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© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

“[T]o be an effective 

deterrent, the force has to 

maintain a credible threat of 

offensive action. If military 

forces have to resort to 

offensive activities and 

compellence, its deterrence 

has failed by definition.”

June 5, 2012

Atrocity Prevention through 

Persuasion and Deterrence 

Political Missions and Preventive Deployments 

Summary

•	 Political missions can be described as multilateral teams of primarily civilian expertsthat rely

largely on political persuasion to find a nonviolent way out of crises. Preventive deployments

are defensive military missions primarily aimed at deterring state or non-state actorsfrom

initiating undesired actions. Both political missions and preventive deployments are traditionally seen as conflict management tools used by international or regional organizations.

•	 In certain circumstances, political missions and preventive deployments could contribute to the

prevention of mass atrocities by keeping potential perpetratorsfrom implementing a mass atrocity policy and protecting vulnerable populations,through persuasion and deterrence.

•	 The success of both tools dependsin large part on the rare consent of a host government,

manifestly failing to protect its population from a threat posed by non-state actorsinside its

territory, or hostile actors operating from neighboring countries. The utility of these missionsis

limited when the host regime isresponsible for the atrocitiesin the target area.

Introduction

About 25 leading policymakers,scholars and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders participated in an inputsession organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace on April 5, 2012. The participants

analyzed the utility of political missions and preventive deploymentsfor atrocity prevention. This

brief describesthe key findings and conclusionsfrom the working session, and serves asinput for

the U.N.secretary-general’sreport in advance of the U.N. General Assembly’sinteractive dialogue

thissummer on timely and decisive responsesto prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war

crimes and crimes against humanity in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect principle.

Political missions and preventive deployments are traditionally seen as conflict management

tools. Both instruments have received insufficient attention in assessments of the international

toolbox available for atrocity prevention. However, both types of missions have operated amid actual and imminent atrocity situations, and have arguably mitigated the risk or impact of atrocities.

This brief analyzes the utility of preventive deployments and political missions for the prevention of mass atrocities or R2P crimes, specifically their role as an R2P Pillar III tool, in a context

where atrocity crimes are imminent or ongoing, both in times of peace or violent conflict. In his

January 2009 report on the“Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect,”U.N. SecretaryJonas Claes

E-mail: jclaes@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.1982

PEACEBRIEF128
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Atrocity Prevention through Persuasion and Deterrence

page 2 • PB 128 • June 5, 2012

General Ban Ki-moon posited that this responsibility contains three pillars: 1) the protection

responsibilities of the state, 2) international assistance and capacity building; and 3) timely and

decisive response to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against

humanity. R2P’s third pillar includes pacific and coercive tools for collective action in the face

of atrocities, and after local efforts or international capacity-building failed to prevent a crisis

situation. Since tools are rarely applied in isolation, a separate study should analyze the complementarity of these instruments with alternative measures.

As mass atrocities often occur in the context of violent conflict, traditional conflict management

toolsindirectly contribute to the prevention of atrocity crimes. In certain circumstances, political

missions and preventive deployments can directly prevent atrocities or mitigate their effect as

a complement to other diplomatic, economic or military measures. Through persuasion and

deterrence, political missions and preventive deployments could keep potential perpetratorsfrom

implementing a“mass atrocity policy”and protect vulnerable populations. As preventive deploymentssucceed, they may transform into a political mission, or both instruments may operate

simultaneously in a complementary manner.

Atrocity Prevention through Persuasion: Political Missions

Political missions can be described as multilateral teams of primarily civilian experts deployed by

international or regional organizations. Political missionsrely largely on political persuasion to

find a nonviolent way out of crisesthrough engagement with the conflicting parties. The existing

missions vary widely in terms of activities,size and scope, and include standing regional offices,

special envoys, or transformed peacebuilding missions. As a conflict management tool, the existing missions are rarely deployed with a preventive mandate and have a mixed track record. So far

no political mission was explicitly mandated to prevent atrocities, even though some operated in

areas where atrocities occurred, like the U.N. Regional Office for Central Asia (in Kyrgyzstan) or the

U.N. Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS).

Given the constraints posed by atrocity situations, political missions are primarily useful as‘Pillar

II instruments,’addressing structural drivers of conflict orstate fragility and providing assistance in

effective governance when the risk of atrocitiesisremote. Political missions can contribute to the

operational prevention of atrocities as a mechanism for mediation, persuading potential perpetratorsto refrain from atrocity planning and embrace nonviolent optionsto achieve strategic objectives. Political mediation, however, is only useful when the political objectives of the conflicting

parties are reconcilable. Missions can develop anticipatory relationships with political and military

leaders, including potential perpetrators, exercise diplomatic pressure, or warn about the risks of

radicalstrategies. Political missions could also coordinate the diplomatic efforts of other international actorsinvolved in crisis diplomacy. The missions have been involved in observing, monitoring and

reporting human rights abuses. Their role could go beyond mapping the capabilities, interests and

strategies of powerful players, to include the condemnation of observed abuses, protective accompaniment, and rumor control. The ability of political missionsto protect potential victimsin a‘Pillar

III context’islimited. However, when properly resourced, a protective civilian presence can provide

early warning to the international community or locals at risk, inform the planning process of other

Pillar III responses, and obstruct the effortsrequired to plan, authorize and execute atrocities.

Political missions are less controversial than more coercive tools, particularly when they carry

a region-wide mandate, like the U.N. Regional Office for West Africa. Their generally discreet, nonmilitary, and consensual nature limitsthe perceived intrusiveness. They are also relatively inexpensive, and benefit from their adaptability to evolving circumstances. Asthe situation movesfrom a
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Atrocity Prevention through Persuasion and Deterrence

page 3 • PB 128 • June 5, 2012

Pillar II to an imminent or active atrocity situation, however, the political mission’s core objectives

need to be reconciled with and, if necessary,subordinated to, the goal of mitigating the risk or

impact of atrocities. Effortsto fostersustainable politicalsettlements may obstruct time-sensitive

initiativesto restore stability or protect civilians.

One could envision the rapid deployment of a political mission asthe only accepted tool in a

non-permissive environment. But authorizing, funding and equipping new missionsin the face

of atrocitiesremains a burdensome process unlikely to produce the timely relief crisissituations

require. Moreover, there is a risk that political missions may be accepted by repressive regimesto

stave off international criticism or buy time to execute a planned atrocity campaign. In addition,

they strongly depend on explicit internationalsupport and credible commitments, and may by

themselveslack the enforcement capability to affect the calculations of potential perpetrators.

Atrocity Prevention through Deterrence: Preventive 

Deployments

Preventive deployments can be described as defensive military missions deployed by international or regional organizations. These missions could alternatively be labeled as preventive

contingency operations or military flexible deterrent options. Preventive deployments are inherently defensive and could contribute to the prevention of atrocity crimes through deterrence.

However, to be an effective deterrent, the force has to maintain a credible threat of offensive

action. If military forces have to resort to offensive activities and compellence, its deterrence

has failed by definition. Both in theory and practice, preventive deployments have primarily

been identified as conflict management tools, but they rarely have been put to practice. The

UNPREDEP Mission deployed in Macedonia in the 1990s—the only U.N. preventive deployment mission—was established at the request of the Macedonian government and effectively

prevented the outbreak of violent conflict at a time when the risk of atrocities was remote.

An example of a preventive deployment directly engaged in atrocity prevention is EUFOR RD

Congo (2006). Mandated to assist MONUC during the elections in Kinshasa, this mission was

spatially and temporally very limited.

The armed force could operate preventively within the area at risk, directly protecting civilians

through a visible presence, or act as an‘over-the-horizon force,’serving as a credible contingency

unit deployable when identifiable tripwires are crossed. In the absence of violent conflict, preventive deployments could establish a military presence to dissuade potential perpetrators expected

to plan, instigate or commit atrocity crimes, and build up capacity for offensive action in case the

failure of deterrence triggers a need for compellence. If undesired actions continue the mission

can issue explicit military threats. In case of ongoing atrocities, preventive deployments could effectively contain the intensity of the crimes or reduce the risk ofspill-over into more stable areas or

neighboring countries. The mission would protect potential victimsin case of a power imbalance

through the facilitation of evacuations, the establishment of humanitarian corridors, air drops of

humanitarian supplies, police monitoring, and the protection of villages or IDP/refugee camps. The

presence of a military force with surveillance assetsto monitor and report atrocity crimes can influence potential perpetratorsthrough the‘power of witness.’The mission could conduct information

operationsto monitor perpetrator behavior, collect intelligence and condemn widespread abuses.

The success of a preventive military mission relies on solid commitmentsto back the mission

militarily in case compellence isrequired. The authorization of military deploymentsrequires a significant level of internationalsupport, and ultimately depends on the level of media attention, the

nature ofstrategic links between power patrons and the potential perpetrator, regionalsupport for
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international engagement, the resource availability and the assessment of the mission’slikely effectiveness. When these come togethersuccessfully, the presence of a robust multilateral military

force demonstrates an intimidating level of international resolve by increasing the perceived cost

of atrocity campaigns as a final resortstrategy, and strengthensthe credibility of complementary

economic, political and diplomatic efforts. Preventive deployments can complement the work of

non-combatant evacuation operations, and encourage national forcesto protect local civilians as

they extract their nationals at risk.

Preventive deployments are not without risks, however. The threat orslow deployment of

thisintrusive tool may create moral hazards or cause an unintended escalation asthe perceived

window of opportunity closesin the eyes of the perpetrator. Intended victims may feel themselves

protected by the force, and empowered to undertake their own retribution. The authorization of

military options may trigger domestic political opposition or concerns within the general public

opinion. The operational risks are multiple, including the high potential for anti-coalition sentiments, casualties, or equipment loss. The deployment may pause the security dilemma, but does

not address potentially underlying causes of atrocity situations by itself.

Conclusions

Political missions and preventive deployments could serve as useful toolsfor atrocity prevention

in a limited number ofscenarios, and carry the largest utility when an international mission is

already established on the ground for alternative purposes prior to the eruption of atrocities. When

confronted with imminent or ongoing atrocities, these‘pillar II missions’require a rapid adjustment

and expansion of their mandate and capacity. The early inclusion of atrocity prevention in the

mission’s mandate would facilitate thistransformation. Unless a ground presence exists prior to

the escalation, the success of both mission types depends on the rare consent of a host government manifestly failing to protect its population from a threat posed by non-state actorsinside

itsterritory, or hostile actors operating from neighboring countries. Since political missions and

preventive deployments are generally consensual, their utility remainslimited in cases where the

regime is primarily responsible for the atrocitiesin the target area.

The current institutional preparednessto conduct political missions or preventive deployments mandated to prevent atrocitiesis minimal. A central challenge remainsthe lack of training,

doctrine and planning for the prevention of atrocitiesthrough civilian or military means, both

at the national and international level. Most of the existing doctrine is woven into national and

intergovernmental doctrine for peacekeeping operations, COIN, and non-combatant evacuations.

Doctrine developmentshould focus on the risk posed by non-state actors as potential perpetrators. The guiding principlesshould also recognize that in the face of imminent atrocities, these missions may need to relinquish their impartiality, a significant departure from multilateral missions

primarily aimed at political engagement or the prevention of violent conflict. Despite their political

role, neither civilian nor military missions can remain passive in the face of atrocities, and have a

responsibility to take appropriate action within their meansin the face of atrocity crimes.

In addition to training and doctrine, these missionsrequire the necessary surveillance capabilities and skillsto understand and interpret early indicators, and take appropriate action. Both

types of missionsshould consider the use of new technologiesto acquire intelligence on civilian

insecurity. Internal coordination among U.N. actorsin the field is key, as well as coordination with

the other international and local actors present in the targeted area. Too often bureaucratic politics

will hamper the execution of integrated missions whether aimed at political engagement, conflict

management or the prevention of mass atrocity crimes.

About This Brief

This Peace Brief describes the key 

findings and conclusions from a 

working session organized by USIP 

on April 5, 2012. The participants 

included 25 leading policymakers, 

scholars, and NGO leaders with 

a focus on conflict management 

and atrocity prevention. The brief 

serves as input for the U.N. secretary-general’s report in advance 

of the U.N. General Assembly’s 

interactive dialogue this summer 

on timely and decisive responses 

to prevent and halt genocide, 

ethnic cleansing, war crimes 

and crimes against humanity in 

accordance with the Responsibility 

to Protect principle.

Atrocity Prevention through Persuasion and Deterrence

page 4 • PB 128 • June 5, 2012