IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TINA R. RANKIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 09-180 Erie

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., J.

Plaintiff Tina R. Rankin (“Rankin”) commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”) [42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f]. For the reasons

that follow, the Commissioner’s motion will be denied and Rankin’s motion will be granted only

to the extent she seeks a remand for further consideration. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rankin protectively applied for SSI benefits on May 15, 2007, alleging disability as of

July 1, 1993. (AR 104). The application was administratively denied on August 3, 2007. (AR

41, 47). Rankin responded on September 20, 2007, by filing a timely request for an

administrative hearing. (AR 53). On February 12, 2009, a hearing was held before

Administrative Law Judge O. Price Dodson (the “ALJ”). (AR 17). Rankin, who was assisted 1

by a lay representative, appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 19-32). Testimony was also 2

taken from Julie Schaefer (“Schaefer”), Rankin’s support coordinator from Erie County Care

The hearing was apparently conducted by means of an electronic connection apparatus. Although Rankin

1

appeared in Erie, Pennsylvania, the ALJ presided over the hearing from Norfolk, Virginia. (AR 8, 17).

It is permissible for non-attorneys to represent claimants in administrative proceedings conducted by the

2

Social Security Administration. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1).

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Management (“ECCM”), and Robert D. Edwards (“Edwards”), an impartial vocational expert. 

(AR 32-36). In a decision dated April 10, 2009, the ALJ determined that Rankin was not

“disabled” within the meaning of the Act. (AR 5-16). The Appeals Council denied Rankin’s

request for review on May 14, 2009, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner in this case. (AR 1). Rankin commenced this action on July 15, 2009, seeking

judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. No. 1). Rankin and the Commissioner

filed motions for summary judgment on December 30, 2009, and February 22, 2010,

respectively. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 10). These motions are the subject of this memorandum opinion. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

“supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d

Cir. 1994). The Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or reweigh the evidence of record. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-1191

(3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention that “[t]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable

amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565,108 S.Ct. 2541, 101

L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)(internal quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commissioner’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court “would have

decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). 

“Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). 

In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a “medically

determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any

‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory twelve-month period.” Stunkard v. Secretary of

Health & Human Services, 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered to be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity

“only if his [or her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or

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she] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 

To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative law judge must do more than

simply state factual conclusions. He or she must make specific findings of fact. Stewart v.

Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983). The administrative

law judge must consider all medical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate

explanations for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Weir on Behalf of Weir v. Heckler, 734 F.2d

955, 961 (3d Cir. 1984); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”), acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated

rulemaking authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose

of determining whether a claimant is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. The United

States Supreme Court recently summarized this process as follows:

If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will

not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability

unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful activity.” 

[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,” defined as

“any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§

404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the

impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of

impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant

qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the

list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the

claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is

determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth,

and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the

claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether

the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in

the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003)(footnotes

omitted). 

In an action in which review of an administrative agency’s determination is sought, the

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agency’s decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the

agency in making its decision. In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947), the Supreme Court explained:

When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of

administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing

with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is

authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds

invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is

powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to

be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the

domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency. 

Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

recognized the applicability of this rule in the Social Security disability context. Fargnoli v.

Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 44, n. 7 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court’s review is limited to the four

corners of the ALJ’s decision. 

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

In his decision, the ALJ determined that Rankin had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since her alleged onset date. (AR 10). Rankin was found to be suffering from a learning

disability, which was deemed to be “severe” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 

(AR 10). The ALJ concluded that Rankin’s impairments did not meet or medically equal an

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listing of Impairments” or,

with respect to a single impairment, a “Listed Impairment” or “Listing”). (AR 11-13). 

In accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 416.945, the ALJ assessed Rankin’s residual functional

capacity as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all

exertional levels but within the world of unskilled work, the claimant is limited to

no more than simple repetitive tasks.

(AR 13). Rankin was born on January 24, 1985, making her twenty-four years old as of the date

of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 14, 20). She was classified as a “younger person” under the

Commissioner’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c). Her level of education was deemed to be

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“marginal,” since she had completed high school in a special education program. (AR 14); 20

C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(2). Rankin was able to orally communicate in English, but she had no past

relevant work experience. (AR 14). Given the applicable residual functional capacity and

vocational assessments, the ALJ concluded that Rankin could work as a laundry worker, cleaner

or hand packer. (AR 15). Edwards’ testimony established that these jobs existed in the national

economy for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). (AR 35). 

IV. BACKGROUND

Although there is some ambiguity in the record concerning Rankin’s educational history,

it appears that she transferred from Garfield Heights High School (“Garfield Heights”) in

Garfield Heights, Ohio, to Strong Vincent High School (“Strong Vincent”) in Erie, Pennsylvania,

because she had been bullied during her time at Garfield Heights. (AR 137). After completing

her junior year (i.e., the 2002/2003 school year), Rankin withdrew from Strong Vincent and

transferred to the Perseus House Charter School of Excellence, Inc. (“Perseus House”). (AR 20,

134, 136). She graduated from Perseus House in 2004. (AR 362). Rankin started to take adult

education classes at the Erie Adult Learning Center on December 17, 2007, but she later

withdrew from her classes after being embarrassed by a teacher. (AR 366). 

In accordance with the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”) [20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.], Rankin received “specially designed instruction” in the

areas of reading, writing, English and mathematics while participating “in the regular curriculum

in all other areas.” (AR 149). Testing conducted when Rankin was seventeen years old revealed

that, on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (“WISC”), she had a verbal intelligence

quotient (“IQ”) of 63, a performance IQ of 79, and a full scale IQ of 69. (AR 353). On May 6,

2003, less than four months after her eighteenth birthday, additional testing was conducted. (AR

135-146). This testing revealed that Rankin had a verbal IQ of 66, a performance IQ of 83, and a

full scale IQ of 83 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (“WAIS-III”). (AR 139). It was

determined that Rankin was functioning at a first- or second-grade level, and that she would be

“unable to function” in a curriculum in which academic material was presented at a level higher

than that expected in a second-grade setting. (AR 140, 143). A school record reported that

Rankin was “unable to read or write.” (AR 138). 

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At the hearing, Rankin testified that she could not read a newspaper by herself. (AR 21). 

She stated that she had tried to apply for a job at a local McDonald’s restaurant, but that she had

been ridiculed and laughed at because of her inability to read and understand the written

application that an individual needed to complete in order to obtain the position. (AR 22). 

Rankin explained that she would experience a “nervous breakdown” and begin to cry if she were

asked to read something while working. (AR 24). 

Rankin also has a history of asthma. She controls her symptoms by using an inhaler and a

nebulizer. (AR 27-28, 264). She testified that she would sometimes wake up “coughing” and

“choking” in the middle of the night. (AR 28). Rankin explained that she sometimes needed to

seek treatment at Saint Vincent Health Center (“St. Vincent”), a hospital located in Erie, because

of her inability to breathe normally. (AR 31). 

In January 2008, Rankin sought treatment at St. Vincent for “right flank pain” and

“excessive vaginal discharge.” (AR 242). Subsequent testing revealed the she was suffering

from kidney stones. In 2008, Rankin underwent three separate surgical procedures designed to

destroy or remove kidney stones. (AR 28-29, 242, 261, 288-289, 293, 313). Some of Rankin’s

treatment notes also indicate that she had been taking medication for bipolar disorder at one

point, but that she had stopped using the medication after becoming pregnant. (AR 197). Rankin

was treated for a urinary tract infection on December 16, 2008. (AR 381). 

V. DISCUSSION

In support of her motion for summary judgment, Rankin advances two general arguments. 

First, she contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination was erroneous. 

(Doc. No. 9 at 10-13). Second, she argues that the ALJ erred in determining that her

impairments did not meet or medically equal Listing 12.05C. (Doc. No. 9 at 13-14). Under the

Commissioner’s regulations, an assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity is

relevant at the fourth and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §

416.945(a)(5)(I)-(ii). Where a claimant is deemed to be per se disabled at the third step, no

residual functional capacity determination is needed. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153, 107

S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987)(recognizing the third step of the sequential evaluation process

as a basis for identifying those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that they

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would be found to be disabled regardless of their vocational backgrounds). Therefore, the Court

will address Rankin’s argument concerning Listing 12.05C before addressing her argument

concerning the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. 

The Listing of Impairments describes impairments which preclude an adult from

engaging in substantial gainful activity without regard to his or her age, education or work

experience. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000). In order to qualify as per se

disabled at the third step of the analysis, a claimant must show that his or her impairment (or

combination of impairments) either “matches” a Listing or is “equivalent” to a Listing. Sullivan

v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-531, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). An impairment

“matches” a Listed Impairment only if it satisfies all of the specified medical criteria contained

within the applicable Listing. Id. at 530. An impairment is “equivalent” to a Listed Impairment

only where it is supported by medical findings equal in severity to all of the criteria applicable to

the most similar Listing. Id. at 531. The burden is on the claimant to present evidence in support

of his or her allegation of per se disability. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir.

1992). 

Rankin argues that the ALJ erred in determining that her impairments did not meet or

medically equal Listing 12.05C. (Doc. No. 9 at 13-14). The language contained in Listing 12.05

provides:

12.05 Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning

initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence

demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22. 

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the

requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied. 

A. Mental incapacity evidenced by dependence upon others for

personal needs (e.g., toileting, eating, dressing, or bathing) and

inability to follow directions, such that the use of standardized

measures of intellectual functioning is precluded;

OR

B. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 59 or less;

OR

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and

a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and

significant work-related limitation of function;

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OR

D. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70,

resulting in at least two of the following:

1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or

2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or

3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace; or

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended

duration.

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.05. As the ALJ correctly noted in his

opinion, the record contains no evidence of per se disability under the “A” or “B” criteria. (AR

11). At this stage, Rankin advances no argument concerning the “D” criteria. (Doc. No. 9 at 13-

14). Therefore, the Court’s analysis will be limited to the application of the “C” criteria in this

case. 

Since Rankin registered verbal IQ scores of 63 and 66 and a full scale IQ score of 69, her

impairment satisfied the first criterion of Listing 12.05C. The ALJ determined that the second

criterion was not met because Rankin had not presented evidence of “a physical or mental

impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” (AR

11). He based this finding on his prior determination that Rankin’s learning disability was her

only “severe” impairment. (AR 11). 

In order to establish that she is “disabled” under the Act, Rankin must demonstrate that

she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The twelve-month durational requirement applies to both a claimant’s

inability to work and the underlying “impairment” that prevents him or her from working. 

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214-222, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). The ALJ

referred to Rankin’s experiences with kidney stones as “brief episodic events” which did not last

(and had not been expected to last) for the requisite period of twelve months. (AR 10). He

stated that the record contained “no evidence of asthma as a medically determinable impairment

during the period [of time] at issue.” (AR 11). Although some of Rankin’s treatment notes

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indicated that she had bipolar disorder, the ALJ apparently found it to be “non-severe” because

Rankin had failed to provide him with “supportive evidence” and “treatment records” to establish

the presence of resulting functional limitations. (AR 11). 

At the hearing, Rankin testified that she needed to rely on an inhaler and a nebulizer to

control her asthma. (AR 27). She explained that she would frequently wake up “coughing” and

“choking” “in the middle of the night.” (AR 28). Rankin specifically testified that she had used

her inhaler the night before the hearing, after her aunt had awakened her after finding her

breathing to be abnormal. (AR 28). She declared that she had sought treatment for asthmarelated symptoms on several occasions. (AR 31). On January 9, 2008, Rankin sought treatment

at St. Vincent for a severe episode of breathing difficulty. (AR 262-264). The record also

indicates that, on May 2, 2002, Rankin was crying because of intense chest pain and an inability

to breathe. (AR 208). Rankin also testified that she had experienced asthma-related symptoms

as recently as the night before the hearing. (AR 28). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that an administrative

law judge “must give serious consideration to a claimant’s subjective complaints” even where

such complaints “are not supported by objective evidence.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,

1067 (3d Cir. 1993). Although Rankin needed to provide objective evidence of a condition that

could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged in her testimony, she was not

required to produce objective evidence of the symptoms themselves. Green v. Schweiker, 749

F.2d 1066, 1070-1071 (3d Cir. 1984). In light of the documentary and testimonial evidence

contained in the record, the ALJ’s conclusion that there was “no evidence of asthma as a

medically determinable impairment during the period [of time] at issue” is not supported by

substantial evidence. (AR 11). 

Having satisfied the first criterion of Listing 12.05C, Rankin can establish that she is per

se disabled by demonstrating the existence of “a physical or other mental impairment imposing

an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 3

In this case, the record clearly contains evidence establishing the manifestation of Rankin’s impairment

3

before she had reached the age of twenty-two. (AR 139, 352-353). Therefore, the more generalized requirements of

Listing 12.05 have been satisfied, and the Court’s analysis can be confined to the specific requirements of Listing

12.05C. Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 188-189 (3d Cir. 2003); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d

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P, Appendix 1, Listing 12.05C. In determining whether an impairment results in “an additional

and significant work-related limitation of function” within the meaning of Listing 12.05C, the

Commissioner applies the same standard that is used to determine whether an impairment is

“severe” at the second step of the sequential evaluation process. Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d

1264, 1266 (10 Cir. 2008); Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 188 (3d Cir. 2003); Antonetti v. th

Barnhart, 399 F.Supp.2d 199, 203-204 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). A “severe” impairment is an

impairment which “significantly limits [a claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Under the Commissioner’s regulations, “basic work

activities” relate to “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.921(b). By concluding that Rankin’s asthma had not been a “medically determinable

impairment” during the relevant period of time, the ALJ improperly forestalled the proper

analysis that he was required to engage in for purposes of the second criterion of Listing 12.05C. 

(AR 11). Consequently, his finding at the third step of the sequential evaluation process that

Rankin’s impairments did not meet or medically equal Listing 12.05C is not supported by

substantial evidence. Markle, 324 F.3d at 188. 4

Rankin also argues that the ALJ erred in determining her residual functional capacity. 

(Doc. No. 9 at 10-13). The ALJ concluded that Rankin had the residual functional capacity to

perform a full range of work “at all exertional levels,” provided that such work was “unskilled”

and involved only simple, repetitive tasks. (AR 13). 

On April 30, 2007, Dr. David Fox (“Dr. Fox”), Rankin’s primary care physician,

indicated that Rankin was “permanently disabled” due to “illiteracy.” (AR 133). Under the 5

Commissioner’s regulations, a claimant is deemed to be “illiterate” if he or she “cannot read or

Cir. 1992).

On September 26, 2007, a medical review team connected with the Erie County Assistance Office opined

4

that Rankin’s impairments were per se disabling under Listings 12.02 and 12.05D. (AR 128-130). The ALJ rejected

this opinion and provided a detailed explanation for doing so. (AR 11-13). The Court notes that Dr. Douglas

Schiller, a nonexamining medical consultant, determined that Rankin did not have the “marked” limitations

necessary to establish the existence of a per se disability under Listings 12.02 and 12.05D. (AR 188). In her brief,

Rankin only makes reference to Listing 12.05C. (Doc. No. 9 at 13). Therefore, the Court’s analysis with respect to

the third step of the sequential evaluation process is limited to the ALJ’s findings concerning Listing 12.05C.

There appears to be another ground listed in support of Dr. Fox’s opinion, but it is illegible. (AR 133).

5

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Case 1:09-cv-00180-SJM Document 12 Filed 08/09/10 Page 10 of 13
write a simple message.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(1). The ALJ did not address, however, the

issue of Rankin’s alleged illiteracy, nor did he explain the basis for his implicit finding that

Rankin was literate. The ALJ did, however, determine that Rankin had a “marginal” education. 

(AR 14). An individual with a marginal education is presumed to have minimal “language

skills.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(2). In his hypothetical question to Edwards, the ALJ merely

described Rankin’s level of education as “marginal” with no reference to Rankin’s literacy (AR

34). 

Even an individual with a high school education can be “illiterate” under the

Commissioner’s regulations. Diehl v. Barnhart, 357 F.Supp.2d 804, 824 (E.D.Pa. 2005). It must

be acknowledged that the Commissioner’s regulations have set a low bar for determining that a

claimant is literate. Glenn v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 814 F.2d 387, 391-392 (7th

Cir. 1987). In any event, however, the Commissioner is required to support a finding of literacy

by reference to the evidentiary record where, as here, the claimant has presented evidence of

functional illiteracy. Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 506, 510 (10 Cir. 1987); Jimmerson v. Apfel,

th

111 F.Supp.2d 846, 850 (E.D.Tex. 2000). The Commissioner’s regulations do not incorporate an

inability to read or write within the definition of the term “marginal education.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.964(b)(2). Consequently, it cannot be assumed that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to

Edwards properly conveyed the nature and severity of Rankin’s limitations. (AR 34-35). 

At the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process, “the Commissioner bears the burden

of proving that, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and past

work experience, she can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the regional or

national economy.” Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2003). To that end, an

administrative law judge’s hypothetical question must adequately convey to a vocational expert

all of the claimant’s credibly established limitations in order for the vocational expert’s answer to

that question to constitute “substantial evidence” of the existence of jobs consistent with the

claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational profile. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d

546, 552-555 (3d Cir. 2004). If a limitation is omitted from the hypothetical question, there is a

danger that the vocational expert will identify a job requiring the performance of a task that could

not be performed by an individual with the omitted limitation. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113,

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122-124 (3d Cir. 2002). 

In light of the foregoing analysis, the ALJ’s decision in this case cannot stand. The only

remaining question is whether a judicially-ordered award of benefits is warranted, or whether the

case should be remanded for further administrative proceedings. An immediate award of

benefits is proper only where the evidentiary record has been fully developed, and where the

evidence as a whole clearly points in favor of a finding of disability. Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d

310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000). That standard is not met here. The record is devoid of specific findings

concerning the effects of Rankin’s asthma on her ability to work, since the ALJ erroneously

concluded that there was “no evidence of asthma as a medically determinable impairment during

the period [of time] at issue.” (AR 11). Moreover, the impact of Rankin’s reading and writing

difficulties on her ability to work was never properly considered during the course of the

previous administrative proceedings. These matters should all be addressed by the 6

Commissioner in the first instance. Therefore, the case will remanded to the Commissioner for

further administrative proceedings. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court expresses no opinion as to whether Rankin can ultimately establish her

entitlement to SSI benefits under the Act. In any event, however, the Commissioner must

specifically consider whether Rankin’s asthma qualifies as a “severe” impairment under the

previously-described regulations and case law. If the matter is not resolved at the third step of

the process, the Commissioner will need to make specific findings as to the degree of Rankin’s

impairment relative to her ability to read and write, and, if necessary, incorporate such limitations

in the hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment filed by the Commissioner will be

denied, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Rankin will be granted only to the extent

she seeks a remand for further consideration. An appropriate Order follows.

The Court expresses no opinion as to extent and severity of Rankin’s reading and writing difficulties. This

6

is a matter for the ALJ to resolve in the first instance.

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Case 1:09-cv-00180-SJM Document 12 Filed 08/09/10 Page 12 of 13
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TINA R. RANKIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 09-180 Erie

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9 day of August, 2010, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying th

Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. No. 8] is GRANTED only to the extent she seeks a remand for further

consideration by the Commissioner. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner of

Social Security for further proceedings consistent with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.

No. 10] is DENIED.

The clerk is directed to mark the case closed.

s/Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record.

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Case 1:09-cv-00180-SJM Document 12 Filed 08/09/10 Page 13 of 13