U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–462 PDF 2013

OVERSIGHT OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 13, 2013 

Serial No. 113–32 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAUL LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 13, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 3 

WITNESS 

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable J. Randy Forbes, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 45 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

THURSDAY, JUNE 13, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Coble, Smith 

of Texas, Chabot, Bachus, Issa, Forbes, King, Franks, Gohmert, 

Jordan, Poe, Chaffetz, Marino, Gowdy, Amodei, Labrador, 

Farenthold, Holding, Collins, DeSantis, Smith of Missouri, Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Cohen, Johnson, 

Pierluisi, DelBene, and Jeffries. 

Staff Present: Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Robert 

Parmiter, Counsel; Kelsey Deterding, Clerk; Perry Applebaum, (Minority) Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown, 

Parliamentarian; and Aaron Hiller, Counsel. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Committee will come to order, and without 

objection the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. We welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the 

oversight of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. I 

recognize myself and the Ranking Member for opening statements. 

This hearing on oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

will come to order. We welcome Director Mueller to your final appearance before the House Judiciary Committee as FBI Director, 

and we are happy to have you here with us today. 

Before we begin, let me take a moment to commend you for your 

successful tenure at the FBI. You took office under extremely difficult circumstances. In fact, you were confirmed 1 week before 

September 11, 2001, and the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. During your 12 years as Director, you have led the 

transformation of the FBI from a domestic law enforcement agency 

into a complex intelligence-driven national security organization 

whose primary missions include confronting the most significant 

security threats facing our Nation today. You have done the American people a great service, and for that you have my sincere gratitude. 
2 

We now know that last week’s unauthorized disclosure of certain 

NSA intelligence programs was committed by a 29-year old former 

defense contractor. I know there is little you will be able to say 

about these programs in a public hearing, but I and other Members 

of the Committee believe it is important for you to explain to the 

extent you are able why you believe these programs are a necessary part of America’s counterterrorism operation. 

I also believe the recent reports regarding the NSA programs illustrate this Administration’s ongoing problem of national security 

leaks. The Obama administration takes credit for having investigated more national security leaks than any previous Administration. While this may be true, I am not certain whether it is due 

to a more aggressive investigative approach to national security 

leaks or the simple fact that there have been a shockingly high 

number of leaks in the last 41⁄2 years. 

These leaks illustrate the delicate balancing act between the 

need to protect national security information and investigate leaks 

and the need to preserve the First Amendment right to freedom of 

the press. 

Regardless of how some Members of Congress may feel about the 

recently revealed NSA programs, the fact remains that the terrorist threat to the United States is ongoing. We were reminded of 

this nearly 2 months ago when the Boston Marathon, traditionally 

a day of celebration, was the target of a terrorist attack. Dzhokhar 

Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan, set off twin explosions that 

killed three people and injured more than 250. This attack was a 

grave reminder, as you warned this Committee in 2010, that domestic and lone wolf extremists are now just as serious a threat 

to our safety as international organizations, like al-Qaeda. 

I would like to commend the FBI and its State and local partners, all of whom worked tirelessly to identify and locate the bombers and apprehend Dzhokhar. However, prior to the Boston attack, 

several Federal agencies, including the FBI, received intelligence 

information about Tamerlan. I am concerned that inadequate interagency coordination may have prevented robust information sharing in this case. It is imperative that the Administration and Congress examine this matter closely to identify areas in which intelligence information sharing can be improved. 

On the subject of counterterrorism, I also look forward to hearing 

from you about the FBI’s efforts to investigate the attacks on the 

American consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Immediately following the 

attacks, the Obama administration called them a spontaneous response to a video critical of Islam. As we all now know, the attacks 

were, in fact, preplanned acts of terror. I am intensely concerned 

that the Administration’s handling of the attacks has hampered 

the FBI’s ability to conduct a thorough investigation. As former 

Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks testified, the Administration’s mischaracterization of the attacks so angered the Libyan government that they prevented the FBI Evidence Response Team 

from traveling to Benghazi for 2 weeks. 

Finally, Mr. Director, I am very interested in hearing from you 

about how the Bureau intends to tighten its belt in a responsible 

manner during this time of fiscal uncertainty. Along with Crime 

Subcommittee Chairman Sensenbrenner, I sent you a letter in 
3 

April asking several questions about the FBI’s budget and spending 

priorities, including the FBI’s policy to provide extensive financial 

benefits, including paying for all laundry and food for the highly 

paid professionals brought to work at FBI headquarters for 18- 

month stints. 

I appreciated receiving your response last week, but I believe 

this is an area where the FBI and other Federal law enforcement 

agencies are not making the best use of taxpayer dollars. I hope 

to hear what the Bureau intends to do to address this issue. I look 

forward to hearing your answers on all of these important topics 

today, as well as on several other issues of significance to the FBI 

and the country. 

And it is now my pleasure to recognize for his opening statement, 

the Ranking Member of the full Committee, the gentleman from 

Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte, and I join in welcoming the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We 

gather today at a time when the Nation stands at a legal and political crossroad. We are confronted with a seemingly endless war 

that increasingly must be fought in the digital age. And I say this 

not only because of the recent disclosures concerning the FBI and 

the NSA surveillance programs, but because of a range of actions 

that occurred since the attacks of September the 11th, 2001. 

It’s not a partisan concern, and it is one that applies both to the 

present Administration and to the last one as well. Nor is it a concern particularly limited to surveillance programs. It extends to our 

increasing reliance on drones to conduct foreign policy and the government’s use of the so-called state secrets doctrine to avoid legal 

accountability. And, yes, in no small part because of the actions of 

the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it’s my fear that 

we are on the verge of becoming a surveillance state, collecting billions of electronic records on law-abiding Americans every single 

day. 

A point the recent disclosure confirmed by the Administration 

that Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act is being used to engage 

in a nationwide dragnet of telecommunications records. I have, 

along with many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans alike, I’ve long expressed concern that Section 215 fails to 

impose a meaningful limit on the government’s ability to collect 

this type of information. If every call is relevant, then the relevance 

standard we enacted into law has little practical meaning. 

Another point is the total secrecy in which surveillance operates 

under the PATRIOT Act and FISA. This secrecy denies Congress 

the opportunity to conduct meaningful oversight and prevents the 

public from holding its government accountable for its actions. I 

concede that it’s a difficult and sensitive issue to resolve, but that’s 

our job. A free society can only be free if it has the informed consent of its citizens. It is critical that the public knows how its government treats the content of its emails and telephone calls even 

when it collects them by mistake. 

It is true that some Members of the Congress have chosen to receive classified briefings about these programs, I among them. 

These briefings, though, often prohibit attendees from taking even 

notes or to even discuss such information with anyone else. And 
4 

with all due respect to my friends in the Administration, the mere 

fact that some Members may have been briefed in a classified setting does not indicate our approval or support of these programs. 

Indeed, many of us voted against the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act and the FISA Amendments Act, precisely because of 

what we learned in those classified sessions. I agree with President 

Obama about the need to find a way to have a responsible conversation about these issues and how we can engage all Americans 

in this debate to a maximum extent possible. 

But at a time when no major decision of the FISA Court has 

been declassified, and when the Administration continues to rely 

on the state secrets doctrine to avoid accountability in the courts, 

I must say that we are not yet able to have a more public and rational, even if limited conversation. The only way to ensure that 

this critical debate will actually occur is for this Committee to 

achieve an appropriate balance between the need for secrecy and 

the need for informed debate. One way to tell that that balance has 

been tilted too far in favor of national security is when individuals 

in public service have legitimate grievances with our government, 

but feel they have no recourse but to leak classified information to 

the press. 

I don’t condone these leaks. I believe that if we fail to adjust the 

concerns at the heart of these controversial programs that there 

will be more leaks. And so, Director Mueller, as one who supported 

the extension of your term as Director, and whose integrity I have 

always held in highest regard, we in the end are a Nation of laws 

and not men. Moreover, with all due respect, my considered judgment is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s actions are inconsistent with the requirements of the PATRIOT Act and violate 

the fundamental privacy of law-abiding citizens. 

And so I finish where I started. The Congress, and in particular 

this Committee, stands at a crossroad. Every day it seems that a 

new part of the legal architecture put in place to fight this war on 

terror is exposed. The prison at Guantanamo Bay is unsustainable. 

Of the 166 men held there, 86 are already cleared for transfer. 

More than 100 are engaged in the third month of a hunger strike. 

Nearly 2,000 personnel are needed to keep the prison functioning. 

Thanks in no small part to the efforts of the Chairman, we have 

begun to explore the legal underpinnings of the Administration’s 

drone programs. There is a growing bipartisan unease with the notion that the executive branch can kill a United States citizen on 

its own determination that he poses an ‘‘imminent threat.’’ 

And with respect to the Section 215 collections exposed only last 

week, it seems clear that the government’s activity exceeds the authority this Congress has provided, both in letter and in spirit. 

With every new disclosure, another piece of the legal architecture 

put in place after September the 11th crumbles. 

And so it is my hope that over the coming weeks the Members 

of this Judiciary Committee can come together and conduct meaningful oversight of these programs. Where needed, we should pass 

relevant and credible legislation, just as we did on a unanimous 

basis after September 11. 

Tomorrow morning my colleague Justin Amash and I will introduce a bill that will address the overbreadth and impenetrability 
5 

of the surveillance programs. It is not the only proposal to address 

these problems. It should not be the only response to the broader 

questions we face. But it is a modest start and I hope that my colleagues will join me. This is a time for Members of both sides of 

the aisle to come together and help restore our Nation to its proper 

role as a beacon for civil liberties around the world. 

I thank the Chairman for indulging me additional time to make 

the statement. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And without objection, other Members’ opening 

statements will be made a part of the record. 

We again thank Director Mueller for joining us today. 

And, Director, if you would please rise, I will begin by swearing 

you in. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let the record reflect that Director Mueller responded in the affirmative, and I will now introduce him. 

Our only witness today is Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert S. Mueller, III, who has led the FBI since September 4, 

2001. He was first nominated by President George W. Bush. In 

2011 he was asked by President Obama to remain as FBI Director 

for an additional 2-year term, and that was swiftly approved by the 

Congress. 

Director Mueller has a long and honorable record in public service. After graduating from Princeton and receiving a master’s degree from New York University, Director Mueller enlisted as a Marine and served in combat in Vietnam. He received a Bronze Star, 

two Navy Commendation Medals, a Purple Heart, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. 

After his military service, he earned his law degree in my home 

State, at the University of Virginia. Early in his legal career, Director Mueller served as a prosecutor in the United States Attorney’s 

Offices in both San Francisco and Boston. After working as a partner in the Boston law firm of Hill & Barlow, Director Mueller returned to the Justice Department in 1989 as an assistant to Attorney General Thornburgh and later as head of the Criminal Division. In 1998, Director Mueller was named United States Attorney 

in San Francisco, a position he held until 2001, when he was nominated to be Director of the FBI. 

Director Mueller, as your tenure is set to expire this year, we 

welcome you today for one last look and look forward to your statement. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, and good morning. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You know what, turn on that microphone. 

Mr. MUELLER. Good morning, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking 

Member Conyers, and Members of the Committee. And I thank you 

for the opportunity to appear here today and appear on behalf of 

the men and women of the FBI. And on their behalf let me begin 

by thanking you for your support of the Bureau over the 11 years 

that I have been there. 
6 

We live in a time of diverse and persistent threats from terrorists, spies, and cyber criminals. And at the same time we face a 

wide range of criminal threats from white-collar crime to child 

predators. And just as our national security and criminal threats 

constantly evolve, so, too, must the FBI counter these threats, even 

during a time of constrained budgets. 

Today I would like to highlight several of the FBI’s highest priority national security and criminal threats. As illustrated by the 

recent attacks in Boston, the terrorist threat against the United 

States remains our top priority. And as exhibited by many of our 

arrests over the past year, we face a continuing threat from homegrown violent extremists. These individuals present unique challenges because they do not share a typical profile. Their experiences and motives are often distinct, which makes them difficult to 

identify and difficult to stop. 

At the same time, foreign terrorists still seek to strike us at 

home and abroad. Terrorists today operate in more places and 

against a wider array of targets than they did a decade ago. And 

we have seen an increase in cooperation among terrorist groups 

and an evolution in their tactics and an evolution in their communications. Core al-Qaeda is weaker and more decentralized than it 

was 11 years ago, but it remains committed to attacks against the 

West. Al-Qaeda affiliates and surrogates, in particular al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula, pose a persistent threat. And in light of recent attacks in North Africa, we must focus on emerging extremist 

groups capable of carrying out attacks from that region. 

Next, let me turn for a moment to discuss the cyberthreat, which 

has evolved significantly over the past decade and cuts across all 

FBI programs. Cyber criminals have become increasingly adept at 

exploiting weaknesses in our computer networks. Once inside, they 

can exfiltrate both state secrets and trade secrets. And we also face 

persistent threats from hackers for profit, organized criminals, 

cyber syndicates, and hacktivist groups. 

As I have said in the past, I do believe that the cyber threat may 

well eclipse the terrorist threat in years to come. And in response, 

we are strengthening our cyber capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the 

wake of the September 11th attacks. Our Cyber Division is focused 

on computer intrusions and network attacks. FBI special agents 

work side by side with Federal, State, and local counterparts on 

cyber task forces and our 56 field offices. We have increased the 

size of our National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, which 

brings together 19 law enforcement, military, and intelligence 

agencies to stop current attacks and prevent future attacks. 

And cyber crime requires a global approach. And through the 

FBI’s 64 legal attache offices, we are sharing information and coordinating investigations with our international counterparts. 

And at the same time, we recognize that the private sector is the 

essential partner to protect our critical infrastructure and to share 

threat information. We have established several noteworthy outreach programs, but we must do more. We need to shift to a model 

of true collaboration and build structured partnerships within the 

government, as well as in the private sector. 
7 

Turning finally to the FBI’s criminal programs, the FBI’s responsibilities range from complex white-collar fraud to transnational 

criminal enterprises and from violent crime to public corruption. 

Given limited resources, we must focus on those areas where we 

bring something unique to the table. For example, violent crime 

and gang activity continue to exact a high toll in our communities, 

and through Safe Streets and Safe Trails Task Forces we identify 

and target the most dangerous of these criminal enterprises. 

At the same time, the FBI does remain vigilant in its efforts to 

find and stop child predators. Our mission is threefold. First, to decrease the vulnerability of children to exploitation. Second, to provide a rapid, effective response to crimes against children. And 

third, to enhance the capabilities of State and local law enforcement through task force operations such as the Innocent Images 

and Innocence Lost initiatives. 

Now let me turn and spend a moment discussing the recent public disclosure of highly classified national security programs. The 

highest priority of the Intelligence Community is to understand 

and to combat threats to our national security, but we do so in full 

compliance with the law. We recognize that the American public 

expects the FBI and our Intelligence Community partners to protect privacy interests, even as we must conduct our national security mission. The FISA Court has approved both programs, and 

these programs have been conducted consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. And the programs have 

been carried out with extensive oversight from courts, independent 

inspectors general, and Congress. 

These programs do remain classified today, so there are significant limits on what we can discuss this morning in open session. 

But I do understand that there have been classified briefings on 

these programs for this Committee and for the House at large, and 

I hope that you have been able to attend it, and if not, will be able 

to attend such a briefing from the Intelligence Community regarding both the focus, the strictures on, and the legality of these programs. 

As to the individual who has admitted making these disclosures, 

he is the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation. These disclosures have caused significant harm to our Nation and to our safety. 

We are taking all necessary steps to hold the person responsible for 

these disclosures. As this matter is actively under investigation, we 

cannot comment publicly on the details of the investigation. 

Now in closing, I would like to turn to sequestration. The impact 

of sequestration on the FBI’s ability to protect the Nation from terrorism and crime will be significant. In 2013 the FBI’s budget was 

cut by more than $550 million due to sequestration, and in 2014 

proposed cuts will total more than $700 million. The ongoing hiring 

freeze will result in 2,200 vacancies at the FBI by the end of this 

fiscal year, with 1,300 additional vacancies in 2014. 

I have long said that our people is the Bureau’s greatest asset. 

Additional operational cuts will impact the FBI’s ability to prevent 

crime and terrorism, which will impact the safety and security of 

our Nation. We do understand the need for budget reductions, but 

we would like to work with the Committee to mitigate the most significant impacts of those cuts. 
8 

Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, Members of the 

Committee, I want to thank you again for your support of the FBI 

and for its mission. Our transformation over the past decade would 

not have been possible without your cooperation, and I look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

[The testimony of Mr. Mueller follows:] 
9 

ilepurbttent of afustite 

STATEMENT 

OF 

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III 

DIRECTOR 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

A T A HEARING ENTITLED 

"OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION" 

PRESENTED 

JUNE 13,2013 
10 

Statement for the Record 

Robert S. Mneller, III 

Director 

Federal Bnreau of Investigatiou 

Committee on the Judiciary 

U.S. House of Representatives 

"Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation" 

June 13,2013 

Good morning, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Members of the 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and for your 

continued support of the men and women of the FBI. 

Today's FBI is a threat-driven, intelligence-led organization. We have built a workforce 

and leadership team that view continuing transformation as the means to keep the FBI focused 

on key threats to our nation. 

Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a time of 

acute and persistent terrorist and criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and to 

our communities. 

Counterterrorism remains our top priority. As illustrated by the recent attacks in Boston, 

the terrorist threat against the United States remains very real. 

Yet national security is not our sole focus - we remain committed to our criminal 

programs. In the economic arena, investment fraud, mortgage fraud, and health care fraud have 

undermined the world's tlnancial systems and victimized investors, homeowners, and taxpayers. 

At the same time, gang violence, violent crime, crimes against children, and transnational 

organized crime pose real threats in communities across the country. 

These diverse threats facing our nation and our neighborhoods underscore the complexity 

and breadth of the FBI's mission. To do this, we in the Bureau are relying on our law 

enforcement and private sector partners more than ever before. 

Yet regardless of the challenges we face, the FBI remains tlrmly committed to carrying 

out our mission while protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of the citizens we serve. 

I look forward to working with this committee in these tlnal months of my term to ensure 

that the FBI maintains the capabilities needed to address these diverse threats now and into the 

future. 
11 

Counterterrorism 

Over the past two months, we have seen an extraordinary etfort by law enforcement, 

intelligence, and public safety agencies to find and hold accountable those responsible for the 

Boston bombings 

I would like to thank those who have worked tirelessly in the pursuit of safety and justice. 

These collaborative efforts, along with the public's help, enabled us to identify the individuals 

who we believe are responsible for this attack. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the 

bombing victims - those who perished and those who are embarking on a long road to recovery 

As this case illustrates, we face a continuing threat from homegrown violent extremists. 

These individuals present unique challenges because they do not share a typical profile. Their 

experiences and motives are often distinct, but they are increasingly savvy and willing to act 

alone, which makes them difficult to identify and to stop 

In the past two years, we have seen homegrown extremists attempt to detonate IEDS or 

bombs at such high profile targets as the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, commercial 

establishments in downtown Chicago, the Pentagon, and the US. Capitol. Fortunately, these 

attempts, as well as many others, were thwarted. Yet the threat remains. 

Overseas, the terrorist threat is similarly complex and ever-changing. We are seeing more 

groups and individuals engaged in terrorism, a wider array of terrorist targets, greater 

cooperation among terrorist groups, and continued evolution and adaptation in tactics and 

communication. 

AI Qaeda and its affiliates, especially al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 

continue to represent a top terrorist threat to the nation. These groups have attempted several 

attacks on the United States, including the failed Christmas Day airline bombing in 2009, and the 

attempted bombing ofUS.-bound cargo planes in October of20 10. 

In December 2011, Somali national Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame pled guilty to nine 

counts of providing material support to AQAP and al Shabaab. A Joint Terrorism Task Force 

investigation found that Warsarme conspired to teach terrorists how to make bombs, provided 

explosives weapons and training to al Shabaab and arranged for al Shabaab leaders to obtain 

weapons from members of AQAP. Warsame faces up to life in prison. 

Counterintelligence 

We still confront traditional espionage - spies posing as diplomats or ordinary citizens. 

But espionage also has evolved. Spies today are often students, researchers, or 

businesspeople operating "front companies." And they seek not only state secrets, but trade 

secrets, research and development, intellectual property, and insider infonnation from the federal 

government, US. corporations, and American universities. 

2 
12 

They continue to grow more creative and more sophisticated in their methods to steal 

innovative technolOb'Y, eroding America's leading edge in business and posing threats to national 

security. Tn the past four years, the number of arrests related to economic espionage has 

doubled, indictments have increased four-fold, and convictions have risen six-fold. 

The loss of critical research and development data, intellectual property, and insider 

information poses a significant threat to national security. 

In March, Steve Liu, a Chinese national and former employee of a New Jersey defense 

contractor, was sentenced to more than five years in prison for stealing thousands of electronic 

files detailing the performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, and drones. 

Liu traveled to China and delivered presentations about the technology at several Chinese 

universities. 

These cases illustrate the growing scope of the "insider threat" - when trusted 

employees and contractors use their legitimate access to information to steal secrets for the 

benefit of another company or country. This threat has been exacerbated in recent years as 

businesses become more global and increasingly exposed to foreign intelligence organizations. 

We in the FBI are working to combat this threat. The Counterintelligence Division 

educates academic and business partners about how to protect themselves against economic 

espionage. We also work with the defense industry, academic institutions, and the general public 

to address the increased targeting of unclassified trade secrets across all American industries and 

sectors. 

And we are focused on the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In July 

2011, the FBI established the Counterproliferation Center to identify and disrupt proliferation 

activities. The center combines the operational activities of the Counterintelligence Division, the 

subj ect matter expertise of the WMD Directorate, and the analytical capabilities of the 

Directorate ofTntelligence. Since its inception in July 20 II, the Counterproliferation Center 

(CPC) has overseen the arrest of approximately 50 individuals, including several considered by 

the US. Intelligence Community to be major proliferators. 

For example, Lu Futain pled guilty on November 18, 2011, to federal charges of selling 

sensitive microwave amplifiers to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Lu was sentenced to 

15 months in prison and three years of supervised release on October 29, 2012. Lu founded 

Fushine Technology, a corporation based in Cupertino, California, which exported electronic 

components used in communications and radar equipment. In April 2004, Lu's finn exported a 

microwave amplitier to co-defendant Everjet Science and Technology Corporation, a PRC-based 

company also owned by Lu, without having obtained a license from the U.S Department of 

Commerce. 

Susan Yip, a Taiwanese citizen, was sentenced to two years in prison on October 24, 

2012, for helping obtain sensitive military parts for Iran in violation of the Iranian trade 

embargo. In her b'llilty plea, Yip admitted to using her Taiwan and Hong Kong-based companies 

to carry out a fraudulent scheme to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations, by acting as a 
13 

broker and conduit for the purchase of items in the United States for shipment to Iran. From 

October 2007 to June 2011, Yip and her fellow conspirators obtained, or attempted to obtain, 

more than 105,000 parts valued at approximately $2.6 million. Yip helped buy the parts without 

notifying U.S. suppliers that the parts were being shipped to Iran, and without obtaining the 

required U.S. Government licenses 

Together with our law enforcement and intelligence partners, we must continue to protect 

our trade secrets and our state secrets, and prevent the loss of sensitive American technology 

The diverse threats we face are increasingly cyber-based. Much of America's most 

sensitive data is stored on computers. We are losing data, money, and ideas, threatening 

innovation. And as citizens, we are also increasingly vulnerable to losing our personal 

information. 

That is why we anticipate that in the future, resources devoted to cyber-based threats will 

equal or even eclipse the resources devoted to non-cyber based terrorist threats. 

We in the FBI have built up a substantial expertise to address cyber threats, both here at 

home and abroad. 

We have cyber squads in each of our 56 field offices, with more than 1,000 specially 

trained agents, analysts, and forensic specialists. We have hired additional computer scientists 

The FBI also has 63 Legal Attache offices that cover the globe. Together with our international 

counterparts, we are sharing information and coordinating investigations. We have Special 

Agents embedded with police departments in Romania, Estonia, Ukraine, and the Netherlands, 

working to identify emerging trends and key players in the cyber crime arena. 

Here at home, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force comprises 191aw 

enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to coordinate cyber threat investigations. We in 

the FBI work closely with our partners in the NSA and DHS. We have different responsibilities, 

with different "lanes in the road," but we must all be on the same page in addressing cyber 

threats. 

The leaders of the FBI, DHS, and NSA recently met to clarify the lanes in the road in 

cyber jurisdiction. Together, we agreed that the DOJ is the lead for investigation, enforcement, 

and prosecution of those responsible for cyber intrusions affecting the United States. As part of 

DOJ, the FBI conducts domestic national security operations; investigates, attributes, and 

disrupts cybercrimes; and collects, analyzes, and disseminates domestic cyber 

intelligence. DHS' primary role is to protect critical infrastructure and networks, coordinate 

mitigation and recovery, disseminate threat information across various sectors and investigate 

cybercrimes under DHS's jurisdiction. DoD's role is to defend the nation, gather intelligence on 

foreign cyber threats, and to protect national security systems. 

4 
14 

Although our agencies have ditferent roles, we also understand that we must work 

together on every substantial intrusion, and to share information among the three of us. 

Notification of an intrusion to one agency will be notitlcation to us all. 

In addition, the private sector is a key player in cyber security. 

Private sector companies are the primary victims of cyber intrusions. And they also 

possess the information, the expertise, and the knowledge to be an integral partner in reducing 

instances of cyber crime. 

Tn February 2013, the Bureau held the tlrst session of our National Cyber Executive 

Institute, a three-day seminar to train leading industry executives on cyber threat awareness and 

information sharing 

One example of an effective public-private partnership is the National Cyber Forensics 

and Training Alliance - a proven model for sharing private sector information in collaboration 

with law enforcement. Located in Pittsburgh, the Alliance includes more than 80 industry 

partners from a range of sectors, including financial services, telecommunications, retail and 

manufacturing. The members of the Alliance work together with federal and international 

partners to provide real-time threat intelligence, every day. 

Another initiative, the Enduring Security Framework, includes top leaders from the 

private sector and the federal government. This partnership illustrates that the way forward on 

cyber security is not just about sharing information, but also about solving problems - together. 

We intend to further strengthen the bridges we have built between the federal government 

and the private sector in the cyber security realm. We must fuse private-sector information with 

infonnation from the Intelligence Community and develop channels for sharing information and 

intelligence quickly and effectively. 

Our success in resolving cyber investigations rests on the creative use of investigative 

techniques we have used throughout the FBI's history - physical surveillance, forensics, 

cooperating witnesses, sources, and court-ordered wire intercepts. 

One example concerns the hacker known as "Sabu" - one ofthe co-founders of the 

hackti vist group LulzSec. 

The case began when our Los Angeles Division collected numerous TP addresses used to 

hack into the database of a TV game show. Our New York Office used a combination of 

investigative techniques, including human sources, search warrants, and surveillance, to identifY 

and locate Sabu. 

We went to arrest him, and we gave him a choice· go to jail now, or cooperate. 

Sabu agreed to cooperate, and he became a source, continuing to use his online identity. 

His cooperation helped us to build cases that led to the arrest of six other hackers linked to 
15 

groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec. It also allowed us to identify hundreds of security 

vulnerabilities - which helped us to stop future attacks, and limit harm from prior intrusions. 

Defeating today's complex cyber threats requires us to continually evolve and adapt. 

Instead of just building better defenses, we must also build better relationships. And we 

must overcome the obstacles that prevent us from sharing information and, most importantly, 

collaborating. 

u.s. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community, along with our international and 

private sector partners, are making progress. However, technological advancements and 

expansion of the Internet continue to provide malicious cyber actors the opportunity to harm U.S. 

national security and the economy Given the consequences of such attacks, the FBI must keep 

pace with this rapidly developing and diverse threat. 

Criminal 

With regard to criminal threats, our responsibilities range from complex white-collar 

fraud in the financial, health care, and housing sectors to transnational and regional organized 

criminal enterprises, and from violent crime to public corruption. These criminal threats pose a 

significant threat to the safety and security of our communities 

Public Corruption 

Public corruption is the FBI's top criminal priority. We have had a number of successful 

investigations in this area in recent years, including a racketeering indictment handed down in 

April. Twenty-five individuals, including 13 Maryland correctional officers, allegedly conspired 

with the Black Guerilla Family gang inside prisons to distribute drugs and launder money. Gang 

members allegedly bribed correctional officers at several Maryland prison facilities, convincing 

them to smuggle in drugs, cell phones, and other contraband. The correctional oftlcers alerted 

imprisoned gang members of upcoming cell searches and several of the oftlcers had long-term 

sexual relationships with the gang members and were impregnated by them. The defendants face 

maximum sentences of20 years in prison. 

Financial Crimes 

We have witnessed an increase in financial fraud in recent years, including mortgage 

fraud, health care fraud, and securities fraud. 

Mortgage Fraud 

The FBI and its partners continue to pinpoint the most egregious offenders of mortgage 

fraud As of May, the FBI had nearly 2,000 mortgage fraud investigations nationwide - and 

nearly three-fourths of these cases included losses of$! million or more. 

6 
16 

With the economy and housing market still recovering in many areas, we have seen an 

increase in schemes aimed at distressed homeowners, such as loan modification scams and 

phony foreclosure rescues. 

Others seek to defraud lenders by submitting fraudulent loan documents and setting up 

straw buyers to purchase homes. The homes then go into foreclosure, the banks are left holding 

the bag, and neighborhoods are left to manage the blight associated with vacant properties. 

Last month, the leader of a $66 million mortgage fraud scheme was sentenced to eight 

years in prison after arranging home sales between straw buyers and distressed homeowners. 

Gerard Canino, 51, trom Long Island, New York, along with his co-conspirators, obtained 

mortgage loans for sham deals by submitting traudulent applications to banks and lenders. The 

lenders sent the mortgage proceeds to the conspirators' attorneys and the attorneys submitted 

false statements to the lenders about how they were distributing the loan proceeds. They then 

distributed the loan proceeds among themselves and other members of their conspiracy. 

Over the past tive years, we have continued to boost the number of Special Agents 

investigating mortgage fraud. Our agents and analysts are using intelligence, surveillance, 

computer analysis, and undercover operations to identify emerging trends and to find the key 

players behind large-scale mortgage fraud. 

We also work closely with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Postal 

Inspectors, the IRS, the FDIC, and the Secret Service, as well as with state and local law 

enforcement offices 

Health Care Fraud 

Health care spending currently makes up about 18 percent of our nation's total economy 

- and that percentage will continue to rise as our population ages. The federal government 

proj ects that by 2021, health care spending will reach 20 percent of the U. S. economy. These 

large sums present an attractive target for criminals - so much so that we lose tens of bill ions of 

dollars each year to health care fraud. 

Last month, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force - a partnership between the Department of 

Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services - arrested 89 individuals, including 

doctors, nurses, and other licensed medical professionals, for allegedly participating in Medicare 

fraud schemes costing more than $223 million in false billing. 

Since its inception in March 2007, Medicare Fraud Strike Force operations have charged 

more than 1,500 individuals who collectively have falsely billed the Medicare program for more 

than $5 billion. 

Health care fraud is not a victimless crime Every person who pays for health care 

benetits, every business that pays higher insurance costs to cover their employees, every 

taxpayer who funds Medicare, is a victim. Schemes can cause actual patient harm, including 

7 
17 

subj ecting patients to unnecessary treatment, providing sub-standard services and supplies, and 

passing potentially life-threatening diseases due to the lack of proper precautions. 

As health care spending continues to rise, the FBI will use every tool we have to ensure 

our health care dollars are used to care for the sick - not to line the pockets of criminals. 

Corporate and Securities Fraud 

Another area where our investigations have increased substantially in recent years is in 

corporate and securities fraud. From September 2008 to April 2013, the FBI has seen a 36 

percent increase in these cases, to more than 2,750 today. 

One of our largest securities fraud cases centered on the Stanford Financial Group - a 

Houston, Texas, tinancial company that caused $7 billion in losses and impacted more than 

30,000 victims. Using evidence obtained throughout the investigation, the FBI identified key 

executive management personnel who conspired to commit large-scale securities fraud. In 

January and February of2013, the last of these co-conspirators were sentenced to prison. To 

date, five individuals have been sentenced, ranging from 3 years to 110 years in prison. 

As financial crimes become more sophisticated, so must the FBI. In the post-financial 

crisis period, the FBI devoted an additional 150 Special Agents and more than 175 forensic 

accountants to combat evolving financial crimes. 

In addition to the dedication of more personnel, the FBI continues to use sophisticated 

techniques, such as undercover operations and Title III intercepts, to address these criminal 

threats. These techniques have been widely known for their successful use against organized 

crime, and they remain a vital tool to gain concrete evidence against individuals conducting 

crimes of this nature on a national level. 

Finally, the FBI recognizes the need for increased cooperation with our regulatory 

counterparts. Currently, we have embedded agents and analysts at the Securities and Exchange 

Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which allows the FBI to work 

hand-in-hand with U.S. regulators to mitigate the corporate and securities fraud threat. 

Furthermore, these relationships enable the FBI to identify fraud trends more quickly, and to 

work with our operational and intelligence counterparts in the field to begin criminal 

investigations when deemed appropriate. 

GangsNiolent Crime 

For many cities and towns across the nation, violent crime - including gang activitycontinues to pose a real and growing problem. 

Gangs continue to become more sophisticated. They commit criminal activity, recruit 

new members in urban, suburban, and rural regions across the United States, and develop 

criminal associations that expand their influence over criminal enterprises, particularly streetlevel drug sales. 
18 

Gangs also have expanded their operations to alien smuggling, identity theft, and 

mortgage fraud. Our Violent Crime, Violent Gang/Safe Streets, and Safe Trails Task Forces 

target major groups operating as criminal enterprises - high-level groups engaged in patterns of 

racketeering This allows us to identify senior leadership and to develop enterprise-based 

prosecutions. 

Active Shooter Threats 

Communities across America also continue to face active shooter and mass casualty 

incidents. Since the Sandy Hook tragedy last December, the FBI has been working with the 

Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance to provide tactical training to law 

enforcement agencies upon request 

One hundred FBI agents across the country have attended Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid 

Response Training (ALERRT) school and are prepared to train other officers in life-saving 

tactics. The 16-hour Basic Active-Shooter course prepares tirst responders to isolate any given 

threat, distract the threat actors, and end the threat. In addition, during the month of April, the 

FBI conducted two-day conferences and table top exercises with state, local, tribal, and campus 

law enforcement executives. We have also worked with experts at Texas State University to 

improve tactical training for officers that respond to active shooter situations and then held twoday conferences on active shooter situations at most of our 56 tield offices nationwide. These 

conferences reached senior command staff from state, local, tribal and campus police agencies. 

These experiences gave behavioral experts, victim assistance specialists, and other personnel the 

opportunity to work through best practices and spurred discussions on how to best react to active 

shooter and mass casualty incidents. We are continuing our efforts with a new table top exercise 

specifically designed for campus law enforcement. This is an issue that impacts all of us, and the 

FBI is committed to working with our partners to protect our communities. 

Transnational Organized Crime 

We continue to confront organized crime. Crime syndicates run multi-national, multibillion-dollar schemes - from human trafficking to health care fraud, and from computer 

intrusions to intellectual property theft. 

These sophisticated enterprises come from every corner of the globe. Often they operate 

both overseas and in the United States, and include Italian, Russian, Asian, Balkan, Middle 

Eastern, and African syndicates as well as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. We work to cripple these 

national and transnational syndicates with every capability and tool we have: undercover 

operations; confIdential sources; surveillance; intelligence analysis and sharing; forensic 

accounting; multi-agency investigations; and the power of racketeering statutes that help us take 

down entire enterprises. We also work closely with our international partners - in some cases, 

swapping personnel - to build cases and disrupt groups with global ties 

In the spring of 2012, four members of an Armenian organized crime ring were convicted 

in one of the largest bank fraud and identity theft schemes in California history. Two of those 

9 
19 

convicted directed the scheme from behind bars. Using cell phones that were smuggled into a 

California state prison, they coordinated with others to obtain confidential bank profile 

infonnation and stole money trom high-value bank accounts. The six-year conspiracy cost more 

than $10 million in losses to victims throughout the Southwest 

Crimes Against Children 

The FBI remains vigilant in its efforts to keep children safe and to find and stop child 

predators. Our mission is threefold - tirst to decrease the vulnerability of children to sexual 

exploitation through awareness; second, to provide a rapid and effective federal investigative 

response to crimes against children; and, third, to enhance and assist the capabilities of state and 

local law enforcement investigators through task force operations. 

Through our entire Violent Crimes Against Children program, including the Child 

Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams, the Innocence Lost National Initiative, the Office of 

Victim Assistance, Innocent Images program, and numerous community outreach programs, the 

FBI and its partners are working to make the world a safer place for our children. 

And as new technology and new tactics are used to lure our young people, we must 

evol ve in our etl'orts to stop those who would do them hann. 

Tn January, a 31-year-old man trom Montgomery, Alabama, was sentenced to 35 years in 

prison for producing child pornography through a massive online sextortion scheme. 

Christopher Patrick Gunn reached out to hundreds of young girls, gained their trust and their 

personal information, and then threatened to reveal that infonnation unless they sent sexually 

explicit images of themselves. Gunn victimized children in at least a half-dozen states and 

Ireland. 

This case came to light after junior high school aged-victims contacted their local police 

in a small Alabama town. Authorities soon realized there were strikingly similar cases in 

Mississippi and Louisiana. 

By combining our resources and using our partnerships with state, local, and intemational 

law enforcement, we are able to investigate crimes that cross geographical and jurisdictional 

boundaries. 

In April, we apprehended Eric Justin Toth, who had been added to the FBI's Ten Most 

Wanted Fugitive list in April 2012, and is currently charged with production and possession of 

child pornography. Toth, who also used the name David Bussone, is a fonner camp counselor 

and private-school teacher who taught here in Washington, D.C. He had been on the run since 

2008, after an FBI investigation revealed pornographic images on a camera in his possession 

while at the school where he taught. A recent tip led law enforcement to Nicarab'Ua, where Toth 

was living under an alias. He was apprehended in Esteli, Nicaragua, and has been returned to the 

United States to face prosecution. 

10 
20 

And in February, the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, crisis negotiators, and behavioral 

analysts were instrumental in rescuing a five-year-old boy in Midland City, Alabama. Working 

with the Dale County Sheriff's Department and the Alabama Department of Public Safety, some 

300 officers and agents worked side-by-side to end a six-day siege in which an anti-government 

gunman named Jimmy Lee Dykes killed Charles Poland, a heroic school bus driver who died 

protecting the children on his bus. Dykes kidnapped the boy and held him hostage in an 

underground bunker. For six days, local, state, and federal negotiators spoke with Dykes and 

attempted to resolve the situation peacefully. When it was clear Dykes was becoming more and 

more agitated, authorities feared that the boy was in imminent danger. At that point, members of 

the Hostage Rescue Team entered the bunker in an attempt to rescue the boy. Dykes 

immediately attempted to detonate one of several bombs he had planted around his property and 

fired several shots at law enforcement. Dykes died during the confrontation. The boy was 

rescued safely, and incredibly, no law enforcement officials were injured. 

This case represents some of the finest collaboration between local, state, and federal law 

enforcement agencies in recent time. 

Indian Country 

The FBI continues to maintain primary federal law enforcement authority to investigate 

felony crimes on more than 200 Indian reservations nationwide. More than 100 Special Agents 

from 20 ditferent tield offices investigate these cases. 

Sexual assault and child sexual assault are two of the FBI's investigative priorities in 

Indian Country. Statistics indicate that American Indians and Alaska natives suffer violent crime 

at greater rates than other Americans. Approximately 75 percent of all FBI Indian Country 

investigations concern homicide, crimes against children, or felony assaults. 

The FBI continues to work with tribes through the Tribal Law and Order Act of 201 0 to 

help tribal governments better address the unique public safety challenges and disproportionately 

high rates of violence and victimization in many tribal communities. The Act encourages the 

hiring of additional law enforcement officers for Native American lands, enhances tribal 

authority to prosecute and punish criminals, and provides the Bureau oflndian Affairs and tribal 

police officers with greater access to law enforcement databases. 

Currently, the FBI has 14 Safe Trails Task Forces that investigate violent crime, drug 

offenses, and gangs in Indian Country. In addition, the FBI continues to address the emerging 

threat from traud and other white-collar crimes committed against tribal gaming facilities. 

Technology 

As criminal and terrorist threats become more diverse and dangerous, the role of 

technology becomes increasingly important to our efforts 

We are using technolOb'Y to improve the way we collect, analyze, and share information. 

In 20 II, we debuted new technology for the FBI's Next Generation Identification System, which 

11 
21 

enables us to process fingerprint transactions much faster and with more accuracy. We are also 

integrating isolated data sets throughout the Bureau, so that we can search multiple databases 

more etTtciently, and, in tum, pass along relevant information to our partners. 

Sentinel, the FBI's next-generation information and case management system was 

deployed to all employees on July 1,2012. The system's indexing ability allows users to extract 

names, dates, vehicles, addresses, and other details, and to more etTtciently share data with our 

law enforcement partners. Sentinel also enhances the FBI's ability to link cases with similar 

information through expanded search capabilities and to share new case information and 

intelligence more quickly among Special Agents and analysts. 

The FBI shares infonnation electronically with partners throughout the Intelligence 

Community, across the federal government, as well as with state and local agencies For 

example, the FBI works closely with the nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 

Initiative to ensure that SARs entered into the Justice Department's Information Sharing 

Environment's Shared Space system are simultaneously shared with eGuardian, the FBI's system 

used to collect and share terrorism-related activities among law enforcement, and in turn, 

delivered to the appropriate policing and Intelligence Community partners. 

Going Dark 

The rapid pace of advances in mobile and other communication technologies continues to 

present a significant challenge for conducting court-approved electronic surveillance of criminals 

and terrorists 

Court-approved surveillance is a vital tool for Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

authorities. It is, for example, critical in cyber cases where we are trying to identify those 

individuals responsible for attacks on networks, denial of service attacks, and attempts to 

compromise protected information. However, there is a growing gap between law enforcement's 

legal authority to conduct electronic surveillance, and its ability to conduct such surveillance. 

Because of this gap, law enforcement is increasingly unable to gain timely access to the 

information to which it is lawfully authorized and that it needs to protect public safety, bring 

criminals to justice, and keep America safe. We must ensure law enforcement capabilities keep 

pace with new threats and new technology, while at the same time protecting individual privacy 

rights and civil rights. 

It is only by working together - within the law enforcement and intelligence 

communities, with our private sector partners and with members of Congress - that we will find 

a long-term solution to this growing problem. In March, the FBI took one step toward improved 

collaboration and communication with the opening of the National Domestic Communications 

Assistance Center. The center will enable law enforcement to share tools, train one another in 

modern intercept solutions, and reach out to the communications industry with one voice. 

12 
22 

Civil Rights! Civil Liberties! Rule of Law 

Technology is one tool we use to stay a step ahead of criminals and terrorists. Yet as we 

in the FBI continue to evolve to keep pace with today's complex threat environment, our values 

must never change. The rule oflaw remains our guiding principle. 

Every FBI employee takes an oath promising to uphold the rule oflaw and the United 

States Constitution. For the men and women of the FBI, this is our guiding principle. In my 

remarks to New Agents upon their graduation from the FBI Academy, I emphasize that it is not 

enough to catch the criminal; we must do so while upholding his civil rights. It is not enough to 

stop the terrorist; we must do so while maintaining civil liberties. It is not enough to prevent 

foreign nations from stealing our secrets; we must do so while upholding the rule oflaw. 

Following the rule oflaw and upholding civil liberties and civil rights make all of us safer 

and stronger. In the end, we will be judged not only by our ability to keep Americans safe from 

crime and terrorism, but also by whether we safeguard the liberties for which we are fighting and 

maintain the trust of the American people. 

Conclusion 

Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, I thank you for this opportunity to 

discuss the FBT's priorities. The transfonnation the FBI has achieved during my term would not 

have been possible without your support and the support of the American people. Your 

investments in our workforce, our technology, and our infrastructure make a difference every 

day at FBI offices throughout the United States and abroad, and we thank you for that support. 

I look forward to any questions that you may have 

13 
23 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Before we begin the questions portion of the 

hearing, I want to remind Members of the Committee that although certain classified programs were publicly leaked last week, 

that does not mean that they have been declassified. Members who 

may choose to question the Director about these programs should 

exercise caution in how they phrase their questions in due regard 

for their classification and appreciate the Director’s very limited 

ability to speak to the programs in an unclassified setting. 

We will now proceed under the 5-minute rule, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Director, the recent revelation of the NSA data collection 

programs has led to a great deal of debate both in Congress and 

in the public. I know there is very little you may be able to say 

in a public setting, but to the extent you can, please explain to this 

Committee why you think these programs are important and how 

they protect the American people from terrorism. Do you share the 

concerns of many Members of Congress, including myself, and 

American citizens, that civil liberties need to be protected in the 

operation of these programs? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me start by saying that the challenge in 

a position such as I have held for the last 11 years is to balance, 

on the one hand, the security of the Nation, and on the other hand, 

the civil liberties that we enjoy in this country. And there is not 

a day that goes by that we don’t look at some issue that raises that 

balance. One of the things we do insist upon and assure, and that 

is any endeavor we undertake addressing national security is legal. 

In this particular case, the programs to which you refer, the legality has been assured by the Department of Justice. The FISA 

Court has ruled on these two programs, monitors these two programs, and, again, has assured the legality of the efforts undertaken in these two programs. 

And lastly, I will say in response to what Ranking Member Conyers said in terms of a debate, Congress has been briefed, as has 

been pointed out, has been briefed over the years, was briefed prior 

to the 2009 re-up, was briefed before the 2000 re-up, in an effort 

by the Administration to make certain that Congress knew and understand the efforts that were being taken under Section 215. And 

if there were a change to be made by Congress, if the line is to be 

drawn differently, so be it. We would follow that to the letter of the 

law. But I repeat that in both of these programs passed by Congress they have been approved and the legality assured by the Department of Justice, by the FISA court, and have been briefed 

and—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me interrupt you because we do need to get 

a couple more questions in. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I think you’ve made your point on that. I’m sure 

further discussion about it before the day ensues. 

As you know, the Committee is investigating the use of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 to obtain a search warrant for Fox 

News correspondent James Rosen’s emails. In your experience as 

a Federal prosecutor, as assistant to Attorney General Thornburgh, 

as Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, and as FBI 

Director, when you authorize a search warrant for a target of a 
24 

criminal investigation, wasn’t prosecution of that target the objective? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say no. Quite often in search warrants 

there are—or affidavits in support of search warrants—there are 

occasions where a person will be mentioned as having culpability, 

but there will be no discussion or anticipation of prosecution. That 

could be for a variety of reasons. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, to that point, in the case in particular we 

have got Mr. Rosen, and perhaps in other cases, where you did not 

intend to prosecute. Did you characterize the individual as a flight 

risk, as was done in the matter involving Mr. Rosen? And did you 

delay notice of the search warrant for 18 months, as was done in 

the case with regard to Mr. Rosen? And it actually turned out to 

be 3 years because the judge neglected to release the information 

until 18 months after his order had required that it be done, but 

the Justice Department requested 18 months in the first place. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yeah, I am not—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Why would that be necessary if there were no 

intention to prosecute? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with the full extent of that investigation in particular, all of the facts that were raised either in 

the affidavit or in the discussion as to how one would proceed to 

get the data that persons wanted. I can say two things. One, that 

there was great scrutiny given at the local level, I am sure, to what 

needed to go into the search warrant and its affidavit, in particular 

with reference to the judicial requirements for getting those particular records. And secondly, that there is a protocol, longstanding 

protocol in the Department of Justice that was adhered to in getting approval for that particular action. 

I know and you know that the Department of Justice is now 

looking at this set of circumstances—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me interrupt you and get one more question 

in. 

Mr. MUELLER. All I want to say is that to the extent that there 

are tweaks that need to be done, we are happy to abide by those 

tweaks. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Following the apprehension of Dzhokhar 

Tsarnaev, some criticized the timing of the criminal complaint 

against him and his initial appearance. We know the timing of 

these acts is set forth by the Constitution and the rules of criminal 

procedure. Do you believe these criminal rules are well suited to intelligence gathering from a domestic terrorism suspect, and should 

the Congress consider amending these rules when we are faced 

with a domestic terrorism situation, whereas in this case the questioning of this individual by the FBI prior to him being given Miranda warnings short circuited your opportunity to question him 

about imminent dangers, like other potential sites, other suspected 

co-conspirators, and other bombs that may have been in existence 

at the time, and therefore very important that the defendant—the 

prospective defendant be questioned? 

Mr. MUELLER. Any investigator would tell you or interrogator 

would tell you, the longer you have, the more information that you 

get. And particularly in this day and age, where if you have access 

to the information on computers or thumb drives or what have you, 
25 

you will have a much better opportunity to get appropriate questioning accomplished. On the other hand, you have the dictates of 

the Constitution and the applicable statutes. 

In a very narrow sliver of cases, where it is terrorism, where the 

threat is substantial, I would say that one could look at opportunities for giving those questioners additional time to extract information that may protect the public. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

My time has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. We appreciate your presence here 

today. 

In the past week, many in the Administration have implied that 

because they have briefed the Congress and this Committee, that 

we are all complicit in the use of these surveillance tactics. Can 

you acknowledge here this morning that your briefing me and my 

staff does not constitute our assent or agreement to these programs? 

Mr. MUELLER. The briefings that have been, continue to be provided to Congress is to inform Congress of how these programs are 

being applied, to what end they’re being used, and in order to establish a dialogue as to what, if any changes need to be done to 

these programs, but also in furtherance of the Congress’ role as the 

oversight body. And consequently, I don’t think we look at the 

briefings as a form of agreement in any way, shape, or form, but 

look at the briefings as our obligation to inform Congress as to 

what is happening so if Congress wishes to take steps to change 

the particular statute and the applicability of a particular statute, 

then Congress takes the steps to do that. 

Mr. CONYERS. The public’s understanding of this program is that 

the government collects these records. Let’s take the Verizon system. And they collect the records of every person in the United 

States and retains them for some period of time, and then queries 

a massive database when it has a specific concern about one of us, 

any one of us. Is that understanding accurate? 

Mr. MUELLER. Within broad parameters, yes. But let me make 

two points, if I could. First, that the particular databases of 

metadata has no content whatsoever. We have no authority to get 

content. What the statute, we believe, and the FISA Court has allowed is the accumulation of metadata; that is the fact of a telephone call, the numbers called, and the time and length of those 

calls, and there are cases that where that has been instrumental 

in identifying individuals who sought to harm our country. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, I know that, that the content isn’t kept. But 

to have that information of who called whom, the length of time, 

probably where the parties were, do we need—does that serve any 

real purpose? I mean, is that—this puts everybody in the United 

States of America subject to this kind of content. We have a feeling, 

at least some of us, that it’s not necessary, nor does it serve a legitimate legal protective purpose. 

Mr. MUELLER. Would you indulge me, because I want to go back 

to what occurred 9/11, and which has some bearing on this. Before 

9/11, there was an individual by the name of Khalid al-Mihdhar, 

who came to be one of the principal hijackers. He was being 
26 

tracked by the intelligence agencies in the Far East. They lost 

track of him. At the same time, the intelligence agencies had identified an al-Qaeda safehouse in Yemen. They understood that that 

al-Qaeda safehouse had a telephone number, but they could not 

know who was calling into that particular safehouse. 

We came to find out afterwards that the person who had called 

into that safehouse was al-Mihdhar, who was in the United States 

in San Diego. If we had had this program in place at the time, we 

would have been able to identify that particular telephone number 

in San Diego. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. I’m almost out of time. 

Mr. MUELLER. I understand, but I ask indulgence just to finish 

because it’s a critical point as to why we have this program and 

how important it is. 

Mr. CONYERS. All right. 

Mr. MUELLER. If we had the telephone number from Yemen, we 

would have matched it up to that telephone number in San Diego, 

got further legal process, identified al-Mihdhar. 

One last point. The 9/11 Commission, itself, indicated that investigations or interrogations of al-Mihdhar, once he was identified, 

could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in 

the 9/11 plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed 

the plan. In any case, the opportunity was not there. If we had had 

this program that opportunity would have been there. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just finish. 

I am not persuaded that that makes it okay to collect every call. 

Look, the Verizon system, how can the government collect information on all of the Verizon system if the statute limits the government to those records that are relevant? If they are relevant, relevant under your interpretation means that anything and everything goes, and that’s what you did in the example that you just 

gave me. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me say, the gentleman’s time has expired. 

We are going to try to be very close to the 5-minute rule. And it 

is an excellent question. We will have to wait for the answer. We 

will submit the questions in writing to the Director and ask him 

to respond in writing to those that we don’t have time to ask today. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 

Sensenbrenner, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To begin, Director Mueller, let me commend you for your 12 

years of very dedicated service in an agency that obviously had to 

change its targeting and its mission as a result of 9/11. And you 

and I got our jobs as leaders, me as Chairman, about the same 

time. You’re about ready to retire. I was retired as Chairman in 

2007, but I’m not about ready to retire from Congress or asking 

questions. So I’ll begin. 

Let me start out with two quotes from then Senator Barack 

Obama. First is, ‘‘President Bush has put forward a false choice between the liberties we cherish and the security we provide. I will 

provide our intelligence and the law enforcement agencies with the 

tools they need to track and take out the terrorists without undermining our Constitution and our freedom.’’ 
27 

The second quote, which comes from the same speech in Washington of August 1st, 2007, ‘‘The Bush administration acts like violating civil liberties is the way to enhance our security. It is not. 

There are no shortcuts to protecting America.’’ Unquote. 

Now, Director Mueller, you have served both under President 

Bush and through the transition to President Obama. What new 

privacy protections did the FBI implement under President Obama, 

and were those in place when the FBI applied for the FISA application that was leaked to the Guardian? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we have internally a privacy officer. The Department of Justice has a privacy officer. I do not know specifically, 

but in programs such as this or other areas where we initiate collection of information, it goes through our privacy shops. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That’s not my question, with all due respect. Were there new privacy protections that were implemented 

by the new President, Barack Obama, after January 20th, 2009, 

when he took office? 

Mr. MUELLER. Are you asking were there? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not certain of the timing of additional, whatever additional privacy protections were instituted, if there were. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. So there might not have been. 

Well, I am very interested in your comment about the alMihdhar case, which was somebody who got on the radar screen 

before 9/11 and before the PATRIOT Act. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which I had a hand in drafting, requires that the business records FISA warrants, or orders, be directed solely at foreigners who are the targets of an authorized terrorism investigation and not on United States citizens unless they are contacted or 

involved with foreigners. 

Now, I don’t think that Section 215 would have put a crimp on 

identifying al-Mihdhar if that was in place before September 11th. 

But my question is, with respect to the FISA order that was leaked 

to the Guardian, is with the narrowness that Section 215 is, and 

as I have described it. How can Section 215 be utilized to scoop up 

the phone records of American citizens who are not in communication with a foreigner who is an object of an authorized terrorism 

investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. To a certain extent I have to defer to the Justice 

Department on the legal theory and the FISA Court. I can tell you 

generally that there is the belief that the body of telephone toll 

data has in that information that is relevant, may be relevant in 

the future, has been relevant in the past, and that its collection in 

this matter thereby satisfies the requirement for relevance according to the court. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, you know, the question of relevance 

is the same type of question that could be issued either with a 

grand jury subpoena or with a national security letter without involving the PATRIOT Act. I hear you involved the PATRIOT Act 

in something that is done in secret, and there are no due process 

protections in place because the recipient of the FISA warrant can’t 

tell what records he’s turned over. And that’s not the case with either national security letters or grand jury subpoenas. 
28 

Now, I guess what my concern is, is that there really isn’t any 

way for anybody whose records are turned over to approach the 

FISA Court or any other court, because they don’t know about it, 

to try to get the order quashed. And an FBI agent was the one that 

signed the affidavit to get that order. 

And my time is up. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me, if I may just follow up with one observation. And that is, as we all know, these particular records are 

not covered by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has 

held that to be the case. And secondly, the determination as to the 

legality and that standard has been addressed by the FISA Court 

in the affirmative to support this particular program. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Nadler, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Let me just suggest, by the way, that that 1979 decision of the 

Supreme Court that a phone bill is not protected by the Fourth 

Amendment might not apply to a lot of the stuff today given how 

pervasive and privacy invading this metadata has become, compared to what could be done in 1979. So I wouldn’t—I don’t know 

that I would totally rely on that precedent to do everything that 

is being done. 

But let me ask you the following. Under Section 215—and I also 

would like to associate myself with the remarks that a dragnet subpoena for every telephone—every telephone record, et cetera, every 

email record—although I know they don’t do that anymore, but 

they could again tomorrow, and they did do it—certainly makes a 

mockery of the relevance standard in Section 215. 

If everything in the world is relevant, then there is no meaning 

to that word. Now, some of us offered amendments to narrow that 

several years ago, and in retrospect maybe we should have adopted 

those amendments. But that’s no excuse for a misinterpretation of 

relevance to the point that there is no such meaning to the word. 

Now, secondly, under Section 215, if you’ve gotten information 

from metadata and you as a result of that think that, gee, this 

phone number, 873, whatever, looks suspicious and we ought to actually get the contents of that phone do you need a new specific 

warrant? 

Mr. MUELLER. You need at least a national security letter. All 

you have is a telephone number. You do not have subscriber information, so you need the subscriber information. You would have to 

get probably a national security letter to get that subscriber information. And then if you wanted to do more—— 

Mr. NADLER. If you wanted to listen to the phone? 

Mr. MUELLER. Then you have to get a particularized order from 

the FISA Court directed at that particular phone and that particular individual. 

Mr. NADLER. Now, is the answer you just gave me classified? 

Mr. MUELLER. Is what? 

Mr. NADLER. The answer you just gave me classified in any way? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t think so. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Then I can say the following. We heard precisely the opposite at the briefing the other day. We heard precisely 

that you could get the specific information from that telephone sim-
29 

ply based on an analyst deciding that and you didn’t need a new 

warrant. In other words, that what you just said is incorrect. So 

there’s a conflict—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not certain it’s the same—answer to the same 

question. I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, I asked the question both times and I think 

it’s at same question. So maybe you’d better go back and check because someone was incorrect. 

Mr. MUELLER. I will do that. That is my understanding of the 

process. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. I don’t question it’s your understanding. It 

was always my understanding. And I was rather startled the other 

day. And I wanted to take this opportunity to—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I would be happy to clarify it. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Second, we have heard from Director—DNI Clapper of the terrible, horrible damage to national security done by, what’s his 

name, Snowden, by releasing this information. I’d like to you comment on that. I don’t understand how national security was 

breached. 

We knew publicly, from 2006 at least, from the reporting in the 

USA Today on May 11th, 2006, about the—basically the existence 

of a massive NSA database of metadata from domestic phone calls. 

That was reported back then. We debated it in this Committee and 

on the floor of the House in connection with the reauthorization, 

I believe in 2012 and in 2008. At least several times. So that was 

known publicly. 

The only thing that was not known as far as I can tell that was 

revealed was the specifics of that court order, which tell us nothing 

other than what was already public. Plus you could have it for 

whatever length of time it was. And even the stuff about Section 

702, we debated that at length in the FISA Amendments Act debate a couple years ago, so that was pretty known. The only thing 

that may not have been known is the exact technical capabilities. 

But my assumption—and tell me why you think this is not correct—is that any terrorist or would-be terrorist with half a brain 

in his head would assume that all electronic communications are 

vulnerable and may be subject to interception. And how does what 

what’s his name just released add to that assumption or change 

that assumption? 

Mr. MUELLER. And let me address the last point, because I often 

hear that any terrorist who has a brain would figure it out. The 

fact of the matter is there are terrorists and there are terrorists. 

And I can speak generally, but I cannot going into some of the 

more details as to specific harm to national security. But I can tell 

you every time that we have a leak like this, if you follow it up 

and you look at the intelligence afterwards, there are persons who 

are out there who follow this very, very, very, very closely and they 

are looking for ways around it. 

One of the great vulnerabilities that terrorists understand is 

their communications, and they are consistently looking for ways 

to have secure communications. Any tidbit of information that 

comes out in terms of our capabilities and our programs and the 

like they are immediately finding ways around it. 
30 

And if we lose, as we—one of my problems is that we are going 

to lose because we’ve got chat, VoIP, a number of other things, lose 

our ability to get their communications, we are going to be exceptionally vulnerable. I ask you to get the more—the classified briefing as to more specifics. But nobody be misled in this: This hurts 

national security. 

Now, the issue is, how do you balance that against privacy? I understand that. And you may come down differently than others, 

than the FISA Court, than me, perhaps. But all I can say is that 

there is a cost to be paid. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Coble, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. Director, again, thank you for your years of service. 

I want to revisit Benghazi, Mr. Director. Some recent weeks ago 

the former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, appeared before a 

Senate hearing and she was asked about certain facts that surrounded the Libyan tragedy, and she responded, what difference 

does it make? Well, I’ll take umbrage with that response. Which I 

felt was insensitive and condescending. It may make a great deal 

of difference. 

Having said that, we have all seen, are familiar with reports that 

the FBI’s Evidence Response Team, the ERT, waited in Tripoli for 

more than 2 weeks for access to Benghazi. Some have said that 

this was due to bureaucratic entanglements. Do you agree with 

that? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not. We monitored the situation very closely 

after that occurrence. We had persons ready to go. Quite obviously 

we were in touch immediately with the State Department requesting the opportunity to go. There were a number of factors that 

made this as unique a situation overseas as we have seen. This 

isn’t the first bombing that we’ve had of our embassies. East Africa, we had a number of years ago. But we got our people in. In this 

case there were a combination of factors that were the delay. 

In Benghazi there is no law enforcement. Was not then. Is not 

now. There is nobody that you can deal with in terms of assuring 

your security. 

Mr. COBLE. Let me ask one more question. 

Mr. MUELLER. Secondly—pardon? 

Mr. COBLE. Go ahead. 

Mr. MUELLER. Secondly, the Libyan government. It is dependent 

upon getting visas from the Libyan government and the Libyan 

government then and today is still unstable and it’s very difficult 

to get any decisions made from a person who is a decision maker 

in that arena. But I would say the bottom line is to assure the security of our people when we went in. When we could assure the 

security of our persons, we did go in and do our onsite review. 

Mr. COBLE. Did you speak to anyone in the Libyan government 

about the delay? 

Mr. MUELLER. We were talking through our Ambassador. I think 

it was the Ambassador there at the time pushing hard. I know the 

State Department was pushing hard. We were pushing hard. But 

the two concerns, the safety and the reluctance of the government 
31 

to move quickly on this, inhibited our ability to do what we wanted 

to do. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Mueller, as a former prosecutor I know you are 

familiar with the importance of preserving a crime scene in order 

to assure that you can collect the maximum amount of evidence. 

Having said that, once the ERT arrived in Benghazi, how quickly 

were they able to secure that scene and begin collecting evidence? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the ERT team went in with a military component with support from air assets and others. And I think we did 

it within a 24-hour period. 

Mr. COBLE. Would it be fair to say that the 2-week delay in the 

FBI’s ability to secure the scene of the attacks led to the corruption 

of the scene? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say that—I’m not certain I would say corruption of the scene. I would say that you always want to get to 

the scene as soon after the occurrence. Certainly, the scene had 

been entered by any number of people and it was not as pristine 

as we would like. Absolutely. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Mueller, would it also be fair to say that the corrupted scene led to less evidence collection since we cannot establish the chain of custody? That is to say that the same evidence at 

the scene was the same when you all began as was 2 weeks prior? 

Mr. MUELLER. Oh, I think yes, I would say yes. The delay adversely impacted the ability to gather evidence in a variety of ways 

and adversely impacted the investigation. 

Mr. COBLE. Has this put a damper on our ability to pursue 

leads? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m sorry? 

Mr. COBLE. Has this put a damper on our ability to pursue leads 

and/or suspects? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, you don’t know what you don’t know, what 

you may have missed. I can tell you that the investigation is ongoing. We’ve had some success that I can’t get into today. But it is 

a very difficult operating environment, not just at the scene itself, 

but obtaining the cooperation of witnesses and others who may 

have information relating to the—— 

Mr. COBLE. My time is about up. Mr. Mueller, this Benghazi 

tragedy still hangs in my craw. I’m not directing this at you, but 

I’m directing it at somebody. We still don’t know all the facts. I 

don’t suggest there is a cover-up but it has the trappings of a coverup. And I repeat it hangs in the craw. As my late granddaddy used 

to say: It makes my coffee taste bad in the morning. But we will 

see what happens. Thank you for being with us. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, thank you for your very distinguished service. 

As you know, people acquiring firearms can, with the gun show 

loophole and a lot of other exceptions, easily obtain a firearm without a criminal background check. What difference would a universal or virtually universal background check make? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, at the outset it would mean fewer persons 

who have the characteristics, ability and characteristics, would be 

in possession of guns. 
32 

Mr. SCOTT. On the issue of these telephone records, you’ve indicated how the acquisition of all telephone records helps to protect 

us from terrorism. Is it true that this data can be used for things 

other than terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. You can’t use it for a criminal investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. You can’t use it if the purpose of the Section 104 

wiretap is a significant purpose, that terrorism is a significant purpose, there may be some other purpose? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m sorry, I missed the question, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Under Section 104 you can get the warrant, you have 

to show that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 

foreign intelligence information. ‘‘Significant purpose’’ was the 

change in the law from ‘‘the purpose,’’ which suggests that it’s the 

primary purpose. If it’s just a significant purpose, that would leave 

open the idea that there is another purpose for getting the information. When I asked Attorney General Gonzales that question, what 

other purpose you could be using these warrants for, he blurted out 

criminal investigations, of course without the normal probable 

cause and everything else. 

Is the acquisition of this information, this metadata, solely for 

protection against terrorism or can it be used for something else? 

Mr. MUELLER. Terrorism. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, if you tripped over some other things, like you 

noticed a crime, could you use it in a criminal prosecution? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. Not that I’m aware of. The strictures are that 

you cannot. Now, there may be a way to go to the court if there 

was an egregious crime that you get some permission of the court, 

but the court would have to authorize it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, the exclusionary rule works because you don’t 

illegally obtain evidence because if you got it you can’t use it. There 

is a suspicion that some of us have that you’re getting this information and you can use it, if you’ve got one of these task forces and 

one of the guys can get a FISA warrant, other guy can’t, will you 

go get the FISA warrant, we’ll track down, because you’ve got one 

of the guys in the place is an agent of a foreign government, so we 

can go listen in and see if we can’t trip over a crime, then use the 

evidence. You’re saying you can’t use it for anything other than terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. You cannot under the statute. If you are talking 

about 215, it says reasonable, articulable suspicion that a particular telephone number was associated with al-Qaeda or a foreign 

power. It’s very simple. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yeah, significant purpose. Not primary purpose. 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m uncertain on—I’d have to go back—— 

Mr. SCOTT. We changed it from primary purpose to significant 

purpose which just opened up the idea that you could have some 

ulterior motive. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, on that particular language and language 

change, if you allow me to get back to you, I’d like to give some 

thought to that. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so that this information that we’re getting can 

only be used for terrorism? That’s what we’re hearing—— 
33 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, under 215, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. In the IRS situation there is some question as to 

whether some progressive groups were also targeted for scrutiny 

under Section 501(c)(4) abuse. But if it can be shown that only 

groups targeted were targeted because of political views, would 

that violate criminal law? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to—that’s speculative. Excuse me just 1 

second if I could. 

I just wanted to check whether I was right on—I wanted to check 

my answers on my previous—on your previous questions. Thank 

you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. On the Boston bombing, obviously there was 

information out there that you could have used. Do your limited resources limit your ability to track down each and every lead that 

you’re given and compromise your ability to protect us against terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. We get thousands upon thousands of terrorism 

leads each year. The Boston office is up in that range of those number, a thousand a year. In this particular case, though, I do believe 

that when we got the lead on Tamerlan from the Russians, that the 

agent did an excellent job in investigating, utilizing the tools that 

are available to him in that kind of investigation. As I think you’re 

aware, he did all the records checks. He went out to the—interviewed persons at the college where Tamerlan was there for a period of time. Ultimately, interviewed the parents. Interviewed 

Tamerlan himself. Sent the information back to Russia. And on 

three separate occasions we asked the Russians for additional information that might give us indications or evidence that he was 

a terrorist. 

So I think we did a thorough job in following that lead. And at 

that point in time, I do not know that there was much else that 

could be done within the statutes, within the Constitution to further investigate him. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, 

Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, as Mr. Sensenbrenner did, I want to thank you for 

your service over the years to our country. I also want to disclose 

that I happen to represent Cincinnati, Ohio, where some of the allegations of apparently rogue employees who were allegedly acting 

on their own have—were originated. 

But my questions, let me begin with this. The IRS, of course, is 

privy to some of our citizens’ most sensitive information and it’s 

tasked with applying the law in a fair and impartial way. You 

would agree with that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. However, the members of a tea party group 

in my district received a letter asking some pretty invasive questions, I believe. Providing all their Facebook and Twitter information, for example. Any of their advertising. They specifically mentioned a gentleman by the name of Justin Binik-Thomas—although 

it says Bink, B-I-N-K, it’s actually B-I-N-I-K, I believe—who’s just 

an ordinary citizen who didn’t have any connection with that par-
34 

ticular organization that received this inquiry from the IRS. And 

he also got no notification in that matter at all. 

They also got questions about providing a list of all the issues 

that were important to that organization. And they wanted to know 

what their position was regarding each issue. And I am very concerned about the IRS’ admitting to targeting conservative groups 

and this overly invasive line of questioning and request for information. It’s really, I believe, more like harassment rather than an 

appropriate inquiry under 501(c)(4) status inquiries. 

Now, the Attorney General announced back on May 14th that he 

had ordered an investigation by the FBI. Has the FBI begun that 

investigation now? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. And I assume that you can’t go into the details of that because it’s an ongoing investigation. Am I correct on 

that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Correct. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Now, the IRS Commissioner, Steven Miller, 

initially blamed these actions, as I said, on two rogue employees 

way out there in the Cincinnati office, so how could we possibly 

know anything about that here in Washington, basically. And he 

acted like nobody here in this city knew anything it or was connected in any way with it. 

That’s become pretty clear at that point that the IRS in Washington was involved in this. And I’d like to read a couple of things 

here relative to Elizabeth Hofacre, who was one of the Cincinnati 

employees, and some of the things that she has indicated on the 

record. She said that the tea party cases, the patriot cases, those 

types of organizations that were questioned by the IRS, that they 

were basically in a holding pattern, their applications. She indicated that they were basically in a black hole. She had been working for 11 years at the IRS and she said the way the IRS handled 

the tea party cases was unprecedented. 

So unprecedented, which I think is pretty significant. She said it 

was micromanaged to death by an IRS lawyer who worked in 

Washington. Again, no Washington connection, of course, but that’s 

where this IRS lawyer was, here in Washington, D.C. And back in 

July 2010 the IRS developed what was called a BOLO list. Do you 

know what a BOLO list is? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Well, it stands for Be on the Look Out. 

BOLO, Be on the Look Out. And it instructed—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I knew BOLO in the law enforcement context. I didn’t know whether you were using it in that context. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yeah, it was used in that context to send Hofacre 

applications from organizations involved with the tea party movement. And she told congressional investigators that she understood 

the purpose of the list was to target conservative and Republican 

groups. Other political groups did not get handled the same way, 

according to her. A USA Today review of tax exemptions granted 

at the time showed dozens of liberal groups got exemptions while 

tea party groups were on hold. 

And subsequently there was another BOLO criteria that came 

down from D.C. talking about including groups whose issues in-
35 

clude government spending, government debt and taxes, and if 

you’re critical of the country or the direction that it’s going or the 

way it’s being run. And, again, a lot of these things sat in limbo 

for 27 months. 

Will all these matters be investigated by the FBI no matter how 

high up they go? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can specifically assert that all will. To the extent 

that there is any indication of criminal misconduct, we will follow 

the leads and the evidence wherever it takes us. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North 

Carolina, Mr. Watt, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Mueller, for your service over the years. 

I think you have raised the standard very high and I appreciate 

that. 

I want to follow up on—in a response that you made to a question Mr. Conyers gave you used the phrase that you thought the 

American people were concerned about to what end they, the programs, these two programs, are being used. 

And I think that is absolutely the case. I think that was the case 

when we were debating the PATRIOT Act and the reauthorization 

of it. And the concerns that a number of us were raising at that 

time was to what end would these programs be used. 

Congressman Scott has questioned you about some of those ends. 

And what I want to do is frame this based on the four things that 

you mentioned in your opening statement. You talked about terrorism. You talked about national security. You talked about 

cybersecurity. And you talked about criminal activity in your description of cybersecurity, and you said that that required publicprivate interaction. And all of these things have become more global, I take it, all four of those categories have become more global. 

So the question I’m raising is, is there a distinction between terrorism, the purposes for which information can be used in these 

programs for terrorism purposes—that’s why the statutes were put 

in place—is there a distinction between terrorism and national security? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think terrorism as defined is a threat to national 

security, in and of itself. 

Mr. WATT. Okay, but does national security include some things 

outside terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. Include the what? 

Mr. WATT. Some things that are outside the category of terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. Terrorism is a separate category, but you have 

cyber terrorists, you have individuals, and one of the concerns we 

have, quite obviously in the future—— 

Mr. WATT. What about trade, trade as a matter of—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Trade—— 

Mr. WATT [continuing]. National security, I take it—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I can tell you if—I mean, one of the hypotheticals 

is a terrorist attack, cyber terrorist attack on Wall Street. That is 

trade. To the extent that you would disrupt that, then absolutely, 

that is a matter of national security. 
36 

Mr. WATT. So I think what—you were right that the public’s concern here is what is the overlap between these four categories and 

to what extent can this information that is being gathered be used 

for things that—in the gray areas here. 

I was uncomfortable that we got so preoccupied with terrorism 

that we compromised, I thought, personal liberties, but assume 

that we got comfortable with that after 9/11. What if you found 

something in this information that’s gathered under these two programs that related more to criminal activity, serious criminal activity, the question is can that be used, anything you find in these 

phone dragnets, can it be used in a criminal investigation if you 

decide that it’s not terrorist related necessarily, but could be national security related or cybersecurity related? What is the dividing line between the use of these things other than an individual 

agent’s discretion or whatever an individual agent represents in an 

affidavit to the court? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start by the use of the word dragnet. I do 

not believe—— 

Mr. WATT. I’m sorry. And I didn’t intend to use it either. I really 

apologize. It’s data gathering. 

Mr. MUELLER. It’s data gathering; it is not content. The statute 

is fairly specific that it’s attributable to terrorism, and the traditional what one would understand to be terrorism, al-Qaeda and its 

like, and other terrorist groups that are specifically mentioned. 

As I tried to point out before, the program is set up for a very 

limited purpose, in a limited objective, and that is to identify individuals in the United States who are using a telephone for terrorist 

activities and to draw that network. 

Mr. WATT. Is cyber terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. If there was—— 

Mr. WATT. Is cyber terrorism? 

Mr. MUELLER. Sniper? 

Mr. WATT. Cyber? 

Mr. MUELLER. Cyber? It can be, it can be. But not as distinguished—I’d have to look at that, but I don’t believe it would be 

covered in this particular statute. I tried to leave out the possibility 

that if there were a piece of evidence that was applicable to a homicide or substantial, the only way for that piece to be utilized was 

go back to the court and get the approval of the court to utilize this 

information in a way that was not covered in the original order. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BACHUS. Director Mueller, I also want to commend you on 

your service to our country. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. And let me ask you, I have been reading about 

James Rosen case, the reports on it, and I find a great deal of confusion over what the Justice Department and the FBI have done 

and what they haven’t done. You’re familiar with the search warrant and the affidavit? 

Mr. MUELLER. In that particular case? 

Mr. BACHUS. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I’m not that familiar with it. 
37 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. Are you familiar—I mean, at the time the 

search warrant was issued, Stephen Kim had already been identified as the leaker of the information. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not aware of the timing, I know this was 3 

years ago. 

Mr. BACHUS. Yeah. No, actually in 2010, yeah, yeah, that’s right, 

he had already been identified, I’ll just tell you, if you read the affidavit, clearly he had been identified as the leaker. And I know that 

Attorney General Holder said he didn’t know of a prosecution, you 

know, or wasn’t a party to a prosecution of the press. But if you 

read the search warrant, I know that it talks about Mr. Rosen as 

being perhaps an aider or abetter or co-conspirator. But if you read 

the affidavit, he clearly was encouraging Stephen Kim to leak classified information. I mean, there is quite a bit of that. In fact he 

was concealing his identity and telling Kim to conceal his identity. 

Now, also according to this affidavit—and I take this as being 

true, I know of nothing in this affidavit that has been disproved— 

this disclosure threatened our national security, clearly, and it 

probably or could have cost the life of our intelligence source in 

North Korea, because I’m not even sure if the person is still alive. 

Now, just assuming that what I say—that assuming the affidavit 

is correct and that James Rosen was doing all of this information, 

daily contact with Kim, I know that there has been accusations 

that the Privacy Protection Act was violated. But, you know, it says 

that protects journalists from being compelled to turn over to law 

enforcement any work product or documentary materials, including 

sources, before the information contained in these materials is disseminated. 

Now, it was disseminated a year before. So that I don’t think is 

valid. It also prevents investigators from searching newsrooms to 

uncover information or sources that a news organization has assembled. I don’t think that applies in this case. I know of no search 

of any newsroom or any work product. 

But it says there is no protection if there is probable cause to believe the person possessing the materials has committed or is committing a crime to which the materials relate to, including receipt, 

possession, or communication of classified material. 

Now, this affidavit contains 35 pages of very active recruiting of 

the State Department employee, advising him, the reporter, to use 

a fake email. And the search warrant was to Google. So, you know, 

it’s has been said that they should take—the government should 

take reasonable steps to obtain the information through alternative 

sources or means than the reporter. Well, I would think Google 

would be an alternative source. 

And there is a clear presumption—well, there isn’t now, but 

there is a presumption I think again seizing a reporter’s work product. But I would ask you to read that affidavit. And my point is 

simply, from reading the affidavit, I would think it’s clearly within 

the right of the government to prosecute this reporter. 

Mr. MUELLER. I can tell you two things. One, I did briefly review 

the affidavit when it—when the issue arose, so I am somewhat familiar with it. I can tell you that the focus of our investigations are 

on the person within the government has leaked the information. 

Mr. BACHUS. Sure. 
38 

Mr. MUELLER. That is the focus of our investigations. And thirdly, I would say that given the issues that have been raised, that 

it is appropriate to go back and look at the statute that was applied to that search warrant and to the protocols that have been 

established in our exercise of our investigative ability when it 

comes to this tension between the First Amendment, on the one 

hand, and stopping leaks on the other hand. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. BACHUS. Let me just—Mr. Chairman—there was no prosecution—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, for 

5 minutes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to you, Mr. Director, for your years of service to our 

country. I remember so well seeing you right after 9/11. You had 

been on the job just a handful of days. And you have certainly 

served our country well and honorably, and I thank you for that. 

I do have, following up Congressman Bachus’ questions, I do 

have concerns about our posture relative to the press. And I wanted to talk about the issue of the phone numbers for the Associated 

Press or Associated Press reporters. 

The Department of Justice recently let AP know that it had subpoenaed the records for 20 phone numbers as part of a leak investigation. And the AP has said that approximately 100 of its reporters use these phones on a regular basis. 

Now, one of the phones was the AP’s primary number in the 

House of Representatives press gallery and used by many reporters, not just the AP. And this raises concerns not only about the 

First Amendment, but also about separation of powers. Certainly 

it is likely that many of the calls made by these phones were with 

congressional staff or Members of Congress and likely irrelevant to 

the leak case, but certainly do raise issues of speech and debate. 

I am wondering, in the Department of Justice, the Attorney General has to personally sign off on subpoenas for reporters. In this 

case, since the Attorney General recused himself, the Deputy Attorney General apparently signed off. Who at the FBI needs to sign 

off on a subpoena request like this before it goes over to the Justice 

Department? Is that you? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. It is at the Assistant Director level, if I’m not 

mistaken. I’d have to get back do you specifically. 

But I believe, depending on the context and what is ordered, it 

would be the Assistant Director in charge of the particular division 

that is doing that. Generally it is the Assistant Director that handles the leak investigations. 

Ms. LOFGREN. In a case like this would there be at that level consideration of the implications for chilling First Amendment rights, 

and would there also be an analysis of the speech and debate implications and the separation of power implications? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think the flag would be raised on both of—certainly it’s a leak investigation. Any leak investigation you know 

that you’re in an environment where there are competing tensions. 

Any time you come across anything that implicates the legislature 

and Congress in some way, then that sends up a red flag and re-
39 

quires additional scrutiny and decision as to who to—or how the 

investigation goes. And then you absolutely want to be with Assistant United States Attorney handling the case and deciding what 

steps to be taken. 

Ms. LOFGREN. We would assume then in this case that the Department of Justice and the FBI decided it was okay if Members 

of Congress in the legislative branch were the subject of your inquiry because of the location of this phone call in the House gallery? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not certain that that in and of itself, the fact 

that there is this one telephone number that is a main number 

would be sufficient to raise a flag of, okay, we’re going to get congressional conversations across this line. And it’s not across this 

line. It’s not that at all. Because remember it’s the toll records, it’s 

a request for toll records, not conversations themselves. 

Ms. LOFGREN. In terms of investigating leaks of classified information, certainly that’s a worrisome issue. But why did you think 

it was necessary to seek records for so many telephones used by so 

many reporters in the AP case? Obviously many of the records 

under this subpoena wouldn’t have relevance to the leak investigation. Did the FBI have a process for minimizing the collection of 

irrelevant records from the subpoena or did all the data get 

uploaded into FBI databases regardless of relevance? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we are adapting, let me just say adapting 

special procedures to assure that the records are protected. In 

terms of the numbers, I’d have to leave that to the Department of 

Justice and it’s an investigative—it’s in the midst of investigation 

still. I will tell you that I do believe that there was a substantial 

effort made to minimize the request. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me just close with this. In order to get a subpoena for the records of the reporters, they would have to be implicated in this leak investigation. Is it the FBI—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Did you say they would have to be implicated? 

Ms. LOFGREN. The reporters. Is it the FBI practice to consider reporters, editors, and publishers who print stories about classified 

government matters as criminals? And how many times since 

you’ve been the FBI Director has the FBI sought reporters’ work 

materials or communications with search warrants alleging that 

they are criminals? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired, but 

the Director may answer the questions. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we quite obviously don’t consider that category that you listed criminals in any way, shape, or form. Our 

focus is on identifying that individual who has those secrets and 

to whom that person has given the secrets. Part of that investigation goes to show the contacts between the person who is leaking 

the materials and the person publishing the materials. If you go to 

court on this you have to show that this particular set of materials 

that were leaked went to a particular person for publication. But 

the focus is on the person who is doing the leaking. 

And the last part, I can’t recall. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Could you get back to us on that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. 
40 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. And I would yield 10 seconds to the gentleman from Alabama. 

Mr. BACHUS. Let me say I think the AP—what happened with 

the AP is outrageous. What I was simply saying is there is a totally 

different dynamic with Rosen. 

Mr. ISSA. Director, you used a term just now for the gentlelady 

from California, you said we are in the process of. Actually, no, you 

said we are, and you said it in the present tense. It’s fair to characterize that what you are really saying is we are now in the process 

of protecting that which has not been previously protected. In other 

words, since you used the present tense, I’m assuming that before 

this became very public, protections that will be in effect in the future were not in effect? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we have protection of all of our investigations. Some investigations are protected more than others. 

Mr. ISSA. But, Director, I just want to hold you to the explicitness of your word, if I may. You said it in the present tense. So 

is it fair—yes or no—is it fair for me to assume that there are additional efforts now underway that will be implemented? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, yes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. At some time in the past was James Rosen 

a subject of an investigation as to criminal activity? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. ISSA. Is he now a suspect in a criminal investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. So a warrant or any other document naming him as a suspect of a criminal investigation would be false? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I don’t think there is such a warrant out 

there. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So any kind of documentation that alleged that 

he was involved in that would be a false statement? I just want to 

follow up on what Mr. Bachus said that, you know—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I know—I think I know where you’re going. 

Mr. ISSA. Will you get me there? 

Mr. MUELLER. We’re not all the way there. The colloquy and 

questions that you ask I am comfortable with. When you go and 

say conduct described in a particular entity which could or could 

not be subject to ultimately a prosecution. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. But it’s fair to say he wasn’t a suspect. 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. ISSA. And we’ll let the words of some documents speak for 

itself. 

Today are you using all necessary and available resources to apprehend those people responsible for the murders in Benghazi. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. To your knowledge, are the CIA, NSA, and other appropriate overseas assets being used to try to find those responsible 

and bring them to justice? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. Is there a reason, can you explain to us—this is a little 

longer than the usual answer I’m sure—how it could be that we’ve 

got videos of them, we’ve got knowledge of who many of these peo-
41 

ple are, in some cases by name, and yet we haven’t found one of 

them in Libya or some other country? Isn’t that unusual, to have 

such a cold record as far as we know today? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me explain in a couple of ways. Yes, it is unusual to have such a cold record. As I articulated before, this is a 

unique situation. We have had embassy attacks before. We have 

had our colleagues in law enforcement and the government helping 

us. There is no government to help us in Libya. We don’t have colleagues we can go to. And so it is unique. But—— 

Mr. ISSA. But you have had access to the site and to people there 

and you do have the ability to get into Benghazi, if absolutely necessary, either you or agents on our behalf. 

Mr. MUELLER. If absolutely necessary. But it is a very hostile territory, as you can understand. Nonetheless, we have video. We 

something there to work with, and I can tell you that we have been 

working with it. And that quite obviously individuals who may 

have participated against whom we may have evidence, whether it 

be video or otherwise, we are pursuing. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Just two more quick questions. In your lifetime 

of law enforcement, is it a practice that you believe is appropriate 

to, when you have information and transcripts and other collected 

data, to selectively make some of it available in order to facilitate 

both public and witness cooperation? In other words, do you put 

out certain information, and, conversely, do you retain certain information? In other words, you don’t put out an entire transcript 

or deposition, you don’t put out all the evidence you have, but you 

do put some of it out as a matter of course in investigations in 

order to get people pointed. For example, you put out a picture of 

somebody in the case of Benghazi and yet you’re retaining, I’m 

sure, some information that only you know. 

Mr. MUELLER. We are making use of newer media, on Facebook 

and the like, and in the course of our investigation in Benghazi you 

can go on our Web site and find stills from the videos. 

Mr. ISSA. Selectively picked while others were retained. 

Mr. MUELLER. Picked because we want people to come forward. 

We did the same thing in Boston. The way we were able to identify 

the two responsible there was to focus in on the—identify them 

leaving the—at the scene and identifying them afterwards and 

publicizing their pictures. 

Mr. ISSA. Lastly, the people responsible for Benghazi to our 

knowledge are not U.S. persons. Therefore, if you knew the location 

of them, wouldn’t they be eligible for a presidential-ordered drone 

strike, no matter what country they were in? 

Chairman GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Director will be allowed to answer the question. 

Mr. MUELLER. That could perhaps be answered by others than 

I who are more familiar with the ins and outs of the regime for undertaking such activity. 

Mr. ISSA. But to your knowledge, it would be consistent with 

other drone strikes ordered by the President? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, I’m not that familiar with other drone 

strikes and I’d have to try to defer from answering that particular 

question on lack of knowledge and probably legal ability as well. 
42 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Well, with the Chairman’s indulgence for 10 seconds, Director, I want to thank you for your long years of service 

and for all that you’ve done for America. This is always a tough 

place to come, but you’re always welcome. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me start by saying, Director, we have 

interacted with each other for the past 11 years, and I want to 

thank you for your service. You are particularly one that I admire. 

Having graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law, 

you are obviously a very wise man. So, fellow alum, let me thank 

you and know that we will show no bias this morning, but I do 

want to thank you for your service. 

One of the points that seemingly has not penetrated into this 

Committee is the enormous hit that the FBI is going to take on sequestration. You mentioned $550 million, $700 million in 2014, the 

other was 2013. A loss of 2,200, I think you said, 1,400. 

That is going to be somewhat somewhat devastating, is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the FBI has had a vigorous influence on 

the civil rights investigations of America. Yesterday was the 50th 

anniversary of the death of Medgar Evers. Would that impact a variety of responsibilities that the FBI has, including civil rights enforcement? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can’t go that far because let me tell you that 

when we get faced with cuts we prioritize. We would not cut 

counterterrorism, we would not cut counterintelligence, we would 

not cut cyber. The two principal criminal programs are public corruption and civil rights. They will be—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you would be tight, you would be tight, but 

you would try to do it, but you would be tight in other areas. 

Mr. MUELLER. We would be tight. And as we go down that list 

of priorities we will be cutting and the support that you get in 

those investigations would be cut—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And that’s very important. 

Let me just ask you about gun legislation. You are a lawyer and 

a strong advocate, I know, of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. 

Would a gun storage bill, a universal background check—when I 

say that, requiring people to store their guns, universal background 

checks—would that seemingly infringe on the Second Amendment, 

just on its face? 

Mr. MUELLER. The one thing I am not is a constitutional lawyer. 

And I understand the thrust of the question. And I understand—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would good laws help make us safer possibly? 

Mr. MUELLER. We can always do more. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me move to this question of the emails and the various public 

discussion, which I think is good. Do you think that we could have 

a significant release or significant construction interpretation of 

Section 501 decisions that could be declassified in a manner consistent with the protection of national security intelligence sources, 
43 

methods, and properly classified and sensitive information, meaning that the decisions of the FISA Court be declassified, keeping in 

mind under the restraints of national security, classified intelligence sources, et cetera? Could that occur? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have to defer to the Department of Justice on 

that because that relates to the protocols that are set up not just 

by the Department of Justice, but by the FISA Court as well. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so opinions of the FISA Court, you think, 

disclosing them, you as an investigator, if it was protecting other 

classified, would not be open to the public and be reasonable? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I would think that, no, there are absolutely 

in those opinions are matters that absolutely should remain classified. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But some could—if they would keep that classified, others could be released? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t know that for a fact. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. With respect to Section 501, it speaks to tangible things that are part of this investigation. Do you think Section 501, that is the issue of application for order of investigation, 

could be narrowed somewhat? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m just not familiar with what you are talking 

about, ma’am. Section 501? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It’s 215, codified 501, Section 215. 

Mr. MUELLER. Oh, 215. I’m sorry. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Whether or not that would be codified, narrowed a little bit from its broadness, which is how we have gotten 

to where we are today. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think there can be a discussion as to the scope 

of 215, understanding that the purpose of it, but also the impact 

on privacy—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me ask these two quick questions. 

Do you think what we have done over the past—what we have 

been disclosed is so broad that we undermine what we need to do 

by not narrowly focusing? And then lastly, with respect to the Boston Marathon case, I want to quickly get to that. Have you in your 

investigation determined why the dots were not connected as they 

looked at the two perpetrators’ travel overseas, coming back, have 

you found the smoking gun on that issue? Can you go first to the 

question of narrowing this broad trolling, it seems to be, and still 

get where you needed to go. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I wouldn’t call it broad trolling, needless to 

say. I see it appropriate to the goal that you have. And to the extent that you narrow it, you narrow the dots that are available. 

You will narrow the dots that are available that may be that dot 

that prevents the next Boston. 

On the Boston case, I think we did a very thorough job when he 

came to our attention. I do think there could have been better exchange of information, particularly by the Russians earlier on. That 

may have helped. And there were other things in terms of alerting 

the travel that we are fixing. But even if we fix that, even if that 

had been fixed prior to the Boston bombing, I do not think it would 

have stopped it. 

But I go back to the point, yes, you can narrow, yes, you can 

draw a balance, but you are going to minimize the dots. 
44 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the gentleman again for his 

service. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you again for 

your service. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Director, I want to join the chorus of those complimenting you for your service. The unfortunate thing is so many 

Americans will never thank you because they don’t know the harm 

that you kept from befalling them because of your efforts. But we 

thank you for that. 

You have heard a lot of Members who asked you about an application for a search warrant. I gave a copy of that application to 

your staff before this hearing, and I think they have it to present 

to you now. But for the record, it’s case 1:10-MJ-00291-AK document 20. With the Chairman’s permission I’d ask that that be 

made a part of the record of this hearing. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
45 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20 Filed 11107/11 Page 1011 

UNITED STA rus DISTRICT COURT 

In Ihe MlIlterofth. Search of 

for tho 

DistfiCi o(Columbla 

(8r'~de""'b''''"",p.rlyl.6 ... .,..1red ~.ft·_ 2011. _ 'U.1!".a ~ .,.ldi"'ItYIMpulOllbfl""",.tw1·_,j Case No. 11,1 "r-IW-Il II E-mail Account i#gmail.com on Computer S."",,,, Operated by Google, 1nc.,lOVO 

Amphlthoatre Parl<way. Mountain View, Cefifomla 

Al'l'lJCAT!ON FOR It. SEARCH WARRANT 

I, a federal '.w enforcement officer or on attorney for the government, request • search w""",,1 and stale under ponally of pOljury that I have "","on 10 beHove tlmlon th. following pemm or proparty (Identify ... ",no. '" ...... I~ .... 

P~S!I'i.!<'l[t:1,tt W'fW'~~iI.eom. "",Inlalned on compule!r .~rve'" operated by Googl", Inc., headquartered 

.t 1600 Amphitheatre Parl<way, Mountain VIew, callfomla, 

located In tho Northern District of ~_.~~, thero is now concealed ,,""'lfylh. pcrm. ",dualbo ,''' prt>pU/J''' b ... Ued): 

""rtaln proparty,lha dl$clo.ure afwhich I. governed by nUe 42, U.S.C. SacUa" 20000", and nUa lB, U.S.C. Secllon$ 2701 through 2711, namely rontenb.! Of eladronlc ... mplls and other electronic data and mo", fully described In 

ATTACHMENT A 10 this opptiooUon. 

The bas!s fOT the sew-ch under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(0) Is (cII,d.n. '" ,"oro): 

m evidence ofa crime; 

f'lf contraband, I'ml!> of crime, or olller Items Illegally possessed; 

f'lf property designed for use, intended for use, or wed In commUting a crime; 

IJ • perron to b. OIl'eS!lod or a person who i. unl.wfully rosImined. 

The search is ,el.ted to a violallo" of: 

Cod.Seatlon 1 B U.S.C, § 793 . 0ff'/lSe Description 

Gathering, lran.mllilng "r 'oolno defense Inl'DrmaUon 

The!!pDllcaUon is b .. ed on these racls: S •• e!lll!:h.d affidavl! h.",ln I''''!pora!ed by ",feronee •• " fully re.tated herein. 

f'lf Continued on Ihe olll1ch.d .heeL 

Ci Delayed notice of __ days (give ._1 ending dale Ifmo ... than )0 days: ____ ) Is requested 

under 18 V.S.C. § 3103 .. tho basi. o[whlMls sot forth !Ill 

Sworn 10 bofor. mOllnd signed in my presenco. 

Da,e: HAY 282010 

ell)' and stal.: W.sI1lngl"n, D.C, 
46 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 1 of 36 

THE UNITED STATES DISTIUCT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

N\0~' 

~.N,>': 1D-291-M-Ol 

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT 

w, tetiSBGGMAIL.COM 

MAINTAINED ON COMPUTER SERVERS 

OPERATED BY GOOGLE. INC., 

HEADQUARTERED AT 

UNDER SEAL 

1600 AMPHITHEATRE PARKWAY, 

MOUNTAlNVIEW,CA 

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT 

I, Reginald B. Reyes, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and slate as follows: 

1. INTRODUCTION 

1. I IIIll a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FDP') assigned 10 

the Washington Field Office, and have been employed by the FBI for over five yem. I am 

assigned to a squad responsible for ooUlllerespionage matters and matters involving the 

unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and bave worked in 1his field since October 

2005. As a result of my involvement in espionage investigations and investigations involving 

the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. I am familiar with the IaCtics, methods, and 

leclmJques of particular United Slates persons who possess, or have possessed a United Steles 

government security clearance and may choose to hann the United Slates by misusing their 

access to classified information. Before working for the FBI, I was a Special Agen! with the 

Drug &fore"men! Administration for two years. 

2. As a federal agent, I am authorized 10 investigate vIolations oflaws of the United 

Slates and to execute warrants issued under the authority of the United Stetes. 
47 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 2 of 36 

The statements in lhis affidavit are based in part on information provided by the investigation to 

date and on my experience and baclcgroll!ld as II Special Agent of the FBI. The Information, set 

forth in this affidavit concerning the investigation at issue is known to mc as Ii result of my own 

involvement in thaI investigation or hIlS been provided to me by other law enforcement 

professionrus. Since this affidavit is being submitted fur the limited purpose of securing II search 

wammt, I have not included each and every fact mown to me concerning this investigation. 

3. This affidllvit is made in ~upportof~~~lIIlI~I.~t!.J.t 

~:~:£Jl1.2J AAd 12 V.S.C. §~ to compel GoogJe,lncorporated, which fimCtiOIlS as an 

electronic commllllication service IWd remote computing service, and is a provider of electronic 

commllllication and remote computing servIces (hereinafter "Google" or the "PROVIDER"), 

located at 1t100 Amphitheatre Parkway, MoW!tain View, California, to provide subscriber 

information, records, end the contents of limited wire IIIld electronic communicatioDS pertaining 

to the account identified lw ••••• @gmail.com. herein referred to as the SUBJECT 

ACCOUNT. I have been informed by the United Stales Attorney's Office that because this 

Court has jurisdiction over the off ens .. under Investigation, it may issue the Wllmlnt 10 compel 

the PROVIDER pursUS'1! 10 II! U.S.C. § 2703(,,).1 

4. The SUBJEer ACCOUNT is an e-mail BCCOW!t. As discussed below, 

investigation into the SUBJECT ACCOUNT indicates it is en e-mail accoW!tusedby!!!!!!!2.1!!!1 

, ll.!li 18 U.S.C. § 2703{a) ("A governmental enlily may require the disclosure by a provider .•. pursuant 

10 a wammllssued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a ccurt with jurisdiction over the offellse Md •• invesligotion •... "). 

2 
48 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 3 of 36 

,.' 

5. For the IeasOns set forth below, I believe there is probable cause 10 conclude that 

the contents of the wire and electronic oommuniC!llions perteining to the SUBJECT ACCOUNT, 

are evidence, muts !lDd instrumentalities of crimina! violations of 18 U,S.C. § 793 (Unauthorized 

Disclosure of National Defense Information), and that!Ji!lre Is f!O~~~o..~~ 

.~ has committed or is commit?!,J!_",viol,:~on of section 793(d), as an ~der and~~ettor 

~~or co-~~t£~bi<;b tOO m1l:t;:rlws relsle. 

6. Based on my training and experience, and discllSSions with the United States 

Attorney's Office, I hElve learned that Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(d) makes 

punishable, by up to ten years impriscmnent, the willful communication, delivery or 

trsnsmis5ion of documents and information related to the national defense 10 someone nol 

entitled to receive them by one with lawfulllCCeS8 or possession ofth" same. Specifically, 

sectiOD 793(d) states: 

(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted 

with any document, writing, code book, sigMi book, sketch, photogtaph, photographic 

negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the 

national defense, or information relating to the natiooal defense which infonnation the 

possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury oftbe United Stales or to the 

advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate., delivers, transmits or causes to 

be communicated, delivered, or transmitted Of attempts 10 communicate, deliver, irnnsmi! 

or cause to be communicsled, delivered or transmitted the same to any persoll nol ""titled 

to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer 

or employee of the United States cDlitled 10 receive it ... shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than ten years or bolh. 

18 U.S.C. § 793(d). Further, section 793(g) makes Ii conspiracy to violate section 793(d) a 

violation of 793 and punishable by up 10 ten years imprisonmem. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(g). 

7, BlISed on my training and experience, and discussion with the United States 
49 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 4 of 36 

Attorney's Office, I have learned tImt ""'~~~~':. ill!91lll11t:i~1l i~~1lnc:llb,~.:I:l1!]llv..!iveO[~~r 

12958, as amended by Executive Order 13292, and their predecessor orders, Execlllive Orders 

12356 aod 12065, as information in any ferro that: (I) is OW!:lcd by, produced by or for, Grunder 

control of the United Stales government; (2) falls within one or more ofllle Clliegories sel forth 

in the Order; and (3) is classified by an original classificatioo authority who determines that its 

unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in dillDuge to the natiollll1 

security. Where such damage cculd reasonably result in "exceptionally gIllVe" damage to the 

national security, the information may be classified as ''TOP SECRET." Access to classified 

information at My level may be further restricted through ccmpartmcntaJization "SENSITlVE 

COMP ART.MIiNTED INFORMATION" (SCI) categories, which further restricts the 

dissemination mel handling of the information. 

8. Based all my training sod experience, and discussions with the UIli!ed States 

Attorney's Office, I have learned that the Privacy Protection Act (the "PPA"), codified al42 

U.S.C. § 200000 ~., defines when Ii search warrant impacting media-related work product 

IlIld documentary materials may be executed. Section 2000118(11) of the PPA states, in pertinent 

pm: 

(II) Work product materials 

Notwithstanding ally other law, it shall be llDIawful for II goveroment officer Or 

employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of 11 criminal offense, 10 

search for or seize any work product material; possessed by a person EellSol'lllbly 

• Soetioo 2000aa-7(1)) d.rmes thole""" "documentmy materials' .. follows: 

(Il) "Work product material." , .. used in this chapter. means malerials, other than colltraband or 

the fruits of a crime or things otherwise criminally possessed, or property designed or intended 

for US" or whlclt i. or has been used, 115 a means of commitling a criminal offenso, and _ 

4 
50 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 5 of 36 

believed to have Ii purpose to disseminate to the public II newspaper, book, broadcast, or 

otller similar fonn of public communication, in or affecting intersmte or foreillfl 

cOllUllerce; but this provision shall not impair or affect tile ability of /lily government 

officer or employee, plIISuaol 10 otllerwise applicable law, to search for or seize such 

materials, if-

(1) there is probable cause to believe that the person-possessing such materials 

hIlS committed or is committing tile criminal offense to whicb tile 

materials relate: Provided, however, Thai Ii government officer or 

employee may not search for or seize such materials under tile provisiollll 

of this pars graph if the offense 10 which the materials relate consists of 

the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of SIlch materials 

or the infonnation contained therein (but such II search or seimre may be 

conducted WIder the provisions of this paregmph if the offense consists 

ofth .. receipt, possession, or communication ofinfonnation relating to 

the national defense, classified infnrmation, or restricted data under the 

provifriollS of section 193,794,797, or 798 oftitle 111, or (other 

-enumerated statutes]) .... 

(b) Other dOCll.menu 

Notwithsmnding any other law, it shal! be uniawful for a government officer or 

employee, ill connection with the investigation Of prosecution of Ii criminal offense, to 

semeh for or seize documentl1r)l materials. oIlier than work product materlals.3 possessed 

(I) in IlDlicipotion of communicating such material. to the public, are prepared, produced, 

authored, or created. wbether by the pe .. on in possession orlbe materials or by 8l\l' olber 

person; 

(2) "'" possessed for the pUlpO'" of communicating such material. to the public; and 

(3) include menial impressIons, conclusions, opinions, or theories of Iho person who prepared. 

produced, authored or created such maletl.l. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b). 

, S""tion 20()O.,...7(a) defines the terms "documenlruy malori.I." as follows: 

(a) "Documentary materials" f as used in this chapter, means materials upon which infbrmation is 

recorded, and includes, but i. nollimitod 10, written or printed moterials, photographs, motion 

picture films, ."satives, video lapes, audio tlIpes. and oilier mechDJIically, magnetioallyor 

electronically recorded cuds, tap ... or discs, bul does not include contraband or fruits of. 

crime or things othorwi ... criminally posses..,d, Or property designed or intended for .S., Or 

5 
51 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07111 Page 6 of 36 

by II porson in co=oon with Ii pwpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, 

broadcast, or other similar form of public oommunication, in or affecting iIltersllIte or 

foreign oommerpe; but this provision shall not impair or .,ffeot the ability of any 

government officer or employee, Plll'SUllllt to otherwise applicable law, to search for Of 

seize such materials, if-

(1) 

or 

search fur or seize such materials under the provisioilS 

of this plll1lgraph if the offiIDse to which the materials relote consists of the 

receipt, possession, commllilication, Of withholding of such materials or 

the infonllatio!l contained therein (but such a search or seizure may be 

conducted WIder the provlsiOll8 of this plll1lgfaph if the offense consists of 

the receipt, possession, or oommunicatlon of information relating to the 

Datiollll.l defense, classified infunnatioll, or restricted dalll UIldcr the 

provisions of section 793, 794, 797, or 198 oftille 18, or [other 

enumerated statutes]) '" 

42 U.S.C. § 2000!l8(a) (emphasis added). Thus, section 2oo0aa(6) specifically exempts from its 

prolUbitions cases in which there is probable cause to belleva that the possessor of media related 

work product or documentarY materials has committed 8 violation of section 793. I bave been 

further informed thet the legislative IUstory ()fthe statute indicates: 

The pwpQse of the statute is to limit searcbes for materials held by persoilS 

involved ill Fir.t Amendment activities who me themselves not suspected of 

participation in the criminal activity for wlUch tile mllterials are sought, Iilld not to 

limilthe ability of law enforcement officers to search for and seize materials held 

by those suspected of committing the crime IUIder investigation. 

s. Rep. No. 96·874 at II (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 3950. I also have been 

infonned that violations ofilie PPA do not result in suppression oftha evidence. ~ 42 U.S.C. § 

------------~ ~~--------------

which is or has b.on used as, lb. roM •• of com milling II criminal offoollO. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000",,-7(0). 

6 
52 

'.' 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 7 of 36 

2000aa.6(d), but can result in civil damages 3galnst the sovereign whose officers or employees 

executed the search in violation ofsecuon 2000aa(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(1I}. 

n. FACTS Slll'PORTING PROBABLE CAUSE 

9. In or about June 2009, classified United States IliltiOnal defense information was 

published in II!! article on Ii nationalnew8 organization's website (hereinafter the "June 2009 

article"). The J un" 2009 article was written by !he Reporter who frequently pbysically worked 

out of Ii booth loeated at the main Department of State (DoS) building located st 2201 C Street, 

N.W., Washington, D.C. 

10. The Intelligence Community owner (lfthe classified information at issue (the 

"Owner") hIlS informed the FBI thaI the June 2009 article wsclosed national defense information 

thai was classified TOP SECRET/SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (TSISCI). 

It bas also informed the FBI that the informatiOJl was not declassified prior to its disclosure in the 

June 2009 article,that the information's public disclosure has never been lawfully authorized, 

and thaI the infonnation remains classified at the TS/SCI level to this day. 

11. Following the disclosure of the classified national defense infonnation in the June 

2009 article, an FBI investigation was initiated 10 determine the source(s) of the unauthorized 

disclosure. That investigation bas revealed that the Owner's TSISCI information disclosed in 

the June 2009 article was first made avllilable to a limited number of Intelligence Community 

members in on intelligence report (the "Intelligeuce Report") that was electronically 

disseminated to the InteUigence Community outside of the Owner on the morning of the date of 

7 
53 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07111 Page 8 of 36 

publication of the Jooe 200!lllrticle. The Intelligence Report was i1Ccessible on If. classified 

information database that warned all Intelligence Community users seeking access to 

information in the database, through R "click Ibrough" banner, of the following: 

Due to IeOOtli unauthorized disclollW'es of sensitive intelligence, you are reminded 

of your respollSibility 10 protect the extremely sensitive, compllrlmented 

intelligence eontainecl in this system. Use of this computer system constitutes 

consent to monitoring of your actions. None of the intelligence contained in this 

system may be discussed or shared with individuals who are nol authorized to 

receive it. Unauthorized use .•. is prohibited and violations may result in 

disciplinary action or criminal prosecution. 

12. The Intelligence Report was clearly IIWked ni/scI. The security markings 

further instructed the reader that every portion of the iDfurmalion cootained i.u the Intelligence 

Report was classified TS/SCI and was not authorized for disclosure without permission of the 

Owner. 

13. The investigation IIll$ revealed that one individual who accessed the Intelligence 

Report through the classified database on the date of the JWle 2009 article (prior to the 

publication of the article) was Stephen Jin-Woo Klm.4 Review of goverrunent records has 

revealed Ibal Mr_ Kim was born onlllllllllliand _ natumlized lIS Ii United States 

• So for, the FBI', inv.stigation has rev.aled in ex.,... of9S individuals, in addition to Mr. Kim, who 

accessed the IIItellig.n •• Repor! on Ibe date of the June 2009 artiele and prior to its publication, To date, 

however, Ill. FBI's investigation h .. not "",,,,,led OIly other individuol, olber ibM Mr. Kim, who Iwilt 

."" .. sed tllollltelligonee Report QlI1/. who aloo had contact with the Reporter on the date of pUblication of 

the June 2009 articl .. , Thu. far, tI,,, FBI'. in"""tigation has revealad four olb"" individuals who have 

admitted to limited contacts with eilber the Reporter's news organlzatlon or the Reporter ",,)'Wher. from 

sj" weeks, 10 .ix months, or 10 nine years prior to publication of lb. June 2009 article. Th. FBI's 

illVestigation of these contacts is on-going. All these individuals have dOllied being the SOIUll. of the JUlie 

2009 sIt;"l. IlId the FBI has not discovered illY information 10 d.te that would lend II) discredit theft 

sto1ements. 
54 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 9 0136 

citizen in 1988.s Mr. Kim is a Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory employee who W!I!I on 

detail to the DoS's Bureau ofVerificatlon, Compliance, and Implementation (Vel) at the time of 

the publication of the JUlle 2009 article. VCI is responsible for ensuring tha! appropriate 

verification requirements are fully considered IIDd properly In!egrnted into arms control, 

nonproliferation, and disarmament agreemenlS and to monitor other countries' complilmce with 

such agreements. On his detaii to Vel, Mr. Kim worked as II Senior Advisor for intelligeoce to 

the Assistant Secretary of State for VCI. 

14. Like Ibe Reporter's boolb al DoS on the date of publica lion of the June 2009 

article, Mr. Kim's VCI office was located at the DoS headquarters building at 2201 C Stroot, 

N.W., Washington, D.C. 

15. Based on my Irainlng I!I1d experience, I have learned that classified infonnation, 

of any designation, may be shared only with persons determined by an appropriate United States 

government official 10 be eligible for access to classified information, ilia! is, the individuallws 

received a security clearance, hIlS signed an approved non-disclosure agreement and possesses a 

"need to know" the information in question. If a person is not eligible to receive classified 

information, classified information may nDt be disclosed to that person. 

16. Government records demonstrate that, at IllI times relevant 10 this investigation, 

Mr. Kim possessed B TS/SCI security clearance. As B government employee with a security 

clearance, and prior to the disclosmes at issue, Mr. Kim executed multiple SF 312 Classified 

information Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA.) with the Oovernment. NDAs are legally 

'In prior affidavits in Ibis matter seeking sean:h warranw of Mr. Kim', e-mail accoWlts, the date of Mr. 

Kim's naturalization was erroneo"sly reported .s 1999 ,.ther than 198B. 

9 
55 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 10 of 36 

binding agreements between l1li individual being gnmted, or lIlready in possession of, II security 

clearance, and the United Stlltes Government wherein the parties agree that the individuallJcver 

disclose classified information without the authorization aithe Government The NOAs fuither 

notified Mr. Kim that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information can lead 10 criminal 

prosecution. including for violatiollS of 18 U.S.C. § 793. 

! 7. The Reporter did not possess II security clearance and was not entitled to receive 

the infonDatioll published in the June 2009 article. Nor Willi Mr. Kim authorized, directly or 

indirectly, by the United Stlltes Government to deliver, communicate, or transmit the TS/SCI 

infonnation in the article to the Reporter or any other member oftha press. 

I S. Government electronic records revealed that between the hours !he Intelligence 

Report WIls made available to the Intelligence CQmmllllity on the moming oftha publication of 

the Juoe 2009 article, and the publication of the JUlie 2009 article, the unique electronic USCI' 

profile and password associatad with Mr. Kim fU:cessed at least three times the Intelligence 

Report that contained the TSISCI information wbich later that day was disclosed in the Juoe 

2009 article.6 Specifically, the Intelligence Report was accessed by Mr. Kim's user profile at or 

& Mr. Kim accessed the clossified damboso III ,!uesliollihrough hi • .ooS work computer provided to him 10 

proces. and !eoess TOI' SECRET/SCllnfo""otion. The "eliole through" banner 011 Mr. Kim's DoS 

ohWlified computer permits the government'. review or the data contailled therem. It road: 

NOTICE AND CONSENT LOO-ON BANNER 

THIS IS A DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DDS) COMPlJTBR SYSTEM. THIS COMPUTER 

SYSTEM, INCLUDING ALL RELATED EQUiPMENT, NETWORKS, AND NBTWORl( DEVICES 

(SPECIFlCALL Y INCLUDING IN'l1l.RNET ACCESS), ARB PROVIDED ONLY FOR AUTHORIZED 

U.S. GOVIlRNMENT USE. DoS COMPUTER SYS'l'EMS MAY BE MONITORED FOR. ALL 

LAWFUL PURPOSES, INCLUDING TO ENSURE TIIA T THEIR USB IS AUTHORIZED. FOR 

MANA;GEMENT OF TIm SYSTEM, TO FACILITATIlPROTECI10N AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED 

10 
56 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 11 of 36 

around 11:27 a.m., 11:37 a.m., snd 11:48 a.m. on the date the article was published. DoS 

security badge access records suggest that, al those times, Mr. Kim was in his VCI office suite 

where his DoS TS/SCI computer was located on which he would have accessCd the lntellige!lce 

Report. 

19. Telepbone call records demons11ate that earlier on that same day. multiple 

telephone commUDioations OCCUlTed between phone numbers IlSsoeiBted with Mr. Kim and with 

the Reporter. Specifically: 

at or aroundlO:1S a.m., an approximate 34-second call was made from the 

Reporter's DoS desk telephone to Mr. Kim's DoS desk telephone; 

two minutes later, at or around 10:17 a.m., an approximate II minute 3S second 

call was made from Mr. Kim's DoS desk telephone to the Reporter's DoS desk 

telephone; 

ACCESS, AND TO VERIFY SECIJRlTY PROCEDURES, SURVIVABILITY. AND OPERATIONAL 

SECURITY. MONITORING INCLUDES ACTIVE ATTACKS BY AUTHORIZED DoS ENTITlES 

TO TEST OR VERIFY THE SECIJRlTY OF mIS SYSTEM. DURiNG MONITORING, 

lNFORMATION MAYBE BXAMlNED, RECOIIDED, COPIED, AND USED FOR AU1HORIZED 

PURPOSES. ALL INFORMATION, INCLUDING PERSONAL INFORMATION, PLACED ON OR 

SENT OVER mIS SYSTEMMA ¥ BE MONITORED. USB OF THIS DoS COMPUTER SYSTEM, 

AUIlIORIZED OR UNAU1HORJZED CONS1TIlJTES CONSENT TO MONITORING OF TInS 

SYSTEM UNAUTHORIZED USE MAY SUBJECT YOU TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. 

EVIDENCE OF UNAUmORIZED USB COLLECTED DURING MONITORING MAY BE USED 

FOR ADMlNISTRA TIVE, ClUMINAL OR. OTHER ADVERSE ACTION. USE OF TInS SYSTEM 

CONS"ITI"UTllS CONSENT TO MONITORING FOR THESE PURPOSES, 

Further, Mr. Kim bad to "click through" an additional banner on the classified database wh= h • 

• cussed tholnl.mgen"" Report, as detailed in P_graph 11 above, which stated that ""s. ofthi, 

computer system constitutes consent to monitoring of your actions. ~t 

Moreover, DDS policy spocific.lIy I'"",.ribe. that "personal use [or 008 cl .... ilied compute .. ] is 

strictly prohibited; therefore. users do not b.w • reasonable .xpectation of privacy." 12 F AM 632.1.5; 5 

FAM 723(2). In addition, th. DoS's Foreign Aff.i .. Manuol st.I •• Ib.t DDS office spaces "'" subject 10 

•• curity inspection" to in'''''' th.t .Iossified informalion Is properly protected. Indeed, Mr. Kim's office 

was 10000tod in • s""ured facility within the main DoS building that was subject to daily inspections by 

rotating duty officlll'll (.ometimes inoluding Mr, lGm him •• lf) who were responsibl. for milking sure Ib.t 

classified information in ","oil of!lte office. within th. facility was properly secured. 

11 
57 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 12 of 36 

0116 hour later. al or l!I'ound 11:18 a.m.,M approximate 3 minute 58 second call 

WIlt! made from Mr. Kim's DoS desk telephone to the Reporter's DoS desk 

telephone; !1lld 

at or MOUll!! II :24 a.m., en Ilpproximate 18 second call W!!S made from Mr. Kim's 

DoS desk telephone to the Reporter's DoS desk telephone. 

20. Thereafter, telephone call records for Mr. Kim's office phone reveal that aJ or 

around the same time that Mr. Kim's user proj1k was viewing the TSlSCllntelllgence Report 

two telepho". calls ",ere plilcedfl'om his desk phone to the Reporter. Specifically, a call was 

llllIdeat or around 11:37 a.m (at or aroood the same time that Mr. Kim's user profile WtlS 

viewing the Intelligence Report) from Mr. Kim's desk phone 10 the Reporter's desk phone 

located within the DoS. That call lasted approximately 20 seconds. Immediately thereafter, a 

call was placed by Mr. Kim's desk phone to the Reporter's cell phone. This second calilasled 

approximately I minute and 8 seconds. 

21. In the hoW' fullowing those calls, the FBI's investigation has revealed evidence 

B1Iggesting that Mr. Kim mel face-te-face with the Reporter oulSide of the DoS; Specifically, 

DoS security badge access records demonstrate thai Mr. Kim md the Reporter departed the DoS 

building at 2201 C Street, N.W., at nearly the 31l1lle time, they were absent from the building for 

nearly 25 minules, and then they Tetumed to the DDS building at nearly the same time. 

Specifically, the security badge IIccess records indicate: 

Mr. Kim departed DoS at or l!1'Oood 12:02 p.m. followed shortly thereafter by The 

Reporter at or around 12:03 p.m.; and 

Mr. Kim returned 10 DoS at or around 12:26 p.m. followed shortly thereafter by 

The Reporter al or armmd 12:30 p.m. 

22. Within a few hours after those nearly simulllmeous exits and entries lit DDS, the 

12 
58 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 13 of 36 

June 2009 article was published on the Internet. Following th" publication of the article, yet 

another call ,was placed from Mr. Kim's DoS desk telephone to the Reporter's DoS desk 

telephone number. 'This clllliasted approximately 22 seconds. 

23. In the evening of Allgust31, 2009, DDS Diplomatic Security entered Mr. Kim's 

DoS office space, without his knowledge, pursuant to DDS internal regulations, procedures, and 

computer bmmer authority for purposes of imaging his computer hard drives, Lying in plain 

view on Mr. KJm's desk next 10 his DDS compulerWflll a photocopy of the June 2009 article as 

well as two other articles publisbed in June 2009. All three articles were stapled together. These 

three articles were also observed on Mr. Kim's desk during entries made in his DoS office space 

onSeptember2! and 22, 2009. 

24. On September 24,2009, the FBI conducted Il non-custodial interview of Mr. Kim 

concemlng th.leak of classified infOI1llStiOIl in the June 2009 article, W'Ilong other leaks of 

classified information. During that interview, Mr. Kim denied being a somce of the classified 

information in the JUDe 2009 article. Mr. Kim also claimed to have 110 recollection of ODe of the 

other two articles which were seen in plain view on his desk on August 31, 2009. Mr. Kim 

admilled to meeting the Reporter in approximately March 2009 but denied having lUIy contact 

with the Reporter since thaI time. Mr. Kim acknowledged that DoS protocol required that he 

would have to go through the DoS press office before he could speak with the press. Mr. Kim 

slated, "I wouldn't pick-up" phone IlIld call [the Reporter] or [the news organization thai the 

Reporter works for]." 

25. An analysis of call records for Mr. Kim's DoS desk phone reveals that between 

May 26, 2009 and July 14,2009,36 calls were placed to or received from telephone numbcrn 

13 
59 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 14 of 36 

associated with the Reporter, including the 7 aforementioned calls on the date of the pUblication 

of the JUlIe 2009 article. Further, there were j calls during this timefrmnll between his desk 

phone end a number aSsociated with the Reporter's news organization. 

26. During the September 24, 2009 non-custodial interview, wilen aske<:! by the FBI 

for II cell phone number 10 reach him in the future, Mr. Kim slate<:! that his cell phone was "no 

longer active" as oflhe day of the interview. Mr. Kim indicated to the FBI that he would be 

purchasing I! new cell pbone with a different number. 

27. An analysis of call records for Mr. Kim's celiular pholle: revealsihat between 

May 26, 2009 and June 30;2009,16 calls were placed to or received from telephone numbers 

associated with the Reporter and 10 calli were placed to or received from telephone numbelll 

associated with the Reporter's news organization. 

28. It is apparent from the foregoing both that Mr. Kim Willi in conmet with the 

Reporter on multiple OCCasiOllS prior to and after the publication of the JUDe 2009 article, and 

that Mr. Kim did nOI want the FBI, who !Ie knew was investigating the leak of c1lllisified 

information in thst article, to know about those contacts. The FBI bas also lemned thaI, 

following its interview with Mr. Kim, h. provided the Deparonent of Energy (DoE) - for which 

Mr. Kim's pennanent employer, LLNL, is a sub-contrnctor- with "pre-paid" cell phone Dumber 

'In prior affidavits in this matter ...,killg s."",h warrants "rMr. Kim' •• -mall 8000UOIo, it was reported 

that there wore II oWl. between Mr. Kim's ""Uuler phone and telepbone numben ossoei.ted with the 

Reporte,'s news organization, Mr. Kim's toU records for hi. cellullll' phone do, in raol, list 11 such catls, 

Further "",jow orlllo •• records suggested, however, thai 0.0 ofib. calla may have bee" double counted 

by Mr. Kim'. celluler telephone service provide •. Discovering lIlis di."",poncy, !he •• rvi"" provide, was 

contacted and indicaled thot wh.! sppears 10 be two call. on !he tol! records waa, in fact, only a single 

call. Accordingly, in this affidavi~ I have ""rreeled the total or lb. call. between Mr. Kim'. eeliul!ll' 

telepho". and telephone "umb.rs associated with the Reporter" new. organi:mtion to reflect that there 

were only 10 such ",,11lI. 

14 
60 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 15 of 36 

(sometimes referred to as 8. "throwaway" phone) that he instructed DoE representatives to use in 

the future to contact him about future employment opportunities. 

29. Similarly, durin~ the same September 24, 2009 non-custodial illterview, Mr. Kim 

told the FBI that the best e-maileddress through which to contact him was 

••• IIIII@@Yahoo.com.OnedaYlater,Mr.Kime-mailedtheFBlandstated that "[m]y 

yahoo account that I gave you is full and lUll [sic] goillg to get rid ont I can be reached at 

IIIIIIIIIIII!Jgmail.com." It is apparcnt from the foregoing that, like his cell phone number, Mr. Kim 

was concerned about the FBI focusing on his 1I1111111111@Yahoo.coma-mailaccount 

30. Following the FBI's interview oiMr. Kim on September 24,2009, FB[ and 

DoSlDiplomatic Security entered Mr. Kim's office on the evening of September 26, 2009. The 

stapled photocopies of the three articles containing classified information (including the June 

2009 article) seen next to Mr. Kim's computer Oll August 31,2009, September 21 and 22, 2009, 

were no longer present in Mr. Kim's office on September 26'" - two days after his interview with 

the FB! wherein he Was questioned about the unauthorized disclosures of classified information 

in the Juoe 2009 article. 

31. A forensic analysis of the hard drive imaged from Mr. Kim' s DoS unclassified 

DoS computer,' has revealed !Ill .-mail communicstion, dated July 11,2009, from the Reporter's 

8 Th. "click through" banner On Mr. Kim'. DoS unclwified computer permits the government's review 

of the data contained therein. II reads as ra!low.: 

You are ac"",.ing a U.S. Government info"".!ion system, which includes (I) this compuler, (2) 

this computer n.tworlc. (3) all compulel1l connected 10 the network, and (4) all devices and 

storage media allach.d to this network or 10 a computer on this network. This information system 

i. provided for U.S. Government-authorized us. only. 

15 
61 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07111 Page 16 of 36 

Unauthorized or improper use of this system may result in discipl;nBIY actions, as well as civil 

and criminal penallies. 

By using this information system, you·unde~d and consenl to the following: 

You have no reasonable expectation "fprivacy reganling any communications or 

data InIMiting 0' stored on thi. information system. At ""y time, and for any 

lawful govemmOlit purpose, lb. government may monilor, inleroept, and search 

""d seize any communication or data Irm1siting Of stored On thi. infonnation 

system. 

Any communicatioos or data tmlsiting Of stored on this infOO1lation system may 

b. dl1lClosed Or used for any lawful government purpose. 

Nothing herein consents Ie the •• .,..,h and seizure of a privale!y-owned computer or oiller 

privately owned communications device, or tho contents thereof, that is in the system user' 9 

home. 

Further, when h. fIrSt started at tho DoS in lun. 2008, Mr. Kim signed an "Internet Briefing 

Acknowledgement" and "Security Briefing for OpenNet+ Account" forms, both of which staled that he 

understood that his use of Government provided internet.and of bi! OpenNel+ account "may b. 

monilered al any tim •• " H. also signed. "Waiver Statement Form," wheroin h. acknowledged that he 

understood thai 

• he did "no! bave a reasonable expectstion of privacy concerning the data Oil [his] 

tomputer;" 

"All data contained Oil [his] comput.r may b. monitored, in!erceptod, reconded, read, 

copied, or captured in any monn .. b)' authcrized personnel. For example "Uporv;";o,", 

system pem>lllIel or ••• urit;y personnel may give law eofo",,,,,,.nl official. any poteotial 

evidenc. of crima, fraud, or omployee misconduct found on [his] compu~er." 

• "Law enforcement may be authorized 10 access and collect evidence from (his] 

computer/' 

"Authori2ed personnel will be routinely monitoring [his] computer for authorized 

purposes." 

• "Consequently, lilly u •• of [ltis] ocmputer by MY u •• r, authorized or umwlltorized, 

",,"!!tIllites DIRECT CONSBNT 10 monitoring of [hIs] computer." 

SimillUly, while DoS policy perm;'" limited pe,..onal US" ofthointemellllld p.""nol o-mail through an 

Internet oconeclion, that policy also stales: 

Employees have no expectation of privacy While using any U.S. Govomment-p,<>vided ."" ••• 10 

16 
62 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07111 Page 17 of 36 

e-mail account 10 an e-mall accountentllledBIII •• 1!lyahoo,com. The c-mail from the 

Reporter forwarded another c-mail from other ncws reporters which included in its body" news 

article (not written by the Reporter) that would appear in the Washington Times (nut the 

Reporter's news organization) the following day, July 12, 2009. This e-mail was found b the 

unallocated space located on Mr. Kim's DoS unclassified hard drive. I have been informed that 

when a computer file is deleted, the deleted file is flagged by the opernting system as no longer 

needed, but remains on the hard disk drive in unallocated space unless the date is later 

overwritten. 

32. Electronic evidence retrieved from Mr. Kim's DDS unclassified workstation also 

revealed that on September 24,2009, following his interview with the FBI, Mr. Kim's user 

profile logged into thelllllllll@yahoo.comaccountthroughanDoSinternetcmmeclion 

accessed through his DDS unclassified workstation. DoS security badge access records suggest 

that Mr. Kim was in his vcr office suite where his DDS unclassified workstation was located 

when theILlIIIII.I@yahoo,comaccountwasaccessedonSeptember 24, 2009, While 

accessing that account on his DoS computer, Mr. Kim's user profile observed e'mails in that 

account from an c-mall account entitled 1llll[lll~gltlail.com (which is the subject 

matter of the Government's request for a warrant here). Mr. Kim's profile also observed c-mails 

between the Reporter's work c-mail and 11I1I.II@yaboo.com.thee-mailaccount 

the Internet. The Department considers electronic mail messages on U.S, Government 

computers, using the Internet Or other networks, 10 be government mnte;riais and it mlly have 

access to those messages whenever it has a legitimate purpose for doing so. Such messages are 

subject 10 ,.gul.tiolls and laws covering govemment records, and may be subject to Freedom of 

Infonnallon Act (FOlA) request or legal discovery orders." 

5 FAMnJ (4), 

17 
63 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 18 of 36 

identified by Mr. Kim as hi. own during his September 24, 2009 interview with the FBI. but 

which, one day later, he told the FBI was "full" and t.~at he was "going to get rid of it" 

33. During the Internet session described above 00 September 24,2009, !IAr. Kim 

attempted to clear his "Temporary Lqjemet Files." I have been informed that deletion of 

Temporary L-..ternet Files created by a web browser sofuvare application moves the cached 

content of internet sites visited to unallocated space, wlrich, again, is space on the hard drive 

flagged by the operating system as being available for overwriting. 

34. On November 9, 2009, search warrants were executed on both the 

1II1111111@yahoo.com and 11111I@yahoo.com .-mail accounts. Those searches 

revealed multiple e-mails between Mr. Kim and the Reporter dating between May 11, 2009 and 

August 15, 2009. Review of those e-mails demonstrntes '{])V'OnfIOCnm and 

1I111111111§!yahoo.com are e-mail accounts used by Mr. Kim and 

1II111111i1111111111@gmail.comisanaccountusedbytheReporter9 toFeceive e-mails from Mr. 

Kim and perhaps other sources. Further, in their e-mail communication. Mr. Kim IIlld the 

Reporter appear to have employed aliases (i&, Mr. Kim is "Leo" and the Reporter is "Alex"). 

The content of the a-mail communications also demonstrate that Mr. Kim was a source for the 

Reporter conceming the foreign country that was the subject matter of the June 2009 article (the 

"Foreign Country") and thai the Reporter solicited the disclosure of intelligence infonnation 

from Mr. Kim conceming that country. A chronological listing and description of the most 

18 
64 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07111 Page 19 of 36 

pertinent c-rnalls is as follows: 

(aJ. 1I11! •• I@Yahoo.comto 

I am back from my trip. Here is my personal bformation. 

Please send me your personal cell number. I believe you have 

mine. It was great meeting you. 

Thanks, 

Stephen 

(Mr. Kim attached to this c-mall his resume and a biograpb.ical description, both 

of which noted his access to classified information and ~js expertise concerning 

the Foreign Country). 

(b). A May 20,2009 e-mail from ail.com to 

•••• III:g1yahoo.com respon e above May 11, 2009 e-mail outlines 

a clandestine commurucatians plan between Mr. Kim and the Reporter. In the emall, the Reporter solicits Mr. Kim as • source of sensitive and/or internal 

government dacuments (italicized below). It reads: 

Your credentials have never been doubted - but I am nonetheless 

grateful to have the benefit of a chronological listing of your postings and 

accomplishments. I only have one cell phone number, on my Blackberry, 

which I gave you 202-[phonc number for the Reporter]. Unfortunately, 

when I am sealed in my booth at the State Department, which is much of 

every day, it does 110t get reception. thus [sic] I instruct individuals who 

wish to contact me simply to sead me an c-mail to tb.is address 

[ gmail.com]. One asterisk means 10 conlact them. or 

thai preViously :mggcsledplansfor communication are to proceed as 

agreed; Mo aslerisks meallJ' Ihe opposite. With all this establish.d, and 

presuming you have read/seen enough about me to know that I am 

trustworthy ... let's get about our work! What do you want to accompliSh 

together? As I told you when we met, I can always go on television and 

say: "Sources lell [name of the Reporter's national news organization]" 

Bull am in a much beller position /0 advance the jnteresls of all 

concerned if! can say: "{Name of the Reporter's Malional news 

organization] has obtained . .. " 

Warm.st regards, [first name of Reporter]. 

19 
65 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 20 of 36 

[Emphasis added] 

(c). IIiAnIiQiilh.eiifiMliitliliYli20, 2009 1Nmil from@gman •. wmto II! I§yahoo.tmn, the body of which slates: 

(d). 

(0), 

Please forgive my delay in replying to you. I was on vacation au! of town 

Yours faithfully, [first natlle ofReporterJ 

A Mai12. 2009 e-mail from @gmail.cOl:ll to 

B/yaltoo.colll in which the Reporter explicitly seeks from Mr. Kim 

the disclosure of intelligence infmmation about the Foreign Counlry. It reads: 

Thanks Leo. What I am interested in, as you might expect, is 

breaking news ahead of my competitors. I want to report authoritatively, 

and ahead afmy competitors, on new initiatives or shHts in U.S. policy, 

events on the grOWlc! in [the Foreign Country], whal inlelligence is picking 

up, etc, As possible examples: J'd love to report that the ICIO sees 

activity il"'.side [the Foreign Country] suggesting [description of national 

defense information that is the subject of the intelligence disclosed in the 

June 2009 article]. I'd love to report on what the hell [a named U.S. 

diplomat with responsibilities for the Foreign Country] is doing, maybe on 

the basis o/internal memos detailing how the U.S. plans to [take a certain 

action related to the Foreign Country] (ifthat is really our goal). I'd love 

to see some internal Siale Department analyses about !he state of [. 

particular program within the Foreign Country that was the subject matter 

of the June 2009 article], about [the leader of the Foreign COWltry). . ,. In 

short: Let's break some news, and expose muddle-headed policy when we 

see it - or force. the administration's hand to go in the right direction, if 

possible, The only way to do this is to EXPOSE the policy, or what the 

{Forefgn Country} is up to, and the only way to do that authoritatively is 

with EVIDENCE. 

Your" faithfully, Alex. 

[Emphasis added] 

If' jim forwi1~~'::'~i~::~ c~_~~~~~g !ybove Mlly2~~~:com at 10:57 

10 "Ie" is a common acronym denoting !~InteJligence Community," 

20 
66 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 21 of 36 

a.m. on the date of the June 2009 article. At the time of Ibis e-mail, DoS badge 

records indicate thaI Mr. Kim II!Id the Reporter were outside the DoS building, 

baving left the building ot approximately the same time. The content of the 

forwarded e-mAil is blank, but the SIlbjoot line is "Fw: Re: here." 

(I). In II!I e-mail dated ill JUlIe 2009. following the publication of the June 2009 

article, the Reporter forwarded from work e-maiJ BCC<lunl (which 

speUs oul the Reporter's name) to accoUll! the 

following e-mwl from another reporter the Reporter's Il1Itional 

news organization. 11 reads: 

Hi [firs! name ofReporterj - wondering if you would like to check 

with your sourc:es on some1hing we are hearing bUI cat:I't get totally nailed 

down over here. 

It seems that the [U.S. Government is concerned about somethiog 

related to the Foreign CO\llltty]and is watching it very closely ... We 

can', gel many more de!aili; than that right now - but our sourc:e said if we 

could find [0 specific detall] elsewhere he would give us more. Though 

you might be able to squeeze out 8 few details and we could double team 

this one" .. 

Many tIumks, dear friend •.. "' 

[Name ofsccond reporter associated with Reporter's national news 

organization] 

The Reporter then forwarded the above e-mail asking for the Reporter to "squeeze 

QuI a few oreign Countty from the Reporter's "sources" 10 Mr. 

Kim at account and included the following 

introductory nole: 

Leo: From the [Reporter's national news organization] Pentagon 

correspaodcnl. I Il.IlI at 202-[Reporter's office number at the Reporter's 

news organization] today. 

Hugs and kisses, Alexll 

II One day after !his e-mail was •• nt, loll records indicate thai Mr. Kim placed a six-and-a-half minute 

phon. call 10 lb. Reporter'. office number at lb. ~porl.r's news organization (as requested in lb •• 1>""0-

refereDced .·mail). 

21 
67 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 22 0136 

(g). 

(h). 

(i). 

0). 

2:; Uri! n~d in June 2009 from the Reporter's work e-mail to tl\yahoo.l')om containing 6 su~ject referencing the Foreign Country. 

The content oflbo e-mail included only the Reporter's phone number next to an 

asterisk C*) which, according 10 the May 20, 2009 .-mail described above, was the 

Reporter's signal that Mr. Kim should call him.l> 

A Jllli ! I, 2009 e.-mail from the Reporter's work c-mail to 

@yul!oo.corfiattaching, without comment, a news article dated the 

following day from another national neWS organization conceming the 

intelligence community. 

A July 12, 2009 e-mail from the Reporter's work e-mail to 

,,_llIIiiljliIlYMOQ.com attaching, without comment, a news article dated the 

fol/owing day from another national news organization concerning the Foreign 

Country. 

An August 15,2009 e-mail from thelllllllll@Yahoo.comaccounttothe 

Reporter's work e-mail account, which states: 

Hope you are alright but I sense that they a."" no!. 

(k). An August 15,2009 e-mail from the Reporter's work c-mail responding to the 

above e-mail, and slating: 

Leo, 

YOIl are most perceptive and I appreciate your inqulry. Call me at work 

on Monday [at .he Reporter's work phone number 1 and I will tell you 

about my reassignment. In the meantime, enjoy your weekend! 

Alex 

(The el.ccranic signature to this e-mail following the word "Alex" identifies the 

Reporter by tbe Reporter's full name, phone number, e-mail address, and media 

organization). 

35. The FBI conducted a second non-custodial interview of Mr. Kim on March 29, 

" On the date oflhis .·mail, Mr. Kim was traveling outside of the United States. Mr. Kim's toll record, 

do not indicate that Mr. Kim called the Reporter after this e-ma.il was sent. They do indlcs.te, however, 

that tru.e minutes after this c-mai! was sent, a 53 second call W/lS placed from. number associ.ted with 

the Reporter's news organization to 1\1r, Kim"s cell phone. 

22 
68 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 23 of 36 

2010. During the interview Mr. Kim made IlllUIlIber of admissions, including; 

• coDfuming that the Owner' 5 information disclosed in the June 2009 article was 

natiOOlll defense infommtioll and most ofit, in Mr. Kim's rnhld, was properly 

classified at the TOP SECRETISCllevel; 

II collfuming thaI the same disclosures in the lUlle 2009 article were, in Mr. Kim's 

mind, "egregiollll," "bsd" and harmful to the national security in a number of 

respects which he described in detail; 

• acknowledging tlmt, while be could oot recall the specifics of the Intelligence 

Report, he was "fairly certain" be bed reviewed it and agreed that if electronic 

records indicated that he had accessed the Report then he did so; 

.. agreeing that the Owner's infomwtioll disclosed in the lUlle 2009 article appeared 

to be derived from the Intelligence Report with only one difference that he 

described as II "subtle nUlIIIce;" 

.. acknowledging that he had received exteusive training on the handling of 

classified information, and had executed multiple classified infonnation nondisclosure agreements with the Government; 

• cOllfuming !hat he understood the TS/SCI c!ossifiCll1iOIl markings that were 

prominently displayed on the Intelligence Report; 

• admitting that the Owner's infonnation disclosed in the June 2009 article, to his 

imowledge, did not "match" infonn.lion in the public domain, but advising that 

"bits and pieces" of the article were possibly derived from open source 

infonn.lion; 

• acknowledging that he understood the security banner on the classified computer 

database ami thai hi. actions were subject 10 monitoring; 

• re-slating his false statement from his interview with the FBI on September 24, 

2009, that be had no contact with the Repl>rter !Ofter they frrsl met in Marcb 2009; 

• after being confronted with the evidence of his extensive contacts with the 

Reporter in the months after they first met, (i) first slating that his calls with the 

RepOrler had been facilitaled by an unidentified "friend" and tha! he did no! 

infonn the FBI afhis telephone contacts with the Reporter because he did not 

coWlider then "direct colltacts;" bill then later (ii) openly admitting durill/! the 

inlerview that be Iwd "lied" to the FBI about the extellt ofms relationship with tne 

Reporter n"""usc he was "llooreil"IMt the FBI might investigate him for the 1M!!:; 

23 
69 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 24 of 36 

• while denying tb.t he had met face-ta-face with the Reporter on the date of the 

June 2009 article, admitting that be had met with the Reporter outside of the DDS 

building at other times including once following the FBI's September 24, 2009 

interview; 

• admitting that the emails seized during the FBI's investigation were, in fact, 

emails between himself and the Reporter; 

.. admitting, after being asked Ibe question a number oftilnes, that "Leo Grace" was 

an alias used in the e-mails for himself and that" Alex" was an alias used by Ibe 

Reporter, and 

• while asserting Ibat to. 2 y):yahOQ.com account pre-dated his 

relationship wilb the Reporter, stating Ibat it was the Reporter's idea to use covert 

e-mail communications as a means of compartmentalizing the infonnation and a 

way for Mr. Kim to Hfeel comfortable talking with [the Reporter]." 

35. According to the FBI agents who conducted the interview, during the interview, Mr. 

Kim never provided a coherent explanation for the evidence of his extensive contacts wit~ the 

Reporter including on the date of the leak in question. At Doe point. he indicated that he was 

communicating with the Report hoping that the Reporter "could help put him in a think tank." 

Mr. Kim's reaction to the evidence was mostly stwmed silence, although at one point he 

admitted that some oftha evidence was ''very disturbing." Nevertheless, Mr. Kim denied that he 

was a source for the Reporter or had knowingly provided the Reporter with classified documents 

or infonnation. Mr. Kim claimed to have specifically infonned the Reporter thai the Reporter 

"woo't get stuff out of me," to which the Reporter allegedly replied, "I don't want anything." 

Mr. Kim did admit, however, that he may have "inadvertently" confirmed information that he 

believed the Reporter had already received from other individuals. Mr. Kim made further 

24 
70 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 25 0136 

statemeuts which could fairly be chsmcterized lIS either a confession Of II near confessionl': 

• "I did not purposely discuss the [Intelligence Report], but mlght have discussed 

[some oCthe topics discussed in the Report]." 

". "Maybe I Inadvertently confumed something ... too stubborn to Dol •..• [I] jus! 

don't know ... someone values my views, listens up, ... maybe I felt flattered. 

[lb. Reporter] is a very affable, very convincing, persistent pernon. [The 

Reporter1 would tell me I WIIS brillillllt and it is possible I succumbed to flattery 

without knowIng it. Maybe it was my vanity_ (The Reporter] considers me an 

expert and would tell me .,. could use my in.~lght. ... The Ie is B big macho 

game but I would never say I'm read iu 10 this and you are nol I would never 

pass [the Reporter] classified." 

• "[The Reporter] exploited my vanity." 

" "[M]y personal and profeSsional training told me not to meet poople like [the 

Reporter]. I felt like while on the phone I was only confirming what be already 

knew. I was exploited like a rag doll. [The Reporter] asked me a lot of questiollil 

IlI!d gol me to talk 10 bInI and have pbone convernll.tions with him. [The Reporter] 

asked me a lot, not jllSt specific countries. [The Reporter J esked me bow nuclear 

weapons worked." 

• "It's apparent I did it I didn'lsay 'did you see this?' I think I did it. I can't deny 

it I didn't give [the Reporter] the [speoilic intelligence information in the 

article). I didn't provide him with the stuff." 

.. "1 don't think I confirmed, .. maybe I inadvertently confirmed in tho context of 

other conversations [with the Reporter], It wasn't far-fetcbed that the informatioll 

was alit there. I would not talk over an open line about intelligence. I did not 

leak classified." 

.. Finally, Mr. Kim opined that "someolle either gave [the Reporter] the [the 

Intelligence Report] or it was read to [the Reporter] over the telephone," 

31. During his interview, Mr. Kim also consented to Ii pbysical search ofms 

condominium in Mclean, Virginia. No hard-copy classified documents or other hard-copy 

materials directly related to the leak at issue were found during the search of Mr. Kim's 

"Tho FBI interview was ~ot audio or video taped. Whet follows are exoerpts from an FBI report 

memorializing the interview. 

25 
71 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 26 of 36 

condominium. During the seareh the FBI recovered three computem !balare presently being 

lIJlalj'Zed. ThIlS far, no information reievlll!l to this investigatioll hils beell identified 011 those 

computern. 

38. The text of the JUIle 2009 article reflects the Reporter's knowledge aDd 

understaDding that the information the Reporter had received was intelligence information the 

disclosure ofwruch could be harmful 10 the Urnt"d Slates. 

39. I conclude from the foregoing thai there is probable cause 10 believe thai: 

(a). From the beginning of their relationship, the Reporter i1Sked, solicited and 

encouraged Mr. Kim to disclose sensitive United States internal documents and 

inte.lligence information about the Foreigll County. Indeed, in the May 20, 2009 

c-mail, the Reporter solicits from Mr. Kim some of the national defense 

intelligence information that was later the subject matter of the JUIle 2009 article; 

(b). The Reporter did 110 by employing lJaltery IIDd playing to Mr. Kim's vwty and 

ego; 

(e). 

(d). 

(e). 

(t). 

(g) 

Much like Ill! intelligence officer would run an elBndestine intelligence source, the 

Reporter iMlnlcied Mr. Kim on a covert cDmmunications plan thot involved the email of either one or two asterisks to what appears to be a .. -mail account set up 

by the R.e , to facilitate communication with 

Mr. Kim flnfonnation; 

To conceal further their communications, the Reporter Il.!ld Mr. Kim employed 

aliases in their .-mail communication to .BOO other (i&.. Mr. Kim is "Leo" Il.!ld 

the Reporter Is "Alex''); 

The Reporter was in repealed telephone contact with Mr. Kim prior to, and on the 

day of, the leak of the classified information in question; 

On the day of the leak, Mr. Kim Wlill Oil the telephone with the Reporter at or 

arOlmd the some time thai Mr. Kim Will) viewing the intelligence Report 

cont!i.Wing TOP SECRETISCI natioll1ll defense information "boul the Foreign 

Coontry; 

The IelC! of the June 2009 article reflects the Reporter's knowledge and 

UIlderslimdiog that the Information the Reporter had received WIlS intelligence 

26 
72 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 270136 

information the disclosure of which could be bllIlllfui to the United States; 

(h). Nevertheless, the Reporter published 00 article 011 the Internet containing the TOP 

SECRETISCI I18tional defense infonnation about the Foreign COlllltry that was in 

the Intelligence Report; , 

(i). Thereafter, it appears the Reporter (i) returned the favor by providing Mr. Kim 

with news articles In advance o/Ihillr publication concerning intelligence mattm 

and the Foreign CoWltry and (ii) continued 10 contact Mr. KIm as 8 source when 

the Reporter's colleaguea needed sensitive government infonnntion about the 

Foreign Country. 

40. Based on the foregoing, there is probable cause 10 believe that the Reporter has 

committed a violation of18 U.S.C. § 793 (Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense 

Information). at the very least, either as an aider. abettor andlor co-conspirator of Mr. Kim. 

m. ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 

41. Fwther, based on the foregoing. there ill probable CBuse 10 belleve thnt evidence 

material to this investigation will be found in thelllllllllll@gmalJ,C!om account While 

the searohes of Mr. Kim's e-mail accounts have .... v.aled a number of e-malls between Mr. Kim 

and the Reporter, certain of those c-mails indicate that there are additional .-mail 

communications that have nol been recovered by the FBI and that, if they still exist, would likely 

be found in theITIIIIIIIIIIIIII@gmail.comllCcoWlt.Specifically,thesearohesofMr.Kim's 

1IIIIIIIIIIIt@yahoo.com.-mailaccountdldnotrevealhisresponsestotheMay 20, 2009 or 

May 22. 2009 .-mails from the Reporter soliciting sensitiVe, internal andlor intelligence 

information about the Foreign COWltry. The May 22, 2009 ,,-mail from the Reporter, for 

eKample, begins "Thanks Leo, What I am interested in, as you might expect, is breaking neWS 

ahead of my competitors." Thus, the May 220d e-mail iss respanse from the Reportar to an 

earlier e-mail from Mr. Kim apparently inquiring !IS to what Idnd of infOlmation the Reporter 

27 
73 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 2B of 36 

was interested in receiving. Further, the subject line oCtile e-mail is "Re: here, n indicating that 

there was a prior a-mail from Mr. Kim 10 the Reporter with the subject line "here." That e-mail 

- sell! from Mr. Kim to the Reporter just following the Reporter's May 20, 2009 solicitation of 

infonnatioll from Mr. Kim - was not [oUlld in the searches of Mr. IGm's e-mail acco1lllts.Itis 

reasonable 10 believe that this and other e-mail! sent from Mr. Kim to the Reporter would exist in 

the "in-boxn ofllle 7 @gmail.com account. Mr. Kim's missing reaponses 10 !he 

Reporter's e-mails would materially assist tile FBI's investigation as tiley could be expected 10 

establish further tile fact of the disclosures, their content, and Mr, Kim's fIIld the Reporter's 

intent in making them, and could be expected 10 constitute direct evidence of their guilt or 

innocence. 

42, The JllIlfl 2009 article was published onlune 11,2009. The Owner's information 

published in thIIt article was first disreminated 10 representatives of the United States 011 Jlme 10, 

2009. 

43. Further, it would maleria.lly assist the FBI's investigatioll to review all e-mails in 

the Reporter's gDlllil.oom account on these two days to potelltially establish 

by direct evidence the fact of the disclosures. Further, because we I::now that Mr. Kim was in 

contact with the Reporter through this aCCOIlllt, il is relllloflllble to believe that any other sources 

the Reporter may bave had with regard 10 the Foreign Country, if WlY, would similarly use the 

@gmail.colII 11000l1li1 to commWlicate with the Reporter, particularly given the 

s!atement in the May 20, 2009 a-mail that the Reporter ''instructs individuals who want to ",.oh" 

the Reporter to send WI e-mail to that accollllt. 

44. Accordingly, the FBI submits thlll Ocagie should be ordered 10 produce in 

28 
74 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 29 of 36 

response to this wammt: 

(i) 

(ii) 

on whatever dllte, between 

-;~J.Mr.'IJCimi·i'iS~kn~o;~wntb~,~ •. -.~m;;!lI~·~1 accoWllS, ... !IIld 

"to" or l'from" the 

!!IgmalJ.eom on June 10'" ani! 11"',2009. 

45. While it is not required for a wrunm! 10 issue under section 2000aa, the FBI has 

exhausted all reaso!ll\ble non-media alternatives for collecting the evidence it seeks. We seek e· 

mails between the Reporter Md Mr. Kim that we have probable cause to believe existed. To 

gather that 1lvidence, we have the option of searching either the Reporter'. Or Mr. Kim's .-mail 

accounts. Our searched of Mr. Kim's .-mail accounts have not yielded all the e-mails between 

him Ilnd the Reporter that our evidellce to date demonstrates exist. Other than asking the 

Reporter for a voluntary production of the .-mails from thellllllll •• 1!lgmail.ccm 

account, there is no other way to get the evidence we rightfully seek. Because oH11C Reporter's 

own potentia! crimlnalliabiiity in this matter, we believe that requesting the voluntary 

production of the malerillls from Reporter would be futile III1d would pose a subslanlial threat to 

the integrity oftbe investigation Wld of the evidence we seek to obtain by the WlllT!IIlt. 

46. Based on the above, there is probable cause to believe that the Reporter (along 

with Mr. Kim) has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) either as Mr. Kim's co· 

conspirator Wldlor alder and abettor, and that e~dence oftha! crime is likely contained within the 

1I111111 ••• SI@gmail.comaccount.Accordingly,theFBI'srequesttosearch the contents of 

" A Google representative has indicated that, if ordered by. court os part of a search warrant, Gaagl. C!lIl 

produce .. mall communications between certain .-mailaccounls. 

29 
75 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 30 of 36 

that account falls sq\l!lJely withln section 2000.a(8)'5 exceptioD pencitting searches of mediarelated work product materials, even when possessed by a national news reporter because there is 

"probable cause to believe that the person possessing such materials bas committed or is 

committing the criminal offense to which the materials rela!e." 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). 

47. On Oelober 2, 2009, the FBI submitted a preservation letter to Google, pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(1), requesting that the contents ,w.~ma.IJ.C\lm be 

preserved. On January J 5,2010, a second preservation letter for the account was sent to Google, 

This second preservation letter was 15 days over the 90-day limit for preservation prescribed by 

18 U,S.C. § 2703(f), Thus, there remains the possibllity that relevant content in the aCCollnt bas 

been deleted. IS Nevertheless, we consider that possibility remote because, to the FBI's 

knowledge, in January 2010, neither Mr. Kim nor the Reporter knew that Mr. Kim was a large! 

of this investigation nor that the existence ofthellllllllllllll@gmoil.comaccountwas 

known to the FBI. On Aprii9, 2010,."~,other 90-day extension of the preservation order was 

permitted by Google, Inc. for the account. 

IV. COMPUTERS, THE INTERNET, AND E-MAIL 

48. I have received training from tho FBI related to computer systems and the use of 

computers during criminal investigations. Based on my education, training and experience, and 

information provided to me by other law enforcement agents, I know the follo·,vi.!1g: 

(0). The mlemet is a worldwide computer network that connects computers and 

allows communications and the transfer of data and information across state and 

national boundaries. The tenn "computer", as used herein, is defined in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(0)(1) and includes an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or 

" On J .. ~"ary 21,2010, Google refused to confirm to an FB! agent whether there is any content in the 

account without servrce ofform~l process. 

,10 
76 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 31 of 36 

other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage 

functions, and includes any data storage fw:ility or oommUDiCiltiollS fscility 

d.i=tly related to or oPlll'llling In conjlUlCtion with such device. A computer WIer 

accesses the Internet through a computer network or IIll Internet Service Provider 

(ISP). 

(b). E-mail, or electronic mail, is a popular method of sending messages arui files 

between computer lWers. When B computer user sends an e-mail.itis created on 

the sender's computer, transmitted to the mail server of the sender's ,,-mail 

service providers, then trIIllsmitted to th~ mail !lerVefof the recipient's e-mWl: 

servioo provider,and eventually trnnsmilled La the reeipienL's computer. A saver 

is II computer attached to !I de<licated network that serves many users, Copies of 

INtlllils !'ftc 1I3oo11y maintained Oil lhe recipient's e-mail server. &JI:l in some =es 

are maintained on the sender's e-mail server. 

49. Based on my tralnlng !Il1d experience, and infonnetion provided to me by other 

la.w enforcement agents, I know the following: Firsl, searches of e-mail accounts usually provide 

infolIDstion thaI helps identify the user(s} oithe .-mail accollllU. Second, Individuals who use email in ooru:lection with criminal activity, or activity of questionable legaLity, often set up an email account to be used solely for that purpose. This is often part of an effort to maintain. 

anonymity and to separate persona! communication from communication and information that is 

related to the crimiualactivity. Third, when the criminal violation involves a COIISpirllCy, 11 

seM:h of an e-mail account often oIlows the identification of any co-conspiIlltors. 

v. BAgNRGwm REG6,lIDJNG GOGGLE 

50. Based on my training and experience, I have learned the follOwing about Google: 

(a). Google is an internet services company thaI, among other things, provides .-mail 

services (bOWD as gmail). Subscribers obtain an account by registering on the 

Internet with Coogle. Google l'fXjueslS subscribers to provide basic informetion, 

such as Mme, gender, zip code and other personal/biogmphlcal information. 

However, Google does not verify the information provided. 

(b)- Googlc is located at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California. 

Googie maintains electronic records pertaining to the subscribers of its e-mail 

31 
77 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 32 of 36 

sernces. These recotds include account access infm:matioo, e-mail transection 

info!'mll.tion, IlIId accoUIIIllpplication information. . 

(0). Subscribers to Google may access their Google acoounts using the Internet. 

(d). E-mail messages IlIld files seot to B groail account IIIS stored in the account's 

"inbox" as long as they are not identified as "SPAM," th" account bas not 

exceeded the maximum IMl1'Ige limit, and the account has not been set to folWlll'd 

messages or download to l1li e-mail client with the option "delete groaiJ's copy." 

If the message/file is nol deleted by the subscriber, the account is below the 

maximum storage limit, and the account bas not been inactivated, then the 

mes..age/file will remain On the server indefinitely. E-mail messages and filed 

sent from II gmail Il<;cooot will remain Oil the server indefinitely lIIIless they are 

deleted by the subscriber. 

(e). Google provides POP3 access for gmail accounts, 1'0.1'3 is a protocol by which email client software such as Microsoft Outloak or NelscapeMaii can access the 

servers of an e-mnil seMel: provider and download the received messages to a 

local computer. If POP3 IU)Cl:.l!S is enabled, the account mer can select to keep !lcopy of the downloaded messages on the server or to have the messages deleted 

from the server. The default setting for gmail accounts is to keep a copy cfthe 

messages on the server when POF3 1ICCe8S is enabled. Gmail subscribers can also 

access their accounts through an c-mail client such 8!l Microsoft Outlook by using 

the IMAP protocol. When groail subscribers access their accounts through IMAP. 

Ii copy of the received messages remains all the server unless explicitly deleted. 

(f). A Ooogle subscriber can store files, including a-mails, text files, IlIJ.d image liles, 

in the subscriber's account on the server.! maintained llIld/or owned by Google. 

(8), E-mail. and other files stored by a Googlo subscriber in a Googl" account are not 

necessarily also located on the computer used by the subscriber to access the 

Ooogle account. The subscriber mal' store e-mails and other files in their Google 

account server exclusively. A search of the files in !be subscriber's computer will 

not necessBrily uncover the files tim! the subscriber bas stored Oil !he Google 

server. In addition, communications sent 10 the Ooogle subscriber by another, but 

not yet retrieved by the subscriber, will be loollled on the Google server in the 

subscriber's account, bul nol on the computer used by the subscriber. 

(h). Computers located at Google contain information lIlId other stored eleetromc 

communicatiollS belonging to unrelated third parties. & a federal agent, I am 

trained and experienced in idlllltifYing communicatiollS relevant to the crimes 

under investigation. The persollllei ofOoogle are not. I also know that the 

manner in whicb the data is preserved and analyzed may be critical to the 

32 
78 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 33 of 36 

Sllooessful prosecution of any case based upon this evidence. Computer Forensic 

Examiners are Irniced to handle dlgital evidence. Google employees are not It 

would be inappropriate and impmctical, however, for federalllgllllts to searcllthe 

vast IXllllpl'ter network of Googte for the relevant accounts IlIId then to Ilnlllyze 

the contents of those oocmmls on the premises of Google. The impOOI on 

Google'g business ",,(!Uk! be severe. 

51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2111 is called the "Electronic COllllllunications Privacy Act." 

(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(8) provides, in part; 

A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 

electronic communication service of the contents of an electronic 

communication that is in electronic siorage in an electronic 

oommunicatiollS system for one hundred IIJId eighty days or less, only 

pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure or equivalent State wammt. A governmental entity may require 

tho disclosure by II provIder of electronic communication that has beeD in 

electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than 

oue hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) 

of !his section. 

(b). I!lU.S,C. §2703(b)provides,inpart; 

(I) A govermne:ntal entity may require Ii provider of remote computing 

service to disclose the contents of lillY wire OT electronic communlcation to 

which this paragraph is made applicable by paragraph (2) of this 

Slibsectio/l-

(A) Without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the 

governmental entity oblllms a wrurnnt issued u.ing the procedures 

destribcd in die Federa! Rules ofCriminni Procedure by a court 

witiljurisdiclion over the offense ooder investigilhOn or equivalent 

Stall! warrant; Dr , , .. 

(2) Paragraph (l) is appllcable with respect to My wire or electronic 

communlcation that is held or maintained on that service -

(A) On behalf of, and received by means of electronic tmnsmission 

from (or created by means of computer processing of 

communications received by means of electronic transmission 

33 
79 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107/11 Page 34 of 36 

from), a subscriber or customer of S!loh remote computing service; 

and 

(B) Solely for the pmpose of providing storage or computer 

processing services to such suOOcrlber or customer, If the provider 

is not authorized to access the contents of any such 

communications for purposes of providing MY services other than 

storage or computer processing. 

(0). The Government may wse obtain reoords Wid other infolD1!1uon pertaining 

to a .ubscri ber or customer of an electronlc communlcatioll service or 

remote computing service by w:ry of /I search wammt. 18 U.S.C. § 

2703(c)(l)(A). No notice to the subscriber or cuslomeris required. 18 

U.S.C. § 2703(0)(2). 

(d). 18 U.S.C. § 2711 provides, in pari: 

As used in Ibis chapter-(I) the terms defined in section2SIO of 

Ibis title have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in thai 

section; and (2) the term ''Temote computing service" mellllS the 

provision to the public of computer storage or processing services 

by means of en electronic communications system. 

(e). 18 U.S.C. § 25 10 provides, in pari: 

(8) "contents," when used with respect to any Wire, 0f!I1, or 

electronic communication, includes any infol1!lation concemlng 

the substance, purport, or meaning ofthel communlcation; ... (14) 

"electrocic communications system" mellllS any wire, redio, 

electromagnetic, photooptical or photoeieclJ:onic facilities for the 

transmission of electronic communications. and eny computer 

facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic slorage 

of such communicatiOIlQ; (15) "elecll'onic ... oommunication 

service" meaDS My service which pro,,;des to lIS"'" thereof the 

ability \0 send or receive wire or electronlc communiclltiollS; ... (\7) 

"electronic storage" means - (A) any temporary, inlemlediate 

storage of Ii wire or electronic communication incidental 10 the 

electronic Irmlsmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such 

communicatioll by an electronic communication service for 

pmposes of backup protection of such communication. 

(f). 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) provides, inpru1: 

34 
80 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11107111 Page 35 of 36 

Notwithstanding section 3105 of this title, the presence of an 

officer shall Dot be required for service or execution of a Sdarch 

warrant issued in accordance with this chapler requiring diselosvre 

by a provider of electronic communicatiollS service or remOle 

computing service of the contents of communications or records Of 

other information permining 10 a subscriber 10 or customer of such 

service. 

VII. .!;lEQUEST FOR NO/ll.;gISg:.OSmm BY ~ROvmER 

52. PursIl!UlIIO 18 U.S.C. § 270S(b). this Cour!can enler!lll order commanding the 

PROVIDER IIot 10 notify any other person, including the subscriber (lethe SUBJECT 

ACCOUNT, oHhe clOstence of the wammt because there is rellSon 10 believe that notification of 

the existence of the warrant will result in: (I) endangering the life or physical.afoly of an 

individual; (2) flight from prosecutioa; (3) destruction of or llIrnpering of evidence; (4) 

intimidation of potential witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. The 

involvement ofth" SUBJECT ACCOUNT as set forth above is not public and I know, based on 

my training and experience, that subjects of criminal investigations will often destroy digital 

evidence if the subject learns of an investigation. Additionally, if the PROVIDER or other 

perscns notify anyone th.t 8 warrant b •• been issued on the SUBJECT ACCOUNT, the targets 

of this investigation and other person. may further II"'slc thou identity and activity, flee, or 

otherwise obstruelthis investigation. Accordingly, I request thai this Court .nter an order 

commanding the PROVIDER not 10 notify any otherpmon, including the subscriber oethe 

SUBJECT ACCOUNT, of the existence of the warrant. 

vrn. REQUEST FOR SEALING 

53. Because this investigation is contWuing and disclosure ohame of the detail. of 

this affidavit may compromise subsequent investigative measures 10 be taken in this case, may 

35 
81 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-1 Filed 11/07/11 Page 36 of 36 

cause subjects to flee, may cause individuals to destroy evidence and/or may otherwise 

jeopardize !llis investigation, I respectfully request that !llis affidavit, lind associated materials 

seeking !IIi! searoh WlImIIIt, be sealed until further order of this Court. Finally, I specifically 

request that the sealing order not prohibit infomlation oblBined from this warmrt from being 

shared with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

IX. CONCLUSION 

54. Based on the foregoing, there is probable ClIlIse to believe !bat the Reporter bas 

committed or is comrriitting a violation of 18 US.C. § 793 (Unauthorized Disclosw-e of National 

DefellSe Information), as an alder, abettor and/or oo-conspirator, and that on the computer 

systems owned, maintained, andior operllled by Google, Inc., there exists In, ""d related to, the 

SUBJECT ACCOUNT, evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities o~ violation of section § 793. 

By !llis affidavit and application, I request that the Cow-! issue a search WllIYaIli directed to 

Google, Inc., allowing agents 10 seize the cOlltent OfthB SUBJECT ACCOUNT and other relaled 

illf'orm~tion stored on !be Google servers IlS further described and delimited in Attachment A 

hereto. 

Special Agent 

Federal Bure.u of Invesligalion 

36 
82 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11/07111 Page 1 of 6 

A IT ACHJ\:lEm A: ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 

PursUllllt 10 18 U.S.C. § 2703 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a), il is hereby ordered as follows: 

I. SERVICE OF WARRANT AND SEARCH PROCEDURE 

a. Googie, Incorporated, a provider of electronic collllTlumcstion and remote 

computing services, located at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway. Mountcin View, California, (the 

"PROVIDER") will isolate those accounts and files described in Section n below. Pursuant to 

18 V.S.C. § 2703(g) the presence ofllll !l8en! i. nol required for service or execution of this 

WBfrllllI. 

b. The PROVIDER sballilot notifY any other person, including the subscriber(s) of 

1II1l11111111111£i)g:woll.clllII of the existence of the warrant. 

c. In order to minimize lilly disruption of computer service to Innocent third parties, 

the PROVIDER's employees and/or law enforc'emen! peJSonnel trained in the operation of 

computers will create an exact duplicate of the computer accounts and file. described in Section 

II below, including IIIl exact duplicate of all informatiOIl slored in the computer accounts and files 

described therein. 

d. As soon as practicable after service ofWs warrant, the PROVIDER shall provide 

the e)(llot duplicate in electronic form of the account and files described in Section II below and 

all information stored in tha! account and files 10 the following FBI special agent; 

Reginald B. Reye. 

FBI·WFO 

601 4~ Street, NW 

W ... hingIDn, D.C. 20535 

""'" 202-278'-2864 Desk: 202.2784868 

The PROVIDER sooll send the information to the agent via facsimile Md overnight mail, Md 

where maintained in electronic form, on CD·ROM or an equivalent electronic mediwn. 
83 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11/07111 Page 2 of 6 

e. The FBI will make !Ill exact duplicate (If the original production from the 

PROVIDER. The original production from the PROVIDER will be sealed by the FBI and 

preserved for authenticity and chain of custody purposes. 

n. FiLES Ar:ID Aq;;!lllli.IL't{! m!i COPlEn BY THE PROVl'DH'S EMPlron:!M! 

B. AsIy and all commllllioations. on whatever date, between 

••••• @gmoil.com("SUBJECTACCOUNT'')andIlllYofthefollowingaccounts: 

(I) @yahoo.com, 

(2) 5J @yahoo.com, l1li11 

(3) III\IB@gmall,\lOIll. 

"AsIy and all communications" includes, without limitatioll, received messagflll (whether "to," 

"cc'd," or "bec'cI"to the SUBmCT ACCOUNT), forwarded messages, sent messages (whether 

"to," "co'!!," or "bee'd" to the three ooove-listed accounts), deleted messages,and messages 

maintained in trash or other folders, Wid lilly attachments thereto, including videos, documents, 

pholos. internet addresses, IIIId computer files sent 10 IIIId received from other websites. "AsIy 

and 1111 communications" further includes ali prior email messages in WI eml!.il "chain" between 

the SUBJECT ACCOUNT and eny of the three sbove-lisled accounts, whether or not those prior 

emails were In fact sent between the SUBmCT ACCOUNT and the above-listed accounts; 

b. AsIy WId all coInmW'llcatiom "III" or "from" the sUBmcr ACCOUNT on iune 

10 WId/Of June II, 2009. "AsI)' and all communications" includes, withoullimitalion, received 

messages (whether "to", "co'd," or "bcc'd" to the sUBmcr ACCOUNT). fOTWlll'ded messages, 

sent messages, deleted messages, messages maintained in trash or other folders, and 1liiY 

attachments thereto, including videos, documents, phOIaS, internet addresses, and computer files 

2 
84 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11/07/11 Page 3 of 6 

senllo lIIld received from other websites. "Any end all communications" further includes all 

prior email mesSliges in an email "chain" sent ''to'' or "from" the SUBJECT ACCOUNT on June 

10 Of June 11, 2009, whether or not those prioremails in the "chain" were in fact senl orreceivcd 

on June 10 OrJWl6 11,2009; 

c. All existing printouts from original storage of all of the electronic mail described 

above in Section n (a) and 1I(b); 

d. All transactional information of all activity of the SUBJECT ACCOUNT 

described above in Section lI(a} and !I(b), including log files, dates, limes, methods of 

connecting, ports, dial-ups, registration Internet Protocol (lP) address and/or localions; 

e. All business records III1d subscriber infOmJlltiOIl, in any form kept, pertaining 10 

!be SUBJECT ACCOUNT described above in Section II(a) and lJ(b), including applications, 

subscribers' fullilames, all screen names associated with the subscribers and/or accounts, IIlI 

account names associated with the subscribers, account numbers, screen names, status of 

accounts, dales of service, methods of payment, telephone numbers, addresses, detailed billing 

records, and histories and profiles; 

f. All records indicating !be account preferences and services available 10 

subscribers of the SUBJECT ACCOUNT described above ill Secl.iolllI(a) and IICb). 

m. lNFORMATWN TO BE SlUl.ED BY .LAW /l<NFORCEMENl p~ 

Items to be seized, whicb are belieVed to be evidence and fruits of violations of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 793 (Unau!borized Disclosure ofNalional Defense Information) as follows: 

B. The contents of electronic communications, including attachments and stored 

files, for the SUBJECT ACCOUNT as described and limited by Section TI(a) and IICb) above, 

3 
85 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11/07/11 Page 4 of 6 

inclucling videos, computer files sen! to and received from other websites, received messages, 

senl messages, cleleted mcSSIIges, messages milintained in !nIsh or other folders. nny attachments 

therein, md all existing prinlOlIlS from originlll5lorage of all of the electronic mail described 

above in Section I1(a) ami n(b). that pertain 10: 

I. records or infonuation relatecllO violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793; 

2. My mel all communications between Stephen Kim Wid the'author oCthe 

article (the "Author'') that is the subject matter oithe FBI investigation 

that is the basis for !his WlIIl'mlt (the "Article'') and !lily record or 

information that rellects such communications; 

3. records Of information relatillilin Stephen Kim's communications and/or 

activities on the dale of publication of the Article; 

4. records or information relating to the Author's cOmmunication with lilly 

other source or po!entilll source of the information disclosed in the Article; 

5. records or information related 10 Stephen Kim's or the Author's 

knowledge oflaws. regulatiDns, rules anellor prooodmes prohibiting the 

unauthorized disclosme of nationlll defense or classified information; 

Ii. records or information related In Stephen Kim's or the Author's 

knowledge of government rules lIIlellor procedures regarding 

commllilications with membc1'1l of the media; 

7. records or information related 10 lilly disclosure or prospective disclosure 

of classified andlor illtelligence informatioll; 

8, any classified docwnent, Image. !Word or information, and my 

4 
86 

Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11/07/11 Page 5 of 6 

commtmicatiOIll! concerning such documents, images, records, or 

infonnation; 

9, any document, image, record or information concerning the nlltionru 

defense, including but nollimiled 10 documents, maps, plans, diagrams, 

guides, manuals, and other Department of Defense, U.S. military, and/or 

weapons material, as weI! as sources and methods of intelligence 

gathering, and any commUilications concerning sucb documents, images, 

records, or infonru;tion; 

10. records or Information related to the state of mind afeny individuals 

seeking the disclosure or receipt of classified, intelligence and/or national 

defense information; 

I!. records or information related to the subject matter oCthe Article; and 

12. records or information related to the user(s) oflhe SUBJECT ACCOUNT. 

b. All oflne records and information described above in Sections n(d), U(e). and nm 

including: 

I. Account infurmation for the SUBJECT ACCOUNT including: 

(a) Names and associated email addresses; 

(b) Physical address and location information; 

(c) Records of session times and durations; 

(d) Length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized; 

(e) Telephone or insIrumenlnumber Or other subscn'ber number or identity. 

including any tempomrily assigned network address; 

5 
87 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-2 Filed 11107111 Page 6 of 6 

(f) The means and 50= of payment for such service (including any credit 

card or bank llCOOunt number); and 

(g) Interne! Protocol addresses used by the subscriber to register !he IlI:COllDt or 

otherwise initiate service. 

2. User connection logs fur the SUBJECT ACCOUNT for any connections to or 

from the SUBJECT ACCOUNT. User connectioillogs should include the following: 

(0) Connection time !lIlt! date; 

(b) Disconnect time Md dal~; 

(e) Method ofcollllootion to system (e.g., SLIP, PPP, Shell); 

(d) Dallllrnnsfer volume (e.g., bytes); 

(el The IP address that was used when the user cormected to the service, 

(f) Connection infon:nmion for other systems to which user connected via Ihe 

SUBJECT ACCOUNT, including: 

(1) COlUlootion destinstion; 

(2) Connection time IIDd date; 

(3) Discollllect time and dale; 

(4) Method ofco!lllectlon 10 system (e.g., (elnel, ftp, hllp); 

(5) Data tmmfer volum~ (e.g., bytes); 

(6) Any other relevant routing information. 
88 

Case 1:1O-mj-00291-AK Document 20-3 Filed 11/07/11 Page 1 of 1 

./\093 (Rev. JlAJ9) Search !U1d Sr.:h:um Warr6Itt 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

f.rlli. 

District of Columbia 

In the Malter of !he Search of 

(Briefly dacrlbt 1Jr, jH'Oplr/y'(1 &, ,elJyched 

f)/' i""'1n' rho 1"=' Uy ...... and oddrm) 

E-mall Account : !!Ismall.com on Computer Servo", Operated by (;00918, Ino.,l aoo Amphl!h.etre Parliway, Mountain View, Callfomla 

CasoNo. 10-291-M-O i 

SEARCH AND S~IZURE W ARRANr 

TO: Any authorized low enfo,cement officer 

An application by e federal law enforcement office, or an attorney for tho gov'fIlmenl requests Ibe search 

oflh. following person or propeli)' located in the NlllIh.r" District of C!!IIforola 

(It/fJflll/y lhe permll a' ;[5'k 1118 f!!!NH!rty to ", SUlrch,(/ Q"J Bf~ Its 'ocallon): 

Ii-mall aemun! & 111111111119moll.oom, melnlalnoo en compute, Servers operated by Google, Inc" headquartered 

at 1600 Amphitheatre Partway, Mountain View, California. 

The person or propeli)' 10 b •• earched, described above, i. bell""ed 10 conceal (l&rnil/Y rite "",,0. "'.d'scrlb"h. 

prop'ri)I '" IHI na.~: 

Cerlllin pmperty,lhe disclosure of which ;s govsmed by TIlle 42, U.S.C. Secllon 2000..0, and TIUa 18, U.S.C. Socllan. 

2701 !hrnugh 271 I, n.mely conte.1s of electronic e-malls and othor eloclronlc dets, more fully described In ATTACHMENT A to !hIs eppliwUon. 

lfind Ibaillie effidavit(s), or any recorded testimony, establish probable CBuse 10 search and seize the person Of 

property. 

YOU ARE COMMANDED to executethlswarranl on 0' before ~UN 112010 

I (no,to UCfJfld /4 dnyJJ 

r:f in iii. doytime 6:00 .. m. 10 10 p.m. a .t any time in !he day or night as I find reasonable """'. has been 

established. 

Unless delayed notice Is .uthorized below, you mu.! give. COP>' oflho w""""tond • ",coipt for the property eaken fo the person from whom. or ITom whose premises, the property was faken, or leave the copy and receipt at the 

pia"" where the property w .. laken. 

The omcer .~ecuting this wl!ITant or an officer present during the oxecution ofth. wanant, must pr.p .... Pn 

inventory as requl",d by Jaw and promptly return this warrnnt and Inventory 10 United Stales Magi"' .. ,. Judge 

r:J',.l1nd Ilia! immediate notification may have an adve .. e resultll.ted in 18 U.S.C. § 2105 (excepl for delay 

or trial), and •• !hen ... Ihe officer executing ijlis wammt to delay notice 10 the person who, or whoso property, will be 

semhed or seized (c:heel. 1M tJPpropriol4 bru) Of or ~ days (rffJIID ~r:nd J.O). 

au.IiI, !he facts late, of ___ .~_~ 

Oat. and lime ',"ued: _'i~Lt~ 20 1~_ 

City and siR\", District of Col! Imbla.. 
89 

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Director, is it not true that the standard 

for arresting an individual for committing a crime and the standard for charging and individual for committing a crime are both 

probable cause? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. If indeed that is the standard for arresting an individual and charging them with a crime, in this application for a 

search warrant that we presented to you and you have been questioned about several times today your special agent, Reginald B. 

Reyes, certifies in this application that there is probable cause to 

believe that the individual involved in here, which was James 

Rosen, had committed or is committing a crime. And yet your testimony, as I understand it, today is that there was no potential for 

prosecution. 

My question to you today is, if you have an individual that you 

know has reached the standard for arrest, the standard for charging with a crime and one of your agents has attested to that, how 

can you say, what standards does the Department has that says 

that there is no potential that that individual will be prosecuted? 

Mr. MUELLER. There are any number of occasions where we may 

have probable cause, or facts that would purport to establish probable cause to charge somebody with something, and we do not. 

Mr. FORBES. No, no, I understand that. I understand that. But 

how do you say before you even get the evidence, that you have 

reached that standard to charge someone to prosecution, how do 

you say that there is no potential that you will prosecute this individual when you haven’t even obtained the evidence to know the 

extent of that crime? 

Mr. MUELLER. Because a lot of the time we include search warrants and we have got cooperators who are—— 

Mr. FORBES. But in this case of Mr. Rosen’s can you tell us if he 

was cooperating, or if there is any guidelines with the Department? 

Mr. MUELLER. That was not my response was to your question 

before—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. That there are many occasions—— 

Mr. FORBES. In this occasion with Mr. Rosen. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me finish, sir. There are many occasions 

where you have probable cause to believe a person has committed 

a crime and you have no intention whatsoever to prosecute. 

Mr. FORBES. Absolutely, I know that. But in this case can you 

tell us what guidelines would allow the Department, allow you to 

testify today under oath that there was no potential to prosecute 

Mr. Rosen if your agent had said that you had probable cause to 

charge him and to arrest him and you had not even gotten the results from the search warrant yet? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not certain I understand the question. 

Mr. FORBES. Then let me rephrase it and be very specific. You 

have stated that there was no potential for prosecution for Mr. 

Rosen. A search warrant was issued. At the time this search warrant was issued, your agent attested to the fact that that there was 

probable cause, the standard to both arrest him and charge him. 

Yet your statement is that there was no potential for prosecution 

at that time for Mr. Rosen. And my question is, what guideline, or 
90 

on what basis do you say that there wasn’t even the potential for 

prosecution? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to go back and look at my answer, but 

I am not certain I stated it in that way. 

Mr. FORBES. So then would you say there was at least a potential 

for prosecution when the search warrant—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not going to say that because I am not the 

prosecutor on the case. I did not have the case. And those decisions 

are being made by—— 

Mr. FORBES. I know they’re ultimately being made, but you can’t 

state today that there was no potential for prosecution, can you? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not going to state it one way or the other. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, let me ask you this question then. I’ll shift 

totally because you don’t want to answer that question. 

Since the President has been in office, we have had a 40 percent 

increase in gang membership in the country. We know that 48 percent of violent crimes are committed by gangs in most jurisdictions; 

90 percent in some States, including the President’s home State of 

Illinois. Can you tell us what has been the cause of the uptick in 

gang activity of almost 40 percent since the President has been in 

office? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, at the same time you talk about the uptick 

in the gang activity, and it has grown over a period of time, and 

I don’t think there is any person who can say there is any one 

cause of increase of gang activity. It goes to a number of factors. 

But by the same token, there has been a substantial, large reduction in violent crime throughout the country. New York, Chicago, 

there is an article, as you are familiar with, I am sure, the reduction of homicides in Chicago this fiscal year, or this year, not the 

fiscal year. And consequently, on the one hand you will have certain communities who have an uptick in gang violence, but you 

also have a number of communities who have effectively addressed 

that gang violence with new ways of community policing. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Director, but the increase has been 

40 percent. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I had the opportunity to go to Russia with a 

CODEL a couple of weeks ago, and the FSB deputy director met 

with us and the head of counterintelligence. They said that they 

had sent a memo to you, or I believe it was to the FBI, and I presume you got it, in 2011 about the Tsarnaevs, that they had been 

radicalized and they were fearful that they may be some threat either to us or to Russia if they returned and wanted some information about when they would return. They thought there were some 

laws that maybe impeded your ability to do a complete study or 

carry your study for a longer period of time. 

I’d like to ask you this. First, did you get that paper from the 

FSB, or from the counterintelligence about the Tsarnaevs, number 

one? Number two, why could you not follow up on it further than 

you did and is there legislation needed to be passed to allow you 
91 

to do that, that would be keeping within the rights of American 

citizens? And three, are the relations between the FBI and the FSB 

improved to where we can share intelligence to work against the 

threat of radical Islam and terrorism in both of our countries? 

Mr. MUELLER. In response to number one, yes, we did get what 

we call a tear line through our legat in Moscow in March of 2011, 

an agent was assigned to it and an agent did a thorough investigation; ran through all of the records checks; went to Bunker Hill 

Community College where he had spent time; did neighborhood research before he then interviewed the parents; and finally interviewed Tamerlan himself. 

After all of those efforts, we did not find any indication that he 

was involved with terrorism, nor did we find predication for further 

investigative efforts such as wiretap or what have you. 

We then reported the extent of that investigation back to the 

Russians and asked for any additional material they had that 

would assist us in furthering up additional investigation. And we 

got after two—actually three requests—we got no response from 

them. 

We did, I think, all of the investigation that could have been 

done. Any additional information at that time I do not believe 

would have turned up more evidence of his ultimate radicalization. 

And finally, in terms of the FSB, yes, we had a chilly period with 

the FSB. I, as you I think know, met with General Bortnikov several weeks before you did after Boston. They have been helpful to 

our investigation. We hope that we can continue to exchange information to prevent further terrorist attacks, particularly in the 

United States. 

Mr. COHEN. Why was there not an ability to let them know that 

he returned to Dagestan, which was their request to know that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Because we did not pick that up. When he got on 

the plane, there had been—and there were several reasons. And 

that is one of the—— 

Mr. COHEN. What are the reasons? The impression that I got, 

and this is a big leap, but they said that if they would have known, 

if you would have followed up and they would have known he was 

coming back to Dagestan, that possibly the Boston Marathon bombing would not have occurred. I presume that means they would 

have offed him, which would have been great. 

Mr. MUELLER. Perhaps. In this particular case, the warning went 

to the task force and—not the warning, I should say the fact of his 

having left went to the task force, and for a variety of reasons, not 

the least of which is the case had been closed some time ago, that 

particular indication that he was on his way back to Russia did not 

get acted upon. 

Mr. COHEN. Is there something that needs to be corrected? Has 

it been corrected? Is there a law that needs to be changed? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, yes. No, it does not need a law. It requires 

a correction to our procedures, which we have done, to assure that 

every such notice has a recorded record. It cannot be done informally, somebody talking across the table. 

Mr. COHEN. Satisfied, thank you, sir. 

Let me ask you this other man, Todashev, who was killed in 

Florida, apparently was one of the guys that killed the three mari-
92 

juana—you know, to get marijuana in here somewhere—those 

three marijuana guys up in Massachusetts. 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not certain what you’re talking about. 

Mr. COHEN. There was another fellow that was a friend of 

Tamerlan’s who was in Florida and being investigated by FBI 

agents and they killed him. You remember that, don’t you? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say that there was a response to a threat 

that resulted in—— 

Mr. COHEN. What was the threat? Because at first the reports 

were there was a knife or something, and then later they said 

there was no weapon. 

Mr. MUELLER. That’s still under investigation. 

Mr. COHEN. How did you get knowledge of Todashev and his involvement in this crime? Was it through the FSB or was it your 

own investigation? 

Mr. MUELLER. Actually, it was a number of ways, including one 

of the programs that is under scrutiny today. 

Mr. COHEN. What do you mean, 215 and 702? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Director can answer that question. 

Mr. COHEN. Yeah, is it 215 and 702, is that what you mean? 

Mr. MUELLER. There was effort done in terms of that particular 

program as well, but I will tell you that we came upon him in a 

variety of ways. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, Director, for your testimony and your services. 

Following up on the question, it wasn’t clear to me, was the initial information on the gentleman referred to, Ibragim Todashev, 

was that original information from the Russians? 

Mr. MUELLER. You’re saying—— 

Mr. KING. I think I heard you say there was a variety of sources 

that brought you to him. 

Mr. MUELLER. You’re talking about the individual from Florida? 

Mr. KING. Yes, who was murdered—or killed, excuse me. I don’t 

want to imply that murder is an FBI activity. 

Mr. MUELLER. It came from several leads that we were following 

here domestically. 

Mr. KING. And was there an initial lead that perhaps came from 

the Russians? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t recall. There may have been, but I can’t 

recall that there was, that he had been identified by the Russians. 

Mr. KING. Are you aware of a letter from the FSB dated March 

4, 2011? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. KING. And was that letter initiated by the Russians, by the 

FSB? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. KING. And that letter sat in a file for a while, and your response to that was how soon after that? 
93 

Mr. MUELLER. It did not sit in the file for a while. It was acted 

on very quickly afterwards. 

Mr. KING. Did you have domestic information on Tamerlan prior 

to that, prior to that date of—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Did we have information on him prior to that 

date? 

Mr. KING. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t believe so. Now, wait, let me just say, his 

name had come up—— 

Mr. KING. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. In two other cases. Those two other 

cases, the individuals had their cases closed. So he was one or two 

person away. 

Mr. KING. So it is reasonable that the letter of March 4, 2011, 

refocused the FBI on Tamerlan? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. KING. And then are you aware of a letter also from the FSB 

dated April 22nd of 2013? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. KING. And those two letters, are they classified? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain what their classification level is. 

Mr. KING. I would ask you to take a look at both of those letters 

and consider, if they are classified, to release them. The subject 

matter of that and the information within it, I think that Mr. 

Cohen and I would agree, is something that would be useful for the 

American people to be aware of. 

And for me, I was struck by the amount of domestic information 

that the Russians had on activity inside the United States on 

Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and that seemed to be the first information 

that flowed forth. Is it also, to the public is my reference, is it also 

possible to reconstruct, going backward through the timeline, a 

place or places where there might have been an intervention that 

could have prevented the Boston bombing, knowing what we knew 

at the time? 

Mr. MUELLER. You know, every time we have an incident like 

this we go back and scrub it hard. I indicated one area, and that 

is notification of the subject traveling should have been documented. Whatever action was taken as a result of that notification 

from borders and customs should have been documented. But in 

looking back at it, I do believe that his radicalization went forward 

substantially during probably the time he went to—was in Russia, 

but I do not believe that he was on the radar screen of the Russian 

authorities when he was back there. 

Mr. KING. It’s also my understanding. But as far as the 

radicalization that took place, do you see that as a long process 

that perhaps started when he was younger and was a product of 

his home country, the United States and back to his home country, 

or how do you view the radicalization? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think the best you can say is maybe in fits and 

starts. 

Mr. KING. Okay. And I think that’s fair. The security, though, 

when we have people coming in from, let’s say, the North Caucasus 

region, who are persons that come from, let’s say, a profile that 

would fit persons of interest from Nations of interest, do we do in-
94 

quiries with the Russians or any other country to do background 

checks on those individuals that might be seeking asylum here in 

the United States that come from those areas? 

Mr. MUELLER. You’d really have to turn to DHS in terms of what 

they consider, in terms of evaluating the asylum. Well, I think really DHS—— 

Mr. KING. But don’t they subcontract that out to you? Doesn’t 

USCIS ask FBI to do the background checks? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t think they contracted us. 

Mr. KING. Shorthand. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think they run records checks through us to see 

what derogatory material we may have on somebody who’s seeking 

asylum. 

Mr. KING. But are you aware of any inquiries that might ask the 

Russians to give us some advice on who they might be watching 

that’s coming into the United States under asylum, which is how 

Tamerlan got here? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t know, because I can’t speak to what the 

FSB does in all of its cases, but if they have a person they believe 

to be a terrorist, I would say often they give us that information 

and ask for assistance from us to address that particular person. 

Mr. KING. Let me suggest that in a direct question of Mr. 

Beseda’s, who’s second in command at FSB, he said that those kind 

of inquiries, he couldn’t say it never happened, but as he looked at 

the other people on the panel, they seemed to think there was one 

inquiry perhaps 10 years ago. His specific response was those inquiries are nil. 

So I’m going to suggest to this panel that we need to take a good 

look at how we do background checks on people that are coming 

from Nations of interest, who likely are persons of interest, to 

tighten up our security. And I think that was a window, and there 

might be hundreds and perhaps more than hundreds that come 

through a window like that. 

I thank you for your service, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, thank you for your many years of exemplary 

service to the Nation. This will probably our last time seeing you 

before this particular Committee. And I wanted to do that. I wanted to give you that. 

And I will also agree with you that as terrorism, both foreign and 

domestic, changes and adapts, our law enforcement capabilities 

have to do the same. And so if data collection will help us remain 

secure in our personal liberties, then that’s a discussion that we 

should have. And if we don’t have security, then our civil liberties 

are definitely threatened. And I know that everyone can agree with 

that. 

And this is an issue, unlike those that some of my colleagues on 

the other side of the aisle are looking for out in the backyard— 

Benghazi, IRS, the Rosen subpoena—we can deal with those 

things, but there are some issues right at the front door knocking 
95 

loudly. And I think the loudest knock is coming from data collection and secrecy in government. And so my questions would be regarding that. 

Why is it necessary for data collection, internal domestic data 

collection, to be a secret? Why is it that that program has to be a 

secret? I disagree with the notion that public knowledge of those 

programs can undermine our ability to respond to terroristic or terrorist threats. 

And I also want to applaud the work of companies like Google 

that work very hard to make government legal requests as transparent as possible. This week Google requested permission from 

you and the Attorney General to publish aggregate numbers of national security requests, including FISA disclosures, as part of its 

transparency report. 

Wouldn’t the aggregate publication of national security requests, 

kind of like metadata, wouldn’t that better serve the conversation 

on civil liberties and national security than keeping Americans in 

the dark? Because as we keep Americans in the dark, it tends to 

break down the trust that Americans have for government. I’m 

really concerned that we have too much classified information, and 

I’m disturbed or perplexed, actually, about who actually decides 

what should be classified and how do we go about unclassifying 

things? 

So I know that’s a couple of questions. I want to give you a 

chance to respond. 

Mr. MUELLER. I do think that there is quite obviously a tension 

between the secrecy attendant, classification attendant to certain 

programs and documents, and I am not going to say that there 

aren’t occasions where there are things that are overclassified. 

When it comes to identifying the way we handle communications 

and all their iterations, particularly in this day and age when you 

have any number of ways to communicate, whether it be email, 

chat, and a variety of alternate ways of communicating, to the extent that those were associated with terrorist groups, or actually 

those associated with the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians, and 

the others, to the extent that that they have information as to how 

we operate in terms of how we identifying—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how we may use those programs, but the 

programs themselves, why is it that just a broad disclosure that, 

yes, Americans, we are collecting metadata from your phone 

records and this is why we are doing that, and then you explain 

the intricacies of what you’re doing, what you’re not doing. You’re 

not talking about any specific programs or operations—excuse me, 

no specific operations or operatives, those kinds of things, but just 

the existence of the program. Americans need to know what is 

being done and why. 

Mr. MUELLER. All I would say is, there is a balance to take. I 

would urge you to, in the classified briefings, to ask that question 

and see what—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I have, and I’ve never gotten a satisfactory 

answer. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I can tell you because whenever there are 

disclosures like this, we see, through other programs we have and 
96 

intercepted communications, we see exactly what those individuals 

are doing, the terrorists, to change their communications. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. JOHNSON. There will always be that adaptation to what 

we’re doing. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Gohmert, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director. I’m not going to comment about your 

being the last time here. I did that a few years ago, and didn’t turn 

out right. But anyway, I want to follow up on what my friend Mr. 

Johnson was talking about, the overclassification issue, because it 

does seem to be a problem and certainly an issue. 

There is an article today entitled ‘‘Obama’s Snooping Excludes 

Mosques, Missed Boston Bombers.’’ I wasn’t aware of the—and I 

went to the FBI Web site—I wasn’t aware of the Sensitive Operations Review Committee, so I wanted to find out what it was. 

Well, apparently, if something involves things like news media, religious or domestic, political organization, things like that, then it 

has to go before the Sensitive Operations Review Committee in 

order to be approved. And here is the information on the data 

about if it’s a political organization, like a Tea Party, a religious 

organization, like evangelical Christians, which the Department of 

Homeland Security is so afraid of, or a mosque, apparently, it has 

to get approval here, and we already knew and we have gone 

through with—and it seemed ridiculous to me and Michele 

Bachmann and Lynn Westmoreland that the material we were reviewing that was purged by subject matter experts was classified. 

It would seem that if you’re trying to make the Islamists feel better about training materials, you’d want them to see what they 

were removed. And I’m just curious, why are the subject matter experts that the FBI had go through all their training material and 

purge anything that might be offensive to an Islamist, why was 

that needed to be classified? I would think they’d be heroes in the 

Islamic world for getting that stuff out. Why was that classified? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we went through a thorough review. I think 

you have been fully briefed on it. In those materials are examples 

of cases—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I need you, I have just a short time, I need 

you to answer questions, and my question is, why were the subject 

matter experts’ identity classified? 

Mr. MUELLER. Because the process in whole had within its parameters all information that we have in the Bureau, and if I am 

not mistaken, we gave you the names of the individuals. 

Mr. GOHMERT. In a classified setting. And so I’d get prosecuted 

if I revealed them. And I don’t know why you can’t make those 

public, so the people would know. But obviously, you feel—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I will look at that and—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, and also I want to go back to Boston. You 

said things like, and out of the example what you said, the FBI did 

an excellent job, did a thorough job, don’t know what else we could 

have done. And according to the Russians, there was a great deal 

more that could have been done. And when we find out about this 

Sensitive Operations Review Committee, and as this article points 
97 

out, if it’s true, it says that we don’t know who the chairman and 

members are of the Sensitive Operations Review Committee, who 

the staff, that’s kept secret. The FBI never canvassed Boston 

mosques until 4 days after the April 15 attacks. 

If the Russians tell you that someone has been radicalized and 

you go check and see the mosque that they went to, then you get 

the articles of incorporation, as I have, for the group that created 

the Boston mosque where these Tsarnaevs attended, and you find 

out the name Al-Amoudi, which you will remember, because while 

you were FBI Director this man who was so helpful to the Clinton 

administration with so many big things, he gets arrested at Dulles 

Airport by the FBI and he is now doing over 20 years for supporting terrorism. 

This is the guy that started the mosque where your Tsarnaevs 

were attending, and you didn’t even bother to go check about the 

mosque? And then when you have the pictures, why did no one go 

to the mosque and say, who are these guys? They may attend here. 

Why was that not done since such a thorough job was done? 

Mr. MUELLER. Your facts are not altogether—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. I point out specifically. 

Mr. MUELLER. May I finish my—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Point out specifically. Sir, if you’re going to call 

me a liar, you need to point out specifically where any facts are 

wrong. 

Mr. MUELLER. We went to the mosque prior to Boston. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Prior to Boston? 

Mr. MUELLER. Prior to Boston happening, we were in that 

mosque talking to the imam several months beforehand as part of 

our outreach efforts. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Were you aware that those mosques were started 

by Al-Amoudi? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’ve answered the question, sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You didn’t answer the question. Were you aware 

that they were started by Al-Amoudi? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You were not. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. 

Pierluisi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you 

for your service to our Nation. You will leave a lasting legacy and 

large shoes to fill. 

As you have recognized, the FBI’s role since 9/11 has evolved and 

expanded. Prior to the attack, the agency’s primary responsibility 

was to fight domestic crime, including violent crime. Now the Bureau also stands at the forefront of the government’s efforts to prevent and respond to terrorism. And as the tragic events in Boston 

illustrate, the stakes could not be higher. Conducting both law enforcement and counterterrorism operations is a large and complex 

portfolio, and I know you are constantly reviewing the allocation of 

personnel and resources to ensure that both missions receive the 

attention they deserve. 
98 

The example of Puerto Rico, though, a U.S. territory, home to 3.7 

million American citizens, underscores why it is important for the 

FBI, notwithstanding its transformation in the wake of 9/11, to 

continue to place great emphasis on its traditional role as a crimefighting agency. As Chairman Michael McCaul noted at a hearing 

last year in the Homeland Security Committee, the people of Puerto Rico are under siege. Like all American citizens, my constituents 

are targets for al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations. They, too, 

worry about terrorism when they board a plane, visit a tourist site 

with their children, or travel abroad. Indeed, in 1972, 16 American 

citizens from Puerto Rico were killed and many more were wounded at an airport in Israel, the victims of one of the first incidents 

of international terrorism. 

But the fact is, my constituents are dying violent deaths every 

day and they are not being killed in terrorist attacks. Rather, they 

are dying in huge numbers because of the toxic mix of drugs, guns, 

local gangs, and transnational criminal organizations. 

I know you are familiar with the statistics, but they bear repetition. In the 10-year period between 2003 and 2012, there were 

8,600 homicide victims in Puerto Rico. The year 2011 was the most 

violent in the territory’s history with 1,164 murders. That is the 

equivalent of over three homicides a day, every day. It is about the 

same number of homicide deaths as Texas, which has a population 

that is seven times that of Puerto Rico. 

Although the number of murders in Puerto Rico decreased in 

2012, the island’s per capita murder rate was still about three 

times higher than any State and about six times higher than the 

U.S. national average. 

As you know, I have urged the Federal Government to surge resources to Puerto Rico to alleviate this crisis. Earlier this year, following a visit by Secretary Napolitano to Puerto Rico, DHS decided 

to substantially increase its presence on the island. Next week, I 

am meeting with a senior advisor to the Secretary to receive an update on the steps that DHS component agencies are taking and the 

results that we can expect to see. 

Yesterday, the Appropriations Committee approved the Defense 

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2014, and that bill directs the 

Secretary of Defense to provide a report on the counterdrug activities that DOD is undertaking or intends to undertake to support 

law enforcement operations in and around Puerto Rico. 

In March, I wrote a detailed letter to Attorney General Holder, 

copying you, reiterating my request that DOJ surge resources to 

Puerto Rico. It is clear that the FBI, along with DEA and ATF, 

needs to do more, much more to reduce the level of violence in 

Puerto Rico and to reassure my constituents that their national 

government cares about them and is working every day to protect 

them and their families. 

Director Mueller, can you please tell me what concrete steps the 

FBI is taking or will take to reduce the exceptionally high level of 

violence in Puerto Rico? The threat has evolved in terms of both 

its nature and its severity, and it is critical that the FBI’s response 

evolve as well. The time for business as usual, is over, Director. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as we have discussed previously, Congressman, I am tremendously sympathetic to what is happening in 
99 

Puerto Rico as we go along. We have made advances. We have 

added hybrid squads to cover any kind of crimes. We have got four 

violent gang Safe Street Task Forces. That is more than I think 

any office in the country. We have an allocation of 313 full-time 

agents; they are fully staffed. We’re about five down. 

But I can tell you, under this term of sequestration, the possibility of allocating additional resources to Puerto Rico is very, very 

difficult. I, having been a homicide prosecutor, I think I have some 

understanding of the devastation to communities that are beset by 

violent crime. I wish we could do more. I wish we had the resources 

to surge. I know we’re working closely with ATF, DEA, and ourselves to combine our resources along with the Puerto Rican National Police, and we’re having some success. All I can tell you is 

that I wish I could do more at this point, but given the budget constraints, it would be very difficult. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, this past Sunday, Mr. Cummings, Ranking Member on 

the Oversight Committee, said based on everything he’s seen regarding the IRS case, based on everything he’s seen, the case is 

solved. Is Mr. Cummings accurate in his assessment. 

Mr. MUELLER. Could you repeat that, if you would? 

Mr. JORDAN. Based on everything I have seen, according to Mr. 

Cummings, the case is solved. This is regarding the IRS scandal. 

Mr. MUELLER. Which case? 

Mr. JORDAN. The IRS case. 

Mr. MUELLER. The IRS case? 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. The IRS case is currently under investigation, and 

basically it’s just started. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yeah. What can you tell us? I mean, you started a 

month ago. What can you tell us about this? Have you found any— 

have you found the now infamous two rogue agents? Have you discovered who those people are? 

Mr. MUELLER. Needless to say, because it’s under investigation, 

I can’t give out any of the details. 

Mr. JORDAN. Can you tell me some basics? Can you tell me how 

many agents, investigators you have assigned to the case? 

Mr. MUELLER. I may be able to do that, but I’d have to get back 

to you. 

Mr. JORDAN. Can you tell me who the lead investigator is? 

Mr. MUELLER. Off the top of my head, no. 

Mr. JORDAN. This is the most important issue in front of the 

country the last 6 weeks, you don’t know who’s heading up the 

case, who the lead investigator is? 

Mr. MUELLER. At this juncture no, I do not know who they are. 

Mr. JORDAN. Can you get that information to us? We would like 

to know. We would like to know how many people you have assigned to look into this situation. 

Mr. MUELLER. I have not had a recent briefing on it. I had a 

briefing on it when we first initiated it, but I have not had a recent 

briefing as to where we are. 
100 

Mr. JORDAN. So you don’t know who is leading the case? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know who is the lead agent. 

Mr. JORDAN. Do you know if you have talked to any of the victims? Have you talked to any of the groups who were targeted by 

their government? Have you met with any of the tea party folks 

since May 14, 2013? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t know what the status of the interviews are 

by the team that’s on it. 

Mr. JORDAN. Would you expect that that’s been done? 

Mr. MUELLER. Certainly at some point in time in the course of 

the investigation it will be done, but generally at the outset of the 

investigation you get the documents so that you can have a—— 

Mr. JORDAN. But don’t you normally talk to the victims? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know specifically—— 

Mr. JORDAN. In your extensive record and history in investigative 

work, don’t you typically talk to the victim? It is a criminal investigation. Don’t you typically talk to the victims pretty soon? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. I’m sure it will happen. 

Mr. JORDAN. So did the FBI contact any of these same victims, 

were they contacted by the FBI prior to the investigation? When 

these same groups were applying for tax-exempt status, did the 

FBI pay some of these individuals a visit? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

Mr. JORDAN. Pardon? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

Mr. JORDAN. You don’t know? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

Mr. JORDAN. Some of them testified that they were paid a visit 

by the FBI. Specifically, Catherine Engelbrecht in Texas said she 

was visited by the FBI. She was head of True the Vote. Is that true 

or not? 

Mr. MUELLER. Do not know. 

Mr. JORDAN. You do not know, okay. If the FBI did contact people involved in the IRS scandal, victims groups, prior to the investigation when they were applying for tax-exempt status, why was 

that the case? Why would you be looking into it? And was there 

possibly coordination with the IRS—— 

Mr. MUELLER. You are asking me details about the investigation. 

I would be happy to get back to you. 

Mr. JORDAN. I’m not asking you details about the investigation. 

I’m saying, why were people targeted before the investigation started? Why were they contacted by the FBI, people who are now part 

of tea party groups who were targeted by the IRS? 

Mr. MUELLER. You’re asking questions about details of the investigation. I would be happy to take the questions. 

Mr. JORDAN. That is not a detail about the investigation. That 

took place prior to the investigation starting. 

Mr. MUELLER. May I finish? May I please finish? You are asking 

detailed questions about the investigation. I’d be happy to get back 

to you and answer those questions that I can, understanding ongoing—— 

Mr. JORDAN. I’m asking basic questions about the investigation, 

like who’s heading it up, and you can’t tell me that. Can you get 

back to me on any group who was targeted by the IRS, who the 
101 

FBI visited with prior to the investigation starting while they were 

applying for tax. That would be important information for this 

Committee to have. Can you get that to me? 

Mr. MUELLER. We’ll look at the questions and try to respond. 

Mr. JORDAN. Have you reviewed the Inspector General’s report 

regarding the IRS scandal? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have been through it, yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Do you have any concerns about the way the Inspector General did the report and collected information? 

Mr. MUELLER. I did not focus on that at all. I was looking—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, let me ask you a couple things. Is it typically 

important for the investigator to have one of the central players in 

this, Ms. Holly Paz, who was Director of—one of the key players 

at the Tax Exempt Division, sit in on all the interviews, almost all 

the interviews with employees in that division? Is that typically 

how an investigation is done? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with those circumstances. I understand what you are saying about those circumstances, so not 

being familiar with it, I can’t—— 

Mr. JORDAN. In your time as an investigator is that how you 

would do interviews, with the boss sitting next to the person you 

are trying to get information from? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, again, I’m—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Is it appropriate for Holly—the Inspector General 

came out in a transcribed interview that our staff has done, the 

Oversight Committee staff has done, is it appropriate to have her 

collect the data and give it to the Inspector General? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with the—— 

Mr. JORDAN. If that happened, is that appropriate? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not going to speculate. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask one last thing, because this did happen. 

Mr. Chairman, the last question. 

So is it appropriate when the Inspector General is doing his investigation, doing his audit, to give information to the very people 

he is investigating in the course of the investigation and not share 

that same information with the Oversight Committee? Specifically, 

May 30 of last year, the Inspector General told Doug Shulman that 

the terms tea party, patriot, 9/12 were used to identify groups and 

put them on a list. He told them that was going on at the IRS. He 

told them that a year ago. Four days later he told the general counsel at Treasury, Chris Meade, the same information, but did not 

share that with the Committee who asked for the investigation, the 

Committee who has oversight over the Inspector Generals in all 

Federal agencies, did not share that information with us. Is that 

typically how an investigation is supposed to work? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, you are talking about circumstances with 

which I am not familiar. Each investigation is a little bit different, 

and I really can’t comment on what was appropriate in that particular investigation without knowing and sitting down and going 

through the facts. 

Mr. JORDAN. But that’s—if I could, Mr. Chairman, then I will 

stop—that’s the point. You’ve had a month now to investigate. This 

has been the biggest story in the country and you can’t even tell 

me who the lead investigator is. You can’t tell me that actions the 
102 

Inspector General took, which are not typically how investigations 

are done, you can’t tell me if that’s appropriate or not? This is not 

speculating. This is what happened and you can’t tell me how 

many agents are assigned to the most important news story, maybe 

the most important—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. The Director will be allowed to answer the question. And if he can’t answer it today, we would definitely expect that he answer it in writing to us as promptly as possible. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yeah, I would be happy to take your questions in 

writing, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 

Washington, Ms. DelBene, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for your service and for being with 

us here today. 

I happen to agree with those who believe that greater transparency and better data about the requests that government entities are making to Internet companies and providers will help inform the discussion that we’re having about how to balance legitimate national security needs with privacy rights. 

I understand it was referred to a little bit earlier that Google 

sent a letter to you and Attorney General Holder earlier this week. 

I’m requesting that it be permitted to provide the reports of the 

number of FISA national security requests it receives as well as 

their scope. And I wondered if you could share with us what your 

response is to that request. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think that’s being looked at by Justice at this 

point. 

Ms. DELBENE. Okay. Then earlier this year, Google did work 

with the Department of Justice and the FBI to disclose in broad 

strokes the number of national security letters that Google receives. And did Google’s disclosures of these numbers harm national security in any way? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me just hypothesize without answering 

particularly. If you had such figures out there, would not somebody 

who wanted to have secure communications maybe make some decisions as a result of that information as to what, you know, as to 

what communications capability they use? 

Basically, there are issues that need to be discussed in the course 

of deciding what needs to be declassified. I think most of us in the 

government would love to be able to disclose more because it would 

be more understandable to persons, but you have the conflicting 

values of trying to protect the country and trying to protect that 

information that enables us to continuously identify and to intercept the communications of terrorists in an effort to thwart attacks. 

That’s the conflict. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. The Committee is currently also considering reform of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. And 

as you may know, the Senate Judiciary Committee recently reported reform legislation out of Committee. Members on both sides 

of the aisle seem to agree that we’ve failed to modernize our law 

to align with reasonable expectations of privacy, especially in the 

digital age. 
103 

For routine criminal investigations, I believe law enforcement 

should use the same standard to search your inbox that they do to 

search files and letters in your home, but our current outdated law 

allows police to provide only a subpoena, issued without a judge’s 

approval, to force service providers to turn over emails that have 

been opened or are more than 6 months old. 

The Committee is currently considering legislation that would require government entities to obtain a warrant before having access 

to stored content. And I’m pleased that the Department of Justice 

and Attorney General Holder recently acknowledged that reform to 

the Electronic Communications Privacy Act has failed to keep up 

with the development of technology. And I wanted to know if you 

agree that it’s time to reform these laws to include a warrant 

standard for stored content? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I would agree that it’s time to relook at 

these laws given the communications in terms of what the impact 

on—it would have on particular requirements in particular situations. I would wait to see what kind of legislation is proposed. 

Ms. DELBENE. Do you have a proposal, what kind? Right now if 

I, you know, have a physical letter, a piece of paper in my home, 

you need a warrant. If I have an online piece of communication it 

doesn’t necessarily have the same standard. 

Mr. MUELLER. We’d be pleased to get back to you either by regular letter or by email. 

Ms. DELBENE. And in terms of broader reform, in terms of keeping up, do you have recommendations on other reforms you think 

that we need to look at because the way that folks communicate 

now is very different than in the past? You talked about chat and 

other forms. Clearly, our laws have not kept up with the changes 

in technology, and do you have an opinion or ideas of how you 

would like to see legislation formed there? 

Mr. MUELLER. We will get back to you on that with whatever 

ideas we have. 

I do think there needs to be reform. There is always impetus to 

increase the standards to get particular documents, but it should 

be done, in my mind, dependent on the attributes of privacy that 

are necessary for a particular means of communication or a particular piece of data relating to communications. If you raise a 

standard too high, we then do not get the basic information that 

can identify terrorists to the point where then we could take the 

additional investigative steps, identify the subscriber. Once we 

have identified the subscriber, identify others in that network. 

If we, as a result of that predicated level of investigation find 

that they are involved in terrorism, then getting a wiretap. We 

tend to confuse that which is covered by the Fourth Amendment, 

that which is not covered by the Fourth Amendment. And so as one 

drafts the legislation, my belief is that ought to be kept in mind. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman, and recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
104 

And to the Director, thank you. You have made yourself regularly available to this Committee, and as a Member it’s very helpful, and we appreciate it and appreciate your service. 

I want to talk a little bit about geolocation metadata, and specifically the Jones case, which is a Supreme Court ruling where they 

ruled 9 to nothing that a GPS device placed on a vehicle for an extended period of time was an unreasonable search. Geolocation is 

broadly defined as using a GPS device or triangulation so that you 

can tell the specific whereabouts of where a particular phone is. 

Could you help me define what metadata is? Because what we 

have seen in the news is that the metadata category is the simple 

telephone number, where they’re calling, and how long they’re calling. Can you help me define what else is in the so-called metadata 

category? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, in the case of emails, it would probably be 

header information. I think people would consider the adressing information—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What about— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. But not the subject line, for instance. 

That would not be metadata. In terms of the telephone, it would 

be that which you articulated, principally. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Would it include geolocation information? 

Mr. MUELLER. That’s a question I’d have to get back to you on. 

I have not thought about that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We had submitted in advance our questions that 

we were going to ask here today in part so I could have a candid 

dialogue with you. We were very good at providing the questions 

that I was going to ask. With all due respect, sir, you’re the Director of the FBI. You’ve been there for 12 years. You had to of think 

post-Jones what are the implications of the Jones case, what is 

geolocation, and how does it apply? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. I mean, we have been—after the Jones 

case, we have taken—the Jones case can be applied to a number 

of ways that we utilize geolocation. In each of these different ways, 

we have taken the most conservative approach because you don’t 

know what is going to be the progeny of Jones. 

On the particular question of whether or not geolocation is 

metadata off the top—well, I shouldn’t do it off the top of my head. 

I have to make certain that I look at that one. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Is there a database of geolocation information 

that is warehoused by our Federal Government? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Post-Jones there has been guidance given by the 

Department of Justice to the FBI. I would love to see that information and share that. I have seen two unclassified documents that 

were through a Freedom of Information Act. Is that something that 

you can share with this Committee? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to look at that. But if it’s unclassified, internal, then I’d have to look at that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. All right. I guess what I have a problem is, this 

phone right here, the Federal Government has no problem following this phone, who I call. If I call my 12-year old daughter, the 

telephone number I called her on, how long I had. But the 

geolocation is something that we—I have a bill that I have spon-
105 

sored that really basically categorizes geolocation as content as opposed to metadata. 

So if you’re going to follow what this telephone number is, where 

it is, is that or is that not content? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’ll tell you, I think it’s a very difficult question, 

and I’d want to think about it. It can be metadata, it can be content, and may depend on the circumstances. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But is there a database that anybody knows of 

that—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know of a database that specifically is addressed to geolocation, apart from anything else, investigative activity that is solely a geolocation database. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Post-Jones, does the FBI believe that there 

should be a lower or different standard for law enforcement to access geolocation information from smart phones or other mobile devices than the standard for attaching tracking devices to cars 

under Jones? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to get back to you on that. I apologize. 

I can see you gave me the questions, and I did not get briefed on. 

It’s my own fault for getting briefed on the questions so I’m better 

able to answer them. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I appreciate it. 

And, Mr. Chairman, it’s terribly disappointing to come to this 

point, talk about something that is in the headlines of every newscast. I gave the questions in advance. 

Mr. MUELLER. And they noted that I would be asked on that, I 

might add. So it’s my fault. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Your staff did some great work, I guess, but it’s 

terribly frustrating, sir. You’re the head of the FBI. You’re the Director of the FBI. This is an important discussion and dialogue. 

And I know I won’t get an answer and that’s the—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I will be happy to meet with you after I have had 

a chance to review the questions that you have and the answers 

that you need. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What would be a reasonable timeframe for me to 

start to call and say, hey, where is this information? 

Mr. MUELLER. A week. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Okay. I appreciate it. Thank you, sir. 

Yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman. 

And we will again reinforce our urging that these questions be 

answered as promptly, and in this case a meeting take place with 

the gentleman from Utah. He has a very good issue that needs to 

have your input. 

And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Jeffries, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. I thank the distinguished Chair. 

And I also want to thank the Director for your presence here 

today and certainly for your service to this great country. 

Edward Snowden has been characterized by many, as a villain 

by some. His actions have been called courageous or heroic. It’s not 

my place, I believe, to characterize him one way or the other. A 

court of law, hopefully, will assist in coming to a conclusion as to 

what took place in accordance or in violation of our laws. 
106 

But it is clear that he has become a lightning rod that has 

sparked what I think is a very important debate in this country 

that we in the Congress should have as to the proper balance between legitimately held security concerns and concerns for privacy 

and liberty which are essential to the preservation of our democracy. And so in that spirit, just wanted to get a sense of some of 

the particulars, to the extent that you can discuss them in an open 

Committee hearing, related to the recent 215 acquisition of information connected to the Verizon metadata. 

Now, presumably, that was acquired based on a conclusion by 

yourself, the FBI, the Department of Justice, other relevant actors, 

that the metadata for all Verizon customers in the United States 

of America and beyond for a 3-month period was relevant to a 

counterterrorism investigation or to foreign intelligence acquisition. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. If you’re talking about the relevance and the finding of relevance, I’d really have to defer you to the FISA Court. But 

yes, there is an order that had been issued—and I might add, it’s 

just one piece of the order, there are other aspects of it—that 

deemed that this information that was accumulated satisfies the 

relevance standard in the statute. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Right, in order for the FBI to come to the conclusion that it can legitimately pursue this information, I presume 

that you also have to conclude that it’s relevant information. Is 

that right? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, for access to this information, it’s very, very 

limited. There has to be a showing of the reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the number that you are seeking to search for is associated with terrorism. And there is a very limited search of the 

data that is done to answer that particular question. And that 

process satisfies the relevance standard under the FISA Court. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, once you pursue information based on that 

reasonable suspicion standard, what is the process for attempting 

to acquire content information connected to that metadata, presumably on a forward-looking basis? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, if you want to get additional information relating to that particular telephone number, you would have to get 

additional legal process. For instance, subscriber information. If 

you ultimately wanted to obtain a wire interception, then there are 

additional legal processes that you have to go through. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, under the general relevance standard is it 

fair to say that it would be the FBI’s position that this type of 

metadata information should also be made available pursuant to a 

court decision if it’s sought connected to other service providers beyond Verizon? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I can’t talk to the specifics of the program. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Is there anything that you can say as it relates to why Verizon was deemed or Verizon users were deemed 

particularly relevant in such a broad way as it relates to every single user over a 3-month period of time across the country of more 

than 300 million people? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, again, it goes into the details of the program 

that I can’t get into in open session. I don’t know whether they got 
107 

into this when you had the classified session on Tuesday, but in 

open session it would be difficult for me to respond. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Well, thank you. I respect that. 

Switching topics, in terms of the sequestration impact that it’s 

had on the FBI, recently, I think the FBI has increased its efforts 

connected to illegal piracy in the intellectual property space. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. That’s an important step that you’ve taken. Piracy 

impacts, obviously, commerce and our economy in increasingly significant ways. Are those FBI efforts impacted in any adverse way 

connected to your increased enforcement efforts in the intellectual 

property space? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t think this year. Next year they will be. 

They will be impacted. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. They have been impacted this calendar year? 

Mr. MUELLER. Across the board, my expectation is we have to 

consider rather dramatic and drastic reductions across the board. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Poe, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m way over here, Director. I want to talk about a constituent 

from Houston, Texas, named Catherine Engelbrecht. In July of 

2010, she and her husband, business owners, started two groups, 

a nonprofit—hoping to be a nonprofit group—True the Vote and 

King Street Patriots. December of 2010, the FBI Domestic Terrorism Unit inquired about their attendees. January of 2011, the 

FBI Domestic Terrorism Unit inquired about one of their 

attendees. January of 2011, Catherine Engelbrecht Enterprises 

were audited for 2008 and 2009. January of 2011, True the Vote, 

IRS questions their nonprofit application. That was the first round. 

March of 2011, the IRS questions—excuse me, May of 2011, King 

Street Patriots were visited by—rather members of King Street Patriots went to the FBI after their request about questions, how are 

they doing, anything you need to tell us or report. October of 2011, 

True the Vote, IRS questions their application. They wanted to 

know who their Facebook people were, all of their tweets, who they 

were tweeting to, wanted personal knowledge about their family, 

every place they had ever spoken—this is Catherine—every place 

she intends to speak, who they were speaking to, the names of the 

participants, copies of transcripts, everywhere they intended to 

speak, and they asked about 300 questions, including who is doing 

the training, what are the backgrounds of the trainers. And then 

they ask who your lawyers were and the background of the lawyers 

that represented them and the qualification of the lawyers, et 

cetera. I will furnish you the 300 questions, Mr. Director. 

Three more visits by mail, or by rather phone by the FBI, June, 

November, and December to the King Street Patriots. And then the 

IRS in February of 2012 questions the nonprofit status again of 

True the Vote. This was the third round. 

At that time, I sent to your office—excuse me, the Department 

of Justice—an inquiry saying, is this group, these people under investigation for criminal offenses? I get a letter back from the Jus-
108 

tice Department that says, they are not under criminal investigation. But it continues. They were visited later by the ATF. They 

were visited by OSHA, they were visited by TCEQ. They were visited again by the IRS, fourth round. 

All of these IRS questions are coming from Cincinnati, and they 

get finally another question from the IRS from Utah. That was in 

March of this year. April of this year, here comes the ATF again, 

another unscheduled visit to their business. 

Now, I have read the civil rights law. It’s important, and you 

have a Civil Rights Division in the FBI to enforce civil rights violations. The way I understand the law, you can’t target a certain 

group because of their beliefs. The IRS has already said, we targeted—some people in the IRS—has already targeted certain tea 

party groups because they were tea party groups. 

My question, without going into details, my question, in a hypothetical case, IRS targeting groups with this information that you 

have seen there inquired about, ironically, four different agencies 

all inquiring about a group for over several years, does that appear 

to be something that if a complaint was filed with the FBI, the FBI 

would investigate as a civil rights violation? 

Mr. MUELLER. Sir, I think that’s part of the—would be part of 

the ongoing investigation, I should say—of the circumstances relating to the IRS that was initiated a number of weeks ago. My expectation is this would be a piece of that investigation. 

You also indicate, though, that FBI agents visited these individuals. I will go back and look at the predication for that particular 

visit ourselves to follow up on that aspect of it to the extent that 

these persons were paid visits by the Bureau. 

Mr. POE. All right, thank you, Mr. Director. 

I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I want to thank you for your service to our country in 

the military as a prosecutor and as a law enforcement officer. 

I wanted to touch on three different areas. I want to start with 

the Rosen affidavit because it states, in pertinent part, there is 

probable cause to believe that a reporter has committed a violation 

of the Espionage Act—and this is the phrase I want to focus on— 

at the very least, either as an aider and abetter and/or a co-conspirator. If the standard is probable cause, why in the world would 

the affiant add the phrase, at the very least, if they weren’t contemplating a prosecution? 

Mr. MUELLER. I don’t know why the person would have added 

those, that statement. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, you were a very distinguished Federal prosecutor. I was not at all distinguished, but I was a prosecutor. I 

don’t remember ever adding surplusage, extra wording, to an application for a search warrant. So I am vexed by why the affiant 

would say, at the very least. 

Mr. MUELLER. I just don’t know. 

Mr. GOWDY. Also in the application for search warrant they requested a nondisclosure order citing the five different reasons. 
109 

Now, it was my experience and I assume yours that the affiant is 

under oath when they appear before a judge. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you know which of the five categories that would 

need to be shown for a nondisclosure order was testified to in this 

case, which of the five reasons statutorily that you can seek a nondisclosure order were at play? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not that familiar with the facts to be able to 

answer that. 

Mr. GOWDY. But you would agree with me that when you’re before a judge and you’re swearing out your affidavit, if you ask for 

a nondisclosure order you have to have some evidence that one of 

those five factors is in play? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am not all that familiar with the statute. 

I will say that when you file an affidavit everything in there ought 

to be accurate and you ought to be prepared to swear to every item 

in that. 

Mr. GOWDY. Do you ever recall discussing the Rosen investigation with the Attorney General? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, let me ask you this. If the affiant said at the 

very least there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, was there a discussion of indicting Rosen? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not that I had. 

Mr. GOWDY. If you had more than probable cause why would 

there not be discussion of indicting? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there may have been discussion, as you well 

know, with the Assistant United States Attorney and the agent in 

terms of what went in the affidavit. You have done any number of, 

hundreds probable of affidavits yourself, and the discussion between the lawyer and the agent is for the lawyer to get what the 

agent knows in the course of the investigation, can get it written 

up so that you can get the approvals that you need. I’m sure that 

happened here. It did not come up, does not come up to my level 

to have that kind of discussion. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. So it is fair to say that you were not part 

of any conversations with respect to whether or not something 

along the lines of an indictment should be considered for the reporter, but you do not know whether or not the conversations took 

place. But you yourself were not part of them. 

Mr. MUELLER. I was not and had not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Okay. Does the Bureau have a policy with respect 

to shopping judges or not shopping judges? If you go to a magistrate or you go to an Article 3 judge and you’re denied, is there 

a policy within the Bureau on judge shopping? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. Not that I’m aware of. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right, let me switch gears. There was an allegation this week of American diplomats being involved in the alleged 

solicitation of prostitution overseas. Would the Bureau have jurisdiction to investigate that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Have to look at that. Initially, I would say—well, 

I’d have to look at it. I’d say no, but there may be, off the top of 

my head, maybe I am missing something. I have to get back to you 

on that. 
110 

Mr. GOWDY. If there were an allegation that the State Department attempted to interfere with or influence the investigation, is 

that something the Bureau would have jurisdiction over? 

Mr. MUELLER. In the first instance, I’m not certain. We may. 

Going back to the question about the activities overseas, if it implicated the disclosure of U.S. secrets, for instance, then we would 

have, perhaps, some predication for being involved in the overarching investigation. As to the second question, I just can’t say. 

Mr. GOWDY. I’ve been out of the business for a while, but I think 

it may be a crime to travel for the purpose of soliciting underaged 

sex. I could be wrong about that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Underage, yes. I do believe that that would be covered. But I have to check on that. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. 

Mr. MUELLER. Like you, I have not done this work for some time. 

Mr. GOWDY. Yes, sir. All right. Finally, with respect to Benghazi, 

and this is not a trick question, I think the answer is obvious, the 

quicker you get to a crime scene, the better you’re going to be able 

to investigate it and process it, right? 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right. And the Bureau did not get to the crime 

scene in Benghazi for how long? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think 2 weeks. 

Mr. GOWDY. And why did the Bureau not get to the crime scene 

in Benghazi for 2 weeks? 

Mr. MUELLER. There were a number of factors, and the first one 

relates to the state of security in Benghazi. There was no security. 

Mr. GOWDY. All right, I want to just stop you there because I 

want to ask one more question and my time is out. I am asked all 

the time back home in South Carolina, if Benghazi was not safe 

enough for the premier law enforcement agency in the world to go, 

how was it safe enough for us to send diplomats? 

Mr. MUELLER. That’s another question that is not in my bailiwick. I understand the question is being asked. I presume it is a 

rhetorical question. 

Mr. GOWDY. It is rhetorical unless you know the answer. I can’t 

answer it. I don’t know. 

Mr. MUELLER. All I am saying is, rhetorical or not, I can’t answer. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. It is a good question, but the time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And we will look for opportunities to ask it 

again. 

And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Collins, for 6 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Director, I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate—by the time we get to this, there are sometimes rhetorical 

questions that seem to pop their heads up. And I think this question, my friend from South Carolina brings a very good point. 

There are things that people out in the world look at and they see, 

and they are honest, hard-working folks, and they look at these 

things and they say, this doesn’t make sense. And I think it just 

attributes to the disconnect that many times happens with the 
111 

folks who get up and go to work every morning, and they look on 

their TV and they see what is happening up here, and they say it 

just doesn’t pass the smell test. And I think that’s some of the 

things that we’re concerned about. 

But I want to go in a different direction. We’ve covered the 

gamut. Our country wants to be safe. The people in the Ninth District, they want to know that their government is watching out for 

them. They want to know that there is sharing, legal sharing, and 

not overreach, but legal work that is hard work between police and 

law enforcement agencies and the Justice Department. 

My father was a state trooper for 31 years in Georgia. I get it. 

But there needs to be a balance in there. So there is a program 

called the Joint Regional Intelligence Group, and I want to switch 

gears here. The Director of National Intelligence issued a directive 

establishing the Joint Regional Intelligence Group pilot program. 

The purpose of this program will be to coordinate information sharing between foreign and domestic intelligence communities. 

We have been hearing from State and local law enforcement that 

the FBI has largely taken control of standing up the pilot program 

and that they have been excluded. Is that the case, or is that your 

understanding of what is going on right now? 

Mr. MUELLER. And who would be excluded? 

Mr. COLLINS. The State and locals feel like they’re being excluded here. 

Mr. MUELLER. This issue I think we’ve addressed in terms of the 

regional intelligence centers. I know there was some concern at 

some point that this is a new vehicle. We have, I think, explained 

sufficiently to State and local law enforcement that this is not anything new. It’s a greater integration of the intelligence capacity 

around the country. 

Mr. COLLINS. So you’re saying this is an existing program and 

what the Director of National Intelligence is saying is not new? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I’m not certain exactly which program the 

Director of National Intelligence is talking about. I thought you 

said regional—— 

Mr. COLLINS. The Joint Regional Intelligence Group. 

Mr. MUELLER. Joint Regional Intelligence, yes. It certainly includes State and local law enforcement and there are various parts 

of that particular undertaking, and you have to differentiate between the various parts of that undertaking. For instance, part of 

it is the role of our special agents in charge is being in the various 

divisions or districts as being in charge and being the person who 

is in charge for intelligence collection, or coordination, I should say, 

under the ODNI. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay, so and again, the understanding here, tell 

me a little bit more about this program. Maybe we’re talking about 

the same program, maybe we’re not. Because this seemed to be 

more of a pilot program which would mean that it was more—it 

was either integrating stuff that was already there or starting 

something from you that may have been. Where is this being located out of? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I guess I am confused in terms of specifically 

what programs you’re talking about under the ODNI. I would be 

happy to get back to you—— 
112 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Specifically on this, as I can read it, 

and assimilate it. 

Mr. COLLINS. All right. In light of that—and we’ll move on and 

I appreciate you getting back to me about those questions—a lot 

has been said about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 

We sort of danced around a little bit of that. As you’re sort of in 

your last little bit here, I want to sort of open this up and say, is 

it out of date? Would it be helpful for law enforcement to have a 

clear standard of collection? And if so, what do you believe that 

would be? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, yes, I do think it is outdated. It does need 

review. As I indicated before, I would caution against raising 

standards for obtaining basic non-Fourth Amendment information 

because you eliminate much of the data that provides predication 

for further investigation. And so as one looks at it, I would look at 

it to be updated, but also I have some concern about raising standards, which would impact on our ability to conduct cases, whether 

it be terrorism or otherwise. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, as I have a law professor who’s basically lamented many times on the demise that there was even a Fourth 

Amendment even existing today in light of a lot of things in cases 

that have been going on. Is there a way though that we balance 

this in a new age and environment, in which it seems to be 

metadata? We call it these things where it’s collection, but we’re 

collecting on such large scales in this electronic life. We’ve got a 

pretty hard line to focus here in which we are protecting civil liberties yet giving access where need be, where I think people would 

understand there would be a reason to investigate. 

Mr. MUELLER. I do think that given the new technology, the ability to communicate in any number of ways, that the statute needs 

to be upgraded. 

The concern comes, you can identify terrorists by looking at substantial accumulations of non-Fourth Amendment protected data. 

And in the case of a terrorist who wants to undertake an attack 

to kill Americans, it may well be worth that balance. On the other 

hand, what you want to protect against is abuse of that collection 

of data. 

Mr. COLLINS. And that hits. And the concern I have had—and 

our time is done, but the quick question—depending on many-yearold court decisions on what is, quote, ‘‘metadata’’ and what is protected, I’m concerned that we’re in a situation now to where some 

of the older rules of things that didn’t understand this kind of technology may be balanced in a way that we’re going to have to look 

at it differently. Instead of saying, well, it’s always been okay 

under these circumstances, and now try to apply it. Now, I think 

we may be trying apples and oranges, and I think people are concerned about that. 

Thank you, though, for your service. Thank you for being here 

to answer the questions. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Labrador, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 
113 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Director, for being here, and thank you for your service. 

I was a criminal defense attorney, and I’m a little bit confused 

by the answer from the Administration about the Rosen investigation. It seems to me that how many times as an FBI Director, or 

as an attorney, or in your law enforcement practice, have you had 

the opportunity to investigate somebody who you did not intend to 

prosecute? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as I said before, that happens all the time, 

I mean. 

Mr. LABRADOR. No, the question is—I want to be very specific 

about this. Not that you don’t prosecute after the investigation, because that is the purpose of the investigation, is to find out if you 

need to prosecute somebody, but to actually look into people’s private information, private communications who you don’t intend to 

prosecute. Do you understand my specific question? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think I do, but I think we’re maybe on—we’re 

passing each other, because you can—it can be a husband and wife 

team that are avoiding taxes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Correct. 

Mr. MUELLER. At the outset you have probable cause to believe 

that the wife was—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Yeah, but you have probable cause to believe that 

they are both committing a crime. And then you determine after 

the investigation that one committed the crime and one did not 

commit the crime, right? 

Mr. MUELLER. That’s an option, yes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So tell me how often a prosecutor investigates 

somebody who is not intended to be prosecuted, that they don’t intend at any time to file charges. Because it seems to me that’s 

much broader than the Fourth Amendment. If that’s what prosecutors are doing, then you’re going beyond the extent of the Fourth 

Amendment. 

Mr. MUELLER. You’re a defense counsel, you know the dialogue 

between defense counsel and the prosecutor as to whether or not 

the person is going to be prosecuted in terms of testimony. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Correct. 

Mr. MUELLER. We make the decision day in and day out, and we 

are not going to prosecute a particular person if they cooperate 

with us. Now, often it’ll be we will investigate him for a period of 

time, then make a decision the person is better as a cooperator, 

and consequently we have no thought about prosecuting him. We 

want their testimony. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But what this Attorney General said and what 

you have said is that Mr. Rosen was never intended to be prosecuted. I have never heard of an investigation, ever, where you 

went after an individual when there was no intention to find out 

if that person was going to be prosecuted. And that’s what I am 

having a hard time with. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not certain I said that because I was not in 

that position to make that determination. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Well, that’s what the Attorney General said in 

this Committee. He said that there was never an—— 
114 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to go back and look specifically at what 

the Attorney General said. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But wouldn’t you think that would be inappropriate then, to go after somebody that you don’t intend to ever 

prosecute, because that has been the excuse of this Administration. 

I’m having a hard time with that excuse. 

Mr. MUELLER. I’d have to give thought about that, but I do think 

there are a number of occasions as a prosecutor where we have the 

ability, the capability, and maybe the intent at the outset, and then 

we make a determination, for whatever reasons, whether we want 

the cooperation or other things, where we make a determination 

that we’re not going to go forward. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And I agree with you. 

Mr. MUELLER. And there are competing interests. 

Mr. LABRADOR. When you make a determination after the investigation has occurred. But the problem with the Rosen subpoena, 

and the problem that we had with this investigation, is that Mr. 

Rosen was never intended to be prosecuted, according to the Attorney General. So this was a fishing expedition, something that I 

think went beyond the Fourth Amendment, which wasn’t necessary. And that’s why they had to go around shopping for different 

judges who would actually approve of this subpoena. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I don’t perceive it as being a fishing expedition at all. As I indicated previously, in these investigations you 

focus on, we, the FBI, focus on the leaker from the Federal Government. That’s the person who we want to identify and to ultimately 

prosecute. To do that we have to show that the information went 

from this person to the person who ultimately published it. And as 

part of the investigation, you gather facts in terms of how that information got from the individual who had the security, or had 

the—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. But when you go to the judge, you tell the judge 

that you are intending to prosecute this person, or this person has 

violated the law in some way, or you have reasonable suspicion to 

believe that this person has violated the law. How often have you 

as a law enforcement officer submitted a subpoena to a judge saying that somebody—you suspect somebody violated the law when 

you had no intention to ever prosecutor that person, you didn’t 

think that your investigation was going to lead to the prosecution 

of that person? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have to think about it. Under those circumstances, the way you say them, I have to think about it. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LABRADOR. Yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman, because he is asking a 

very important line of questions and I would ask him if he would 

allow me to ask this question. 

If the allegations made in that case with regard to Mr. Rosen violating the Espionage Act, saying that he was—that there was probable cause to find that he was not—he was at least an aider, abetter, or co-conspirator in violation of the Espionage Act, later said 

that he was a flight risk, and you asked that the record be sealed 

for 18 months, if those indeed were the facts, if those indeed were 

the case, why wouldn’t you prosecute the individual? 
115 

Mr. MUELLER. There may be other competing interests. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Like what? 

Mr. MUELLER. The First Amendment. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. What’s that? 

Mr. MUELLER. The First Amendment. There can be other competing interests. The First Amendment. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Okay, but that just goes right back to the question asked by the gentleman from Idaho. If the First Amendment, 

which I think is of paramount importance here, is indeed that consideration, then why would it be appropriate to go before the court, 

before the judge, and say all of these things about the individual 

in order to get a search warrant to go through his email records 

without his knowledge? 

Mr. MUELLER. I’m not familiar—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. If you’re not going to prosecute him, why not 

tell him? Why not tell him? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not that familiar with the discussions that 

went on, first of all, at the level of the Assistant United States attorney and the agent who was on it, or as it went through the Department of Justice. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

I thank the gentleman for yielding. And I’ll yield him an additional minute if he wants to pursue the question. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, you have asked my 

questions. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, this concludes the hearing today. Director, 

we thank you. You have given us more than 3 hours of your time. 

You have answered a lot of questions, a lot of difficult questions, 

and we very much appreciate that. I will join all of my colleagues 

and I think virtually every one of them thanked you for your service. If they did not, I’m sure it is because they neglected to do so. 

You have a remarkable record as Director of the FBI. I do think 

there are some questions here that remain that you were not able 

to answer. We will submit questions to you in writing. And I think 

you have made a few commitments yourself to do that. We would 

find that very important to have those additional pieces of information. 

And without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days 

to submit additional written questions for the witness or additional 

materials for the record. 

And with that, with our thanks again, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

Æ