troops and were stowed so that

they could be discharged quickly and in

the order in which they would be needed.

This type of loading might involve a sacrifice of as much as 35 percent of the cargo

space.142 Most amphibious assault forces

were mounted in the theaters, but there

were some notable exceptions. General

Patton's Western Task Force, which

landed in northwest Africa, and General

Middleton's 45th Division, which participated in the assault on Sicily, were

combat loaded at Hampton Roads.143 The

expedition against Attu was mounted at

San Francisco. Some small units of the

Okinawa invasion force were embarked

at San Francisco and Seattle.

The necessity of moving many fully assembled vehicles within the Mediterranean for the assault on southern France

led to a special type of stowage known as

flatting. When the ships were being loaded

at U.S. ports, ammunition and heavy

rations beyond the theater's immediate

requirements were placed deep in the

holds to serve as ballast. They were covered over with a solid wood floor on which

vehicles were placed. More than 150 vessels were loaded in this manner. The vehicles were discharged as soon as the

vessels arrived in the theater, but the

flatted cargo remained while the vessels

made several intratheater trips with additional vehicles. The ammunition and

rations were discharged when they were

needed by the theater, and in any case before the vessels returned to the zone of interior.144

 This type of loading was used

also in moving vehicles from the European

theater to the Pacific after V-E Day. The

Liberty ships used to transport vehicles

from the United Kingdom to the Continent in the invasion of northern France

did not carry flatted cargo but were ballasted with sand.

Block loading was a system used in the

Pacific beginning in late 1943 for the resupply of invasion troops. It involved

loading vessels with carefully organized

blocks of supplies of the kind troops were

likely to require soon after landing. The

blocks were discharged when and where

they were needed. The system assured the

ready availability of rations, ammunition,

and other supplies in invasion areas, and

since the supplies could be ordered by

block numbers it dispensed with the detailed work of requisitioning item by item.

It also avoided the necessity of establishing

storage operations ashore during the early

stages of the invasions. Loading was done

according to a standardized stowage plan

so that needed commodities could be

readily found. Block loading, since it involved the use of ships for storage pur142

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 12-14; WD FM 55-105,

25 Sep 44, pp. 35-36, sub: Water Transportation—

Ocean-going Vessels. 143

 The Road to Victory, A History of Hampton

Roads Port of Embarkation, ed., Maj. William

Reginald Wheeler, 2 vols. (Newport News, Virginia,

1946, printed by the Yale University Press, New

Haven, Connecticut), Vol. I, Chs. VII and IX. 144

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

6-9 Jul 44, Mtg of Superintendents of Water Divs, 7

Jul 44, pp. 3 and 4, OCT HB PE Gen; Rpt, Water

Div OCT, FY 1945, p. 23.
374 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

poses, was contrary to the general doctrine

of the Chief of Transportation that vessels

should be discharged as quickly as possible, but it met an urgent need at many

forward Pacific bases.145 A similar system

was utilized in the invasion of Normandy,

although in that case it was called prestowing. During the period May-July

1944 fifty-four prestowed ships were dispatched from the zone of interior to the

United Kingdom, where they were held

until they were called to the Continent for

discharge.146

Commodity loading was a plan devised

specifically for the invasion of the European continent, where the requirements

for supplies were expected to be extremely

heavy and also somewhat unpredictable.

Entire ships were loaded with commodities of a particular type such as ammunition, clothing, rations, and engineer

materiel. Some commodity-loaded ships

carried a combination of signal and medical supplies. Here again the ships were to

be used for storage purposes until adequate storage facilities were established on

shore. Having a limited range of supplies

in each ship facilitated discharge and simplified the transfer of the matériel from

the beaches and ports to dumps and

depots.147 Some of these cargoes, of course,

failed to utilize the entire dead weight of

the ships, while others left an abnormal

amount of unused cubic capacity.148

The principal complaint of the Chief of

Transportation, however, stemmed from

the length of time commodity-loaded

ships were held in the theater. Delayed

discharge was inherent in the plan, but it

was greatly increased by the congestion

that developed at French ports during the

summer and fall of 1944 and by the delay

in providing adequate storage facilities

ashore.149 From May through December

1944 more than 700 commodity-loaded

vessels were dispatched from the United

States to northern Europe. A larger number had been contemplated, but because

of the backlog of ships awaiting discharge

at French ports, the program was reduced

late in 1944.150 At the end of February

1945 General Somervell, with a view to

making "the fullest and most efficient use

of all cargo space available in all Armyallocated ships," undertook to discontinue

commodity loading.151 But the theater

still wanted this type of loading, and it was

continued on a limited scale for several

months.

Army mail was a type of cargo that required careful handling at all times, and

at certain periods it attained considerable

bulk. Since the prompt delivery of letters

and packages was an important factor in

maintaining troop morale, ports of embarkation required large plants and organizations not only physically to handle

the mail, but also to maintain records of

the locations of troop units, to provide cor145

 See Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan, Ch. IV. 146

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

cited n. 144, ASF MPR, Dec 44, Sec. 3, p. 56; Comments by Gen Goodman on the original manuscript

for this volume, p. 7, OCT HB PE Gen Oversea

Supply. 147

 The problem of unloading vessels carrying a

wide variety of commodities had been pointed out by

the North African theater in July 1943, when the

build-up of supplies at North African ports for the

invasion of Sicily and Italy was under way; see Msg,

Algiers to NYPE, 5 Jul 43, CM-IN 3163. 148

 ASF MPR, Aug 44, Sec. 3, p. 55. 149

 Wardlow, op cit., pp. 287-90. 150

 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 12 Oct 44; Memo,

Gross for Somervell, 4 Jan 45; both in OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks; Msg, COMZONE ETOUSA to

WD, 11 Jan 45, CM-IN 10111; ASF MPR, Dec 44,

Sec. 3, p. 56. 151

 Msg, Somervell to Gen Lee, CG COMZONE

ETOUSA, 28 Feb 45, CM-OUT 45333.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 375

rect labels for mail incompletely or inaccurately addressed, and to insure that it

was dispatched promptly and to the correct oversea destinations.152

 When General

Somervell visited the North African theater in January 1943, he reported that the

mail situation there was unsatisfactory

and implied that this was not an isolated

case.153

Responsibility for improving the service

rested only partly with the Chief of Transportation; it was shared by the Army

Postal Service, the U.S. Post Office Department, and the originators of mail, who

in a surprising number of cases were either

uninformed or grossly negligent in affixing

addresses. Ports of embarkation were instructed to be sure that all mail sacks were

correctly labeled, that they were placed

on the ships that would deliver them to

their destinations at the earliest time, that

they were distributed over a number of

ships in convoys so that a large quantity

of mail would not be lost in the sinking of

a single vessel, that they were given top

stowage to facilitate immediate discharge,

and that they were safeguarded against

pilferage at all times. It was important to

keep the mail flowing regularly, since interruptions and deliveries out of sequence

inevitably brought complaints from soldiers and their families.154

The volume of Army mail to be shipped

overseas increased greatly with the approach of each Christmas season. The

peak came in the fall of 1944; in October

of that year the ports of embarkation dispatched 162,900 measurement tons of

mail, and in November they dispatched

178,800 measurement tons.155 During the

1944 Christmas mailing period the New

York Port of Embarkation shipped about

2,600,000 sacks of mail and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation about 750,000

sacks. Some mail could be loaded in

broken stowage without actual loss of ship

space, but the Chief of Transportation in

a report to General Somervell stated that

Christmas mail for that year had cost the

armed forces the equivalent of about

twenty-one ships that would otherwise

have been available for military cargoes.156

This report expressed no criticism of the

program, but there was a feeling among

those concerned with finding sufficient

shipping to meet military needs that a

more drastic restriction should have been

placed on the size of parcels and that the

quantity of Army printed matter shipped

as mail should have been reduced.

From December 1944 through May

1945 with the strength of the forces overseas at its highest level, mail shipments by

water averaged about 65,000 measurement tons a month. During this period it

was necessary to ship some air mail to

Europe by surface carrier because of the

shortage of space on aircraft. Consideration was given to a special lightweight

form for Army air mail, but it was not

152

 Memo, CG SOS for PEs, 23 Jun 42, sub: Mail

Handling at PEs, AG 311.1 (6-23-42); Organizational Manual NYPE, 1 Jul 44, Sec 311.00, OCT HB

NYPE Gen; Information Concerning NYPE Army

Post Office, undated, OCT HB NYPE Army Post

Office. 153

 Memo, Somervell for Styer, 23 Jan 43, par. 10,

OCT HB Wylie Urgent Matters. 154

 For a discussion of these problems, see Msg,

NYPE to OCT, 14 Oct 44, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CG ASF for CG NYPE, through

CofT, 14 Feb 45, sub: Handling of Mail for ETO,

AG 311.1 (1-4-45). 155

 Memo, Statistics and Progress Br, Control

Group OCT, for Hist Unit, 29 Jan 47, OCT HB

PE Gen Mail Shipped. For an analysis of the mail

shipped by the NYPE, from September 1942-April

1945, see Summary, NYPE, Dec 41-Apr 45, pp. 22-

23, OCT HB NYPE Gen. 156

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Nov 44, sub:

Christmas Mail to Overseas, ASF Hq Shipping 1944.
376 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

MAIL ON TRUCKS AT THE SAN FRANCISCO PORT OF EMBARKATION

adopted because V-mail had not been

popular and the Army Postal Service foresaw difficulty in introducing the new

idea.157

It is clear that the problems that confronted the Transportation Corps in transshipping military equipment and supplies

at the ports of embarkation during the

war were very different from those encountered during peacetime. The composition of the matériel was different, and

the difficulties of matching shipping space

and cargoes, providing special types of

vessels and special types of stowage when

necessary, avoiding delay in the sailing of

ships and convoys, and meeting emergency

requests from the theaters as they arose involved many departures from the normal

methods of commercial operation. The

aim of the Chief of Transportation and the

port commanders was to utilize well-tested

commercial methods wherever practicable, but they were obliged to disregard

them often in order to meet the needs of

the theater commanders.

Shipment of Ammunition and Explosives

No aspect of his responsibility gave the

Chief of Transportation greater concern

than the handling of ammunition and explosives.158

 The crux of the problem was

157

 Memo, Dir Army Postal Sv for TAG, 27 Jan

45; Memo, TAG for Styer, 29 Jan 45; Memo, CG

ASF for CG NYPE, 14 Feb 45; all in AG 311.1 (1-

4-45). 158

 The term "explosives" is often used in this discussion to cover live ammunition, except small arms

ammunition, as well as bulk explosives.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 377

SORTING MAIL AT THE NEW YORK PORT OF EMBARKATION

at the ports where transshipment from the

inland to the ocean carriers took place.

The volume to be moved to the U.S. forces

overseas was unprecedented, and in addition large quantities were sent to the British and the Soviet Union on lend-lease.

All of the principal U.S. ports were required to handle this traffic, and a number of the smaller ones were used also.

The size and explosive power of artillery

shells had been increased greatly in recent

years, and huge aerial bombs were an entirely new element of the traffic. With the

Black Tom and Halifax disasters of World

War I still in memory, the need for extraordinary care was recognized even

before the United States became an active

belligerent in World War II.159

Numerous agencies were concerned

with this traffic. While the Army procured

and shipped the largest volume, the Navy

also made heavy shipments from west

coast ports.160 The Bureau of Explosives,

an element of the Association of American

Railroads, maintained a continuous inspection service and aided in the enforcement of the regulations affecting the

inland carriers. In this it collaborated

with the Bureau of Safety of the Interstate

Commerce Commission. The establishment and enforcement of standards of

safety in the transportation of dangerous

159

 AR 55-155, 27 Nov 42, Sec. IV, and AR 55-

470, 30 Dec 42, were the basic Army regulations

affecting the transportation of explosives, inflammables, and chemical materials. 160

 For the relative bulk of Army, Navy, and lendlease shipments during 1944, see Rpt, Ammunition

and Explosives, Port Performance and Capacity, in

OCT HB PE Gen Explosives.
378 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

cargoes by water was a responsibility of

the U.S. Coast Guard. As the agencies

controlling the bulk of the shipping used

for the transportation of these cargoes, the

War Shipping Administration and the

British Ministry of War Transport were

directly concerned. Within the Army the

Chief of Transportation and the Chief of

Ordnance were the principal parties at interest. Safeguarding the movement of explosives was therefore a broad co-operative

undertaking. But since the Army was the

principal shipper and the bulk of the traffic passed through the Army ports of

embarkation, General Gross considered

his responsibility especially heavy.

World War II brought forth an entirely

new concept of handling explosives at U.S.

ports. In World War I ships had been

loaded chiefly at anchor. The Black Tom

disaster took place at a railway terminal

on the New Jersey shore, where ammunition was being transferred from cars to

barges for loading on ships anchored at

Gravesend Bay. Although this method

was employed to some extent in 1940 and

1941, it was objectionable because it involved double handling. The preferable

method was to transfer explosives directly

from the inland carrier to the ship, but the

general adoption of this method was complicated by the fact that the docks capable

of handling large ships were located near

centers of population and hence involved

exceptional hazards.

During 1940 shipments of explosives

were made chiefly from New York, New

Orleans, and San Francisco. At New

York, some ships were loaded at the new

Bayonne Terminal, which was in the

lower bay on the New Jersey shore; others

were loaded at anchor at Gravesend Bay;

and a few vessels took on small quantities

at commercial piers.161 Shipments through

New Orleans were loaded at isolated

anchorages. Benecia Arsenal on the eastern side of San Francisco Bay had a small

wharf, but the depth of water did not permit large ships to go alongside and consequently explosives were moved by barge

or rail to the Army port of embarkation at

Fort Mason. The small shipments made

from other ports were loaded at commercial docks or at anchorages.

By the beginning of 1941 it was evident

that the volume of explosives to be transported would increase rapidly and that

special facilities for handling them would

be needed. In January the commandant

of the U.S. Coast Guard brought the situation to the attention of the governmental

agencies concerned, and his contention

that additional facilities would be needed

was strengthened by the passage of the

Lend-Lease Act in March.162 The Ordnance Department took steps to provide

two-berth docks adjacent to its depots at

Charleston, South Carolina, and San

Jacinto, Texas, and also to improve the

wharf at Benecia and to dredge for deeper

water alongside. Two railroads provided

small docks below New Orleans where explosives could be loaded on outbound

ships.163

In the summer of 1941 the situation at

New York, which was the principal shipping point for both Army and lend-lease

explosives, became serious because of the

Navy's acquisition of the Bayonne Terminal for development into a supply and re161

 Interv with Mr. Harry A. Campbell, Chief Inspector, Bur of Explosives, 10 Dec 43, OCT HB TC

Gen New Facilities. 162

 Memo, Rear Adm Russell R. Waesche for Secy

of Treas, 22 Jan 41; Memo, ACofS G-4 for USW, 3

Mar 41; Memo, OUSW for Carl W. Fischer, Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense,

11 Jun 41; all in OCT HB TC Gen New Facilities. 163

 OCT HB Monograph 8, pp. 27-28.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 379

pair base.164 A strong protest by the Army

failed to stop this action, and since the

facility would no longer be available for

loading Army and lend-lease explosives,

prompt steps were necessary to provide

another suitable dock. Loading in Gravesend Bay continued, and as a temporary

measure arrangements were made to use

part of the Claremont Terminal of the

Lehigh Valley Railroad. Finding a wholly

acceptable site for a new explosives dock

was difficult. Any place inside the Narrows was uncomfortably close to densely

populated areas. Sites outside the Narrows

were objectionable because loading operations would be subject to interruptions by

high seas. With considerable misgivings a

decision was made to build a new sixberth finger pier at Caven Point, just

north of the Claremont Terminal and

much closer to Manhattan and Jersey City

than the Bayonne Terminal.165 The work

was authorized in August 1941 with a

prospective completion date of 1 June

1942, a date that was very nearly met.

While the Caven Point project was

being planned to meet the urgent need at

New York, it was evident to the Army that

this was only the beginning of a much

broader program. It was foreseen that

many ports would be required to transship

the explosives that would move overseas if

the United States should enter the war.

This was particularly true since the prevailing practice was to load limited quantities on many ships, rather than large

quantities on fewer ships, in order to limit

the effect of any explosion that might take

place in port and the amount of ammunition that might be lost through the sinking

of a ship at sea. It was also foreseen that

special explosives storage facilities would

be needed back of the ports in order to

avoid accumulating shipments in railroad

yards and on docks where protection

against sabotage, fire, and accident was

more difficult.166 When war came on 7

December 1941, the construction of explosives loading docks at Boston and Baltimore had been approved, and The Quartermaster General, with concurrence of

the Chief of Ordnance, had recommended

the construction of explosives docks and

backup storage facilities at a number of

other Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coast

ports. This program was approved by the

Chief of Staff on 19 December, and the

Chief of Engineers was promptly directed

to undertake the work.167 (Table 32)

The selection of sites for the new docks

encountered more than the usual difficulties. In addition to the safety of nearby

communities, transportation, engineering,

and operating factors had to be given consideration. Compromise of the various

points of view was necessary in order

164

 Memo, Trans Br G-4 for Comdr Bertram J.

Rodgers, USN, 5 Jul 41, OCT HB Gross Day File.

This was one of several instances of ocean terminals

being acquired for nontransportation purposes that

led to an agreement that no waterfront facilities

would be taken over by the Army or the Navy until

clearance had been obtained through the Ocean

Shipping Section of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board; see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 177-78. 165

 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4, 7 Aug

41, OCT HB Gross Day File. 166

 Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 21 Jul 41, sub:

Depots to Facilitate Movement of Am; Memo,

ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 25 Jul 41; both in G4/32697-2; Conf, Trans Div OQMG and Ord Dept,

28 Nov 41, sub: Defense Aid Constr Program, OCT

HB TC Gen New Facilities. 167

 Memo, TQMG for ACofS G-4, 4 Dec 41, sub:

Additional Trans and Stg Facilities, QM 500 T-E,

OCT HB TC Gen New Facilities; Memo, ACofS G-4

for CofS, 11 Dec 41, G-4/32697-2; Memo, Defense

Aid Dir WDGS for TAG, 30 Dec 41; Memo, TAG for

CofEngrs, 31 Dec 41; last two in AG 600.12 (12-11-

41). These explosives facilities were financed chiefly

with defense aid (lend-lease) funds, as were the holding and reconsignment points that were being constructed at the same time.
380 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

to get ahead with the urgent project. As at

New York, the location selected for the

dock at Boston created hazards that later

resulted in limitations being placed on the

extent to which the facility could be used

for loading ammunition.

There also were differing opinions regarding the design of the docks, and in the

decision on this matter the views of Mr.

Harry A. Campbell, Chief Inspector of the

Bureau of Explosives, weighed heavily.

The docks were built without transit

sheds, since it was believed that any

covered storage would encourage the accumulation of ammunition at the waterfront that should have been held at the

backup storage facilities or returned to

storage when immediate loading to ships

could not be accomplished. A proposal to

depress the railway tracks was rejected,

and the docks were built with flush decks

in order that they might be more effectively guarded from fire and sabotage and

have greater flexibility of use.168

Less difficulty was experienced in finding sites for backup storage facilities.

Where Ordnance depots already existed

near the ports—as at Raritan, New Jersey;

Charleston, South Carolina; San Jacinto,

Texas; and Benecia, California—they

were used to back up the explosives piers,

and in some cases additional igloos were

constructed to provide sufficient capacity

for that purpose. The new storage facilities were all remote from population

centers.

Some of the new storage facilities were

used extensively, while others were less

active. When the backup storage plan was

inaugurated, interruption of railway

transportation by enemy action was considered a possibility; if that had occurred

the existence of stocks of ammunition

near the ports would have greatly aided

the Army in keeping the forces overseas supplied. Since such interruptions did

not occur, the need for the backup facilities was less than had been anticipated.

Ammunition held at those facilities for

only a short time pending call to the ports

was retained in the railway cars rather

than being unloaded and placed in the

igloos.169

While construction was in progress the

question arose whether the explosives

docks and backup storage facilities should

be operated by the Chief of Ordnance or

by the Chief of Transportation, whose

office was created early in March 1942.

Since the installations were to handle explosives moving overseas, it was decided

that they should be under the direct control of the commanders of the ports of embarkation and under the general supervision of the Chief of Transportation, except in those cases where they were part of

or adjacent to existing Ordnance installations and could be readily controlled by

the commanders of those installations. In

the beginning the explosives docks at

Baltimore, Charleston, San Jacinto, and

Benecia, and the new igloos at Raritan,

Charleston, San Jacinto, and Benecia

were operated under control of the Chief

of Ordnance, and all others under control of the Chief of Transportation.170

 In

1943 the docks at Baltimore and Charleston, as well as the additional igloos that

168

 Many memos relating to the selection of sites

and progress of construction are in OCT HB TC Gen

New Facilities; see particularly analysis of requirements and description of facilities prepared by the

Chief of Ordnance, 25 May 42. See also comments

on pier design in Interim Rpt, Army-Navy Committee for Study of Facilities for Shipment of Explosives, Oct 45, p. 5, OCT HB PE Gen Expl. 169

 Interv with Chester V. Parker, Ord Dept, 1

Apr 52, OCT HB PE Gen Expl. 170

 Memo, CG SOS for PEs, CofOrd, CofEngrs,

CofT, 16 Aug 42, SPX 825.1 (7-7-42).
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 381

TABLE 32—SPECIAL ARMY PIERS AND BACKUP STORAGE FACILITIES FOR EXPORT AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

a

 The original project was for four berths. In June 1942 a three-berth extension was authorized at the request of the Lend-Lease Administration. The addition was considered desirable because of the intention to load airplanes and other cargo at this terminal. For the same

reason, transit shed space of 265,000 square feet was provided. b

 The Navy projected a two-berth dock at this location. In February 1944 the Army requested that it be increased to four berths for

joint use, the Navy to operate the entire facility. Army vessels began loading at Earle in August 1944. c

 Original dock had two berths; it was extended in 1944. d

 The pier and storage facilities at Theodore, Alabama, were turned over to the Navy in May 1944. e

 Beginning date is for reconstruction of an old one-berth pier, and completion date applies to entire four-berth project. f

 Igloos added to existing ordnance installations especially for export shipments.

Source: Table C in OCT HB Monograph 8, slightly modified as result of further research.

had been constructed at Charleston, were

transferred to the control of the Chief of

Transportation.171

Although the explosives facilities authorized by the Army early in the war then appeared adequate for all purposes, some

171

 OCT HB Monograph 8, p. 33.
382 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

additional facilities were provided later. In

the spring of 1944, in anticipation of a

heavy increase in the flow of ammunition

to the European Theater of Operations

and the desirability of limiting the quantities loaded at Boston and New York because of the locations of the Castle Island

and Caven Point piers, a railway pier was

leased at Searsport, Maine, and placed

under the jurisdiction of the Boston Port of

Embarkation for the loading of explosives.172

 The Navy had begun the construction of an explosives pier at Earle,

New Jersey, a short distance outside the

entrance to New York Harbor, and the

Army, although not favorably impressed

with the location because of its exposure to

weather, arranged for the construction

of two additional berths for Army use—

a further measure to lighten the load on

Caven Point.173 To the same end, the explosives dock at Philadelphia was enlarged from two to six berths.174

Because the facilities at Benecia were

limited and unsatisfactory, Parr Terminal

No. 1 at Richmond, California, was leased

and used for explosives loading by the

Army beginning early in the war. During

1944 the desirability of building a new explosives dock and backup storage facilities

in the San Francisco Bay area, to replace

or at least to relieve the facilities at Benecia

and Richmond, was considered. Early in

1945, in anticipation of the end of the war

in Europe and the shifting of the military

effort to the Pacific, the Army advocated

the construction of a six-berth pier at California Point. There was strong opposition

to the proposal largely because of the

disastrous explosion that had occurred at

the naval ammunition depot at Port Chicago, California, in July 1944, and when

construction began it was limited to two

berths. The facility at California Point

was not completed before the end of

hostilities and was then abandoned.175

In addition to the Bureau of Explosives

and the U.S. Coast Guard, several boards

and committees studied the operations at

the ports and the backup storage facilities

with a view to increasing safety. The Joint

Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board,

an advisory body established by an act of

Congress in 1928, found the scope of its interest greatly broadened by developments

of the war. Its jurisdiction was accordingly

defined as covering safety problems

"wherever explosives are handled by the

War and Navy Departments."176 The

board, which consisted of Army and

Navy ordnance officers, was frequently

critical of the facilities that had been provided for loading explosives and recommended that new and more favorably located facilities be developed. In order that

the problem might be thoroughly studied

from a transportation as well as an ordnance point of view, the Joint Army-Navy

Board on Port Facilities for Handling and

Loading Ammunition and Explosives was

172

 Memo, CG SOS for CG BPE, 21 Apr 44, sub:

Estab of Cargo Port at Searsport, SPX 323.3 (17 Apr

44).

173

 Ltr, SW for SN, 3 Feb 44; Ltr, Actg SN for SW,

15 Feb 44; both in OCT HB TC Gen New Facilities;

Memo, CofS ASF for CofT, 1 Jul 44, ASF Hq Trans;

Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 27 Jul 44; Memo,

McIntyre for Williamson, 16 Sep 44; last two in

OCT HB Wylie Expl. 174

 A backup railway storage yard at Newark, Delaware, was authorized but was not completed; ASF Cir

161, 30 May 44, Sec. 1, 175

 Memo, CG ASF for ACofS G-4, 20 Jan 45;

Memo, ACofS G-4 for CG ASF, 2 Feb 45, sub: California Point Am Facility; both in WDGDS 825.1;

Memo, JANASB for Ord Dept, 17 Apr 45; Memo, SN

for SW, 21 Apr 45; last two in OCT HB TC Gen New

Facilities; Rpt, Rail Div FY 1945, p. 27, OCT HB

Rail Div Rpts; OCT Opns Mtg, 13 Aug 45, OCT

HB Dir of Opns. 176

 WD Cir 372, 13 Sep 44, Sec. IV.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 383

established in September 1944.177 Late in

the war the storage board was renamed

the Army-Navy Explosives Safety Board,

and shortly after the war it took over the

functions of the port facilities board.178

General Gross lost no opportunity to

stress the necessity for utmost care and

foresight on the part of Transportation

Corps personnel concerned with the

movement of explosives, particularly the

commanders of the ports of embarkation.

This necessity was underscored by a fire

that started on the SS El Estero while it was

loading explosives at Caven Point in April

1943. The ship was towed into the bay

and scuttled, thus avoiding an explosion,

but the incident brought a strong reaction

from state and municipal officials and the

public. Gross pointed out that while

"everyone wants to kibitz," including local

officials and the boards and committees

concerned with safety, the Transportation

Corps had to plot its own course. Since it

was responsible for transporting ammunition to the theaters, it had to decide what

risks were necessary to meet the oversea

requirements. But he emphasized that the

Transportation Corps was "absolutely

naked in its responsibility" and would

have to accept the blame for any disasters

that might originate at its facilities. He

therefore demanded "utter vigilance,"

which in case of a disaster would at least

satisfy conscience that all had been done

that could have been done to prevent it.179

Recognizing the great anxiety of the communities where explosives facilities were

located and the tendency of the public to

criticize the Army for endangering civilian lives, the Chief of Transportation wrote

to one of the port commanders: "We not

only must be eternally careful, but must

guard against even the appearance of

carelessness."

 180

While stressing the necessity for taking

every feasible precaution in the interest of

safety, the Chief of Transportation, with

the support of the commander of the

Army Service Forces, was unwilling to be

rushed into providing the additional facilities the Joint Army-Navy Ammunition

Storage Board recommended, since the

existing Transportation Corps facilities

had established excellent safety records.181

Considering both war requirements and

civilian safety, the only explosives facilities

at the ports to be graded "poor" by a special joint committee that made an investigation late in 1944 were those located on

San Francisco Bay—the Ordnance facility

at Benecia and the Navy docks at Richmond and Mare Island.182

 As has been

noted, the Army immediately took steps

to provide a new explosives pier at California Point.

In addition to impressing upon the port

commanders their inescapable responsi177

 Memo, JANASB for SW and SN, 8 May 44;

Interim Rpt, undated, covering discussions of the

joint board on port facilities during October 1944,

both in OCT HB PE Gen Expl; Rpt of board on

port facilities to SW and SN, 20 Jan 45, OCT HB

Gross Expl. 178

 Ltr, SW to SN, 28 Aug 45; Ltr, SN to SW, 2

Oct 45; Memo for Record by McIntyre, 17 Oct 45;

all in OCT 825.1 Am Loading Facilities; WD Cir

311, 10 Oct 45. 179

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-

14 Jan 44, pp. 79-80, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs

Confs; Conf on Am Loading Situation in N.Y. Harbor, 3 Jan 44, OCT HB PE Gen Expl. 180

 Ltr, CofT to LAPE, 18 Jun 43, OCT HB Gross

Day File. 181

 Memo, JANASB for SW and SN, 15 Aug 44,

WDGDS 825.1; 1st Ind, CG ASF for ACofS G-4, 6

Sep 44 and atchd draft prepared in OCT, OCT HB

Gross Day File. 182

 Exhibit A to Rpt of Subcommittee of Joint

Army-Navy Board on Port Facilities for Handling and

Loading Ammunition and Explosives, which appears

as Tab A in Rpt of that board, 20 Jan 45, OCT HB

Gross Expl; Memo, CG ASF for ACofS G-4, 30 Apr

45, sub: Recommendations Regarding Am Ship Loadings, OCT 523.8.
384 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

bility for the careful handling of explosives, the Chief of Transportation arranged

for close supervision of all phases of this

traffic by his own office. General Wylie,

who as Director of Operations was

charged with supervision of all matters relating to internal security and accident

prevention, exercised a general oversight,

and his staff included an explosives control officer to deal with the details and dayto-day developments. General McIntyre,

as Deputy Director of Operations, had a

major role in this activity and represented

the Chief of Transportation on several

boards and committees that dealt with the

problems arising out of the transportation

of explosives.183

The primary step in the effort to avoid a

major disaster was to forestall the accumulation of large quantities of explosives on

the docks and in their supporting railroad

yards. Early in the war the Chief of Transportation directed the port commanders

not to hold carloads of explosives at the

piers or on the adjacent railroad sidings in

excess of the number that would be unloaded during the next twenty-four hours,

and not to hold loaded cars in backup railroad yards in excess of the number that

would be needed during the next fortyeight hours. Explosives could not be

shipped to the ports except on call of the

port commanders, and they were instructed to make the arrival of shipments

at the ports coincide as nearly as possible

with the berthing of vessels.184 The ports

were required to make daily teletype reports to the Chief of Transportation, stating the number of cars of ammunition

(Army and lend-lease separately) at the

piers, in railroad yards, at the backup storage facilities, and en route to the ports, and

the number of cars unloaded at the piers

during the past twenty-four hours.185

When excessive accumulations were indicated by these reports, the port commanders were instructed to reduce them.

Early in 1944 specific numbers of cars

were established as ceilings applicable to

the piers and railway sidings at the respective ports. These numbers ranged

from 25 cars at Seattle and Portland to

150 at New York. The ceilings could not

be exceeded without express authorization

of the Chief of Transportation.186 With

greatly increased shipments of ammunition to the European theater expected as

the date for the invasion of the Continent

approached, plans were laid for restricting

the flow of such shipments through New

York by making capacity utilization of the

other Atlantic coast explosive piers, and if

necessary of piers in the Gulf.187

Other safety measures taken at the ports

can be mentioned only briefly.188 Tugs

were required to stand by during loading

operations to assist in evacuating vessels

from piers in case of emergency. The Coast

183

 TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, 1 Jul 44, Sec.

102.03. 184

 Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS, 24 Nov 42; Memo,

CofT for Somervell, 27 Nov 42; both in OCT HB

Gross Day File; Memo, CofT for PEs, 14 Jan 43, sub:

Contl of Mvmt of Am, OCT 523.8 1942-44; Min of

Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug 43, pp. 67-72,

OCT HB PE Gen Confs; Memo, CofT for PEs, 13

May 44, sub: Shipts to PEs, OCT 523.8 NY; Memo,

CofOrd for CofT, 10 Jun 44, OCT HB PE Gen

Expl. 185

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 2 Mar 43, OCT HB PEs

Gen Expl; TC Cir 50-63, 20 Feb 45, sub: Contl of

Mvmt of Explosives, and revision, 19 Mar 45. 186

 Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 11 Jan 44, sub:

Limitations on Number of Cars of Am, OCT 523.8

1942-44. 187

 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 18 May 44, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Ltr, Gross to Groninger, 2 Jun 44,

OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 188

 For a fuller discussion, see Memo, Gross for

Somervell, 13 May 44, with Tabs A-E, OCT 825.1

Am Handling Facilities. See also TC Cir 45-4, revised 26 Jan 45, sub: Shipside and Dockside Protection.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 385

SPECIAL EXPLOSIVES LOADING PIER at Mukilteo, Washington, a facility of the

Seattle Port of Embarkation.

Guard was required to have personnel

present to supervise the handling of explosives, and Chemical Warfare Service representatives were on hand when chemical

ammunition or supplies were being loaded.

Minimum guarding standards were established, and the port commanders were

instructed to use only military police

(rather than civilian guards) for security

functions on or near the explosives piers.

The work at these piers frequently was on

a round-the-clock basis, and full lighting

was required as essential to efficient guarding and to the prevention of accidents in

handling dangerous cargo. Fire protection

was carefully planned, continuous training

was decreed, and the Chief of Transportation arranged for officers concerned with

this activity to receive instruction at the

Coast Guard training station at Fort

McHenry, Maryland.189 When the location of railroad storage tracks for the explosives piers made it desirable, barricades

were built around them to minimize the

effect of any explosions that might occur.

To supplement the inspections made by

the joint boards, the Chief of Transportation assigned an inspector to visit the ports

at regular intervals.190 Safety "audits"

were made by the Safety and Security

Branch of the Ordnance Department.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard

was responsible under law for safeguardins: vessels and water-front facilities, and

189

 Memo, OCT for PEs, 22 Aug 44, sub: Special

Course in Fire Fighting, OCT HB PEs Gen Expl. 190

 Copies of inspection reports made by Col

Theodore L. Dunn and Lt Col Raymon C. Buell are

in OCT HB Wylie Expl Contl.
386 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

BARRICADED STORAGE TRACK near Caven Point explosives pier in New York Harbor.

the Chief of Transportation was responsible under Army regulations for the ships

and the shore facilities operated under his

command. The necessity for co-ordinating

their activities to assure efficiency and

avoid unwarranted overlapping was soon

apparent. An agreement between these

officers was signed in June 1943. Broadly

speaking, the Army port commanders

were assigned full responsibility for the

protection and safeguarding of the waterfront facilities that they operated and of

all vessels operated by or allocated to the

Army while they were moored at such

facilities, except in regard to waterside

hazards. The Coast Guard Captain of the

Port was assigned responsibility for all

other water-front facilities and vessels, and

for waterside protection of all facilities and

all vessels whatsoever. The Captain of the

Port was authorized to inspect all ships,

except those manned and operated by the

Army, to determine whether they were

safe for loading explosives and had competent crews; he was also authorized to pass

on the competency of all longshoremen

engaged in handling explosives and to

issue certificates of competency, or socalled red cards. Constant co-operation

between Coast Guard and Army port

officials was enjoined.191

One of the concrete results of this

co-operation was the preparation of a disaster control plan for each port. After study

of the reports covering the destructive

explosion and fire that occurred at the

water front in Bombay, India, in April

1944, the Chief of Transportation and the

Coast Guard commandant directed that 191

 Agreement Defining the Responsibility of the

Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Chief of

Transportation for the Protection of Vessels and

Waterfront Facilities Under Jurisdiction of the Chief

of Transportation, 7 Jun 43, OCT HB Int and

Security Div
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 387

these plans be reviewed and elaborated.192

The basic feature of the disaster control

plan was the establishment of a single point

from which all activities could be directed.193

 When the war ended "walkietalkie" radio sets were being provided to

facilitate communication between the piers

and Coast Guard fireboats.194

Although most explosives were handled

at piers specially built or specially operated for that purpose, many shipments,

usually small ones, were loaded at regular

piers.195 Moving a vessel from a commercial pier where general cargo had been

taken on to an explosives pier to complete

loading, or vice versa, involved expense

and loss of time, and, when the amount of

ammunition to be loaded was relatively

small, the Army believed that enforcement

of the regulation against the use of regular

piers should be relaxed. The situation was

complicated by the existence of state and

local as well as federal regulations.196 In

case of national emergency, however, the

federal authority was overriding, so that

actual control lay with the U.S. Coast

Guard, which was charged with the enforcement of the navigation and ship

inspection laws. Therefore the loading of

explosives at a pier that had not been designated for that purpose involved obtaining a waiver from the Coast Guard. In

case a waiver was denied in the first instance, the Coast Guard would grant it

upon certification by the Secretary of War

that the military urgency outweighed the

marine hazard involved. The Secretary of

War delegated the authority to issue the

certificates to the Chief of Transportation,

who in turn delegated it to the port commanders, so that in the end the port commanders determined when the prohibition

against loading explosives at commercial

piers was to be set aside.197

The general practice during the early

part of the war was to move explosives

overseas in small consignments; theater

requirements could be met in that way

and distribution of the shipments over a

number of vessels decreased the hazard.198

Later, when the theater demands for ammunition were much heavier, larger consignments and even full cargoes became a

necessity. The only rule restricting the

amount of ammunition placed in a single

ship was that the explosive content should

not exceed 2,000 tons, and since the ratio

of the explosive content to the total weight

was low, this rule imposed no real limitation.199

 The heavy requirements of the

U.S. forces in the invasion of continental

Europe necessitated the dispatch of many

vessels with full explosives cargoes to that

theater from New York and its outports,

including some carrying exclusively aerial 192

 Memo, JANASB for SW and SN, 17 Jan 45,

OCT HB Wylie Expl; Joint Memo for PEs and Dist

Coast Guard Off, 22 Mar 45, sub: Plans for Joint

Army-Coast Guard Fire-Fighting Operations, OCT

HB Int and Security Div. 193

 See Memo, NYPE for Int and Security Div,

OCT, 25 Apr 45, and atchd disaster control plan,

with photos; also plans for other ports in OCT HB

Int and Security Div. 194

 Memo, C of Int and Security Div OCT for Ex

OCT, 5 Jun 45, OCT HB Int and Security Div. 195

 The extent to which piers other than those specially operated for explosives loading were used is

shown by reports received from certain ports in September 1945, filed in OCT HB PE Gen Expl. 196

 CMTC 20th Mtg, 4 Jun 42, and subsequent

meetings. 197

 Memo, Dist Coast Guard Off, 3d Naval Dist,

for NYPE, 6 Jul 43, sub: Explosives Loading at Certain Piers, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; TC Cir 114,

14 Sep 43; TC Cir 55-1, 1 Jan 44, par. 4; Memo, CG

NYPE for Dir of Opns OCT, 18 Sep 45, OCT HB

Wylie Expl. 198

 Memo, ACofT for LAPE, 26 Sep 43, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks. The British and the Russians continued this practice throughout the war in loading

lend-lease explosives at U.S. ports. 199

 Memo, McIntyre for Gross, 3 Jan 44, OCT HB

Wylie Expl; Memo, Meyer for McIntyre, et al., 10

Feb 44, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.
388 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

bombs. Numerous full cargoes of explosives for the Pacific areas were loaded at

San Francisco.200

The peak of the oversea movement of

explosives came in the winter of 1944-45,

and it was occasioned chiefly by the heavy

expenditures of ammunition in the European theater in the drive into Germany.

The ammunition situation in that theater

reached critical proportions in November

1944. At that time the War Department in

public statements pointed out that the

troops under General Eisenhower's command were firing a thirty-five-day supply

of heavy ammunition every ten days, and

were using more mortar shells in an average day than had been used in an average

month in the North African campaign.201

The heavy expenditure was being made

for the dual purpose of defeating the

enemy as quickly as possible and of holding

down U.S. casualties.

Late in November a delegation of officers representing General Eisenhower

came to Washington to work out the solution to two critical problems affecting his

command—the ammunition supply, and

the congestion of shipping at northern

Continental ports.202

 The two problems

were related, for while the volume of

ammunition available in the zone of interior for shipment to the ETO had become

low, there also had been delay in getting

ammunition aboard ships in European

waters speedily discharged and made

available to the troops due to the congestion at the ports then in Allied hands.

The War Department with the co-operation of the War Production Board took

vigorous steps to increase the production

of critical items of ammunition, even to the

extent of placing additional plants in operation. Equally vigorous measures were

taken to improve the port situation in the

ETO and to speed up the delivery of critical items to the theater. The German

counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December gave additional impetus to these

efforts.

The acceleration of the movement of

ammunition to the European theater

called for special procedures all along the

supply pipeline. Studies made by representatives of ASF headquarters and the

theater had allowed sixty days for delivery

from factories to firing lines. The Chief of

Transportation pointed out that with the

volume of ammunition to be moved, and

assuming the maintenance of the usual

standards of safety, such delivery could be

assured only for the critical items, not for

the entire ammunition movement. By

employing special trains and fast ships and

by expedited handling at all points, he

estimated that critical items could be

moved from production plants to the troops

in from forty-eight to fifty-five days.203 By

arranging for shipments to move directly

from plants to shipside, enlisting the aid

of the railroads in expediting transit to the

seaboard, and providing prompt handling

200

 Reports covering the period January 1942-

August 1945 indicate the following breakdown of

total number of vessels that loaded Army explosives

at each port and the number that loaded full

cargoes:

Total Full

Port Vessels Cargoes

New York.. ...................... . 1,193 36

Searsport......................... . 70 13

Boston.......................... . 311 O

Charleston. ....................... . 134 71

San Francisco. .................... . 1,364 88

Los Angeles....................... . 249 4

See reports dated September and October 1945 in

OCT HB PE Gen Expl. Satisfactory data for other

ports not available. 201

 WD press releases, 13 Nov 44, 28 Nov 44, and

6 Dec 44. 202

 Memo, ACofS OPD for Somervell, et al., 25 Nov

44; OCT HB Gross ETO. 203

 Memo, Gen Wood, ASF Hq, for Gross, 28 Nov

44, and reply, undated, both in OCT HB Wylie Expl.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 389

at the ports, the average time was reduced

to 46.7 days.204 The opening of the port of

Antwerp to Allied traffic late in November

contributed to this reduction.

During the war—that is, from December 1941 through August 1945—the Army

shipped a total of more than 9,488,000

short tons of ammunition and explosives

to its forces overseas. (Table33 and Chart 12)

In addition, about 1,979,000 short tons of

lend-lease ammunition were loaded at

Army-controlled piers, making a total of

11,467,000 tons.205 The largest amount,

2,713,000 short tons, was loaded at New

York. San Francisco, Hampton Roads,

Baltimore, and Philadelphia each loaded

over a million tons. The peak month for

such shipments was December 1944, when

685,000 short tons were placed in ships at

all ports.206

The return of surplus and defective

Army ammunition and captured enemy

ammunition from overseas also created

safety problems on the ships and at the

discharge ports despite the control exercised over this traffic by the War Department.207

 In the spring of 1944 the Chief of

Transportation informed the commanders

of the Pacific areas that they must use

more care in the stowage of ammunition

returned to the zone of interior, give a full

and accurate description of each item on

the ship's manifest, and otherwise observe

the regulations. In ensuing months fuller

instructions were sent to all theaters.208 As

additional control measures, the theater

commanders were required to obtain the

approval of the Commanding General,

Army Service Forces, or the Commanding

General, Army Air Forces, before returning any artillery ammunition or aerial

bombs to the United States, and to obtain

authority of the Chief of Transportation

before loading ammunition or explosives

on any vessel destined for the United States

or another theater. In order to discourage

the shipment of small quantities on many

vessels, the minimum load on any ship was

placed at 500 long tons.209

During the summer of 1944 a joint committee was set up to develop safety methods and standardize the practices for the

return of explosives by both the Army and

the Navy, and its work eventually led to a

comprehensive agreement.210 The safety

problem involved not only the handling of

ammunition and explosives manifested as

such but also the detection and disposition

of unmanifested items that were inadvertently shipped with salvaged vehicles,

204

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 3 Jan 45, sub: Am

for ETO, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Opns Council

Mtg, 4 Jan 45, OCT HB Dir of Opns; Rpt, Rail Div

OCT, FY 1945, p. 25; ASF Annual Report for the Fiscal

Year 1945, p. 38. 205

 A detailed analysis prepared by USCG, Summary Rpt of Vessels and Tonnages of Explosives and

Ammunition Handled Under Coast Guard Supervision, 1 Jan 40 to 15 Aug 45, 27 Nov 45, includes

Navy as well as Army and lend-lease shipments and

distinguishes ports and terminals; in OCT HB PE

Gen Expl. 206

 On the basis of estimates computed in June 1945,

shipments to Pacific commands were expected to

reach a peak of 780,000 tons in June 1946, of which

350,000 tons were to be for ground forces and 430,000

for air forces, assuming that industry could produce

that amount and that shipping would be available;

Memo, Maj Archie G. Pease for McIntyre, 7 Jun 45,

OCT HB PE Gen Expl. 207

 AG Memo 471 (2 Jun 43), 8 Jun 43, sub: Return of Live Ammunition. 208

 Memo, CofT for CGs SWPA, SPA, and CPA,

22 Apr 44, OCT 523.8 1942-44; Memo, CofT for

CG NATOUSA, 7 Aug 44, with note indicating that

same letter was sent to other theaters, OCT HB

Wylie Expl Contl. 209

 Msgs, WD to Theater and Base Comdrs, 8 Aug

44, CM-OUT 77625, and 18 Aug 44, CM-OUT

82813; WD Cir 370, 12 Sep 44, Sec. III; WD Cir 56,

19 Feb 45, Sec. II. 210

 Mtg, Joint Com on Return of Army and Navy

Am from Overseas, 4 Jul 44, OCT HB Wylie Expl;

Rpt, Rail Div, FY 1945, p. 26; WD Memo 850-45,

17 Jul 45.
390 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 33—ARMY-PROCURED AMMUNITION AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED OVERSEAS FROM

ARMY-CONTROLLED PIERS AT U.S. PORTS: DECEMBER 1941-AUGUST 1945 a

(Short Tons)

 b

a

 Excludes small arms ammunition. In addition to tonnage shown here, 60,000 tons of Army explosives and 340,000 tons of lend-lease

explosives were shipped from piers not under Army control at New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Savannah, Jacksonville, Miami, Tampa,

and Seattle. b

 Tonnages were obtained by converting carloads on the basis of forty tons to a carload through July 1944, thereafter forty-five tons

to a carload. c

 The explosives pier and storage facilities built by the Army at Mobile (Theodore) were turned over to the Navy in May 1944.

Source: Monthly reports compiled by Explosives Control Office, OCT, from daily teletype reports received from the ports of embarkation, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

tanks, weapons, and other combat

equipment.211

Special precautions were also necessary

in moving inflammables and chemicals

overseas. Shipment of these commodities

on the same vessels with large quantities of

ammunition was avoided whenever possible, and under all circumstances they were

segregated during loading and stowed in

different holds. The preparation and ventilation of ships' holds for the transportation of chemical warfare gases and liquids

were prescribed in Army and Coast Guard

regulations.212 The Army required that

gases carried below deck be accompanied

by an officer or enlisted man of the Chemical Warfare Service, who acted as technical adviser to the ship's master, made sure

that sufficient gas masks, protective clothing, and neutralizing agents were on board,

and instructed the crew in their use.

211

 TG Cir 45-8, 19 Jan 45, and revision, 22 May

45, sub: Screening the Oversea Salvage and Return

Cargo. 212

 AR 55-470, 30 Dec 42, pars. 24, 25, 39-41, and

Changes 3, 1 Nov 43.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 391

CHART 12—ARMY-PROCURED AMMUNITION AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES LOADED AT ARMY-CONTROLLED PIERS FOR DELIVERY OVERSEAS: DECEMBER 1941-AUGUST 1945*

* See footnotes to table 33.

Source: Monthly reports compiled by Explosives Control Office, OCT, from daily teletype reports received from the

ports of embarkation, reworked for statistical volume of this series.

Despite the volume of dangerous commodities handled, no disasters occurred at

facilities operated by the Army. Fires

started at a number of the piers, but they

were quickly extinguished. Several ammunition ship explosions occurred at foreign

ports, and there were a number of explosions of ammunition moving by rail in the

United States.213 These incidents, together

with the Port Chicago disaster, kept the

Transportation Corps constantly alert to

the necessity of exercising extreme care in

the handling of hazardous shipments.

Packing, Marking, Documentation,

and Security

The Chief of Transportation, in addition to developing policies and procedures

to govern the actual transportation of

Army supplies and equipment, took an

active interest in the development of the

practices and procedures that were necessary to insure the timely and safe delivery

of matériel overseas. The packaging, packing, processing, marking, and documenting of shipments were primarily the

concern of Army Service Forces headquarters and the respective procuring and

shipping services, but they bore so directly

on the proper performance of the transportation function that General Gross

considered these matters definitely within

213

 Ltr, Bur of Explosives to author, 28 Mar 52,

OCT HB Int and Security Div.
392 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

his purview.214 The protection of cargo

while it was being loaded and during the

voyage clearly was his responsibility.

In Army parlance "packaging" refers

to the original container in which the

product is placed, while "packing" refers

to the exterior or shipping container,

which may consist of one or many packages. Successful packaging and packing

served a number of purposes: they preserved the product from deterioration;

they withstood the rigors of transportation

and so protected the product from damage; and they afforded a unit of cargo that

could be handled readily and stowed in a

minimum of ship space.

The Chief of Transportation naturally

desired that supplies be properly packed

before they reached the ports of embarkation, but although progress toward this

goal was made during the war it was never

fully achieved. There were several reasons.

The Army's packaging and packing specifications at the outset were woefully inadequate to meet the conditions that World

War II imposed, and time was required to

establish new standards. Metal and wood

were scarce commodities and less sturdy

substitutes had to be used wherever possible. Manufacturers did not always fully

comply with the Army's specifications,

which were unlike those used in commercial practice. The requirements varied

from theater to theater.

The inadequacy of the Army's packaging and packing methods was apparent as

soon as supplies began moving overseas

after Pearl Harbor. Transportation under

wartime pressure sometimes involved

rough handling and faulty stowage. Metal

parts that were not properly protected

corroded as the result of contact with salt

air or salt water during the ocean voyage.

After discharge overseas, supplies frequently were stored in open dumps, uncovered or ineffectively covered by tarpaulins. There was universal complaint

because the cardboard containers that

were extensively used did not stand up

under weather and hard usage.215 The

assault landings in North Africa emphasized the fact that many supplies were not

suitably packed for that type of operation.216

 Strong complaints were received

even from the United Kingdom, where

transportation and storage conditions were

more nearly normal than in any other

oversea command.217

Within the scope of his authority General Gross took early steps to correct this

situation.218 In February 1942, as Chief of

the Transportation Branch, G-4, he appointed an expert consultant to study

packing and packaging from the standpoint of transportation and to recommend

improvements.219 Soon after the Office of

214

 For a general discussion, see ASF Hist Monograph, Storage Operations, December 1941-December 1945, Ch. 8, ASF Storage Div; Logistics in World

War II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces

(Washington, 1948), pp. 77-78. 215

 Ltr, Brig Gen William H. Harrison to Gen Clay,

6 Jan 43, written during a visit to NATOUSA;

Memo, Col Ralph I. Glasgow for CofT, undated,

written after a visit to NATOUSA in March 1943,

both in OCT 322-352.9 Africa; Memo, Somervell for

Styer, 3 Oct 43, par. 22, written after a visit to the

Pacific theater, OCT HB POA Insp Trips; Stauffer,

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War

Against Japan, Ch. V. 216

 Memo, Ross for Somervell, 15 Jan 43, sub: Observations in North Africa, par. 1j, OCT HB Wylie

Urgent Matters. 217

 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 26 Sep 42, sub: Difficulties in Shipping Supplies Overseas, OCT HB

Water Div Packing and Packaging. 218

 For a fuller discussion than can be given here,

see OCT HB Monograph 19, Ch. 6. 219

 Memo, Gross for NYPE, 13 Feb 42, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Capt Malcolm J. Odell for

C of Development and Liaison Br OCT, 25 Jul 42,

sub: Report on Packing and Crating, OCT HB Development and Liaison Div.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 393

the Chief of Transportation was set up, a

unit that eventually became the Packaging and Packing Section of the Water

Division was created to deal with these

problems.220 This unit had general supervision over activities at the ports of embarkation; it consolidated their reports into

recommendations for improving methods,

and maintained liaison with the corresponding units in ASF headquarters and

in the several technical services.221 In view

of the great variety of supplies procured

and shipped by the Quartermaster Corps,

the Chief of Transportation obtained from

The Quartermaster General the loan of an

expert who had spent two and a half

months making a study of the problems of

packing and packaging in relation to

Quartermaster matériel.222

The ports of embarkation afforded the

best opportunity to study packing and

packaging in relation to transportation,

and the port commanders were instructed

to co-operate fully with the representatives

sent out by the Chief of Transportation

and also to add packing experts to their

own staffs.223 These experts, who were

known as shipment surveyors, inspected

freight as it passed through the ports,

directed the repacking or recoopering of

shipments that were found to be unfit for

loading aboard ships, and reported their

observations and recommendations to the

Chief of Transportation, who passed them

on to the technical services concerned. Although the shipment surveyors could inspect only a small part of the freight

handled at the ports, their activities made

a substantial contribution to the improvement of Army practices. They revealed

the sources of improperly packed shipments and the nature of the deficiencies,

as well as the extent to which the condition

of shipments on arrival at the ports could

be attributed to improper handling during

transportation by rail or truck.224

It was soon evident to the Chief of

Transportation that this problem should

be attacked on a broader basis than his

authority would permit, and in June 1942

he recommended that the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, establish an

agency to provide general supervision and

over-all co-ordination of the packing and

packaging activities of the technical services; he also recommended that any of the

services that had not already done so be

required to engage qualified personnel to

deal with packing and packaging.225 Immediate action was taken to carry both

recommendations into effect. A Packing

and Crating Unit was established in the

Procurement and Distribution Division,

Services of Supply, which later became

the Packing and Packaging Section, Procurement Division, Army Service Forces.

This section dealt with the subject as it

related to production points; it supervised

220

 OCT Adm Memo 78, 13 Jul 42, Sec. III;

Memo, CofT for Cs of All Divs, 1 Dec 43, sub:

Transfer of Functions; OCT Off Order 5-28, 4 Apr

44, Packaging, Packing, and Processing, and revision, 22 Apr 44; all in OCT HB Water Div Packing

and Packaging. 221

 See remarks of Maj John K. Mount, C of Packing and Packaging Sec, then part of Port and Field

Agencies Div, at ZTO Conf, Washington, Sep 43,

pp. 103-06, OCT HB Zones Gen. 222

 Memo, CofT for TQMG, 5 Apr 43, sub: Report

of Col Paul P. Logan; Memo, CofT for Lutes, 5 Apr

43; both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks. 223

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 1 May 42, sub:

Supervision Over Packing, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks. 224

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 11 Jul 42, sub: Shipt Surveyors, OCT HB Devel and Liaison Div; TC Cir

50-44, 14 Jul 44, sub: Rpts of Insp, and revision, 7 Dec

44; OCT Misc Ltr 37, 22 Jul 44, sub: Shipt Surveyors'

Rpts, OCT 400.162; Packing and Packaging Conf,

Montgomery, Ala., 14-17 Mar 44, pp. 23-36, OCT

HB Water Div Packing and Packaging. 225

 Memo for CG SOS, 20 Jun 42, sub: Central

Control of Packing and Crating, OCT 400.162 Central

Control.
394 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the preparation of specifications for packing and packaging and co-ordinated the

inspection activities of the several services.

The ASF Storage Division had a corresponding section, which dealt with the

subject from the standpoint of depot operations.226

 Since the packing of organizational equipment by troop units about to

be moved overseas was often faulty, the

service commands were directed to establish packing squads to instruct and assist

units in this work.227

Early in 1945 an Army Packaging

Board was set up that included the chief

of the ASF Packing and Packaging Section

as chairman, a representative of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff as vice chairman,

and a representative of each technical

service.228 At the same time a Joint ArmyNavy Packaging Board was established to

develop so far as practicable uniform specifications and methods for the armed

forces. The shipment surveyors at the ports

of embarkation took on the added function of policing the execution of the specifications and other instructions issued by

these boards, and the Packing and Packaging Section in the Office of the Chief of

Transportation undertook corrective action whenever the surveyors' reports indicated that need for such action existed.229

Before they were packed many items of

supply and equipment had to be processed

to prevent deterioration en route and to

avoid the necessity of reconditioning after

reaching the theater. Normally processing

was done by the manufacturers or at technical service depots, but often it was necessary for a holding and reconsignment

point or a port of embarkation to perform

the task.230 Although in the earlier part of

the war processing was haphazard and inadequate, the technical services under the

direction of ASF headquarters gradually

worked out detailed instructions relating

to the cleaning, spraying, and sealing of

principal items before they were packed.

The instructions pertaining to complicated

machinery were necessarily detailed, covering the removal and wrapping of detachable parts, the preparation and packing of spare parts, the removal of fuel and

lubricants in the case of engines, the coating of metal surfaces and electrical wiring,

and the taping of openings and joints.

The theaters also had their problems

with packaging, packing, and processing.

Some supplies were beyond rehabilitation

when they arrived from the zone of interior, and others had to be repacked or

reprocessed. The Chief of Transportation

supplied the theaters with copies of the

specifications approved by the War Department and requested them to notify

him when shipments were received that

did not conform to these specifications.231

During 1943 he sent officers skilled in this

field to the principal theaters to report on

the condition of supplies when they arrived

and on the effectiveness of the methods

226

 Memo, CG SOS for Procurement and Distribution Div, 24 Jun 42; Memo, CG SOS for Cs of Tech

Svs, 6 Jul 42, sub: Central Control and Co-ordination;

both in OCT 400.162; ASF Cir 29, 13 May 43, sub:

Staff Responsibilities for Packing and Packaging. 227

 SOS Memo S 55-4-43, 9 Feb 43, sub: Packing

Unit Equip; SOS Memo S 55-7-43, 27 Mar 43, sub:

Org of Packing Squads; WD Cir 128, 31 May 43. 228

 ASF Cir 44, 7 Feb 45, Sec. VIII; WD Cir 80,

13 Mar 45, Sec. II. The War Production Board had a

Container Coordinating Committee to establish standards among all federal agencies; see Russell Jones,

"The Packaging Problem," Army Transportation Journal, August 1946, pp. 6-7. 229

 OCT Misc Ltr 229, 6 Jul 45, OCT HB Water

Div Packing and Packaging. 230

 The processing of vehicles and other unboxed

equipment at the ports is discussed briefly above, pp.

151-52. 231

 Memo, CofT for SOS ETOUSA, 7 Nov 42,

OCT 461 England; the basic directive was ArmyNavy General Specifications for Packing and Packaging Oversea Shipments, US Army 100-14.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 395

used by the several technical services.232

Most of the assaults against enemy-held

shores were mounted in the theaters, and

a considerable part of the materiel used in

those assaults was packed or repacked

overseas. In June 1943 the Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, created traveling

packing squads to train troop units in this

work.233 On request ASF packing teams

were sent from the zone of interior to assist

theater personnel. In anticipation of the

enormous packing job that would have to

be performed in the ETO and the MTO

when redeployment began, training for

this activity was started in the theater

early in 1945 with special emphasis on the

packing of supplies destined for tropical

areas in the Pacific.234

Closely allied to the subject of packing

was that of palletization. The principle of

palletization was well established in warehouse operations as a means of saving time

and labor and facilitating the moving and

stacking of commodities. For warehousing

purposes it involved only the placing of

boxed, bagged, or other regularly shaped

packages on wooden pallets that could be

moved and stacked by fork-lift trucks.

The adaptation of palletization to military use took three forms. What the Army

called palletized loads differed from the

warehouse palletized loads only in that

the supplies had to be fastened to the pallets. Palletized unit loads were supplies

strapped or otherwise fastened to pallets

that had been especially designed for particular commodities, such as various types

of ammunition. Skidloads were supplies

fastened to pallets or platforms that were

so constructed that they could be used as

sleds and drawn across beaches in assault

landings.235

Palletized loads and palletized unit

loads presented both advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the

Chief of Transportation. If not too bulky,

they were easily handled at rail and shipping terminals and were quickly loaded

into ships. But there was a tendency on

the part of the technical services to make

the loads large and heavy, in which case

it was difficult to move them into the

wings of the hold and they could only be

stowed in the square of the hatch. Some

such pallet loads had to be broken up after

arrival at the ports. Overseas, palletized

cargo could be effectively handled only at

ports that had fork-lift trucks or other suitable gear, and there were many that were

not so equipped.236 Moreover, the pallets

themselves took up ship space, and when

small packages were made into big ones

the amount of filler cargo available at the

loading ports was reduced and the amount

of broken stowage was increased.

In view of the problems that palletization created the Chief of Transportation

feared that the tendency toward palletization would get out of hand. He contended

that only certain commodities should be

palletized, that the size of the palletized

loads should be limited, and that palletized cargo should not constitute more than

25 percent of the total cargo on any

232

 Rpt, Shipping Procedures Br, Port and Field

Agencies Div, OCT, 28 Oct 43, par. 4, OCT HB Port

and Field Agencies Div. 233

 Ltr, Wylie for Ross, ETOUSA, 8 Jun 43, OCT

HB Wylie Staybacks. 234

 WD Memo 700-45, 25 Apr 45, sub: Co-ordination of Packing; TC ETOUSA Weekly Ltr, 14 May

45, OCT HB TC Gen Redeployment; Capt. F. W.

Koepnick, "Wrap It Up," Army Transportation Journal,

September 1945. 235

 See Ltr, C of Water Div OCT to British Army

Staff, Washington, 2 Apr 45, OCT HB Water Div

Packing and Packaging. 236

 For a time shipment of palletized cargo to the

United Kingdom was stopped on this account; see

Memo, CofT for Storage Div ASF, 30 Jun 44, OCT

HB Water Div Packing and Packaging.
396 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ship.237 ASF headquarters, on the other

hand, pressed for greater use of palletization in moving supplies from manufacturers and depots to oversea commands,

and urged the technical services to keep

the matter under constant study.238 Consideration of the extension of palletization

sometimes brought clashes between ASF

and OCT officials, but in the end the governing factor was the facility with which

palletized loads of various compositions

and sizes could be handled by the railroads and at shipping terminals, and accordingly the shipment of palletized cargo

to the ports was subject to the approval of

the Chief of Transportation.239 A joint

Army-Navy committee was set up to coordinate the procedures of the two departments with regard to palletization.240

Skidloads of ammunition and other

supplies were used in the invasion of Attu

in May 1943, and a few months later in

the invasion of Sicily. The advantages

were at once apparent, although it was

obvious that further study of design and

handling methods was necessary. A

report on the landing of skidloads of

Quartermaster supplies (rations, gasoline,

oil, and water) in the Sicilian invasion indicated that the operation had been very

successful and that the time for delivery of

these commodities to the dumps had been

reduced about 50 percent.241 Skidloads

were used in subsequent amphibious operations whenever the circumstances

warranted.

The marking of shipments to identify

them and to indicate their destinations,

like many other procedures that had been

set up for peacetime operations, underwent a thorough revamping after the

United States entered the war. The inadequacy of the existing system of marking, as well as the unreadiness of the supply services to carry it into full effect, was

apparent at San Francisco during the

feverish effort to reinforce the Philippines

just before the Japanese attack.242 The development of a satisfactory marking system made slow progress, for there were a

number of interests to be served—those of

the shippers, those of the Transportation

Corps, those of the oversea commands, and

the over-all interest of military security.

During late 1942 and early 1943 the

European theater protested that the marking system devised in the zone of interior

did not meet its needs. The theater had a

difficult experience with marking during

the invasion of North Africa and wanted

an improved marking system for shipments to that area. It also wanted more

complete markings on shipments to the

237

 Ltr, Wylie for Ross, ETOUSA, 8 Jun 43, OCT

HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, CofT for NYPE and

HRPE, 24 Jun 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Interv,

Harold Larson with Maj Mount, 24 Jun 44; Interv

with Edgar C. Seward, 4 Apr 52; last two in OCT

HB Water Div Packing and Packaging. 238 Memos, CG ASF for C of Tech Svs, 19 and 24

Jul .44; Memo, CofT for PEs, 1 Aug 44; all in OCT

400.162 Palletization; Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 14

Jul 45; 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 17 Aug 45; last two

in OCT 400.162. 239

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 24 Nov 44, sub: Limitation of Weight of Pallet Loads; Memo, CofT for Dir

of Supply ASF, 7 Dec 44; both in OCT 400.162 Palletization; OCT Misc Ltr 99, 24 Mar 45, sub: Palletized Unit Load Shipments, OCT HB Water Div

Packing and Packaging. 240

 Joint Army-Navy Conf on Palletization, 12 Jan

44, OCT HB Wylie Cargo. 241

 Memo, Maj Albert J. Lorion for Dir of Storage

ASF, 20 Oct 43; Memo, Col Albert R. Drake, Storage

Div ASF, for Dir of Supply ASF, 22 Nov 43; Memo,

CofT for Storage Div ASF, 30 Jun 44; Memo, Brig

Gen William A. Borden for Lutes, 14 Jul 44; all in

OCT HB Water Div Packing and Packaging. 242

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 143-44; Memo, Somervell

for Gross, 5 Feb 42, and reply, 7 Feb 42, OCT HB

Water Div Code Marking.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 397

United Kingdom, where the depot situation, the crowded condition of the port

areas, and the overburdened transportation lines created special problems in the

reception and consignment of cargoes. A

plan that the European theater proposed

was at first rejected by ASF headquarters

and the Chief of Transportation because

they considered it too detailed and burdensome. But the theater persisted and

in the end got substantially what it

wanted.243

For marking purposes Army shipments

fell into two broad classes: those that accompanied troop organizations moving to

oversea destinations, and those that

moved separately to meet the needs of the

forces already overseas. Although the

procedures finally evolved were necessarily complex in order to meet the needs

of all parties at interest, the descriptions

given below cover the basic features.244

The coded oversea address for separate

shipments, which was stenciled on each

box, crate, or other container, consisted of

five parts.245 The first part was the shipping designator, which was a code name

of four letters indicating the port of discharge or the general destination of the

shipment. The second part, or time indicator, was a single letter that gave the

priority of the shipment by indicating the

month and the half of the month in which

the shipment would be forwarded from

the United States. The third part consisted

of an abbreviation of the name of the

shipping service (Ord, QM, et cetera) and

a Roman numeral indicating the class of

supply. The fourth part, known as the

consignee combination, was a group of

letters and digits that identified separately

packed components of an assemblage or

supplies that would have to be brought

together to serve a special mission. The

fifth and final part of the oversea address

was a combination of letters and digits

that identified the shipment with the

requisition against which it was made,

showed the depot from which it originated, and indicated the number of the

shipment when several shipments were

made on separate shipping documents

from a single depot against a single requisition. Under this system the oversea

address marked on a package might read

as follows: BOBO-A-ORDII-GT3-

A302RA3.

In order that the matériel of the respective technical services might be identified

on sight, each service was given a color

that appeared as a band on packages

shipped by certain services and as a corner

triangle in other cases. The color markings

were especially helpful overseas, where

they aided native longshoremen and

porters in segregating the matériel of the

several services without reference to code

markings. Some unique color markings

243

 For early developments, see OCT HB Monograph 19, pp. 239-68; for the ETO proposal, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I, Ch. III,

Sec. (3). 244

 Developments in the system are found in the

following basic directives: AG 400.161 (7-25-42), 26

Jul 42, sub: Requisitioning and Marking Supplies;

AG 311.5 (10-10-42), 11 Oct 42, sub: Policy and Procedures; SOS Memo S 5-43-43, 23 Feb 43, sub:

Marking by Contractors; AG 400.161 (3-19-43), 23

Mar 43, sub: Assignment of Code Combinations; AG

400.161 (5-10-43), 1 Jun 43, sub: Requisitioning and

Marking Supplies; AG 400.161 (27 Oct 43), 28 Oct

43, sub: Special Color Marking; AG 400.161 (8 Jul

44), 15 Jul 44, sub: Identification of Separate Shipments; WD TM 38-414, Army Marking Directive,

May 1945. For a review of developments, see OCT

HB Monograph 19, pp. 239-68. 245

 Description based on WD TM 38-414, May

1945, which consolidates previous directives. Code

markings were shown on the extract requisitions sent

from ports to sources of supply.
398 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were used to identify special shipments.246

Other markings appeared on the containers and care had to be taken to prevent them from obscuring the coded oversea address. Markings to indicate weight

and cubic contents and data concerning

the procurement contract were allowed to

appear on only one or two sides of the container and were confined to specified

areas. If the contents of a package were

uniform and could be described by a simple term, this information was stenciled on

the container, but if the contents were

complex they were stated only in the

packing list, one copy of which was affixed

to the outside of the container while the

other copy was placed inside. When the

component parts of an assemblage were

shipped in two or more containers that

had to be kept together, a disc in the color

of the procuring service was marked on the

container to indicate that it was part of a

set, the number assigned to the set was

placed below the disc, and below that the

number of that container and the total

number of containers in the set were

shown. When equipment was shipped unboxed, the markings were stenciled directly on the article, if possible, rather

than being committed to a tag or sticker

that might become detached.247

Organizational equipment, individual

equipment, and initial supplies moving

with troop units were not marked with the

coded oversea address but with a shipment number. To the few persons permitted to know its meaning, this four-digit

number identified the troop unit to which

the matériel belonged, the oversea destination, and the approximate time of

embarkation. When a large unit moved

on a single shipment number, a letter after

the number indicated the component to

which the materiel pertained. A shipment

number was used only once and hence

had only one meaning. Sometimes initial

maintenance supplies accompanying

troop units were to be delivered to a depot

overseas rather than to the unit itself. In

this case, the shipment number was followed by letters indicating the procuring

service to whose depot or dump the matériel was to be moved from the port of discharge. When ready to receive such supplies, the unit requisitioned them in the

usual manner.248

In the summer of 1942, when the shipment marking problem was being widely

considered, the War Department established a Code Marking Policy Committee

to give the subject continuing study from

the Army point of view and to provide desirable co-ordination with the Navy and

also with the British, who were transporting lend-lease supplies on their ships and

were receiving increasing quantities of

U.S. Army supplies at their ports. The

committee included representatives of the

Operations Division and G-2 of the War

Department General Staff, the Services of

Supply headquarters, the Army Air

Forces, the Transportation Corps, and the

U.S. Navy. The Chief of Transportation's

representative on this committee was Col.

246

 OCT Cir 135, 20 Oct 43, sub: Marking for

Allied Military Government and Office of Strategic

Services Shipments; OCT Misc Ltr 77, 6 Sep 44, sub:

Color Marking; OCT Misc Ltr 146, 10 Nov 44, sub:

Special Color Design; last two in OCT 400.161. 247

 Col Coe, lecture on code marking at Atlantic

Coast TC Officers Training School, Fort Slocum,

N.Y.Jun 43, OCT HB Water Div Code Marking.

For variations from this system used in shipping AAF

technical supplies and for clear markings that were

permitted in some circumstances, see WD TM 38-414,

Secs. XI, XII. 248

 Coe lecture, cited n. 247. Shipment numbers

were assigned in the movement orders.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 399

Noble M. Coe, who continued to be active

in the matter throughout the war. At the

same time the Chief of Transportation

established a unit in his office to deal with

code marking.249 Eventually ASF headquarters directed the chiefs of all technical

services to designate officers to co-ordinate

the activities of their organizations pertaining to marking and related subjects

with like activities of the other services

and with ASF headquarters.250

The Chief of Transportation not only

had an active part in formulating code

marking procedures, but he also had the

chief responsibility for policing their

execution. In the early weeks of the war

with the object of bringing deficiencies to

the attention of the technical services concerned, he instructed the port commanders to report to him whenever they found

that the prescribed procedures had not

been observed by depots or contractors or

that the markings were illegible.251 In September 1942 General Gross reported that

about 25 percent of the shipments received

at the ports of embarkation were so poorly

marked that the ports had to assume the

heavy burden of remarking them.252

The second object of policing was to

prevent the compromise of shipping designators and shipment numbers. This might

occur when both code and clear markings

were placed on the same package or when

code-marked packages were shipped on

the same vessels with packages marked in

the clear. The latter contingency arose

chiefly in connection with the shipment of

Army cargo and lend-lease cargo on the

same ship. Various instructions were issued

to reduce the likelihood of compromise,

but it was recognized that shipping designators, which were used repeatedly, afforded only partial security. The shipment

numbers, used only once when supplies

accompanied specific troop units, provided better protection.253

The arrangements that General Gross

made to provide "positive action" on code

marking violations embraced both the

ports of embarkation and the transportation zones. The port commanders were

directed to set up staffs, including the

shipment surveyors, to scrutinize markings to insure that they were in accordance with War Department regulations;

they were also directed to report important violations by telegraph to the zone

transportation officers in whose territories

the offending shippers were located, with

a copy of the telegram to the Chief of

Transportation, and to report all violations

in writing at weekly intervals. The latter

reports were sent to the appropriate zone

transportation officers when they related

to the ASF technical services or the service commands, and to AAF intransit

depots when they related to AAF shipments, with copies to the Chief of Transportation in all cases. The zone transportation officers were directed to take up

with the offending shippers, in the case of

249

 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 25 Jul 42,

OPD 311.5 (7-25-42); 1st Ind, CG SOS for OPD, 5

Aug 42; 2d Ind, OPD for CG SOS, 27 Aug 42; Memo,

Wylie for Ex OCT, 12 Sep 42; all in OCT 400.161;

Rpt by Maj Kenneth T. Boughner, C of Code Marking Br, 10 Nov 42, OCT HB Port and Field Agencies

Div Rpts. 250

 ASF Cir 99, 11 Apr 44, Sec. VII; ASF Cir 167,

2 Jun 44, Sec. VI. 251

 Memos, CofT for PEs, 11 Feb 42 and 14 Mar

42, OCT HB Water Div Code Marking. 252

 Min of ASF Staff Conf, 9 Sep 42, p. 6. 253

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 7 Sep 42, sub: Marking of

Supplies for Oversea Shipts; Memo, CofT for PEs, 4

Nov 42, sub: Secrecy of Oversea Troop and Cargo

Mvmts OCT HB Water Div Code Marking; OCT

Cir 29, 23 Feb 43; OCT Cir 150, 12 Nov 43, and revision, 11 Dec 43; TC Cir 90-6, 4 Apr 44.
400 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

separate shipments, the violations reported by the ports and to assist shippers

in understanding and complying with the

code marking system. In the case of shipments accompanying troop units, the zone

transportation officers took up violations

with the appropriate service commands,

which were responsible for instructing

troop units regarding the marking of their

impedimenta.254 In June 1944 the Chief of

Transportation was able to report that

compliance with the code marking regulations had improved to an extent that

warranted curtailment of his enforcement

activities; nevertheless, sufficient policing

at the ports to deal with serious violations

or persistent violators was continued.255

The Navy used a marking system similar to that of the Army but different in

some respects. The two departments

agreed that in the case of joint operations

the commander of the operation should

decide which system would be used, or

whether the Army and the Navy would

use the systems that each normally

employed.256

A great saving of labor and expense was

accomplished by the introduction of the

War Department shipping document and

the vendor's shipping document. Many

agencies along the route between the

manufacturers and the consumers of Army

supplies and equipment required identical

or almost identical information regarding

the shipments, and in the early part of the

war separate documents were made out

for each purpose. These documents were

known variously as shipping tickets, packing lists, depot tallies, tally-outs, tally-ins,

dray tickets, dock tallies, hatch lists, and

so forth. There was general recognition of

the desirability of committing all or most

of the needed information to a single form

to be filled out by the originators of shipments, with sufficient copies to serve the

purposes of those who would handle the

shipments subsequently. The devising of

such a document was a formidable task,

requiring consultation with many agencies and the harmonizing of many points

of view, but the project was pushed to a

conclusion by a War Department procedures committee headed by General

Styer, Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces.

After trial at a limited number of installations in the spring of 1943, the War Department shipping document was placed

in effect at all ASF installations. Work on

the development of the vendor's document was begun as soon as the War Department document was found to be practicable.257

The War Department shipping document was designed for use in shipping

matériel of the ASF technical services

from depots, arsenals, ammunition loading plants, holding and reconsignments

points, ports of embarkation, or other

storage points under the control of those

services.258 It was also the basis for somewhat different procedures used in making

shipments from posts, camps, and stations,

in making shipments within or from oversea theaters, and in shipping the technical

254

 WD Cir 128,31 May 43; OCT Cir 79, 11 Jun

43, and revision, 15 Jul 43; Min of ZTO Conf, Washington, Sep 43, pp. 95-98, OCT HB Zones Gen. 255

 TC Cir 90-7, 10 Jun 44. 256

 WD Memo W 55-44, 9 May 44. 257

 Remarks by Col Coe in Min of Port Comdrs

Conf, Boston, Aug 43, pp. 146-53, and in Min of ZTO

Conf, Washington, Sep 43, pp. 98-100; Memo, Chm

Procedures Committee for CofT, 12 Apr 43, sub: Installation of WD SD on Experimental Basis; Memo,

Styer for Cs of Tech Svs, 18 Sep 43, sub: WD SD Covering Shipts from Manufacturers; last two in OCT HB

Contl Div Procedures Br; Memo, Somervell for Under

Secy of Navy, 28 Feb 44, ASF Hq Navy. 258

 ASF Manual M 401, 25 Jan 44, WD Shipping

Document.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 401

supplies of the Army Air Forces.259 The

vendor's shipping document was used in

connection with shipments from vendor's

plants on contracts or purchase orders

negotiated by the ASF technical services,

including government-owned contractoroperated establishments; in addition to

being a shipping document, it was set up

to serve as a basis for fiscal control.260 As

finally constituted, both documents could

be used for either domestic or oversea

shipments, and both could be used in connection with movements of lend-lease

matériel as well as matériel intended for

Army use.

Very detailed instructions were necessary to enable Army installations and

manufacturers to properly utilize these

complex documents, and the new system

was placed in operation gradually and not

without many mistakes. Staff supervision

of the utilization of the shipping documents was assigned to the ASF Control

Division. The chiefs of the ASF technical

services were responsible for compliance

with the procedures by the installations

under their control and by their contractors.

With documentation, as with packing

and marking, responsibility for the policing of performance rested mainly with

the Chief of Transportation.261 The ports

of embarkation and the holding and reconsignment points were directed to

maintain sufficient inspection service to

determine whether the documents were

being properly prepared and distributed,

and to report violations. The port agencies, which represented the Chief of Transportation in connection with lend-lease

shipments, also reported violations. The

zone transportation officers were instructed to aid Army installations and

contractors in their respective areas in

understanding and utilizing the documents and to take up with the appropriate

officers specific reports of violation.262

Teams of Transportation Corps officers

were sent to the European and Mediterranean theaters to ascertain how the War

Department shipping document was meeting their needs. These officers found that,

while the general plan was working out

well, the information contained in the

documents was not always reliable. A

common complaint was that the copies

used as packing lists did not agree with

the contents of the boxes. Such discrepancies created confusion in theater depot

records. The errors, usually attributable

to the shippers in the zone of interior who

prepared the documents, were not readily

detectable at the ports of embarkation, although the technical service officers at the

ports made an effort to discover and correct discrepancies so far as practicable.

Errors were also found in shipping documents prepared at the ports of embarkation to cover shipments received without

such documents. The investigation emphasized the need to train personnel in the

procedures and to give constant supervision to the work.263

 Officers were also sent

259

 ASF Manual M 403, 1 Sep 43, Sec. IV, Station

Supply Procedure; WD TM 38-413, Feb 45, Theater

Shipping Document; WD Memo 55-45, 6 Feb 45,

Documentation of AAF Oversea Shipments. 260

 ASF Manual M 410, 5 May 44, Vendor's Shipping Document. 261

 ASF Cir 94, 2 Oct 43, Sec. II; ASF Cir 136, 17

Apr 45, Sec. III. 262

 TC Cir 50-42, 29 Jun 44, sub: Policing WD SD,

and revision, 3 Oct 44; TC Cir 50-41, 29 Jun 44, sub:

Policing VSD, supp. 1, 25 Aug 44, and supp. 2, 30 Oct

44; Conf on Policing WD SD and VSD, Chicago,

10-12 Jul 44, OCT HB Contl Div Procedures Br; TC

Cir 90-15, 21 Feb 45, sub: Shipping Document Violations. 263

 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD, 6 Oct 43, sub:

Visits by TC Officers; Memo, Lt Col Vancel R. Beck

for CofT, 31 Jul 44, sub: Inaccuracies in WD SD, and

atchd rpts; all in OCT 523.06.
402 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

overseas to instruct theater personnel in

the proper use of the theater shipping

document.264

The adoption of the War Department

shipping document aided the ports of embarkation in satisfying the theaters' requirements regarding ships' manifests.

From the early days of the war the supply

officers in the oversea commands had

complained that the cargo information in

the manifests prepared at the loading ports

was not properly organized and not sufficiently detailed for their purpose.265

 The

War Department shipping document provided this detailed information, and the

ports of embarkation had merely to transmit it to the consignees. As a first step,

copies of the shipping documents were

sent to the oversea commands by air as

advance information. Then, under a new

procedure that became effective early in

1944, two types of manifests were prepared for each voyage. The transportation

manifest included only the summary information required by the transportation

agencies concerned.266 The supply manifest, prepared expressly for the use of the

supply officers overseas, consisted of a

copy of the transportation manifest supported by copies of the shipping documents covering the manifested cargo.

The divergent shipping procedures of

the Army and the Navy, including documentation, were a cause of confusion, particularly in the Pacific, where ships and

shore facilities were often used jointly. In

April 1944 officers representing the two

departments, after attending a conference

held at San Francisco to study the situation, recommended that an effort be made

to adopt joint procedures. Several months

of intensive work on this problem, in which

the Control Divisions of ASF headquarters and the Office of the Chief of Transportation took the lead, resulted in the

publication of a joint manual, Ocean

Shipping Procedures, in March 1945.267

Uniform procedures were adopted whenever practicable, and where different

methods seemed unavoidable they were

presented separately and fully so that all

instructions would be included in one volume. The manifesting procedure agreed

on followed the plan already in use by the

Army. Procedures relating to passenger

traffic as well as freight traffic were covered.268

 An important feature of the joint

procedure was a system for supplying

shipping information to the theaters and

obtaining information from them, a system designed to overcome a handicap that

the Chief of Transportation long had felt,

especially with respect to the Pacific.

From the spring of 1943 onward the

Office of the Chief of Transportation included a unit that devoted itself exclusively to the study of shipping procedures

for the purpose of improving them, and to

the supervision of activities of the Transportation Corps field installations in applying and policing these procedures. In

264

 Memo, Goodman for Maj E. M. Card, Jr., 31

Aug 44; Memo, Maj Card for CG NYPE, 13 Dec 44,

sub: Report of Documentation Team to NATOUSA;

both in OCT 523.06 Med; Memo, Col Elliott C.

Goodwin for CG ASF, 18 Oct 44, sub: ASF Shipt

Procedure Team, OCT 300.7 (TM 38-413). 265

 Memo, Somervell for TQMG, 21 Jan 42,

G-4/33893; Memo, CofT for PEs, 26 Sep 42, sub:

Preparation of Manifests, OCT HB Contl Div Procedures Br. 266

 WD TM 38-412, Standard Supply and Transportation Information From PEs to Oversea Theaters,

21 Mar 44, pp. 12, 17; Ltr, Col Beck to Gen Ward,

25 Mar 53, in OCMH Files. On the general subject,

see OCT HB Monograph 19, pp. 269-76. 267

 WD TM 38-412/OPNAV 39-H3, OSPRO;

Memo, Wylie for Gross, 27 Apr 44, OCT HB Meyer

Staybacks; Memo, Robinson for Somervell, 8 May 45,

OCT HB Contl Div Procedure Br. 268

 Wardlow, op. cit., p. 211.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 403

the beginning this unit dealt with packing, packaging, code marking, and documentation.269

 Later the work was divided,

with packing, packaging, and code marking being assigned to the Water Division,

and documentation to the Control Division along with all other procedures pertaining to Transportation Corps field

installations. After February 1944 the

Procedures Branch of the Control Division

was aided by an advisory procedures committee, consisting of representatives of all

divisions that had responsibilities in connection with traffic movements, as well as

representatives of the Fiscal, Personnel,

and Control Divisions.270

The security of cargo up to the time it

was delivered to the theater commanders

at oversea ports was a problem to which

the Chief of Transportation and his port

commanders gave much attention; they

had some success, but the problem was

never solved to their full satisfaction. In

the fall of 1942 the practice was begun of

placing cargo security officers on vessels

carrying large Army shipments. These

officers were expected to be present during

the loading and discharging operations to

prevent mishandling, damage, and pilferage and to make regular inspections of

accessible cargo while at sea. They were

also responsible for the prompt delivery of

manifests, stowage plans, and other documents to the proper authorities at oversea

ports and for reporting to the commanders of home ports any irregularities

discovered during the trips.

Cargo security officers were placed on

the great majority of vessels carrying

Army cargo, but not on all. They were not

considered necessary on troopships that

had permanent transport commanders.

They were not assigned to vessels carrying

less than 1,000 measurement tons of Army

cargo unless the Chief of Transportation

expressly authorized them. Their assignment to vessels carrying only organizational equipment was at the discretion of

the port commanders.271 Cargo security

officers were not placed on vessels operated by the U.S. Navy or on vessels controlled by the British Ministry of War

Transport. The British were asked to grant

this privilege, but they maintained that

under their practice the loading agents

and the ships' masters were fully responsible and that the presence of U.S. officers

on board would inevitably lead to

friction.272

The object in assigning cargo security

officers was to have someone on each

vessel whose sole duty was to look after the

safety and prompt delivery of the Army's

property. However good in theory, the

plan encountered a variety of difficulties

in practice. The officers who could be

spared for this work were in most cases

lieutenants, and usually they were entirely

without experience in shipping matters.

Even such junior officers were not always

available, and the port commanders were

authorized to use casual officers who

might be traveling on the freighters, and

269

 Hist Record, Shipping Procedures Branch, Port

and Field Agencies Div, undated, OCT HB Port and

Field Agencies Div Rpts. 270

 TC Cir 5-9, 8 Feb 44, sub: TC Procedures Committee, and revision, 16 Dec 44; Memo, Maj Frederick

L. Krueger for Wardlow, 7 Jul 44, OCT HB Contl

Div Procedures Br. 271

 Memo, Somervell for CofT, 16 Oct 42; Telg,

CofT for PEs, 19 Oct 42; both in OCT HB Wylie

Staybacks; WD Cir 337, 28 Dec 43, Sec. V; WD FM

55-105, Water Transportation, 25 Sep 44, pp. 23, 39,

53, 59; TC Pamphlet 24, 11 Oct 44, and revisions, 6

Feb 45 and 29 May 45. 272

 Memo, British Army Staff for Wylie, 9 Oct 43,

OCT 563.5; Memo, Wylie for PEs, 23 Oct 43, sub:

Cargo Security Officers British Vessels, OCT 323.36

PEs.
404 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

to use enlisted men of the first four grades

when certain types of cargo were being

carried.273 In the early stages of the undertaking the young officers assigned to the

task frequently were ineffective because of

a lack of initiative, stamina, or interest.

The training the port commanders could

give them before they sailed was limited.274

 Sometimes the ships' masters were

antagonistic and not infrequently the officers at oversea ports were un-co-operative.

In the beginning there was considerable

doubt whether the benefits from this plan

justified the withdrawal of the officers

from other activities, but as the cargo security officers gained experience the

results of their work became progressively

better. After a time the Chief of Transportation concluded that the undertaking

had been worth while, and in order to increase the prestige and effectiveness of

these officers their title was changed to

ship transportation officer, their duties

were increased, and they were described

as "representatives of the Chief of Transportation" for the performance of those

duties.275

Various other measures were taken by

the Chief of Transportation to improve the

security of cargo. Ports of embarkation

were instructed to deliver to the cargo security officers personally any small packages containing valuable articles. Shipments that were considered especially subject to pilferage, such as tobacco and

candy, were to be stowed in places where

they would not be readily accessible to

members of the crew or passengers. To

facilitate such stowage, shipments of this

kind were to be marked for "special attention" on the shipping documents.276

Although pilferage on board was a frequent occurrence creating a situation that

The Inspector General on one occasion

described as a "most disgraceful impairment to morale," the greatest loss of cargo

was at oversea ports.277 This was particularly true at ports where native labor was

used extensively and in parts of the world

where respect for private property had no

place in the moral code. There the problem was essentially one for the local commanders to cope with, but cargo security

officers were instructed to request the assignment of additional military police

during discharging operations when the

need was apparent. The Chief of Transportation urged that requests of theater

commanders for additional military

police for this purpose be given favorable consideration by the War Department.278

 The demands for military police

were multifarious, however, and oversea

commanders frequently gave other responsibilities higher priority than the

guarding of cargo. As a result, the records

of the theaters in dealing with the problem varied widely. Reports of cargo security officers indicated that, when the

oversea port commanders adopted a

strong policy in the detection and punish273

 Memo, Wylie for ACofT for Pers and Tng, 26

Mar 43, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Col

Meyer for Col Allan L. Hanstein, 21 Apr 44, OCT

HB Meyer Staybacks. 274

 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 1 May 43, sub:

Cargo Security Officers, OCT HB PE Gen Cargo

Security; Min of Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug

43, App. 6, OCT HB PE Gen Confs. 275

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 112-23, OCT HB PE Gen; WD Cir 141,

12 May 45, Sec. II. 276

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 22 Sep 42, sub: Pilferage

of Stores En Route, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; OCT

Cir 96, 26 Jul 43, sub: Care of Valuable Cargo;

Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 6 Nov 44, sub: Identification of Pilferable Cargo; 1st Ind by CG ASF, 15 Nov

44; last two in OCT 400.161. 277

 Memo, Styer for CofT, 19 Sep 42, OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks. 278

 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 22 Sep 42; Memo,

CofT for ACofS OPD, 21 Feb 43; both in OCT HB

Meyer Staybacks.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 405

ment of pilferage, good results could be

accomplished.

Adjustments at the End of Hostilities

Because of the volume of freight in the

supply pipelines leading to the theaters, it

was foreseen that victory in Europe and

then in the Pacific would necessitate quick

adjustments in the flow of traffic if huge

waste was to be avoided. For all technical

services this meant adjustments in the

procurement and distribution of supplies.

For the Chief of Transportation it also

meant a sweeping change in the direction

and volume of freight movements and in

the employment of transportation facilities. In accordance with policies laid down

by ASF headquarters, concrete though

tentative plans were developed by the

Transportation Corps during the summer

and early fall of 1944.279

In order to avoid congestion at the ports

and railway terminals, the plans provided

for the prompt disposition of all supplies

that were in process of shipment when V-E

Day arrived. During a period of about six

months before V-E Day all requisitions

from and shipments to the European and

Mediterranean theaters and other transatlantic areas were marked either "SHP"

or "STO." STO indicated that the shipments would be stopped and not forwarded

overseas when V-E Day was announced,

and SHP meant that the shipments would

be allowed to continue to their destinations. In the early spring of 1945 when it

was evident that the German surrender

was not far off, SHP and STO shipments

were loaded in different cars and different

ships wherever practicable.280

The problem of holding and disposing

of STO shipments was a complicated one.

After the machinery had been made

ready, a trial run was held on 25 March

1945. The results were generally satisfactory, although it was evident that some

details required further attention.281 A

conference for final instruction and orientation was held in Chicago on 1 and 2

May 1945, and was attended by representatives of the Chief of Transportation, the

port commanders, the zone transportation

officers, and the traffic and operating departments of the railroads.282

The impact of V-E Day was not as

severe as might have been expected.283

This was due not only to the thorough

planning that had gone before but also to

the fact that the readjustments in cargo

movement were effected gradually rather

than abruptly. The first step was to curtail

requisitioning as soon as the end of the

campaign could be visualized. A considerable cutback in requisitions from the ETO

279

 Min of Port and Zone Comdrs Conf, Chicago,

6-9 Jul 44, morning session, 7 Jul 44, pp. 75-89, OCT

HB PE Gen Confs; Memos, Wylie for the respective

ports, 30 Aug 44; Memo, CofT for the respective

ports, 16 and 18 Sep 44, sub: Proposed Port Missions;

Memo, Meyer for Wylie, 16 Sep 44, sub: Traffic Control Depot Control Room; Memo, CG AAF for CofT,

18 Sep 44; 1st Ind, CofT for CG AAF, 20 Sep 44; all

memos in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Agreement

between OCT and AAR for Holding and Releasing

Cars, 26 Sep 44, OCT 387 Demobilization Planning—

Freight Rates; comments by Gen Goodman on manuscript for this volume, pp. 7-10, OCT HB PE Gen

Oversea Supply. 280

 AG Memo 400.161 (30 Sep 44), 12 Oct 44,

revised 6 Apr 45, sub: Advance Marking of Oversea

Shipments To Effect Embargo On or About V-E Day;

TC Cir 90-12,7 Dec 44, same sub, and revisions, 17

Feb 45 and 23 Apr 45; Memo, Groninger for CofT,

18 Sep 45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, p. 9, OCT HB SFPE Gen. 281

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 25 Mar 45, sub: Info

Pursuant to Action 28, OCT 387 Action 28; Memo,

Gross for Lutes, 29 Mar 45, sub: Trial of V-E Day

Actions, OCT 387 Trial Run. 282

 Memo, CofT for PEs and ZTOs, 16 Apr 45,

OCT 387 Redepl Conf. 283

 The supply policy after defeat of Germany is

stated in AG Memo 400 (30 Oct 44), 4 Nov 44, sub:

WD Policies and Procedure Governing Redeployment

upon Cessation of Hostilities in Europe.
406 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

had been made during the fall of 1944,

when the offensive against Germany was

going well, but this cutback was more

than offset by the heavy increases necessi- tated by the German counteroffensive in

December and January. After the failure

of that counteroffensive and the resumption of the Allies' steady advance into Germany, curtailment of requistioning could

again be given attention. In April there

were some substantial cutbacks. Beginning on 2 May, with the early capitulation of the German Army assured, actions

to stop the flow of supplies already started

to Europe were taken on a progressive

basis. The readjustment in traffic therefore was well under way when V-E Day

actually came.284

In accordance with advance planning,

all railroad cars stopped as the result of instructions from Washington were immediately reported to a control room that had

been established in the Traffic Control Di- vision. In order to provide instructions for

the prompt disposition of all stopped shipments, representatives of each of the ASF

technical services and the AAF had been

assigned to this room. Between 2 and 11

May, a total of 7,112 cars of freight was reported as being held at east coast ports or

as stopped en route to the ports. Of these,

1,668 cars were reported by the railroads

and 5,444 by the ports. The aim was to

provide instructions for the disposition of

these cars within twenty-four hours of the

receipt of the reports. This aim was

achieved for all but ninety-four cars.

Soon after the operation was completed,

Mr. Charles H. Buford, Vice President of

the Association of American Railroads,

wrote to General Gross regarding the V-E

Day arrangements as follows: "In all of

the good work that the Army had done

throughout the war I don't believe anything was accomplished that surpassed

the plans for stopping and changing the

flow of business on the railroads."

 285

The changes that the end of the fighting

in Europe would necessitate in the use of

shipping were anticipated, and the War

Shipping Administration was alerted to

them.286 The Water Division kept a cur- rent record of all vessels and their cargoes

en route to or awaiting discharge in the

European and Mediterranean theaters.

Beginning on 1 May it received daily reports from east coast ports regarding cargo

being loaded and the scheduled disposi- tion of all vessels that would be affected by

the announcement of V-E Day.287 The

following tabulation shows the actual disposition made of 369 such vessels:

 288

Number of

Disposition Vessels

Total............................... . 369

Ships at sea that proceeded to destination and

ships loading at U.S. ports that sailed as scheduled. ................................. . 234

Ships loading at U.S. ports that were partially

discharged, reloaded, and dispatched to original destination.......................... . 8

Ships loading at U.S. ports that were completely

discharged and rescheduled .............. . 16

Ships stopped at sea and returned to U.S. ports

for discharge........................... . 37

Ships already in the theater that were ordered

back to U.S. ports for discharge. .......... . 25

Ships en route to Europe that were diverted to

Pacific destinations...................... . 49

284

 OCT HB Monograph 23, pp. 118-19. 285

 Rpt by Col Randall, C of Contl Br Traf Contl

Div OCT, 17 May 45, sub: Summary of V-E Day

Activities Regarding Army Cargo; Ltr, Buford to

Gross, 14 May 45; both in OCT HB TC Gen Redeployment; ASF MPR, May 45, Sec. 3, p. 12. 286

 Ltr, Col Hicks to WSA, 28 Mar 45, OCT 565.2. 287

 Memos by Col Syran for Demob Plng Unit,

OCT, 12 and 16 May 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl;

Memo, Col Syran for Hist Unit OCT, 11 Jun 45,

OCT Water Division Rpts. 288

 Tabulation by Ocean Traf Br, 31 May 45, sub:

Final Report, Results of Activities in Connection with

Redeployment, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 407

In the midst of this effort to make the

readjustment of shipping necessitated by

the German surrender, the Chief of Transportation began the final phase of his

planning for the utilization of ports in support of the war in the Pacific.289

 Careful

estimates had been made of the capacity

of west coast ports to handle the traffic of

both the Army and the Navy when operations against Japan reached their height,

and it was decided that Gulf and Atlantic

ports would be used to a certain extent.

Aside from the fact that the transcontinental railroads were already operating

near capacity, east coast loadings were desirable because there would be a steady

transfer of ships from the Atlantic to the

Pacific and there were large stocks of supplies in eastern depots. Under these circumstances and in view of the heavy pressure from higher authority to inactivate

east coast port installations as rapidly as

possible, a careful survey of the available

facilities and the probable requirements

for discharging cargoes from Europe and

for loading cargoes for the Pacific was

necessary.290 The basis for this survey was

established at a meeting between representatives of the Chief of Transportation

and the port commanders on 8 May.

Instructions regarding SHP and STO

markings to aid in the adjustment of cargo

movements following the surrender of

Japan were not issued until early August,

and consequently few shipments were so

marked when August 14 arrived. The

Chief of Transportation and the railroads

had arranged that the permits for shipments that were not to be stopped would

be marked "VDJ," and this simplified the

adjustment so far as inland movements

were concerned. The west coast ports,

however, had no instructions as to which

of the shipments already in their hands

should be forwarded overseas and which

should be held, and so found it necessary

to use their own discretion.291

Adjustments in westbound traffic were

started a few days before the Japanese

capitulation became an actuality. On 10

August orders were issued by ASF headquarters to stop the loading of ammunition ships and to stop the movement of

ammunition toward the ports. It was not

considered necessary at that time to

cancel outstanding permits for other shipments to Pacific coast ports since the number of permits recently issued had been

small. At 7:05 P.M. on August 14, ASF

headquarters directed that all V-J Day actions be put into effect at once. The railroads were immediately requested to stop

and hold all cars en route to west coast

and Gulf ports, with predetermined exceptions, and to report the held cars to the

Traffic Control Division in Washington.292

As a result of the actions begun on 10

August, 6,113 cars loaded with Army

freight en route to the ports were stopped

and reported to Washington. Of these,

3,045 were permitted to continue to the

ports and 3,068 were diverted to interior

storage points in accordance with decisions

by the respective technical services channeled through the Traffic Control Division

control room. In addition, 9,430 carloads

289

 Concerning earlier planning, see Wardlow, op.

cit., pp. 179-80. 290

 Conf, Washington, 8 May 45, OCT HB TC

Gen Redepl. 291

 AG Memo 400.161 (3 Aug 45), 8 Aug 45, sub:

Marking Procedures; OCT Misc Ltr 226, revised 9

Aug 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; Memo, CG

SFPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, p. 10, OCT HB SFPE Gen. 292

 Ltrs, Col Messersmith to J. J. Kelly, AAR, 10

and 14 Aug 45, OCT 523.095 Embargo; Memo for

Record by Gen Wylie, 19 Aug 45; WD press release,

22 Aug 45; last two in OCT HB TC Gen Demob.
408 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

of freight that were in the port areas, on

wheels or in storage, were reconsigned to

interior storage points. The latter dispositions were spread over a period extending

from 14 August to 18 September.293

Evidence of the careful screening of

oversea shipments during the weeks preceding the Japanese surrender, despite the

lack of SHP and STO markings, is seen in

the effect V-J Day had on the employment

of vessels. Of 290 ships that were on berth

in U.S. ports or en route from the United

States to Pacific destinations, 25 that were

being loaded were ordered to discharge,

44 that were being loaded were ordered

to complete loading and sail as scheduled

(some after partial discharge), 18 that

were at sea were ordered back to the

United States, and 203 at sea were allowed

to proceed as scheduled. A total of 221

vessels that were loading at European

ports for Pacific destinations or were en

route from Europe to the Pacific were

affected. Of the 32 ships on berth in

Europe, 1 was ordered discharged, 1 was

ordered to complete loading and proceed

to Casablanca, and 30 were ordered to

"complete loading and sail to the United

States. Of the 189 ships en route from

Europe to the Pacific, 21 were ordered to

the United States and 168 were directed

to proceed to their original destinations.294

The Return Cargo Movement

Although some Army matériel that had

been shipped overseas was returned to the

zone of interior during the war and this

tonnage increased considerably at the end

of the fighting, the volume of homeward

cargo never amounted to more than a

fraction of that which had been moved

outward.

There was a gradual increase in homeward shipments during 1943 and 1944,

with receipts reaching a peak of 352,000

measurement tons in July 1944.295 The

cargoes consisted chiefly of supplies and

equipment returned for rehabilitation,

scrap returned to bolster the dwindling

reserves of metal, rubber, and other

strategic materials, captured enemy equipment returned for study, and ammunition

that had deteriorated or was in excess of

theater needs; a small amount of naval

matériel was included. The War Department controlled the types of matériel to be

returned and defined the responsibilities

of the Army commanders at U.S. ports for

discharging and inspecting the shipments

and forwarding them to depots or other

inland destinations.296

The principal difficulty encountered

by the Army port commanders was to

obtain sufficient advance information from

the theaters to enable ports to plan for

the discharge of cargoes and to obtain

instructions for their disposition.297 Getting the theaters to pack, segregate, manifest, and stow the shipments properly also

293

 Memo, Col Dunwoody, C of Demob Plng Unit,

for CofT, 20 Sep 45, OCT HB TC Gen Redepl; OCT

HB Monograph 23, pp. 119-23. 294

 Tabulation by Ocean Traf Br, 4 Sep 45, sub:

Results of Activities Following Japanese Surrender,

OCT HB TC Gen Redepl. 295

 Monthly reports of outbound and inbound

cargoes from PEs to Water Div OCT, tabulated for

statistical volume of this series. 296

 WD Memo W 30-5-42, 7 Oct 42, sub: Collection

and Return of Salvage; WD Memo W 30-2-43, 10

Jan 43, sub: Plan for Return of Rubber Scrap and

Cartridge Cases; WD Memo W 30-16-43, 8 May 43,

sub: Policy Relating to Return of Salvage and Scrap;

ASF Cir 289, 4 Sep 44, Sec. I; TC Pamphlet 36, 11

Apr 45, sub: Procedure for Processing Shipments

Returned From Overseas. 297

 Monthly Vessel Utilization Summary, 25 Jun

45, OCT HB PE Gen Cargo Inbound.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 409

proved to be something of a problem.298

The increase in the amount of matériel

returned from Europe after V-E Day was

limited by a number of U.S. policies.

Large quantities of American equipment

and supplies were to remain overseas to aid

in the recuperation of the war-exhausted

countries. Serviceable matériel needed in

the Pacific was to be shipped directly from

Europe, since direct shipment would avoid

transshipment at U.S. ports, relieve the

heavily burdened American railroads,

afford the most efficient use of shipping,

and assure arrival of the matériel in the

Pacific with as little delay as possible. Specific items were designated as eligible for

return to the United States if they were

economically repairable, and indications

were given to the theater commanders regarding the proportion of ship space to be

used for the matériel of the respective

technical services. About 50 percent of the

total was to be used for Ordnance matériel, and 25 percent for Engineer matériel.299

 During the redeployment period

the volume of cargo discharged at Army

ports of embarkation reached a new

monthly peak of 780,000 measurement

tons in June 1945.

The return of matériel from the Pacific

increased after the sudden surrender of

Japan, but not as rapidly or to the extent

that might have been expected. Time was

required to decide what items and amounts

would be needed in the occupation of

Japan and other captured territories.

Much of the equipment was in poor condition because of hard usage and inadequate maintenance. The depots in the

zone of interior were full, and the feasibility of transporting and storing matériel for

which there was no visible need and with

which obsolescence would quickly catch

up was at least dubious. In January 1946,

when the largest monthly volume of returned cargo—1,127,000 measurement

tons—was received at Army ports in the

United States, only 447,000 measurement

tons came from Pacific areas while 680,000

measurement tons came from Atlantic

areas. An analysis of cargo received from

overseas during the war and in the immediate postwar period is given in Table 34.

The return of ammunition and explosives to the United States created problems of safety even when the shipments

were relatively small. After V-E Day when

the traffic became considerable, the problem of receiving and reforwarding such

cargo at U.S. ports became critical. This

was due in part to the increased volume of

the traffic and the difficulty of getting the

theaters to pack, stow, and manifest the

shipments properly, and in part to the increasingly strict enforcement of safety

measures. Realizing that a disaster originating with the handling of returned explosives near centers of population would

lack the justification of war necessity, the

Army and Navy Explosives Safety Board

stopped the use of explosives piers located

near large cities and restricted this activity

to a few facilities that had the advantage

of isolation. In December 1945 and January 1946, when the return movement of

ammunition was approaching its peak, the

approved facilities on the east coast were

unable to handle the traffic promptly, and

storage facilities also were short. Early in

January fifteen vessels with full cargoes of

298

 Memo, CofT for PEs and Port Agencies, 4 Sep

44, OCT HB PE Gen Cargo Inbound; TC Cir 15-16,

2 Jan 45, sub: Return Cargoes. 299

 AG Memo 400 (18 May 45), 21 May 45, sub:

Initial Priorities for Return of Equipment and

Supplies.
410 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 34—CARGO RETURNED FROM OVERSEAS AND DISCHARGED AT ARMY PORTS IN THE

UNITED STATES: 1942-1946

 a

(Thousands of Measurement Tons)

a

 Includes all cargo discharged at U.S. ports from vessels under Army control and Army cargo discharged from other vessels; also small

amounts of cargo discharged at Army subports at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, and Juneau, Alaska, and at Vancouver, British Columbia,

where there was no Army port organization. b

 Miscellaneous cargo includes troop equipment and personal property, automobiles and household goods of military personnel, salvage,

mail, Army Exchange and Special Services property, and some other items. c

 Less than 500 measurement tons.

Source: Monthly reports of outbound and inbound cargo, from ports of embarkation to Water Division, OCT, tabulated for a statisical

volume of this series.

ammunition and eleven with part cargoes

were reported to be at anchor off Cape

May. This backlog fortunately was cleared

up without incident, and the flow of returned ammunition from the ETO and

the MTO was reduced by dumping or

scuttling a considerable tonnage at sea.300

The volume of returned ammunition

received at U.S. ports reached a monthly

peak in March 1946, when 203,949 long

tons were discharged. The movement declined rapidly thereafter and in June 1946

the receipts were only 36,171 long tons.

During the thirty-month period January

1944-June 1946, explosives discharged by

the Army ports of embarkation totaled

1,776,321 long tons—that is, 150,225 tons

in 1944, 842,602 tons in 1945, and 783,494

tons in the first six months of 1946.301

International Aid Shipments

In addition to shipping a large volume

of freight overseas for the use of U.S. forces,

the Army was concerned with the transportation of supplies under several forms

of international aid. The Army's transportation responsibilities varied with the different forms of aid, and the procedures

300

 OCT Opns Mtgs, 30 Aug 45, 3 Jan 46, and 1

Apr 46, OCT HB TG Gen Dir of Opns, Opns Council Mtgs; WD press release, 18 Dec 45, OCT HB PEs

Gen Explosives. 301

 Rpts of ammunition and explosives returned,

rendered by PEs to Explosives Contl Off OCT, tabulated for statistical volume of this series.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 411

had to be worked out as the emergency

progressed and new developments took

place in international relations.302

International aid shipments fell into two

broad categories—lend-lease, and civilian

aid. Lend-lease shipments under the

Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941 began

before the United States entered the war

and ceased when the fighting was over.

Except as noted below, the Army was responsible for the transportation of lendlease supplies only until they were loaded

in vessels at U.S. ports, for the bulk of this

traffic was moved on vessels under the

control of the War Shipping Administration, the British Ministry of War Transport, and the Soviet Union. However, in

order to obtain more balanced cargoes,

some lend-lease matériel consigned to

Allied governments was transported on

vessels under Army control.303 Also, some

lend-lease supplies were shipped on vessels

under Army control and consigned to the

U.S. commanders in the oversea areas,

because distribution could be best effected

in that way; these were known as commanding general shipments.304

 Civilian

aid shipments for the relief of the populations of former occupied countries and

former enemy countries began soon after

the Allied armies invaded North Africa

and continued long after the war was over.

The Army's wartime responsibility included transportation of such cargoes to

the oversea ports. The Army also distributed the supplies so long as the military

situation made this procedure desirable,

but when it became feasible distribution

was turned over to civilian agencies.305

The commanding general and civilian

aid shipments involved no unusual procedural difficulties for the Chief of Transportation since they moved on vessels under

Army control and were handled in much

the same manner as shipments intended

for the use of the U.S. forces. The chief

problem was that of shipping space. During the winter of 1943 General Eisenhower

in North Africa gave high priority to these

shipments. Civilian aid supplies were

needed to relieve distress and as a bulwark

against native unrest. Military matériel

was urgently needed so that French units

could be rearmed and made ready to

co-operate with the Allied forces. In the

beginning the plan was to ship civilian aid

supplies as filler cargo on vessels carrying

military supplies and thus to avoid having

them displace matériel that had been requisitioned by the U.S. oversea commanders. But civilian aid shipments to North

Africa reached such volume that they inevitably competed with military supplies

for ship space. The criterion then was to

insure that civilian aid supplies did not

move to the detriment of Allied military

operations, rather than that they did not

302

 There were numerous foreign countries involved, and also numerous American agencies. The

story is a complicated one and only enough can be

presented here to show what the Chief of Transportation's responsibilities were and how they were met.

For a broad discussion of international aid, see Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., passim. See also A Guide to

International Supply, prepared by International Div

ASF, 31 Dec 45. 303

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 193-95. 304

 See Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., Chs. X,

XVIII, XIX. 305

 Although this procedure was already in effect,

responsibility for shipping and distribution was formally assigned to the Army by the President in Ltr,

President to SW, 10 Nov 43, OCT HB Wylie LendLease. Numerous civilian agencies were involved, the

largest being the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), established in November 1943; see Charles P. Taft, "Scope and Functions of UNRRA and its Relations with Other

Agencies," Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1945,

pp. 368-72. For other aspects, see Logistics in World

War II, pp. 234-38.
412 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

displace any military cargo. The problem

was a continuing one for the Chief of

Transportation, and in March 1945 General Gross expressed grave concern lest the

growing demand for ships to move civilian

aid supplies to Europe should handicap

the Army in bringing the war against

Japan to a speedy conclusion.

 306

The movement of lend-lease supplies

was the source of numerous problems for

the Chief of Transportation. This was due

partly to the volume of the traffic and

partly to the fact that the Chief of Transportation did not have the same degree of

control over lend-lease shipments that he

had over supplies consigned to U.S. Army

commanders. The Treasury Department

and the Department of Agriculture, as

well as the War Department, procured

and shipped a large volume of lend-lease

matériel, and their interests had to be

respected. The War Shipping Administration provided a substantial part of the

shipping for lend-lease movements, and it

also was charged by the President with

insuring that the supplies he agreed from

time to time to furnish to the British, the

Russians, the Chinese, and others were

delivered according to plan. The WSA

established its own machinery for controlling the shipment of such supplies to the

ports, and the activities of its representatives and those of the Transportation

Corps had to be carefully co-ordinated.

The beneficiary governments had agencies

in the United States with which the Chief

of Transportation had to maintain close

working relationships, and their interests

did not always coincide with those of the

Army. In addition to WSA vessels, British

and Soviet ships were used to lift lendlease supplies, and the cargoes moved over

commercial piers. Under these circumstances the Chief of Transportation found

it advisable to maintain special offices,

commonly known as port agencies, at the

principal ports to represent his interests.307

A basic responsibility of the Chief of

Transportation in connection with the export of lend-lease supplies was to prevent

shipments from accumulating at the ports

and creating a state of congestion that

would adversely affect the movement of

military supplies. To this end, port-bound

shipments of lend-lease supplies procured

by the War Department had been subjected to the same release system as shipments destined for U.S. forces overseas

when that system was installed in August

1941. In the spring of 1942, when an overall release or shipping permit system based

on authority vested in the Office of Defense Transportation was adopted, the

Chief of Transportation was given the

added responsibility of issuing permits for

shipments of lend-lease supplies procured

by other governmental departments.308

The port agencies were the channels

306

 Leighton and Coakley, op. cit., Ch. XVIII;

Memo, C of Water Div for NYPE, 19 Nov 42, OCT

HB Topic Lend-Lease; Memo, Wylie for Brig Gen

John R. Deane, 6 Jan 43; Memo, CG ASF for GofT,

13 Apr 43, sub: Shipments of French Rearmament

Matériel; last two in OGT 563.5 Africa; Memo, CG

ASF for Dir of Plans and Opns ASF, 31 Mar 44, sub:

Planning for Furnishing Supplies to Civilian Populations, ASF Hq Dir of Plans and Opns; Ltr, Gross to

Ross, 22 Mar 45, OCT HB Gross Day File. 307

 The port agencies, initially called commercial

traffic agencies and late in the war district transportation offices, were independent of the Army ports of

embarkation; see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 111-12, 122,

425. Numerous directives were issued to define procedures; the following are basic: Memo, CG SOS for

C of Sup Svs, 4 Dec 42, sub: Procedure for Shipment

of WD Lend-Lease Matériel, SPX 400.3295 (11-29-

42); ASF Cir 194, 27 Jun 44, Pt. III, sub: Procedure

for Shipment of Materials Consigned to the CG of a

US Army Force; TC Pamphlet 13, 4 Jul 44, and revisions, sub: Lend-Lease Procedures; ASF Cir 423, 27

Dec 44, Pt. III, sub: Procedures for Water-Borne

Export and Lend-Lease Materials. 308

 See above, p. 273.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 413

U.S.-BUILT BROAD-GAUGE LOCOMOTIVES FOR THE USSR loaded on a

Soviet freighter at the Portland Subport of Embarkation.

through which the Chief of Transportation's Traffic Control Division satisfied itself that shipping was available before it

released lend-lease shipments for movement to the ports. The port agencies also

represented the Chief of Transportation in

policing traffic conditions to insure that

rail cars and trucks were unloaded

promptly on arrival at the ports, that excessive or improper use was not made of

port storage, that supplies were loaded

aboard vessels promptly and in accordance

with priorities, and that any shipments

that could not be exported within a reasonable time were moved out of the

ports.309 The port agencies had other

duties with respect to lend-lease supplies

procured by the War Department (other

than commanding general shipments),

which were War Department property

until they were loaded on the ships; these

duties included policing the marking and

documentation of the shipments, pro309

 TG Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, revised 1 Jun 45,

Sec. 502, par. 12. Concerning organization of port

agencies, see TC Cir 130-1, 6 Dec 44, and Functional

Chart of Baltimore Port Agency, 22 Feb 45, both in

OCT HB Zones Gen Port Agencies.
414 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

viding for repacking, processing, and repairing when necessary, and supervising

the stowing of the matériel in the ships to

insure safe transit.310

For about a year after the United States

entered the war the control of lend-lease

shipments to and through the ports was in

a state of flux. Originally such shipments

were consigned to agents of the beneficiary

governments at the loading ports. Under

this arrangement U.S. commercial freight

forwarders were deprived of the opportunity of handling lend-lease traffic, which

together with strictly military traffic constituted the bulk of the wartime export

tonnage. In response to appeals from these

concerns, a bill was introduced in Congress

late in December 1941, the obvious purpose of which was to enable the freight

forwarders to handle lend-lease shipments.

The Quartermaster General, then responsible for Army transportation, watched

the progress of the bill with close interest;

he saw in it a potential threat to the control that had been set up over the portbound movement of Army-procured lendlease shipments and also to the effectiveness

with which the port agencies—at that time

called commercial traffic agencies—carried out their responsibilities for keeping

lend-lease traffic moving smoothly to shipside. Despite Army opposition the bill was

passed with some modifications and was

approved by the President on 14 March

42.

 311

Discussion between the War Department, the War Shipping Administration,

and other interested agencies regarding a

modus operandi under the new act continued over a period of several months,

and the procedure was not finally settled

until November 1942. Under this procedure "war forwarding corporations," designated by the WSA to perform forwarding

functions on behalf of the WSA and the

respective beneficiary governments, became the consignees of lend-lease shipments at the ports and represented their

principals in matters relating to transshipment.312

 The Chief of Transportation

through his Traffic Control Division continued to issue permits for shipments to

start from their points of origin; the Transportation Control Committee continued to

exercise an over-all supervision of traffic

conditions at the ports and on the transportation lines feeding the ports; the

Army's port agencies, together with agencies of the other procuring departments,

continued to co-operate with representatives of the WSA and the beneficiary governments in regard to the movement and

transshipment of lend-lease supplies. The

WSA also instituted a new arrangement

for synchronizing the arrival of cargoes at

the ports with the readiness of ships to

receive them. Shippers were required to

obtain forwarding authorization serial

numbers through the respective forwarding corporations before they applied to

the Chief of Transportation for shipping

permits.313

310

 Min of ZTO Conf, Sep 43, pp. 138-40, OCT

HB Zone Gen. 311

 Memos, Wardlow for Dillon, G of Trans Div

OQMG, 23 and 29 Jan 42, OCT HB Topic Freight

Forwarders Foreign; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS

USA, 25 Feb 42; Ltr, SW for Dir Bur of Budget, 28

Feb 42; last two in OCS 17304-55 to 17497-7; PL 498,

77th Cong. 312

 The Chief of Transportation was opposed to

consigning WD lend-lease shipments to the war forwarding corporations and favored consigning them to

the Army's port agencies, but he conceded this point

during the final stages of the discussion; see draft

letter, ASW to WSA, 21 Oct 42, marked by Gross

"not sent by McCloy"; Memo, Douglas, Deputy WSA,

for Somervell, 26 Nov 42 and reply, undated; last

three in OCT HB Wylie Lend-Lease. 313

 OCT HB Monograph 23, pp. 77-79; WSA

Opns Regulation 23, Forwarding Regulation 1, 25

Nov 42, OCT HB Wylie Lend-Lease.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 415

The control of port-bound shipments of

lend-lease freight, which included establishing routes, issuing permits to ship, and

ordering diversions when necessary, involved certain difficulties that were not

encountered in oversea movements of

matériel for the U.S. forces. Ship schedules

for lend-lease movements, whether they

were for WSA, British, or Soviet vessels,

were less stable than for Army-controlled

vessels. Old ships under the Soviet flag

employed in the Pacific were especially

troublesome in this respect, since they were

often delayed en route and frequently required extensive repairs after arrival at

U.S. ports. The advance information regarding arrivals and sailings of vessels of

foreign registry often was inadequate.

Lend-lease cargoes were loaded at numerous commercial piers that were under

different managements, so that there was

nothing comparable to the integrated control that Army port commanders exercised

over all operations under their jurisdiction. The agencies responsible for lendlease operations at the ports rarely had

large open and closed storage spaces at

their disposal, and were inclined to hold

freight in rail cars longer than was desirable in order to have the advantage of

direct transshipment from cars to ships

and to avoid the cost of extra handling

and storage. The beneficiary governments

made frequent changes in priorities, requiring adjustments in the plans for portbound movements. Availability dates for

lend-lease supplies were to a considerable

extent based on manufacturers' estimates

and were less reliable than the dates furnished by Army depots. The issuance of

permits for Army matériel was subject to

close day-to-day co-ordination between

the Traffic Control Division, the Water

Division, the ports of embarkation, and

the technical services, but in the case of

lend-lease shipments the Traffic Control

Division had to be guided largely by

the Transportation Control Committee's

monthly block releases and the War Shipping Administration's FAS's, and such information as it could obtain through the

port agencies. Both the Traffic Control

Division and the International Division in

the Office of the Chief of Transportation

considered the control exercised over lendlease shipments less satisfactory than that

exercised over Army shipments to its own

oversea forces.314

The International Division, headed by

Col. Marvin H. Dixon, was the general

co-ordinating agency for the Chief of

Transportation in all matters affecting the

movement of international aid supplies.315

It was responsible to the Director of Operations, who had over-all responsibility for

co-ordinating movements with which the

Transportation Corps was concerned. It

maintained liaison with the International

Division, ASF, and the corresponding divisions of the technical services concerning

policies, procedures, and instructions regarding particular shipments. It also

maintained liaison with other branches of

the United States Government concerned

with international aid, and with agencies

of the beneficiary foreign governments located in the United States. It was responsible for keeping the Army port agencies

informed on procedural matters and

special requirements.316

314

 TC Monograph 23, pp. 74-77; Rpt, International Div OCT, 28 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishments

and Handicaps, p. 5, OCT HB International Div. 315

 The unit handling this work was a branch of

the Movements Division until 1 July 1944, when it

became the International Division. 316

 TC Pamphlet 1, Organizational Manual, 1 Jul

44, Sec. 204.00; Rpts of International Div, FY

1943-44, FY 1944-45, 28 Sep 45, 1 Jul 45-15 Aug 46;

all in OCT HB International Div.
416 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Shipments of lend-lease freight (except

explosives), whether procured by the War

Department or other federal departments,

were often stored at the holding and reconsignment points pending the readiness

of the ports to transship them. This procedure was in accordance with the early

planning for these points. The tendency of

the agents of the beneficiary governments

to accumulate large banks of many types

of supplies at the ports in order to be in a

position to meet the frequently changing

requirements of their principals presented

a constant threat to the fluidity of the

larger ports; the ability of the holding

and reconsignment points to accommodate

large quantities of such freight and to deliver it to the ports within a few hours

greatly aided the Transportation Control

Committee and the Traffic Control Division in their effort to avoid congestion at

the seaboard. The Transportation Control

Committee had authority, delegated by

the Office of Defense Transportation, to

divert lend-lease shipments to holding and

reconsignment points when it considered

this desirable. When such shipments were

moved out of the points new FAS numbers

and new unit permits were obtained. The

Army's railroad open storage yards were

used in a similar manner.

The larger quantities of lend-lease

ammunition were transshipped at the special explosives piers operated by the Army,

and when necessary they were accommodated temporarily at the Army's special

backup storage facilities. In addition to

the other control measures, all shipments

of lend-lease explosives had to be cleared

by the port agencies, and those agencies

were authorized to divert such shipments

to backup storage when immediate loading in vessels was not possible. Ordnance

depots and other shippers of explosives

were required to notify the port agencies

by wire on the day of shipment, giving all

information necessary to proper handling

on arrival at the ports. Close co-ordination

obviously was necessary between the port

agencies and the Army ports of embarkation that operated the explosives facilities.

Civilian aid shipments transported

overseas by the Army, the record for

which begins with July 1943, totaled

6,769,000 long tons up to the end of the

war—that is, through August 1945. The

heaviest shipments during this period were

in the months immediately following the

German surrender, and for obvious reasons they went predominately to Europe

and the Mediterranean; only about 3 percent of the total went to the Pacific.317

 The

principal commodities were foodstuffs and

coal. Civilian aid shipments during the

year 1945 totaled 4,902,407 measurement

tons; in 1946 they totaled 3,147,297 measurement tons. Beginning in March 1946

substantial quantities were sent to Japan

and Korea.318

Total tonnage figures for the cargoes

shipped overseas under lend-lease are not

available, so the extent of the movement

can be indicated only in dollars. The total

value of lend-lease aid from 11 March

1941 through December 1945 was approximately $50,000,000,000, of which 46.9

percent was classified as munitions.319 The

War Department placed the value of the

matériel it furnished to other nations

under lend-lease at $24,510,915,000; of

that amount, $19,837,425,000 represented

317

 ASF Statistical Review, World War II, pp. 41, 42,

150.

318

 ASF Monthly Progress Reports and WD Progress Reports (monthly), Transportation, OCT HB

MPR. 319

 The President, Twenty-Second Report to Congress

on Lend-Lease Operations (Washington, 1946), pp.

17-19.
OVERSEA FREIGHT MOVEMENTS 417

direct shipments, $1,075,800,000 commanding general shipments, and $3,597,-

690,000 transfers from Army stocks in the

theaters.320 Shipments of the last two categories moved on vessels under Army control, while the bulk of the direct shipments

moved on nonmilitary vessels. From January 1944 through August 1945 the lendlease cargoes transported on nonmilitary

vessels totaled 23,630,375 long tons.321

Theater Requirements Met

As a general appraisal it is fair to say

that the Army was successful in maintaining an adequate and orderly flow of supplies and equipment to the forces overseas.

This general statement is subject to many

qualifications. The over-all shortage of

shipping limited the amount of cargo that

could be moved to particular destinations.

For a period there were shortages of some

items of supply, so that requisitions for

those items from low-priority theaters

could not be filled promptly, and some

ships sailed with less than capacity cargoes. In the early part of the war the shipping procedures were inadequate, and

even after improved procedures had been

worked out the observance was sometimes

faulty. Automatic supply had its shortcomings and time was required for the

theaters to establish a sound basis for

requisitioning. The multitude of supply

items, changing priorities, and uncertain

communications rendered full understanding between the theaters and the

ports of embarkation responsible for their

supply difficult of attainment. But these

conditions were not unexpected in the

rapid unfoldment of a global war, and

theater commanders who complained bitterly during their campaigns because particular shipments were delayed, or because

of the condition of the material when it

was delivered, in the end agreed that the

over-all job of keeping them supplied had

been well done.

Many of the circumstances adversely

affecting the supply of the theaters were

not under the control of the Chief of

Transportation. The amount of shipping

available for particular routes was governed by commitments made on the highest levels of national and international

strategic planning. Shortages of supply

items were the result of inaccurate planning or production lags. Shipping procedures had to take into account the interests of the procuring and shipping agencies

and the theaters of destination as well as

those of the transportation service. Cooperation between the ports of embarkation and the theaters was a two-way affair,

and failures were attributable to omissions

on the part of the oversea commands as

well as errors in the zone of interior. There

were, however, certain responsibilities that

rested directly on the Chief of Transportation and his port organizations.

The ports of embarkation had the principal operating responsibility. They were

expected to keep the arrival of cargo at

the seaboard commensurate with the

capacity of the ships consigned to them

for loading. They were required to load

vessels efficiently and dispatch them according to schedule. They had to exercise

technical skill and ingenuity in handling

the many heavy, bulky, and irregularly

shaped items of military equipment that

were required in theaters. The transshipment of large quantities of high explosives

320

 Statistics, Lend-Lease, p. 10, compiled for a

statistical volume of this series, now in preparation. 321

 Rpts, Lend-Lease Cargo Shipped on Nonmilitary Vessels, by International Div, OCT, tabulated

for statistical volume of this series.
418 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

called for extraordinary safety measures

as well as technical proficiency. The processing of vehicles, tanks, and other equipment at the ports of embarkation rather

than at depots and home stations was

found to be the best way of assuring their

arrival overseas in good condition. Emergency requests from the theaters had to be

met through intensified efforts and sometimes through hastily improvised methods.

The oversea supply divisions at the ports

had an intricate and exacting task in editing theater requisitions and working with

ASF headquarters and the technical services in getting the requisitioned items

shipped in accordance with the priorities

and schedules. Peacetime terminal operations cannot be compared with the

wartime operation of a military port in

the amount of tonnage handled, the variety of the cargoes, the pressure of the time

element, or the problems of security.

Peacetime standards therefore were not

applicable to military ports. As wartime

establishments the ports of embarkation

won many commendations from officials

of the War Department and the oversea

commands.

The role of the Chief of Transportation

and his staff in Washington was essentially

one of planning, co-ordination, and supervision. While the port commanders were

responsible for moving matériel to particular theaters, the Chief of Transportation's

responsibility embraced all ports and all

theaters. His work in calculating the

Army's requirements for shipping to carry

out strategic plans and in allocating the

available vessels to the best advantage was

basic to the success of the entire supply

program. Having obtained the vessels, he

was expected by the commander of the

Army Service Forces to bring pressure to

bear on the procuring services whenever

they showed signs of falling behind in their

efforts to move enough matériel to the

ports to fill the available cargo space. His

machinery for controlling the shipment of

freight to the ports by the issuance of permits was indispensable in avoiding congestion at the seaboard. He studied the

methods employed in the field, helped the

field agencies work out improvements,

and undertook to establish uniform

methods when this was considered practicable. He co-operated with ASF headquarters and the technical services in developing adequate systems for packing,

marking, and documenting shipments and

in enforcing the prescribed procedures.

The Chief of Transportation and his headquarters staff must be credited with a high

level of performance in these matters.

In all these activities the Transportation

Corps functioned under the supervision of

ASF headquarters. In technical transportation matters the Chief of Transportation

and his port commanders and other field

representatives had virtually a free hand

so long as they got satisfactory results. The

controversy between ASF headquarters

and the Chief of Transportation over the

supervision of the oversea supply divisions

at the ports stemmed partly from the conflict between supply and transportation

considerations and partly from a broader

problem of organizational relationship—

to be discussed in the concluding chapter—that had to be worked out step by

step.
CHAPTER VI

Military and Technical

Training

When the transportation service was

created as an element of the new Services

of Supply in March 1942, it was looked

upon primarily as an agency to move the

Army's troops and matériel; little thought

was given to its training function. Yet that

function developed into one of great importance, and during the course of the

war the Chief of Transportation trained

765 Transportation Corps troop units comprising 179,400 officers and men, trained

36,700 replacements, gave schooling to

11,600 officers and officer candidates, and

arranged for the technical training of

about 1,000 enlisted men at civilian

schools and factories. This personnel was

needed to perform transportation functions in the oversea commands, and without it military operations would have been

greatly handicapped. In addition, the

Chief of Transportation trained 37,700

officers and men of other services to function as units and perform duties at the

ports and on troop transports and hospital ships. Because of his late start, the

Chief of Transportation could not provide

troop organizations as rapidly as they

were needed, and consequently 200 Transportation Corps units, aggregating almost

37,000 officers and men, were activated

and trained overseas, using personnel obtained from Infantry, Artillery, and various technical service units.1

Two types of units that were subsequently assigned to the Transportation

Corps were being trained in limited numbers by other agencies during the rearmament period. Those required for the operation of oversea ports were organized and

activated by The Quartermaster General

and were trained at the ports of embarkation. When the ports were placed under

the control of the new Transportation

Service, this training function naturally

passed to its jurisdiction, although the organizations continued to be designated

Quartermaster units until the transportation service became the Transportation

Corps in July 1942. Units required for the

operation of military railways were organized and trained by the Chief of

Engineers until November 1942, when the

Military Railway Service was transferred

to the Transportation Corps. These older

types of units required some revamping to

meet the conditions that World War II

presented, and the need quickly developed for a number of other types to carry

on transportation activities overseas.

To fulfill his training responsibilities,

the Chief of Transportation had to develop a headquarters staff to determine requirements, prepare mobilization training

1

 Data from 1st Ind, CofT for Hist Div WDSS, 8

Aug 47, sub: Statistics on Tng During World War II,

OCT HB Tng Div Rpts.
420 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

programs, establish tables of organization

and equipment, formulate training doctrine, and supervise training activities in

the field. He had to expand the training

facilities for port and railway troops and

establish additional facilities for the new

types of units. He had to develop methods

for obtaining personnel with which to

activate units and to fill needs of oversea

commanders for individual transportation

officers, and this in the environment of a

growing manpower shortage in both the

military and the civilian fields. Not the

least of the problems confronting the Chief

of Transportation was that of establishing

a satisfactory working basis with the

headquarters of the Services of Supply

(SOS), which had supervision of the training activities of all of the technical services, and a workable division of responsibilities between his office and the service

commands.

Transportation Corps units were military organizations, although their tasks

were essentially technical. They were intended to function in the communications

zones overseas rather than in the combat

zones, but this did not mean that they

were remote from combat activity. Any

strategic point along a line of communications was subject to air attack; if near the

combat zone it might be attacked by a

motorized enemy force, and if on the coast

it might be the object of a commando

raid. Numerous Transportation Corps

port companies performed their tasks

under aerial attack, and some under artillery fire. Some port companies, amphibian truck companies, and harbor craft

companies participated in assaults on

enemy-held shores, and many more were

present during the support phases. Military Railway Service troops were called

upon to keep trains running and to repair

tracks close to the line of combat. Transportation Corps troops, therefore, had to

be trained as soldiers as well as in the

technical aspects of their service. Some

Transportation Corps units won honors

and citations and many of the officers and

men were singled out for individual

awards.

Although they performed a distinctly

transportation function, motor transport

troop units were not included in the

Transportation Corps. Throughout the

war the organization and training of these

units were supervised by The Quartermaster General, and actual training

was given by various agencies of the

Army. The Chief of Transportation believed that truck operating units should be

part of the Transportation Corps, but his

recommendation in the summer of 1942

that they be placed under his jurisdiction

did not receive the approval of SOS headquarters. In the course of the war the

chiefs of transportation in the theaters

used such units extensively in providing

over-the-road truck service. In some cases

they activated and trained the units, using

whatever personnel might be made available to them by the theater commanders.

They also found that truck units trained

in the zone of interior for service with

tactical troops required further training

for over-the-road operations. In July 1946,

as a result of wartime experience, truck

companies and a number of other motor

transport units were transferred to the

jurisdiction of the Transportation Corps.2

Distribution of Training Responsibilities

A somewhat scrambled situation with

regard to training responsibilities existed

2

 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations, p. 66.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 421

during 1942, largely as a consequence of

the reorganization of the War Department that took place soon after the United

States entered the war. The establishment of the Services of Supply interposed

a new echelon between the technical services and the General Staff. The nine service commands, successors to the corps

areas, were the field agencies of the new

and powerful SOS. The training of technical service troops, which up to then had

been a minor and routine task, became one

of great scope and urgency, with emphasis

on the preparation of units as distinguished from individual replacements.

Under the reorganization directive the responsibility of the Commanding General,

Services of Supply, for the operation of

training centers and schools for SOS personnel was unequivocal, and the headquarters organization that he set up included a staff division to deal with training.3

 It remained to be seen what part of

its responsibility SOS headquarters would

delegate to subordinate agencies and what

roles it would assign to the technical services and the service commands, respectively. Disagreement between technical

service chiefs, who previously had had full

responsibility, and SOS headquarters was

soon evident.

It is of interest that in the early part of

the war responsibility for the training of

service troops was a matter of dispute between the Services of Supply and the

Army Ground Forces. The initial arrangement was that the AGF and the AAF

would train the service units normally employed in close support of combat troops,

and that the SOS would train the service

units normally employed in the zone of

interior or in the communications zones of

theaters. This arrangement resulted in

both the AGF and the SOS training certain types of organizations that could be

employed either in combat or in noncombat activities, and there was a sharp difference of opinion as to how the duplication

should be eliminated. Following an investigation by The Inspector General and a

study of the problem by G-3 late in 1942,

the War Department decided against any

major change in the program but transferred the responsibility for training certain types of units from the AGF to the

SOS and certain types from the SOS to

the AGF.4 No Transportation Corps units

were involved in this shift, for the Chief of

Transportation had strongly urged that all

Transportation Corps units be activated,

trained, and controlled by his office.5 The

adjustment led to better understanding

and co-operation between the AGF and

the SOS. Beginning in January 1944 a

further reduction in duplication of effort

was achieved by providing in the troop

basis for the training of a particular type

of unit by only one command.6 ASF headquarters nevertheless was of the opinion

that a better plan would have been for all

service units to have been activated and

trained in their service functions by ASF,

and then turned over to the AGF or the

AAF for combat training before being

assigned to duty.7

3

 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, par. 7; Initial Directive for

Org of SOS, 9 Mar 42. For brevity the word "training" is often used to cover the entire field of military

and technical instruction, although the instruction of

individuals was more precisely known as schooling. 4

 Memo, DCofS for TIG, 5 Nov 42, sub: Survey of

Sv Units; 1st Ind, TIG for DCofS, 5 Dec 42; Memo,

G-3 for CofS, 30 Dec 42, sub: Tng Sv Units; Memo,

G-3 for SOS and AGF, 5 Jan 43; all of above and

other related documents are in AG 353 (12-30-42). 5

 Memo for C of Opns SOS, 24 Oct 42, sub: Service

Units, OCT HB Dir of Mil Tng. 6

 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, The Procurement and

Training of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 303-07. 7

 Logistics in World War II, p. 116.
422 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

In the distribution of training responsibilities it was clear that certain functions

should be retained by SOS headquarters.

The Training Division in that headquarters, later known as the Office of the Director of Military Training, established training policies, co-ordinated and approved

training doctrine and programs, and supervised the training activities of all technical services. The Mobilization Division,

as it was developed in ASF headquarters,

prepared the over-all program for the activation of ASF units within the troop basis,

correlated the preparation of tables of

organization and tables of equipment by

the technical services, and dealt with the

General Staff, the Army Ground Forces,

and the Army Air Forces regarding the

assignment of ASF units to particular

missions.8 It was clear also that primary

responsibility for the establishment of

training doctrine and training programs in

their respective fields should rest with the

chiefs of the technical services. But there

was a difference of opinion as to who

should control the training centers. The

responsible officers in SOS (and later ASF)

headquarters preferred that the control of

these installations should be in the service

commands. Some of the chiefs of the technical services, including the Chief of Transportation, felt strongly that this control

should rest with them.

The Army regulation defining the

functions of the service commands, published in December 1942, should have

eliminated all uncertainty as to the training responsibilities, but it did not do so.

During the ensuing months a number of

SOS and ASF directives were issued to

clarify a situation that admittedly was

confused.9 The net result was that the

chiefs of technical services controlled training activities only at the installations that

were under their command for the performance of other functions, while the

service commanders controlled the training centers. The technical services continued to be responsible for the preparation of training doctrine and training

programs and for the establishment of

student quotas.

The Chief of Transportation was not as

widely affected by this development as

were most of the other technical service

chiefs since some of the training of port

and marine units was being done at his

ports of embarkation, a large training

center at New Orleans was left under the

command of the commander of the New

Orleans Port of Embarkation, and military

railway units were receiving their technical training on the commercial railroads.

However, a training center at Indiantown

Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania,

which was originally set up as a Transportation Corps activity, was transferred to

the control of the Third Service Command, and a center for the training of

amphibian truck companies and harbor

craft companies, soon to be established at

Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, was

placed under the control of the Fourth

Service Command.

The objections that the technical service

chiefs had to this arrangement were aired

at a conference held in July 1943.10 Some

of them felt that pride of service, which

had great morale value, could be more

effectively instilled at training centers con8

 SOS Org Manual, 15 Feb 43, Sec. 302.07 and

Sec. 302.11, par. c(5); ASF Manual M 301, Organization, 15 Jan 44, Secs. 201.04, 203.00, 203.01; see also

ASF Manual M 4, April 1945, sub: Mil Tng. 9

 AR 170-10, 24 Dec 42; SOS Memo S 350-5-43,

3 Feb 43, sub: Tng Responsibility of SvCs; ASF Cir

28, 12 May 43, sub: Designation of Tng Activities;

ASF Cir 37, 4 June 43, same subject. 10 Min of ASF Conf of CGs of SvCs, 22-24 Jul 43,

pp. 355-62.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 423

trolled entirely by the technical services

than at service command installations

where technical service distinctions could

not be emphasized. When the technical

service chiefs had direct control of the

training installations, they could more

freely move equipment and personnel

around and try experiments to improve

the training methods. When they had to

work through the service commands to

have their doctrines and programs effectively carried out, they often encountered

resistance to their ideas and consequent

delays. Since the blame for inadequately

trained units fell on the technical service

chiefs in any case, they felt that they

should have complete control of the training activities. At this conference the Director of Military Training, ASF, expressed

the view that the desired results could be

obtained equally well by either method if

the technical services and the service commands would co-operate fully. The purpose in giving the service commands

control of training centers, he explained,

was to economize on manpower and

equipment. General Somervell, after listening to the views of the technical service

chiefs, indicated that he intended to go

forward with the plan recently placed in

effect.

In the spring of 1944, ASF headquarters

made a significant change in the method

of training troops. Instead of units being

activated before the troops had received

basic military or basic technical training,

the troops thereafter were to pass through

a period of preactivation training, during

which they would receive individual instruction in basic military and technical

subjects. After completing this training as

individuals, they would then be given

basic unit training as members of an

organization, or basic team training as

replacements.11 To carry out this program,

unit training centers and replacement

training centers were combined when they

were located at the same posts, and the

combined activities were designated ASF

training centers. The purpose of the new

plan was to give more emphasis to individual instruction; it was expected to reduce

the number of personnel adjustments necessary after units had been activated,

assist in getting better results from unit

training, and promote economy in the use

of training personnel and training equipment.12

 As a general rule the training

centers remained under the control of the

service commands, but the commander of

the New Orleans Port of Embarkation

continued to command the extensive

training facilities that had been developed

under his jurisdiction.

From the standpoint of economy and

uniformity the ASF plan of placing training activities under the control of the service commanders had obvious advantages,

but the Chief of Transportation never was

convinced that these outweighed the disadvantages. His Training Division, in a

report rendered at the end of the war,

referred to its lack of direct control over

the technical training of troops at certain

training centers as "one of the greatest

difficulties encountered."

 13

 The division

objected particularly to an arrangement

under which it was held responsible for the

failure of units to pass The Inspector General's final inspection when it had not had

full control of the technical training of

those units. This was an especially acute

problem for the Chief of Transportation 11

 ASF Cir 104, 15 Apr 44, Sec. III; ASF Cir 135,

11 May 44, Sec. IV; ASF Annual Report for the Fiscal

Year 1944, p. 286. 12

 Logistics in World War II, p. 116. 13

 Rpt, Tng Div OCT, 28 Sep 45, sub: Difficulties

and Accomplishments, OCT HB Tng Div Gen.
424 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

because Transportation Corps troop units

embraced a greater number of military

occupational specialties— 128 types of specialties, mostly in the field of marine and

railway operations—than the units of any

other technical service.14

The staff that the Chief of Transportation built up in his headquarters to supervise training activities had a very modest

beginning. On 1 April 1942 a Training

and Intelligence Branch was established

with one officer, Col. Llewellyn W. Oliver,

dividing his time between these two activities. As the training responsibility expanded and a number of schools and

training centers became necessary, the

headquarters staff was expanded to meet

the new requirements. Eventually, as the

Military Training Division, this staff consisted of forty-four officers and civilians.15

During the formative period it was headed

in succession by Lt. Col. Edward H.

Connor, Jr., Col. John F. Davis, and Col.

George B. Norris. In January 1943, shortly

after the training responsibility had been

greatly broadened by the addition of the

Military Railway Service to the Transportation Corps, Col. Frank C. Scofield was

designated chief of the division. Scofield

held the position until March 1945, when

he was appointed president of the new

Transportation Corps Board. Col. Geoffrey

C. Bunting headed the Military Training

Division during the remainder of the war

and well into the postwar period. Colonels

Scofield and Bunting also carried the title

Director of Military Training. Both had

come to the Transportation Corps with

training experience gained while serving

with the Coast Artillery Corps.16

The field organization for training

began to expand in the early summer of

1942, when it was apparent that the ports

of embarkation with their other heavy

responsibilities could no longer be relied

on to turn out the number of units and

replacements that would be needed overseas. A training center for port troops was

authorized in July 1942 at the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation. A training center at New Orleans was authorized

in November 1942, which in addition to

port troops trained many other types of

units and replacements. When the Transportation Corps took over the Military

Railway Service in November 1942, it

also took over training responsibilities

that required the use of facilities at Camp

Claiborne, Louisiana, Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and later Fort Francis E. Warren,

Wyoming. The growing need for troop

units to operate small boats and amphibious trucks and to carry on other types of

marine activities led to the establishment

of a training center at Camp Gordon

Johnston, Florida, in December 1943.

Meanwhile, the Transportation Corps had

started several schools for officers and an

officer candidate school under the supervision of the port commanders at New

York, New Orleans, and San Francisco.

The ports of embarkation continued to

train certain types of Transportation Corps

units, and a number of other installations

were used in a limited way for training

purposes.17

14

 See MOS listed in Rpt, Mil Tng Div, 1 Jul 45-15

Aug 46, Exhibit 8, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 15

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, 1 Jul 45-15 Aug 46, Exhibit

6, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 16

 For the organization of the division at the end of

the war, see Mil Tng Div, 30 Jun 45, Exhibit A, and

preceding discussion, OCT HB Mil Tng Div Rpts. 17

 A comprehensive list of installations that were in

use or available for immediate use in training Transportation Corps troops is given in Rpt, Mil Tng Div,

30 Jun 45, pp. 21-23, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts; the list

indicates the type of units trained at each installation

and whether military, technical, and/or unit training

was given.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 425

The commander of the New Orleans

Port of Embarkation had a prominent role

in the Transportation Corps training program. He had direct supervision of the

largest training center for Transportation

Corps units and replacements and of a

school for officers and officer candidates.

Since the New Orleans port commander

was responsible to the Chief of Transportation and was in general sympathy with his

aims and programs, this arrangement was

preferable to that which obtained at other

unit and replacement training centers,

where the service commands had direct

control. Yet the arrangement at New

Orleans was not without its problems. The

Director of Military Training in the Office

of the Chief of Transportation believed

that the necessity of communicating with

the training center and the school through

the port commander deprived him of the

direct contact with the activities at those

installations that he needed to make his

policies fully effective. Brig. Gen. Fremont

B. Hodson, the port commander, had had

staff supervision over Transportation Corps

training activities while he was a member

of General Gross's staff in Washington. He

therefore had a good background for this

phase of the port commander's responsibility when he assumed command of the

port in September 1943. Difficulties and

delays arose, however, when the port commander and the Director of Military

Training did not agree on points of policy

or on methods, and the latter felt that he

was placed at a disadvantage. There was a

feeling also that an officer should not be

required to divide his attention between

the operation of an active port and the

conduct of a training center and a school.

General Hodson vigorously opposed the

suggestion that the training activities at

New Orleans be brought under the direct

supervision of the Director of Military

Training, and this was not accomplished

until after the war.18

Schooling for Officers and

Officer Candidates

A shortage of competent officers was a

persistent problem for the Chief of Transportation throughout the war. This was a

condition experienced by other elements

of the Army, but as a new service the

Transportation Corps felt the shortage

with special keenness. Unlike the wellestablished services, the Transportation

Corps had had no opportunity to build

up and train a nucleus of officers during

the prewar rearmament period. Although

it drew some of its personnel from other

services, the other services also were in

need of officers and to a large extent the

Transportation Corps had to fend for itself.

Its needs were met, though never adequately, by schooling officers who lacked

technical background in the skills they

would require, schooling men newly commissioned from the transportation industry

in basic military subjects, and developing

junior officers in an officer candidate

school.

The demand for transportation officers

arose from three sources. Transportation

officers were required to staff the rapidly

expanding organization of the Transportation Corps in the zone of interior; they

were required for the many types of Transportation Corps troop units that were being activated for oversea service; and they

were required by the oversea commanders

for their headquarters and base section

staffs. The oversea requirement was met

18

 Interv with Col Bunting, 19 May 52, OCT HB

Dir Mil Tng; Memo, CofT for CG NOPE, 20 Nov 45,

OCT HB Wylie Tng.
426 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

in part by transferring experienced officers

from Transportation Corps headquarters

and field installations, and in part by furnishing officers trained in the schools.19

During the first two years of the war the

drain on the Transportation Corps establishment in the zone of interior, especially

the ports of embarkation, was heavy.

Nevertheless, the theaters were not satisfied with the number or the quality of the

officers sent them. The situation was relieved somewhat after the Transportation

Corps School had been functioning for a

time, but up to the end of the war in

Europe the number of officers available to

the Chief of Transportation was never

sufficient to enable him to weed out drastically those who had failed to prove their

competency.

Initially all schooling for officers was

provided at the ports of embarkation, since

at that time port headquarters and port

battalions were the only units for which

the Chief of Transportation was responsible. As the number and types of units

charged to the Chief of Transportation increased it was evident that additional

schooling arrangements would have to be

made.20

The first schools for Transportation

Corps officers were established in September 1942 at Fort Slocum, New York, and

Camp Stoneman, California.21 Fort Slocum and Camp Stoneman also served as

staging areas for the ports of embarkation

at New York and San Francisco, and the

new schools were placed under the supervision of the commanders of those ports.

The purpose of the schools was to provide

orientation and basic military indoctrination for inexperienced officers, particularly

officers recently commissioned from civilian life and reserve officers called to active

duty.22 The Atlantic Coast Transportation

Corps Officers Training School at Fort

Slocum received officers from installations

in the eastern part of the United States

and from recently activated units of the

Military Railway Service. The Pacific

Coast Transportation Corps Officers Training School at Camp Stoneman schooled

officers from installations west of the Mississippi. Classes usually consisted of 100

officers, but some classes were larger, and

some were smaller because of the inability

of installation commanders to meet their

quotas without handicapping their operations.23

 The normal duration of the course

was six weeks.

The goal toward which these schools

worked is well expressed in the words of

Col. Bernard Lentz, commandant at Fort

Slocum. To each class he made it clear

that the primary aim was to teach "soldiering" to officers drawn from civilian

occupations and to imbue them "with the

military virtues that an officer must fully

understand if he is to function properly in

any branch of the military organization."24

 The Chief of Transportation insisted that the indoctrination should inculcate a pride in and an enthusiasm for the

Transportation Corps. He referred to surveys of Army Service Forces troops that

had revealed a "deplorable lack of enthusiasm" and "a disposition to prefer other

branches of the service to the one in which

19

 Wardlow, op., cit., p. 85. 20

 OCT HB Monograph 26, pp. 8-11. 21

 OCT Tng Memo 2, 14 Sep 42, in OCT HB

Wylie Tng; Hist Rpt of Mil Tng Div to 30 Dec 42,

Tab II, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 22

 See Master Program of Instruction for Fifth

Course, in Mil Tng Div Rpt, 30 Jun 43, Tab 16, OCT

HB Tng Div Rpts. 23

 Remarks by Col Scofield in Min of Port Comdrs

Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, p. 56, OCT HB PE

Gen.

24

 Bernard Lentz, "Military Railway Officers Train

at Fort Slocum," Railway Age, 30 Jan 43.
MAJ. GEN. FREDERICK GILBREATH, Commander of the San Francisco Port of

Embarkation, inspecting the officers' school at Camp Stoneman.
428 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

they were."

 25

 These were attitudes that

General Gross wanted the schools to correct so far as transportation officers were

concerned.

During 1943 the need to give technical

training to officers became increasingly

pressing. Officers assigned to the Military

Railway Service were in most cases railroaders by profession, but the officers of

port, harbor boat, amphibian truck, and

other types of Transportation Corps units

frequently were without qualifying experience. The schools at Fort Slocum and

Camp Stoneman were not equipped to

give technical training, and some other

provision had to be made. The school at

Stoneman was closed in February 1944,

and the one at Slocum in the following

October; between them they had given

instruction to more than 3,000 officers.26

In February 1944 the Chief of Transportation established the Transportation Corps

School at New Orleans, with divisions for

officers and officer candidates, to operate

under the supervision of the commander of

the New Orleans Port of Embarkation.27

The courses initially given in the officer

division of the Transportation Corps

School were of eight weeks' duration. They

dealt with water activities (port and allied

operations), stevedoring, troop movements, and traffic regulation for railways,

highways, and inland waterways.28 Later,

a two-week course for post transportation

officers was added and a four-week course

for ship transportation officers (originally

called cargo security officers). Through

August 1945 a total of 1,412 officers was

graduated from these courses.29 The instruction included classroom work and

practical experience on ships and in shops.

The practical work was necessarily limited

and a poor substitute for actual operating

experience, but it was helpful.

A basic problem at the school was the

difficulty of obtaining satisfactory instructors. Often it was a choice between an

experienced man who had no teaching

ability and a competent teacher without

practical experience. In such a situation

the latter was chosen, since it had been

found that the instructor that was able to

organize and present his material well got

the better results. New instructors assigned

to the school first took an instructor's

guidance course and then were gradually

given teaching responsibility.30

Technical training for officers was not

confined to the Transportation Corps

School; it was continued at the ports of

embarkation after the establishment of the

school and was given also at certain unit

training centers where the requisite facilities and instructors were available.

Courses in stevedoring were given at the

training center at Indiantown Gap, and

courses in coastwise piloting and navigation, marine engines, and amphibian truck

operations were given at the training

center at Camp Gordon Johnston.31 While

this distribution of the load had the advantage of utilizing instructors and equip25

 Ltr, CofT to Lentz, 26 Jul 43, OCT HB Gross

Day File. 26

 Slocum held eighteen classes with a total attendance of 2,122; Stoneman held twelve classes with a

total attendance of 914; see 1st Ind, CofT for Hist Div

WDSS, 8 Aug 47, sub: Statistics on Tng, Tabs l and

1b, in OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 27

 Memo, Dir Mil Tng ASF for CofT, 6 Dec 43,

SPTEE 352 (Trans, 22 Nov 43), sub: TC Sp Sv Sch;

Memo, CofT for PEs, et al., 15 Jan 44; TC Cir 35-1,

25 Feb 44, sub: TC School; all in OCT HB Tng Div,

TC School NO. 28

 TC Cir 35-1, revised 17 Jun 44; Min of Port

Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, pp. 69-70;

Memo, CG NOPE for CofT, 18 Sep 45, sub: Accomplishment and Handicaps, p. 5, Exhibit A, OCT HB

NOPE Gen. 29

 1st Ind, CofT for Hist Div WDSS, cited n. 26,

Tab la. 30

 OCT HB Monograph 26, p. 26. 31

 OCT HB Monograph 26, pp. 11-26, describes

the courses briefly and indicates the manuals and

other texts used.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 429

TRAINING TRANSPORTATION OFFICERS, commissioned directly from civilian

life, at Fort Slocum, New York.

ment that were already available and in

use for other purposes, it had the disadvantage of not permitting officers to

acquire experience in co-ordinating the

operations of different types of Transportation Corps units, although such co-ordination would be required during their

service in the oversea commands.32 The

Chief of Transportation took steps to rectify this shortcoming, but the necessary

adjustments were not accomplished until

after the end of the war.

The establishment of an officer candidate school was one of the proposals put

forward by the Chief of Transportation in

June 1942, when he recommended that

the Transportation Service be converted

into the Transportation Corps in order to

better fulfill its mission.33 Such a school

was the only visible means of meeting the

need for junior officers to serve with Transportation Corps troop units. The schooling of officer candidates began in the fall

of that year and the activity can be divided into two periods—the first, when

the emphasis was on administration, and

the second, when military and technical

instruction were stressed.

In response to the Chief of Transportation's recommendation, the General Staff

made provision for the schooling of officer

candidates for the Transportation Corps

at Army Administration School, Branch

No. 4, located at Mississippi State College,

32

 For example, co-ordination between port units,

amphibian truck companies, and small boat companies was necessary in port and beach operations. 33

 Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 30 Jun 42, sub:

Reorg of Trans Sv, OCT 020 Org of TC.
430 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Starkville, Mississippi.34 This school, operating under the supervision of The Adjutant General and concerned chiefly with

administration, was not what the Chief of

Transportation had asked for, but it was a

step in the right direction. The capacity

was fixed at 750, the course was of twelve

weeks' duration, and a new class of about

250 was enrolled at intervals of four weeks.

The first class reported on 17 October

1942. The Adjutant General furnished instructors for the administrative subjects,

which occupied eight weeks of the course,

and the Chief of Transportation furnished

instructors for the technical subjects,

which were dealt with in the last four

weeks.35

The Chief of Transportation was not

satisfied with the school at Starkville and

considered it only a temporary expedient.

The emphasis on administrative subjects

did not fit in with the urgent need that he

foresaw for junior officers capable of leading transportation troops in the theaters.

Inadequate basic military training on the

part of many candidates was a further

handicap. The standards of admission,

which permitted men capable of only

limited service and without any practical

or technical background to enter, also fell

short of the Chief of Transportation's desires. The location of Mississippi State

College, which had no shipping facilities

and was not adjacent to an airport, was

not favorable to the teaching of practical

transportation. The lack of military atmosphere and the fact that the school was

not a Transportation Corps installation

limited the opportunity to inculcate in

officer candidates the pride of service

on which General Gross placed great

emphasis.36

Two steps were taken to overcome these

handicaps. The school at Starkville was

transferred to the control of the Chief

of Transportation in January 1943.37

Changes were then made in the qualifications for admission and in the curriculum

to bring them more into line with the

Transportation Corps' needs.38 In June

1943 the school was transferred from

Starkville to New Orleans and was redesignated the Transportation Corps

Officer Candidate School (OCS).39

The new OCS was operated first at the

New Orleans Staging Area, where the

unit training center was located. In February 1944 it was moved to the Army Air

Base where it became the Officer Candidate Division of the Transportation Corps

School, which was established at that

time. Further changes were made in the

curriculum in order to stress technical

subjects and military leadership. The

course was lengthened to seventeen weeks.

Full use was made of the opportunity to

visit and study the various types of commercial transportation facilities available

at New Orleans.

The number of officer candidates at the

school varied greatly. From a starting

capacity of 750, to accommodate three

classes of 250 each, the capacity was increased to 1,000 in the fall of 1943, only

to be drastically cut early in 1944 to conform to a new War Department policy.

The summer of 1944 brought a heavy

34

 Memo, DCofS USA for CG SOS, 17 Jul 42, OCT

020 Org of TC; Memo, CofT for PEs, 9 Sep 42, OCT

HB Tng Div OCS; WD Memo 350-94-42, 22 Sep 42,

sub: Estab of Brs of Army Adm Sch. 35

 OCT HB Monograph 26, pp. 27-34. 36

 Memo, CofT for Dir Mil Tng ASF, 29 Mar 43,

sub: Change in Location of OCS, OCT HB Tng Div

OCS; Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, p. 58. 37

 WD Memo 350-6-43, 7 Jan 43. 38

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, 1 Jan-30 Jun 43, pp. 3-4,

OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 39

 WD Memo W 350-136-43, 24 May 43.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 431

demand from Europe and the Pacific for

junior officers, and the capacity was raised

to 2,250. The largest classes were graduated in November and December 1944,

with 764 and 604 graduates respectively.40

Officer candidates who could not keep

up with their classes were set back a class,

and those who did not soon demonstrate

proper qualifications were relieved. The

strictness with which this policy was enforced naturally depended somewhat on

the demand for junior officers at the time,

but the Chief of Transportation's instruction was to "weed out the duds." The

forty-one classes that had completed the

OCS course up to 15 August 1945 had a

total enrollment of 9,901. This figure includes about 1,800 candidates who were

set back, so that the actual number of candidates was smaller. Of the 1,280 who

were not graduated, 333 were relieved for

academic reasons, 501 for lack of leadership qualities, and 446 for other reasons.

The number graduated and commissioned

was 6,865. Upon graduation about 3,100

were assigned to ports of embarkation for

duty or further practical training; about

3,000 were assigned to officer replacement

pools, 222 were considered ready for immediate assignment to troop units, and

the remainder were sent to other Transportation Corps offices and installations.41

Troop Units for the Operation

of Oversea Ports

The potential need for troops to operate

oversea ports at which there was an inadequate native labor force was recognized during the rearmament period, but

the extent of the requirement was not

visualized because the extent of American

involvement was not foreseen. In February 1941, G-4 expressed the opinion that

at least one port battalion should be activated, probably at San Francisco, although no provision had been made in

the troop basis for such a unit.42 A much

more realistic approach to the subject was

presented in April by Colonel Dillon, chief

of The Quartermaster General's Transportation Division, who recommended

that personnel and a training center be

provided as soon as possible for the activation and training of from thirty-five to

forty port battalions.43 In this matter Dillon evidently was "a prophet without

honor," for it was more than a year before

a training center for port troops was authorized and the activation of new port

organizations proceeded slowly. Up to 1

July 1941 only two port battalions had

been placed in training. From that date

to 9 March 1942, when the transportation

service was established, four port headquarters and eight and a half port battalions were activated.44

It was natural that in the beginning

port units for oversea service should have

been activated and trained at ports of embarkation, since they had the required

facilities and experienced personnel to

serve as instructors. But the ports had

other responsibilities that became extremely heavy as soon as the United States

entered the war, and it was not practic40

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 67-68; History of the TC Officer Candidate School, tabulation of classes through No. 37, OCT

HB Tng Div Rpts; OCT HB Monograph 26, p. 36. 41

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, 1 Jul 45-15 Aug 46, Exhibits

14 and 16. These tabulations contain some minor discrepancies that cannot be explained. 42

 Memo, G-4 for G-1, 10 Feb 41, sub: Various

Actions in Connection With Ports of Embarkation,

par. 5a, G-4/32544. 43

 Memo, Col Dillon for Maj Gen Edmund B.

Gregory, TQMG, 15 Apr 41, OCT HB OQMG Gen. 44

 Mil Tng Div, Summary of Units Activated, 1 Jul

41-30 Jun 43; Rpt, Mil Tng Div, 1 Jan 43-30 Jun 43,

Exhibit 45; both in OCT HB Tng Div Rpts.
432 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

able to require them to provide military

as well as technical training for the large

number of units that would be needed.45

Accordingly, in June 1942 the Chief of

Transportation recommended that a

training center with capacity for four battalions be established, and that it be

located in the general vicinity of the New

York Port of Embarkation so that officers

and key enlisted personnel might have an

opportunity to visit the port and observe

longshore operations.46 At about the same

time General Gross indicated that twenty

port battalions and two port companies

had been authorized, which were already

overseas or committed, and he recommended the authorization of twelve additional battalions to meet requirements in

the United Kingdom and in the Pacific.47

In July the War Department authorized

the establishment of a unit training center

at the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, with initial capacity for 2,200

trainees and provision for enlargement to

5,000 as required.48 The new center was

placed under the supervision of the Chief

of Transportation, and he, in turn, placed

it under the direct control of the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation. As already noted, this facility

was transferred to the control of the Third

Service Command in January 1943.

Until July 1942 port units were activated under tables of organization established by The Quartermaster General,

and they were designated Quartermaster

battalion, port, and headquarters and

headquarters company, port. The Chief

of Transportation had been responsible for

their training since the creation of his office in March 1942, because the ports of

embarkation had been placed under his

control at that time. When the Transportation Corps was established on 31 July

1942, these units were transferred to the

new Corps and the Chief of Transportation became responsible not only for their

activation and training, but also for the

preparation of tables of organization and

equipment, training doctrine, and training programs.49

The training activity at Indiantown

Gap had scarcely gotten under way when

it became apparent that additional capacity for the training of port battalions would

be needed, and also that provision would

have to be made for the training of harbor

craft companies and other types of units,

as well as replacements. A location on the

seaboard was desirable, and the New Orleans Staging Area was available since the

New Orleans port was not being used for

the shipment of troops to the extent that

had been anticipated. Accordingly, a unit

training center at New Orleans was authorized in November 1942, with an initial

capacity for 619 officers and 10,000 enlisted men.50

 The installation, which later

45

 Program for training port units at ports of embarkation is given in OCT Tng Memo 1, 18 May 42,

OCT HB Tng Div Units Port. 46

 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 10 Jun 42, sub: Estab

of Unit Tng Center, OCT 323.5 Misc. 47

 Memo for CG SOS, 26 Jun 42, sub: Additional

Reqmts, OCT HB Tng Div Units Port. 48

 AG Memo 320.2 (7-8-42), 10 Jul 42, sub: Trans

Sv Training Center. 49

 WD GO 38, 31 Jul 42; GO 46, 17 Sep 42. Memo,

CG SOS for CofT, 4 Sep 42, OCT 322, listed units

transferred from the QMC to the TC as follows: 12

headquarters and headquarters companies, 37 port

battalions (17 white and 20 Negro), and 2 port companies. The transfer of 7 aviation boat companies

listed in the memo was rescinded by WD GO 46, 17

Sep 42. The 22d and 23d Ports of Embarkation listed

were activated in SWPA and were more in the nature of pools that could be drawn on for personnel for

assignment to various ports than they were operating

organizations; see Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp.

103-05. 50

 AF Memo 320.2 (11-1-42), 10 Nov 42; WD GO

84, 6 Dec 43.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 433

was renamed Camp Plauché, was called

a SOS (later an ASF) training center, but

from the beginning it was under the control of the Chief of Transportation who, in

turn, placed it under the direct supervision

of the Commanding General, New Orleans Port of Embarkation.

In the beginning troop units to perform

longshore labor were activated and

trained as battalions, but later they were

activated and trained as companies. The

battalion, consisting of four companies

and a headquarters and headquarters detachment, was a larger unit than was

needed at many oversea ports, and the

Chief of Transportation concluded that

greater flexibility would be possible if these

troops were trained as companies. The

companies could be assigned singly to

very small ports, or several could be assigned to a larger port with a headquarters and headquarters detachment, or the

required number of port companies could

be attached to a headquarters and headquarters company, which was trained to

administer and supervise extensive port

operations. Accordingly, in June 1943, all

port battalions in the zone of interior were

broken up and the port companies and

headquarters and headquarters detachments were numbered separately.51

The general plan was that port companies would receive their basic military

and technical training at the unit training

centers, and then receive further training

at the ports of embarkation. At the training centers "land ships" and "dummy

cargo" were used, and it was hoped that if

each unit spent a short time at a port of

embarkation before going overseas it

would be able to acquire some experience

with "live" ships and real cargo. This

hope was realized only to a limited extent,

for the labor unions objected to the use of

soldiers to load ships when civilian longshoremen were available, and the port

commanders often preferred to use them

for other work such as cleaning gear,

sweeping piers, and unloading railway

cars.52

A port headquarters and headquarters

company was the overhead organization

of a port of embarkation in miniature.

Under The Quartermaster General, these

units were known as mobile ports, presumably because they might be moved

from place to place to meet changing

needs. Under the Chief of Transportation,

they became known as major ports or

medium ports depending on the task to

which they were assigned, the number of

port companies and other service units

employed, and the size of the headquarters organization required to supervise the

operation. A major port was capable of

supervising the transshipment of 300,000

measurement tons of cargo and 50,000

troops per month; a medium port was expected to supervise the transshipment of

up to 150,000 measurement tons and

25,000 troops per month. The major port

had an authorized strength of 109 commissioned officers (including a brigadier

general and 11 colonels), 1 warrant officer, and 409 enlisted men. The authorized

strength of the medium port was 76 commissioned officers (including 3 colonels)

and 231 enlisted men.53 Whenever practicable the officers and enlisted men for an

51

 AG Memo 322 (10 Jun 43), 17 Jun 43, sub: Redesignation and Reorg of TC Units. 52

 Comment by Col Bunting, 17 Jun 52, OCT HB

Tng Div Units. Concerning the organization, mission,

and training of port companies, see T/O&E 55-117,

31 Jul 44; MTP 55-3, 12 May 43; TC Pamphlet 37,

Jun 45, sub: Port Companies, Stevedoring and Operations. 53

 T/O&E 55-110-1, 20 Nov 43; T/O&E 55-120-1,

13 May 44; TC Pamphlet 30, 21 Dec 44, sub: Hq and

Hq Co, Major and Medium Port (Overseas).
PORT COMPANIES IN TRAINING use "land ships" at the Unit Training Center,

Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania (above). Enlisted men with the co-operation of civilian stevedores

gain experience in handling heavy lifts at San Francisco (below).
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 435

oversea port headquarters were drawn

from the personnel of ports of embarkation in the zone of interior so that they

would have at least a general familiarity

with water-front operations. But often such

personnel was available only for the key

positions. In any case, those headquarters

were activated and trained at the ports of

embarkation.54

A summary of the personnel of several

major ports and their attached units will

give an idea of the military strength required for large oversea operations. On 1

September 1944, the 4th and 12th Major

Ports, stationed at Cherbourg, had attached to them nine port battalions,

two port marine maintenance companies,

four harbor craft companies, one base

depot company, three engineer fire-fighting platoons, two engineer utilities detachments, two finance disbursing sections,

and two medical disposition sections;

these units aggregated a total of 10,534

military personnel, and in addition 922

civilians were employed.55 On 24 November 1944, the 16th Major Port, stationed

at Le Havre, had attached nine port battalions, two separate port companies, nine

amphibian truck companies, two harbor

craft companies, one military police battalion, one port marine maintenance company, one postal regulating station, one

Army postal unit, one engineer utilities

detachment, two finance disbursing sections, two harbor entrance control posts,

one signal radar maintenance unit, one

medical composite section, one special

services detachment—a total of 8,919

officers and enlisted men (employed civilians not stated).56

 On 24 March 1945, the

6th Major Port, stationed at Marseille,

comprised, in addition to the headquarters

and headquarters company, nine port

battalions, five separate port companies,

four military police companies, and some

other small units, making a total of 9,749

military personnel; in addition, this port

employed 10,555 civilians and 4,496

prisoners of war.57 At Tacloban, Leyte,

the port headquarters—not a full major

port—had attached three port battalions,

four harbor craft companies, one amphibian truck battalion, one port marine

maintenance company, and some small

units, making a total of 4,843 military

personnel; it employed 2,210 civilian

laborers and clerical workers.58

During the early part of the war it was

impossible for the Chief of Transportation

to supply all the port units required by the

oversea commanders because of his late

start in training, the difficulty of foreseeing future needs sufficiently in advance,

and the limited troop basis. Under the

expanded training program that got well

under way in 1943, the number of units

available for oversea assignment increased

rapidly; but the demand also increased,

and since the European and Mediterranean theaters had the higher priorities the

Pacific commands could not be adequately supplied with port units until after

Germany's surrender. That fact is reflected in Table 35. It is worth noting that

the three port headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area and one of the two port

54

 For the training program, see MTP 55-5, 30

Apr 43. 55

 History of 4th Port, 15 August-1 September

1944, OCT HB Maj Ports. Major ports also used

Quartermaster truck companies, but they were

usually attached to base sections and allocated to the

ports as needed. 56

 Histories of Units and Sections of 16th Port, November 1944, OCT HB Maj Ports. 57

 History of 6th Port Headquarters, November

1944-March 1945, Exhibit S-1, OCT HB Maj Ports. 58

 History of TC, Philippine Islands, July 1945, pp.

5 and 6, OCT HB SWPA PI.
436 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 35—PORT UNITS IN OVERSEA AREAS: 31 MARCH 1945

Source: Rpt, TC Personnel, 31 Mar 45, OCT HB Dir of Pers.

headquarters in the Pacific Ocean Areas

in the spring of 1945 had been activated

in the theater rather than in the zone of

interior. This was also true of a goodly

number of the port companies.

The port headquarters and operating

units trained by the Chief of Transportation in the zone of interior during the war

had an aggregate strength of about 107,-

000 officers and men. They accounted for

approximately 60 percent of the total

strength of Transportation Corps units

trained by the Chief of Transportation.

Similar units that were activated and

trained as elements of the Quartermaster

Corps and transferred to the Transportation Corps, or were activated and trained

as Transportation Corps units in the oversea commands, had an aggregate strength

of approximately 20,830. (Table 36)

The effectiveness of port units when

they arrived overseas varied greatly. In

the beginning there were numerous complaints from the theaters.59

 After training

doctrine and methods had been improved

and the technical and unit training

periods had been lengthened, there was

less cause for dissatisfaction.60 Unfortunately, many port headquarters and port

companies had to be sent overseas before

their training had been completed. Unfortunately, also, the plan to have port

companies get some practical experience

in loading ships at domestic ports was not

carried out in most cases. Relatively few

of the men had had previous experience

with water-front operations, and many

were in the low aptitude classification.

Port companies composed of Negro personnel, which predominated after 1942,

on the average learned more slowly than

white companies because the men had less

suitable educational and occupational

backgrounds.61

After reaching their oversea stations the

59

 Memo, CofT for RTC, New Orleans, et al., 22

Feb 43, sub: Tng of Stevedore Pers, OCT HB Tng

Div Units Port; Memo, Gross for Wylie, 12 Nov 43,

par. 7, OCT HB Wylie Gross Ltrs. 60

 Technical and unit training at first occupied nine

weeks, then eleven weeks, and under the ASF plan of

preactivation training introduced in April 1944 it

was fourteen weeks. 61

 Of a total of 462 port companies in being on 31

March 1945, 350 were Negro and 112 were white; of

90 headquarters and headquarters detachments, 50

were Negro and 40 were white; Rpt, TC Pers, OCT

HB Dir of Pers.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 437

TABLE 36—TRANSPORTATION CORPS TROOP UNITS ACTIVATED DURING WORLD WAR II

 a

a

 Includes prewar emergency period. b

 Includes some units activated by The Quartermaster General and the Chief of Engineers and transferred to the Transportation Corps

before completion of training. c

 Includes some units activated by The Quartermaster General and the Chief of Engineers in the zone of interior and transferred to the

Transportation Corps while en route to or after arrival in oversea commands.

Source: 1st Ind, CofT for Hist Div WDSS, 8 Aug 47, Tab 6, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts.
438 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

men learned as they worked. Their development into efficient units then depended

heavily on the leadership exhibited by

their officers, but climate and other conditions naturally had an influence on their

discharge performances.62 Many organizations stationed at oversea ports during

critical military operations, often working

under hazardous conditions and for abnormally long shifts, performed herculean

tasks in handling cargoes and constituted

an indispensable element of the military

machine.

Although port companies were intended

primarily for oversea service, enough were

trained to provide insurance against a

shortage of civilian longshoremen at U.S.

ports.63 The possibility of such a shortage

was visualized in the fall of 1943, and on

the recommendation of the Chief of Transportation sixty port companies were

added to the training program for 1944.

This enabled more of these units to be held

at the ports of embarkation than otherwise would have been the case. But the

units were to be employed in the loading

of ships only when there were not enough

civilian longshoremen available, or when

special security arrangements had to be

made for the loading of particular cargoes.

Otherwise, they were to be held in a training status until they were required for

oversea service. As it developed, troops

were not needed for any large-scale stevedoring operations at domestic ports but

were used principally for other work. The

Director of Military Training admonished

the port commanders to give these troops

jobs that would contribute to their knowledge of cargo handling and not to assign

them exclusively to other kinds of labor,

but as has been indicated the port commanders were able to do this to only a

limited extent.64 There were forty-two

port companies stationed at the ports of

embarkation on 30 April 1945.

Troop Units for Military Railways

The importance of effective railway

service for mass movements in theaters of

operations was first demonstrated in the

War Between the States and again in

World War I. As a rule, the Military Railway Service (MRS) functions in the communications zone and delivers troops and

supplies to the combat forces at railheads,

whence they are moved forward by means

of transport under the control of those

forces. The military operation of railroads

in theaters is desirable because of the need

for secrecy, the danger of sabotage, the

shortage of native equipment, and the insufficiency or doubtful loyalty of native

workers. Under some circumstances the

railways must be operated exclusively

with military personnel, as when the

MRS first followed the invading armies

into Germany. Usually a variable amount

of civilian labor can be used with troops

filling in where needed; this was the case

in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France,

India, Burma, and Luzon, and in Germany after the surrender of that country.

During World War II the U.S. Army operated railways in two areas where there

was no military activity. The MRS was

employed as a means of increasing the

capacity of the Iranian State Railway for

62

 See Wardlow, op. cit., p. 298, for summary data

on rates of discharge, and Bykofsky and Larson, The

Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, passim,

for discussion of cargo-handling problems in the several theaters. 63

 Wardlow, op. cit., p. 264. 64

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, p. 59. Colonel Bunting was of the opinion that

most units deteriorated while at the ports of embarkation because of lack of suitable work; see his comment, 17 Jun 52, OCT HB Tng Div Units Misc.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 439

the movement of lend-lease supplies to the

Soviet Union. In Alaska, military management and troop labor were utilized to

get heavier traffic moved on railroads that

in peacetime were called on for only

limited service.65

At the beginning of the year 1939 the

Military Railway Service of the U.S. Army

existed only as a number of reserve units,

each unit composed of personnel employed by the commercial railroad by

which it was sponsored. Because of the

long period of inactivity, the esprit de corps

was at low ebb. In view of the situation in

Europe the Chief of Engineers, who at

that time was responsible for this branch

of Army transportation, took steps to revitalize the service. Col. (later Maj. Gen.)

Carl R. Gray, Jr., an executive of a western railroad who held a reserve commission, was called to active duty as Manager,

Military Railway Service, with headquarters at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. Col.

(later Brig. Gen.) Charles D. Young, an

executive of an eastern rail line, was

placed on duty in the Office of the Chief

of Engineers. These officers took early

steps to build up reserve units to full

strength, to extend the interest of the railroads in sponsoring such units, and to prepare for future expansion.66

The first MRS unit was placed in active

status in June 1941. At that time the 711th

Railway Operating Battalion was activated at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; in August

it was transferred to Camp Claiborne,

Louisiana, to undertake its first real railroading task. That task was to construct

and operate a single track railroad from

Camp Claiborne to Camp Polk, a distance of about fifty miles, with terminal,

repair, and dispatching facilities. Operations on the road began in December

1941, when the first locomotive was received, and the initial construction work

was completed in the following July. In

addition to the training that the 711th derived from building and operating the

Claiborne and Polk Military Railway, the

line was visualized as a training site for

MRS units that might be activated later.67

When the United States entered the

war General Gray's headquarters and this

railway operating battalion were the only

elements of the MRS that had been activated. The units in reserve status included

five railway grand divisions, twenty railway operating battalions, and three railway shop battalions.68

 The activation of

additional units began in April 1942.

The original organization of the MRS

units was based on established principles

of American railroading; modifications as

to detail were made as the result of experience in the theaters. The headquarters

and headquarters company, Military

Railway Service, was an administrative

organization corresponding to the office of

the general manager of a large railroad

system. The headquarters and headquarters company, railway grand division, also

an administrative organization, corresponded to the office of the general superintendent. The railway operating battalion, which was capable of operating and

maintaining 120 miles of right of way,

corresponded to the railway division. The

railway shop battalion was organized and

65

 MRS operations in the several areas are discussed

in Bykofsky and Larson. The Transportation Corps:

Operations Overseas. 66

 Maj. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., "The Military Railway Service," Army Transportation Journal, May-June

1948. 67

 Pamphlet, Claiborne and Polk Military Railway,

prepared by the 711th Ry Opng Bn, 11 Jul 42, OCT

HB Rail Div MRS; "The First Army Railway Battalion Builds a Training Railroad," Railway Age,

August 1, 1942. 68

 OCT HB Monograph 26, p. 51.
440 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

equipped to make heavy repairs on locomotives and cars.69

 In addition to these

larger units, the MRS included smaller

organizations known as railway work

shops (mobile), base depot companies,

and hospital train maintenance detachments.

Discussion of the desirability of transferring the Military Railway Service from

the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers

to that of the newly created Chief of Transportation began in the spring of 1942.

Although some functions were shifted

earlier, complete transfer was not made

until the following November.70 The

twenty-five operating and shop units that

had been activated, General Gray's headquarters, certain overhead personnel, and

the pertinent railway equipment were included in the transfer. Some of the units

were already overseas and some were en

route, but most of them were still in the

zone of interior.71 After 16 November the

Chief of Transportation was responsible

for the organization, training, and assignment of these and such additional units as

the oversea commanders might require.

The invasion of North Africa had just

begun, and it was foreseen that that theater would give the Military Railway Service its first real test. The heaviest requirement, of course, would come after the

Allied armies had established themselves

on the European continent.

The MRS units activated in the zone of

interior by the Chief of Transportation

had a total authorized strength of 38,201

officers and enlisted men. In addition,

units aggregating 6,846 officers and men

were activated by the Chief of Engineers

and transferred to the Chief of Transportation or were activated overseas. (See

Table 36.) The total strength of the Military Railway Service on 30 June 1945 was

44,084 officers and men, of whom 43,231

were overseas and 853 (a railway operating battalion recalled from Alaska) were

in training status in the zone of interior.

In considering the following distribution

of MRS units as of 30 June 1945, it should

be borne in mind that the number of railway troops in the Mediterranean theater

and in Alaska had been considerably reduced by that date and that a reduction

had been begun in the Persian Gulf

Command:72

Area Personnel

Total. ............................ . 43,231

European Theater of Operations. ......... . 28,828

Mediterranean Theater of Operations. .... . 3,207

Persian Gulf Command................. . 3,473

India-Burma Theater................... . 4,036

Southwest Pacific Area.................. . 2,772

Alaskan Department. ................... . 915

Soon after the Chief of Transportation

took control of the Military Railway Service it was arranged that all MRS units

should be activated and should receive

their basic military training at the unit

training center at New Orleans. When the

program became especially heavy late in

1943, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, was used

to relieve New Orleans. In the fall of 1944,

with the railway training program nearing completion, this activity was transferred to Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming. 69

 Article cited n. 66. T/O&E's for these units were

numbered respectively 55-302, 55-225, 55-235.

T/O&E's of the same series were issued for the component companies of the larger units and for some

smaller MRS units. 70

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 62-65; Memo, CofEngrs

for CG SOS, 10 Jun 42, OCT 322 Ry Bns Tng and

Deferment; WD GO 60, 5 Nov 42. 71

 AG Memo 320.2 (11-25-42), 1 Dec 42, sub:

Designation of Certain Railway Units; Memo, C of

Mil Ry Br OCT for CofT, 19 Nov 42, sub: Situation

Rpt on Ry Tr Units, OCT HB Rail Div MRS. 72

 Rpt, Rail Div, FY 1945, pp. 6-7; cf. Rpt, Rail

Div, FY 1944, pp. 12-13.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 441

After completing military training, the

units received technical training either on

the Claiborne and Polk Military Railway

or on one of the commercial railroads. In

view of the limited capacity of the Claiborne and Polk line and the advantages

of having troops trained on a busy right

of way beside experienced civilian workers, the Army policy was to use the commercial railroads to the greatest possible

extent. Throughout this training the troops

were stationed at conveniently located

military installations.73

During the first year of the war General

Gray, as Manager, Military Railway

Service, was the field agent responsible for

the supervision of all training of railway

troops. Early in 1943 he and his headquarters were transferred to the North

African theater and a different arrangement had to be made. Technical training

was then placed under the supervision of

the Commanding General, New Orleans

Port of Embarkation, and a Director of

Railway Training was assigned to assist

him in fulfilling this responsibility.74 When

the railway function was moved from New

Orleans to Fort Francis E. Warren, the

office of Director of Railway Training was

abolished and direct supervision was assumed by the Office of the Chief of Transportation.75

Two divisions in the Office of the Chief

of Transportation were concerned with

railway troop training—the Military

Training Division, which had general responsibility, and the Rail Division, which

exercised technical supervision. In the

beginning this dual interest resulted in

some misunderstanding and duplication

of effort, but later the role of each division

was more clearly defined.76 The Rail Division included many officers and civilians

with practical railroad experience; it was

in direct contact with the commercial railroads on other matters; and it maintained

close liaison with the MRS units that were

in service overseas. The Rail Division was

therefore in an advantageous position to

determine the organization and equipment

of units that would best meet the theaters'

needs, to outline technical training programs to prepare the troops for the tasks

they would be called upon to perform, and

to determine the extent of the oversea requirements. After the position of Director

of Railway Training was discontinued, the

Rail Division inspected troops during

technical training to determine their

progress and the effectiveness of the

methods used. Late in the war it was

authorized to establish an inspection

branch, with headquarters in Baltimore,

to carry this work forward.77 The Military

Training Division supervised the military

training of railway units and replacements

and co-ordinated the activation, training,

and assignment of these units with the

over-all program.

After the usual six weeks of basic military training, headquarters organizations

were given eleven weeks of technical and

unit training, operating battalions were

given fifteen weeks, and shop battalions

were given nineteen weeks. Military Railway Service units were exempted from the

ASF preactivation plan that was placed in

effect in the spring of 1944, and, instead of

going through a period of individual

73

 OCT Cir 49, 5 Apr 43, sub: Tng Ry Trs; Memo,

Rail Div for Hist Unit OCT, 16 Sep 44, OCT HB

Tng Div Units Rail. Some base depot companies received their technical training at the Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point. 74

 OCT Cir 49, 5 Apr 43. 75

 TC Cir 35-4, revised 6 Dec 44. 76

 Memo, Col Hodson for Gross, 21 Apr 43, sub:

Responsibility for Mil Pers Activities and Tech Tng

Pertaining to the MRS, OCT HB Rail Div Misc. 77

 TC Cir 5-20, 6 Jun 45.
442 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

technical training before units were activated, MRS troops took all their technical

training as units. This arrangement recognized the fact that most of the men assigned to railway units had had the

equivalent of basic technical training as

railroad employees, and that their chief

need was for unit training to prepare them

to undertake military railroading as wellknit organizations.78

Until 1944, MRS units were composed

almost entirely of personnel with railroad

experience. Thereafter it was necessary to

complete the units with a considerable

percentage of inexperienced enlisted men,

although most officers still had a railroading background. After taking responsibility for the Military Railway Service, the

Chief of Transportation naturally was

desirous that all experienced railroaders

inducted under selective service should be

made available to him. Time was required, however, for the Transportation

Corps' interest in these men to become

generally understood at induction stations, reception centers, and replacement

training centers, and many selectees

who would have been of great value as

railroad troops were assigned to other

services.79

The Military Railway Service established an excellent record in the oversea

areas where it operated. Some units

naturally were more proficient than

others, but the general level was high.

This success may be attributed chiefly to

the fact that a large proportion of the

officers and enlisted men had been railroaders in civilian life, and the further fact

that most units were sponsored or trained

by large American railroads. These circumstances contributed not only to technical proficiency but also to esprit de corps.

Not all units could be sponsored by railroads, because as the war progressed the

carriers came to the point where they

could no longer give up the large numbers

of men required for operating battalions

and shop battalions. The Chief of Transportation then made "affiliation agreements" with individual railroads covering

units whose personnel had been drawn

from various sources.80 In addition to good

training, this arrangement provided the

lift to morale that came from identification with an important rail line.

Crews for Small Boats and

Amphibious Trucks

During the early part of the war civilian crews for small boats, like crews for the

transports the Army operated, were

trained at the ports of embarkation. By

1943, however, the calls from the theaters

for crews to operate the vessels required

for their harbor, coastwise, and interisland

services had become so heavy that the

port commanders could no longer be expected to carry the training load. Also,

there was a growing demand for military

crews, particularly for vessels to be used in

the forward areas. At about the same time

the recently developed 21⁄2-ton amphibious truck, labeled DUKW during the

experimental period and commonly called

the "duck," was placed in production.

78

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Jan-Jun 44, p. 6, OCT HB

Tng Div Rpts. For the training program under the

Chief of Engineers, see Memo, C of Mil Ry Br for

CofT, 19 Nov 42, OCT HB Rail Div MRS. 79

 Wardlow, op. cit., p. 65. 80

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated Problems, problem 9, OCT HB

TC Gen Misc. The sponsorship and affiliation of

MRS units that completed training during the period

July 1943-June 1945 is shown in Rail Div Rpts, FY

1944, pp. 7-8, FY 1945, pp. 5-6, OCT HB Rail Div

Rpts.
TRAINING TROOPS FOR THE MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE. Replacements for railway operating battalions repair trestle at Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana (above).

Members of railway shop battalion put on side rod in repair shop at Bucyrus, Ohio (below).
444 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

This vehicle was quickly found useful in

the Pacific for moving cargo from ships at

anchor to dumps on or back of the

beaches, and in the invasion of Sicily it

proved its value in assault operations. The

Army increased its original order and decided to place military crews on this type

of equipment when it was used overseas.

During hostilities the Chief of Transportation trained forty-six harbor craft companies and five separate harbor craft

crews, with a total of 12,731 officers and

enlisted men; he trained fifty-one amphibian truck companies and three headquarters detachments, totaling 9,395 officers

and men. Some additional units were activated and trained overseas. (See Table 36.)

Military crews for the Army's small

boats—that is, vessels up to 200 feet in

length—were activated and trained as

harbor craft companies, a company providing personnel for a number of crews.

The first harbor craft units were based on

a Quartermaster Corps table of organization for aviation rescue companies. After

study of the types of vessels being built by

the Chief of Transportation for the theater

commanders and the types being acquired

overseas, the Water Division and the Military Training Division developed tables of

organization for a variety of crews. These

tables were published in August 1943.81

The first harbor craft companies were

activated early in 1943 and trained at the

Charleston Port of Embarkation, which

was not carrying as heavy a traffic load as

most of the other ports. Basic military

training at first occupied four weeks, but

was soon extended to six; basic technical

training and unit training were given in

nine weeks. After completion of this training the troops were sent to more active

ports for advance training and actual experience in operating various types of

vessels. The latter arrangement was of unquestionable value, but the desired results

were not always achieved, sometimes

because the ports were too busy to give

the trainees adequate attention and sometimes because the crews had to be dispatched overseas soon after the completion

of their basic training.82

The summer of 1943 brought such

heavy requests from the Southwest Pacific

Area for small boat crews that new training arrangements had to be made.83

 A

similar situation existed with respect to

amphibian truck companies, and it was

decided that these two types of units could

be trained at the same installation. A

survey of possible sites was made, and in

September 1943 the Chief of Transportation, somewhat against his better judgment, agreed with ASF headquarters on

the use of Camp Gordon Johnston at

Carrabelle, on the Gulf coast of Florida.84

As already stated, the activity was placed

under the control of the Commanding

General, Fourth Service Command. The

Chief of Transportation was responsible

for the establishment of training doctrine,

programs, and quotas, and for inspections.

As a general rule, troops were to receive

their basic military training at the unit

training center at New Orleans before

being sent to Carrabelle for technical

training. 81

 T/O&E 55-500, 17 Aug 43, which included

many types of small units, is discussed below, p.

451.

82

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Feb 45, sub: Tng of Units, pp.

15-40, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 83

 Concerning the over-all problem of manning

small boats and the use of military, civilian, and Coast

Guard crews, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 255-61. 84

 Memos, CofT for Dir Mil Tng ASF, 3 Jun 43 and

16 Jun 43, included as Ex 46 and 47 in Rpt, Mil Tng

Div, Jan-Jun 43; Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Quarter Ending

30 Sep 43, p. 2 and Ex 3, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts;

AG Memo 322 (23 Sep 43), 27 Sep 43, sub: Estab

ASF Tng Center.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 445

At Camp Gordon Johnston the technical training period for harbor craft companies was originally eleven weeks, of

which eight were devoted to basic technical training ashore and three to unit

training afloat. In the spring of 1944 unit

training was extended to six weeks, making a total of fourteen weeks. The training

ashore was organized to develop twelve

types of administrative specialists and

eighteen types of technical specialists.

During the period afloat each member of

the trainee crew worked alongside the corresponding member of the trainer crew,

and toward the end the trainee crew

handled the vessel completely. The basic

problem at Camp Gordon Johnston was

to develop competent technical specialists

in eight weeks from men wholly unfamiliar with marine equipment. Lack of officers with marine experience was a particularly acute problem. Since the crews

were small, the proportion of officers to

enlisted men was unusually high. The

training center drew heavily on the Transportation Corps School for officers, but no

matter how thorough the schooling, it was

not an adequate substitute for actual experience at sea.

The amphibious truck was a new type

of equipment and the training of troops to

handle it was a pioneer undertaking. Since

the Transportation Corps had had an active part in the development of the

DUKW, it was well aware that a specialized type of training would be needed by

those who operated and those who maintained this vehicle. The first such training

was undertaken in January 1943 at Fort

Story, Virginia, under the supervision of

the Commanding General, Hampton

Roads Port of Embarkation. In March the

activity was transferred to the control of

the Charleston Port of Embarkation,

which had more housing than was needed

for transient troops and also had suitable

beaches at Sullivan's Island near Fort

Moultrie. The Amphibious Vehicle Training School at Charleston had a capacity

of 350, and the plan was to give three

weeks of specialized training to officers

and enlisted men who had already had

basic military training, were experienced

vehicle drivers, and were able to swim.85

It was soon evident that this program

would fall far short of the requirements

in the number of men trained, their technical proficiency, and their military qualifications. The period of technical and unit

training was then extended to seventeen

weeks, and in June the Chief of Transportation recommended the establishment of

a large center where amphibian truck

companies, as well as harbor craft companies, could be trained. Camp Gordon

Johnston was favored by ASF headquarters and training began there in December

1943. The Charleston Port of Embarkation continued to operate the Amphibious

Vehicle Training Center (formerly School)

until the summer of 1944.86

Since amphibian truck companies

might be used in assault operations or in

resupply service in forward areas, adequate military training was a prerequisite.

The minimum period of basic military

training was six weeks, and it was hoped

that the men received at Camp Gordon

Johnston would all meet that qualification, but frequently this was not the case.

If tests showed that the men were slow

85

 Memo, CofT for Dir Tng SOS, 16 Mar 43, OCT

352 Trans; 1st Ind, CG ASF for CofT, 24 Mar 43;

Memo, TAG for CG CPE and CofT, 7 Sep 43; last

two in AG 322 (3 Sep 43); statement prepared in

Contl Div OCT, 12 Oct 43, sub: TC Amphibious Vehicle Tng Center, OCT HB Tng Div Unit Tng. 86

 Memo, Actg Dir Plng ASF for TAG, 26 Jul 44,

AG 322 (3 Sep 43).
446 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

learners and were not qualified after six

weeks of training, military instruction was

continued. The first two groups received

at Camp Gordon Johnston, comprising

twelve companies and eight companies,

respectively, had been transferred from

other services. Their military qualifications were tested on arrival. The first

group was given credit for only two weeks

of military training, and four additional

weeks were prescribed; the second group

was given credit for four weeks, and two

additional weeks were prescribed. But in

each case tests made after completion of

the additional period showed that they

were not yet ready, and three further

weeks of military training were required.87

Basic technical training and unit training were laid out for twelve weeks and five

weeks respectively, but because of the preponderance of substandard troops the

total period was eventually lengthened to

twenty weeks. During basic technical

training the qualifications of the men were

determined by aptitude tests, and they

were designated for instruction as drivers,

mechanics, and so forth. A training officer

was assigned to each company. At the

beginning of basic technical training, six

vehicles were assigned to each company

with one enlisted instructor for each vehicle. Later in the training period additional vehicles were assigned, but the

number of enlisted instructors was not increased. During basic unit training one

training officer was assigned to each company and one enlisted instructor to each

platoon. This training included several

two-day continuous ship-to-shore cargohandling operations, with the troops working in twelve-hour shifts; several two-day

problems, involving combined operations

with the Navy in the use of LST's; and

several bivouacs, during which each company was wholly responsible for its own

administration and supply and for the

operation and maintenance of its equipment under field conditions.88

In the beginning the training of amphibian truck companies at Camp Gordon

Johnston suffered from the lack of satisfactory equipment. The production of

DUKW's was not large and the demand

from the theaters was heavy, so that not

enough vehicles were allotted to the training center. This deficiency was not overcome until February 1944. The old

freighter that was anchored offshore for

use in training troops to moor their vehicles alongside and receive cargo from

the ship's boom was in such poor condition that it was soon replaced by a barge

equipped with Liberty ship cargo gear.

The barge did not roll as a ship at anchor

would do, and therefore did not afford

realistic training in the most difficult part

of the operation—that is, receiving cargo

alongside a vessel at anchor in an open

roadstead. There also was a scarcity of replacement parts so that maintenance of

the vehicles was difficult.89

The problem of turning out competent

amphibian truck companies was intensified by two circumstances—the degree of

technical skill and judgment required for

the proper operation and maintenance of

this new vehicle, and the unsatisfactory

quality of the troops assigned to these

units. The DUKW was a more complicated mechanism than the ordinary land

vehicle, it had not been perfected by years

of engineering study and development,

and it could not take the amount of abuse

that the standard Army truck was able to

withstand. Operating both in water and

87

 Rpt, Tng of Units, cited n. 82, pp. 50-51. 88

 Ibid., p. 52. 89

 OCT HB Monograph 26, pp. 71-72.
AMPHIBIAN TRUCK COMPANY TROOPS IN TRAINING. DUKW's practice entering a heavy surf (above); a DUKW in choppy water receives cargo over the side of a

training barge (below).
448 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

on land, it encountered a variety of conditions that might foul the mechanism or

damage the body. The personnel assigned

to these units averaged far below the desired level of skill and initiative.90

 This

was especially true of Negro personnel,

most of whom had no mechanical background whatsoever and low mechanical

aptitude. When it became evident that

service units would be made up largely of

Negro troops, the Chief of Transportation

tried to have an exception made of amphibian truck companies, but he was unsuccessful because of the Army's over-all

manpower problems.

Under these circumstances a severe

screening process was adopted to eliminate

enlisted men who did not have the required intellectual or technical qualifications, or who were otherwise unqualified

for the amphibian truck company. The

other disqualifying traits included fear of

the water, dislike of operating at night,

and unwillingness to operate alone. These

shortcomings often were not detected in

the initial screening but appeared after

the training was well under way. In view

of this fact, amphibian truck companies

were for a time activated with an overstrength of 15 percent, so that replacements for disqualified personnel would be

immediately available and the effectiveness of unit training would not be impaired.91

 In 1944, much to the dissatisfaction of the Chief of Transportation, the

overstrength was limited to 5 percent.

Despite the unsatisfactory start in the

training of amphibian truck companies,

caused by the lack of a training program

and unsatisfactory personnel and equipment, the results eventually achieved were

good. This was due in part to the careful

weeding out of unsuitable individuals, and

in part to the improvement of the training program through study of the experiences of the first companies sent overseas.

Since the units were being used in assault

operations to a greater extent than had

been foreseen, more attention was given

during the training period to the requirements of these operations. In 1944 and

1945 the performance of these units in

both assault and resupply operations was

generally satisfactory. Some of them received citations for their accomplishments

and conduct under fire.

A considerable number of amphibian

truck companies was activated and trained

overseas. (See Table 36.) This was made

necessary by the fact that under an enlarged program DUKW's were produced

and shipped overseas more rapidly than

soldiers could be trained in the zone of

interior to man them. Also, an extensive

training operation was conducted by the

Central Pacific Base Command to prepare

units that had received their basic training

in the zone of interior for participation in

joint assault operations. A special feature

of this training Was instruction in landing

on coral islands, which presented unusual

hazards to tires, propellers, and vehicle

bodies.92

The use of Camp Gordon Johnston as a

facility for the training of harbor craft

companies and amphibian truck companies, and of replacements for both types

of units, involved a number of handicaps.

It was designated for this purpose, contrary to the desires of the Chief of Transportation, because it was no longer needed

by the Army Ground Forces to train engi90

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated ASF Problems, Item 5 of atchd

list, OCT HB TG Gen Misc. 91

 Rpt, Tng of Units, cited n. 82, pp. 47-50. 92

 TC Journal, issued by Army Port and Service

Command, Honolulu, 30 Jun 45, p. 2.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 449

neer special brigades for participation with

the Navy in amphibious assault operations.93

 Aside from the fact that the buildings were primitive and not suitable for the

accommodation of troops over a long training period, the water facilities were very

unsatisfactory. The harbor was small and

the channel was narrow, so that only the

smaller boats could enter. Vessels too large

to enter the harbor were anchored outside,

and this meant that considerable time was

lost in transporting personnel between the

camp and the anchorage. The gulf was

nearly always calm, and the troops therefore had no opportunity to become familiar

with the problems of operating small vessels and DUKW's in rough water. There

was no surf, which was a prerequisite for

the proper training of amphibian truck

companies.94

As noted earlier, the Chief of Transportation was not happy about the arrangement that placed Camp Gordon Johnston

under the control of the Commanding

General, Fourth Service Command. He

believed that the training of Transportation Corps troops should be under his

direct control. He felt that this view was

particularly valid with respect to harbor

craft companies and amphibian truck

companies, since these were new types of

military units and their training had to be

modified from time to time in order to

meet conditions encountered overseas.

Under these circumstances a direct and

intimate relationship between the chief of

service and the commander of the training

center would have been advantageous.

But Army Service Forces headquarters

favored placing training activities under

the service commands as a matter of general policy, and there was the further

consideration that Camp Gordon Johnston

was not used exclusively for Transportation

Corps troops.

Other Types of Units

The greater part of the Transportation

Corps' troop strength was accounted for

by the types of units already discussed, but

during the course of the war the Chief of

Transportation was called upon to organize and train other types that were needed

by the commanders overseas for their

transportation operations.95

Traffic regulation groups (later called

traffic regulation units) were needed in the

active theaters to insure the prompt and

orderly movement of troops and supplies

in the communications zone and the economical use of transportation equipment.96

They were made up of teams specially

trained to deal with traffic moving by railway, highway, inland waterway, or air. As

a general rule, they functioned under the

control of the commanders of base, inter93

 When the Army and the Navy agreed in March

1943 that the Navy would thereafter provide amphibious training for ground troops, Camp Gordon Johnston was made available to the Navy, but it did not

consider the site suitable. See Study 22, Hist Sec AGF,

1948, sub: The Amphibious Training Center, pp. 10-

17, 37-70; Memo, G-3 for CofS, 11 Feb 43, sub: Navy

Use of Carrabelle, WDCSA 370.5; agreement reached

in conference 8 March 1943, signed by Admiral King

and General McNarney, OCT HB Tng Div Units

Amph Truck. 94

 Colonel Bunting states that only the boat crews

that made long training trips had experience with

waves and swells; some DUKW companies were sent

to the east coast of Florida to become familiar with

operating in the surf. Interv with Bunting, 16 Jun 52,

OCT HB Dir Mil Tng. 95

 This brief discussion is based chiefly on Rpt,

Training of Units, cited n. 82, pp. 63-66, and OCT

HB Monograph 26, pp. 79-82. For numbers trained,

see Table 36 above. 96

 TC Pamphlet 19, 12 Sep 44, Traffic Regulation

Units.
450 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

mediate, and advance sections. The traffic

regulation groups that were activated in

the zone of interior received their basic

military and technical training at New

Orleans. Because of the urgency of the

need, a considerable number of these units

were activated and trained overseas.

Regulating stations performed a function similar to that of the traffic regulation

groups, except that they dealt with traffic

moving from the communications zone to

the combat zone. Their mission was to

regulate the flow of supplies from communications zone railheads to the various

elements of the forces in the forward areas.

They were designated Army Service Forces

units, but the table of organization was

drawn up by the Chief of Transportation

and the units that were activated in the

zone of interior were trained under his

supervision at New Orleans.

Marine ship repair companies were

trained to operate the shops on special

repair ships that were equipped and controlled by the Transportation Corps. These

vessels moved from place to place in the

oversea theaters and performed whatever

marine repair and heavy maintenance

work was required. Such requirements

arose because many of the oversea ports

where vessels under Army control were

stationed or at which they called to load

or discharge cargo had no marine repair

facilities, or the facilities were inadequate.

Since this type of unit was required first in

the Pacific, the early units were activated

and trained at the San Francisco Port of

Embarkation. Later they were trained at

Camp Gordon Johnston. As the result of

an arrangement with the Selective Service

System, under which drafted shipyard

workers were assigned to the Chief of

Transportation and then placed in marine

ship repair companies, the need for technical training for these units was reduced

to a minimum.97

Port marine maintenance companies

performed a function similar to that of the

marine ship repair companies, but they

were stationed on shore. For the most part

these units received their basic military

training at Camp Plauché, and their technical and unit training at Camp Gordon

Johnston.

Base depot companies were organized

to handle Transportation Corps supplies

in the theaters. The need for such troops

was first felt by the Military Railway

Service, and the first units activated were

accordingly trained by American railroads. The organization later was revised

and the training was broadened so that

the troops were prepared to handle all

types of Transportation Corps supplies.

Concurrently, it was arranged that the

technical training relating to the handling

of railway supplies would be given at the

Marietta Holding and Reconsignment

Point, and that training in the handling of

port and marine supplies would be given

at the Voorheesville Holding and Reconsignment Point, since these were the principal depots for the respective types of

supplies.98

The staging area company was not,

strictly speaking, a transportation unit,

but it was assigned to the Chief of Transportation for organization and training

because he supervised the troop staging

areas in the zone of interior. These units

were intended for use at troop staging

areas in the theaters, and mess personnel

made up 70 percent of the total. The tech97

 TC Pamphlet 28, 14 Dec 44, Marine Maintenance Org, pp. 3-5. 98

 TC Pamphlet 25, 11 Oct 44, Base Depot Co.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 451

nical training of this personnel was given

at established schools for Army cooks and

bakers.

The floating spare parts depot was the

last new type of unit organized by the

Chief of Transportation. Such units were

placed on vessels that had been specially

equipped to serve as supply ships and to

issue marine and railway spare parts to

forces at the more remote stations in the

Pacific. The two units of this type that

were activated in June 1945 received their

military training at Camp Plauché, and

their technical training at the Montgomery Holding and Reconsignment Point,

where a Transportation Corps depot was

located. Each spare parts ship was

equipped with two amphibious trucks and

two launches for use in making ship-toshore deliveries.

During 1943 it was found that the theater commanders were not familiar with

the many skills embraced in the Transportation Corps training program, and also

that they often required technicians in

units of less than company strength. This

was particularly true in the Pacific, where

the forces were distributed among many

widely separated bases and islands. To

meet this situation, the Chief of Transportation issued a composite table of organization setting forth more than sixty small

units and teams of trained technicians that

could be put together and dispatched to

the theaters quickly. The publication of

this composite table, from which various

combinations of technical organizations

could be built up, simplified the problem

of the theater commander in getting troops

to meet his requirements and the problem

of the Chief of Transportation in supplying

what the oversea commands requested. It

also eliminated the waste of personnel involved in ordering larger units than were

necessary. The composite table covered

five types of headquarters units, five types

of mess teams, two land vehicle repair

teams, thirteen maintenance and repair

teams for marine and rail equipment,

three types of stevedoring units, three types

of amphibian truck units, four types of

depot units, four types of traffic regulation

units, two types of operating units for railway trains, eleven types of crews for small

boats, and nine types of crews for other

marine equipment such as barges, floating

cranes, and marine tractors.

 99

In addition to training Transportation

Corps troops, the Chief of Transportation

trained personnel of other services that he

employed in fulfilling his responsibilities.

As a general rule, this personnel already

had received basic military and technical

training, and the Chief of Transportation's

task was to prepare them to function as

units at the ports and on the troop transports and hospital ships. This training was

given chiefly at the ports of embarkation

and the period of instruction was short.

The types of units and the number of

officers and men involved are shown in

Table 37.

Cadres, Fillers, and Replacements

The first obligation of the Chief of

Transportation, as of other chiefs of services, was to provide trained units to meet

the needs of the oversea commanders, but

the training of individuals or teams for use

as cadres, fillers, and replacements eventually developed into a sizable operation.

Cadres were the nucleus around which the

green troops of newly organized units were

99

 TC Pamphlet 26, 7 Nov 44, Service Organizations (T/O&E 55-500).
452 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 37—TROOPS OF OTHER SERVICES TRAINED AT TRANSPORTATION CORPS INSTALLATIONS: 1 AUGUST 1942-1 SEPTEMBER 1945

Source: 1st Ind, CofT for Hist Div WDSS, 8 Aug 47, Tab 7. OCT HB Tng Div Rpts.

assembled and from which those troops

received a certain amount of instruction.

Fillers, or filler replacements, were individuals with particular skills who were

used to complete understrength units,

either before or after they were moved
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 453

overseas. Replacements, more precisely

known as loss replacements, were needed

by theater commanders to replenish units

that had been depleted through battle casualties, injuries, sickness, or other causes,

and the demand for these troops naturally

expanded as the number of Transportation

Corps units overseas increased.100

Until well into 1943 cadres for port units

were provided under the "parent unit"

plan. When a port unit was activated, it

was given 15 percent overstrength, with

the intention that 10 percent would be

used as a cadre for a unit to be activated

later and that 5 percent would offset normal attrition. The cadre personnel was not

selected until late in the training period,

and up to that point the men were trained

as members of the parent unit. This plan

was attended by several problems. The

success of the new unit obviously depended

to a considerable degree on the quality of

the cadre, yet the commander of the parent unit naturally resisted giving up his

more competent men. Some commanders

went further and tried to use the formation of a cadre as the occasion for getting

rid of some of their less desirable personnel. It was found also that, while cadremen

might have the desired degree of technical

proficiency, they often were poor instructors. An attempt to replace those who

proved to be poor instructors resulted in

the personnel of the unit being in different

stages of training.101

The parent unit plan of supplying

cadres for port organizations was necessary during the first year of the Transportation Corps' existence because the Corps

had no adequate plan for training loss replacements. Such a plan got under way

in the spring of 1943, and after July of that

year cadres were no longer taken from

units but from personnel that had exhibited suitable qualifications during training

as replacements. The latter plan worked

out much more satisfactorily.

The experience with cadres for amphibian truck companies, harbor craft companies, and other types of Transportation

Corps organizations was much the same as

with port units. Until replacement training centers were established, units that

were completing training were required

to provide cadres for units that were being

activated. After replacement training centers were set up, cadres were selected from

personnel undergoing training at those

centers.

The selection of cadres for rail units was

relatively simple because the personnel

consisted largely of experienced railroaders. When these men were inducted

into the Army, they were sent immediately

to the training center where rail units were

activated. There they were formed into

provisional battalions for messing and

housing, while the records of their civilian

experience were being studied. On the

basis of this study the best qualified men

were designated as cadremen to be assigned to new units as soon as the activation orders were received. This method was

employed throughout the war. It naturally

did not apply to units that were sponsored

by particular railroads and were made up

of personnel supplied by those roads.

The amount of training required by

fillers depended on the stage of the units'

training at which they were introduced.

The most important phase of the problem

was the filling of vacancies in units that

had completed training and were about to

sail for oversea stations. Troop organiza100

 The discussion in this section is based largely on

Rpt, Mil Tng Div OCT, Jan 45, sub: Tng of Repl,

Fillers, and Cadres, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 101

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 126-38, OCT HB PE Gen.
454 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

tions often arrived at the port staging areas

with less than full strength, and while at

the staging areas members were likely to

be withdrawn on account of illness, physical defects, or other causes. The port commanders were responsible for filling all

vacancies before the units sailed. To this

end they maintained pools of enlisted personnel covering a wide range of military

occupational specialties, and gave these

men such additional training as the port

facilities would permit. To a large degree

the pools were made up of men left behind

by units that had sailed earlier and who

in the meantime had recovered from illnesses, satisfied requirements regarding

the firing of weapons, completed periods

of punishment, or otherwise removed disqualifications. The quality of these men

was below average, and, as casuals who

had spent abnormally long periods at the

staging areas, their morale was likely to be

low. But since fillers usually constituted a

small percentage of the strength of a unit,

their shortcomings were not difficult to

overcome or to absorb.102

A replacement training center at New

Orleans, authorized in February 1943,

was the first and largest such facility for

Transportation Corps troops.103 It had an

initial capacity of 3,000 trainees, and this

capacity was increased to more than 5,000

as the demand for replacements mounted.

The principal job was to train replacements for port units. This training included four (later six) weeks of basic military training, and nine (later eleven)

weeks of basic technical and team training. The center at New Orleans also gave

basic military training to troops that were

to receive technical training as replacements for rail units, amphibian truck companies, and harbor boat companies at

other centers. Its total output was 26,002.

A replacement training center set up in

June 1944 at Indiantown Gap turned out

1,362 Negro replacements for port companies.

Camp Gordon Johnston was used for

replacement training, as well as for unit

training, for amphibian truck companies

and harbor craft companies beginning in

December 1943. Largely, but not exclusively, the basic military training of these

troops was given at New Orleans, so that

the center at Camp Gordon Johnston

could devote itself mainly to technical and

team training.104 The output of enlisted

replacements at this center was 2,705.

The need for technically trained replacements for railway units was first met

by two so-called railway schools, located

at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, and Camp

Shelby, Mississippi.105 This training activity was concentrated at Camp Claiborne

in January 1944, and some months later it

was transferred to Fort Francis E. Warren,

Wyoming. From late 1944 onward the

latter station provided all military and

technical training for railway troops except the technical unit training that was

given on commercial railroads.106 The

combined output of rail replacements at

the three installations was 6,634.

102

 The port commanders were responsible for filling vacancies in all units being staged, not in Transportation Corps units alone, and the size of the pool

depended on the total number of troops staged. 103

 AG Memo 320.2 (2-18-43), 20 Feb 43, sub:

Estab TC RTC. 104

 Memo, CofT for Dir Mil Tng ASF, 12 Jul 44,

sub: Rev Loss Repl Req, OCT 320.3 Gen. 105

 1st Ind, CG ASF for CofT, 11 Apr 43; Memo,

CofT for Dir Mil Tng OCT, 9 Dec 43; both in OCT

352 Trans. 106

 AG Memo 354.1 (4 Jan 44), 7 Jan 44, sub: Estab

of TC RTCs; AG Memo 352 (1 Jan 44), 6 Jan 44,

sub: Discontinuance of Ry Sch Camp Shelby; AG

Memo 352 (3 Jan 44), 8 Jan 44, sub: Discontinuance

of Ry Sch Camp Claiborne; ASF Memo SPX 353

(19 Oct 44), 20 Oct 44, sub: Capacities of ASF Tng

Centers.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 455

The replacement training centers at

New Orleans and Camp Gordon Johnston

were located at installations where there

were already unit training centers for

Transportation Corps troops. Under the

plan of preactivation training that the

Army Service Forces instituted in April

1944, the independent operation of replacement training centers and unit training centers was discontinued, and troops

received basic military training and basic

technical training before being assigned to

units or to teams for training as replacements. After this plan went into effect the

team training of Transportation Corps

replacements covered a period of three

weeks, during which the men were kept in

bivouac under conditions approximating

those that they would encounter in the

field. At this stage all troops received instruction in preventive maintenance, safety

precautions, night operations, field sanitation, and protective measures against air

and chemical attack; the specialists also

received further training in their respective specialties. For reasons that have been

stated, the preactivation plan was not

applied to the training of railway troops.

The preactivation training plan simplified the problem of providing competent

cadres and replacements, but it did not in

itself meet the most difficult phase of that

problem—the shortage of good noncommissioned officers. In view of that shortage,

ASF headquarters directed that all installations where replacements were trained

set up leadership courses for the development of noncommissioned officers. The

participants were selected from among the

trainees who had shown the best leadership qualifications; the number was not to

exceed 3 percent of the established capacity. The nine-week course was broken

down into a three-week period for theoretical training, and a six-week period of

practical application with the leadership

trainees acting as corporals.107

The Transportation Corps was late in

setting up an adequate replacement training program. The first such program was

authorized in February 1943 and started

two months later at New Orleans.108 Up

to that time troops for replacements had

been obtained wherever they could be

found, with the ports of embarkation providing the largest number. The obvious

explanation is that the entire training program under the Chief of Transportation

was late in getting started because the

Transportation Corps itself was not created

until the end of July 1942, and because its

training responsibility was not fully defined until November 1942. As has been

pointed out, the pressing need in the beginning was for troop units with which to

fill requisitions from the oversea commands, and the training of replacements

had to wait until that basic requirement

had been met.

Civilian Schooling for Specialists

Under arrangements made by the Chief

of Transportation, 1,000 enlisted men and

65 commissioned officers were given the

benefit of special technical training at

schools operated by industrial concerns or

other private institutions. During the

courses the men had the opportunity to

work with equipment that was not available at the Transportation Corps training

107

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 15 Mar 44; Memo

11, TC RTC, New Orleans Army Air Base, 20 Apr

44, sub: Estab Leadership Tng Course; both in OCT

352.11 Camp Plauche; ASF Cir 150, 20 May 44,

Sec. I. 108

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, p. 58, OCT HB PE Gen.
456 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

centers and under the direction of highly

skilled instructors.109

Men were selected to attend these

courses after they had completed basic

military training and had demonstrated

technical aptitudes. Since some would be

required to instruct other enlisted men

after returning to their units and others

would be used as instructors at the training centers, their ability as instructors and

their leadership qualifications were important.

The amphibious truck—a type of equipment that had not been used previously

for either military or commercial purposes—was unfamiliar to all the men

when they were first assigned to amphibian truck companies, and expert instruction was necessary to enable them to

perform satisfactory maintenance and repair work on these vehicles. This need was

accentuated by the large number of men

assigned to such units who had had no experience whatsoever with automotive

mechanics. The General Motors Corporation, which manufactured the DUKW,

offered a course in its War Products School

that met the Chief of Transportation's

requirements. Beginning in October 1943,

one maintenance officer and a number of

enlisted mechanics from each DUKW

company were sent to this school. During

the next nine months 32 officers and 270

enlisted men completed the three-week

course.

During World War II the Army began

using diesel locomotives for the military

railways in certain oversea areas. The

number of railroaders inducted into the

Army with adequate training in the maintenance and repair of these locomotives

was far short of the need, and neither the

equipment nor the instructors for this

training were available at the Transportation Corps training centers. The Chief of

Transportation therefore arranged for two

builders of diesel locomotives to provide

the necessary instruction. These were the

Whitcomb Locomotive Company, Rochelle, Illinois, and the Buda Company,

Harvey, Illinois. In the beginning two

weeks were spent at one plant and one

week at another, but later these courses

were consolidated into one of three weeks.

This training, which began in May 1944

and ended the following November, was

provided for 25 officers and 432 enlisted

men.

Specialists in marine diesel and gasoline

engines were required in large numbers

by the harbor craft companies, and an inadequate number of men with civilian

experience in these fields was available to

the Chief of Transportation. As in the case

of the DUKW units, the answer to the

shortage was to provide training above the

training center level for a limited number

of carefully selected soldiers. This training was given at three locations: Chrysler

Corporation, Detroit, Michigan; Cummins Engine Corporation, Columbus, Indiana; and Hemphill Diesel Engine

School, Los Angeles, California. The

period of instruction varied from one week

to five weeks. Between January and July

1944 this special instruction was given to

8 officers and 148 enlisted men.

Among the specialists required for the

port maintenance and ship repair companies were boilermakers, riveters, and

steam fitters, for which the Army did not

have adequate training facilities. Such

companies were trained at Camp Gordon

Johnston, Carrabelle, Florida, and ar109

 Section based on Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Jan 44,

Schooling of Enlisted Men, and 1st Ind, CofT for Hist

Div WDSS, 8 Aug 47, Tabs 3 and 4; both in OCT

HB Tng Div Rpts.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 457

rangements were made for courses in these

specialties, which were given at the Duval

County Vocational School, Jacksonville,

Florida, to be available to men sent over

from Carrabelle. The instruction lasted

six weeks in the case of riveters, and eight

weeks in the case of boilermakers and

steam fitters. Fifty men completed each

course, all during the period July-September 1944.

Since the men who took these specialist

courses were selected with careful regard

for their potentialities, had the advantage

of better equipment and more experienced

instructors than were available at the

training centers, and passed the knowledge they acquired on to other soldiers at

the training centers and in the units to

which they belonged, the value of this instruction to the Transportation Corps cannot be measured simply by the number of

the men who received it. It was an arrangement that had cumulative benefits.

Final Inspection of Units

Units were not sent overseas until they

had been subjected to a final inspection

by The Inspector General. The Inspector

General's reports took into account personnel strength, completeness of equipment, and status of training, and were

based on minimum requirements established by the Army Service Forces. Unit

commanders made semimonthly status

reports that were expected to give an accurate picture of the condition and

progress of the troops so that the commanders of the training stations and the

Chief of Transportation could follow the

progress of each unit and take steps to

overcome any apparent deficiencies.110

The Army Service Forces headquarters

did not commit units to overseas service

unless the status reports indicated that

they would be ready, yet these units frequently failed to pass The Inspector General's examination. This situation reached

a point in the summer and fall of 1943

that led the ASF commanding general to

require all technical services to take drastic action. Currently The Inspector General was rejecting more than a third of the

ASF units committed.111

The number of Transportation Corps

units rejected in the final inspection had

not been outstandingly large, but the

Chief of Transportation took measures to

improve the situation. He established an

inspection branch in his Military Training

Division to examine units in training at

centers under the control of the service

commands, to follow their progress, and to

make suggestions for overcoming deficiencies.112

 He also admonished the commanders of ports of embarkation, under

whose supervision many of the port and

marine units completed their training, regarding their responsibilities in this matter. Despite the demand for units in the

theaters, the port commanders were advised to guard against too optimistic status

reports, since such reports encouraged too

early commitment.113

110

 Memos, CofT for PEs, 27 Sep 42, 22 Oct 42, 1

Apr 43, and 27 Nov 43, OCT HB Mil Tng Div Status

Rpts; ASF Memo S 350-37-43, 30 Apr 43; ASF Cir

168, 30 Dec 43. 111

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 26 Jul 43, sub: Adverse IG

Rpts, OCT 370.5 POM; Memo, Styer for Dir of Opns

ASF, 16 Aug 43, sub: Unsatisfactory Condition of

ASF Units, ASF CofS file, Dir of Opns; Memo, TIG

for DCofS WDGS, 13 Oct 43, sub: Readiness of Units

OCT 370.5 (Readiness Dates); Memo, Styer for CofT,

28 Nov 43, sub: Tng of T/O Units, OCT 353 Gen. 112

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Quarter Ending 31 Dec 43,

p. 13, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 113

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, p. 61, OCT HB PE Gen.
458 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

PORT COMPANY TROOPS training for assault operations.

Inspections during the first quarter of

1944 resulted in twelve out of nineteen

Transportation Corps units inspected

being found not ready. This apparently

bad record can be explained on the

ground that many units had been ordered

to the European theater, in response to the

theater's urgent requests, before they had

completed their training programs. Later,

the Army Service Forces adopted a different basis of judgment, and when units

were ordered overseas at their "current

status of training" they were considered

"not ready" only when they failed to

meet the requirements of the movement

orders. On the new basis the record for the

year 1944 showed only 12 Transportation

Corps units rejected out of a total of 102

inspected. This rate of rejections (11.8

percent) was slightly higher than the

average for all ASF units (10.1 percent).

During the last quarter of 1944 and the

first five months of 1945, no Transportation

Corps units were rejected by The Inspector General. By that time the extreme

pressure for the delivery of units to Europe

had disappeared and training programs

did not have to be cut short.114

One aspect of the difficulty of having

units ready to meet oversea requirements

was the uncertainty of the Transportation

Corps troop basis. The Chief of Transportation complained of the failure of higher

authority to authorize increases in the

troop basis promptly enough to enable

him to spread the activation dates, avoid

114

 Min of ASF Staff Conf, 13 Apr 44, pp. 1-3; ASF

MPR, 31 Dec 44, Sec. 9, Training, p. 15, and 31 May

45, p. 13.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 459

TROOPS PRACTICE GOING OVER THE SIDE on a debarkation net.

peaks and valleys in the training load, and

so insure best training results.115 This was

a problem that he shared with the other

technical services. The quarterly troop

basis was set up by the Chief of Staff after

consideration of the requests submitted by

all branches of the Army. Against the

background of a general manpower shortage, requests of the AGF and the AAF

were in a favored position as compared

with those of the ASF. ASF headquarters

had to distribute its troop allotment

among the several technical services, and

it was always a case of distributing a

deficit. Under these circumstances and in

view of the unpredictable extent of oversea requirements for some types of units, it

is not surprising that the Chief of Transportation's frequent requests for an increased troop basis should have met with

delays and that the increases should have

come unevenly.

It is impossible to judge how far the

Chief of Transportation's experience with

adverse reports on the readiness of Transportation Corps units can be attributed to

the fact that many of the units received

their training at installations that were

not under his direct control. But to the

end of the war he held the opinion that his

inability to deal directly with the commanders of those installations concerning

training programs and methods, and to

order immediate changes in the training

of particular units when his inspectors

115

 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 3 1 Aug 42, OCT 322

Activation of Units; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20

Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated ASF Problems,

Item 7, OCT HB TC Gen Misc.
460 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

found that such changes were desirable,

was a definite disadvantage.

Review of Training Problems

Two circumstances affected practically

everything undertaken by the Chief of

Transportation in the field of training—his

late start in the activity, and the steady

broadening of his responsibilities during

the first year of the war. As Colonel Scofield later pointed out, when he came to

the Transportation Corps at the beginning

of 1943 it had no tables of organization or

tables of equipment of its own but was

using those of other services.116 There were

no up-to-date technical manuals for use as

training guides. Mobilization training

programs were still to be worked out or

brought into line with the requirements of

the theater commanders.117 A plan of collaboration between the Military Training

Division and the several operating divisions in establishing appropriate training

doctrine and methods was yet to be developed. The training organization in the

Office of the Chief of Transportation was

still in its infancy, and the establishment

of training centers for the various types of

Transportation Corps units and replacements was not yet complete. Yet requests

were already pouring in from the oversea

commands for greater numbers of units

than could be promptly supplied, and it

was inevitable that those requests should

increase. The Chief of Transportation,

therefore, began his major training effort

with a heavy backlog and several handicaps.

The scarcity of officers who were competent to guide the troops in the performance of their technical tasks, and at the

same time provide capable military leadership, was a keenly felt handicap. The

Chief of Transportation's organization suffered particularly because it had no

peacetime background and its personnel

had been assembled from many sources

after the war began. At a conference of his

principal officers at New Orleans in January 1944, when training was one of the

main topics for discussion, General Gross

called attention to reports from overseas

indicating that too many officers with

Transportation Corps units were failing to

fulfill their responsibilities, and urged that

officers who did not display the proper

qualifications during training be eliminated promptly. He warned that training

would never make a leader out of a man

who did not have innate officer qualities

of character, and that passing such men

down from unit to unit would only delay

the day when they would be sent overseas

to discredit the Transportation Corps.118

The demand for officers was such that this

policy could not be fully enforced.

The lack of technical qualifications

could be overcome to a certain extent by

longer training, and the extension of the

courses at officer and officer candidate

schools and the lengthening of the unit

training periods were helpful. But actual

experience in transportation or an allied

field gave an officer a competence that no

amount of training could equal. The Chief

of Transportation therefore felt that the

restriction placed on the commissioning of

technicians from civilian life by the War

116

 Remarks in Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan 44, p. 60, OCT HB PE Gen. 117

 In the above discussion of the several types of

units no attempt has been made to account for all

T/O&E's, MTP's, and TM's; these are dealt with in

periodical reports of the Military Training Division,

filed in OCT HB Tng Div Rpts; see also list of

T/O&E's, 1 Nov 45, OCT HB Tng Div T/O&E. 118

 Min of Port Comdrs Conf, New Orleans, 11-14

Jan 44, pp. 55, 57, 73, OCT HB PE Gen.
MILITARY AND TECHNICAL TRAINING 461

Department, beginning in 1943, was a

severe blow to his organization.

The Chief of Transportation protested

repeatedly because of the quality of the

enlisted personnel that he was given to

train. There were slow learners and very

slow learners among the white troops, but

there was a much larger percentage of

them among the Negro troops that made

up most of the port companies and amphibian truck companies activated after

1942. A survey of 1,000 Negro troops

received at the unit training center at

New Orleans in the summer of 1944 disclosed that only 10.7 percent had completed elementary school; 52.2 percent

were in grade IV, and 42 percent were in

grade V, as rated by the Army general

classification test.119 Mechanical aptitude

tests produced equally unsatisfactory results since so large a proportion of the men

had had no previous experience with machinery. The introduction of a special mobilization training program for substandard port and amphibian truck companies,

with a lengthened period of technical

training, was helpful but did not wholly

offset the basic disadvantage.120

Negro units had unusually high rates of

attrition, which were due mainly to

AWOL offenses and venereal disease. In

view of the attrition rate during training,

the Chief of Transportation sought to obtain reauthorization of 15 percent overstrength for these units at the time of their

activation, but he was not successful because of the manpower shortage, which

in 1944 was being severely felt by all

branches of the military service.121

Reports from the theaters indicated

that port units and the several types of

marine units were often required to operate together, but they had had no training

for combined operations when they arrived overseas. Since the various types of

units received their training at different

installations, the deficiency could not be

readily corrected during the war, although

a proposal to that end was made early in

1944. In May 1945 the Chief of Transportation recommended that, in the postwar

Military Establishment, Fort Eustis, Virginia, be assigned to the Transportation

Corps for use as a combined training center. This was done early in 1946, and later

that year the Transportation Corps School

also was transferred to Fort Eustis, which

then became the center for all types of

Transportation Corps training activities.122

The training of railway units gave the

Chief of Transportation less concern than

the training of other major types of units,

because so large a percentage of both

officers and men in rail units had had experience in the railroad industry, and because the technical training of most of the

units was accomplished on the commercial

railroads. The plan of having particular

railroads sponsor, provide personnel for,

and train certain units proved so advantageous that it was extended to other

branches of the transportation industry

early in the postwar period.

119

 Memo, Col Frederick W. Huntington for CG

NOPE, 21 Aug 44, sub: Test Scores, OCT 353 Camp

Plauché; concerning similar test at Indiantown Gap

UTC, see Rpt, Tng of Units, Feb 45, p. 6, OCT HB

Tng Div Rpts. 120

 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, to 31 Dec 43, p. 5 and Ex 7

and 8, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts. 121

 Memo, CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 20 Jan 44, AG

320.2 (15 Jan 44); Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Jan

44, sub: Current and Anticipated ASF Problems,

Item 8 on atchd list, OCT HB TC Gen Misc; Memo,

TAG for CGs SvCs, 25 Mar 44, sub: Overstrength

Engr and TC Units, AG 320.2 (22 Mar 44). 122

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 133-34; Rpt, Mil Tng

Div, FY 1945, p. 4 and Ex B; Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Jul

45-Aug 46, pp. 39-40, 46, 52; last two in OCT HB

Tng Div Rpts.
CHAPTER VII

The Supply Program

and Its Execution

The theme of the Transportation Corps

supply story is very much like that of the

training story and some others—a theme

of handicaps resulting from a late start

and of a laborious effort to overcome those

handicaps. The late start resulted chiefly

from the fact that the Transportation

Corps was a new organization, and that it

acquired its supply functions after the war

was already under way. The effort to

attain an effective performance was laborious because the Chief of Transportation

had to assemble his staff after the field of

technical personnel had been well combed

by other branches of the armed forces and

by rapidly expanding industries, and because he had to start almost from scratch

in developing effective plans and procedures for the establishment of programs,

the placing of contracts, the control of

production, and the improvement of

designs.1

The need during peacetime for an integrated Army transportation service, which

would make carefully considered plans for

emergencies and provide a nucleus of

trained officers ready to carry those plans

into effect, had been clearly foreseen by

those who were responsible for military

transportation in World War I; but Congress had disregarded recommendations

to that end and had discontinued the

Transportation Service that had been built

up during 1918-19.2 The unfortunate results of that decision were nowhere more

glaringly apparent than in the difficulties

that the Chief of Transportation in World

War II encountered in fulfilling his supply

responsibility.

Scope of the Responsibility

During the prewar emergency responsibility for the procurement of marine

equipment and materials-handling equipment for water-front use rested with the

Transportation Division in the Office of

The Quartermaster General, but actual

procurement was accomplished chiefly by

the ports of embarkation. Procurement

authority covering equipment for military

and utility railways was in the hands of

the Chief of Engineers, although The

Quartermaster General established the

requirements for utility railroads. The

Chief of Transportation took over responsibility for the design and procurement of

marine and materials-handling equipment

when his office was established in March

1

 This chapter draws heavily on OCT HB Monograph 28, prepared in consultation with Transportation Corps supply officers immediately after the war. 2

 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,

Organisation, and Operations, pp. 34-35.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 463

1942, and at the same time absorbed The

Quartermaster General's Transportation

Division in his headquarters organization.

Responsibility for the design and procurement of railway equipment remained with

the Chief of Engineers until November

1942, when it was transferred to the Chief

of Transportation. At that time some technical personnel was transferred, though the

number was not as large as the Chief of

Transportation had expected.3 Responsibility for the procurement of marine, rail,

and materials-handling equipment carried

with it responsibility for the procurement

of the supplies and spare parts that were

necessary for operation and maintenance.

Some minor items were added to the Chief

of Transportation's procurement responsibility as the war progressed.

There were a number of exceptions to

this general division of supply responsibility. The Chief of Engineers continued to

procure the floating equipment required

for his work on rivers, harbors, and fortifications, and he procured small assault and

reconnaissance boats required by his tactical troops. The Chief of Engineers prepared the specifications and provided the

funds for barrage balloon equipment arid

certain bridge and wharf construction

equipment, which the Chief of Transportation procured and inspected. A similar

division of responsibilities was made between the Air Forces and the Chief of

Transportation in regard to aircraft crash

rescue boats. In September 1942 the procurement authority for materials-handling

equipment was divided by SOS headquarters between the Chief of Engineers and

The Quartermaster General, but locomotive cranes became a responsibility of the

Chief of Transportation when he took over

the military railways, and he was subsequently charged with the procurement of

gantry cranes and stiff-leg derricks for port

operations.4 In the early months of the

war the Chief of Transportation procured

several types of landing craft for amphibious operations, but in September 1942 the

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that thereafter

such craft would be procured by the Navy.

Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936

the Maritime Commission was charged

with the upbuilding of the American merchant marine, and accordingly the Army

limited its procurement to non-oceangoing vessels—that is, vessels of not more

than 1,000 tons gross or 200 feet in length.5

No attempt can be made in this chapter

to discuss the procurement of particular

items of equipment, but a general summary will give an idea of the scope of the

Chief of Transportation's procurement responsibility. The marine equipment that

he procured included cargo vessels, combination cargo and passenger vessels, tugs,

towboats, rescue and salvage boats, small

landing boats, mine planters, mine yawls,

crane barges, barrage balloon barges, refrigerator barges, and many other types of

barges and lighters for general and special

purposes. The railway equipment included

steam, diesel, and gasoline locomotives,

numerous types and sizes of freight, passenger, and hospital cars, locomotive

cranes, and maintenance-of-way rolling

3

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 4

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 3-8. Assignments of

specific items to specific services for procurement were

reported weekly by the ASF Procurement Assignment Board and published as ASF circulars or

memos. See also WD Procurement Regulations, 600

series, concerning interagency and interdepartmental

purchases. 5

 Memo, Asst to Chm of Mar Com for Strategic

Shipping Bd, 6 Jan 42, OCT HB Topic Strategic

Shipping Bd; AG Memo 561 (1-30-42), 31 Jan 42,

Acquisition of Vessels Under 1,000 Tons; WD Memo

W 55-9-42, 4 Dec 43.
U.S.-BUILT LOCOMOTIVES FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS. The 2-8-0 standardgauge steam locomotive procured by the Military Railway Service (top); the 2-10-0 broad-gauge

steam locomotive procured for shipment to the Soviet Union under lend-lease (middle); the

127-ton diesel locomotive of the type used by the MRS in Italy and Iran (bottom).
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 465

stock.6 The materials-handling equipment

was of few types and constituted only a

small part of the total procurement. In

addition, the Chief of Transportation purchased about 50,000 items of spare parts

and expendable supplies.

The total value of the equipment and

supplies procured by the Chief of Transportation and delivered to him during the

years 1942-45 was $2,072,523,000. (Table

38) This figure does not include the considerable amount of matériel for which the

Chief of Transportation determined requirements and provided funds but which

he obtained through other procuring

agencies such as the Navy, the Maritime

Commission, and other Army technical

services. (See Table 39 for budget estimates

for all equipment and supplies.)

Of the total matériel accepted by the

Transportation Corps or its predecessors

up to the end of 1945, almost one quarter,

valued at $516,000,000, was shipped to

Allied governments under the Lend-Lease

Act of 11 March 1941. Railway equipment

valued at $452,000,000 accounted for the

larger part of the lend-lease shipments. Of

this amount, $240,000,000 went to the

Soviet Union, $140,000,000 to the United

Kingdom, and $72,000,000 to other countries.7

 A considerable part of the locomotives and rolling stock delivered to the

United Kingdom during the period when

U.S. forces were being built up there was

moved to the Continent after the invasion.

Taking over this large procurement

responsibility after the war was well under

way, and being confronted immediately

with heavy and urgent demands for equipment needed in the theaters of operations,

the Chief of Transportation had many

problems to solve before he could meet the

requirements. He had to establish an organization in his headquarters that was

capable of setting up a procurement program, supervising the execution of that

program, and dealing with the technical

questions involved. A considerable field

organization was necessary to maintain

liaison with contractors scattered throughout the country, to inspect the work in

progress, and eventually to accept the finished products. Methods had to be developed for scheduling production and assuring that the schedules were kept. Steps

had to be taken to standardize equipment

whenever possible in order to simplify procurement and maintenance. A depot system and a method of controlling the issuing

and reordering of stocks had to be established. Technical study was necessary to

improve old equipment and develop new

items to meet the needs of forces scattered

throughout the world.

The Headquarters and Field

Organizations

A full-fledged headquarters and field

organization to deal with supply matters

was not achieved until after the United

States had been at war for more than a

year. There were several reasons for this.

The procurement personnel that the Chief

of Transportation had acquired from The

Quartermaster General and the Chief of

Engineers provided a meager foundation

on which to build the large staff that became necessary. The extent of the theaters'

6

 Designs Active as of April 1, 1943, OCT HB Dir

of Sup Program; Pamphlets, Marine Equipment, and

Railway Equipment, both issued on 31 March 1943,

describe the principal items; in OCT HB Dir of Sup

Publications. 7

 ASF Rpt, International Aid Statistics, World War

II, through 31 Dec 45, pp. 8, 23, 32, 40. The above

figures include only direct shipments to the beneficiary countries; they do not include transfers from

Army stocks in the theaters, which amounted to

$37,000,000.
466 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 38—ESTIMATED VALUE OF TRANSPORTATION CORPS EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

ACCEPTED: CALENDAR YEARS 1942-1945 a

(Thousands of Dollars)

a

 Estimated from physical quantities delivered and standard dollar weights, which for most items were unit costs as of 1945. The figures

therefore reflect physical volume—for comparison between years and technical services—rather than cost to the government; they do not

take into consideration price changes or contract renegotiations. Supplies covered by budgetary category "Miscellaneous Supplies" (Table

39) are distributed among the three types shown in this table.

Source: Statistics, Procurement, p. 20, compiled for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation.

needs for marine and rail equipment and

related supplies unfolded only gradually as

the strategy of the war took shape. Another

reason was the difficulty experienced in

obtaining the services of competent men to

handle the technical phases of this activity.

These circumstances had a direct bearing

on the crisis in Transportation Corps supply operations that developed in the

summer and fall of 1943.8

In addition to getting a late start, and

partly on that account, the Chief of Transportation's supply organization was subject to frequent revampings both at headquarters and in the field. Changes were

inevitable in a structure that was being

built from the ground upward to handle a

rapidly developing work load, but to a

large degree the reorganizations were the

result of differing views held by the several Transportation Corps officers who

headed the activity, and of the efforts of

ASF headquarters to have the supply

operations of the several technical services

conform to certain procedures.

The Chief of Transportation's first

supply responsibility, which he took over

from The Quartermaster General in

March 1942 when his office was created,

was for the design and procurement of

marine equipment. In the beginning this

responsibility was assigned to the Water

Division, but the need for a separate procurement organization was foreseen. During the spring and summer steps were

taken to assemble personnel for such an

organization, and in July the establishment of a Requirements and Procurement

Division was announced, with Maj.

William B. Bunker as chief. The new division was charged with the determination

of requirements and the letting of contracts for marine equipment, but responsibility for the design of this equipment

remained with the Water Division. Minor

supply functions, which had been assumed

by other divisions while the Office of the

Chief of Transportation was in its formative stage, were also transferred to the 8

 See below, p. 470.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 467

TABLE 39—BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR TRANSPORTATION CORPS EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:

FISCAL YEARS 1942-1946

 a

(Thousands of Dollars)

a

 Includes estimates for marine equipment and supplies prepared by The Quartermaster General for the fiscal year 1942 and estimates

for railway equipment and supplies prepared by the Chief of Engineers for the fiscal years 1942 and 1943 before such procurement was transferred to the Chief of Transportation. Estimates include matériel procured by other agencies—Navy, Maritime Commission, Ordnance

Department, etc.—at the request and for the account of the Transportation Corps, as well as matériel procured directly by the Transportation Corps. b

 Data not available.

Source: Final Report of the Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, World War II, 30 November 1945, p. 90; based on data supplied

by the Director of Matériel and Supply for that report.

Requirements and Procurement Division.9

In September 1942, with marine requirements mounting rapidly and the

transfer of railway procurement authority

to the Chief of Transportation in prospect,

Col. Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., an Air Service

veteran of World War I and a patent attorney with scientific and industrial contacts

in civilian life, was named chief of the

Requirements and Procurement Division,

with Major Bunker as his assistant. In

November, with the transfer of the railway

procurement function assured, Colonel

Toulmin was designated Assistant Chief of

Transportation for Supply, and as such

was one of the three principal assistants to

the Chief of Transportation. Bunker, then

a lieutenant colonel, was named Executive

for Supply.

Colonel Toulmin thus became responsible for all aspects of the supply activity—

determination of requirements, establishment of designs and specifications, placement of contracts, supervision of production, and other supply matters.10

 But in

regard to requirements and designs for

marine and railway equipment, the Assistant Chief of Transportation for Supply was

directed to work in close collaboration

with the Water Division and the Rail Division, which were responsible for maintaining liaison with the theaters on this equipment and for reviewing their requisitions.11

The need for a field organization to

assist the headquarters staff in placing and

administering contracts was early apparent, and in October 1942 the Chief of

Transportation established five zone procurement offices. The new offices were

located in the Army port agencies at

9

 OCT Adm Memo 79, 14 Jul 42, OCT HB Dir of

Sup Gen. 10

 These changes are reflected in Adm Log of TC,

and TC Org Manual, in OCT HB TC Gen. 11

 Memo, Ex OCT for Gen Franklin, 19 Jun 43,

sub: Division of Responsibility, OCT 400.13 Procurement Policy.
468 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Boston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and

San Francisco, and in the Army Transportation Agency at Chicago.12

 The ports of

embarkation previously had assisted the

headquarters organization in placing contracts for marine equipment, making inspections, and expediting deliveries. Under

the new arrangement the ports were to be

relieved of those responsibilities, but they

were to make their technical staffs available to the zone procurement officers to

the extent that they were needed. The

port commander at San Francisco protested against this arrangement, partly

because he thought it unwise and partly

because he had not been consulted in advance. In reply, the Chief of Transportation conceded that the arrangement regarding procurement zones had been

made hastily as the result of the urgency

of the oversea demand for marine equipment and "pressure from above," and

stated that a more adequate plan was

being formulated.13

The new plan for a field supply organization, to which the Chief of Transportation referred, was a part of a broader plan

to bring all Transportation Corps field

agencies, except the ports of embarkation

and the training activities, under the

supervision of nine zone transportation

officers. In addition to supervising Transportation Corps activities pertaining to the

movement of troops and supplies in his

area, each zone transportation officer was

directed to establish a supply division to

deal with such matters as the Assistant

Chief of Transportation for Supply might

delegate to him. The transportation zones

were coextensive with the service commands, and the zone transportation offices,

which were established as of 1 December

1942, were located in Boston, Massachusetts; New York, New York; Baltimore,

Maryland; Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus,

Ohio; Chicago, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; Dallas, Texas; and Salt Lake City,

Utah. Later, the supply division of the

ninth zone was transferred from Salt Lake

City to San Francisco. Certain zones had

subordinate district offices, and in areas

where there were many Transportation

Corps contractors, district supply officers

were appointed.14 While the zone transportation offices were establishing supply

divisions to perform the bulk of the field

work, the ports of embarkation were

directed to designate supply officers to

determine the requirements of those installations for Transportation Corps equipment, to oversee the transshipment, storage, and issue of the equipment, and to

carry out such local procurement as might

be authorized by the Chief of Transportation.15

Concurrently with the establishment of

the zone supply divisions, a Transportation Corps Supply Plan, which outlined

the responsibilities of each element of the

headquarters and field organizations and

the procedures to be followed, was issued.16

This was an attempt to explain, and at the

same time give an atmosphere of sta12

 WD Cir 341, 10 Oct 42, Sec. IV; OCT Cirs 61,

14 Oct 42, and 62, 19 Oct 42; Memo, CofT for Field

Representatives of Requirements and Procurement

Division, 21 Oct 42, OCT HB Dir of Sup Gen. 13

 Memo, CofT for Col John H. Mellom, SFPE, 19

Oct 42; Ltr, Gen Gilbreath to Gross, 24 Nov 42, and

reply, 27 Nov 42; all in OCT HB Gross SF. 14

 SOS Cir 91, 1 Dec 42, sub: Reorg of TC Field

Agencies; TC Cir 5-5, 8 Jan 44. For the background

of ZTO's, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 111-14. Considerable information regarding the activities of zone

supply divisions will be found in their annual reports

for the fiscal year 1944. OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. 15

 Memo, CofT for PEs, 15 Jan 43, sub: Sup Divs,

OCT 323.3 PEs. 16

 TC Supply Plan, 1 Jan 43, OCT HB Dir of Sup

Org. This document was supplemented by TC Supply Manual, 1 May 43, dealing with procedures. Both

were rescinded by OCT Cir 158, 9 Dec 43, Supp. 1.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 469

bility to, an organization that up to then

had been extremely fluid and not well

understood by other elements of the

Transportation Corps. But for some time

stability remained a goal rather than a

fact. Under the supply plan the number of

divisions in the headquarters organization

had been increased from three to five, yet

within a few weeks Colonel Toulmin proposed a further reorganization on the basis

of eight divisions. Maj. (later Col.) Luke

W. Finlay, executive for General Gross,

informed Toulmin that, while the Chief of

Transportation wanted him to have a free

hand in organizing his staff, Gross had

misgivings with regard to increasing the

number of divisions, since each new selfcontained division increased the amount

of executive and clerical personnel required.17

 This particular reorganization

did not take place, but other changes were

to follow soon.

In June 1943, four of the five divisions of

the Chief of Transportation's supply organization were moved to Cincinnati, Ohio.

They were the Engineering Division, the

Procurement Division, the Production

Division, and the Controlled Materials

Plan Division, which was subsequently

absorbed by the Production Division. At

that time the War Department was urging

the removal of activities from the overcrowded Washington area.18

 From the

Chief of Transportation's point of view,

Cincinnati had certain advantages: it provided a better labor market from which

technical and clerical personnel could be

drawn, and a more centrally located base

from which to maintain contact with contractors and prospective contractors. In

setting up the Field Service Group, as the

Cincinnati office was designated, 16 officers and 213 civilians were transferred

from Washington. The addition of technical personnel and several administrative

units brought a steady increase in the

roster of the Field Service Group, and on

30 June 1944 it included 63 officers and

707 civilians.19 This office, although it was

geographically separate, remained organizationally a part of the Office of the Chief

of Transportation.

Although the growth of the organization

at Cincinnati was chiefly in the operating

divisions, a considerable administrative

staff was found necessary. Provision was

made in the beginning for an administrative division to handle such matters as

personnel, procedures, custody of property, security, transportation orders, mail,

and records, but other requirements soon

developed. The procurement and management of civilian personnel was so persistent a problem that the Civilian Personnel Division in Washington could not deal

with it properly at long range, and consequently set up a branch in the Field Service Group early in 1944. It was found also

that legal and fiscal matters in connection

with procurement could not be satisfactorily handled from Washington, and

branches of the Legal and Fiscal Divisions

were accordingly established in Cincinnati. The emphasis that Army Service

Forces headquarters placed on control

through statistical analysis and procedural

studies led to the establishment of a Control Branch in the Field Service Group.20

17

 Memo, Finlay for Toulmin, 16 Mar 43, sub: Expansion of Sup Org, OCT HB Ex Staybacks, Dec 42-

Dec 44. 18

 Memo, CG SOS for Cs of Svs, 1 Mar 43, sub: Removal of Activities From Washington, OCT 323.11. 19

 ASF Memo S 210-12-43, 15 Jun 43; OCT Off

Order 25-2, Changes 11, 24 Jul 43; Annual Rpt, Field

Sv Gp, 30 Jun 44, section dealing with Adm Div, pp.

1-3, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. 20

 The activities of these branches are discussed in

Annual Rpt, Field Sv Gp, FY 1944, OCT HB Dir of

Sup Rpts.
470 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Despite the removal of four divisions to

Cincinnati, the supply organization remaining in Washington was substantial

and it continued to grow, totaling 325

military and civilian personnel in February

1945.21 The Requirements Division was

the only major element to remain in Washington when the Field Service Group was

set up in Cincinnati; that division could

not be moved because it had to work constantly with the Water and the Rail Divisions in formulating the Transportation

Corps supply program and also with ASF

headquarters. Colonel Toulmin soon found

it necessary to add a Technical Staff to

advise him on technical matters, to prepare technical manuals, and to act as consultants on matters of design and construction. A Liaison Staff was also established

to maintain working relations with ASF

headquarters, the technical services, the

Navy, the Maritime Commission, and

other governmental and private agencies

concerned with the design and procurement of transportation equipment. In

addition, a control staff and an administrative staff were maintained in the Office

of the Assistant Chief of Transportation

for Supply.

While recognizing that Cincinnati

offered certain advantages to the Field

Service Group, the Chief of Transportation

felt that these were more than offset by the

handicaps that the division of the organization entailed. In addition to the increased personnel requirements, he believed that full co-ordination and efficiency

could not be attained while the staff was

functioning in two locations. After a period

of trial he proposed a relaxation of the

War Department policy against increasing

the personnel in Washington to permit the

return of the Field Service Group to his

headquarters.22 This permission was not

obtained during the war.

In May 1943 the Army Air Forces

approached the Chief of Transportation

regarding the possibility of obtaining the

transfer of Colonel Toulmin to the Air

Service Command, because of his air experience. General Gross responded unfavorably, explaining that Toulmin was doing a

fine job and that the young Transportation

Corps supply organization was hard

pressed to meet the Army's rapidly growing demand for marine and rail equipment. But in October ASF headquarters,

which disagreed with Toulmin on some

aspects of the supply operation, intervened

and the transfer was made. At that time

General Gross was on a long tour of the

theaters with General Somervell. When

he returned to Washington and learned of

this development, Gross voiced his keen

displeasure and expressed admiration for

Toulmin's "outstanding accomplishment"

in the launching of a huge procurement

program.23

For several months the Transportation

Corps supply organization functioned

under the direction of Colonel Bunker,

but in January 1944 Brig. Gen. Burton O.

Lewis was designated Director of Supply,

with Bunker as his deputy.24 General

Lewis came to the position with long

experience in the supply activities of the

Ordnance Department. Just before he was

assigned to the Office of the Chief of Trans21

 Wardlow, op. cit., p. 74. 22

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Jan 44, Item 10,

OCT 319.1 Current and Anticipated ASF Problems. 23

 Ltr, Gross to Brig Gen Elmer E. Adler, ASC, 29

May 43; Ltrs, Gross to Toulmin, 4 Nov 43 and 16 Oct

44; all in OCT HB Gross Day File. 24

 OCT Off Order 25-2, Changes 14, 25 Oct 43;

Changes 17, 15 Nov 43; Changes 22, 6 Jan 44.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 471

portation he had been chief of the Boston

Ordnance District.

During this interval ASF headquarters

made a survey of the Transportation

Corps supply organization and activities.

Although oriented particularly toward

the problem of spare parts, the survey led

to several developments that affected the

general supply operation—the establishment of a Stock Control Division (in

Washington) to assume full responsibility

for maintaining a balance between the

demand for and the supply of Transportation Corps matériel, the establishment of a

Maintenance Division (in New York City)

to develop spare parts lists and maintenance procedures, and the creation of a

more complete depot system for the

storage and issue of matériel.25

The organizational adjustments that

were made by General Lewis during the

early months of his incumbency evidently

did not achieve all that was desired. In

November 1944, Brig. Gen. Ephraim F.

Jeffe was designated Deputy Director of

Supply with the specific mission of studying the organization and procedures and

initiating such changes as might seem

desirable. General Jeffe was an electrical

engineer by training and had been a

public utilities executive in civilian life.

He was serving as Executive Vice Chairman of the War Production Board when

his transfer to ASF headquarters was

arranged. His assignment to the Chief of

Transportation followed within a few

weeks.26

Several changes in the headquarters

organization resulted from General Jeffe's

work. A reorganization of the Cincinnati

office was made in which the Engineering,

Procurement, and Production Divisions

were merged, and the revamped organization was redesignated the Procurement

Division. The Stock Control Division in

Washington was redesignated the Distribution Division. The Maintenance Division in New York was renamed the Technical Publications Branch and made a

part of the Distribution Division.27 In

March 1945, a directive was issued to

transfer the Distribution Division from

Washington to Cincinnati, but the order

was rescinded before it was carried into

effect.28

While these changes were being worked

out in the OCT headquarters supply

organization, ASF headquarters took steps

to simplify the Chief of Transportation's

field procurement machinery. The ASF

officers objected particularly to the dispersion of procurement activities to so many

zone and district offices, on the ground that

this increased the number of personnel

required and made co-ordination of activities difficult. While recognizing that there

had been reasons for the dispersion during

the early stages when both contracting and

production were beset with many difficulties, ASF headquarters believed that the

time had come to reduce the number of

field procurement offices and to make

them responsible directly to the OCT

Director of Supply—rather than to the

zone transportation officers—and to limit

procurement by the ports of embarkation

more severely.29 These adjustments were

25

 Rpt 146, Spare Parts for Trans Equip, Dec 43,

OCT 020 Org of TC Sup Activities. 26

 OCT Info Bull 78, 1 Nov 44; WD Biographical

Statement, as of 23 Jun 45; both in OCT HB Dir of

Sup Gen. 27

 OCT Info Bull 99, 22 Dec 44, OCT HB Dir of

Sup Org; TC Cir 5-23, 30 Dec 44. 28

 OCT Misc Ltr 86, 13 Mar 45, and Changes 1,31

Mar 45, both in OCT HB Dir of Sup Org. 29

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 15 Feb 45, sub: Procurement, OCT HB Dir of Sup Org.
472 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

initiated by the Chief of Transportation in

March 1945, but about two months were

required to carry them fully into effect.

The procurement activities of the zone and

district offices were consolidated into four

new procurement offices. The zone transportation officers at New York and Chicago served also as heads of the procurement offices in those cities; the procurement offices at New Orleans and San

Francisco were at first attached to the district transportation offices located there,

but soon became independent of them.30

The many changes that took place in

the supply organization—only the principal ones have been recounted—brought

it at the end of the war to a fairly simple

structure. The Director of Matériel and

Supply then had five divisions functioning

under his supervision. The Requirements

and Distribution Division, the Research

and Development Division, the Maintenance Division, and the Property Disposal

Division were located in Washington; the

Procurement Division was located in Cincinnati. The four field procurement offices

were responsible to the Procurement Division; four depots and three subdepots were

under the supervision of the Requirements

and Distribution Division.

One fact is clearly evident in the Chief

of Transportation's experience with his

supply organization—the handicap under

which a chief of service functions when he

undertakes a large wartime operation

without the benefit of seasoned personnel,

tested organizational pattern, and established procedures. The shortage of technical personnel was the basic difficulty. In

the beginning the Chief of Transportation

had to concentrate on building up a staff

to deal with the heavy movements of

troops and matériel that were necessary.

When authorization was obtained to employ a sizable staff of engineers, designers,

and other technical experts, such men

were difficult to obtain because of the

heavy demand in other fields. This was

particularly true of marine technical personnel because of the large naval and

merchant ship construction programs.31

Setting Up the Supply Program

The establishment of a supply program

for the Transportation Corps involved two

basic steps—estimating the requirements

of various elements of the armed forces in

the zone of interior and overseas for the

items for which the Chief of Transportation had procurement responsibility, and

getting those requirements approved by

ASF headquarters and incorporated in

the Army Supply Program. When formulating the program it was necessary not

only to take into account the prospective

needs, but also to consider the availability

of materials and component assemblies

under priorities set up by the War Production Board, the capacity of manufacturing plants to produce the desired items,

and the decisions of joint (Army-Navy)

and combined (British-American) agencies regarding the types or quantities of

matériel needed to support the approved

strategy.

There was little precedent on which

to base estimates of Army requirements

for transportation equipment. Not only

was the fighting on a much broader scale

than in any earlier war, but it was of a different character. The progressive move30

 TC Cir 5-8, 9 Mar 45, sub: Consolidation of Zone

and District Procurement; OCT Misc Ltr 166, 18

May 45; TC Cir 5-8, Changes 3, 17 Jul 45. 31

 Interv with Col Bunker, 3 Nov 52, OCT HB Dir

of Sup Gen.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 473

ment of forces from island to island, or

from continent to continent, called for a

great variety of floating equipment with

which to carry out amphibious assaults,

to support the assault forces after they had

gained a foothold in areas formerly held

by the enemy, and to operate the ports

through which established garrisons were

served. There was no static land warfare

in the manner of World War I, and the

forces operating in continental areas

moved fast and far in their pursuit of the

enemy, requiring large numbers of American locomotives, railway cars, and motor

vehicles to supplement such native equipment as might have escaped destruction

in aerial attacks or by enemy demolition.

The requirements for certain types of military equipment might be calculated from

the projected troop basis, but with transportation equipment many other factors

had to be considered that were much more

difficult to evaluate.

The greatest difficulty in establishing requirements was with marine equipment.

In the early part of the war the Chief of

Transportation got but limited help from

the theaters in setting up a long-range

program. Since he headed a new service,

his working relations with some of the theaters were in the developmental stage.

The theater commanders found it difficult

to estimate their needs far in advance since

strategic plans were exceedingly fluid and

the amount of transportation equipment

available locally was uncertain. Yet the

Chief of Transportation had to prepare his

program and place orders well ahead of

actual need because of the long lead time

on many vessels—that is, the long period

between the placing of contracts and final

delivery.32 In some cases the lead time was

as much as twelve months.

Several circumstances contributed to

slow production. Not only were vessels

large and complicated items of military

equipment, but they called for scarce materials and subassemblies that were controlled by priorities. The subassemblies

usually came from numerous manufacturers, and delay in the delivery of any one

component meant delay in the completion

of the end product. Because the marine

industry had been fully committed by the

Navy and the Maritime Commission before the Chief of Transportation entered

the field in a large way, he found it necessary to place contracts with small and in

many cases entirely new boatbuilding and

engine building concerns, which had

neither the personnel nor the plant facilities necessary for fast construction. Under

these circumstances the Chief of Transportation could not wait for the theaters to

submit requisitions for critical items; he

had to get a program approved and place

contracts far ahead of theater requests in

order to avoid harmful delays in filling

these requests.33

Because of the heavy early demand,

the late start in ordering against that demand, and the scarcity of raw materials

and certain types of machinery, no stockpile of marine equipment existed during

the greater part of the war. Early in 1943

the Chief of Transportation was ready to

start building stockpiles of certain types of

equipment in order to lighten the burden

of heavy requisitions that were expected

to come in later. But the necessity of

32

 See Memo, Toulmin for CofT, 28 Dec 42, for

first comprehensive forecast of requirements in the

Pacific; in OCT 561.4 Army Shipbuilding Program. 33

 Memo, Toulmin for CofT, 6 Jan 43, sub: Acceleration of Army Shipbuilding Program; Memo, Gen

Clay, ACofS for Matériel SOS, for ACofS for Opns

SOS, file copy not dated; Memo, CofT for ACofS for

Opns SOS, 22 Feb 43; all in OCT 561.4 Army Shipbuilding Program.
VESSELS PROCURED BY THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS. 143-foot diesel

electric ocean-going tug, used extensively in theaters of operations (top); 182-foot tanker for

intratheater use (middle); 125-foot derrick barge (bottom).
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 475

rationing metals, as well as engines and

other components, so as best to serve the

war program as a whole made this impossible.34

 There was also pressure from the

War Department Procurement Review

Board on ASF headquarters and the technical services to scale down their proposed

supply programs, since some surpluses

had been discovered overseas.35 Not until

1944 were reserves of certain marine end

items possible, and they existed only for

launches and a few other types of vessels

that were in general use. The late stages

of the war found Transportation Corps

depots with limited stocks of replacement

parts.

Although the Requirements Division,

under the Director of Supply, and the

Water Division collaborated in making

estimates of future theater requirements,

such estimates involved a large amount of

guesswork as to the numbers and types of

vessels that would be needed. As new information came to hand, earlier estimates

were revised, usually upward. Inability to

provide concrete justification for these estimates was the main reason for ASF criticism of the Transportation Corps supply

program in 1943.36 Later the difficulty

was eased by more forehanded planning

on the part of the theater commanders,

and by better understanding of theater

requirements gained through experience

on the part of the Chief of Transportation's

staff.37

Not all marine equipment was intended

for the theaters; about 27 percent of the

vessels and other floating equipment

under control of the Chief of Transportation at the end of the war was assigned to

commands in the zone of interior—ports

of embarkation, service commands, defense commands, the Army Air Forces,

the Chief of Engineers, the Coast Artillery

Corps, and a few other governmental

agencies.38 Generally speaking, the domestic requirements were established without

difficulty because of ready communication between the requisitioning agencies

and the Chief of Transportation, but there

were emergency requirements and also

requests for changes in designs. This was

particularly true of vessels requisitioned

by the Army Air Forces.39

In addition to the difficulties experienced in satisfying ASF headquarters regarding requirements for marine equipment, the Chief of Transportation's

program encountered criticism from other

sources. The Navy was one of the critics.

The Army and the Navy were competitors for raw materials, engines, and other

equipment for small vessels and naturally

held divergent views on some matters.

This divergence became apparent first

in connection with landing craft. In the

spring and early summer of 1942, as part

of the preparations for an emergency

cross-Channel attack in the fall of that

year if circumstances should demand it, 34

 Documents cited in n. 33; Memo, ASF ACofS for

Matériel for CofT, 22 Feb 43, sub: Production Conf,

pars. 2 and 7, and reply by CofT, 26 Feb 43, sub:

Recommendations, both in OCT 400.17. 35

 Memo, Gross for Proc Review Bd, undated but

accompanied by compilation dated 28 Jul 43; Memo,

Dir ASF Plng Div for Dep Dir of Opns, 21 Aug 43,

sub: Rpt of McCoy Bd; both in OCT HB Gross

McCoy Bd. 36

 Interv with Col Bunker, 8 Jul 52, OCT HB Dir

of Sup Gen. 37

 For an outline of the work and problems of the

Requirements Division, covering both Army and international aid requirements, see appropriate section

of Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, OCT HB Dir of Sup

Rpts. 38

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 250-51, gives distribution

of 12,466 units of marine equipment under TC control in August 1945. 39

 Memo, CG AAF for CofT, 14 Mar 43, sub: AAF

Floating Construction Program; 1st Ind, CofT for CG

ASF, 18 May 43; both in OCT 561.4 Army Air

Forces.
476 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

a hurried effort was made to procure sufficient landing craft for such an operation.

The Chief of Transportation depended

chiefly on the Navy to procure the craft

that would be needed by the Engineer

Amphibian Command, but since the

Navy's program was in arrears he placed

some orders directly. During this period

there were sharp differences of opinion between the Army and the Navy on priorities and also on the design of craft for

Army use.40

The decision taken in July to invade

North Africa in November 1942 and to

delay the cross-Channel attack removed

some of the pressure from the landing

craft program, but it remained critical. In

September the Navy proposed that thereafter it procure all amphibious craft in

order to avoid competition, confusion, and

multifarious designs.41 The Chief of Transportation agreed and the Army approved

this proposal. Thereafter all orders for

such vessels were placed by the Chief of

Transportation through the Navy, but the

Chief of Transportation maintained a close

liaison with Navy procurement activities

in order to be fully informed regarding

production schedules and changes in

design.42

While not unwilling to rely on the Navy

for the landing craft required for tactical

purposes, General Gross maintained that

his organization should continue to procure the many other types of small vessels

that the Army needed for its logistical operations. He emphasized the point because

he was aware of sentiment favoring the

transfer of this procurement authority to

the Navy. He did not want to have to assume the "role of a petitioner" in order to

get the vessels required by Army commanders, since he had not found the Navy

readily responsive to such requests. The

Chief of Transportation believed, moreover, that in the scramble of various

agencies to get the vessels they needed

there was "no greater compelling force

than that of self interest."43 General

Somervell supported this position and entered a vigorous rejoinder when the Navy

proposed a centralization of marine procurement in its hands in the spring of

1943. Somervell characterized the proposal as "a wholly unwarranted intrusion

into Army affairs," which he felt was not

likely to further co-operative efforts in

that field. The Navy withdrew its proposal

but expressed the view that a fuller exchange of information was desirable to

avoid duplication.44

The next threat to the Chief of Transportation's marine procurement program

came from an unexpected source—the

40

 Memo, Somervell for Adm King, 13 Apr 42;

Memo, Gross for Brig Gen Walter Bedell Smith, 5

May 42; both in OCT HB Gross Day File; OCT Adm

Memo 42, 6 May 42, sub: Landing Boats; Memo,

OPD for Joint Staff Planners Subcommittee on Landing Craft, 9 May 42; Joint Memo, Somervell and Adm

Home for the President, 14 May 42; Memo, Maj

Howard W. Quinn for CofT, 14 May 42, sub: Navy

Design 50-Foot Tank Lighter; Memo, Quinn for

Gross, 9 Jun 42, sub: Truman Committee Hearing;

last five and other documents in OCT 370.5 Mvmt

BOLERO; Hist Rpt. Marine Br Development and

Liaison Div OCT, 21 Jul 42; Memo, Capt Frank M.

Warren, Jr., for C of Port and Field Agencies Div

OCT, 25 Nov 42; last two in OCT HB Development

and Liaison Div; Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Third Annual

Report, March 4, 1944, pp. 133-40, 167-68. 41

 Memo, Adm Home for JCS, 9 Sep 42; Memo,

Secy JCS for Adm William D. Leahy, Marshall, and

King, 10 Sep 42; Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 14

Sep 42; all in OPD 560, Sec. 2. 42

 Memo, Wylie for Exec OCT, 20 Mar 43, OCT

000-900 Landing Boats. 43

 Memo, Gross for Gen Wood, Reqmts Div ASF,

22 Apr 43; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 22 May 43;

both in OCT HB Gross Day Files. 44

 Memo, Somervell for Home, 22 Apr 43; Memo,

Home for Somervell, 11 May 43; Memo, Somervell

for Home, 13 May 43; all in ASF Hq Navy 1942-44.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 477

Director of War Mobilization, Mr. Byrnes.

In the fall of 1943, in collaboration with

the Joint Production Survey Committee

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Byrnes

initiated a broad investigation into the

shipbuilding programs of the Maritime

Commission, the Navy, and the Army. He

noted what he thought was an undesirable

lag in the execution of the conversion program, which the Chief of Transportation

had undertaken in order to provide the

Army with troopships, hospital ships, and

other specialized types of ocean-going

vessels; he also noted a duplication in the

small boat programs of the Transportation

Corps and the Navy. Mr. Byrnes observed

that he was "somewhat persuaded" that

the Transportation Corps should be relieved of its responsibility for the procurement of small boats in order that it might

direct its efforts more vigorously to its

other heavy responsibilities. The Army

stoutly defended the progress of its conversion program, and emphasized its conviction that if the needs of the theaters for

small boats were to be met promptly the

Army Chief of Transportation should be

responsible for the design and procurement of such vessels.45

While the Joint Production Survey

Committee was making a broad inquiry

into the shipbuilding situation, Admiral

King requested that the Transportation

Corps' marine procurement program be

reviewed by another committee of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. He took cognizance

particularly of the heavy orders being

placed for small boats to be sent to General MacArthur; he believed the program

to be excessive and wasteful of both vessels

and crews. The Army had no objection to

such a review. It considered the Joint

Military Transportation Committee the

proper agency to make the survey but

yielded to the Navy's insistence that the

Joint Logistics Committee do the job. The

report of the Joint Logistics Committee, in

March 1944, found the Transportation

Corps' marine construction program not

excessive in view of the requirements and

suggested ways of meeting the crew problem. The report of the Joint Production

Survey Committee rendered in May presented the same conclusion.46

Both the Army and the Navy recognized that without co-ordination of procurement there was likely to be duplication and waste, but in the absence of

evidence that either service had an excessive number of vessels the incentive for

positive action was lacking.47 Consequently, although various joint committees

worked on technical matters, no serious

attempt was made to harmonize the programs until late in the war. A Joint Small

Craft Subcommittee was set up in October 1944, with Brig. Gen. John M. Franklin, Assistant Chief of Transportation, as

chairman. This committee, on which the

War Shipping Administration was also

represented, apparently did not get down

to the serious consideration of oversea requirements until after the defeat of Germany and the concentration of the war ef45

 Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 253-54, 305-06. As additional documentation, see Memo, James V. Forrestal

for the President, 21 Sep 43; Memo, the President for

SN, 28 Sep 43; last two in OPD ABC 561 (7 Nov 43);

Ltr, Byrnes to SW, 19 Oct 43, OCT HB Ex Relations

with OWM; Ltr, Byrnes to SN, 19 Oct 43; Memo,

CofT for CG ASF, 29 Oct 43; last two in OCT 561.4

Army Shipbuilding Program. 46

 JCS 644, 24 Dec 43; Memo, Marshall for JCS, 28

Dec 43, OPD ABC 570 (3-1-43), Sec. 2; Memo, CofT

for JLC, 5 Jan 44, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo,

CofT for JPSC, 24 Jan 44, OCT 561.4 Army Shipbuilding Program; JCS 644/1, 14 Mar 44; JCS 573/3,

20 May 44. 47

 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 13 Jun 43, OCT HB

Wylie Vessels—Small Boats.
478 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

fort in the Pacific.48 In the meantime,

under an agreement between the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary

of War, a Joint Marine Procurement

Board had been established for the announced purpose of co-ordinating the procurement of small boats, marine engines,

and accessories. This board, on which

Generals Gross, Franklin, and Lewis were

the Transportation Corps representatives,

was directed to set up subcommittees to

assume the work that had already been

undertaken somewhat informally with respect to programs and procurement practices, designs and specifications, and repair

parts and packaging.49 Neither of these

bodies had progressed far with its mission

when the war ended.

Many small vessels that did not enter

into the Chief of Transportation's supply

program were purchased or chartered

locally by the oversea commanders. The

theater commanders had authority for

such local procurement to meet urgent

needs, and they exercised it to the full.

Usually the vessels thus acquired were old

ones, but some new construction was undertaken by local shipyards. This was

notably true in the Southwest Pacific

Area, where the need for floating equipment was especially heavy. The marine

industry in Australia constructed hulls for

about 3,000 boats. Most of them were of

the smaller nonpropelled types (lifeboats,

surfboats, dinghys, and barges), but upwards of 1,000 were powered boats for

which machinery was supplied from the

United States.50 The work in Australia

was done under lend-lease and hence did

not enter into the Chief of Transportation's

budget, but the machinery shipped from

this country was charged against Transportation Corps funds.

The Chief of Transportation experienced less difficulty with the program for

railway equipment. When he took over

that responsibility from the Chief of Engineers in November 1942, the situation was

well in hand; a study had been made of

the possible requirements in areas where

the U.S. forces might operate, and a stockpile of equipment had been started.51

 The

areas in which the Military Railway Service might be needed were relatively few,

and the extent of the operations was more

readily calculated than in the case of

marine equipment. Those concerned with

programming the procurement of rail

equipment were not confronted with requirements so urgent and yet uncertain as

those that developed in the Pacific for

boats and barges of many descriptions.

The expansion of rail requirements for

oversea areas was gradual, starting with

limited needs in Alaska and then extending to the United Kingdom, North Africa,

Iran, India, Italy, continental Europe,

48

 Memo, Vice Adm Ben Moreell for Home and

Somervell, 17 Mar 44, sub: Army and Navy Standardization; Memo, Somervell for VCNO, 24 Mar 44;

both in ASF Hq Navy 1942-44; Memo, Col Hicks for

Gross, 10 Aug 44; Memo, Franklin for JLC and

JMTC, 10 Aug 45; last two in OCT 334 Joint Small

Craft Subcommittee. 49

 OCT Off Order 5-36, 20 Mar 45, and revision,

29 May 45; Joint Memo, Vice Adm Edward L.

Cochrane and Gross for SN and USW, 1 Jun 45, sub:

Joint Marine Procurement Board Progress Report,

OCT HB Gross Joint Marine Procurement Board. 50

 Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the

Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 370-76, App.

32, OCT HB Monographs; Ltr, Australian Military

Mission in Washington to CofT, 15 Feb 46, OCT

561.21 SWP, lists vessels by types and indicates that

Australia also built for the U.S. Army 14,600 pontons, 4,500 life rafts, and other floating equipment,

making a total of 23,697 marine items. 51

 Memo, Maj Frank E. Cheshire for McIntyre, 7

Nov 42, OCT 400.17; Memo, CofT for ACofT for

Supply, 21 Nov 42, sub: Advance Plng for Rail Equip;

Memo, McIntyre for Gross, 14 Dec 42, sub: Locomotives for Mil Reqmts; last two in OCT 453 Gen.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 479

Luzon, and finally Japan. This gradual

expansion permitted the redeployment of

some rail equipment from less active to

more active areas. A considerable part of

the rail equipment procured by the Chief

of Transportation was for international

aid, and the extent of such procurement

was determined by higher authority. The

need for locomotives and rolling stock for

the utility railroads at Army installations

in the zone of interior also developed

gradually.

The fact that the Chief of Transportation experienced less difficulty with the

railway equipment program did not mean

that it held no problems for him. The requirements for the Military Railway Service became large as the military operations

expanded, and heavy procurement was

undertaken for other nations under the

policy of international aid.52 The program

had to be tailored according to the availability of steel and plant facilities for the

construction of locomotives and cars. The

Chief of Transportation's needs also had

to be balanced against the requirements

of the domestic carriers, which became

progressively urgent as the war advanced.

The balance was struck first within the

Army—the Chief of Transportation and

the ASF Directors of Matériel and Requirements were the principal figures—

and it was then subject to revision and

final determination by the War Production Board, acting for the President. Generally speaking, the Chief of Transportation's program received good support in

the higher echelons as one having a direct

bearing on the outcome of the war. The

amount of new equipment authorized for

the domestic carriers was held to a minimum on the theory that, if the American

railroads should find it impossible to handle all military and civilian traffic, the less

essential civilian traffic could be curtailed.53

The plan of special operational projects

inaugurated by the Army Service Forces

in June 1943 was helpful to the Chief of

Transportation, but it did not solve his

problem of ascertaining theater requirements sufficiently far in advance.54

 The

plan was designed to assure that the chiefs

of technical service would receive carefully

calculated forecasts of exceptional matériel requirements in time to include these

requirements in their programs and have

the matériel ready when needed. Such

projects—most of which originated in the

theaters, although some were formulated

in the War Department—gave the Chief

of Transportation earlier information regarding future demands than he had been

receiving. But for equipment that had a

long lead time, he still had to place contracts on the basis of a general estimate of

requirements before the theater projects

were received.55

The Chief of Transportation made special arrangements for dealing with operational projects with a view to bringing to

bear the combined knowledge of his supply, operating, and planning personnel.

During the period when projects were

52

 1st Ind, CofT, for CG ASF, 18 Jun 43; 4th Ind,

CofT for Hq ASF, 31 Jul 43; both in OCT 453 Gen;

Memo, CofT for Dir Plng Div ASF, 22 Jun 44, sub:

Requirements for Locomotives and Cars ETO, OCT

453 RR Equip, Vol. III. 53

 On equipment for domestic carriers, see Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 328-35. 54

 Concerning the plan, see Logistics in World War

II, pp. 58-59; Memo, Oversea Opns Br, Plng Div

OCT, for Hist Unit, 2 Oct 45, sub: TC Special Operational Supplies; Memo, Foreign Trans Facilities Br,

Plng Div OCT, for Hist Unit, 11 Oct 45, and atchd

documents; last two in OCT HB Plng Div Oversea

Opns Br. 55

 Memo, Gross for JLC, 5 Jan 44, par. 4e, OCT

HB Gross Day File; Interv with Col Bunker, 8 Jul 52,

OCT HB Dir of Sup Gen.
480 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

being prepared principally in the theaters,

the fulfillment of the transportation sections of the projects was supervised by a

committee that functioned under the

chairmanship of the Director of Supply.

In the late months of the war, when projects were being prepared chiefly in the

War Department, the committee was

headed by a representative of the Planning Division. In the latter instance the

committee actually drew up the transportation sections of the projects.56

The role of the Planning Division in the

preparation of the Transportation Corps

supply program merits further definition.

It was concerned with long-range planning. Through direct liaison with ASF

headquarters and the Operations Division

of the War Department General Staff, as

well as participation in most of the highlevel conferences, the chief of the Planning

Division was always informed regarding Allied strategy and the prospective

deployment of U.S. troops; in fact, the

division contributed heavily to the information regarding transportation requirements and available transportation

facilities on which the strategic plans

were based. Beginning early in the war

the division included a Foreign Transportation Facilities Branch, which studied

foreign ports, railways, and highways in

order to determine their capacities, and

calculated the military personnel and

equipment that would be needed to make

them adequate for Allied needs. Later in

the war the Planning Division also had an

Oversea Operations Branch, which was

responsible for maintaining liaison with

the oversea commands in regard to their

needs for transportation personnel and

equipment, and for co-ordinating the actions of the several divisions of the Office

of the Chief of Transportation in fulfilling

those needs. This branch was the outgrowth of a unit that was set up early in

the war to deal with the requirements of

the forces then being built up in Great

Britain. The activity was gradually extended to cover all oversea commands,

and eventually to include advance planning as well as the filling of requisitions.57

When the supply program proposed by

the Chief of Transportation had been approved by ASF headquarters, it was included in the Army Supply Program. ASF

headquarters often felt that the Chief of

Transportation's estimates of requirements, particularly those for floating

equipment, were excessive and requested

recalculation. After differences within the

Army had been harmonized, the Chief of

Transportation still had to convince the

War Production Board that the equipment was essential in order to obtain allocations of materials from that agency.

Because of the scarcity of raw materials,

ASF endeavored to keep stockpiles of

equipment and supplies at the minimum

consistent with expediency. After sufficient

experience had been accumulated, ASF

endeavored to establish a relationship between past consumption, existing inventories, and future requirements. To this

end, so-called stock control records were

progressively set up for principal items and

many secondary items to provide a history

of each item as a basis for further procurement and further issues from stock. The

records included estimated requirements

for the next three years in the case of principal items, and for the next six months in

56

 OCT Off Order 40-3, 2 Feb 44, sub: Procedures

for Processing Keyed Projects; Oct Off Order 5-41, 13

June 45, sub: TC Projects. 57

 OCT Adm Memo 51,19 May 42, and amendment, 21 May 42; Memo, Gross for Somervell, 7 Aug

43; Interv with Maj Virgil H. Williams, Jr., 11 Jun

45; all in OCT HB Plng Div Oversea Opns Br.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 481

the case of secondary items.58 Beginning

in 1944 these records played a progressively large part in the preparation of the

Army Supply Program.59

Contracting Procedures and Aid

to Contractors

Under War Department procurement

regulations (WDPR) the Chief of Transportation was authorized to award

contracts, make supplemental agreements,

and issue change orders without the approval of higher authority when the contract or subsequent change involved an

expenditure of less than $5,000,000.60 He

was empowered to delegate this authority

and he did so, making the Assistant Chief

of Transportation for Supply (later called

Director of Supply, and still later Director

of Matériel and Supply) responsible for its

exercise, with the instruction that actual

contracting should be decentralized to

field procurement agencies so far as practicable.61

 General Gross made it clear that

he expected all contracting officers to

regard this delegation "as a mandate to

exercise a high degree of courage, insight,

ingenuity, and sound judgment" in the

performance of their mission. He foresaw

that their task would be a difficult one.

While the principle of decentralization

was carried out very effectively in other

aspects of the Chief of Transportation's

work, this was not the case with respect to

procurement. The Procurement Division

in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, located first in Washington and later

in Cincinnati, awarded all contracts for

principal items; it delegated authority to

award contracts and issue purchase orders

for secondary items to supply officers in

the transportation zones and at the ports

of embarkation to the extent that it considered advantageous.62

 By maintaining

full control of contracting for principal

items the Procurement Division was able

to draw on the manufacturing resources

of the entire nation in obtaining favorable

prices and satisfactory production schedules. The field supply officers were responsible, however, as agents of the Procurement Division, for the administration

of the contracts let in their respective

areas, including inspection, expediting,

advising contractors regarding controlled

materials, aiding them in obtaining components and other materials, giving them

assistance in connection with manpower

shortages, promoting the settlement of industrial disputes, and working out necessary adjustments in contracts.

When the nine zone supply divisions

were consolidated into four area procurement offices in the spring of 1945, it was

contemplated that the new offices would

be given broader contracting authority.

This late move toward a greater decentralization of contracting was reflected in

the results for July and August, when the

contracts awarded by the field offices exceeded in value the contracts awarded by

the Procurement Division. By that time

58

 These records were published as monthly progress reports; MPR 20 included TC principal items

and MPR 19 covered secondary items. 59

 ASF Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1944, p. 106,

and Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1945, p. 180. 60

 WDPR, pars. 305.1 and 305.2. Contracts involving $5,000,000 or more required approval of ASF

headquarters. 61

 OCT Cir 24, 26 Jun 42; OCT Off Order 5-3, 2

Dec 42; Transportation Corps Procurement Instructions (TCPI), pars. 1-3-7 and 2-4-4a. TCPI, like

WDPR on which they were based, were a loose-leaf

compilation, originally issued on 1 January 1944 and

revised as necessary. 62

 TC Pamphlets 18, 1 Feb 45, Purchase Methods,

Practices, and Procedures, prepared by Procurement

Division for guidance of field installations, is a good

general guide on the subject.
482 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

contracting for principal items, which had

been done exclusively by the Procurement

Division, was at a low ebb.63

The ports of embarkation made extensive use of Transportation Corps equipment and supplies in storing, outfitting, repairing, and converting ships, filling

emergency requisitions from oversea theaters, and carrying on their extensive pier,

warehouse, and troop staging operations.

In the early months of the war the port

commanders, continuing prewar practices, obtained much of this matériel by

local purchase. But as the supply organization in the Office of the Chief of Transportation grew in strength and developed

its procedures, the Director of Supply's

policy of limiting local purchases so far as

practicable curtailed the ports' authority.

Centralized purchasing, like centralized

contracting, enabled the Chief of Transportation to negotiate with purveyors from

many localities and also to get the price

advantage of large-scale orders. Yet the

Director of Supply approved requests for

purchasing authority when to have denied

them would have imposed a handicap on

the work of the ports, and the ports of embarkation, like other Transportation Corps

field installations, were authorized to

make purchases on their own initiative

when necessary to meet emergencies.

Emergency purchases were limited to the

amount of $10,000 in the case of the ports,

and $2,500 in other cases.64

Contracts and purchase orders were

executed for the Transportation Corps by

duly constituted contracting officers. In

order to insure that there was a Transportation Corps contracting officer at each

Army installation the Chief of Transportation arranged that, unless other provision

had been made, the transportation officer

at each installation would serve also as the

Transportation Corps contracting officer.65

But the Chief of Transportation had no

objection to installation commanders

designating other officers to perform this

function if local conditions justified the action.

All contracts and purchases were made

by negotiation, which was interpreted to

mean any method except the formal

sealed-bid procedure.66 Transportation

Corps contracting officers were instructed

to solicit bids by telegraph, telephone,

letter, or other means from a reasonable

number of qualified contractors whenever

practicable, but they were permitted to

use any means of negotiation that in their

judgment would result in the expeditious

awarding of contracts and at the same

time protect the government's interests. In

the beginning competitive bidding was

seldom resorted to because of the loss of

time involved and the fact that the urgent

need was to find contractors who could

make quick deliveries. Later, when contractors were competing for business and

deliveries had begun to catch up with requirements, bids were called for on an increasing scale and negotiations were

undertaken on the basis of the bids

offered.67 Standard contract forms as prescribed by the War Department were

utilized whenever possible, but use was

also made of special forms, devised by the

Chief of Transportation's Legal Division

and approved by ASF headquarters, to

meet special conditions affecting Trans63

 Rpt, Procurement Div, Statistical Info, 1 Jan 44-

15 Sep 45, p. 2, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. 64

 OCT Cir 160-5, 22 Mar 44; OCT Cir 150-27,

revised 21 May 45. 65

 OCT Cir 87, 14 Dec 42; OCT Cir 22, 9 Feb 43. 66

 WDPR, par. 240.1; TCPI, par. 2-4-1. 67

 Remarks by Gross, 16 May 44, in Subcommittee

of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1945, p. 261.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 483

portation Corps procurement, including

both matériel and services.68

Unless otherwise provided, contracts

and purchase orders executed by contracting officers did not require approval by

the Chief of Transportation.69 Such approval was necessary when the contract

did not follow a standard War Department or Transportation Corps form, when

it contained a major deviation from an

approved contract clause, when it provided for the expansion of plant facilities

wholly or in part at government expense,

when it contained provisions permitting

upward price adjustments, when it was

not on a fixed-price basis, or when it called

for advance payment of more than $100,-

000 or in excess of 30 percent of the contract price. Contracts and supplemental

agreements requiring approval by headquarters included the following clause:

"This contract (supplemental agreement)

is subject to the approval of the Chief of

Transportation or his duly authorized representative and shall not be binding until

so approved."

All contracts were subject to termination or renegotiation under wartime policies established by Congress. These policies

recognized the abnormal conditions under

which contracts were made and fulfilled,

the fluctuation of requirements for military equipment and supplies due to

changes in the strategic situation and new

technical developments, and the desirability of having the prices actually paid

work out fairly for both the contractors

and the government.70

To facilitate contracting and purchasing, each zone supply officer maintained a

record of manufacturers and dealers in

his territory with whom business might be

done. The record included up-to-date information regarding plant facilities, financial resources, labor supply, past production, and any other data bearing on the

concern's ability to fulfill its undertakings.

Whenever the Procurement Division considered using a contractor with whom it

had had no experience, or whose capability

was in doubt, it called on the zone supply

officer for information from his records.

Further investigation might be necessary,

but the object of maintaining these records

was to avoid the delay involved in making

special inquiries. In the early days, because of pressure to get orders placed

promptly, the Procurement Division selected contractors on the basis of general

information, but later it insisted on concrete evidence of the concern's ability to

perform. Even then, shortages of materials

and labor were a constant threat to production schedules.

The Chief of Transportation adopted a

policy of "close pricing" and directed that

contract pricing be made a matter of constant study.71

 The objectives as defined by

the procurement regulations were to offer

incentives for efficiency and reduced production costs, to obtain fair and reasonable prices, and to prevent excessive profits.

The fixed-price contract was considered

the best means to that end. Since the costplus-fixed-fee contract was found to encourage excessive costs, that type was permitted only under special circumstances

and with the approval of the Fiscal Division, acting for the Chief of Transportation.

The Price Analysis Branch of the Pro68

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 47-50, describes

the WD and TC contract forms authorized for use;

see also TCPI, par. 3-2-1. 69

 TCPI, pars. 3-2-4 and 3-7-2g. 70

 The Transportation Corps experience in these

matters is reviewed in OCT HB Monograph 28, pp.

217-47. 71

 TCPI 2, Secs. III and V.
484 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

curement Division, set up in July 1943, attacked the problem from many angles.72

Data were compiled on the cost of basic

items, essential parts and assemblies, and

government-furnished equipment. Analyses were made showing the effect of

major production and engineering changes

on costs and prices. Prices paid to different contractors for similar products

were compared, with allowances being

made for differences in the quantities

ordered, differences in local wage scales,

differences in plant facilities, and other

variable factors. When the analyses revealed that the prices of comparable products were out of line, the procurement

officers concerned took steps to ascertain

the reasons and the contractors offering the

higher prices were required to furnish a

breakdown of actual costs based on production experience. Extensive aid was received in these matters from the Fiscal Division, whose Price Adjustment Branch

and Financial Analysis Branch made extensive studies of contractors' costs and

profits. In May 1944 each zone transportation office and port of embarkation was

directed to set up a price analysis unit to

assist its contracting officers with their

contracting and purchasing activities.73

Studies were made by the Price Analysis Branch to establish the trend of prices

for commodities procured by the Transportation Corps. The over-all Transportation Corps price index, based on October

1942 as 100, gradually fell to a low point

of 93.8 in June 1945. In the latter month

the index for rail equipment stood at 91.8,

and the index for marine equipment at

95.7.74 The over-all price curve showed a

fairly steady trend, but the prices of particular commodities and groups of commodities fluctuated more frequently and

widely.

The price indices for rail and marine

equipment reflected the different conditions in those fields. A decline in rail prices

began in May 1943, owing to the fact that

orders for commercial railway equipment

were light and some of the locomotive

builders had been affected by cutbacks in

tank production.75 The break in the price

index for marine equipment did not occur

until a year later. By that time the smallboat programs of the Navy and the Maritime Commission had reached their peaks,

and there was keener competition among

contractors for orders. The Chief of Transportation then found it possible to place

contracts with some of the larger concerns

and so get the benefit of mass production

prices. Also, the smaller plants with which

he had been dealing improved their

efficiency as they gained experience in

producing vessels for the Army.

Beginning in July 1943 the Transportation Corps eliminated the cost of builders'

risk insurance from the contract price of

vessels by relieving the builders of responsibility for damage incurred while the

vessels were in their possession.76 The contractors reported to the Transportation

Corps when damage had resulted from

storm, fire, or other cause, and were instructed whether to repair the damage at

government expense or consider the vessel

72

 See Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Procurement Div

Sec, pp. 10-13. 73

 TC Cir 160-11, 31 May 44. 74

 ASF MPR, 30 Jun 45, Sec. 1-D, Contract Price

Changes, pp. 63-64; Rpt, Procurement Div, Statistical Info, 1 Jun 44-15 Sep 45, pp. 11, 12, OCT HB

Dir of Sup Rpts. The latter report includes data on

prices paid for individual principal items. 75

 See Memos, CofT for Dir of Matériel ASF, 20

May 43 and 31 Jul 43, both in OCT 453. 76

 OCT Cir 89, 16 Jul 43; TCPI, par. 3-8-96. The

cost of builders' risk insurance on a small freight

vessel was 11⁄4 to 11⁄2 percent of the contract price.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 485

a total loss. The feasibility of this type of

self-insurance had already been tested by

the Navy. Although no special study was

made to determine the saving actually accomplished by the Transportation Corps,

a competent estimate placed the aggregate

cost reduction through the elimination of

builders' risk insurance at three or four

times the expense incurred by the government in assuming the risk.77

 Contractors

were still required to carry collision liability insurance and protection and indemnity liability insurance on vessels that

were delivered afloat; this was done in

order to protect the government against

claims by third parties that might arise

from damage caused by vessels in the

course of launchings or trial trips.78

The Chief of Transportation endeavored

to support the government program for

encouraging full use of small plants as a

means of increasing the country's total capacity for production.79

 The effort was

beset with difficulties, however, and considerable friction developed between the

Transportation Corps and the Smaller

War Plants Corporation (SWPG), which

zealously sought to have maximum use

made of the plants under its cognizance.

The Transportation Corps supply organization reserved the right to decide

whether the plant facilities and the engineering personnel of a concern were

adequate for the satisfactory performance

of a contract, and it had frequent disputes

with local representatives of the SWPG on

this point.80 When the chairman of the

SWPC complained with heat that the

Transportation Corps was ignoring his

office and the mandate that it held under

law, and declared that the country "is not

and will not be under the direction of a

military junta," General Gross replied

that he had supported and would continue to support the objectives of the

SWPC, but that "the war program must

come first," and consequently plants designated by the SWPC to receive contracts

for certain types of work would not be

used unless the Transportation Corps was

convinced that they could produce satisfactory equipment in accordance with

production schedules.81

At the root of the difficulty was the fact

that so much of the Transportation Corps'

procurement involved large rail and

marine items that the smaller plants were

not prepared to build expertly and expeditiously. In view of this situation, emphasis was placed on increasing the use of

small concerns as subcontractors, and contracting officers were instructed to encourage the practice to the maximum. If

the use of the smaller plants resulted in

higher prices for the end products, this

was permissible provided analysis showed

that the prices were justifiable under the

circumstances.82 During the fiscal year

1944, contracts awarded by the Transportation Corps to plants under the cognizance of the Smaller War Plants Corporation constituted 91 percent, on a value

basis, of the contracts suitable for award to

77

 Interv with Joel P. Shedd, Jr., 24 Jul 52, OCT

HB Dir of Sup Contracting Practices. 78

 TCPI, par. 4-4-4. 79

 TCPI, par. 2-2-3; TC Cir 160-5, 21 Aug 44,

Supp. 14. A plant having less than 500 employees

qualified for classification as a smaller war plant. 80

 Memo, ACofT for Sup for Proc Div, 20 Jul 43,

OCT 400.13 Proc Policy; Rpt, Field Sv Gp, FY 1944,

Proc Div Sec, p. 4; Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Proc

Div Sec, pp. 14, 15; last two in OCT HB Dir of Sup

Rpts; Interv with Col Bunker, 23 Jul 52, OCT HB

Dir of Sup Contracting Practices. 81

 Ltr, Chm SWPC to Gross, 17 Aug 43, and reply,

21 Aug 43, both in OCT HB Gross Day File. 82

 WDPR, par. 225.7 and 225.8; Ltr, Cpl Clifford

Starr to Rep Everett M. Dirksen, 26 Jun 45, OCT

453.5.
486 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

these plants.83 During the calendar year

1944, contracts awarded to the smaller

war plants constituted 55 percent of the

total Transportation Corps contracts on

the basis of number, and 24 percent on the

basis of value.84

Several other circumstances were taken

into account in awarding contracts. The

proximity of the production facility to the

delivery point might affect the choice of a

contractor. An effort was made to place

contracts for a particular product with at

least two contractors who were so located

that they would not be subject to the same

hazard—flood, for example—which might

delay production. The contracting officers

were instructed to avoid so far as possible

placing contracts in areas designated by

the War Manpower Commission as tight

labor markets. They were also directed to

avoid doing business with concerns that

were debarred by the War Department

because of law violations or for other

reasons.

It was evident early in the war that

means would have to be found to prevent

unrestricted competition between the

Maritime Commission, the Navy's Bureau

of Ships, and the Army's Transportation

Corps for the services of boat and engine

building plants. This was an especially

important matter for the Chief of Transportation since the other agencies had

heavily committed the industry before the

Army's principal program got under way.

A comprehensive list of plants available

for marine work was made, and each

agency was given priority in placing contracts with certain concerns. If an agency

desired to do business with a plant that

was on another's roster, it did so only after

consultation and agreement.85 The Transportation Corps, generally speaking, had

to be content with the smaller and less

firmly established concerns. This was a

consequence of the fact that, up to the time

the distribution of facilities was made, the

Army's small-boat program had been

relatively limited and had included

chiefly vessels under 100 feet in length.

Despite the disadvantage that the Chief of

Transportation suffered on this account,

the situation was more satisfactory than it

would have been without such an agreement.

Because so many of the boatbuilding

and marine equipment plants at his disposal were of the smaller types, the Chief

of Transportation took active steps to encourage the development of new facilities

and the improvement of old ones in accordance with War Department procurement regulations.86

 Additional plant facilities were provided for nine concerns,

whose prewar production had been in

other fields, to enable them to produce

equipment and supplies needed by the

Transportation Corps. Acting on certificates of war necessity furnished by the

Chief of Transportation, the Defense Plant

83

 Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Proc Div Sec, pp. 15,

19; statement based on monthly reports submitted to

the SWPC. 84

 Rpt, Procurement Div, Statistical Info, 1 Jan 44-

15 Sep 45, pp. 5-6, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. The

corresponding figures for all ASF contracts for FY

1945 were 60 percent and 25 percent; see ASF Annual

Report for the Fiscal Year 1945, pp. 215-16. 85

 The exact date of this agreement is not known,

but it was in effect in May 1942; see Rpt, Procurement Program, Marine Design, Constr and Procurement Br, Water Div OCT, 29 May 42, OCT 400.13.

The representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission who dealt with this matter sometimes were referred to as the shipbuilding co-ordination group, but they had no formal name or status.

This and some other informal committees appear to

have been offshoots of the Strategic Shipping Board,

which the President created in December 1941; see

Wardlow, op. cit., pp. 44, 253. 86

 TCPI, pars. 10-2-1 and 10-3-1.
BOATS FOR HARBOR AND INSHORE WORK. 85-foot rescue boat procured for the

AAF (top); 60-foot Q-boat for local passenger transportation (middle); 85-foot diesel tug (bottom).
488 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Corporation financed these facilities and

leased them to the contractors. When the

contractors' plants were adequate but

additional machine tools or other equipment was needed, government-owned

equipment was furnished. In this manner

thirty-two concerns were aided in fulfilling contracts for components and end

products that were urgently needed.87

Before additional equipment was purchased for this purpose, investigation was

made of the possibility of transferring such

equipment from contractors to whom it

had become surplus. When contractors

were willing to extend their plants or increase their machinery at their own expense, provided advance payments were

made, these payments were arranged for

after the contractors' reliability had been

investigated and agreements designed to

protect the government's interests had

been executed.88

When the Transportation Corps entered

the market with heavy orders for vessels,

it quickly realized that there was and

would continue to be a severe shortage of

some components—engines, electrical

equipment, valves, generators, and so

forth. Without waiting for the contractors

to act, Transportation Corps representatives located and bought up the components wherever they could be found in

dealers' stocks. The stockpile thus accumulated was parceled out to contractors

as the need arose, allowances for such

government-furnished equipment being

made in the contract prices.89 Had it not

been for this forehanded move, the delays

in the deliveries of boats during 1942 and

1943 would have been more serious than

they were. The inclusion of these miscellaneous components in vessels sent overseas

created problems in connection with spare

parts and maintenance, but the primary

object at that time was to get the vessels

into service.

Pursuing this policy, the Director of

Supply found that by contracting for certain components directly, in quantities

large enough to meet the needs of all contractors, he could get better priorities than

by allowing each contractor to order what

he required. In connection with contracts

for the building of 363 vessels of the larger

types (up to 180 feet in length), costing on

the average about $1,000,000, the value of

the government-furnished equipment

averaged about $215,000 per vessel.90

The Chief of Transportation gave full

support to the policy, announced jointly

by the War Production Board, the Navy,

and the Army, of encouraging prime contractors to farm out as much of their work

as practicable to subcontractors in order

to utilize the nation's industrial resources

to the fullest.91 Transportation Corps officers joined with representatives of the War

Production Board and ASF headquarters

in endeavoring to convince prime contractors of the advantages of subcontracting. They also undertook to bring prime

contractors and subcontractors together

and to establish working relationships so

as to achieve the largest possible output of

end items. When a subcontractor was

found to be so heavily committed that he

might become a bottleneck, another sub87

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 67, 68, lists the contractors aided. 88

 TC Cir 162, 4 Dec 43, sub: Procedure for Transfer of Production Equip; TC Cir 150-4, 1 Jan 44, and

revisions. 89

 See Memo, ACofT for Sup for SPE, file copy undated but obviously written in November or December 1942, in OCT 561.1 Seattle 1942. 90

 Rpt, Procurement Div, Statistical Info, 1 Jan 44-

15 Sep 45, pp. 7-8, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts; Interv with Col Bunker, 15 Aug 52, sub: Govt-Furnished Equip, OCT HB Dir of Sup Contracting

Practices. 91

 WDPR, par. 367.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 489

contractor with smaller commitments was

brought to the attention of the prime contractor. These methods increased the total

output, but they also increased the difficulty of maintaining a proper distribution

of controlled materials and of meeting

labor shortages in particular localities.

Labor supply was a constant problem.

It was particularly so in the marine field,

where the Chief of Transportation relied

heavily on small and relatively new concerns whose labor force had been recently

recruited and hence was less stable than

in the more mature plants. The zone

transportation officers kept in touch with

Transportation Corps contractors and subcontractors, and when labor shortages

occurred or threatened they sought the

co-operation of Selective Service boards,

War Manpower Commission representatives, and local industrial committees in

meeting the situation. They arranged for

draft deferments, loans or transfers of experienced workers between plants, and

the recruiting of workers from fields that

were not so hard pressed. They also assisted contractors in establishing training

schools and in working out plans for the

more extensive employment of women.

Transportation Corps contracting officers

sought to avoid the placing of contracts in

areas where the labor market was tight,

and they encouraged contractors to observe the same rule in placing subcontracts. When it seemed necessary to enter

a critical labor area and the contract required the employment of additional

workers, contracting officers were required first to get clearance from the Area

Production Urgency Committee.92

Since the manufacturers of railway

equipment were large and well-established

concerns, the manpower situation was less

acute with them than with the builders of

floating equipment. But they were affected,

nevertheless, and deliveries of locomotives,

especially diesel locomotives, were delayed in some instances because of the

scarcity of skilled workmen.

The need for maximum production was

so urgent that all possible measures had to

be taken to forestall industrial disputes

that would delay plant operations. Representatives of the transportation zones

maintained contact with contractors'

plants, tried to keep abreast of developments in employer-employee relations,

and did what they could to avoid work

stoppages and to promote the settlement

of strikes already started. In this they

worked under the supervision of the Labor

Branch, Industrial Personnel Division,

OCT, which outlined the course of action

in most cases but permitted the zone officers to act on their own initiative in

emergencies.93 These officers had no legal

authority to take positive action and hence

had to work informally. They used their

efforts to clear up misunderstandings between management and labor and explained the damage to the war effort that

a work stoppage would entail. To back up

these informal efforts, they placed their

information at the disposal of federal and

state labor officials and urged them to

take speedy action to the extent of their

authority. Although industrial relations

were relatively harmonious during the

war, strikes were in no sense nonexistent.

Between 1 January and 15 August 1945,

for example, 160 work stoppages occurred

that affected Transportation Corps contracts.94

92

 TG Cir 160-5, 28 Apr 44, Supp. 4. 93

 TC Cir 85-1, 1 Jan 44. 94

 OCT HB Monograph 28, p. 78, lists the principal strikes and their effect on the Transportation

Corps.
490 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Chief of Transportation collaborated with the Navy and the Maritime

Commission in forestalling labor difficulties at shipbuilding plants. A representative of the Chief of Transportation was one

of two War Department members on the

Wage Stabilization Committee of the War

Production Board. This committee—consisting of representatives of the Army, the

Navy, the Maritime Commission, management, and labor, and sitting under the

chairmanship of a representative of the

War Production Board—did excellent

work in establishing uniform practices and

wage scales in the shipbuilding and ship

repair industries, thus removing the chief

causes of disputes. A representative of the

Chief of Transportation acted as adviser to

the National War Labor Board Shipbuilding Commission, which sought to adjudicate disputes in the shipbuilding industry

and thereby avoid strikes.

Extensive use was made of the ArmyNavy "E" production award as a means of

boosting morale and stimulating both

management and labor to maximum

effort. Quality and quantity of production

in the light of the available facilities were

primary considerations in granting these

awards.95 In order that the smaller and

less experienced concerns might share in

this recognition, consideration was given

also to accomplishments in overcoming

specific production obstacles, avoiding

work stoppages, maintaining fair labor

standards, training additional workers,

avoiding accidents, making full use of subcontractors, conserving critical materials,

and maintaining a low rate of absenteeism.

The Transportation Corps sponsored E

awards or "Star" awards for sixty-six contractors; in most instances the contractors

received both awards, and in some cases

the second and third Star awards were

given.96 The Chief of Transportation found

that these awards and the ceremonies in

connection with them were effective means

of increasing and sustaining plant output.

Production Schedules and Controls

The crux of the supply problem was

contract performance. There was no advantage in having equipment on order if

the contractors did not deliver it according to schedule. Here the Chief of Transportation encountered several obstacles.

Although war orders placed by Allied

governments and orders for lend-lease had

resulted in the expansion of many industries in 1940 and 1941, this was not true of

the industries that produced small vessels

and rail equipment. The fact that the full

scope of the Chief of Transportation's program did not become apparent until more

than a year after the United States had

entered the war, and the related fact that

the development of his supply organization and procedures was correspondingly

delayed, had direct bearing on the Chief

of Transportation's ability to set up realistic production schedules and enforce

them. The controls that the War Production Board exercised over the distribution

of strategic materials and components

were factors with which the new Transportation Corps organization had to learn

to cope.

There is obvious significance in the fact

that deliveries of Transportation Corps

matériel, which General Somervell had 95

 TC Cir 85-4, 10 Jan 44; revisions, 15 Feb 45 and

2 May 45. 96

 OCT HB Monograph 28, App. XV, lists the contractors sponsored for awards. Star awards were given

to plants that maintained outstanding production after

receiving the E award. Since rail equipment was built

by a relatively small number of large plants, the larger

number of awards was to builders of marine equipment.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 491

characterized as "alarming" in the fall of

1942, increased only moderately during

the greater part of 1943 and then rose

sharply to a peak in the summer of 1944,

whereas the production curve for all ASF

matériel had reached a high level at the

end of 1942, was fairly steady in 1943, and

declined somewhat in 1944.97

The critical year for Transportation

Corps supply was 1943. During that year

military campaigns in North Africa and

the Mediterranean were undertaken; the

Allies assumed the offensive in the Pacific;

substantial requisitions for transportation

equipment were coming in from the

China-Burma-India theater, the Persian

Gulf Service Command, and Alaska; and

preparations for the invasion of continental Europe were under way. The Chief

of Transportation recognized the difficulties confronting his program, but he did

not consider them inimical or insurmountable.98

 Conferences were held with officials of ASF headquarters and the War

Production Board to enlist their support

for the expanded programs, and production schedules were set up to provide

equipment by the time it would be needed

in the theaters.99 But production lags were

soon apparent and production forecasts

were subject to frequent change. ASF

headquarters, impatient as always with

any evidence of failure, soon began pressing the Chief of Transportation for more

accurate forecasts and increased output.100

The latter recounted his problems and

outlined the measures that were being

taken to solve them, but he contended

that "on an over-all basis" and "with a

few exceptions" the production of Transportation Corps equipment was meeting

the Army's needs.101

The Chief of Transportation's contention was predicated on the program in

effect during the early part of 1943, but

that program was subject to further expansion as the year progressed. This was

particularly true with respect to marine

equipment, for the summer of 1943

brought requests for large amounts of

this equipment from General MacArthur,

who was then making preparations for the

long water trek back to the Philippines.102

After the surrender of the Axis forces in

North Africa, ASF headquarters was concerned lest that success might lead to a

relaxation of the effort to increase the production of war matériel, and pressure was

brought to bear on all technical services to

forestall any such tendency.103 This pres97

 Min of SOS Staff Conf, 9 Sep 42, p. 5; ASF

Statistical Review, World War II, pp. 3, 75, 81. The general ASF production curve again attained a high level

during the early part of 1945 when the final drive

against Germany was being made. 98

 Memo, ACofT for Supply for ACofS for Matériel

SOS, 29 Nov 42, sub: 1943 Production Forecast, OCT

400.17. 99

 Memo, CofT for WPB, OUSW, WDGS, et al., 13

Nov 42; SOS Staff Conf on TC Procurement—Production Activities, 29 Dec 42; Memo, CG SOS for

CofT, 22 Feb 43, sub: Prod Conf; all in OCT 400.17;

Trans Prod Conf, 24 Feb 43, OCT 337 TC Prod. 100

 ASF headquarters issued monthly reports showing the progress of procurement by all services, and

more frequent reports on the procurement of selected

critical items (MPR's 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C); from these

reports the programs of the several services and the

status of particular items were evaluated. 101

 Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns ASF, 12 Apr

43, sub: Operational Stockpile, OCT 400.13; Memo,

CofT for CG ASF, undated, sub: Factors to Disrupt

TC Production, and reply "written 4-29-43," both in

OCT HB Ex Sup; TC Procurement Program, 27 Apr

43, evidently prepared for presentation by General

Gross at an ASF staff conference, OCT 337 Staff

Conf. 102

 In June 1943 the program included 5,280

marine units; in July this number was increased to

6,480, and in August to 6,751; see TC Supply Program, Production During 1943, Chart 8, OCT HB

Dir of Sup Production. 103

 See Memo, Somervell for CofT, 12 Jul 43, sub:

1943 Program; Memos, CofT for ZTO 8th Zone, 17

Jul 43 and 9 Aug 43 (similar memos sent to other

zones); all in OCT HB Dir of Sup Production.
492 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

sure was transmitted to the Transportation Corps supply officers in Washington

and in the field, but the desired results

were not immediately apparent. Deliveries

of marine equipment did not increase during the summer months, and a slight increase in September was partially offset by

a decrease in October—this, despite the

forecast of a substantial increase in October.104

In his effort to overcome the production

lag, the Assistant Chief of Transportation

for Supply instituted a survey in July 1943

to ascertain the bottlenecks. During the

next two months teams of officers observed

the supply operations in the Washington

headquarters, in the Field Service Group

at Cincinnati, and in the zone offices.

These teams reported that a number of

organizational and procedural arrangements required improvement. They recommended that the Engineering Division

be strengthened so that complete and accurate plans, specifications, and bills of

materials could be provided promptly.

They proposed that a chief expediter be

authorized for the Cincinnati office who

would give particular attention to expediting the delivery of components, lack of

which was one of the main causes for the

delay in the completion of end items.

Better understanding and co-operation

between the Production Division and the

zone supply officers were desirable. The

zones needed prompter information from

the Procurement Division regarding contracts placed in their respective territories,

the execution of which they were expected

to supervise. Better liaison was needed between the Procurement Division and the

Production Division, so that the experiences of the latter would always be available to the former when it was placing

new contracts. The investigators pointed

out that production scheduling, in order

to be realistic, would have to take into

account more fully the availability of

essential components.105

While this survey by Transportation

Corps officers was being made, two engineering firms were also looking into the

Transportation Corps supply operations,

one of them concentrating on the Field

Service Group at Cincinnati and the other

on the performance of contractors.106 The

reports of these firms made additional recommendations for improving supply operations. As noted earlier, a change in the

head of the Transportation Corps supply

organization was made in October 1943

which led to changes in organizational

structure and procedures.

Deliveries of Transportation Corps

major items started a definite trend

upward in November 1943, and reached

their highest sustained level in the spring

and early summer of 1944. The increase

was accounted for chiefly by deliveries of

marine equipment, the larger part of

which was for use in the invasion of continental Europe, while the remainder was

destined for the Pacific and other oversea

commands. Deliveries of rail equipment

increased somewhat but not in the same

proportion.107 In April 1944 and again

during the following month General Som104

 Memo, Wylie for Bunker, 25 Oct 43, OCT

400.13 Proc Policy; TC Supply Program, Production

During 1943, Chart 6, OCT HB Dir of Sup Production.

105 Memo Relating to Investigation of Bottlenecks

in the TC Program (undertaken pursuant to instructions contained in Ltr, 2 Jul 43, from Col Harry A.

Toulmin), OCT HB Dir of Sup Production. 106

 Extracts from a report by J. G. White Engineering Company on procedures, and comments by Field

Sv Gp, 27 Sep 43, OCT 310.1 (1943); Rpt 3935, Day

and Zimmerman, Inc., 19 Oct 43, OCT HB Ex Sup. 107

 ASF Statistical Review, World War II, p. 81;

volume is here expressed in terms of value.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 493

ervell expressed satisfaction with the improved production of Transportation

Corps equipment and the greater accuracy

of the forecasts of deliveries submitted by

the Chief of Transportation.108 More consistent deliveries naturally simplified the

task of forecasting. It is impossible, of

course, to judge to what extent these improvements were the result of the efforts

put forward during 1943 to get the program under way and to overcome the

handicaps of a late start, and to what

extent they were the result of the change

in the person of the Assistant Chief of

Transportation for Supply and of the

adjustments in organization and methods

that followed. Better understanding between the officers concerned with supply

in ASF headquarters and the Transportation Corps supply organization was one of

the intangible consequences of the change.

Consideration of the various factors

influencing the production of Transportation Corps equipment must begin with the

control exercised by the War Production

Board (WPB) over the nation's entire production system. After unsatisfactory attempts to control the output of military

and civilian supplies by simpler methods,

the WPB adopted the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) in November 1942. This

plan, which went into operation 1 April

1943 and became fully effective 1 July

1943, was designed to assure that the

available supplies of strategic materials—

steel, copper, and aluminum—were used

only in the manufacture of essential commodities, and that they were made available to manufacturers in such a manner

as to enable them to carry out authorized

programs and approved production schedules.109

 The controlled materials required

to execute the Army's supply program

were allocated by the WPB to the Army

Service Forces, which distributed them

among the technical services in accordance with preference ratings assigned to

the various items that they procured. Materials allotted to the Transportation Corps

were apportioned among its prime contractors; they, in turn, made allotments to

their subcontractors.110

The preparation of bills of materials on

which claims for allotments of controlled

materials were based, the judicious distribution of these materials to prime contractors, the redistribution of materials and

components to avoid overages and shortages, and the accounting required for the

administration of the complex plan imposed a great amount of additional work

on the supply organization. Contractors as

well as Transportation Corps personnel

had to be trained in the intricacies of

administering the CMP. The Transportation Corps' task was complicated by the

fact that it dealt with many small and

inexperienced contractors who had difficulty in preparing accurate bills of materials, and by the further fact that its program was subject to frequent revisions.

The Transportation Corps, nevertheless,

accepted the CMP as a useful arrangement and, while often dissatisfied with the

allotments of materials that it received,

agreed in the end that this plan for controlling the use of strategic commodities,

supplemented by a system of priorities or

108

 Min of ASF Staff Confs, 27 Apr 44, p. 1, and

12 May 44, p. 4. 109

 See WPB Pamphlets, Controlled Materials Plan,

2 Nov 42, and Controlled Materials Plan, General

Instructions on Bills of Materials, 14 Nov 42, both in

OCT HB Dir of Sup Contld Materials. 110

 Manufacturers of certain products required for

general use as well as for military programs received

allotments of controlled materials directly from the

WPB.
494 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

preference ratings to indicate the relative

importance of the various end items and

components, had yielded good results for

the war program as a whole and had aided

the Transportation Corps in scheduling

production and controlling contractors.111

The problem of maintaining production

schedules was more difficult with marine

than with rail equipment. As has been

stated, the Transportation Corps was

handicapped in the beginning by having

to make use of many small and inexperienced prime contractors, because the

better-established boatbuilders were tied

up by contracts with the Navy and the

Maritime Commission when the Transportation Corps entered the procurement field

in a large way. This was a temporary

handicap, however, that was overcome as

the small contractors gradually built up

their plants and personnel and gained experience. The difficulty arising from delays

in the delivery of components by subcontractors was more persistent. Engines were

a major bottleneck, which is understandable, because in addition to the heavy

requirements in engines for vessels of many

types and sizes, propulsion machinery was

in demand for other kinds of war equipment, notably aircraft, motor vehicles, and

tanks. Valves, pumps, generators, bearings, electrical equipment of all kinds, and

fire-fighting equipment were among the

hard-to-get components.112 Some of these

bottlenecks were relieved as the war progressed, but others continued to plague

the prime contractors.

The Chief of Transportation's problem

of obtaining components for vessels was

intensified by the arrangement to supply

machinery from the United States for

about 1,500 hulls that were to be built in

Australia. This arrangement was made

when the Transportation Corps' boatbuilding program in the United States was

lagging and the heavy requirements in

the Southwest Pacific Area were not being

met. Investigation showed that Australia

could construct the hulls but could not

supply propulsion and other machinery.

Adaptation of the Australian hull designs

to the available American equipment and

co-ordination of the production schedules

in the two countries posed a considerable

problem. To meet it, a Pacific Supply Division was set up in July 1943 in the Field

Service Group at Cincinnati.113 This division had its chief difficulty with engines,

for in addition to the over-all scarcity of

propulsion units, the Navy's landing-craft

program was being pressed and had highest priority at the time the procurement of

engines for Australia was under way.114

Despite the care taken to co-ordinate engineering plans, this undertaking was not

very successful. In addition to the engineering difficulties inherent in such a project, some of the Australian concerns were

small and not capable of precision building. For these reasons and because of the

increased output of floating equipment in

111

 For the development and operation of the CMP

and other controls affecting wartime production, see

R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, a volume now in preparation for this series.

The basic TC publications were TC Pamphlet 9,

General Priority Instructions, and TC Pamphlet 15,

CMP Manual. 112

 Memo, ACofT for Supply for ACofS for Matériel SOS, 29 Nov 42, sub: 1943 Production Forecast, and attached Tabular Report, OCT 400.17; Rpt

of Chm WPB, War Production in 1944 (Washington,

1945), pp. 53-63. 113

 Status Rpt of SWPA Procurement and Production, as of 31 Mar 44, prepared by Pacific Sup Div,

OCT 458.1 SWPA, indicates the scope and complexity of the project. 114

 Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Production Div Sec,

pp. 20-25.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 495

the United States, the Australian program

was considerably cut back.115

Changes in the design or equipment of

vessels, often initiated after the contracts

had been let, usually delayed deliveries

beyond the scheduled dates. The Chief of

Transportation complained that such

changes were requested too freely by those

who requisitioned the vessels—theater

commanders, the Army Air Forces, and

the Coast Artillery Corps—but they were

the natural result of an effort by the users

to improve the serviceability of the craft or

to adapt them to new tasks or unforeseen

operating conditions. Those who initiated

requisitions had in mind only their own

peculiar needs and did not hesitate to

request as many different types of tugs,

launches, barges, and so forth, as seemed

desirable.116 Although constant attention

was given to standardization by the Chief

of Transportation, it was never possible to

adhere strictly to standard designs.

Changes, some of them drastic, were

requested and could not be denied.

Although the problem of maintaining

production schedules in the rail equipment field was less acute, it required constant attention. On the favorable side was

the fact that the builders of locomotives

and cars were large and well-established

concerns with sufficient plant facilities and

skilled personnel. But the rail equipment

industry, lacking railway orders to keep

them fully occupied, had been partially

converted for the construction of tanks

and other war equipment, and reconversion was accomplished only gradually. In

1942 rail equipment had not been given a

high priority and was therefore severely

affected by the over-all shortages of steel

and other materials. When the Chief of

Transportation began placing heavy orders

for the Military Railway Service and for

lend-lease, many variations in the sizes,

types, and equipment of cars and locomotives were necessary to meet the requirements of the foreign railroads on which

they would be operated. Although the

equipment ordered for western Europe

was standard gauge, the Transportation

Corps procured 66-inch gauge equipment

for India, 60-inch gauge for the Soviet

Union, meter gauge for North Africa and

India, and eventually 42-inch gauge for

Japan. The couplings, bumpers, brakes,

and springs used on foreign railroads differed from those used in the United States.

These variations from the designs that

they were accustomed to manufacturing

meant delay at the plants of both subcontractors and prime contractors. Moreover,

the War Production Board made direct

allotments of controlled materials to the

manufacturers of components (so-called

"B" products) rather than to the Army,

and the Chief of Transportation believed

that this was responsible for some of the

delays in getting delivery.117

An additional problem arose from the

fact that the War Production Board kept

115

 Memo, Maj Haran W. Bullard for CG ASF, 27

Aug 44, sub: ASF Observers Rpt, OCT 319.1

SWPA; Interv with Col Bunker, 4 Sep 52, OCT HB

Dir of Sup Production. The extent of the cutback is

uncertain but Colonel Bunker estimated that it was

about one third. 116

 Memo, ACofT for Sup for C of Plng Div OCT,

24 Feb 43, sub: Standardization of Marine Equipment, OCT 561.4 Army Ship Building Program;

Memo, CofT for CG ASF, sub: Factors That Disrupt

TC Production, undated, but obviously written in

April 1943, OCT HB Ex Sup. 117 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 Apr 43, sub: Production of Ry Equip, OCT HB Ex Sup; Memo,

CofOrd for Dir of Matériel ASF, 20 Jun 43, sub: Conversion of Facilities, OCT 453; Subcommittee of the

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946, p. 508.
496 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

an especially close control over the production of locomotives and cars in order to

meet civilian as well as military and lendlease requirements. The results did not

always satisfy the Chief of Transportation,

who complained in the spring of 1943 that

the WPB was continually changing its

schedules. This situation led to an agreement, effective 1 January 1944, under

which the WPB continued to schedule

the production of all railway equipment

and components but the Transportation

Corps supervised the work in the field,

provided expediting service, and supplied

the WPB with information on which to

set up and enforce its schedules.118 After

trying the procedure for almost a year the

WPB came to the conclusion that the

Army was not giving sufficient attention

to expediting the production of equipment

for domestic use and proposed the cancellation of the agreement.119

Production scheduling and monthly

forecasts of deliveries under the schedules

were methods of determining the rate at

which equipment and supplies under procurement could be made available to the

users. These methods involved careful

study of conditions at the plants of prime

contractors and subcontractors, the prospective availability of scarce materials,

and the possible effect of manpower shortages.120

 The establishment of the production schedule, or "P" line, was a responsibility of the Production Division, but the

validity of the schedule and the accuracy

of subsequent forecasts of deliveries obviously depended on the care with which

contractors were chosen by the Procurement Division and the effectiveness with

which the field supply officers carried out

their inspection and expediting activities.121

 Understanding and co-operation

between the Production Division and the

zone supply officers was of the greatest

importance in keeping abreast of the progress of production and in preparing delivery forecasts. Improvement of this relationship was one of the needs revealed by

the investigations made in the late summer

of 1943.122

There were numerous factors that made

scheduling and forecasting difficult for the

Chief of Transportation—the newness of

his supply organization, the difficulty of

co-ordinating the production of the many

subcontractors, the necessity of using small

and inexperienced concerns as prime contractors for marine items, the fact that the

larger boats were built out of doors where

weather might interrupt the work, and the

many changes in design that were requested by the users of the equipment.

When the question of scheduling and forecasting was being actively debated in the

118

 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 Apr 43, sub: Production of Ry Equip, OCT HB Ex Sup; Memo, Dir

of Matériel for Opns Vice Chm WPB, 26 Nov 43,

sub: Expediting Locomotive Production, ASF Dir of

Matériel Ry Equip and Reqmts; Memo, CofT for

ZTOs, 29 Dec 43, sub: Ry Equip Production Scheduling, OCT 453 Rys; Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Production Div Sec, pp. 14-16, OCT HB Dir of Sup

Rpts. 119

 Memo, George M. Cornell, Dir Trans Equip

Div WPB, for Hiland G. Batcheller, Opns Vice

Chmn WPB, 29 Nov 44, sub: Army Expediting; DF,

Col Maurice R. Scharff for Brig Gen Hugh C.

Minton, et al., 30 Nov 44; both in ASF Dir of Matériel Ry Equip and Reqmts. 120

 See remarks of Colonel Toulmin at Transportation Corps production conference, 13 September

1943, OCT 337 TC Production, for fuller discussion

of methods of establishing and revising schedules. 121

 Special Order 66, issued by Col Toulmin, 31

Aug 43, sub: Procedure in Connection with Establishment of Marine "P" Line, OCT HB Dir of Sup

Production. 122

 For illustrations of lack of understanding, see

Memo, Col Toulmin for ZTO 6th Zone, 4 Jun 43;

2d Ind by 6th Zone Sup Br, 10 Jun 43; 3d Ind by

ZTO 6th. Zone, 12 Jun 43; all in OCT 6th Trans

Zone.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 497

spring of 1943, the Chief of Transportation

pointed out that only certain items in his

program were in arrears, while other items

were completed on or ahead of schedule.

He therefore argued that a proper measure of Transportation Corps performance

would be a comparison of total actual

deliveries during the month against total

forecast deliveries. ASF headquarters took

the position that this "statistical averaging

out of noncomparable items" would be

meaningless, and that from the standpoint

of meeting specific oversea requirements

the proper measure of performance must

be a comparison on the basis of individual

items. The merit of the ASF position from

a practical standpoint is obvious.123

As already indicated, the Transportation Corps made progress in scheduling

and forecasting deliveries and controlling

production beginning late in 1943.124 The

inherent difficulties were still evident,

however, during the last full year of wartime production, 1 July 1944 to 30 June

1945. For all Transportation Corps material procured during that period the

monthly deliveries exceeded the beginning-of-the-month forecasts (on a dollar

value basis) by an average of 1.9 percent.

The deliveries of self-propelled marine

equipment exceeded the forecasts by 3.7

percent, but the deliveries of nonpropelled

equipment fell short of the forecasts by 7.5

percent. The deliveries of locomotives and

locomotive cranes exceeded the forecasts

by 4 percent, but the deliveries of railway

cars fell short by 6.1 percent. Deliveries of

materials-handling equipment fell short of

the forecasts by 4.7 percent.125 Although

the types of equipment procured by the

Transportation Corps gave rise to distinctive difficulties in maintaining delivery

schedules, the problem was shared by all

the technical services.126

The difficulties experienced in adhering

to production schedules necessitated the

maintenance of a well-organized expediting system. Expediters were sent to the

plants of subcontractors and prime contractors with instructions to ascertain and

report on the progress under each contract. When an expediter found that production was falling behind schedule, his

job was not merely to put pressure on the

contractor but to give him all possible aid

in overcoming his difficulties. To do this

the expediter had to be thoroughly familiar

with the technical aspects of the job and

with the Transportation Corps' organization and procedures. When expediters

attached to the zone or district transportation offices were unable to cope with a

difficulty, they called upon the Production

Division at Cincinnati—later designated

the Production Branch of the Procurement

Division—for assistance. If the problem

could not be solved on that level, an appeal was made to the Director of Supply

in Washington, who had a small staff of

special expediters attached to his office.

When this effort failed, a request for a

higher preference rating was initiated for

approval by ASF headquarters and eventually by the War Production Board.

123

 Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 17 Apr 43,

sub: Forecast Statistics, OCT 400.17; Memo, CofT

for CG ASF (undated but evidently written soon after

above memo), sub: Factors That Disrupt TC Production; reply by CG ASF (also undated), sub: Difficulties in Forecasting TC Production; last two in

OCT HB Ex Sup; Memo, Finlay, OCT, for Robinson, ASF Hq, 15 May 43, OCT 400.13; Memo,

CofT for CG ASF, 18 Jun 43, sub: Production Schedules and Forecasts, OCT 400.314. 124

 For methods of controlling production, see Rpt,

Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Production Div, pp. 6-11, OCT

HB Dir of Sup Rpts. 125

 Rpt, Procurement Div, FY ending 30 Jun 45,

pp. 4, 79, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. 126

 ASF, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1944, pp.

148-49.
498 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

During the war the Production Division

dealt with approximately 2,400 requests to

aid contractors in maintaining their production schedules. In about 1,800 of these

cases the needs were met by assigning special personnel to the task. In approximately 400 cases requests for higher preference ratings were obtained. In about 200

cases it was necessary for the War Production Board to issue special instructions to

break the bottlenecks.127

A thoroughgoing system of inspection

was set up by the Chief of Transportation

to insure that equipment and supplies

were manufactured in accordance with

contractual terms, including engineering

plans, specifications, and instructions regarding packing, processing, and marking.

Inspection also covered the security arrangements that contractors established to

protect technical data, their plants, and

the equipment or supplies they were producing. On the operating level the inspection responsibility was delegated to the

zone transportation officers, and each

zone had a chief inspector. An inspectorin-charge was assigned to each plant having substantial contracts. Special inspectors were assigned to follow through on

items of unusual importance. Staff supervision was given by the Inspection Service

Branch of the Production Division. The

Director of Supply had a small staff of

inspection specialists, who were sent into

the field when conditions required them.

The inspection work, which was initially

covered only by general instructions, was

eventually governed by very detailed

regulations.128

The final inspection and acceptance of

end items was a responsibility of the

inspectors-in-charge. These formalities

usually took place at the manufacturer's

plant, but in cases where that plan was

impracticable the inspection was made at

the depot, holding and reconsignment

point, or port of embarkation to which

the manufacturer had shipped the matériel. In cases of extreme emergency final

inspection could be waived, but the Chief

of Transportation emphasized that such

waivers should be few and should be fully

justified by the circumstances. Acceptances

of rail equipment usually involved no

difficulties, since only a small number of

well-established plants manufactured this

equipment and it was constructed according to the builders' specifications with only

minor changes to meet the Army's requirements. Acceptance of self-propelled marine equipment required more thorough

tests because of the special and frequently

changing designs, the fact that many of

the prime contractors were inexperienced

in such work, and the further fact that

each vessel embraced numerous components, manufactured by different subcontractors, that had to be deftly fitted into

the end product. These vessels were accepted only after they had been put

through a trial run and the performance

had been approved by all members of the

trial board.129

Marine equipment that was accepted

afloat required delivery arrangements different from those applicable to rail equipment, knockdown barges, and other items

that were shipped from the manufacturers'

127

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 102-06. 128

 General Instructions and Routine Reporting

Procedures for Marine Personnel, 1 Jan 43; TC

Pamphlet 6, 9 Feb 44, and revisions, sub: Standard

Inspection Practices; TC Pamphlet 10, 1 May 44,

sub: Inspection Manual, revised 15 Apr 45; all in

OCT HB Dir of Sup Insp. 129

 TC Pamphlets cited n. 128; OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 121-23.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 499

plants by rail or highway carriers. The

ports of embarkation, which took charge

of most floating equipment immediately

after acceptance, sent representatives of

their water divisions to the places of delivery to take over the vessels from transportation zone representatives who had

accepted them from the contractors. The

designated master of the vessel and the

chief engineer accompanied the port representative in each case, in order that they

might observe the trial run and become

familiar with the vessel on its way to the

port. The master and chief engineer joined

the inspector-in-charge in making a complete inventory of equipment and reporting any omissions or defects. The port also

sent a crew, which might be the regular

crew or a special delivery crew, to the

delivery point. After a vessel had been

taken over from the zone representative,

the chief of the port water division was

responsible for it until it was shipped overseas or transferred to another branch of

the Army in the zone of interior. During

this interval he had such repairs or adjustments undertaken as he considered necessary to make the vessel ready for service.130

Maintenance and Spare Parts

The Chief of Transportation and the

agencies that had the responsibility before

him procured more than 100,000 major

items of equipment during World War II.

(Table 40) These were not expendable

supplies but durable equipment, most of

which would continue in service over a

period of years with proper maintenance

and repair.131 The Chief of Transportation

had the wartime responsibility of providing the maintenance supplies and spare

parts necessary for the upkeep of this

equipment, whether it was in the zone of

interior or overseas, and also of issuing

instructions regarding maintenance policies and procedures.132

 As was the case

with other technical services, the Transportation Corps failed to give adequate

attention to this responsibility in the early

part of the war and later came under

severe criticism on that account.

When the Chief of Transportation

began the development of a full-fledged

supply operation in the fall of 1942, the

demand for marine equipment was already

heavy and his new supply organization

had to give its first attention to procuring

the tugs, barges, floating cranes, and other

types of vessels that had been requisitioned.

Spare parts, maintenance supplies, and

maintenance instructions represented future needs, and they had to wait until the

more immediate requirements were met.

Maintenance was not lost sight of, but it

was pushed into the background until the

situation in the oversea commands became

acute and forced a more vigorous attack

on the problem. In the spring of 1943 the

shortage of spare parts was being keenly

felt by the U.S. forces engaged in the

North African campaign, not only in

regard to marine equipment but also in

regard to railway equipment for which the

130

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 123-26. Concerning sources, assignment, manning, and repair of small

boats, see Wardlow, op cit., pp. 249-61. 131

 See remarks by Gen Lewis in Min of Program

Supply Conf, New York, 12-13 May 44, p. 5, OCT

HB Dir of Sup Gen. 132

 AR 55-510, 9 Oct 42, par. 2; AR 55-650, 27

Feb 43, par. 4; WD Memo W 55-44-43, 12 Oct 43.

General Army instructions on maintenance were

given in ASF Cir 31, 15 May 43; WD Memo W 700-

32-43, 6 Jul 43; WD Memo W 700-41-43, 3 Sep 43;

ASF Cir 19, 17 Jan 44; WD Cir 227, 7 Jun 44; WD

TM 37-250, Nov 44, Basic Maintenance Manual.
500 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

SEAGOING STEEL BARGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION for Transportation Corps

Chief of Transportation had become

responsible in November 1942. Other theater commanders also were finding it necessary to either deadline some of their

equipment or resort to makeshift methods

of repair, since spare parts for Americanmade equipment were rarely procurable

overseas. The Chief of Transportation

then took steps to definitely program the

production of spare parts and initiated

other measures to meet the situation.133

These measures included the establishment of a spare parts committee, which

included representatives of the supply

organization, the Rail Division, and the

Water Division, to consider all aspects of

the problem.134

The overcoming of the deficit was a slow

process. Raw materials were scarce and

closely rationed by the War Production

Board. Many manufacturers were heavily

committed by contracts for end items, so

that the production of spare parts could 133

 Memo, Toulmin for Gross, 6 Jan 43, par. 4b,

OCT 561.4 Army Shipbuilding Program; Memo, Brig

Gen Carl R. Gray, Jr., for CofT, 24 May 43, sub:

Spare Parts; Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 24 Jul

43, sub: Immediate Shipment of TC Stores; handwritten Memo, Gross for Toulmin, 27 Jul 43; last

three in OCT 453.31-461 Africa. 134

 Memo, Exec for Sup for Exec OCT, 11 Jun 43

OCT 344 Spare Parts Com.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 501

REVOLVING FLOATING CRANE with 60-ton capacity.

not be pressed. The problem was complicated by the many types of engines and

other mechanisms that the Transportation

Corps had been forced to put into its floating equipment and by the general lack of

standardization. Another aspect of the

problem was the difficulty of estimating

the requirements for replacement parts

and maintenance supplies because of lack

of experience data and the unpredictable

effect of inexpert or careless operation of

the equipment by inadequately trained

personnel. As late as January 1944, the

Chief of Transportation was obliged to

report, "the present status of the spare

parts problem is acute."135

 When the

invasion of the Continent got under way

in June 1944, General Ross, Chief of

Transportation, ETOUSA, was still concerned about the adequacy of spare parts

to keep his transportation equipment in

service, although General Gross felt that

his supply organization had "done fairly

well" by that theater because of its high

priority.136

 While the situation gradually

became easier, the supply of spare parts

135

 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 20 Jan 44, Problems 11 and 14, OCT 319.1 Current and Anticipated

ASF Problems. 136

 Ltr, Ross to Gross, 6 Jun 44, and reply, 19 Jun

44, both in OCT HB Gross Day File.
502 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

TABLE 40—QUANTITIES OF MAJOR ITEMS OF TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT CONSTRUCTED

AND ACCEPTED IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR

a

 Data for acceptances of railway equipment not available for 1940 and 1941. Acceptances in 1942 include those effected by Chief

of Engineers up to 16 November, when railway procurement was transferred to the Chief of Transportation. b

 Marine equipment figures include acceptances by other Army agencies—chiefly the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation

Service up to 31 July 1942, when the Transportation Corps was established. c

 Data for acceptances of materials-handling equipment not available for 1940 and 1941.

Source: Statistics, Procurement, pp. 69-73, compiled for a statistical volume of this series, now in preparation, with further details as to

types and sizes of equipment.

did not catch up with the need until the

production of end items had passed its

peak.137

The difficulties of procurement and

distribution were compounded by lack of

137

 See Memo, Dir Plns and Opns ASF for CofT,

28 Oct 44, and 1st Ind by CofT, 11 Nov 44, both in

OCT 400.212.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 503

centralized responsibility for maintenance

in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. This was evident in a survey made by

representatives of ASF headquarters late

in 1943.138 The recommendations of the

survey team were given careful consideration by General Gross, in consultation with

Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Frank A.

Heileman, Director of Supply, ASF, with

the result that two new divisions were

established in the OCT supply organization. A Stock Control Division was set up

to regulate the accumulation and distribution of spare parts and maintenance supplies, as well as stocks of end items. A

Maintenance Division was installed that

was made responsible for the preparation

of spare parts lists and catalogues and the

determination of requirements for depot

stocks. These functions had been performed up to that time by the operating

divisions—that is, the Water Division, the

Rail Division, and the Transit Storage

Division. The survey team had recommended that the Maintenance Division be

made responsible also for the development

of policies, procedures, and practices for

the maintenance of equipment, but the

Chief of Transportation did not agree; he

decided that these functions should remain with the operating divisions because

of the experience that they already had in

this field and their close contact with the

users of the equipment.139

The Maintenance Division was late in

getting started and it never attained a

position of influence, although it was

given some additional duties. Its purpose

was brought to the attention of the field,

and the theater commanders were requested to aid its work with reports regarding their maintenance problems, the

supply of spare parts already on hand, and

the prospective requirements.140 It was

given supervision over packing, packaging,

and processing activities at Transportation

Corps depots and was charged with the

development of improved methods and

the preparation of manuals on the subject.141

 It was made responsible for the

co-ordination of all communications with

higher headquarters regarding maintenance policies and problems.142

 But the

Maintenance Division was always handicapped because the determination and

enforcement of policies and procedures

remained with the several operating divisions. Its most tangible results were in

publications. Late in 1944 the division was

abolished and such functions as it had

been performing were assigned to the new

Technical Publications Branch of the Distribution Division. In May 1945 the Maintenance Division was reinstated, but its

responsibilities were in the nature of liaison and co-ordination rather than direct

supervision of maintenance activities.143

Secondary only to the procurement and

distribution of maintenance matériel was

the issuance of technical publications to

inform the users how particular items of

equipment were to be maintained, and of

lists or catalogues showing the spare parts

that were available. The preparation of

technical publications was shared by the

manufacturers of the respective items and

the Chief of Transportation.

144

 These pub138

 Rpt 146, Spare Parts for Marine Equipment,

Dec 43, OCT 020 Org of TC Sup Activities. 139

 Memo, Dir of Sup ASF for CofT, 20 Jan 44;

Memo of Conf, 26 Jan 44; Memo, CofT for Dir of

Sup ASF, 31 Jan 44; all in OCT 020 Org of TC Sup

Activities. 140

 OCT Misc Ltr 41, 26 Jul 44, sub: Maintenance

Problems. 141

 TC Cir 90-8, 23 Jun 44. 142

 OCT Off Order 5-4, 27 Oct 44. 143

 OCT Info Bull 55, 23 May 45, Sec. III. 144

 Concerning the work of the Technical Publications Branch, see Rpt, Procurement Div, 30 Jun 45,

OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.
504 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

lications were obtained from the manufacturers so far as possible, and in March

1945 the Procurement Division was instructed to make this requirement a part

of each contract.145 The aim was to have

the publications accompany the equipment, but the theaters complained of not

receiving them. Responsibility for the

preparation of lists and catalogues rested

entirely with the Chief of Transportation.

The compilation of complete catalogues,

together with the establishment of standard nomenclatures, was a heavy task. In

the fall of 1944 two sections of a comprehensive Transportation Corps catalogue

were issued, dealing respectively with

"organizational spare parts" for light

maintenance and "higher echelon spare

parts" such as were required for heavier

maintenance.146

The difficulties encountered by the theaters with the maintenance of Transportation Corps equipment were not entirely

attributable to delays in shipping spare

parts and in providing instructions. An

initial consignment of first echelon maintenance supplies was shipped with all

major items, but they were sometimes removed from the equipment before it

actually went into service.147 Regulations

were issued forbidding such removal, but

the temptation to obtain spare parts wherever they could be found was always

strong with officers having equipment in

urgent need of repair, and tools were

attractive to native pilferers as well as

military technicians. As a further measure

to deal with the problem, the Chief of

Transportation ordered that these supplies

be strongly barricaded in the equipment so

that they would not be readily accessible.

Separate shipments of maintenance matériel, as in the case of other supplies, sometimes were lost in theaters where adequate

depot systems had not yet been set up or

where supply operations had been disrupted by strategic developments.

The establishment and enforcement of

proper packing, packaging, and processing standards and practices were considered part of the maintenance responsibility, since the success with which these

functions were performed had a direct

bearing on the condition of equipment

and supplies when they reached the oversea commands. Different problems were

encountered with the types of locomotives,

cars, and boats that were shipped set up

and uncrated; locomotives, marine engines and other bulky equipment that

were boxed or crated; railway cars,

barges, and landing craft that were

shipped in knocked-down condition; and

the many other items of equipment and

supplies that were shipped in containers.

The basic need was for complete instructions and specifications, and these were

developed gradually in the Chief of Transportation's supply organization. Manufacturers were required to carry out these

instructions and specifications so far as

possible, but considerable packing and

processing had to be done at the depots,

the holding and reconsignment points,

and the ports, where it was often found

that the work had not been properly done

before shipment or that containers had

been broken in the course of transportation.

As with other phases of the supply re145

 OCT Off Order 30-23, 10 Mar 45, sub: Tech

Publications to Accompany Each Shipment. 146

 ASF Catalogue TC-1, 27 Oct 44, describes the

purpose of the TC catalogue, the echelons of maintenance, and the procedures for requisitioning spare

parts. 147

 See Memo, ACofT for Supply for Field Sv Gp,

25 Oct 43, and atchd Rpt on Locomotive Spare Parts

in UK, OCT 453.31 England.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 505

sponsibility, the Chief of Transportation

got off to a late start in the development

of packing, packaging, and processing instructions, and then subordinated this

project to tasks that seemed more pressing,

with the result that progress was slow.148

In September 1944 The Inspector General reported that many manufacturers

were still failing to provide proper protection for equipment before shipment, and

that the Transportation Corps depots were

therefore overburdened with the task of

correcting deficiencies. The depots, on the

other hand, complained that they had not

been given adequate written directions but

had received most of their instruction

orally from visiting officers.149 Even during

the late months of the war satisfactory performance in this field was a goal rather

than an achievement.150

Although his problems with the various

phases of maintenance were acute, the

Chief of Transportation was unwilling to

surrender any part of that responsibility.

Late in 1943 a proposal was placed before

ASF headquarters that the heavier types

of maintenance (third, fourth, and fifth

echelons) for all vessels except Army transports be made a responsibility of the Corps

of Engineers, which already was maintaining certain specialized types of vessels

used in its construction work and for tactical purposes. In opposing this proposal,

the Chief of Transportation pointed out

that in order to provide for the maintenance of transports and small boats the

Transportation Corps had established

marine repair shops at the ports, and that

if the Corps of Engineers were to take over

the maintenance of the smaller vessels a

duplication of facilities and personnel

would result.151 He contended that supervision of the lighter types of maintenance

(first and second echelon maintenance,

which were performed by the operating

crews) and the heavier maintenance could

not be placed under separate agencies

without danger of loss of co-ordination

and detriment to the operation of the vessels. He further emphasized that maintenance requirements had to be considered

in relation to the design of vessels, the procurement and storage of spare parts and

maintenance supplies, and the training of

crews to operate the vessels, all of which

were Transportation Corps responsibilities. The technical soundness of the Chief

of Transportation's position was apparent,

and the proposal was not adopted.152

Spare parts for internal combustion

engines presented one of the more difficult

aspects of maintenance. The number of

these engines included in the wartime

programs for both marine and land equipment was great, and the manufacturers

were beset with heavy backlogs. The

problem was felt especially keenly in the

Southwest Pacific Area, to which the Chief

of Transportation had shipped a large

number of vessels in the early part of the

war. Since many small naval craft were

148

 Memo, C of Packing and Crating Br for C of

Maintenance Div OCT, 21 Feb 44; Memo, CG ASF

for CofT, 27 May 44; both in OCT 400.162; TC Cir

90-8, 23 Jun 44, sub: Packaging, Packing, and

Processing. 149

 Memo, TIG for ACofS G-4, 15 Sep 44, sub:

Packaging of Supplies, OCT 400.162; TC Cir 80-57,

2 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Insp on Packing. 150

 Memos, CG ASF for CofT, 19 Dec 44, 23 Jun

45, 16 Jul 45, all in OCT 400.162; TC Off Order 5-

37, 3 Apr 45; OCT Misc Ltr 243, 17 Jul 45; WD SB

55-14, Oct 45, sub: Processing, Packaging, and Packing TC Equip and Parts. 151

 The Chief of Transportation also converted,

manned, and operated six marine repair ships that

were sent to oversea ports where shore facilities for

repairing floating equipment were inadequate or

nonexistent; Wardlow, op. cit., p. 301. 152 Memo, CofT for Dir of Sup ASF, 14 Dec 43,

sub: Maintenance Responsibility, OCT 563 TC.
506 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

PROCESSING AND CRATING SHOP at the Lathrop, California, Holding and

Reconsignment Point.

equipped with similar engines, the Army

in emergencies was able to obtain some

spare parts from naval depots, although

the extent of such help naturally was limited so long as the Navy had not taken

Army requirements into account in building up theater stocks.153

In the summer of 1944 the War Department and the Navy Department entered

into a formal agreement under which the

Navy would supply parts having high

usage factors for the types of internal combustion engines used by both the Army

and the Navy. The naval spare parts distribution centers in all theaters were directed to honor Army requisitions, but

within limits set by the number of Army

engines in the theater, the Navy's usage

factors, and the supply of spare parts on

hand.154 Although Army requirements in

the theaters were not always met in this

way, the arrangement greatly simplified

the problem of requisitioning and avoided

the maintenance of duplicate stocks.

The progress that the Chief of Transportation had made during the latter part

of the war in building up stocks of spare

parts in the zone of interior did not forestall a renewed crisis in this field after V-J

Day. In accordance with blanket instructions issued to the technical services, all

contracts for equipment and spare parts,

153

 Memo, Col Thomas G. Plant, CTO USASOS

SWPA, for CofT, 30 Nov 43, sub: Engine Spare

Parts, OCT 561.4 SWPA. 154

 Memos, AG 412.5 (27 Jul 44) 28 Jul 44; AG

412.5 (21 Aug 44), 22 Aug 44; AG 412.5 (14 Dec 44),

14 Dec 44, sub: Spare Parts for Marine Engines.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 507

MARINE ROPE IN STORAGE at the Montgomery, Alabama, Holding and Reconsignment Point.

except those covering railway equipment

for the Foreign Economic Administration,

were summarily canceled. Although the

end of the war meant the end of heavy

requisitions for new equipment, much of

the marine and rail equipment already

in the theaters was kept in service and still

required maintenance. As a result, the

Transportation Corps supply organization

during the early postwar period was

placed in the position of having to operate,

on a "hand-to-mouth basis," and for a

period of about nine months spare parts

and maintenance supplies were procured

wherever they could be found as requisitions were received. The policy was not

modified until April 1946, when planned

procurement on a limited basis was again

authorized.155

Progress in Technical Matters

Transportation Corps equipment, generally speaking, consisted of commercial

types modified to meet Army requirements. In a measure this circumstance

lightened the responsibility of the Chief of

Transportation for technical development,

as compared with the services that procured equipment of a strictly military

nature without prototypes in the commer155 Memo, ACofT for Sup for C of Procurement Div

OCT, 4 Sep 45, sub: Readj and Demob; Memo, CofT

for CO Marietta Depot, 10 Apr 46; Interv with Col

Herbert D. May, 17 Jul 46; all in OCT HB Dir of

Sup Gen. During the war Colonel May was chief of

the Field Service Group, and later executive to the

Director of Supply; at the time of this conversation

he was chief of the Supply Division, which was a consolidation of all supply agencies of the OCT.
508 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

cial field. Yet his responsibility was considerable for a number of reasons. The modifications in commercial designs to adapt

them to Army requirements were often

extensive. The equipment had to meet the

needs of a variety of users—the Air Forces,

the Corps of Engineers, the Coast Artillery

Corps, the tactical commanders, the port

commanders, and the beneficiaries of the

lend-lease program. The conditions of employment varied widely in different parts

of the world because of differing military,

climatic, and other factors. The using

services were constantly developing new

ideas to make the marine equipment that

the Chief of Transportation procured for

them more exactly meet their needs. The

differences between U.S. and foreign railway equipment and operations had to be

taken into account in manufacturing locomotives and cars for use overseas.

Relatively little had been done before the

war to prepare for meeting the requirements of a world-wide transportation

operation.

The latter point adds to the evidence

already presented in this volume that a

technical service that has to organize and

start operations after war has begun is at

a great disadvantage. This is true not only

because the service has missed the opportunity for advance research and planning,

but also because it encounters extraordinary difficulties during wartime in assembling technicians, orienting them to their

task, and establishing procedures to assist

them in functioning effectively. Work on

the adaptation of marine equipment had

been carried on in the Quartermaster

Corps and work on the adaptation of rail

equipment in the Corps of Engineers before the Chief of Transportation took over

these functions. But the development accomplished up to that time was limited,

partly because of small budgets and partly

because the scope and variety of the oversea requirements were largely unforeseen.

The Chief of Transportation therefore assumed the major part of the task of technical development, as well as of procurement.156

The technical organization was built

up gradually.157 In the beginning the

Engineering Division was responsible for

all aspects of the work—engineering

plans, designs, specifications, standardization, research, and development. When

the Field Service Group was established

in early summer of 1943, part of the technical personnel was moved to Cincinnati,

where it continued to function as the Engineering Division, charged only with

those functions that pertained to production engineering; the rest of the personnel

remained in Washington and was designated the Technical Staff. Because of the

difficulty of engaging a sufficient number

of technicians to enable the Engineering

Division to cope with the expanding program, the Director of Supply made an arrangement with an engineering firm to

assign personnel to supplement that of the

division.

The Technical Staff in Washington assumed a general supervision of technical

developments. It was aided by a Technical

Committee representing the Director of

Supply, the operating divisions in the

Office of the Chief of Transportation, and

the other technical services that were invited by the Chief of Transportation to participate. In addition to this general advissory committee, subcommittees were estab156

 The Army's general instructions relating to technical research and development are in AR 850- 25, 30 Jun 43, and changes. 157

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 145-51.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 509

lished late in the war to deal with the design of specific types of equipment; they

were known as the Marine Design Committee, the Rail Design Committee, and

the Highway and Materials-Handling

Design Committee.158

This organization continued until 1945.

In January of that year the Transportation

Corps Board was established to aid the

Chief of Transportation in improving all

phases of his service, including matériel,

training, and procedures.159 In June 1945

the Technical Staff was redesignated the

Research and Development Division.160

There was obvious overlapping in the

fields assigned to the Transportation Corps

Board and the Research and Development Division. The arrangement eventually worked out was that the division

would serve in a staff capacity to assist the

Director of Matériel and Supply in fulfilling his technical responsibilities, while the

board would work on specific projects assigned to it by the Chief of Transportation.161

The technical objective was to develop

plans, designs, and specifications that

would assure equipment that was sound

from an engineering standpoint and at the

same time satisfactory to the users. This

objective was especially difficult to attain

with marine equipment because of the

many uses to which tugs, boats, barges,

and floating cranes were put during the

war and the divergent and changing operating conditions. With railway equipment

the technical requirements were less

changeable, but here again there were

many problems because of the differing

gauges, clearances, and railroading methods encountered in the oversea commands.

Materials-handling equipment for docks

and warehouses required no noteworthy

departures from commercial types. The

same was true of motor equipment for

over-the-road service in the theaters.162

In working out satisfactory designs for

such equipment there was close collaboration between the Director of Supply's

technical personnel and the operating

divisions concerned with the respective

types—that is, Water Division, Rail Division, Transit Storage Division, and Highway Division. These divisions were represented on the technical subcommittees that

dealt with the respective types of equipment. Changes in design were made only

with the concurrence of the chief of the interested operating division.

The effort to meet the desires of those

that used the equipment was paralleled

by an effort to avoid an excessive number

of designs. Reference has been made to

the fact that when the Transportation

Corps began procuring large amounts of

floating equipment for the theaters in the

fall of 1942, it had to contract for designs

that the builders could most readily produce and to utilize the kinds of engines,

electrical systems, and other mechanisms

that were promptly available. The result

was that a great variety of vessels was put

into service. This was recognized to be an

unsound situation, since the multiplicity

of types complicated the task of providing

spare parts and issuing maintenance instructions, and also militated against the

158

 For a discussion of the work of the Technical

Staff, see Rpt, Dir of Sup, FY 1944, Tab labeled Tech

Staff; Rpt, Tech Staff and Research and Development Div, year ending 30 June 45; both in OCT HB

Dir of Sup Rpts. 159

 ASF Cir 412, 16 Dec 44; TC Cir 5-7, 17 Jan 45.

160 OCT Info Bull 61, 11 Jun 45. 161

 TC Cir 5-30, 18 Jan 46, revised 29 May 46. 162

 The Chief of Transportation did not contract

for motor equipment, but during the last half of the

war he collaborated with the Chief of Ordnance in

obtaining types of trucks, tractors, and trailers that

would be most serviceable in the mass movement of

freight in the theaters; see Wardlow, op. cit., p. 91.
510 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

development of mass production methods

by the builders. Although such a program

was unavoidable in the beginning, an

effort to standardize was begun at once.163

Standardization involved not only refusing to reorder the nondescript types

that had been procured earlier, but also

holding down the number of changes

made in standard types to meet requests

from the users. During the first year—that

is up to the fall of 1943—about 60 percent

of the basic designs were eliminated and

the remaining 40 percent were simplified

so far as possible. On 1 September 1943

there were 156 active designs of floating

equipment, including 25 tugs, 22 freight

and passenger boats, 30 cargo barges, 14

miscellaneous barges, 6 crane and derrick

barges, 19 rescue and salvage boats, 10

harbor defense boats, and 30 miscellaneous types of small boats. Procurement in

the calendar year 1944 included only

seventy-one designs; only two new types

were built during that year.164 It was

hoped that the number of marine designs

could be brought below forty, but that

had not been achieved when the war

ended.

In attempting to reduce the number of

types of rail equipment, the Director of

Supply was confronted with problems of a

different nature—the relatively inflexible

requirements for operation on foreign railroads and in conjunction with foreign

equipment.165 Cars and locomotives were

built to forty different combinations of

gauges, brakes, and couplers. The size of

rail equipment sent overseas had to take

into account also the roadbeds and the

clearances on the lines over which it would

move. The decision to use diesel-driven

locomotives in Italy and Iran added to the

number of designs on the active list. On 1

September 1943, there were 69 active designs for locomotives, 35 for locomotive

cranes, 43 for freight cars, 31 for tank cars,

and 64 for miscellaneous types of rolling

stock—a total of 242 on the comprehensive railway equipment list.166

 In June

1944, there were seventy-three rail end

items under procurement; that was a

"spot picture," however, and the figure

does not indicate how many designs were

on the active list at that time.167

Although considerable progress was

made toward standardization as the war

went on, there were limits beyond which

the Chief of Transportation could not go.

He had to meet the constantly developing

or changing needs of the users of the

equipment, and a complete "freeze" of

designs was therefore impracticable.168

But the goal of standardization was never

163

 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 22 Feb 43, sub: Production Conf, par. 2; Memo, CofT for ACofS for Matériel SOS, 27 Feb 43; both in OCT 400.17. 164

 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 152-53; List,

Marine and Rail Items Procured by TC as of 1 Sep

43, OCT HB Dir of Sup Program; Rpt, Reqmts and

Distribution Div, 30 Jun 45, Reqmts and Stock Contl

Br, p. 10, OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts. Numerous statements were made during the war regarding the number of designs in use, but the bases of computation

differed; the figures used here apply to designs for

marine end items and appear to give a correct indication of the extent to which standardization was

accomplished during the period of heavy procurement. 165

 Some of the refinements that the Russians and

the British requested were refused; Memo, CofT for

Gen Clay, 6 Jul 44, sub: Diesel Locomotives for

USSR, ASF Hq Dir of Matériel Ry Equip &

Reqmts; Memo, BAS Washington for Dir of Sup, 16

Aug 44, OCT 453 England, and reply, 26 Aug 44,

OCT 453.3 England. 166

 List, Marine and Rail Items Procured by TC

as of 1 Sep 43, OCT HB Dir of Sup Program. 167

 Rpt, Reqmts and Distribution Div, 30 Jun 45,

Reqmts and Stock Contl Br, p. 9, OCT HB Dir of

Sup Rpts. 168

 Memo, ACofT for Sup for Plng Div, 24 Feb 43,

sub: Standardization of Marine Equip; Interv with

Col Bunker, 4 Sep 52, sub: TC Supply Problems,

OCT HB Dir of Sup Production.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 511

lost from sight. To that end and also with

a view to reducing the production delays

and the additional costs involved in unnecessary modification, a close control was

established over change orders, including

those originating with the builders as well

as those initiated by the users of the

equipment.169

A plan of classification, prescribed by

the War Department, supported the idea

of standardization and aided in determining the quantities of end items and spare

parts that should be procured.170 The

designations for the classes were changed

in August 1944; thereafter all items of

equipment for which there was recurring

demand were placed in one of four classes:

"standard" items were those that would

be procured in preference to others; "substitute standard" items were those that

were not as satisfactory as standard items

but could be procured when the latter

were not available; "limited standard"

items could not be reordered, but existing

equipment could be repaired and returned

to service; and "obsolete" items were to

be dropped from use entirely. Classification was made by the Technical Committee, on which not only the Director of

Supply but the operating divisions and

other interested technical services were

represented.171 Classifications were based

on conditions affecting the procurement of

the items as well as on reports from the

theaters regarding performance and operating conditions.

Standardization and classification

called for a system of item identification

that would enable officers overseas to

know exactly what equipment and supplies were available and to prepare their

requisitions in terms that could be readily

understood at depots in the zone of interior. The Transportation Corps plan of

identification included the design number

and a short description of each item; it did

not include code numbers. Like some

other aspects of Transportation Corps supply, development of a standard nomenclature was still under way when the war

ended.172

Although the major technical task was

to adapt commercial equipment to military needs and modify existing Army designs to meet new conditions, some projects

were undertaken that involved research

and experimentation. Among the newly

developed equipment placed in service

during the war was a refrigerator barge

for use in the Pacific, consisting of a standard 112-foot knockdown steel barge with

nine refrigerating units mounted on the

deck and machinery for the generation of

electrical power installed in the hull. A

light four-man lifeboat that could be employed for a variety of purposes was developed for use in connection with the 85-foot

aircraft rescue boat. A yoke-type life preserver, which would support a soldier

carrying a full pack and small arms more

satisfactorily than the vest type or belt

type, was designed. In addition to work

done in collaboration with The Surgeon

General on the design of a "self-contained"

unit hospital car for use in the zone of interior, a light ten-car hospital train was

developed for service on European railroads. In collaboration with the Coast

Artillery Corps, plans and specifications

169

 TC Cir 110-3, 13 May 44, sub: Engineering

Changes or Modifications. 170

 AR 850-25, 30 Jun 45, pars. 14, 15. 171

 TC Cir 160-15, 28 Aug 44, and Supps. 1-7, sub:

Classification of Equipment as to Types and Specifications; TC Cir 160-19, 19 Jan 45. Results of Technical Committee studies are given in reports in OCT

344 TC Tech Com. 172

 See TC Standard Nomenclature for Major Articles of Equipment, 7 Mar 46, in OCT HB Monograph 28, App. XIX.
512 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

were worked out for a new mine planter,

which could handle the larger and heavier

types of submarine mines that were being

developed. Several types of life floats were

constructed to meet special conditions encountered in the oversea commands.173

When the war ended a number of other

projects were under way. A railway flatcar to transport heavy tanks was being developed with a view to distributing the

load so as to make it operable over recently

repaired roadbeds and bridges. A 50-ton

diesel-electric locomotive was being designed, especially for use in forward areas,

which could be employed either singly as

a switcher or in multiple when heavy

tractive power for line hauls was needed.

A 30-ton gasoline mechanical locomotive

was being worked on that would have

high tractive power but an axle load no

greater than the cars that it would draw.

Study was being given to various types of

propellers and propulsion methods, including jet propulsion, with a view to increasing the speed and maneuverability

of small craft and to improving performance in shallow or weed-infested waters.

Data regarding German transportation

equipment were being gathered and analyzed. The Transportation Corps Board

had undertaken tests of numerous materials and devices to determine their

suitability for use by the Army.174

The Transportation Corps contributed

to the development of a number of other

items of equipment that were not its direct

responsibility. The most important of

these was the amphibious 21⁄2-ton truck, or

DUKW. The idea of a cargo vehicle that

could operate on either land or water had

appealed to both the Army and the Navy,

and both had done some work on it. When

satisfactory results seemed to be in doubt

because of indifference or preoccupation,

Brig. Gen. Theodore H. Dillon, Deputy

Chief of Transportation, got behind the

project and kept it active until a serviceable vehicle had been developed and

tested under the auspices of the Office of

Scientific Research and Development.175

The Brodie System for landing and

launching aircraft by use of a portable rig

attached to the side of a vessel or set up on

shore was conceived by a Transportation

Corps officer at the New Orleans Port of

Embarkation and developed with Transportation Corps funds.176

 The Chief of

Transportation sponsored tests to develop

a method of laying pipeline under water,

particularly with a view to piping petroleum from England to France during the

invasion of the Continent; this project was

carried forward by the Corps of Engineers

and later by the British.177 The Transportation Corps collaborated with the Asso173

 Barge, refrigerator, knockdown, design 435

(standard); Lifepreserver, yoke type, combat type,

kapoc; Memo, Tech Staff for Contl Br Off of Dir of

Matériel and Sup, 12 Jun 45, sub: Status Report; all

in OCT HB Dir of Sup Research and Devel; Rpts,

Rail Div, FY 1944, p. 25, and FY 1945, p. 21, OCT

HB Rail Div Rpts. Only one hospital train was built

for oversea use because of the decision to convert passenger cars in the theaters and thereby save shipping.

174 OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 164-67. 175

 Memo, Lt Col Russell F. Oakes, Tech Info Off

OCT, for Wardlow, 20 Sep 46, and attached review

of development of DUKW, and other documents in

OCT HB Topic Amphibious Vehicles; James

Phinney Baxter, 3rd, Scientists Against Time (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1946), pp. 76-81, 243-

51; Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), pp. 35-36; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 163. 176

 Memo, CofT for COMINCH US Fleet, 31 Dec

43, sub: Brodie System; Note by author, 5 Dec 46,

recording statements by Gen Wylie; and other documents in OCT HB Topic Brodie System. 177

 Memo, Col John H. Leavell, OCT, for Ross, 8

Mar 43, sub: Underwater Pipeline, OCT HB Wylie

Petroleum; Memo, Leavell for Gross, 4 Mar 44, par.

(5), OCT HB Gross Petroleum; WD press release, 2

Sep 45, sub: TC Planned Oil Pipelines in Channel in

1942.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 513

elation of American Railroads in developing the Mareng Cell, a rubberized container that made possible the transportation of petroleum in open-top rail cars.178

In these technical matters, as in other

aspects of the supply operation, ASF headquarters kept a close supervision over

technical service activities. The basic regulations were formulated in that headquarters and its representatives sat informally

with the Transportation Corps Technical

Committee. ASF headquarters, moreover,

expected the technical services to keep it

informed on all significant technical developments and to obtain its approval for

the opening or closing of research projects.

When the Chief of Transportation's Director of Supply failed to comply with the

latter requirement, he was sharply reminded of the omission.179

 While ASF

headquarters kept such matters under

close scrutiny, it apparently did so for the

purpose of observing progress or lack of

progress rather than of supervising the

technical aspects of the work.

In view of the fact that so many items of

Transportation Corps equipment were

adaptations of commercial designs, the aid

of private industry in making the adaptations was of great value. During the war

this aid was sought informally as it was

required, but the need for a standing arrangement with industry was recognized

and steps were taken in that direction.180

Not long after the end of the war the Chief

of Transportation announced the establishment of the Technical Advisory Board

consisting of fifty-two outstanding experts

representing all branches of transportation.181

 These men were requested not

only to stand ready to give assistance on

matters referred to them by the Chief of

Transportation, but to bring to his attention any developments or possibilities of

development that might be of interest to

the Army. This arrangement reflected the

importance of the role that the Army's

marine and railway equipment had

played in the conflict just finished; it also

reflected a recognition of the desirability

of constant technical improvement to

enable the Transportation Corps to keep

its equipment abreast of developments

made through private research and adequate for the needs of another war.

Summary of Successes and Failures

The Chief of Transportation's success in

meeting the matériel requirements of the

theaters varied with the different oversea

commands and the different types of

equipment. The needs of the Pacific commands for small vessels and materialshandling equipment developed rapidly,

and, because of his late start in the procurement field and his difficulties in attaining adequate production, the Chief of

Transportation was not able to meet those

needs fully and promptly. Shortages of

such equipment were severely felt in the

Pacific during 1942 and 1943, although

they could not be termed critical in the

sense that they adversely affected the outcome of important military undertakings.

By 1944 the shortages were being steadily

overcome. In the Mediterranean and

European theaters the requirements for

178

 Memo, Buford, Vice Pres AAR, for Metzman,

C of Rail Div OCT, 14 Jul 42; Memo, Maj Cheshire

for CofT ETOUSA, 4 Nov 42; both in OCT 457

Mareng Cell. 179

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 9 Sep 44, sub: TC

Development Projects, OCT HB Dir of Sup Research

and Devel. 180

 Ltr, Lewis to Buford, Vice Pres AAR, 9 May

45, OCT 334 Tech Adv Bd. 181

 TC Cir 5-29, 17 Jan 46, revised 7 Feb 46; WD

press release, 3 Mar 46.
514 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

marine and materials-handling equipment developed more slowly, and since

these commands held top priority their

needs were adequately met, although deliveries sometimes were slower than the

theaters desired. The calls for railway

equipment were relatively light until 1943

and did not reach their peak until 1944, so

that the Chief of Transportation was able

to build up a stockpile that enabled him

to meet most demands as they arose.182

The equipment that the Chief of Transportation procured was technically adequate, except for some items hastily obtained during the early part of the war.

The great variety of uses to which boats

and other floating equipment were put in

the oversea theaters, and the hard and unusual treatment that they often received,

could not be fully foreseen. The vessels

hastily constructed during the early part

of the war to meet the theaters' urgent

needs were in some cases makeshifts and

consequently unsatisfactory from the

standpoint of both operation and maintenance. But considerable progress was

made toward eliminating engineering

faults, and as the theaters reported their

experiences with particular types of equipment the designs were improved to meet

the operating requirements.183 The technical problems were not so great with rail

equipment. Some time was required to

establish the sizes, gauges, and other physical characteristics of locomotives and rolling stock for service in the several theaters,

but when these requirements had been

ascertained there was no difficulty in fulfilling them, since the contractors for such

equipment were well-established and technically competent concerns.

The research work carried on by the

Chief of Transportation during the war,

with a view to developing new and more

effective types of equipment, was limited.

No doubt much could have been accomplished in that direction had the Chief of

Transportation entered the war with an

adequate research staff and with objectives and procedures already established.

Since these conditions did not obtain, he

proceeded on the basis that the most immediate and satisfactory results could be

obtained by adapting equipment already

in use by the Army or the commercial

transportation industry. Basic needs were

met in this way.

Failure to make adequate provision for

spare parts for Transportation Corps

equipment was probably the most serious

shortcoming chargeable to the Chief of

Transportation's supply organization. The

effects of this shortcoming were felt most

severely in the marine field; the military

railway services overseas also were affected

but not to the same degree. It does not excuse the fault in the Transportation Corp's

program to point out that shortage of

spare parts was a common experience in

the theaters, involving all technical services. But it seems fair in extenuation to

reiterate the fact, which has been so often

cited in this chapter, that the Chief of

Transportation inherited the procurement

program after the demands for equipment

182

 Except as otherwise indicated, this summary is

based on facts presented earlier in this chapter and

conversations with Transportation Corps officers. See

also Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 1 Oct 45, sub:

Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, and attached reports of divisions, in OCT HB Dir of Sup

Rpts. 183 Probably the most unsatisfactory item was the

knockdown barge, which was contrived to save shipping space. During a visit to the Pacific theater in the

fall of 1943 General Gross reported that this barge

would have to be improved, since after assembly overseas it too often did not float; Ltr, Gross to Wylie, 26

Sep 43, par. 5, OCT HB Wylie Gross Letters SepNov 43.
THE SUPPLY PROGRAM AND ITS EXECUTION 515

were already large, and that for a time his

resources were severely taxed to supply

the most urgently needed end items.

The Chief of Transportation was slow in

fulfilling his supply responsibilities in

other respects; these included the provision of information regarding the operation

and maintenance of the equipment that he

had shipped overseas, of catalogues to indicate the types of equipment that were

available for shipment, and of spare parts

lists to assist the theaters in ordering replacement parts against future needs. It

would have helped the theaters if they had

been furnished specifications and blueprints for some of the larger equipment that

involved difficult operating and maintenance problems. The earlier adoption of

standard nomenclature and descriptions

would have encouraged the theaters to

requisition items that were in production,

and would have discouraged the practice

of "inventing" new types of equipment to

meet their peculiar needs.184 These aspects of the supply responsibility, like the

procurement of spare parts, were forced

into a position of low priority by the

urgency of the basic need for the equipment itself.

The failure of the Chief of Transportation to concentrate in one division the responsibility for establishing and enforcing

maintenance policies and procedures was

the source of some of the weakness in that

field. The explanation of this failure lies

chiefly in the fact that other divisions,

particularly the Water and Rail Divisions,

already had technical personnel qualified

to deal with these matters, and the procurement of similar personnel exclusively

for the Maintenance Division not only

would have been difficult in view of the existing manpower shortage, but also would

have been wasteful. In addition, having assigned certain maintenance responsibilities

to the operating divisions in the early part

of the war, the Chief of Transportation

found it difficult to transfer those responsibilities later. Yet it seems likely that the

assignment of full maintenance responsibility to a unit set up expressly for that

purpose would have produced better

results.185

There was some co-operation between

the Army and the Navy in the procurement of marine equipment and in related

technical matters, but it fell short of the

possibilities. Procedures for such co-operation had not been established in peacetime, and the pressures of war as well as

habits of independence militated against

their rapid development after Pearl Harbor. The Army and the Navy joined with

the Maritime Commission in an arrangement to assign boatbuilders to work

primarily for one agency so that each

could know fairly accurately the production capacity on which it could rely. The

agreement under which the Navy became

responsible for the procurement of all

amphibious landing craft and that under

which the Navy provided spare parts for

internal combustion engines in Army

equipment were logical and beneficial.

Otherwise, the two departments followed

parallel but independent courses. The

need for standardization, particularly of

marine engines, was recognized, but a

concerted move in that direction was not

made until fairly late in the war, and

although there was some discussion in

184

 Consolidated Operational Report on TC Activities in ETO, May 42 through V-E Day, Annex 3, Rpt

of Supply Division, gives a general review of problems

in that theater; in OCT HB ETO. 185

 See comment by C of Maintenance Div, 19 Sep

45, attached to Memo, ACofT for Sup for CofT, 1 Oct

45, sub: Report on Accomplishments and Handicaps,

OCT HB Dir of Sup Rpts.
516 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

joint committee there were no appreciable

results.

Certain phases of the Transportation

Corps supply operation have been deliberately omitted from this discussion, since

they did not present problems that were

essentially different from those encountered by other technical services. Two of

them—depot operations, and stock control—were substantially affected by the

lateness with which the Transportation

Corps came into being.

During the first two years of the war the

Chief of Transportation had no facilities

that could properly be called depots.

Transportation Corps matériel was placed

in service almost as soon as it was manufactured, and when temporary storage

was required it was provided at the holding and reconsignment points. Supply

officers were placed at those installations to

assume accountability for Transportation

Corps items and fill requisitions as they

were received. As stockpiles gradually

grew, more formal depot operations became necessary, and on 1 January 1944

space was assigned for this purpose at the

four holding and reconsignment points

located at Voorheesville, New York;

Marietta, Pennsylvania; Montgomery,

Alabama; and Lathrop, California. Later

three subdepots were established at the

holding and reconsignment points at

Yermo, California; Auburn, Washington;

and Elmira, New York. Each depot

stocked particular types of equipment

rather than the entire range. The officers

in charge were provided with certain services by the commanders of the holding

and reconsignment points, but they were

responsible to the Director of Supply for

their depot activities.186

Late compliance with the ASF plan of

stock control was a corollary of the late

establishment of the Transportation Corps

depots. This plan, set up in the spring of

1943, was designed to enforce the maintenance of proper stock levels at depots and

other installations in the zone of interior,

to keep the depot stocks in line with the

probable requirements of the oversea

commands, and to provide an over-all

co-ordination to prevent uneven distribution with shortages in some places and

overages in others.187 In July 1944 The Inspector General, following a survey, reported that stock control was still in its

initial stages at Transportation Corps

headquarters and in different stages of

development at Transportation Corps

depots and ports of embarkation. In response to a request from General Somervell for comments on this report, the Chief

of Transportation stated that stock status

reports had been initiated by his Director

of Supply, excesses and shortages at depots

and other field installations were being

studied, and depot stock records were

being brought into balance with physical

inventories. While there was still much to

be accomplished, he felt that considerable

progress had been made.188

186 For space occupied by the depots, see Table 20,

above. OCT HB Monograph 28, pp. 169-94, briefly

discusses depot functions and operations. 187

 Logistics in World War II, pp. 79-80; monograph

prepared in the Industrial College of the Armed

Forces, History of Stock Control, Army Service Forces,

U.S. Army. January 1948. 188

 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 6 Jul 44, sub: Stock

Levels; 1st Ind by CofT, 12 Jul 44; both in OCT

400.212.
CHAPTER VIII

Observations and Conclusions

The record of the Chief of Transportation in meeting his responsibilities for the

movement of Army personnel and matériel, the training of troops, and the procurement of supplies and equipment in

World War II was a good one, and this

fact was recognized throughout the Army.

The staff that General Gross gradually assembled was technically proficient, and

under his leadership it devoted itself to the

tasks of the Transportation Corps without

reservation. But there were some other

factors that weighed heavily in the results.

The new Chief of Transportation had to

establish the place of his office in the Army

organization and plan of operation before

it could properly perform its mission. In

building up personnel and facilities adequate for the job the Chief of Transportation had to contend with personnel ceilings and materials priorities at every step.

Wartime transportation was a co-operative business in which several civilian and

military agencies were concerned, and it

presented problems growing out of divergent interests and differing opinions. And

as an overriding factor there was the extraordinary scope of the military operations, which gave to the Army the greatest

transportation task ever undertaken by a

single agency.

The desire of the Chief of Transportation to have all Army transportation functions performed under his supervision was

based on the firm belief that this arrangement would facilitate co-ordination and

promote economy in operations. While

the desire was not completely realized, the

exceptions did not constitute serious handicaps. The Chief of Transportation did not

control passenger and freight movements

by air, and he unwillingly delegated authority to the Army Air Forces to route

their own domestic freight moving by surface carriers. These exceptions interfered

with the Chief of Transportation's plan of

over-all co-ordination of movements, but

the volume of traffic thus placed outside

his jurisdiction was relatively small. The

bulk of the traffic was under his control

and the procedures that were developed

for handling it proved very successful.

These procedures were successful not only

because military traffic was moved

promptly and safely, but also because

congestion was avoided and the means of

transportation were used intensively so

that the maximum amount of commercial

as well as military traffic could be moved.

The importance that the Chief of Transportation attached to having unbroken

control of troops and supplies throughout

their movement from the zone of interior

to the oversea commands seems to have

been well justified; it appears to have

warranted the vigorous protests that he

made whenever the integrity of his control

was threatened. Careful co-ordination of

the movements to the ports with the loading and dispatch of ships was necessary to
518 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

avoid a waste of transportation and delays

in the arrival of shipments overseas. The

Chief of Transportation worked on the

simple theory that such co-ordination

would be relatively easy if he controlled

the shipments at all stages, and that it

would become more difficult if he had to

depend on the co-operation of other elements of the Army in order to achieve it.

This did not mean that he wanted these

movements to be outside the control of the

War Department General Staff, which

was responsible for carrying out strategic

plans; it meant only that the Chief of

Transportation did not want his ability to

execute authorized movements to become

dependent on the readiness or unreadiness

of other operating agencies of the Army to

adjust their activities to the plans of the

Transportation Corps.

The first and only serious threat to the

continuity of the control the Chief of

Transportation exercised over troop movements was the proposal, in the summer of

1942, to remove the staging areas from the

jurisdiction of the port commanders and to

place them under the service commands.

The reasoning behind this proposal was

logical enough. The command, training,

and equipping of troops while they were at

the ports awaiting transshipment overseas

were not basically transportation functions; they were, in fact, functions that

the service commands were qualified to

perform. But the Chief of Transportation

had practical reasons for wanting the

staging operations to remain under the

direction of his port commanders. Those

commanders were responsible for dispatching the various types of troop units and

replacements overseas in accordance with

movement orders and theater priorities,

and they were responsible for having

enough troops ready for embarkation to

fill the ships that were placed on berth.

The Chief of Transportation believed that

there was less chance of failure in fulfilling

these responsibilities if the staging process

was under the direct control of the port

commanders than if they had to rely on

the service commands to get the troops

ready for delivery to the shipping terminals. Considering the complexity of the

staging process, the urgency with which

wartime movements had to be executed,

and the frequent changes made in the priorities, the force of the Chief of Transportation's logic is difficult to deny. At any

rate, the plan that he favored worked remarkably well during World War II, and,

although the staging operation was placed

under the control of the army commanders

after the war, provision was made that in

the event of a major mobilization the staging areas would revert to the control of the

Chief of Transportation.1

The possibility that the Chief of Transportation might lose control of the movement of a large part of the freight destined

for oversea areas arose in the spring of

1943. At that time proposals were considered to make the oversea supply divisions at the ports of embarkation responsible to ASF headquarters rather than to

the port commanders and the Chief of

Transportation, or to transfer their functions to new agencies that would be responsible directly to ASF headquarters.

The oversea supply divisions' main responsibilities were to process requisitions

received from the oversea commands, and

to schedule the movement of shipments

from depots to ports in accordance with

the priorities and the availability of ships

to lift them. The handling of theater

requisitions and the enforcement of priori1

 See DA SR 55-720-5, 28 Jun 51, pars. 2c-d.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 519

ties were not essentially transportation

functions, but the Chief of Transportation

felt that they were inseparable from the

task of co-ordinating the arrival of shipments at the ports with the readiness of

the ships, a task that was definitely a transportation function. The basic reason for

the proposal to remove the oversea supply

divisions of the ports from the supervision

of the Chief of Transportation was that, in

carrying out the latter's policies regarding

the use of ships and ship space, the ports

had not been sufficiently responsive to the

policies and plans fostered by ASF headquarters relating to the distribution of

supplies.

Since General Goodman set up and

directed the very successful Oversea Supply Division at the New York Port of Embarkation, his views on this subject are of

special interest. From his experience he

became convinced that the OSD, while it

should be located at or adjacent to the

port, should be responsible directly to ASF

headquarters (or the branch of the Army

having corresponding responsibilities),

rather than to the port commander or the

Chief of Transportation. He had observed

that under the Chief of Transportation's

policy that ships must be loaded as nearly

to capacity as possible, low-priority items

sometimes were shipped because they contributed to balanced cargoes, whereas

some higher-priority items were held back

because they would have contributed to

unbalance; he considered the subordination of supply to transportation considerations a logistical mistake. Although he had

received good support from the port commander at New York, General Goodman

saw a potential hazard in a system under

which a port commander could require

that all communications regarding oversea

supply be passed through his office, for the

delays involved in such a procedure would

be incompatible with good service to the

oversea theaters. He concluded, moreover,

that since the oversea supply division had

to bring pressure to bear on the various

technical services to insure that supplies

were shipped in accordance with schedules

it had prepared, it could do this more

effectively as an agent of the commander

of all of the service forces than as a representative of one of them.2

 These views were

substantially in accord with those held by

General Lutes, ASF Director of Operations, as presented earlier.3

The fundamental issue was whether

supply considerations or transportation

considerations should govern the loading

of ships. It is understandable that the view

of the Chief of Transportation, who was

under constant pressure to get more ships

for the Army and to use those available to

utmost capacity, should have differed from

that of General Lutes, who was responsible

for the proper distribution of all ASF supplies, and that of General Goodman, whose

job was to insure that the European and

Mediterranean theaters received the items

they had requisitioned in accordance with

the priorities they had established. It is

obvious, also, that under the pressure of

wartime operations these points of view

could not always be reconciled. The trend

of Army thinking on the subject is indicated by the fact that, after the issue came

into prominence in the spring of 1943, the

influence of the ASF Director of Operations over the operation of the OSD's was

greatly increased, and that after the war

the OSD's, although they remained physically located in the port establishments,

were placed directly under the control of

2

 Ltr, Goodman to author, 14 Apr 52, OCT HB PE

Gen Oversea Sup. 3

 See above pp. 337-38.
520 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the Logistics Division (G-4) of the General

Staff, which had taken over the supply

functions previously performed by ASF

headquarters.4

The disagreements between the ASF

Director of Operations and the Chief of

Transportation, because of the staff function that the latter performed, were inevitable in view of the overlapping of the

responsibilities of the two offices as the

incumbents interpreted them. Both Lutes

and Gross took broad views of their duties,

and neither was inclined to give up any

authority he considered necessary to their

fulfillment. Gross believed that the transportation and logistical studies that his

transportation experts and planning staff

prepared were essential to the strategic

and logistical decisions the commander of

the Army Service Forces and the General

Staff were required to make. Lutes objected to this as an intrusion into his sphere

as the staff officer for planning and coordinating ASF operations. But Lutes also

considered his staff responsibility justification for intervening in matters that Gross

considered purely operational.

The problem of drawing a dividing line

between staff and operating functions is a

familiar one in military circles. The establishment of SOS (ASF) headquarters as

an additional echelon between the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, on the

one hand, and the technical or operating

services, on the other, rendered the problem more, rather than less, difficult. When

plans were being laid in early 1942 for the

establishment of the Services of Supply,

General Lutes, as prospective Director of

Operations in the headquarters organization, expressed the view that transportation should be under his control if he were

to effectively regulate the distribution of

supplies.5 It is not surprising, therefore,

that he subsequently should have had differences with General Gross, who, having

been made chief of an independent transportation service, jealously guarded the

prerogatives that he believed necessary to

the proper conduct of his office.

A great deal has been said in this volume

about the handicaps under which the

Chief of Transportation operated because

of the fact that his office was not established until after the nation had gone to

war. Anyone who has studied the records

must concede that these handicaps were

very real. Naturally some activities were

more deeply affected than others.

The handicap was less severely felt in

the execution of troop and supply movements than in some other fields. Movements of increasing size had been handled

during 1941, and a good working relationship with the railroads had been developed. But methods that were adequate

before Pearl Harbor were inadequate for

the exceptionally heavy movements that

became necessary thereafter. A comprehensive system for controlling port-bound

shipments of freight did not become fully

effective until the summer of 1942, and

consequently there was disturbing congestion at the major ports during the early

months of the war. The standard operating

procedures that were necessary to insure

that all agencies of the Army concerned

with movements understood their functions and performed them properly were

evolved slowly and did not reach maturity

until 1943. As a result, port commanders

had a heavy task preparing troops and

equipment for shipment to the theaters

because home stations, depots, and tech4

 See DA SR 730-5-1, 15 Jul 49, par. 11. 5

 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,

1940-1943, Ch. IX, p. 228.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 521

nical service headquarters sometimes

failed in fulfilling their responsibilities.

How much a permanent Chief of Transportation would have been able to accomplish in forestalling these difficulties

is of course problematical, but at least he

could have visualized the situation and

laid plans for dealing with it.

The controversy over supervision of the

oversea supply divisions at the ports was in

part attributable to the fact that this activity was not assigned to the ports until January 1942, after the United States had

entered the war. The organizations and

procedures necessary to perform this complex and vital function had to be developed

from the ground up, and virtually nothing

had been done in that direction when the

ports were placed under the control of the

new Chief of Transportation in March

1942. The relationships of the oversea supply divisions, which were subsequently

organized, with the other operating divisions at the ports had to be worked out, as

well as the relationships with the Office of

the Chief of Transportation and SOS headquarters. The shortcomings of the oversea

supply divisions during the period of development accentuated the conflict between supply and transportation interests,

which kept the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the headquarters of the

Services of Supply in a state of agitation

for many months. This was one of many

instances that demonstrated the shortsightedness of maintaining in peacetime

organizations and procedures that must be

completely revamped to cope with the

greatly expanded requirements of war.

In the matter of training troops the

handicap was more severe. Until the summer of 1942 the Chief of Transportation

had virtually no training staff at his headquarters; training doctrine and tables of

organization and equipment for port units

were prepared by The Quartermaster

General, and the actual training was

accomplished at the ports of embarkation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when

the Transportation Corps was established

in July 1942 and given full responsibility

for troop units to operate ports and

small boats, little had been done to

visualize the requirements of global warfare and to prepare for meeting them.

The training of railway troops, amphibian truck companies, and some other

types of units was added to the Chief of

Transportation's responsibilities still later.

The assembling of an adequate headquarters staff, the acquisition of appropriate

training facilities, and the formulation of

training doctrine and programs were

accomplished step by step. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the

demand for port and marine units, which

began to build up rapidly in the summer

of 1942, should have soon outstripped the

ability of the Chief of Transportation to

meet it promptly, and that some units

should have been sent overseas without

sufficient training. The Chief of Transportation eventually did a creditable training

job, which he might have done earlier if

he had had the opportunity to prepare for

the task sufficiently far in advance. The

preparation of rail units was not as greatly

affected by this situation, since a Military

Railway Service headquarters had been

functioning for some time when the Chief

of Transportation took over this activity

from the Chief of Engineers and most of

the men for these units were drawn from

the commercial railways and already had

technical skill.

The most serious disadvantage that the

Chief of Transportation suffered because

of his delayed start was in connection with
522 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

the procurement of equipment. Here again

his responsibilities were acquired gradually, the build-up of his headquarters staff

was not started in earnest until the late

summer of 1942, and his field establishment to deal with contractors and supervise production did not begin to take shape

until some months later. This incipient

organization naturally experienced difficulties in determining the amount of

equipment to be procured, finding reliable contractors, mastering the intricacies

of the controlled materials plan, setting up

production schedules, forecasting deliveries, standardizing designs, and meeting

the technical requirements of those who

used the equipment. Although definite

progress was made during 1943 in catching up with the demand for marine

equipment—the main source of difficulty—it was not until 1944 that satisfactory results began to emerge. Because of

the necessity of concentrating attention on

overcoming the backlog of unfilled requisitions for end items, the matter of maintenance and spare parts received only belated attention, and the Chief of Transportation was still struggling with this

problem as he entered the last year of the

war.

Scientific research to develop more

effective types of marine, rail, and highway

equipment for military use in the various

oversea areas began late and remained on

a modest scale. The needs of the Army

were met chiefly by modifying commercial

types, and, while the accomplishments in

that field were considerable, they were of

an engineering rather than a scientific nature. The conception and development of

basically new equipment requires time.

Results are best achieved in an atmosphere of unhurried study and experimentation, and this is difficult to achieve in an

organization beset with wartime operating

problems. The outstanding new transportation item introduced during World War

II was the amphibious truck, and while

the Chief of Transportation foresaw the

need and encouraged the development of

this vehicle, the technical work was accomplished by a civilian agency that was able

to draw upon the talents of numerous scientists and to conduct research and make

tests free from the pressure of operating

responsibilities.

The relations of the Chief of Transportation with the civilian agencies of the

government concerned with transportation must be viewed in the light of the fact

that they were all wartime creations and

had to organize their operations and learn

to work with each other while meeting

their heavy day-to-day responsibilities. It

may seem futile to reiterate the theme that

peacetime organizations and procedures

should provide at least a foundation upon

which wartime operations can be built. As

has been demonstrated, even after belligerency has become virtually inevitable the

hope still lingers that somehow it can be

averted and that the complete changeover that becomes necessary with the advent of war can be avoided. For this

reason some of the vital transportation

lessons taught by World War I were disregarded in 1940 and 1941. It is to be hoped

that the lessons of World War II will not

be wasted.

Beyond the question of mutually acceptable standards and procedures, the relationship between military and civilian

transportation agencies may be a difficult

one because of the difference between the

military and commercial points of view.

This difference was encountered during
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 523

World War II in both the Ocean shipping

and domestic transportation fields, but the

situation became particularly acute in

connection with the latter.

Ships capable of transoceanic service

were devoted almost entirely to the war

effort, civilian traffic being held to that

which was absolutely essential. The Allied

leaders considered the transportation of

lend-lease goods and civilian aid supplies

as much a war necessity as the transportation of matériel to the fighting forces, and,

although the Chief of Transportation

sometimes protested when these programs

were assigned vessels that he urgently

needed to move Army cargoes, it was

inevitable that the broader point of view

should prevail. The controversy over the

attempt of the War Shipping Administrator to have the loading of military cargoes

placed under his control brought the

divergence of the military and commercial

attitudes into prominence for a time, but

when the issue was once settled in favor of

the military agencies, it remained settled.

Thereafter the differences that arose between the Army's transportation officers

and the representatives of the War Shipping Administration were concerned more

with details than with basic concepts.

With domestic transportation the situation was essentially different; civilian

traffic increased during the war and, in

addition, a heavy military traffic had to

be handled. Against the greatly enlarged

volume of traffic only a limited amount

of new transportation equipment could

be provided because of the heavy inroads

that the demands for military equipment

and for ships to move the military forces

made on the supplies of raw materials.

The military authorities were willing to

concede only limited amounts of these

materials to the transportation industry

at the expense of the military programs,

because they believed that civilian traffic

should be reduced to whatever extent

might be necessary to enable the carriers

to meet the demands made upon them.

The carriers, on the other hand, did not

want to cut down civilian traffic more

than was absolutely necessary, and in this

they were supported by the Director of Defense Transportation. As a result, although

the carriers did a remarkable job in handling the inflated volume of traffic, the requests of the armed services for railway

equipment were not always met to their

satisfaction. Equipment for handling military freight was not seriously affected, but

passenger equipment for troop movements

was tight throughout the war. During

redeployment after V-E Day and the repatriation period after the Japanese surrender, there was widespread criticism,

both official and public, because some

troops were not moved promptly from the

ports of debarkation and many soldiers

were required to travel in unsuitable

equipment.

The obvious lesson from this experience

is that since the same domestic transportation facilities must serve both civilian

and military needs in time of war, there

should be an understanding or a policy

declaration regarding the curtailment of

civilian privileges when the requirements

of war demand it. Any such pronouncement would have to issue from the President, and considerations of political expediency might argue against it. But the

salutary effect in assuring proper transportation for military purposes and in harmonizing the relationships of the military

and civilian transportation agencies in

carrying out the war programs would un-
524 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

questionably be helpful. In the countries

of Europe that were fighting for their

existence the military requirements made

heavy inroads into the civilian's right to

use transportation for nonessential purposes. The American military authorities

believed that the people of the United

States would readily yield their privileges

to the extent that the military effort might

require. In fact, they did this during the

late stages of World War II, and the complaint of the military authorities was only

that the substantial curtailment of civilian

traffic was not decreed soon enough to

obviate the necessity of transporting thousands of returning soldiers on long trips in

day coaches, and to forestall the widespread resentment that this treatment

engendered. The curtailment of civilian

privileges should be the timely result of

deliberate decision rather than the belated

consequence of public criticism.

Another question that should be settled

in advance, rather than after it has become

a critical issue, is who shall provide such

additional transportation equipment as

becomes necessary to meet military needs.

The Army Chief of Transportation and

other military officers were of the opinion

that the railroads, because of their greatly

increased revenues, should provide such

additional locomotives, freight cars, and

passenger cars as were required for the

wartime traffic. This applied, of course,

only to cars of standard designs and not to

hospital cars and other specialized equipment that would be of no value to the carriers after the war. The railroads, although

they acquired considerable new equipment, were not inclined to go beyond what

they could reasonably expect to use after

the military crisis was over; they believed

that the additional wartime requirements

should be met at government expense.

This difference of opinion became apparent as early as the summer of 1940. The

impasse was not broken until May 1943,

when the government belatedly placed an

order for special troop sleepers and troop

kitchen cars. Two years later a duplicate

order was placed with a view to meeting

the unusually heavy requirements of redeployment and demobilization. In both

instances the action was precipitate rather

than deliberate, and in the latter case it

was taken so late that most of the cars were

not delivered in time to be of service during the period of heaviest troop travel in

the summer and fall of 1945.

This summary would be incomplete

without specific reference to the system

devised for controlling freight traffic,

which was one of the outstanding accomplishments of the war in the domestic

transportation field. The need for such

control was one lesson that had remained

vivid in the memory of both military and

railway men since World War I, when

lack of it seriously threatened the effectiveness of the American forces in France.

Although the subject was often discussed

during 1941, no system of over-all control

had been developed when the United

States entered World War II. For a time it

seemed that the effort to work out an adequate plan might become stalled over the

question of whether it should be administered by a civilian or a military agency.

But the need was too great to permit a

long delay; basic agreement on a co-operative plan was reached in March 1942, and

a comprehensive system had been placed

in operation by early summer. The central

element of the plan was a committee representing the armed forces and the civilian

transportation agencies. Its over-all control measures, supplemented by controls

applicable to individual shipments, proved
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 525

highly effective. The only reason for complaint was that the system was not set up

soon enough to deal with the traffic congestion that became threatening during

the early months of the war.

The necessity of capitalizing on the

lessons taught by World War II, as a form

of insurance on national security in the

event of another world conflict, has been

widely recognized and frequently voiced.

The special committee of the Senate that

devoted several years to investigating the

failures and successes of the national defense program expressed the view that it

would be "a tragic mistake to allow the

knowledge thus gained to become stale

and to fail to set it down as a definitive

guide for the future."

 6 In 1946 Secretary

of War Patterson, pointing to the need for

continuous planning and research in the

field of military transportation, predicted

that in another great war the competition

between the belligerents for the most efficient means of transport will be exceedingly keen and that "changes in favor of

speed and flexibility will make what we

now have seem primitive."

 7

These statements point up the conclusion, with which few at present will take

issue, that the effort to constantly improve

the procedures and equipment of military

transportation must be no less persistent

and imaginative than those in the field of

military aeronautics, communications,

and ordnance. With World War II and

the conflict in Korea fresh in memory, this

conviction is now clear and strong. The

establishment of the Department of Defense, with its implication of greater unity

among the armed services, is a favorable

factor. But the question that remains to be

answered is whether the present state of

alertness would be able to survive an interval of peace such as existed between World

War I and World War II.

6

 Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Fifth Annual Report, September 3, 1946, p. 12. 7

 Address at meeting of the Army Transportation

Association, Chicago, 13 Nov 46.
Bibliographical Note

In preparing this volume use was made

of material from many sources, but the

chief source of information was the records

of the Office of the Chief of Transportation

(OCT). This was natural because so much

of the account is concerned with the procedures and practices of the Transportation Corps, all of which came under the

observation and supervision of the Chief of

Transportation. The OCT records include

those maintained by The Quartermaster

General while he was responsible for Army

transportation; these OQMG records were

turned over to the Chief of Transportation

when the transportation function was

transferred to him in March 1942. In

addition to subject files, the OCT records

include sets of serially numbered directives of the Chief of Transportation such as

circulars, office orders, and miscellaneous

letters. All of these records are at present

in the custody of the Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General's

Office, except as stated below.

During and after the war the Historical

Branch in the Office of the Chief of Transportation (OCT HB)* built up a special

file of documents of historical significance

as an aid to research. This file includes

periodical reports submitted by the OCT

divisions, by the Transportation Corps

field installations in the zone of interior,

and by the transportation officers with the

forces overseas; copies of especially significant documents located by Transportation

Corps historians in the course of their research; personal files of the Chief of Transportation, and of certain of his principal

assistants, that were turned over to the

Historical Branch after the war; and

monographs prepared by Transportation

Corps historians covering specific aspects

or phases of the Corps' activities. These

records are presently in the custody of the

Historical Research Office in the Office of

the Chief of Transportation, but it is anticipated that eventually they will be placed

with the other OCT records in the custody

of the Departmental Records Branch, The

Adjutant General's Office.

The special historical file was of great

value in preparing this volume as well as

the other volumes of the Transportation

Corps' history. While copies of most of the

documents may also be found in other

records, the file contains some material

that is unique. The personal files of officers

who performed important functions were

of exceptional value. They include both

subject files and chronological files, the

latter also called day files, reading files, or

staybacks. The subject files often contain

information not found elsewhere, and the

chronological files sometimes opened up

avenues of research that might otherwise

have been overlooked. Unfortunately,

many personal files were not turned over

to the Historical Branch but were destroyed or dissipated when the war was

over.

The transportation activities of the

Army were under the supervision of the

Supply Division (G-4) of the General Staff

up to March 1942, and thereafter they

* During the war period the Historical Branch was

also called Historical Section and Historical Unit.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 527

were under the supervision of the Commanding General, Services of Supply,

later known as the Army Service Forces.

These agencies dealt with a wide range of

activities, including all aspects of supply.

It was not practicable, therefore, to search

their records with the same thoroughness

that was applied to the OCT records, and

the research was limited to files that dealt

with basic transportation subjects. The

records of these agencies are now in the

custody of the Departmental Records

Branch, TAGO. In addition to subject

files, the SOS-ASF records include sets of

all serially numbered directives issued by

the Commanding General, and complete

sets of the monthly progress reports

(MPR's), which cover many activities, including transportation.

The same plan of selective research was

followed in examining the records of other

agencies of the War Department. These

agencies included the Office of the Secretary of War (OSW), the office of the

Under Secretary of War (USW), the

Office of the Chief of Staff (WDCSA), the

War Plans Division (WPD) of the General

Staff, the Operations Division (OPD),

which succeeded WPD, and the Plans and

Operations Division (P&O), which succeeded OPD. On some occasions research

also led to the files of other divisions of the

General Staff—G-1, G-2, and G-3. The

records of The Adjutant General were

used extensively, and they were especially

valuable in establishing the background

of the many War Department directives

bearing on transportation and in tracing

the evolution of Army regulations and

War Department circulars.

While many of the minutes and papers

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, and their various committees were found in the records of the several agencies of the War Department, it

was frequently necessary to consult the

records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure complete coverage. These records

include, in addition to JCS and CCS documents, the minutes and papers of the Joint

Board, which was the principal ArmyNavy co-ordinating agency before the

establishment of the JCS. They also include studies of the Combined Shipping

Adjustment Board, a high-level civilian

agency that worked closely with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on problems pertaining to the efficient use of Allied shipping

resources.

Unquestionably much interesting information regarding the execution of the policies and procedures of the Transportation

Corps could have been found in the files

of the field agencies that functioned under

the supervision of the Chief of Transportation. But to have undertaken direct research in the records of the many ports of

embarkation, zone and district transportation offices, port agencies, holding and

reconsignment points, et cetera, would

have meant giving less attention to other

records that seemed more essential to the

purpose of this volume. Study of the activities of the field agencies, therefore, was

based upon the voluminous correspondence between those agencies and the

Office of the Chief of Transportation,

periodical historical reports submitted to

the Chief of Transportation by the field

agencies, reports of conferences between

headquarters personnel and officers from

the ports and zones, and special reports on

specific subjects made at the request of the

OCT Historical Branch.

Since this volume deals primarily with

policies, procedures, and activities peculiar

to the Transportation Corps, chief reliance

was perforce placed on the primary
528 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

sources mentioned above, yet considerable

use was made of secondary sources. Several of the volumes in the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

deal extensively with logistics and therefore with transportation. Official publications of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air

Force have provided information pertaining to those branches of the defense establishment. Some of the published accounts

of specific military campaigns have shown

the interrelationship of transportation and

military operations. A report of the Chief

of Transportation issued soon after the end

of the war, and a report on the war period

published by ASF headquarters somewhat later, contain useful information and

interesting opinions. The same is true of

reports covering the activities of the U.S.

Maritime Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the War Production Board—civilian agencies that exercised a broad influence over wartime

transportation.
Guide to Footnotes

Documents of many types are cited in

the footnotes of this volume, and they are

to be found in the records of many offices

and agencies. The principal records have

been identified in the bibliographical note.

The abbreviations that have been used as

a means of saving space are defined in the

list of abbreviations. The purpose of this

guide is to make clear to the reader how

the footnotes have been formulated, so

that he may better understand the nature

of the source material and more readily

locate any documents that he desires to

examine.

The type of document most frequently

cited is the memorandum (Memo), the

form used chiefly for correspondence within the War Department. The indorsement

(Ind) was used extensively within the War

Department as a substitute for separate

memoranda, especially when it was anticipated that a number of offices would

make comments on the original document. The disposition form (DF) was often

used for transmitting documents within

the War Department, but on occasion it

also included comments and instructions.

The report (Rpt) gave the results of an investigation, inspection, or study; while it

sometimes showed an addressee, it often

did not. The letter (Ltr) was the form generally used for communication between

agencies of the government, but the less

formal memorandum was sometimes employed in this way. The principal forms of

electrical transmission were the radiogram

(Rad), the telegram (Telg), and the teletype message (TWX). When the copy

consulted did not indicate the means by

which the message had been sent, it is

cited as a message (Msg).

In citing communications the descriptive information is given in the following

order: the form of the communication, the

sender, the addressee, the date, and the

subject. To save space, nonessential parts

of long subjects are omitted, and the subjects are omitted altogether when in the

author's opinion they are not essential to

the identification of the documents.

The last part of each citation identifies

the office or agency in whose records the

document is located, and also the file.

Sometimes files are identified only by a

decimal number, but often both a decimal

number and a subject are used. When a

number of documents are to be found in

the same location, the identification of the

agency and the designation of the file are

given only once—after the last cited document.

In citing serially numbered documents

the location is usually omitted, because

these documents are to be found in complete sets in the records of the agencies

that originated them. Such War Department documents are the Army Regulations (AR), Circulars (WD Cir), General

Orders (GO), Technical Manuals (TM),

and Field Manuals (FM). Serially numbered circulars, orders, and manuals were

issued by the Commanding General of the

Services of Supply, later the Army Service

Forces, and similar publications were put

out by the Chief of Transportation. Locations are not given for documents orig-
530 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

inated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations;

the JCS records include the minutes of

these agencies filed chronologically, and

other papers filed serially.

Two other devices were used to shorten

the footnotes. In many instances the citations for a number of statements on the

same general subject are combined in one

footnote, rather than having a separate

footnote for each statement. Usually such

a footnote applies only to statements preceding it, but sometimes it applies also to

statements immediately following. When

a file contains many documents pertaining to the subject under discussion, only

the documents considered more significant

are cited.
Glossary of Technical Terms*

Accessorial services Services rendered by a carrier in addition to

transportation, such as sorting, packing, and

storing.

Balanced cargo A mixture of heavy and light cargo, which approximately fills the cargo space and weighs the

ship down to its legal maximum draft.

Ballast Heavy material, other than cargo, carried in the

hold of a vessel to provide stability.

Balloon cargo Items that occupy an exceptionally large amount

of space in relation to their weight.

Bareboat charter A form under which the charterer hires the vessel

only, and provides the crew, supplies, fuel, and

other operating requisites.

Bottom cargo Dense and heavy cargo, particularly that stowed

in the bottom of a ship's hold to improve

stability.

Broken stowage Ship space lost, or left unfilled, because of the size

or shape of packages or other items of cargo.

Class I installation One wholly under the command of the service

commander. (See service command.)

Class II installation One under the command of the service commander with certain activities exempted. In

general, this class included the posts, camps,

and stations utilized by the Army Ground

Forces.

Class III installation One under the command of the Army Air Forces,

at which the service command performed

limited services.

Class IV installation One under the command of the chief of a technical service or staff division of the Army Service Forces, at which the service command performed certain functions.

Combat loader A vessel specially equipped for combat loading.

The Navy provided two types—APA (transport, attack), and AKA (cargo ship, attack).

* Like most industries, transportation employs technical terms that are not familiar to the lay

reader. Certain Army terms also are not understood outside military circles. These brief nontechnical

definitions will save the reader the inconvenience of seeking explanations elsewhere.
532 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Combat loading Loading a ship with an assortment of equipment

and supplies required by troops entering combat, and stowing the various items in such a

manner that they can be unloaded quickly and

in the order needed.

Combat zone Forward area of a theater of operations, where

combat troops are actively engaged.

Communications zone The part of a theater of operations behind the

combat zone, where supply, transportation, and

other facilities are located and services performed.

Corps area One of nine commands in the zone of interior

before July 1942, with functions similar to

those of the service commands. (See service

command.)

Deadheading equipment Moving transportation equipment from place to

place without a pay load, that is, without

revenue passengers or freight.

Dead-weight tonnage The number of long tons (2,240 pounds) that a

ship can transport, including cargo, fuel, water,

stores, crew, and passengers.

Dry cargo ship Any ship, except a tank ship carrying liquids in

bulk. As used in World War II the term applied

to passenger ships as well as freighters.

Echelons of maintenance Categories ranging from the first echelon, which

included the simpler forms of upkeep, to the

fifth, which included the heavier types of repairs. (See ASF Manual M 807, Glossary, 25

Oct 44.)

Filler cargo Packaged and bagged supplies which can be

stowed in small and irregularly shaped spaces

in the hold of a ship.

Full and down Term indicating that a vessel has all cargo space

filled and that the cargo is sufficiently heavy to

take the ship down to the legal maximum draft.

General cargo Broadly used, the term includes all except bulk

cargoes, but in Army usage it may exclude

explosives.

Gross tonnage The internal cubic capacity of a ship's holds,

'tween decks, and permanently enclosed spaces

on or above the upper deck (except certain

exempted spaces) measured in tons of 100 cubic

feet.
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 533

Impedimenta Military and personal equipment and supplies accompanying a troop movement.

Landing craft A vessel designed to carry troops and combat

equipment ashore for a landing attack.

Line haul Haul over a railroad line, as distinguished from

switching.

Long ton Weight ton of 2,240 pounds; customarily used in

connection with ocean freight, whereas the railroads customarily use the short ton of 2,000

pounds.

Measurement ton Forty cubic feet; sometimes called ship ton, since

it is used chiefly in connection with ocean transportation.

Organizational equipment (Also called organic or unit equipment.) Articles

issued to troop organizations as such, rather

than to individual soldiers.

Reefer ship A vessel with refrigerator space for perishable

cargo. The term reefer is also applied to railway

cars and trucks with cooling equipment.

Service command One of nine commands in the zone of interior after

July 1942 (replacing the corps area); a field

agency of the Services of Supply, and later of

the Army Service Forces. It furnished certain

services to other elements of the Army within its

area, including administrative, legal, financial,

medical, construction, and fixed communications. (See Class I, II, III, and IV installations.)

Short ton Weight ton of 2,000 pounds, customarily used by

the domestic carriers.

Tanker A tank ship for transporting petroleum products

and other liquids in bulk.

Theater of operations An Army command including the area of actual

fighting (combat zone) and the adjacent area

utilized for supporting administrative and supply activities (communications zone).

Zone of interior The area that furnishes manpower and matériel

to the forces in theaters of operations. The

United States and Canada constituted the zone

of interior for the U.S. Army in World War II.
List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

AAR Association of American Railroads

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

Actg Acting

Adm Administrative

AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGO Adjutant General's Office

AKA Cargo ship, attack

Am Ammunition

ANPB Army-Navy Petroleum Board

ANSIA Army-Navy Shipping Information Agency

APA Transport, attack

APH Evacuation ship

APO Army Post Office

AR Army Regulations

ARB Army reservation bureau

ASC Air Service Command

ASF Army Service Forces

Asgmt Assignment

Assn Association

Asst Assistant

ATAA Air Transport Association of America

ATC Air Transport Command

Atchd Attached

Atty Gen Attorney General

BAS British Army Staff

BMWT British Ministry of War Transport

BPE Boston Port of Embarkation

Br Branch

Bull Bulletin

BuPers Bureau of Personnel (Navy)

BUPERS Chief, Bureau of Personnel (Navy)

Bur Bureau

BUSHIPS Chief, Bureau of Ships (Navy)

C Chief

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CG Commanding General
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 535

Chm Chairman

CINCAFPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

Cir Circular

CKD Completely knocked down

CM-IN Classified message, incoming

CM-OUT Classified message, outgoing

CMP Controlled Materials Plan

CMTC Combined Military Transportation Committee

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CO Commanding officer

CofCA Chief of Coast Artillery

CofEngrs Chief of Engineers

CofOrd Chief of Ordnance

CofT Chief of Transportation

Com Committee or commission

Comd Command

Comdr Commander

COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

COMNAVEU Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

Compt Comptroller

COMZONE Communications zone

Conf Conference

Cong Congress

Consol Consolidating

Const Construction

Contl Control

Conv Conversation

CPA Central Pacific Area

CPE Charleston (S. C.) Port of Embarkation

CSAB Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

CTB Commercial Traffic Bulletin

DA Department of the Army

DCofS USA Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Def Defense

Demob Demobilization

Dept Department

DF Disposition form

Dir Director or directive

Disp Disposition

Div Division

DUKW 21⁄2-ton amphibious truck

Emb Embarkation

EO Executive Order

Equip Equipment
536 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

ESF Eastern Sea Frontier (Navy)

Estab Establishment

ETO European Theater of Operations

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Evac Evacuation

Exam Examination

Exec Executive

FAS Forwarding authorization serial number

FM Field Manual

FY Fiscal year

G-1 Personnel Division, War Department General Staff

G-2 Military Intelligence Division, War Department General

Staff

G-3 Organization and Training Division, War Department General Staff

G-4 Supply Division, War Department General Staff

GAO General Accounting Office

Gen General

GHQ General Headquarters

GO General Order

Govt Government

Gp Group

GRB Government reservation bureau

H&RP Holding and reconsignment point

Hist History or historical

Hosp Hospital

Hq Headquarters

HRPE Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation

Hwy Highway

ICC Interstate Commerce Commission

IG Inspector General

IMC Interterritorial Military Committee of AAR

Imped Impedimenta

Incl Inclosure

Ind Indorsement

Indiv Individual(s)

Info Information

INS International News Service

Insp Inspection

Int Intelligence

Interv Interview

JAGO Judge Advocate General's Office

JANASB Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JLC Joint Logistics Committee
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 537

JMPA Joint Military Passenger Agreement

JMPEA Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement

JMTC Joint Military Transportation Committee

JPSC Joint Production Survey Committee

LAPE Los Angeles Port of Embarkation

LCL Less-than-carload

LST Landing ship, tank

Mar Com Maritime Commission

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MCC Movement Coordinating Center

MDW Military District of Washington

Med Medical

MI Military impedimenta

Mil Military

Min Minutes

Misc Miscellaneous

MKD Medium (partially) knocked down

Mob Mobilization

MOS Military occupational specialty

MP Military Police

MPR Monthly progress report

MRS Military Railway Service

Mtg Meeting

MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations

MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

MTS Military Transportation Section, AAR

MTV Motor transport vessel

MTX Expedited military shipment

Mvmt Movement

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

NOPE New Orleans Port of Embarkation

NTS Naval Transportation Service

NYPA New York Port Agency

NYPE New York Port of Embarkation

OCNO Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

OCS Officer candidate school

OCT Office of the Chief of Transportation

ODT Office of Defense Transportation

Off Officer

OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Opn Operation

OQMG Office of The Quartermaster General

Ord Ordnance

Org Organization
538 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

OSD Oversea Supply Division

OSW Office of the Secretary of War

OUSW Office of the Under Secretary of War

OWM Office of War Mobilization

OWMR Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

Pass Passenger

PE Port of embarkation

Pers Personnel

PL Public Law

Plng Planning

PMG Provost Marshal General

POW Prisoner of war

Pres President

Proc Procurement

Prod Production

QMC Quartermaster Corps

Rad Radiogram

RAMP Recovered Allied Military Personnel

Readj Readjustment

Recap Recapitulation

Redepl Redeployment

Reg Regulation or regulating

Reorg Reorganization

Rep Representative

Repl Replacement

Reqmt Requirement

RFC Reconstruction Finance Corporation

RO Rotational group

Rpt Report

RR Railroad, or readjustment regulations

RTC Replacement training center

Ry Railway

SB Supply Bulletin

Sch School

SD Shipping document

Secy Secretary

Sen Senator

SF San Francisco

SFGD San Francisco General Depot

SFPE San Francisco Port of Embarkation

SG Surgeon General

SGO Surgeon General's Office

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

Shipt Shipment
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 539

SKD Semi-knocked down

SN Secretary of the Navy

SOP Standard operating procedure

SOPAC South Pacific Area

SOS Services of Supply

Sp Special

SPA South Pacific Area

SPE Seattle Port of Embarkation

St Staging

Sta Station(s)

Stg Storage

SUP Single-unit pack

Sup Supply

Sv Service

SvC Service command

SW Secretary of War

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

SWPC Smaller War Plants Corporation

Tab Table or tabulation

TAG The Adjutant General

TAT To accompany troops

TC Transportation Corps

TCC Transportation Control Committee

TCPI Transportation Corps Procurement Instructions

TD Temporary duty

Tech Technical

Telg Telegram

TIG The Inspector General

TM Technical Manual

Tng Training

T/O Table of Organization

T/O&E Table of Organization and Equipment

TQMG The Quartermaster General

Traf Traffic

Trans Transportation

TUP Twin-unit pack

TWX Teletype message

UK United Kingdom

UNKRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

USA U.S. Army

USAT U.S. Army transport

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USN U.S. Navy

USW Under Secretary of War
540 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

UTC Unit training center

VCNO Vice Chief of Naval Operations

VSD Vendor's shipping document

WAC Women's Army Corps

WD War Department

WDGS War Department General Staff

WDPR War Department Procurement Regulations

WDSS War Department Special Staff

WPB War Production Board

WSA War Shipping Administration

ZEC Converted Liberty ship

ZI Zone of interior

ZTO Zone transportation officer
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
542 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

Acadia, 218, 219

Acceptance of new equipment, 498-99

Acid, transportation of, 302

Adjutant General, The, 66, 68, 134, 430, 452

Africa. See North African theater; Central Africa.

Afrika Korps, 335

Agriculture, Department of, 268, 269, 285, 286, 412

Air courier, 349, 350

Air Forces. See Army Air Forces.

Air freight regulating officers, 353

Air mail, 375

Air Service Command, 160, 352

Air Transport Association of America, 209

Air Transport Command, 180, 183, 189, 231, 253,

254, 352, 353

Air transportation, of freight, 249, 253, 254, 316,

335, 351, 353

Air transportation, of troops, 108, 167. See also Air

Transport Command; Airlines; Army Air Forces.

controlled by AAF, 7

patients, 213, 225, 228, 231

during redeployment, 176, 180, 183, 189, 190, 195

during repatriation, 204, 208, 209, 210

Airborne divisions, 86

Air-conditioned railway cars, 73

Aircraft, shipment by water, 334, 362-66

Aircraft carriers, 93, 334, 364, 365, 366

Airlines, 16, 17, 28, 195, 208, 209, 210, 249, 316

Army policy on use of, 29

Airports. See Ports of aerial embarkation.

Alaska, 101, 169, 331, 334, 340, 440, 478, 491

Aleda E. Lutz, 219

Alert notices, to troop units, 106, 116, 118

Algonquin, 219

Allocation of ships by WSA

cargo ships, 328, 357, 358, 417

troopships, 93, 94

Ambulances, 71, 229, 230

American Expeditionary Forces, 89, 148

American Hotel Association, 67

American Red Cross. See Red Cross.

Ammunition. See Explosives shipments.

Amphibian truck battalion, headquarters and headquarters detachment, 437

Amphibian truck company, 422, 435, 437, 444, 445,

446, 448, 453

Amphibious assault forces, 135, 136, 163, 220, 373,

392, 395, 396, 420

Amphibious trucks (DUKW's), 442, 446, 449, 456,

512

Amphibious Vehicle Training School, 445

Animals, shipment overseas, 370-71

Antitrust laws, and the railroads, 320

APA's. See Combat loaders.

APO numbers, 135

Appleton, Brig. Gen. John A., 14

Aquitania, 90, 186

Ardennes, German counteroffensive in, 87, 99, 250,

330, 350, 388, 406

Area Production Urgency Committee, 489

Argentina, 90, 233, 234

Armored division, 86, 148

Army Administration School, 429-30

Army Air Forces, 14, 117, 121, 130, 172, 178, 180,

181, 195, 213, 249, 251, 298, 305, 331, 332, 352,

353, 364, 389, 394, 398, 401, 421, 422, 459, 470.

See also Air Service Command; Air Transport

Command.

cargo shipments overseas, 332, 333, 352-53

command of troops at staging areas, 114

control of air traffic, 7, 167

control of domestic surface traffic, 7, 26, 257, 317,

517

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245

intransit depots, 160, 352, 399

marine equipment, 463, 475, 495

matériel returned to U.S., 410

relation to troop movements, 34, 105

Army Emergency Relief, 62

Army freight shipments, to theaters. See Cargo

shipments, to theaters.

Army freight traffic, in U.S. See also Consolidated

car service; Control of freight traffic flow; Freight

rates and classifications; Freight traffic, in U.S.;

Less-than-carload shipments; Traffic Control

Division; Transportation Control Committee,

average tons per car, 303

characteristics, 243-45

clearance problems, 263

distribution among carriers, 248-55, 258

diversion of shipments, 262, 263
544 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Army freight traffic, in U. S.—Continued

effect of end of hostilities, 405-08

length of rail haul, 245

mobilization of freight cars, 296-304

notice to consignees, 298

origins and destinations, 243-45

routing, 247, 255-64

volume, 241, 242, 245-46

Army Ground Forces, 108, 117, 121, 155, 172, 178,

181, 352, 422, 448, 459

command of troops at staging areas, 114

relation to troop movements, 34, 105

requested to avoid excessive travel, 14

training of service troops, 421

Army installations, in U.S., 51, 60, 67, 68, 115,

400, 401. See also Home stations, of troops.

percentage of freight shipped, 243

rail facilities, 35, 44, 45

solicitation by carriers, 259

transportation officers. See Transportation officers,

at Army installations.

utilization of freight cars, 297-302, 304

Army News Service, 141

Army Packaging Board, 394

Army passenger traffic, to theaters. See also Troop

movements, from U.S. to theaters.

numbers embarked, 86, 100

types of passengers moved, 85, 144

Army passenger traffic, in U.S. See also Troop

movements, in U.S.

categories of passengers, 11, 12

centralized management, 25, 26, 35

choice of carriers, 28, 29

dependents of soldiers, 236

growth during war, 11, 12

numbers moved, 12, 29, 30

patients, 70-77, 196

prisoners of war, 77-81, 191

during redeployment, 177, 179, 190-95, 196

during repatriation, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206-10

routing procedures, 25-27

TC organization for managing, 14, 15

Army Postal Service, 135, 375, 376

Army regulating stations, 56, 262, 268, 269, 278

Army reservation bureaus, 63-65, 67

Navy participation, 65

number of reservations obtained, 65

Army Service Forces, 6, 8, 14, 61, 69, 80, 85, 108,

114, 117, 121, 154, 158, 160, 171, 172, 182, 301,

332, 336, 354, 369, 383, 389, 410, 469, 488, 520.

See also Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy; Service commands; Services of Supply;' Somervell, Gen.

Army Service Forces—Continued

Brehon B.; Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D.

evacuation of patients regulated, 212, 213

packing and marking, 391, 393, 394, 396, 397,

398, 399

procurement supervision, 466, 470, 471, 475, 479,

480, 482, 491, 492, 493, 497, 505, 513, 516

regulation of oversea supply, 336-38, 340, 343-45,

346, 349, 351, 353, 355, 356, 405, 407, 518,

519

relation to troop movements, 34, 105, 108

role in redeployment and repatriation, 173, 181,

187, 405, 407

shipping documents developed by, 400

training supervision, 10, 421, 422, 423, 445, 449,

455, 457, 458, 459

Army Service Forces depots, 307. See also Technical

service depots.

Army Service Forces training centers, 423. See also

Training centers.

Army Supply Program, 472, 480, 493

Army Transport Service, 6

Army Transportation Service, 6, 7

Army-Navy consolidated car service. See Consolidated car service.

Army-Navy "E" production awards, 490

Army-Navy Explosives Safety Board, 383, 409

Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 353

Army-Navy Shipping Information Agencies, 164

Asiatic theater, 99, 100, 328, 331, 436

Assembly areas, 179, 200

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, ASF. See

Director of Operations, ASF.

Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations,

OCT. See Director of Operations, OCT.

Assistant Chief of Transportation for Supply, OCT,

467, 470, 481, 492, 493. See also Director of

Supply, OCT; Director of Matériel and Supply,

OCT.

Assistant Secretary of War, 266

Association of American Railroads, 15, 22, 42, 44, 56,

78, 81, 173, 191, 199, 201, 205, 210, 247, 252,

258, 261, 263, 264, 265, 267, 269, 274, 277, 296,

297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 314, 317, 377, 406,

513. See also Car Service Division; Military

Transportation Section.

Atlantic bases, 282, 331, 340

Atlantic coast ports of U.S., 94, 99, 157, 177, 178,

180, 189, 190, 195, 197, 205, 206, 227, 265, 275,

281, 282, 283, 286, 294, 331, 345, 346, 349, 359,

407. See also Ports of embarkation in U.S.

Atlantic Coast TC Officers Training School, 426, 428
INDEX 545

Atlantic theaters, or areas, 99, 165, 350, 355-56, 409.

See also European theater; Mediterranean theater;

North African theater; Theaters of operations,

cargo shipments to, 328, 330

passengers transported to, 101

Attack transports. See Combat loaders.

Attorney General, 320, 325

Attu, 136, 373, 396

Auburn Holding and Reconsignment Point, 283, 287,

288, 291

Auburn TC subdepot, 288, 516

Australia, 233, 371, 478, 494

Automatic supply, of oversea areas, 333, 342, 353,

417

Aviation rescue company, 444

AWOL, 116, 127

Backhauling of freight, 304, 305

Baggage, troop, 20, 21

Baggage cars, use as kitchen cars, 21, 22, 50, 196

Baltimore cargo port, 100, 331, 332, 381, 390

Bands, at embarkations, 132

Barge lines. See Inland waterway traffic.

Barracks bags, 126, 127

Base depot companies, 435, 437, 440, 450

Battle of the Bulge. See Ardennes.

Bayonne Terminal, 378

Benicia Arsenal, 378, 380, 382, 383

Billeting, 115, 129, 130, 135

Bills of lading, 241, 245, 255, 268, 274, 278, 290, 301,

302, 304, 319, 320, 322

Black Tom disaster, 377, 378

Blanche F. Sigman, 219

Blanket routings, 28, 257, 260, 310

Block loading, of cargo, 373

Block releases, for freight shipments, 273, 274, 275,

280, 415

Boston Port of Embarkation, 86, 100, 157, 189, 207,

331, 332, 340, 356, 380, 381, 382, 390

Boyd, Lt. Col. Richard M., 259

Brazil, 90

Britannic, 90

British Army Staff in Washington, 138, 359

British Chiefs of Staff, 132

British Eighth Army, 335, 359

British Ministry of Supply, 287

British Ministry of War Transport, 85, 89, 93, 94,

128, 136, 138, 272, 273, 276, 277, 280, 361, 364,

378, 403, 411, 412, 415

British ports, 155, 156

British vessels, 89, 90, 93, 99, 132, 138, 139, 155, 165,

186, 202, 203, 220, 224, 364, 412

Brodie System, 512

Broken stowage. See Stowage of cargo, in ships.

Buda Company, 456

Budget, for TC matériel, 467, 478

Buford, Charles H., 210, 406

Bunker, Col. William B., 466, 467, 470

Bunting, Col. Geoffrey C., 424

Bureau of the Budget, 215, 324

Bureau of Explosives, 252, 299, 377, 380, 382

Bureau of Safety, ICC, 377

Burma, 370, 438

Burma Road, 279

Bus traffic, 15, 17, 25, 28, 29, 58, 83, 210

number of Army passengers, 30

TC policy on use of buses, 28, 29, 83, 195

Byrnes, James F., 14, 477

Cadres, 451-53

California Point explosives terminal, 382, 383

California-Arizona Maneuver Area, 45

"Call" by port commander

freight shipments, 274, 336

troop equipment, 102, 150

troops, 102, 107

Camp Anza, California, 113

Camp Beale, California, 191

Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 424, 439, 454

Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, 422, 424, 428, 444,

445, 446, 448, 449, 450, 454, 455, 456

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, 113, 127

Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts, 113, 191

Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, 113, 121, 124

Camp Plauché, Louisiana, 113, 433, 450, 451. See

also New Orleans Unit Training Center.

Camp Polk, Louisiana, 439

Camp Shanks, New York, 113, 127

Camp Shelby, Mississippi, 424, 454

Camp Stoneman, California, 113, 127, 426, 428

Campbell, Harry A., 380

Canada, 86, 101, 139, 210

Car Service Division, AAR, 15, 39, 40, 194, 247,

258, 264, 272, 296, 297. See also Military

Transportation Section.

Car Service Section

Control Branch, OCT, 303

Passenger Branch, OCT, 39, 43

Car situation reports, 298, 299

Cargo. Ste also Cargo shipments, to theaters;

Loading of cargo, in ships; Stowage of cargo, in

ships.

better balance sought, 5, 338, 360, 361, 519

returned from theaters, 408-10

shortages at shipside, 4, 329, 359, 417

Cargo distribution chart, 346, 349
546 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Cargo loading committee, 346, 349

Cargo manifest, 103, 349, 350, 389, 402, 403, 408

Cargo planning, 338, 346, 348, 349, 354

balancing ship space and cargo, 357-59

emergency shipments, 359-60

Cargo ports of embarkation, 100, 331, 332

Cargo security officers, 138, 146, 403-04

Cargo shipments, to theaters. See also Cargo; Cargo

planning; Cargo ships; Loading of cargo, in

ships; Regulation of oversea supply movements;

Stowage of cargo, in ships.

adjustments at end of hostilities, 405-08

aircraft, 334, 363-66

ammunition and explosives, 376-89

analysis by destinations, 328, 330, 331

analysis by ports of embarkation, 330, 331, 332

analysis by shipping services, 332, 333

animals, 370-71

cable advice to the theaters, 349, 350

emergency shipments, 335, 359-60, 361

locomotives, 369-70

mail, 374-75

refrigerated cargo, 371-72

tanks, 366, 368

total tonnage shipped, 327, 328

vehicles, 332, 334, 368-69

Cargo ships. See also Liberty ships; Ships for military

use; Victory ships.

allocation by WSA, 328, 357, 358, 417

conversion to hospital ships, 216, 218

conversion to troopships, 90, 91, 176, 185, 202, 203

detention in the theaters, 4, 355, 372, 373, 374

employment affected by German surrender, 406

employment after Japanese surrender, 407-08

fast services established, 159, 185, 350-51, 388

heavier booms installed, 362, 368

specialized ships, 362-63, 369, 370-72

use to carry troops, 91, 131, 203

use to evacuate patients, 228

use to return dependents, 233

Caribbean bases, 261, 271, 282, 331, 334, 340

Carload shipments, 248, 256, 259, 267, 281, 289, 295,

303. See also Consolidated car service.

Casablanca Conference, 156

Castle Island explosives terminal, 380, 381, 382

Casual troops, 123, 144, 169, 171

Catalogue of spare parts, 503, 504

Caven Point explosives terminal, 379, 380, 381, 382,

383

Central Africa, 101, 149, 328, 334

Central Pacific, 101, 149, 163, 169, 328, 331, 334,

340, 448

Chaplains, on troopships, 138, 141, 142, 143

Charles A. Stafford, 219

Charleston Ordnance Depot, 378, 380

Charleston Port of Embarkation, 100, 108, 189, 222,

331, 332, 340, 390, 444, 445

Chateau Thierry, 219

Chemical Warfare Service, 242, 245, 305, 333, 385,

390, 410

cargo shipments overseas, 333

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245

Chemicals, transportation of, 302, 390

Chester Tank Depot, 360

Chicago Junction Railway, 306, 314

Chicago Quartermaster Depot, 307

Chief of Engineers, 7, 283, 379, 439, 440, 462, 463,

465, 467, 475, 478. See also Corps of Engineers.

Chief of Ordnance, 7, 152, 366, 378, 379, 380. See

also Ordnance Department.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 13, 68, 105, 114, 180, 185,

459. See also Marshall, Gen. George C.

Chief of Transportation. See also Gross, Maj. Gen.

Charles P.; Office of the Chief of Transportation;

Transportation Corps.

basic tasks, 7, 8, 167, 242, 327, 419, 462-63

broad objectives, 7, 517-19

creation of office, 7, 84

criticizes theater supply practices, 355

dispute with ASF headquarters over oversea supply

movements, 337-38, 518-19

doctrine on centralized traffic management, 25, 26,

257-60

doctrine on use of holding and reconsignment

points, 286, 289, 295

emphasis on avoidance of port congestion, 273, 275,

276, 277

emphasis on safety in moving explosives, 376, 383

estimate of railroads' performance, 15, 25, 81, 82

freight rate practices criticized, 324, 326

handicaps due to late start, 8, 520-22

organization under his command, 9, 10, 517

policy on use of highway carriers, 17, 28, 29, 248,

250, 251, 252, 312

relations with civilian transportation agencies, 5,

522-24

relations with theater commanders, 8, 473

role in planning troop movements, 34, 94-97

staff functions, 8, 520

views on qualifications of TC officers, 426, 430, 460

Chiefs of technical services. See Technical Services.

China-Burma-India theater, 87, 101, 169, 214, 491

See also India-Burma theater; Asiatic theater.

Chrysler Corporation, 456

Churchill, Winston S., 84, 93, 335

Civilian aid shipments, 319, 330, 332, 411, 416
INDEX 547

Civilian Personnel Division, OCT, 469

Civilian travel in U.S., conflict with military traffic,

11, 46, 58, 59, 193, 199, 200, 523-24

Claiborne and Polk Military Railway, 439, 441

Claremont Terminal, 379

Classification of TC equipment, 511

Clearance problems, on freight shipments, 263

Coast Artillery Corps, 424, 475, 511

Coast Guard, 65, 130, 147, 190, 309, 378, 382, 384-

86, 390

Code marking. See Marking for shipment.

Code marking policy committee, 398

Coe, Col. Noble M., 399

COM-AIR service, 208, 209

Combat loaders (naval attack transports), 91, 135,

162, 176, 202, 203, 373

Combatant vessels, used to move troops, 91, 93, 162,

176, 186, 187, 202, 203, 239

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3, 84, 91, 93, 132, 147,

173, 175, 176, 357

Combined Military Transportation Committee, 93,

357

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, 3, 173, 357,

368

Combined Staff Planners, 56

Comfort, 217, 219

Command groups, at staging areas, 114, 115

Commanders, troop unit, 49, 55, 57, 105, 106, 108,

115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 125, 127, 136, 138, 144,

150, 154, 161, 453

Commanding General shipments, 411, 417

Commanding officer, of troops on troopships, 136

Commerce, Department of, 288

Commercial Traffic Agency, 278, 414

Commercial Traffic Branch, OQMG, 15, 261, 267,

268

Commercial Traffic Bulletin, 35, 263

Committee on Aircraft Transportation, 364-66

Commodity descriptions, Army freight, 320, 321

Commodity freight rates, 320, 322

Commodity loading, of ships, 374

Common carriers. See Domestic carriers.

Communication facilities, 56, 104, 170, 350, 351, 355,

356. See also Radio communications; Telegraph

communications; Telephone communications;

Teletype communications.

Competitive bidding, on TC contracts, 482

Component parts, of TC equipment, 472, 488, 492.

494, 496, 498

Composite table of organization, 451

Comptroller General of the U.S., 33

Connor, Lt. Col. Edward H., Jr., 424

Consolidated car service, 9, 248, 256, 305-16, 326

advantages, 309, 316

freight charges, 314, 315

Navy included, 309

number of shipments handled, 316

operation of the stations, 313, 314

purpose, 305, 306, 313

stations, 306, 307

tonnage consolidated, 310

Consolidated ticket office, 67

Consolidating and Distributing Branch, OCT, 310,

315

Containers. See Packing and packaging.

Continental Europe, invasion of, 87, 99, 111, 155, 156,

157, 159, 160, 226, 277, 330, 362, 373, 374, 384,

387, 491, 492, 501

Contract carriers, 243, 250

Contracting officers, 481-90 passim

Contracting procedures, 481-86

Contractors, for TC matériel, 481-90, 493, 494, 49.5,

496, 504

aid given by TC, 486, 488, 497-98

industrial disputes, 489-90

labor supply, 489

subcontractors, 485, 488

Control Branch, OCT, 256, 261, 262, 274, 359

Control Division, ASF, 337, 401, 402

Control Division, OCT, 299, 402, 403

Control of freight traffic flow, 264-81, 297, 327, 352,

405-08, 520

appraisal of results, 280, 281, 295, 524

lend-lease shipments, 412-15

problems following Pearl Harbor, 268, 269, 271

purpose, 264

system developed, 272-75, 359

transit storage a factor, 269, 282

Controlled items of supply, 120, 343, 344

Controlled Materials Plan, 493-94, 495

Controlled Materials Plan Division, OCT, 469

Conversion of cargo ships, 90, 91, 176, 185, 202, 203,

216, 372, 477. See also Liberty ships; Victory

ships.

Convoy loading, of ships, 149, 157, 372

Convoys, 94, 110, 146, 149, 155, 159, 186, 190, 335,

346, 349, 359

Conway, Capt. Granville, 210

Co-ordinator of Ship Repair and Conversion, 218

CORONET, 334

Corps areas, 68, 105, 118

Corps of Engineers, 242, 245, 284, 305, 409, 410, 505.

508, 512. See also Chief of Engineers.

cargo shipments overseas, 332, 333

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245
548 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Coughlin, Col. Leo J., 285

Council of National Defense, 266

Craig, Col. John E., 273, 277, 280

Crews, for vessels, 136, 140, 221, 234, 499, 505. See

also Harbor craft companies.

Critical items of supply, 344

Crooks, Harry D., 285

Crosshauling of freight, 304, 305

Cummins Engine Corporation, 456

Davis, Col. John F., 424

Debarkation hospitals, 70, 229, 230

Debarkation of troops

at oversea ports, 144

at U.S. ports. See Ports of debarkation, in U.S.

Deck cargo, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 370,

372

Defense, Department of, 525

Defense Plant Corporation, 22, 50, 486

Deliveries of new equipment, 497-99

Demobilization, 173, 174, 181, 199, 207, 209, 210

Demobilization Planning Unit, OCT, 182

Demurrage, 276, 298, 299

Dental treatment, for troops, 116, 143

Dependents, of military personnel, 167, 168, 231-37

movement from U.S., 236-37

war brides brought to U.S., 232-36

Depot Division, OQMG, 282

Depots, 243, 244, 298, 304, 307, 309, 352, 409. See

also Filler depots; General depots; Transportation Corps depots; Technical service depots.

Design, of TC equipment, 467, 475, 495, 505, 508-11,

514

Detroit Tank and Automotive Center, 262

DeWitt, Brig. Gen. Calvin, Jr., 356

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L., 81

Diesel locomotives, 456, 510, 512

Diesel marine engines, 456, 506

Dillon, Brig. Gen. Theodore H., 268, 431, 512

Director of Defense Transportation. See Johnson,

J. Monroe; Office of Defense Transportation.

Director of Matériel, ASF, 479

Director of Matériel and Supply, OCT, 472, 481, 509.

See also Assistant Chief of Transportation for

Supply, OCT; Director of Supply, OCT.

Director of Military Training, ASF, 114, 422, 423

Director of Military Training, OCT, 424, 425, 438.

See also Bunting, Col. Geoffrey C.; Scofield, Col.

Frank C.

Director of Operations, ASF, 8, 337, 520. See also

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy.

Director of Operations, OCT, 243, 328, 415. See

also Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H.

Director of Railway Training, 441

Director of Requirements, ASF, 479

Director of Supply, ASF, 503. See also Supply

Division, ASF.

Director of Supply, OCT, 470, 471, 475, 480, 481,

482, 488, 497, 498, 508, 510, 511, 513, 516. See also

Assistant Chief of Transportation for Supply,

OCT; Director of Matériel and Supply, OCT.

Disaster control plan, 387

Discipline, troop. See also Morale, troop.

on Liberty ships, 146

on regular trains, 59, 67-70

at staging areas, 115, 124, 125

on troop trains, 51

Disposition centers, 177, 178, 189

Distribution centers for remains, 238

Distribution Division, OCT, 471, 503

District transportation offices, 10, 468, 472, 497

Diversion of freight shipments, 262, 263, 275, 278,

280, 311

Division of Defense Aid Reports, 282

Divisions, movement of

to Europe, 86

45th to Sicily, 373

organizational equipment involved, 148

railway equipment used, 36, 40

in redeployment, 184

Dixon, Col. Marvin H., 415

Documentation of shipments, 349, 350, 400-402, 413

Dogwood, 219

Domestic carriers. See also Airlines; Army freight

traffic, in U.S.; Army passenger traffic, in U.S.;

Association of American Railroads; Bus traffic;

Inland waterway traffic; Railway cars, for troop

movements; Railway freight cars; Truck traffic.

Army freight moved, 241, 249

Army passengers moved, 29, 30

collaboration with the Army, 15-25, 81, 258, 296,

304

impact of redeployment, 190-94

impact of repatriation, 200, 201, 204-07, 210-11

planning for redeployment, 179, 180

precedence given military traffic, 5

wartime restriction of services, 11, 523

Double bunking, on troopships, 130, 186

Duke, Brig. Gen. James T., 222

DUKW. See Amphibious trucks.

Duncombe, Col. Herbert S., 137

Dunwoody, Col. Halsey, 182

Duval County Vocational School, 457

Earle explosives terminal, 381, 382, 390

Eastern Sea Frontier, 170, 189
INDEX 549

Economical routes, use of, 27, 29, 248, 259, 312, 316

Editing, of oversea supply requisitions, 342, 343, 347,

352, 354

Edmund B. Alexander, 90

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 87, 217, 219, 250, 335,

359, 388, 411

El Alamein, 335

El Estaro, 383

Elmira Holding and Reconsignment Point, 157, 158,

283, 287, 288, 291

Elmira TC subdepot, 291, 516

Embargo, on freight shipments, 264, 265, 272, 276,

297

Embarkation of passengers, at U.S. ports. See also

Troop embarkation, at U.S. ports,

number of passengers, 100, 101

types of passengers, 85, 86

Emeryville vehicle processing plant, 152

Emily H. M. Weder, 219

Empress of Scotland, 90

Enemy aliens, 80, 81

Engineer Amphibian Command, 476

Engineer special brigade, 449

Engineering Division, OCT, 469, 471, 492, 508

Equipment, troop. See Individual equipment, troop;

Organizational equipment.

Ernest Hinds, 219

Ernestine Koranda, 219

European theater, 70, 78, 81, 87, 91, 93, 101, 103,

131, 157, 158, 159, 168, 169, 171, 174, 179, 180,

183, 187, 189, 190, 197, 200, 204, 214, 219, 220,

226, 227, 233, 328, 330, 331, 334, 335, 340, 341,

347, 350, 371, 373, 374, 382, 384, 385, 395,

396, 401, 405, 406, 410, 431, 435, 436, 440, 513.

See also Continental Europe, invasion of; United

Kingdom.

Evacuation of patients. See Patients, evacuation

from theaters.

Expedited freight shipments, 260-63, 311, 350, 351

Expediting production, 492, 496, 497

Explosives shipments, 47, 91, 248, 252, 298, 353,

376-91, 396

lend-lease, 377, 379, 416

peak movement to theaters, 388

return shipments, 389, 409, 410

safety measures, 382-87, 409

safety record, 391

special storage facilities, 379, 380, 381

special terminal facilities, 266, 378-82, 383

tons shipped overseas, 389, 390

Export freight, at U.S. ports, 276, 277, 279, 281

Export freight rates, 321, 322

Extract supply requisitions, 343, 345, 346, 348, 354

Farr, Col. Donald E., 14, 94, 96, 104, 159, 163, 176

Feeding troops. See Messes.

Field maneuvers, 1940-41, 13

Field Service Group, 469, 470, 471, 492, 494, 508

Filler depots, 343, 345, 355

Fillers (troops), 86, 87, 88, 116, 117, 452, 453, 454

Finance Department, 452

Finlay, Col. Luke W., 182, 192, 469

Fiscal Division, OCT, 403; 469, 483, 484

Fitzpatrick, Col. John C., 213

Flatted cargo, 373

Floating equipment, Army. See Marine equipment,

Army.

Floating spare parts depot, 437, 451

Food service. See Messes.

Forecasts of production, 491, 492, 493, 496, 497

Foreign Economic Administration, 507

Fork-lift trucks, 395

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 439

Fort Eustis, Virginia, 461

Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, 424, 440, 441, 454

Fort Hamilton, New York, 113

Fort Lawton, Washington, 113, 124

Fort McDowell, California, 113

Fort McHenry, Maryland, 385

Fort Mason, California, 378

Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 440

Fort Slocum, New York, 426, 428

Fort Snelling, Minnesota, 439

Fort Story, Virginia, 445

Fort Worth Quartermaster Depot, 307

Forwarding authorization serial numbers, 274, 414,

415

Fourth Service Command, 422, 449

France, 438. See also Continental Europe.

Frances Y. Slanger, 219, 220

Franklin, Maj. Gen. John M., 192, 477, 478

Freight billing guide, 320, 321

Freight Branch, OCT, 256, 259, 323

Freight car efficiency committees, 296

Freight consolidating stations, 307, 309, 310, 313, 314.

See also Consolidated car service.

Freight distributing agencies, 307, 313. See also

Consolidated car service.

Freight forwarders, 251, 306, 309, 312, 313, 414

Freight rates and classifications, 242, 252, 263, 312,

314, 316-26

commodity and class rates, 320, 321, 324

consolidated cars, 314, 315

export rates, 321, 322

government claim for reparations, 325, 326

investigation by special committee, 324

land-grant rates, 312, 313, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322
550 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Freight rates and classifications—Continued

most economical route, 248, 259, 312, 316

quotations by Traffic Control Division, 318

proceedings before ICC, 322, 323, 325, 326

rate personnel in OCT, 322, 323

total charges and savings, 324, 325

Freight shipments, to theaters. See Cargo shipments,

to theaters.

Freight traffic, in U.S. See also Army freight traffic,

in U.S.

average length of haul, 245

average tons per car, 303

circuitous routings, 295

wartime increase, 241

Freighters. See Cargo ships.

Frustrated export freight, 279

"Full and down" loading, of ships, 338, 361, 362, 374

Furlough travel, transoceanic, 86, 183

Furlough travel, in U.S., 58-70, 82

aid in obtaining reservations, 63-65

conflict with civilian travel, 59

cost deducted from pay, 63

discipline, 67-70

military sleeping car lines, 64, 65, 82

restrictions imposed, 59-61

special cars, 61, 62

special fares, 24, 25, 59

G-1, WDGS, 61, 132

G-2, WDGS, 55, 104, 105, 124, 132, 398

G-3, WDGS, 114, 421

G-4, WDGS, 7, 60, 155, 215, 261, 282, 286, 338, 392,

431, 520

Gasoline, transportation of, 298, 302, 353

Gasoline engines, specialists for, 456

Gasoline rationing, 11

Gass, Arthur H., 15

General Accounting Office, 313, 319, 320

General depots, 268, 282, 287

General hospitals, 75, 212

General Motors Corporation, 456

General Staff, War Department, 329, 339, 421, 422,

429, 518, 520. See also Chief of Staff, U.S. Army;

G-1; G-2; G-3; G-4.

George Washington, 90

Germany, 87, 94, 167, 182, 350, 388, 406, 438

Gilbreath, Maj. Gen. Frederick, 356

Goodman, Maj. Gen. William H., 340, 345, 350, 355,

356, 519

Government reservation bureaus, 63, 65, 201

Government-furnished equipment, 488

Gray, Maj. Gen. Carl R., Jr., 439, 440, 441

Green Project, 189, 190

Groninger, Maj. Gen. Homer M., 104, 356

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 7, 8, 18, 42, 48, 65, 78,

87, 96, 112, 147, 159, 162, 175, 181, 183, 190,

192, 193, 199, 200, 201, 227, 273, 287, 324, 329,

337, 342, 345, 378, 383, 391, 392, 399, 406, 412,

428, 430, 432, 460, 469, 476, 478, 481, 485, 501,

517. See also Chief of Transportation.

broad objectives, 7

concern over civilian aid shipping, 412

concern over port congestion, 275, 276, 277

defense of his assistant for supply, 470

differences with ASF Director of Operations, 8, 96,

337, 338, 344, 345, 519, 520

differences with Director of Defense Transportation, 6, 82, 193, 523

measures to control disturbances at ports, 124

Gulf ports of U.S., 177, 206, 281, 294, 331, 340, 407

Hague Convention, The, 215, 216, 221, 231

Halifax, Nova Scotia, 100, 377

Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 100, 121, 135,

170, 189, 207, 331, 332, 340, 373, 390, 445

Harbor craft. See Marine equipment; Small boat

procurement.

Harbor craft companies, 422, 432, 435, 437, 444-45,

448, 453

Hawaii, 330

Hawley, Maj. Gen. Paul R., 227

Headquarters and headquarters company, port, 433,

436, 437

Headquarters and headquarters detachment, port

battalion, 433, 436, 437

Heileman, Maj. Gen. Frank A., 503

Hemphill Diesel Engine School, 456

Hermitage, 90

Hicks, Col. Raymond M., 357

Highway carriers. See Bus traffic; Truck traffic.

Highway control stations, 279

Highway Division, OCT, 14, 242, 509

Hodson, Brig. Gen. Fremont B., 425

Holding and reconsignment points, 9, 160, 177, 2.43,

260, 269, 275, 279, 280, 281-95, 298, 321, 326,

343, 370, 394, 400, 401, 416, 498, 504, 516

basic purpose, 281, 286

control of space utilization, 286-88, 289

development of program, 281-85

estimate of value, 294, 295

tonnage handled, 289, 291

tons handled per man-day, 292

Holloway, Rear Adm. James F., 210

Home stations, of troops, 84, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109,

111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 150, 151, 157, 158

Hope, 217, 219
INDEX 551

Horner, Col. Frederick C., 14

Hospital cars, 24, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 229, 463, 511

operating statistics, 71

staffing, 76

Hospital facilities, on troopships, 215, 222, 224

Hospital ship commander, 221

Hospital ship complement, 221, 225

Hospital ships, 202, 203, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, 226,

231

deployment, 222

list of, 219

medical staffs, 221, 225

operating crews, 221

patient capacity, 219, 220

percentage of patients evacuated, 225

port commander's responsibility, 221, 222, 225

use to return dependents, 233

Hospital train maintenance platoon, 437, 440

Hospital trains, 74, 75

Hospitalization and Evacuation Branch, ASF, 71, 213

Hospitals. See Debarkation hospitals; General hospitals.

Hotel reservations, 67

Household goods, 251

Identification of Organizational Impedimenta (IOI),

106, 155

Ile de France, 90

Impedimenta. See Individual equipment, troop; Organizational equipment.

India, 169, 331, 371, 438, 478

India-Burma theater, 440. See also China-BurmaIndia theater.

Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania, 422, 424, 428, 432, 454

Individual equipment, troop, 126

arrangements for movement by rail, 20, 21

marking for shipment, 398

staging area responsibilities, 117, 119, 120

Induction stations, 13

Industrial disputes, 489, 490

Industrial Personnel Division, OCT, 489

Inflammables, transportation of, 390

Information and Education Division, ASF, 171

Initial supplies, for troops, 86, 88, 148, 332, 333, 334,

354, 398

Initial Troop Equipment Division, NYPE, 104, 154, 354

Inland waterway traffic, 248, 249, 252, 253, 279

Inland Waterways Section, OCT, 253

Inspection

of new equipment, 498-99

of troops in training, 441, 457-59

of troopships, 139, 146

Inspector General, The, 105, 107, 108, 109, 119,

124, 132, 188, 404, 421, 423, 457, 458, 505, 516

Insurance, on boats during construction, 484-85

Intelligence and Security Division, OCT, 124

Internal combustion engines, 505-06, 515

International aid

shipments, 241, 410-17. See also Lend-lease.

TC procurement for, 479, 507

International Division, OCT, 415

Internment camps, prisoner of war, 78, 79

Interstate Commerce Act, 5, 16, 25, 315, 321, 322,

325

Interstate Commerce Commission, 264

diversion of freight shipments, 57, 262, 263, 311

and freight rates, 316, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325,

326

order on rail accommodations for patients, 75

regulation of freight forwarders, 306

regulation of movement of explosives, 252, 377

regulation of refrigerator cars, 302, 310

regulation of special freight trains, 261

safety regulations, 47, 377

Interterritorial Military Committee, 15, 28

Intransit depots, for AAF matériel, 160, 352, 399

Iran, 438, 478, 510

Iranian State Railway, 438

Italian Service Units, 80, 292

Italy, 370, 438, 478, 510

Jackson Barracks, 113

Japan, 167, 173, 174, 177, 182, 183, 195, 199, 200,

287, 328, 331, 334, 335, 356, 409, 412, 416, 479

Jarrett M. Huddleston, 219

Jeffe, Brig. Gen. Ephraim F., 471

Jet propulsion, for small boats, 512

John J. Meany, 219

John L. Clem, 219

Johnson, J. Monroe, 14, 65, 180, 191, 192, 193, 201,

208, 209, 210. See also Office of Defense Transportation.

Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board, 382,

383

Joint Army-Navy Board on Port Facilities, 382

Joint Army-Navy Packaging Board, 394

Joint Army-Navy Surface Personnel Committee, 161,

164

Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Operations Committee,

162

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3, 4, 5, 34, 84, 87, 91, 93, 161,

163, 173, 175, 176, 202, 216, 217, 218, 220, 327,

334, 357, 364, 372, 463, 477

Joint Logistics Committee, 220, 357, 372, 477

Joint Marine Procurement Board, 478
552 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Joint Military Passenger Agreement, 16-19, 20, 21,

28, 196

Joint Military Passenger Equalization Agreement, 16,

17, 19, 318, 319

Joint Military Transportation Committee, 5, 91, 93,

94, 161, 163, 202, 218, 220, 357, 477

Joint preference agreement on use of sleeping cars,

196, 200

Joint Production Survey Committee, 477

Joint Small Craft Subcommittee, 477

Joint Staff Planners, 216

Joint troop-priority list, 84, 93, 163

Joint use of troopships, 84, 161-64, 202

Judge Advocate General, 320, 323

Justice, Department of, 320, 325, 326

Kells, Maj. Gen. Clarence H., 356

Kelly, John J., 15

Kendall, Warren C., 15, 39

King, Admiral Ernest J., 477

Kirk, Maj. Gen. Norman T., 227

Kiska, 136

Kitchen cars. See Baggage cars, use as kitchen cars;

Medical kitchen cars; Troop kitchen cars.

Korea, 328, 416, 525

Labor supply, 323, 420

for domestic carriers, 11, 47, 51, 82, 193

a factor in procurement, 483, 489, 496

at freight consolidating stations, 314

at holding and reconsignment points, 291, 292

Labor unions, 204, 433

Land, Rear Adm. Emory S., 215, 216

Land ships, 433

Land-grant rates, 16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 250, 252, 312,

313, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322

Landing craft, 463, 475-76, 494, 515

Landing ship, tank (LST), 93, 368, 446

Larkspur, 219

Lasher, Col. Edmund C. R., 15, 44

Lathrop Holding and Reconsignment Point, 287,

288, 291

Lathrop TC depot, 288, 516

Latin America, 101, 328

Lead time, on TC procurement, 473, 479

Leavey, Maj. Gen. Edmond H., 280

Legal Division, OCT, 469, 482

Legislation, affecting Army transportation, 7, 18, 19,

25, 32, 61, 204, 232, 250, 306, 318, 319, 414, 462,

463, 483

Lend-lease

shipments, 5, 267, 268, 269, 271, 274, 275, 277, 280,

282, 283, 285, 287, 319, 330, 359, 361, 377, 399,

410-17 passim, 439, 465

TC procurement for, 465, 495

Lend-Lease Act, 19, 281, 378, 411, 465, 478

Lend-Lease Administration, 282, 285, 295

Lentz, Col. Bernard, 426

Less-than-carload shipments, 248, 252, 295, 302, 305.

See also Consolidated car service.

Levels of supply, in theaters, 336, 342, 343, 354

Lewis, Brig. Gen. Burton O., 470, 471, 478

Liaison section, at port staging areas, 115, 178

Liaison Staff, OCT, 470

Liberty ships, 238, 362, 363, 366, 368, 369, 373

conversion to carry prisoners of war, 90

conversion to carry troops, 91, 94, 99

defects as troop carriers, 145-48

use for returning troops, 185, 188, 203

Life preserver, developed by TC, 511

Lifeboat, developed by TC, 511

Lifesaving equipment, on troopships, 130

Liquor, on trains, 51, 68, 69

Loading cable, to theaters, 103

Loading of cargo, in ships. See also Cargo shipments,

to theaters; Stowage of cargo,

component items, 349, 398

dispute between Gross and Lutes, 337, 338, 519, 520

dispute between WSA and armed forces, 5, 523

loading committees at ports, 346, 349

master loading plan, 346, 348

Loading detail, at troop embarkation, 126, 128, 129

Loading plan, for troop embarkation, 103, 126

Loading rules, for freight cars, 296, 299-302, 304

Locomotives, shipment of, 363, 369-70. See also

Railway equipment, procured for the Army.

Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, 100, 101, 160, 207,

208, 331, 332, 381, 390

Louis A. Milne, 219

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 8, 96, 337, 338, 344, 345,

351, 519, 520

Luzon, 438, 479

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 167, 200, 250, 335, 477,

491

McIntyre, Brig. Gen. Andrew F., 14, 384

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 44

Mail, shipment overseas, 374-75

Main numbers, train, 46

Maintenance, of TC equipment, 488, 499-507, 509,

522

Chief of Transportation's responsibilities, 499

early deficiencies, 488, 499-502

Maintenance Division ineffective, 503

publications, 471, 503, 504

summary of shortcomings, 515

Maintenance Division, OCT, 471, 472, 503, 515
INDEX 553

Maintenance supplies, shipment overseas, 88, 154,

332, 333, 334, 341

Major ports, 235, 369, 433, 435, 437

Manifest. See Cargo manifest.

Manpower. See Labor supply.

Mareng cell, 513

Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point, 282, 283,

285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 450

Marietta TC depot, 288, 516

Marigold, 219

Marine Corps, 65, 161, 190, 201, 309

Marine equipment, Army, 462, 463, 466, 467, 473-

78, 480, 484, 485, 486, 488, 491, 492, 494, 495,

497, 498-99, 504, 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 513

dispute over procurement responsibility, 476-77

quantities of major items procured, 502

standardization, 465, 495, 501, 509-11

technical development, 508, 509, 511, 512

Marine propulsion, study of, 512

Marine ship repair company, 437, 450

Mariposa, 233

Maritime Association of the Port of New York, 266

Maritime Commission, 4, 5, 87, 90, 94, 146, 185, 215,

216, 266, 269, 271, 272, 287, 328, 329, 357, 363,

372, 465, 467, 473, 477, 490, 515

competition with armed forces, 486

shipbuilding achievement, 4

statutory responsibility, 463

Marking for shipment, 57, 150, 155, 353, 396-400,

413, 498

Marshall, Gen. George C., 13, 68, 132, 135

Masters, of troopships, 138, 146, 224

Maston, Lt. Col. Victor E., 81

Materials, shortages, 472, 479, 480, 483, 493, 496, 500

Materials-handling equipment, 292, 462, 463, 466,

467, 497, 513. See also Fork-lift trucks,

designs, 509

quantities of major items constructed, 502

Matsonia, 90

Mauretania, 90

Meccano decks, 364

Mechanical-aptitude tests, 446, 461

Medical Corps (Department), 19, 76, 242, 305, 333,

410, 452. See also Surgeon General, The.

Medical hospital ship platoons, 224, 225, 226

Medical kitchen cars, 24, 71, 75

Medical liaison officer, 71, 213

Medical processing, at port staging areas, 116

Medical regulating unit, 71, 213

Medical staff

on hospital ships, 221

on troop trains, 34, 49

on troopships, 143, 224, 225, 226, 233

Mediterranean theater, 81, 91, 93, 101, 180, 183, 187,

189, 190, 197, 204, 218, 226, 227, 328, 331, 340,

347, 371, 373, 395, 401, 405, 406, 410, 435, 436,

440, 491, 513

Medium ports, 433, 437

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 463

Mercy, 217, 219

Messersmith, Col. Joshua R., 201

Messes

on British troopships, 140

for patients moved by rail, 75, 76

at port staging areas, 121

for troops moved by rail, 21, 22, 50

on U.S. troopships, 139-41

Metzman, Gustav, 14

Meyer, Col. Richard D., 85

MI numbers, train, 57

Middle East, 101, 149, 328, 335

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy G., 135, 373

Military complement, on troopships, 137, 138, 143,

146

Military District of Washington, 67

Military occupational specialties, 424, 454

Military passenger traffic in U.S.

definition, 16, 19

precedence given by carriers, 5

Military planning, affected by transportation, 84

Military police, 68, 69, 70, 404, 435

Military Railway Service, 370, 428, 450, 456, 462

early organization, 439-40

equipment for, 478-79, 495-96, 502

transferred to TC, 440

troops for, 419, 422, 424, 426, 437, 438-42, 453,

454, 461, 521

Military security, 46, 56, 57, 105, 178, 396, 397-99,

438, 498. See also Marking for shipment; Secrecy;

Shipment numbers.

Military sleeping car lines, 64, 65, 82

Military training. See Training, TC troop, military.

Military Training Division, OCT, 423, 424, 441, 444,

457, 460

Military Transportation Section, AAR, 15, 25, 26, 27,

39, 40, 48, 51, 54, 74, 247, 261, 265, 296, 303

Mine planters, 463, 512

Minimum standards, for troopships, 139

Mobile ports, 433

Mobilization Division, ASF, 34, 95, 96, 119, 181, 422

Mobilization training program, 460, 461

Monterey, 90, 233

Montgomery Holding and Reconsignment Point,

283, 287, 288, 291, 451

Montgomery TC Depot, 288, 516

Monticello, 90
554 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Morale, troop, 48, 115, 121, 125, 134, 139, 141, 170,

171, 173, 178, 188, 374, 422, 442. See also

Discipline.

Morris, Col. I. Sewell, 27, 44

Mortuary cars, 24, 238

Mortuary ships, 238

Motor carriers. See Bus traffic; Truck traffic.

Motor transport troop units, 420

Motor transport vessels, 369

Motor vehicles, Army-owned. See also Ambulances,

use for freight movements, 243

use for prisoners of war, 80

use for troop movements, 29, 30

Motor vehicles, shipment overseas. See Vehicles,

shipment overseas.

Mount Vernon, 90

Movement Co-ordinating Center, ASF, 181

Movement orders, troop, 34, 56, 102, 104, 105, 106,

107, 116, 150, 152, 187, 354

Movements. See Army freight traffic; Army passenger traffic; Cargo shipments; Troop movements.

Movements Division, OCT, 14, 71, 85, 115, 137, 154,

158, 161, 170, 190, 197, 202, 213, 225, 358

advance echelon at San Francisco proposed, 163

role in planning troop movements, 95, 96

role in scheduling troopships, 94-97

Murrow, Col. Lacey V., 14

National Association of Motor Bus Operators, 16

National Bus Military Bureau, 16

National Bus Traffic Association, 16, 28

National Guard troops, 135

National War Labor Board Shipbuilding Commission, 490

Naval armed guards, 136

Naval commanders, of troopships, 138

Naval Transportation Service, 6, 93, 94, 138, 161,

173, 176

Navy, U.S., 4, 32, 59, 65, 69, 85, 86, 91, 93, 94, 96,

130, 136, 141, 147, 168, 170, 176, 177, 180, 186,

187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 211,

215, 226, 228, 239, 272, 273, 274, 278, 280, 287,

309, 320, 325, 329, 330, 333, 354, 357, 358, 360,

364, 371, 377, 378, 382, 398, 400, 402, 403, 407,

410, 446, 449, 463, 465, 467, 473, 484, 486, 506.

See also Joint Army-Navy entries.

control of personnel movements, 162

conversion and operation of hospital ships, 216,

217, 218, 220

convoy arrangements, 94, 110, 149, 190, 328

co-operation with the Army on shipping, 6, 84, 138,

161-64

Navy, U.S.—Continued

disagreement with Army on troopship allocation,

93, 94

operation of vessels for Army, 4, 90, 142, 216, 217

relations with Army on small boat procurement

475-76, 477-78, 486, 490, 515

transports petroleum for armed forces, 354

Negotiation of contracts, 482-84

Negro troops, 454, 461

handicaps as trainees, 436, 448, 461

at port staging areas, 115, 124

transportation in U.S., 33

New Orleans Port of Embarkation, 100, 101, 189,

207, 294, 331, 332, 340, 371, 390, 422, 423, 424,

425, 428, 433, 512

New Orleans Staging Area, 430, 432

New Orleans Unit Training Center, 422, 424, 425,

432, 440, 444, 450, 454, 455, 461

New York Port of Embarkation, 9, 48, 86, 100,

101, 104, 106, 108, 111, 127, 128, 152, 154, 157,

170, 187, 189, 207, 208, 226, 238, 269, 279, 331,

332, 340, 341, 348, 349, 350, 351, 362, 375, 379,

380, 381, 384, 390, 424, 432

New Zealand, 233

Nieuw Amsterdam, 90

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 167

Nomenclature, TC matériel, 320, 511, 515

Noncontrolled items of supply, 120, 342, 343

Nonmilitary passengers, on troopships, 144

Normandy. See Continental Europe, invasion of.

Norris, Col. George B., 424

North African theater, 78, 81, 90, 100, 135, 145, 149,

151, 156, 168, 217, 218, 226, 328, 329, 330, 335,

340, 350, 373, 392, 396, 411, 438, 440, 476, 478,

491, 499

North Atlantic bases, 100, 331, 340

Northeast Equipment Staging Area, 158, 159

Notices, of delayed items or nonavailability, 346, 347,

349

Nurses, Army, 144, 226, 233

Ocean Shipping Procedures (OSPRO), 164, 402

Ocean Traffic Branch, OCT, 358

Office of the Chief of Transportation. See also

Chief of Transportation; Gross, Maj. Gen.

Charles P.

organization for freight movements, 242, 328, 358

organization for supply, 465-72

organization for training troops, 424-25

organization for troop movements, 14, 15, 85

Office of Defense Transportation, 13, 56, 59, 60, 63,

65, 75, 253, 258, 262, 264, 272, 276, 279, 320,

322, 416
INDEX 555

Office of Defense Transportation—Continued

authority to control freight traffic flow, 271

controls use of passenger train equipment, 39, 46,

194

controls railroad services, 38

improves freight car utilization, 295

regulates use of refrigerator cars, 302

regulates use of sleeping car space, 32, 194

role in redeployment, 173, 180, 190-94, 195, 239

role in repatriation, 200, 201, 205, 208, 209, 210,

211, 239

viewpoint differs from that of TC, 6, 82, 193, 523

Office of Price Administration, 12, 63

Office of Scientific Research and Development, 512

Office of War Information, 13

Office of War Mobilization, 477

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 180,

193, 200

Officer candidates. See Schools, TC officer candidate.

Officers. See Transportation officers.

Ogden Arsenal, 307

Okinawa, 373

Oliver, Col. Llewellyn W., 424

OLYMPIC, 334

Open storage space. See Holding and reconsignment

points; Railroad open storage yards.

Operational projects, 333, 334, 354, 359, 479-80

Operations Division, ASF, 105. See also Director of

Operations, ASF; Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy.

Operations Division (OPD), WDGS, 8, 34, 85, 91,

95, 96, 97, 103, 105, 107, 108, 114, 132, 144, 155,

163, 181, 187, 349, 360, 398, 480

Ordnance Department, 152, 242, 245, 249, 251, 255,

257, 260, 262, 305, 369, 378, 385, 409, 410, 416,

452, 467, 470. See also Chief of Ordnance,

cargo shipments overseas, 332, 333

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245

Organizational equipment, 86, 88, 107, 113, 125, 126,

135

marking for shipment, 57, 155, 397, 398, 400

movement by rail, 20, 21, 44, 57, 242, 245, 248,

256, 305

Northeast Equipment Staging Area, 157, 158, 160

packing, 392, 394

preshipment to ETO, 155-57, 161

processing at U.S. ports, 151, 152, 369

redeployment from ETO, 175, 179, 184, 185, 197

shipments to theaters, 148-61, 166, 358, 372-73

special types of loading in ships, 372-73

Ottzenn, Col. Hans, 356

Outports, for oversea supply, 339, 340, 346

Overloading, of troopships, 99, 130, 131, 143, 185,

186, 188, 190

Oversea air service commands, 352

Oversea commands. See Theaters of operations.

Oversea discharge and replacement depots, 110

Oversea Operations Branch, OCT, 480

Oversea supply. See Regulation of oversea supply

movements.

Oversea Supply Branch, OCT, 338

Oversea supply divisions, at ports, 104, 246, 337-57

passim, 418, 518, 519, 521

Overstrength, TC troop unit, 448, 461

Pacific coast ports of U.S., 84, 94, 96, 99, 136, 149,

162, 177, 197, 202, 204, 205, 206, 228, 244, 268,

281, 294, 331, 345, 377, 407

Pacific Coast TC Officers Training School, 426, 428

Pacific Ocean Areas, 101, 163, 169, 170, 347, 371, 436

Pacific Supply Division, OCT, 494

Pacific theaters, or areas, 87, 93, 94, 96, 99, 148, 149,

152, 159, 161, 165, 167, 173, 174, 179, 183, 185,

187, 197, 200, 202, 203, 216, 220, 261, 268, 287,

330, 339, 350, 355, 371, 389, 406, 408, 409, 431,

432, 435, 450, 451, 491, 513. See also Alaska;

Central Pacific; Pacific Ocean Areas; South

Pacific; Southwest Pacific; Theaters of operations,

cargo shipped to, 328

passengers shipped to, 101

Packing and packaging, 150, 334, 353, 392-96, 408,

414, 498, 503, 504, 505

Palletization, of cargo, 395-96

Panama Canal, 101, 209, 271, 331, 340

Parent unit plan for cadres, 453

Pasco Holding and Reconsignment Point, 288, 291

Passenger Branch, OCT, 14, 27, 38, 42, 43, 44, 63,

66, 74

Passenger fares, on domestic carriers

furlough fares, 24, 25, 59

under Joint Military Passenger Agreement, 16-18,

82

land-grant rates, 16, 17, 18, 19, 27

Pullman fares, 19

Passenger lists, troopship, 103, 125, 134, 145

Passenger traffic, in U.S., 11. See also Army passenger traffic, in U.S.; Civilian travel, in U.S.

Pasteur, 90

Patients, evacuation from theaters, 212-31, 232

by air, 225, 231

efficiency of the operation, 231

handling at U.S. ports, 229-31

policy on, 77, 213, 214

responsibilities, 212, 213
556 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Patients, transportation in U.S. See also Hospital

cars.

length of movements, 76, 77

messing en route, 75, 76

number moved by rail, 76

on regular trains, 74, 75, 196

routing, 73, 74, 76, 77

Patterson, Robert P., 191, 192, 193, 525

Patton, Maj. Gen. George S., Jr., 135, 373

Persian Gulf Command, 169, 440, 491

Personnel centers, 177, 179, 190, 196, 208, 209, 211

Personnel Division, OCT, 403

Petroleum products, transportation of, 253, 302, 353

Philadelphia cargo port, 100, 331, 332, 381, 390

Philippine Islands, 175, 183, 184, 396, 438, 479

Pilferage, 138, 146, 152, 403, 404, 504

Pipeline, under-water, 512

Planning Division, ASF, 334

Planning Division, OCT, 8, 84, 175, 176, 333, 357,

480

Point system, Army personnel, 174, 197, 199

Port agencies, 274, 278, 279, 401, 412, 413, 414, 415,

416, 467

Port authorities, civilian, 266

Port battalions, 431, 432, 435

Port call. See "Call" by port commander.

Port Chicago, California, 382, 391

Port commanders. See Ports of embarkation.

Port companies, 433, 435, 436, 437, 438, 461

Port congestion, 205, 208, 210, 269-71, 276-79, 280,

283, 294, 374, 388, 405, 412, 416, 520

Port headquarters, 431, 432, 433, 435, 436, 437.

See also Major ports; Medium ports.

Port Johnston, New Jersey, 152

Port marine maintenance companies, 435, 437, 450

Port medical supply officer, 225

Port reserves, for oversea supply, 119, 344-45

Port surgeon, 143, 225, 230, 231

Port Traffic, Manager of, AAR, 265

Portland, Oregon, subport of embarkation, 100, 207,

332, 381, 390

Ports of aerial embarkation, 70, 181, 352, 353

Ports of debarkation, overseas, 144, 150, 327

Ports of debarkation, in U.S., 50, 189, 202

congestion during repatriation, 205, 206, 208, 211

debarkations before V-E Day, 169-72

handling of patients, 70, 229-31

handling of prisoners of war, 73

handling of redeployed troops, 176-78

handling of return cargo, 408-10

handling of war brides, 235, 236

handling of war dead, 238

peak month of troop arrivals, 206

Ports of embarkation, in U.S., 9, 56, 84, 85, 93, 96,

102, 104, 108, 137, 142, 143, 243, 267, 298, 375,

392, 393, 394, 399, 400, 401, 403, 404, 405, 406,

407, 408, 415, 416, 417, 455, 475, 482, 498, 504,

516. See also individual ports.

embarkation of troops, 125-36

handling of explosives, 376-91 passim

handling of organizational equipment, 107, 108,

148-61

key role in moving troops overseas, 85, 103, 165

number of passengers embarked, 100

organization for troop movements, 103, 104

procurement activities, 462, 468, 482, 484

regulation of oversea supply movements, 335-57

passim, 518, 519, 521

responsibility for new marine equipment, 498-99

responsibility for particular oversea areas, 100, 103,

331

return cargo, 408, 409, 410

staging of troops, 109-25, 518, 520

tons of cargo shipped overseas, 332

training of TC officers, 426, 427, 428

training of troop units, 10, 419, 422, 424, 431, 435,

438, 451, 457

transshipment of general cargo, 328, 331, 357-76

Potsdam Conference, 186

Preactivation training, 423, 441, 455

Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM), 106,

115, 119, 120, 155

Preparation for Overseas Movement of Individual

Replacements (POR), 106

Preshipment of organizational equipment, 155-57,

161

President Coolidge, 90

Prestowed cargo, 373

Price factor, in TC procurement, 483-84

Primary port, for oversea supply, 339, 340, 346, 347,

349, 351, 353, 354

Prince Rupert, British Columbia, subport of embarkation, 100, 113, 189, 332, 381, 390

Priorities

for cargo shipments overseas, 327, 338, 348, 349,

352, 354, 355, 356, 362, 413, 415, 519

for troop shipments overseas, 93, 98, 102, 103, 104,

106, 107, 113, 131, 145

Prisoners of war, 77-81

Liberty ships used to transport, 90

movement to U.S., 168, 184

number moved in U.S., 79

types of railway cars used to transport, 79, 80, 191

use as laborers, at holding and reconsignment

points, 292

Procedures Branch, OCT, 402-03
INDEX 557

Procedures for Return of Individuals (PRI), 169

Processing

of equipment, 151-52, 369, 370, 394, 414, 498, 503,

504, 505

of troops. See Staging areas, at U.S. ports.

Procurement, of TC matériel, 462-516 passim, 521,

522. See also Contracting procedures; Contractors; Supply program.

Procurement Division, ASF, 393

Procurement Division, OCT, 469, 471, 472, 481, 482,

483, 484, 492, 496, 497, 504

Procurement offices, for TC matériel, 10, 467, 468,

471-72, 481

Procurement Regulations, War Department, 481, 486

Procurement Review Board, 475

Production, of TC matériel. See also Supply program.

"E" awards, 490

early difficulties, 491-92

expediting, 492, 496, 497

handicaps, summary, 522

inspection and acceptance, 498-99

marine equipment, 466, 473, 495-96

materials-handling equipment, 466, 497

peak performance, 491

quantities of major items accepted, 502

railway equipment, 466, 495-96

schedules and forecasts, 465, 481, 485, 491-93,

494-97

War Production Board controls, 472, 479, 480, 488,

490, 493

Production Division, OCT, 469, 471, 492, 496, 498

Property Disposal Division, OCT, 472

Provost Marshal General, 68, 69, 78, 79

Public opinion, 148, 192, 199, 203, 204, 209, 211, 212,

227, 232, 240

Pullman Company, 19, !& 23, 24, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46,

47, 49, 59, 64, 81, 200, 201. See also Sleeping cars.

Purchase orders, 481, 482, 483

Quartermaster Corps, 21, 50, 121, 245, 251, 255, 302,

305, 332, 333, 393, 410, 436, 444, 452, 508

cargo shipments overseas, 332, 333

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245

Quartermaster General, The, 7, 14, 15, 26, 54, 60,

237, 242, 247, 255, 261, 262, 266, 267, 282, 292,

317, 379, 414, 419, 432, 433, 462, 463, 465, 466,

521

Queen Elizabeth, 90, 128, 149, 186, 227

Queen Mary, 90, 128, 149, 186, 203, 227, 233

Radio communications, 55, 169, 256, 349, 351

Rail Division, OCT, 14, 242, 441, 467, 470, 500, 503,

509, 515

Railroad escort, troop train, 51

Railroad open storage yards, 292, 294, 321, 416

Railroads. See also Army freight traffic; Army

passenger traffic; Consolidated car service;

Domestic carriers; Freight rates and classifications; Government reservation bureaus;

Interterritorial Military Committee; Joint Military Passenger Agreement; Railway cars, for

troop movements; Railway freight cars; Railway

terminals; Territorial passenger associations,

and antitrust law, 320

appraisal of military service, 5, 81, 82

embargo power, 264

government claims for recovery of freight charges,

325, 326

organization for military traffic, 15

sponsors of TC troop units, 439, 442, 453, 461

Railway cars, for troop movements. See also Hospital

cars; Medical kitchen cars; Patients, transportation in U.S.; Prisoners of war; Sleeping cars;

Troop kitchen cars; Troop sleepers,

competition between regular and military requirements, 40-42, 46, 82, 190, 193, 200, 205, 206,

210, 211, 239, 523-24

conservation and assignment, 35, 38-40, 42-46, 58

day coaches substituted for sleepers, 42, 190, 191,

192, 193, 205, 207

inspection, 47, 48

numbers controlled by carriers, 37, 38, 40, 41, 205

requirements for redeployment and repatriation,

191-94, 200, 201, 205, 206, 207, 211, 240

special cars on regular trains, 20, 33, 34

special procedures for large movements, 40

types and numbers used by Army, 35-37, 40, 41

Railway equipment, procured for the Army, 462,

463, 465, 466, 467, 478-79, 484, 489, 492, 495,

496, 497, 498, 504, 514. See also Military Railway Service; Utility railoads.

quantities of major items constructed, 502

standardization, 510

technical development, 508, 509, 512

Railway express, 248, 249, 252, 256, 299, 306, 313,

316, 351, 359

Railway freight cars

assignment for Army use, 296, 303, 347

average tons loaded per car, 295, 303, 316

boxcars, 297, 302, 310, 316

crosshauling and backhauling, 304, 305

detention at U.S. ports, 276

emphasis on full loading, 295, 296, 304

export carloads unloaded at U.S. ports, 281

loading rules, 296, 299-302, 304

open-top cars, 299, 301
558 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Railway freight cars—Continued

prompt dispatch at Army installations, 297-99, 304

refrigerator cars, 302, 310

shortages and surpluses, 258, 296, 297, 298, 326

specially fitted boxcars, 303

tank cars, 302

Railway freight traffic. See Army freight traffic, in

U.S.

Railway operating battalion, 437, 439

Railway passenger accommodations

Army rules governing use, 31-33, 59, 194

Navy rules governing use, 32, 59

overcrowding on regular trains, 59-61

use for patients, 73, 74, 75

use for prisoners of war, 79, 80

Railway passenger traffic. See Army passenger

traffic, in U.S.

Railway shop battalion, 437, 439

Railway terminals, 11, 62, 64, 108, 346, 348, 405

Railway track maintenance platoon, 437

Railway transportation company, 437

Railway workshop, mobile, 437, 440

Rainbow Project, 204

Randall, Col. H. Gordon, 274

Raritan Arsenal, 380, 381

Rates and classifications, freight. See Freight rates

and classifications.

Readjustment regulations, Army personnel, 174, 178

Reception stations, 13, 50, 169, 171, 172, 176, 177

Red Cross, 19, 56, 62, 127, 132, 144, 234

Redeployment areas, 189

Redeployment of troops, after V-E Day, 50, 99, 131,

147, 173-97

air and bus traffic in U.S., 195

air movement to U.S., 180, 183, 189, 190

anticipated traffic, 179, 182, 183, 196, 197

arrangements for shipping, 175, 176, 183, 185-87

arrivals in U.S. exceed forecasts, 190

conditions on ships, criticism of, 188

early sailings from Europe, 184

impact on U.S. railroads, 190-94, 239

preparations before V-E Day, 173-82

troop train arrangements, 196

Redistribution stations, 172, 177

Refrigerator barges, 372, 463, 511

Refrigerator boxes, 371

Refrigerator cars, 302, 310

Refrigerator ships, 371-72

Regimental areas, at port staging areas, 115

Regulating station, headquarters and headquarters

company, 437, 450

Regulating stations. See Army regulating stations.

Regulation of oversea supply movements, 335-57,

418, 518-20, 521

automatic supply, 342

controversy over system, 337, 338, 518-20

difficulties in the Pacific, 355-56

effect of V-E Day, 405-06

effect of V-J Day, 407-08

effective regulation at NYPE, 340, 356

inauguration of wartime system, 339

oversea supply divisions at ports. See Oversea

supply divisions.

port reserves, 344

ports of embarkation, major role in, 336, 337

prewar system, inadequacy of, 338-39

primary ports and outports, 339-40

requisitioned supply, 342-44

role of the Chief of Transportation's office, 336, 338

supply policy charts, 345

Release and routing orders, freight, 255, 256, 267,

268, 273, 274, 275, 286, 295, 347

Renegotiation of contracts, 483

Repatriation of troops, after V-J Day, 50, 131, 147,

197-212

air transportation from theaters, 204

air transportation in U.S., 208, 209

forecast of rate of repatriation, 199, 200, 206

mobilization of shipping, 201-04

ODT and Army differences over, 200-201, 205, 209,

210

period of heaviest arrivals, 205, 206, 211

rate of repatriation, criticism of, 203, 204

task of the railroads, 199, 200, 201, 205-07

Repatriation of war dead, 237, 238

Replacement depots, 87, 109, 121, 123, 144

Replacement pools, at port staging areas, 116, 454

Replacement training centers, 13, 87, 121, 423, 424,

453, 454, 455, 460

Replacement troops, 86, 87, 88, 89, 106, 121, 123,

144, 164, 183, 419, 448, 453-55

Reports. See Status reports.

Republic, 219

Requirements, for TC matériel, 467

difficulty of estimating, 472-73, 475

marine equipment, 473, 475

rail equipment, 478-79

Requirements and Distribution Division, OCT, 472

Requirements Division, OCT, 470, 475

Requirements and Procurement Division, OCT,

466-67

Requisitions, of theaters for supplies, 246, 327, 333,

342, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 352, 353, 354, 361,

405, 406, 495, 511
INDEX 559

Research. See Technical development.

Research and Development Division, OCT, 472, 509

Reservation bureaus. See Army reservation bureaus.

REX shipments, 350, 351

Rhine, crossing of, 335

Richmond Holding and Reconsignment Point, 283,

288, 291

Rock Island Arsenal, 360

Roll-up, in the Pacific, 183

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 84, 93, 271, 280, 281, 412

Ross, Maj. Gen. Frank S., 187, 227, 362, 395, 501

Rotational sleeping, on trains, 194

Rotational troops, 86, 87, 88, 169, 171, 172, 181, 183

Route orders, freight shipment, 256, 304

Routing, of Army freight shipments, 247, 255-64, 297

all carriers considered, 317

blanket routings, 257, 260, 310

clearance problems, 263

consolidated LCL shipments, 310

dispute over central routing, 256- 60

diversion of shipments, 262-63

evolution of routing regulations, 255, 256

most economical route favored, 248, 259, 312, 316

number of route orders issued, 256

requests for special service, 260-62

Routing, of Army passenger traffic

blanket routings, 28

patients, 73

procedures, 25-27, 35

railroads suggested routes, 17, 26

Safe arrival cards, 134

Safety measures

in moving explosives, 382-87, 391, 409

on troop trains, 47

Sailing cable, to theaters, 103

Sales commissary, troopship, 141

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 47, 48, 100, 101,

106, 127, 150, 151, 154, 160, 162, 163, 189, 207,

208, 238, 269, 271, 331, 332, 339, 340, 341, 345,

351, 354, 355, 356, 373, 375, 378, 390, 396, 424,

450, 468

San Jacinto Ordnance Depot, 378, 380, 390

Saturnia, 220

Scheduling of troopships, 94-97, 161, 162, 181

Schools. See also Training, TC troop; Transportation Corps School.

TC officer, 424, 426-29

TC officer candidate, 424, 429-31

for technical specialists, 455-57

Scofield, Col. Frank C., 424, 460

Searsport, Maine, subport of embarkation, 332, 382,

390

Seatrain Texas, 335

Seatrains, 362, 363, 368, 370

Seattle Port of Embarkation, 100, 101, 106, 160, 189,

207, 208, 331, 332, 340, 373, 381, 384, 390

Secrecy. See also Military security; Marking for

shipment.

in communications with the ports, 104

at staging areas, 123, 124

at troop embarkations, 131, 132

on troop train movements, 55, 56

Secretary of the Navy, 216, 478

Secretary of War, 132, 216, 232, 261, 387, 525

Security. See Cargo security officers; Military

security; Secrecy.

Selective Service System, 26, 28, 442, 450, 489

Seminole, 218, 219

Senate Special Committee Investigating the National

Defense Program, 147, 192, 210, 525

Separation centers, 171, 177, 208

Service battalion, TC, headquarters and headquarters detachment, 437

Service commands, 26, 33, 60, 68, 69, 73, 76, 77,

78, 79, 105, 112, 114, 120, 121, 213, 229, 231,

244, 245, 259, 394, 400, 420, 421, 422, 423, 425,

468, 475, 518

Service organizations, TC, 437, 451

Services of Supply, 6, 56, 73, 112, 114, 171, 217, 222,

257, 393, 420, 421, 422, 463, 520

Shamokin general depot, 282, 283

Shamrock, 219

Ship Regulating Branch, OCT, 202

Ship repair yards. 96, 162, 217, 218

Ship transportation officer, 138, 141, 404

Shipbuilding, 4, 5, 329, 330, 359. See also Marine

equipment, Army; Maritime Commission; Small

boat procurement.

Shipment numbers, 105, 398, 399

Shipment surveyors, 393, 394, 399

Shippers' advisory boards, 296, 297

Shipping designators, 397, 399

Shipping period cycle chart, 346, 348

Ships for military use. See also Cargo ships; Troopships.

Army-Navy co-operation, 6, 161-64

balance between troopships and cargo ships, 5, 89

British and U.S. pools, 3, 90, 165

for redeployment, 173-76, 183, 185-87

for repatriation, 199, 201-04

shortages, 3, 99, 358

a vital factor, 3, 4, 84

Shreveport Holding and Reconsignment Point, 283,

288, 291, 294

Sicily, 135, 373, 396, 438
560 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Siddall, Hugh W., 15

Signal Corps, 305, 410

cargo shipments overseas, 333

freight shipments in U.S., 242, 245

Skidloads, 395, 396

Sleeping cars. See also Army reservation bureaus;

Pullman Company; Troop sleepers,

assignment of berths, 32, 59, 194

demand during redeployment, 190, 191, 192, 196

demand during repatriation, 200, 201, 205, 207,

209, 210, 211

extra-fare trains, 33

joint preference agreement, 196

military sleeping car lines, 64, 65, 82

number available, 38, 201

rates paid by armed forces, 19

reservation of space, 58, 59, 63-65, 194

rotational sleeping, 194

use for patients, 73, 77

Slipstick, 97

Sloss, Maj. James, 315

Small boat procurement, 475-77. See also Marine

equipment, Army.

Smaller War Plants Corporation, 485

Snyder, John W., 193

Solicitation of freight, 259

Somervell, Gen. Brehon B., 8, 48, 112, 121, 125, 132,

156, 159, 178, 183, 199, 214, 227, 329, 335, 337,

345, 350, 374, 375, 423, 470, 476, 490, 492, 516

South Pacific theater, 87, 101, 149, 163, 169, 328, 334,

340

Southwest Pacific theater, 87, 101, 149, 163, 169, 170,

328, 334, 340, 341, 347, 350, 371, 372, 435, 436,

440, 444, 478, 494, 505

Soviet Union, 271, 276, 277, 280, 411, 412, 415, 439,

465

Spalding, Brig. Gen. George R., 282, 285

Spare parts, 394, 451, 463, 471, 475, 488, 499-507

passim, 509, 514, 515, 522. See also Floating spare

parts depot.

Special freight trains, 261, 360

Special Planning Division, WDSS, 174, 175

Special service activities, 121, 141, 142

Special troop trains. See Troop trains.

Specifications, TC matériel, 467, 498, 509

Spread loading, of cargo, 349

St. Mihiel, 219

St. Olaf, 219

Staging area company, TC, 437, 450

Staging areas, at U.S. ports, 84, 106, 107, 108, 109-

25, 518

basic functions, 109

Staging areas, at U.S. ports—Continued

billeting, 115

capacities, 110, 111, 113, 202

command of, 112-14, 518

command of troops at, 114-15

congestion during repatriation, 205, 211

demonstrated value, 165

function during redeployment, 178, 180, 189

length of troop sojourn, 111, 112

messes, 121

new staging areas built, 110, 113

processing of troops, 109, 115-20

replacement pools, 116, 117

reports on effectiveness, 124, 125

security and discipline, 123, 124

special services and morale, 120, 121

training responsibilities, 117

use for patients, 230

use for returning troops, 171, 177, 178, 180, 202

Standard contract forms, 482, 483

Standardization of equipment designs, 465, 495, 501,

509-11

State, Department of, 144

Status reports

on theater supplies, 343, 353

on troop units, 115, 457

Stock control, 344, 354, 355, 480, 516

Stock Control Division, ASF, 304, 351, 354, 359

Stock Control Division, OCT, 471, 516

Stockpiling, TC matériel, 473, 475, 478, 480, 488,

506, 516

Stokes, Col. Marcus B., 84

Storage Division, ASF, 289, 394

Storage facilities, for explosives, 379, 380, 381

Stowage of cargo, in ships, 159, 349, 350, 360-62,

366, 368, 372-74, 389, 403, 404, 408, 519. See

also Loading of cargo, in ships.

STRESS shipments, 350, 351

Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 337, 338, 400

Subcontractors, 485, 488, 493, 494, 495, 496, 498

Submarines, enemy, 3, 55, 134, 149, 327, 329, 331

Subports of embarkation, 9, 100, 332

Sunset Project, 204

Supply Division, ASF, 159, 300, 338, 354

Supply organization, TC, 463, 465-72, 492

Supply of oversea commands. See Oversea supply

divisions, at the ports; Regulation of oversea

supply movements; Requisitions of theaters for

supplies.

Supply Plan, TC, 468

Supply policy charts, 345
INDEX 561

Supply program, TC, 462-516 passim. See also

Production, of TC matériel.

controversy over marine program, 475-77

co-ordination with Navy, 477-78

operational projects, 479-80

quantities of major items constructed, 502

role of Planning Division, OCT, 480

scope, 462-63

value of matériel procured, 465, 466

Supply turnaround cycle, 347

Surgeon. See Port surgeon; Surgeon General, The;

Transport surgeon.

Surgeon General, The, 70, 73, 74, 76, 212, 213, 215,

217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 227, 229, 511

Syran, Col. Arthur G., 358

Tables of basic allowances, 151, 334, 343, 354

Tables of equipment, 154, 334, 343, 420, 422, 432,

460

Tables of organization, 420, 422, 432, 444, 451, 460

Tank cars, 302, 510

Tank vessels (tankers), 202, 354, 363, 364, 365, 366

Tanks, shipment of, 151, 359, 366, 368

Task forces. See Amphibious assault forces.

Technical Advisory Board, 513

Technical committees, 508, 509, 511, 513

Technical development, of TC equipment, 507-13,

514, 522, 525

Technical personnel, shortage of, 465, 466, 472, 508

Technical service depots, 107, 150, 151, 177, 243,

260, 290, 307, 335, 343, 346, 347, 348, 394, 400

Technical services, 160, 255, 257, 260, 286, 289, 299,

303, 304, 305, 317, 334, 335, 347, 349, 351, 354,

356, 400, 401, 405, 407, 491, 497, 499, 514, 519.

See also Chemical Warfare Service; Corps of

Engineers; Medical Corps; Ordnance Department; Quartermaster Corps; Signal Corps;

Transportation Corps,

equipment of troops, 105, 117-19, 150, 151

marking of shipments, 150, 397, 399

packing of supplies, 150, 391, 393, 395, 396

representatives at holding and reconsignment

points, 290, 292

representatives in port oversea supply divisions,

341, 343, 346

representatives at port staging areas, 117

shipments to theaters, 331, 333, 346, 358, 359

training of troops, 421, 422, 423, 451, 459

Technical specialists, training of, 455-57

Technical Staff, OCT, 470, 508, 509

Technical training. See Training, TC troop, technical.

Telegraph communications, 55, 256

Telephone communications, 55, 57, 104, 256, 273, 351

Teletype communications, 55, 56, 104, 273, 351, 384

Temporary-duty groups, 86, 87, 88, 89, 169, 171,

172, 181, 183

Termination of contracts, 483

Territorial passenger associations, 15, 16, 26, 27, 40,

44, 194

Theater shipping document, 400, 402

Theaters of operations, 8, 86, 103, 150, 151, 154, 169,

170, 187, 188, 225, 228, 229, 232, 233, 334, 342,

343, 345, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 353, 354, 368,

389, 400, 401, 404, 409, 417, 420, 425, 436, 438,

449, 450, 465, 473, 475, 478, 500, 503. See also

Alaska; Asiatic theater; Central Africa; ChinaBurma-India theater; European theater; Mediterranean theater; Middle East; Pacific Ocean

Areas; South Pacific theater; Southwest Pacific

theater; Western Pacific,

cargo returned to U.S., 408-10

cargo shipped to, 328

passengers shipped to, 101

problems with poor packing, 394-95

retention of vessels, 4, 99, 163, 355, 372, 373, 374

training of TC troop units, 419, 420, 436, 437, 440

Third Service Command, 422, 432

Thistle, 219

Thorn, Col. Krauth W., 356

To-accompany-troops (TAT) equipment, 125, 397

Toledo Tank Depot, 360

Toulmin, Col. Harry A., Jr., 467, 469, 470

Tousey, Col. Thomas G., 226

Tracing of freight shipments, 262

Traffic control. See Control of freight traffic flow;

Traffic Control Division; Transportation Control

Committee.

Traffic Control Division, OCT, 14, 15, 21, 26, 27, 28,

29, 35, 38, 41, 42, 44, 51, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 64,

65, 74, 79, 85, 107, 127, 196, 242, 248, 250, 256,

257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 273, 274, 275,

278, 279, 291, 294, 296, 301, 302, 303, 304, 311,

315, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, 328, 336, 347, 359,

360, 406, 407, 413, 414, 415, 416

Traffic regulation group, TC, 437, 449

Training, at port staging areas, 117

Training, TC troop. See also Schools,

amphibian truck companies, 445-49

cadres, fillers, and replacements, 451-55

handicaps, 460-61, 521

harbor craft companies, 444-45, 448-49

inspections, 457-59

military, 420, 426, 430, 433, 440, 441, 444, 445,

450, 454, 455, 456

military railway units, 438-42
562 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

Training, TC troop—Continued

miscellaneous units, 449-51

numbers and types trained, 419, 437

port units, 431-38

TC training organization, 424-25, 460

TC training responsibilities, 420-23

technical, 423, 428, 430, 433, 436, 439, 441, 444,

4455 446, 450, 454, 455-57, 460, 461

troop basis, 458-59

Training centers, 13, 62, 421, 422, 431, 432, 459, 460.

See also Replacement training centers; Unit

training centers.

Training Division, SOS, 422

Training and Intelligence Branch, OCT, 424

TRANSCON air service, 208, 209

Transcontinental railroads, 56, 177, 209, 210, 211,

321, 331, 407

Transit storage, privileges and rates, 321, 322. See

also Holding and reconsignment points; Transit

Storage Division, OCT.

Transit Storage Division, OCT, 285, 287, 288, 289,

290, 291, 292, 293, 298, 503, 509

Transport commander, 130, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139,

141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 170, 188, 224, 234

Transport Economics Section, OCT, 303, 304

Transport services officer, 141, 142

Transport surgeon, 138, 143, 224, 226

Transportation, key role in global warfare, 3

Transportation Act of 1940, 18, 250, 318

Transportation Advisory Group, OQMG, 269, 285

Transportation Commissioner, 266

Transportation Control Committee, 272, 273, 274,

275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 291, 294, 414, 415, 416

Transportation Corps, 242, 245, 333, 410, 432. See

also Chief of Transportation,

establishment, 6

handicaps due to late start, 8, 520-22

organization and personnel, 9, 10, 517

shortage of commissioned and noncommissioned

officers, 426, 428, 455, 460

Transportation Corps Board, 424, 509, 512

Transportation Corps depots, 287, 288, 465, 471, 472,

475, 498, 503, 504, 505, 516

Transportation Corps School, 426, 427, 430, 445, 461

Transportation Division, OQMG, 266, 267, 268, 282,

283, 284, 286, 300, 431, 462, 463

Transportation divisions, at the ports, 104, 127, 346,

356

Transportation officers

at Army installations, 27, 28, 34, 35, 40, 43, 47,

49, 55, 58, 74, 194, 195, 243, 252, 255, 257,

Transportation officers—Continued

at Army installations—Continued

259, 260, 262, 263, 268, 296, 298, 299, 304, 305,

316, 317, 321, 323, 482

for the theaters, 8, 425-26, 460

Transportation operational projections, 97

Transportation requests, 29, 32, 58, 63

Transportation Service, 6, 7

Transports. See Troopships.

Travel bureau, military personnel, 66, 67

Treasury Department, 268, 269, 285, 286, 288, 412

Troop basis, 421, 435, 458, 459

Troop embarkation, at U.S. ports, 125-36

billeting on troopships, 129, 130

loading procedures, 130, 131

movement to shipside, 127

planning, 127, 128, 136

secrecy, 131, 132

task forces, 135

types and numbers embarked, 85, 88, 100

Troop equipment. See Individual equipment, troop;

Organizational equipment.

Troop Equipment Branch, OCT, 154

Troop kitchen cars, 21, 22, 23, 50, 196, 524

Troop lift. See also Liberty ships; Troopships; Victory

ships.

sources, 89-93

supply and demand, 97, 98, 99, 175, 176

Troop movement divisions, at the ports, 104, 125,

154, 354

Troop movements, between theaters, 169, 183. See

also Redeployment of troops, after V-E Day.

Troop movements, from theaters to U.S. See also

Redeployment of troops, after V-E Day; Repatriation of troops, after V-J Day.

before V-E Day, 167-73

Troop movements, in U.S. See also Army passenger

traffic, in U.S.; Troop trains; Organizational

equipment.

Army agencies involved, 34

arrangements with common carriers, 15-18, 20

assignment of car seats and berths, 32

classes of rail accommodations, 16, 31-33

excessive travel alleged, 14

messing, 21, 22

mobilization of railway equipment, 35-46

Negro troops, 33

rail facilities at Army installations, 44

special cars on regular trains, 20, 33, 34

use of Army motor vehicles, 29, 30

Troop movements, U.S. to theaters, 84-166

categories of troops moved, 86-89

embarkation, 125-36
INDEX 563

Troop movements, U.S. to theaters—Continued

joint use of troopships, 84, 161-64

movement from home station to port, 105-09

organizational equipment, 148-61

planning, 95, 96, 97, 165

prewar procedures, inadequacies of, 84, 165

readjustments after V-E Day, 181, 183

role of the ports of embarkation, 106-08

size of shipments, 93

staging at ports, 109-25

Troop sleepers, 22-24, 73, 196, 201, 211, 524

Troop train commanders, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 196, 208

Troop trains, 11, 46-57

advantages over regular trains, 34

complaints about cars, 48, 49

conditions imposed by railroads, 19, 20

departure time adjustable, 58

discipline, 51, 57

entrainment, 49

frequency, 13

inspections, 48

maintenance of schedules, 51, 54, 57

messing en route, 50

mixed trains, 20, 46, 57

problems during redeployment, 196

problems during repatriation, 207-08

safety requirements, 47

secrecy, 55, 56, 57

size and make-up, 46

staff, 49, 50, 196, 207

Troops overseas

when Germany surrendered, 182

when Japan surrendered, 199

Troopships. See also British vessels.

administration on board, 136-45

agreement on minimum standards, 139

Allied fleets, 89, 90

allocation for military service, 93, 94, 202

capacities, 130, 131

conversion of cargo ships, 90, 91

delays for repairs, 96, 99, 162

full loading a problem, 131

joint use by armed forces, 84, 161-64, 202

Liberty ship as a troop carrier, 90, 91, 145-48, 185

location charts, 97

messes, 139-41

military complement on board, 136, 137, 138, 142,

143, 233

operational projections, 97

overloading, 99, 130, 131, 143, 187, 190

for redeployment, 175, 176, 183, 185-87

for repatriation, 202-04, 210

Troopships—Continued

retention in theaters, 99, 163

schedules, 94-97, 107, 161, 181, 187

use for evacuation of patients, 215, 216, 217, 220,

222, 224, 225, 226, 227

use for return of dependents, 233, 234, 235, 237

Truck traffic, 247, 248, 250-52, 259, 279, 306, 312,

317, 318

Truman, Harry S., 232

U-boats. See Submarines, enemy.

Under Secretary of War, 191, 192, 193, 478

Unit loading, of ships, 149, 155, 160, 373

Unit permits, 273, 274, 275, 280, 336, 359, 414, 415,

416

Unit training centers, 13, 423, 424, 432, 433, 459, 460.

See also Camp Gordon Johnston; Camp Plauché;

Indiantown Gap Military Reservation; New

Orleans Unit Training Center.

United Kingdom, 99, 149, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161,

330, 334, 340, 345, 350, 369, 373, 374, 392, 397,

432, 465, 478

Uruguay, 90

U.S. Coast Guard. See Coast Guard.

U.S. Marine Corps. See Marine Corps.

U.S. Maritime Commission. See Maritime Commission.

U.S. Navy. See Navy, U.S.

USSR. See Soviet Union.

Utility railroads, 243, 462, 479

Vancouver Barracks, 113

V-E Day, 143, 167, 168, 173, 175, 176, 180, 181, 182,

183, 184, 187, 189, 193, 227, 232, 239, 356, 405,

406, 409, 435

Vehicles, shipment overseas, 151, 152, 158, 335, 363,

368, 369, 370, 373, 509

Vendor's shipping document, 400-401

Vessels. See British vessels; Cargo ships; Landing

craft; Liberty ships; Marine equipment, Army;

Small boat procurement; Troopships; Victory

ships.

Victory ships, 185, 187, 203

Vissering, Col. Norman H., 358

V-J Day, 167, 180, 188, 197, 210, 239, 407, 408, 506

V-Mail, 135, 376

Voorheesville Holding and Reconsignment Point,

282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 450

Voorheesville TC depot, 288, 516

Wage Stabilization Committee, 490

Wakefield, 90
564 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

War brides, transportation of, 168, 232-36

War dead, repatriation of, 237, 238

War Department bills of lading. See Bills of lading.

War Department shipping document, 400-402

War Food Administration, 180

War forwarding corporations, 414

War Manpower Commission, 79, 486, 489

War Production Board, 63, 180, 388, 471, 472, 479,

480, 488, 490, 493, 495, 496, 497, 498, 500

War Shipping Administration, 85, 90, 91, 94, 96,

136, 138, 145, 157, 161, 173, 180, 202, 204, 209,

210, 218, 239, 272, 273, 274, 275, 338, 364, 371,

378, 406, 411, 412, 415, 477

allocation of cargo ships, 328, 336, 357, 358, 359

allocation of troopships, 93, 94

control of lend-lease shipments, 414-15

conversion of Liberty ships, 145, 146

dispute over loading of Army cargo, 5, 523

provides ships for military use, 4, 5

Warehouses, commercial, 243, 265

Water Division, OCT, 85, 157, 256, 274, 328, 336,

357, 358, 359, 364, 393, 403, 406, 415, 444, 466,

467, 470, 475, 500, 503, 509, 515

Water divisions, at the ports, 104, 346, 354, 499

West Point, 90

Western Defense Command, 54, 80, 261, 268, 269,

271, 278

Western Pacific, 189, 200, 210

Western Sea Frontier, 202

Western Task Force, 135, 373

Whitcomb Locomotive Company, 456

White Project, 189, 190

Williamson, Brig. Gen. William J., 14, 15, 18, 44,

195, 258, 260, 306, 309, 315, 320, 322, 323, 324

Wisteria, 219

Women, on troopships, 144

Women's Army Corps, 19, 69, 234

World War I, 6, 148, 204, 227, 241, 259, 264, 265,

281, 295, 327, 377, 378, 438, 462, 473, 522, 524

Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 14, 85, 94, 97, 209,

210, 273, 384

Yermo Holding and Reconsignment Point, 284, 285,

287, 288, 291, 292

Yermo TC subdepot, 288, 516

Young, Brig. Gen. Charles D., 439

Young Men's Christian Association, 144

Zebulon B. Vance, 235

ZEC cargo ships, 363, 365, 366, 368

Zone supply officers (divisions), 468, 472, 481, 482,

483, 496

Zone transportation officers (offices), 9, 10, 64, 259,

291, 292, 300, 303, 315, 321, 323, 347, 399, 400,

401, 405, 468, 471, 472, 481, 483, 484, 489, 497

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1990 0 - 261-877 (20002) QL 3

PIN : 039008-000