UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIELLE JOHNSON, : CIVIL NO. 4:23-CV-1159

 Plaintiff, :

 v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

LYCOMING COUNTY CHILDREN 

AND YOUTH, et al.,

:

:

 Defendants.

 : 

ORDER

Presently before the court in this pro se lawsuit is the Report and 

Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom, (Doc. 14), dated 

October 25, 2023. Judge Bloom conducted the legally required screening 

review of Plaintiff’s complaint and recommends that it be dismissed with 

prejudice. No objections to Judge Bloom’s report have been filed by any 

party and the time within which they were due has lapsed. 

Where no objection is made to a report and recommendation, the court 

should as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error 

on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. 

Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F. Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing 

Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)(explaining judges 

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should give some review to every report and recommendation)). In any 

event, whether timely objections are made or not, the district court may 

accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made 

by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. '636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31. 

Since the report correctly states the procedural and factual background 

of this case, (Doc. 14, at 1-2), it will not be repeated herein. In short this is a 

lawsuit against Lycoming County Children and Youth, several of its 

employees, and a state court judge stemming from an incident where Plaintiff 

allegedly left her 8-month-old child home alone, was arrested by police, and 

ultimately had custody of her children taken from her by the state. 

District courts have an on-going statutory obligation to preliminarily 

review a pro se complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, 

malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 

U.S.C. '1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a 

complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief, a court 

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable 

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inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light 

most favorable to the non-movant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & 

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required 

to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must also construe such 

complaints liberally “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” Alston v. Parker, 363 

F. 3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting R. Civ. P. 8(f)). The court must apply 

the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. 

Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F. 3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. 

Beyer, 293 F. 3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). Still even when viewed under this 

standard, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 

At the outset, the state court judge that Plaintiff has sued is entitled to 

immunity from the claims against him. See Kwasnik v. LeBlon, 228 F. App’x 

238, 243 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (“A 

judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute immunity 

from suit.”) Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims that invite the court to overturn state 

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court custody orders are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See 

Kendal v Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 

401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)) (“Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting 

federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim 

when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state 

proceeding.”) Since Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that she is part of ongoing 

state court custody proceedings, Judge Bloom recommends, and this court 

agrees, that it should abstain from claims involving those proceedings. 

The complaint also appears to assert broad and conclusory claims of 

race and disability discrimination. However, the complaint does nothing more 

than allege just that—that the plaintiff believes she was discriminated against 

because of her disability and her race. She does not allege any further factual 

support for these claims. In fact, the complaint does not even identify 

Plaintiff’s race or a disability. Accordingly, this complaint runs afoul of Rule 

8’s basic requirement that a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Because the complaint contains no more than vague, 

conclusory allegations, these claims will be dismissed.

Finally, because Plaintiff’s federal claims fail, the court will decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the host state law tort claims alleged 

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in the complaint. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 

(1966) (The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over a supplemental claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction).

Although Judge Bloom recognizes that pro se plaintiffs should 

generally be permitted to amend their complaints, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. 

v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F. 3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), he believes 

this complaint is materially flawed in a number of ways, and thus leave to 

amend would be futile. This court agrees and will accordingly dismiss the 

complaint with prejudice. 

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

(1) The report and recommendation of Judge Bloom, (Doc. 14), is 

ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY as the decision of the court.

(2) Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

(3) The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE. 

s/ Malachy E. Mannion_ MALACHY E. MANNION

 United States District Judge

DATE: January 5, 2024

23-1159-01

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