UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

ABDULLAH MATTOCKS, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1951 

(JUDGE MANNION) 

BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., 

Defendants 

MEMORANDUM 

Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case are 

defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third 

amended complaint, and defendants' motion to stay discovery. For the 

reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted, plaintiff's 

Bivens claim will be dismissed with prejudice, plaintiff's claim pursuant to the 

Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") will be dismissed without prejudice, 

plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint will be denied 

because the proposed third amended complaint suffers from the same 

pleading defects as the currently operative complaint, defendants' motion to 

stay discovery will be denied as moot, and plaintiff will be granted leave to 

file a third amended complaint limited to his FTCA claim. 

Case 3:22-cv-01951-MEM-LT Document 33 Filed 12/17/24 Page 1 of 13
I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff, Abdullah Mattocks, who has been incarcerated in Allenwood 

Low Security Correctional Institution ("LSCI-Allenwood") at all relevant times, 

filed this case on December 8, 2022. (Doc. 1 ). After the court granted two 

motions for leave to amend, the case is currently proceeding on plaintiff's 

second amended complaint, which asserts civil rights claims pursuant to 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 

403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Doc. 26). 

According to the allegations in the second amended complaint, 

Mattocks and several other inmates were escorted outside of LSCIAllenwood's visitation room for visits on February 20, 2021 , at approximately 

9:40 a.m. (Id. 1J10). The temperature that day was purportedly between 10 

and 15 degrees Fahrenheit, with high winds throughout the day. (Id. 1J12). 

Upon their arrival, one of the inmates knocked on the door. (Id. 1J13). An 

unnamed officer opened the door and told the inmates that they would need 

to wait outside. (Id.) Approximately ten minutes later, the inmates knocked 

on the door again and the officer told them they would need to wait outside 

until prison officials completed the 10:00 a.m. count. (Id. 1J14). Mattocks and 

the other inmates told the officer that they were very cold and asked if they 

could come inside. (Id. 1J15). The officer told the inmates that the visiting 

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room was empty but that his supervisors had nonetheless instructed him to 

keep the inmates outside. (Id. ,I16). 

The 10:00 a.m. count was subsequently completed, but the officer 

continued to not let the inmates inside. (Id. ,I17). At that point, Mattocks and 

the other inmates moved to a nearby alley so that they would be more 

sheltered from the wind. (Id. ,I18). Defendant Wolfe, a lieutenant in the 

prison, came out of his office and told the inmates to leave the alley and 

return to the area outside the visiting room. (Id. ,i19). Wolfe told the inmates 

they would not be allowed inside at that time. (Id. ,i21 ). When they returned 

to the area outside the visiting room, the officer from the visiting room came 

outside and acknowledged how cold it was, but again stated that he could 

not let them inside because he had direct orders not to do so. (Id. ,I23). The 

inmates asked Wolfe to let them inside, but he purportedly responded, "this 

is how we doing it today." (Id. ffll 24-25). Mattocks and the other inmates 

were eventually let inside at 11 :30 a.m., after approximately two hours 

outside in the cold. (Id. ,I27). 

The second amended complaint asserts a Bivens claim for deliberate 

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Wolfe, two other 

supervisory officials, and LSCI-Allenwood. (Id. ,i 29). The second amended 

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complaint does not specifically advance a claim pursuant to the FTCA, 

though Mattocks's earlier complaints did so. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on 

March 12, 2024. (Doc. 26). Defendants argue that (1) the second amended 

complaint does not present a cognizable Bivens claim; (2) the second 

amended complaint fails to allege the defendants' personal involvement; (3) 

that the BOP and LSCI-Allenwood are not appropriate defendants to a 

Bivens claim; and (4) that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to the 

extent the second amended complaint attempts to assert an FTCA claim 

pursuant to the FTCA's discretionary function exception. (Doc. 31 ). 

Defendants moved to stay discovery on April 5, 2024. (Doc. 29). Mattocks 

has not directly responded to either motion, but on April 25, 2024, he moved 

for leave to file a third amended complaint that would, inter alia, explicitly 

plead FTCA claims. (Doc. 32). The motion to dismiss, motion to stay 

discovery, and motion for leave to amend are ripe for the court's review. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a 

complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 

Under Rule 12(b )(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 

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determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the 

plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 

210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 

(3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual 

allegations are not required, Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[L]abels and conclusions" are not 

enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court "is not bound to accept as 

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. 

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts "a two-part 

analysis." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual 

elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. Id. 

at 210-11. Second, the court determines "whether the facts alleged in the 

complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for 

relief." Id. at 211 (quotations omitted). 

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Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants. 

Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, "however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 

Ill. DISCUSSION 

A. Bivens Claim 

Mattocks's civil rights claim is brought pursuant to Bivens, which 

recognizes an implied damages remedy for civil rights violations committed 

by federal officials. Prior to 2017, Bivens claims were recognized in 

numerous contexts. In a series of cases beginning with Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 

U.S. 120 (2017), however, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the 

circumstances under which a Bivens claim may proceed. Under Ziglar and 

its progeny, courts considering a Bivens claim must first determine whether 

the claim presents a "new context," in other words, whether it differs "in a 

meaningful way" from the three cases in which the Supreme Court has 

explicitly recognized a Bivens remedy in the past-Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979), and Carlson v. Green, 446 

U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980). Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 138-39. 

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If the case presents a new context, the court must determine whether 

any "special factors" counsel against extending a Bivens remedy to that 

context. Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 102 (2020). To conduct this 

analysis, the court must determine whether "the Judiciary is at least arguably 

less equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a 

damages action to proceed." Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022) 

(quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136). If a court concludes that "even a single 

reason" exists to pause "before applying Bivens in a new context," then 

special factors counseling hesitation exist and a Bivens remedy does not lie. 

Id. (quoting Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If there is "any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better 

suited" to determine the propriety of a cause of action, then a Bivens action 

cannot proceed. Id. at 496. The court must broadly inquire whether "there is 

any reason to think that 'judicial intrusion' into a given field might be 'harmful' 

or 1

inappropriate"'-and if the answer is 11yes," or even potentially yes, the 

plaintiff cannot recover under Bivens. Id. 

Until very recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit allowed plaintiffs to additionally file Bivens claims alleging that prison 

officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk that they would be assaulted 

by other inmates. See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2018), abrogated 

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by Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492, as recognized in Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 

F.4th 197, 203-06 (3d Cir. 2024); Shorterv. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 372-

73 (3d Cir. 2021 ), abrogated by Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492, as recognized in 

Fisher, 115 F.4th at 203-06. In Fisher, however, the Third Circuit recognized 

that the Supreme Court's decision in Egbert abrogates the contrary holdings 

in Bistrian and Shorter. Fisher, 115 F.4th at 203-06. Fisher holds that "unless 

a case is indistinguishable from Bivens, Davis, or Carlson," the court may not 

allow the plaintiff to bring a Bivens damages claim, and claims alleging 

deliberate indifference to a risk of assault by another inmate are no longer 

cognizable Bivens claims. Id. at 205. 

Thus, under Ziglar and its progeny, a court considering whether a 

Bivens claim presents a new context for Bivens liability must determine 

whether the claim is "indistinguishable" from the contexts recognized in 

Bivens, Davis, and Carlson: that is, "a cause of action against federal drug 

agents whose warrantless search of a home violated the Fourth 

Amendment" (Bivens), "a Fifth Amendment damages action against a 

Congressman who fired a staffer because she was a woman" (Davis), or "an 

Eighth Amendment damages action against federal prison officials who 

failed to provide medical care to an asthmatic prisoner" (Carlson). Fisher, 

115 F .4th at 203, 205. 

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The court finds that the Bivens claim in the instant case is 

distinguishable from Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. Mattocks seeks to bring a 

Bivens claim alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a risk 

of harm to him when they compelled him to remain outside in very cold 

weather. The only Bivens claim that is potentially relevant to this claim is the 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim 

recognized in Carlson. As a panel of the Third Circuit has recognized, 

however, claims like the instant one alleging deliberate indifference to harm 

caused by exposure to cold temperatures present a meaningfully different 

context from the medical care claim at issue in Carlson. See Mammana v. 

Barben, 856 F. App'x 411, 414 (3d Cir. 2021) ("Mammana challenged 'his 

confinement in a chilled room with constant lighting, no bedding, and only 

paper-like clothing.' All of which 'bear little resemblance to a claim against 

prison officials for failure to treat an inmate's asthma." (internal citations and 

alterations omitted)). 

Having determined that Mattocks's claim presents a new context for 

Bivens liability, the court must determine whether any "special factors" 

counsel against extending a Bivens remedy to that context. Hernandez, 589 

U.S. at 102. The Third Circuit's decision in Fisher compels this court to 

conclude that such special factors are present. Fisher, 115 F .4th 208. Fisher 

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holds that the BOP's administrative remedy program is an alternative 

remedial structure available to inmates that precludes extension of a Bivens 

claim to a new context. Thus, because the administrative remedy program is 

available to Mattocks, his Bivens claim cannot be extended to this new 

context and the claim will be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. FTCA Claim 

The court additionally finds that Mattocks's second amended complaint 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted to the extent it can be 

liberally construed as advancing a tort claim against the United States under 

the FTCA.

1 The FTCA "provides a mechanism for bringing a state law tort 

action against the federal government in federal court." In re Orthopedic 

Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2001 ). Before 

asserting an FTCA claim in federal court a plaintiff must first exhaust 

administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 

554, 569 (3d Cir. 2015). Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the 

FTCA is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Id. at 569. FTCA claims must 

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff has failed to allege 

1 The United States is the only proper defendant in an action under the 

FTCA. See, e.g., Priovolos v. FBI, 632 F. App'x 58, 60 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 

CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008)). 

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exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., Geiger v. United States, 

No. 3:22-CV-1079, 2023 WL 3136405, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2023); 

Gomez v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-1176, 2016 WL 826899, at *3 (M.D. 

Pa. Mar. 3, 2016); 35A Am. Jur. 2d Federal Tort Claims Act§ 209, Westlaw 

(database updated Oct. 2024). 

Mattocks's second amended complaint is completely devoid of any 

allegations as to whether he exhausted administrative remedies. Absent 

such allegations, the court must dismiss his complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction to the extent it attempts to assert an FTCA claim. 

C. Leave to Amend 

Having determined that Mattocks's second amended complaint is 

subject to dismissal, the court will deny Mattocks's motion for leave to file a 

third amended complaint because the proposed third amended complaint 

suffers from the same pleading defects as the second amended complaint in 

that it states a non-cognizable Bivens claim and does not allege whether 

Mattocks exhausted administrative remedies other than the conclusory and 

unsupported assertion that Mattocks "has exhausted his administrative 

remedies." (Doc. 32-1 ,I 12). 

The court will, however, permit plaintiff to file a third amended 

complaint separately and independently from the proposed third amended 

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complaint attached to his motion for leave to amend in order to cure the 

defects identified with respect to his FTCA claim. Before dismissing a 

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a 

district court should permit a curative amendment unless the amendment 

would be inequitable or futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. Here, leave to amend 

Mattocks's Bivens claim would be futile because it presents a new context 

from Bivens, Davis, and Carlson and special factors preclude this court from 

extending the Bivens remedy to this new context. It does not appear, 

however, that amendment of the FTCA claim would necessarily be 

inequitable or futile. Thus, the court will grant Mattocks leave to file a third 

amended complaint that advances an FTCA claim and includes allegations 

as to whether and how Mattocks exhausted administrative remedies before 

filing the claim. See 35A Am. Jur. 2d Federal Tort Claims Act§ 209 (noting 

that plaintiff should be granted leave to amend before an FTCA claim is 

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 

D. Motion to Stay Discovery 

Finally, the court will deny defendants' motion to stay discovery as 

moot. The motion seeks to stay discovery pending the resolution of 

defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the court has now resolved the 

motion to dismiss, the motion to stay discovery is moot. This ruling is without 

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prejudice to defendants' right to file a renewed motion to stay discovery in 

the event plaintiff files a third amended complaint or otherwise proceeds with 

this action. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, 

plaintiff's Bivens claim is dismissed with prejudice, plaintiff's FTCA claim is 

dismissed without prejudice, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third 

amended complaint is denied, defendants' motion to stay discovery is denied 

as moot, and plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint 

limited to his FTCA claim. An appropriate order. 

Dated: 

22-1951-01 

13 

nnion 

istrict Judge 

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