2023 IL App (2d) 210281-B-U 

No. 2-21-0281 

Order filed October 24, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 20-CF-714 

) 

RAHSHAN D. DUFFIE, ) Honorable 

) Robert A. Wilbrandt., and

) James S. Cowlin, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Following a second remand for the trial court to comply with Batson v. Kentucky, 

we affirm the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie

case that the State was motivated by race in making a peremptory challenge to the 

sole African American venireperson, who said during voir dire that, in his former 

position as a national bank examiner, he would determine whether a violation of 

banking laws was intentional before deciding the appropriate sanction.

¶ 2 In an earlier appeal in this case, we entered a limited remand for proceedings pursuant to 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to determine whether the State’s use of a peremptory 

challenge against an African American prospective juror violated the equal protection clause of 
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the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). We retained jurisdiction to review the trial 

court’s decision on remand. People v. Duffie, 2022 IL App (2d) 210281 (Duffie I). Following the 

proceedings on remand, we concluded that further proceedings were necessary. Accordingly, we 

entered an order remanding the case for a second time. Again, we retained jurisdiction to review 

the trial court’s decision on remand. On the second remand, the trial court concluded, as it had 

initially and on the first remand, that no equal protection violation occurred. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McHenry County, defendant, Rahshan D. 

Duffie, was convicted of escape (730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4.1(a) (West 2020)). Evidence at trial showed 

that defendant violated the terms of his pretrial release in case No. 20-CF-243 by removing an 

electronic monitoring device from his ankle.

¶ 5 In the interests of efficiency and consistency, we excerpt our earlier opinion’s description 

of the relevant events during jury selection: 

“During jury selection, the prosecutor questioned prospective juror Travis Wilbert, 

a retired national bank examiner, about his former occupation. Wilbert indicated that his 

position entailed knowledge and application of banking laws. Asked whether he would 

describe himself as ‘more of an analytical person or common sense person,’ Wilbert 

responded, ‘I’m both.’ Wilbert elaborated:

‘[W]ithin my position, I had to use common sense as well with the laws there can 

be some gray areas, and working with clients, so you have to use common sense, but then 

also have to be analytical to identify where a violation of the law has occurred.’ 

The prosecutor asked whether there were times when Wilbert ‘had to take all these 

different factors into play to determine whether a violation occurred.’ Wilbert responded:
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‘Definitely had to take a lot of things into play. I mean ***, the violation of law 

was there. What was—you know, did you intentionally violate the law or was it over, you 

know, something you overlooked that caused the violation of law; so those type of, you 

know, reasoning, thought process entered into things.’ 

The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Wilbert. The trial court 

interjected, ‘You need a Batson reason on Mr. Wilbert.’ The prosecutor responded that her 

concerns arose from Wilbert’s answers to questions about the role of the law in his former 

occupation of bank examiner. The prosecutor explained:

‘Judge, his answer to the question the law he applied in bank cases, where someone 

could commit a technical violation, but he said that like even if it’s a technical violation, 

he has to look at all the surrounding circumstances and that causes me concern because we 

want somebody who is going to follow the law exactly as it is, not consider, you know, 

well, it wasn’t that big of a violation.

And I think that the factors that he applied in his job are very different from what 

we apply here. He is familiar with the bank law and federal and state law, so that was—

that was the concern that we had and the reason that we would be asking to strike him.’ 

Defense counsel objected to the challenge, stating, ‘[T]he [S]tate doesn’t like 

[Wilbert] because they think he will be favorable to my client and I don’t think it’s for 

good reasons. I think it’s—the reasons are suspicious.’ Defense counsel added that 

Wilbert was ‘the only person of color in this courtroom.’ The trial court allowed the State’s 

peremptory challenge, stating, ‘The court believes that the [S]tate has a reason that would 

comply with Batson.’ ” Duffie I, 2022 IL App 210281, ¶¶ 4-7. 
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¶ 6 In Duffie I, we explained the process for determining whether the use of a peremptory 

challenge runs afoul of the fourteenth amendment:

“In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause 

of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) forbids prosecutors from 

exercising peremptory challenges to potential jurors solely on account of their race. 

[Citation.] Batson developed a three-step process for determining whether a peremptory 

challenge violates that principle. ‘First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing 

that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.’ [Citation.] 

‘To determine at the first step whether racial bias motivated a prosecutor’s decision to 

remove a potential juror, a court must consider the totality of the relevant facts and all 

relevant circumstances surrounding the peremptory strike to see if they give rise to a 

discriminatory purpose.’ [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 22.

We further observed that if a prima facie case is established, the second step of the process requires 

the State to offer a race-neutral explanation for the use of the peremptory challenge, and the 

defendant is afforded the opportunity to show that the State’s explanation is pretextual. Id. ¶ 23. 

In the third step, the trial court determines whether the defendant has established purposeful 

discrimination. Id.

¶ 7 We concluded that the trial court failed to follow the three-step process and, thus, a remand 

for further proceedings conforming to Batson was necessary. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. As noted, we retained 

jurisdiction to review the trial court’s decision on remand. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 8 Before the case was remanded, the original trial judge retired, so a new judge, James S. 

Cowlin, presided over the proceedings on remand. Judge Cowlin filed a written decision finding 

that defendant made no prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against 
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Wilbert was based on his race and, thus, there was no reason to consider the matter further. The 

parties filed supplemental appellate briefs. Defendant contended that the proceedings on remand 

were inadequate because the parties were not given an opportunity to develop an adequate record 

for review of defendant’s Batson claim. We entered an order remanding the case again for (1) a 

hearing entailing “the presentation and admission of evidence, arguments thereon, and the records 

created in the original cause and on the first remand,” and (2) findings and conclusions by the trial 

court. We again retained jurisdiction to review the trial court’s decision. 

¶ 9 On remand, it was stipulated that Wilbert was one of approximately 30 prospective jurors

and that he was the only African American among them. It was also stipulated that defendant was

African American; that one witness at trial was African American, one was Caucasian, and two 

were Hispanic; and that Mary Ann Scholl, the prosecutor who exercised the peremptory challenge 

against defendant, was Caucasian. Defense counsel proffered an affidavit from Wilbert indicating 

that his immediate reaction to being peremptorily challenged was that the challenge was based on 

his race. Counsel also presented his own affidavit, in which he averred that he “[had] previously 

been asked by the State when defending an African American client if [he] intended ‘to play the 

race card?’ ” 

¶ 10 The State advised the trial court that Scholl was leaving town and would be unavailable to 

provide a race-neutral explanation of the challenge in the event the trial court were to find a 

prima facie case that the challenge was based on race. Accordingly, the State asked to proffer 

Scholl’s oral statement of her reasons for challenging Wilbert.1

 Scholl then advised the trial court 

1

We note that defendant has not argued that the proffer relieved him of the obligation to 

make a prima facie showing that Wilbert was challenged based on his race.
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that she was concerned that Wilbert indicated that, in his work as a bank examiner, he had to 

determine whether a violation of banking laws was intentional before determining what 

consequences would follow. Scholl indicated that she was concerned that Wilbert might 

improperly consider defendant’s reason for removing the electronic monitoring device from his 

ankle. Scholl added that she similarly exercised a peremptory challenge against another 

prospective juror, a teacher, who indicated that she looked at all the surrounding circumstances 

when determining how to respond to student misconduct.

¶ 11 At the hearing, defendant was given the opportunity to present evidence and had an 

opportunity to be heard. Following the hearing, the trial court issued written findings of fact. The 

trial court again found no prima facie showing that Wilbert was challenged based on his race. 

Anticipating the possibility that we might conclude otherwise, the trial court added that Scholl had 

offered a race-neutral explanation and that it was not pretextual.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 We initially note that, in this case, the trial court initiated a Batson inquiry sua sponte

during jury selection. In such cases, “the court’s findings of fact, including any specific 

observations of record bearing upon demeanor or credibility, will be accorded the deference the 

manifest weight standard provides; however, the ultimate legal determination based upon those 

findings is a legal determination we will make de novo.” People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 

(2007).

¶ 14 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory 

challenge against Wilbert was not based on his race. In People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 501 

(2006) (quoting People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 71 (1996)), our supreme court explained that, 
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when deciding whether a party has established a prima facie case, the trial court should consider 

the following factors: 

“ ‘(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory challenge] and 

the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes against African-American 

venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against AfricanAmerican venirepersons; (4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as 

compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor’s questions and statements [of the challenging 

party] during voir dire examination and while exercising peremptory challenges; 

(6) whether the excluded African-American venirepersons were a heterogeneous group 

sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, 

and witnesses.’ ” 

We note that it was the Rivera court that supplied the bracketed language in the first factor. 

Actually, Williams framed the first factor as the “racial identity between the defendant and the 

excluded venirepersons.” (Emphasis added.) Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 71.

¶ 15 The trial court, applying the first factor as Williamsframed it, found that this factor favored 

defendant because he and Wilbert were both African American. The State does not challenge this 

finding. The trial court found that the second factor—whether there was a pattern of strikes against 

African American venirepersons—favored the State. Defendant correctly argues that, because 

there was only one African American venireperson, this factor is irrelevant. See People v. Davis, 

345 Ill. App. 3d 901, 910 (2004).

¶ 16 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the third and fifth factors 

favored the State. In addition, defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly found that the fourth 

factor was neutral; defendant contends that that factor favors him. We disagree.
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¶ 17 The third factor is whether there was a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges 

against African American venirepersons. Defendant argues that, because Wilbert was the only 

African American on the venire, the State used peremptory challenges against 100% of the African

American venirepersons. However, this factor does not consider the percentage of African

American prospective jurors challenged by the State, but what proportion of the State’s challenges 

were used against African Americans. See Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 73 (“Comparing the number of 

African-American and non-African-American venirepersons stricken by the State reveals whether 

the State used a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to exclude AfricanAmericans.”) In Williams, where the State challenged one African American venireperson and 

one Caucasian venireperson, the supreme court found that the State’s peremptory challenges were 

not used disproportionately against African Americans. Id. Here, the State used peremptory 

challenges against six prospective jurors and one prospective alternate juror. The State’s use of 

only one peremptory challenge out of seven against an African American prospective juror was 

not disproportionate.

¶ 18 The fourth factor is the level of African American representation in the venire as compared 

to the jury. “The factor of venire representation involves, *** comparing the proportion of 

accepted jurors who are members of the relevant racial group to the proportion of the venire who 

are members of the relevant racial group.” People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 181266, ¶ 43. Here,

there is no dispute that there were about 30 individuals on the venire. The proportion of African

Americans accepted as jurors on the jury was zero. The proportion of African Americans on the 

venire was .033 (one out of thirty). This insignificant discrepancy warrants the trial court’s finding 

that the fourth factor was neutral.
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¶ 19 The fifth factor is the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire examination 

and while exercising peremptory challenges. Defendant argues that some jurors were asked fewer 

questions than Wilbert and that only three jurors were asked whether they considered themselves 

analytical or commonsense thinkers. According to defendant, “[c]onsidering the State’s reasoning 

for dismissing Wilbert, this discrepancy is significant.” {Appellant’s Second Supp. Brief p. 20} 

Defendant’s approach is wrong. When a Batson hearing is conducted properly, the State is under 

no obligation to explain its use of a peremptory challenge until the defendant has made a 

prima facie case of discrimination; thus, it is inappropriate here to consider the State’s reasoning 

in determining whether defendant made a prima facie case. We find nothing in the questioning of 

Wilbert, viewed either in isolation or in comparison to the questioning of other prospective jurors, 

to suggest purposeful discrimination. The trial court did not err in finding that this factor favored 

the State.

¶ 20 The trial court found that the sixth factor—whether the excluded African American 

venirepersons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic—did 

not apply because Wilbert was the only African American venireperson. Also, the court found 

that the seventh factor—the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses—slightly favored the 

State. Defendant does not challenge either of these findings.

¶ 21 Defendant cites the supreme court’s comment in People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 427 

(1992), that “[a] trial judge’s experience with local prosecutors and knowledge of local conditions 

are relevant factors in a prima facie case analysis.” He claims that, under Andrews, there was 

similar relevance in his counsel’s affidavit stating that, during his previous representation of an 

African American defendant, the State asked whether counsel would “ ‘play the race card.’ ” 

Defendant argues, in essence, that the term “race card” has racist overtones because it discounts 
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the existence of racism in society. The argument is flawed because it equates the trial court’s 

experience with local prosecutors with defendant’s experience. Moreover, defense counsel never 

indicated that the prosecutors in this case had ever brought up the “race card.” 

¶ 22 Finally, we note that defendant cites decisions from other jurisdictions holding that striking 

the only African American venireperson is alone sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Suffice

it to say that we are not bound by decisions from other jurisdictions. 

¶ 23 In view of the foregoing, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that 

defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against 

Wilbert was based on his race. Because we uphold that conclusion, we need not consider whether 

the State gave a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge or whether the explanation 

was pretextual.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County. 

¶ 26 Affirmed.