J-S20020-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. MERI JANE WOODS, Appellant No. 990 WDA 2015 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 15 , 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-32-CR-0000078-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 11, 2016 Appellant, Meri Jane Woods, appeals from the judgme nt of sentence entered on December 15, 2014, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015. We affirm. The trial court ably summarized the evidence presen ted during the suppression hearing:

On August 14, 2013, [Appellant voluntarily] went to the Pennsylvania State Police, Indiana [Barracks], to c omplain of her husband’s alleged involvement in child porno graphy. . . . [Appellant] brought a home computer [with her that day, and she claimed that the computer] contained evidence [that] support[ed] her allegations. . . . [Appellant] met with Corporal John Roche, the Coord inator of the Southwest Computer Crime Task Force, and fil led out a six-page written statement. At this meeting, Cor poral Roche requested [Appellant’s] permission to do a pr eview examination of the computer and [Appellant] agreed. Once the preview was conducted, images were found on the computer depicting possible child pornography, andJ-S20020-16

- 2 - [Appellant] was agreeable when Corporal Roche indic ated he would need to keep [the computer] as a result [o f his findings. The interview ended and Appellant left t he barracks.] [Both Appellant and Corporal Roche characterized th e police station interview as “friendly.” See Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 15-16; N.T. Suppression He aring, 8/7/14, at 10. Moreover, Corporal Roche testified: that Appellant “was free to leave at any time” during th e interview; that he never read Appellant Miranda 1 warnings; that, although Appellant’s story “seemed unusual,” Corporal Roche “had no reason to disbelieve the main portion of [Appellant’s] child pornography accusations” agains t her husband; and that, during the interview, he “had no belief that criminal activity by [Appellant] had occurred. ” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/7/14, at 10-11 and 24]. . .

. Following a [later,] full [forensic] review [of the computer,] Corporal Roche noted that [the] times when the imag es were created or accessed were inconsistent with [th e] time periods that [Appellant’s] husband would have had a ccess to the computer because they occurred after he had moved from the residence. . . . Trial Court Opinion, 8/12/14, at 1-2. On December 19, 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appe llant with sexual abuse of children and unsworn falsification to authorities. 2 With respect to the sexual abuse of children charge, the Commonwealth’s laterfiled Information declared:

COUNT 1: Child Pornography – (F3)

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1 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) (effective from December 24, 2012 to December 31, 2013) and 4904(a)(1), respectively.J-S20020-16

- 3 - Offense Date: 08/14/13 18 § 6312 §§ D1 Knowingly possessed or controlled a book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, compu ter depiction, or other material depicting a child unde r the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act, to wit, the defendant did p ossess via a computer system/storage medium, files that depict ed child pornography, an example of one of these is a file [name], “F7pzSGKQdk[1].jpg”, which is a picture of an approximately 9-11 year old female, providing oral copulation to an adult male penis. The image was w ritten to the internal hard disk drive on the defendant’s computer on 8/11/13.

. . . Citation of Statute and Section 1[:] 18 § 6312 §§ D 1 (F3)

. . . Commonwealth’s Information, 2/18/14, at 1. Of note, the above description of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 63 12(d)(1) constitutes only a partial quotation of the statute . At the time Appellant committed the charged crime, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d) (1) read in full:

§ 6312. Sexual abuse of children

. . . (d) Child pornography.-- (1) Any person who intentionally views or knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits an offense.J-S20020-16

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) (effective from December 24, 2012 to December 31, 2013). 3, 4 Appellant, however, did not contest the sufficiency of the Information. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppres s the verbal and written statements she made during the August 14, 2 013 police station interview. Within her suppression motion, Appellan t admitted that she “voluntarily and of her own free will” went to the police station on August 14, 2013 and that the interview between herself and Corporal Roche on August 14, 2013 was “friendly.” Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 8 and 15-16. However, Appellant claimed that he r “verbal and written statements [] were unlawfully obtained” because, du ring the interview, Corporal Roche harbored an unarticulated and hidden suspicion that she actually committed the crime. Id. at ¶¶ 11-21. The trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion after a hearing. Tr ial Court Order, 8/12/14,
at 1.

____________________________________________ 3 At the time Appellant committed the crime, 18 Pa.C .S.A. § 6312(d)(2) declared: “[a] first offense under this subsection is a felony of the third degree, and a second or subsequent offense under th is subsection is a felony of the second degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(2) ( effective from December 24, 2012 to December 31, 2013).

4 On January 1, 2014, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) was renumbered; the crime of child pornography is currently located at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d). However, the 2014 amendment did not alter the defin ition of the crime.J-S20020-16

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Appellant proceeded to a one-day jury trial, where the Commonwealth presented Corporal Roche as both a lay witness and as an expert witness in the field of computer forensics. N.T. Trial, 8/19/ 14, at 29. Corporal Roche testified that on August 14, 2013, Appellant appear ed at the Pennsylvania State Police, Indiana Barracks to report that her h usband, Matthew Woods, had committed a crime. Id. at 30. Appellant carried her personal computer into the barracks. Id. at 31. Corporal Roche testified that, after he an d Appellant went back into his office:

[Appellant said] she had been having difficulties a nd problems with her husband, Matthew Woods. And she essentially was bringing me the computer because sh e wanted me to take a look at what was on it because she wanted to tell me that there was child pornography images on the computer and that they were put there by her husband, Matthew Woods. Id. Since Appellant was “providing [the Corporal] with a lot of information,” Corporal Roche asked Appellant to fil l out a written statement. Appellant did so. Id. As Corporal Roche testified, Appellant wrote the following in her written statement: 5

Well, she started to say that her husband worked a lot and that she was starting to feel as if she wasn’t clos e to him anymore. She felt that he was not himself and that he maybe had a girlfriend. So she took some of her ph one

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5 Appellant failed to include a copy of the written statement in the certified record to this Court.J-S20020-16

- 6 - records and she started conducting searches on the internet with his particular cell phone number to see what w ould come up. She said she felt that he was using prost itutes and I believe he was involved in escort services, h e was involved in . . . some type of drug organization, h e was running it. She stated that the IP address from he r computer was seen all over the world and was used f or pornography websites and child pornography websites . She said that he was selling sexual toys on eBay. She said that she had found on some websites pictures of him, pic tures of his niece, pictures of their daughter.

. . . [S]he said also that her husband . . . was running multiple websites. He was running pornography websites . . . and doing so at least to some extent from the computer that she had brought to me.

. . . [S]he says . . . there is one . . . picture[] showi ng a man’s private area on a child’s mouth. I believe that in this photo is my husband, Matthew [] Woods.

. . . [S]he [also] said [that her husband] left the resid ence on July 23[,] 2013, and . . . has not been back since. Id. at 34-35, 42, and 56. During trial, Appellant’s written statement was adm itted into evidence without objection. Id. at 60. Corporal Roche further testified that, after Appell ant completed her written statement, Appellant directed him “to vario us websites to show . . . where she said her husband [or daughter] was depict ed.” Id. at 37. However, as Corporal Roche testified, he did not be lieve that any of the pornographic images Appellant showed him depicted e ither Appellant’sJ-S20020-16

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husband or daughter. Id. at 37-42. Moreover, and contrary to Appellant’s written declaration, Corporal Roche testified that a review of the computer revealed no evidence that Matthew Woods was “runnin g any type of website.” Id. at 58. Further, during the trial: Corporal Roche provided testimony regarding his exp erience with the Pennsylvania State Police, and in particul ar, his training and experience in computer forensics. Cor poral Roche testified that he received training from EnCa se, [6] and that he is an EnCase certified examiner. He also t estified that he is an AccessData certified examiner. [fn.1] . . . [N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 25-26]. [fn.1] AccessData is the maker of the Forensic Tool Kit [(hereinafter “FTK”)]. [Corporal Roche testified t hat: “AccessData is another company in competition with EnCase. And they make a similar tool. It works perhaps a little bit differently, but its mission a nd function are the same, the forensic examination of storage media of computers and any type of storage media, flash drive, what have you.” N.T. Trial, 8/ 19/14, at 26.] With regard to determining “date stamps” or “time s tamps” relevant to this matter, Corporal Roche testified t hat he first used the EnCase program to search the hard drive of the

____________________________________________ 6 As Corporal Roche testified:

EnCase is a company that makes a software forensic sweep for use by law enforcement and industry. It’s a ve ry expensive program that’s used to be able to look in to some type of media, generally speaking a computer’s hard drive, and start searching for evidence. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 25.J-S20020-16

- 8 - computer brought to the police barracks by [Appella nt]. The gallery function of the EnCase software allowed Corporal Roche to search through a thumbnail galler y of photographs in a timely fashion. Corporal Roche te stified that he identified 43 images that he believed depic ted images of child pornography. [7] Corporal Roche then used EnCase to create [an] “exact bit for bit copy of ev ery piece of information on the [computer’s] hard drive.” [ Id. at 50]. Corporal Roche then was able to examine each image to determine when it was placed on the computer. Corporal Roche testified that the created date and time for “[j]ust about all of the images” was “August 11, 20 13, between the times of about [nine] o’clock and 12 o’ clock a.m.” [ Id. at 51]. He then testified that the created date and time “is the absolute most accurate time to use of when it was first put there.” [ Id. ] Corporal Roche [testified] that “the original created date and time will always sta y the same on the host computer.” [ Id. at 52]. In conclusion, Corporal Roche [testified] that he [was] “[a]bsolut ely scientifically certain that the dates and times are that which was when the computer was used to look at these ima ges and download these images depicting child pornograp hy.” [ Id. at 56. Moreover, Corporal Roche testified that th e images of child pornography on the computer “were a ll created [and] accessed on or after the period of ti me that Matthew Woods left the house.” 8 Id. at 69]. Corporal Roche then testified that he used the . . . FTK from AccessData as a separate method of determining the created date and time for the pornographic images. Using this forensic tool, and comparing the results to th e results reached using EnCase, “[t]he created, the modified, the last accessed, the entry modified, all these dates and t imes

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7 During trial, the parties stipulated that “the pho tos found on the computer depicted children between the ages of [nine] to 11 engaging in a prohibited sexual act or simulation of such an act.” N.T. Tri al, 8/19/14, at 76.

8 Again, in her August 14, 2013 written statement to the police, Appellant admitted that Matthew Woods “left the residence on July 23[,] 2013, and . . . [had] not been back since.” N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 42.J-S20020-16

- 9 - were exactly the same to the hundredths of a second on each and every photograph.” [ Id. at 57]. [Appellant] called Dr. Linda Volonino to testify [o n her behalf]. Dr. Volonino holds a Ph.D. and an MBA in Information Systems. She is a full professor at Ca nisius College and an associate with Robson Forensics. Dr

. Volonino testified that she trained with FTK in New York City, and she teaches FTK to her students. Dr. Vol onino [testified] that she has minimal training with EnCa se. The [trial] court accepted Dr. Volonino as an expert in the field of computer forensics. [ Id. at 78-83]. With regard to the reliability of the time stamps o f the images at issue in this matter, Dr. Volonino testif ied that the time stamps “have no meaning.” [ Id. at 87]. She explained this opinion by [testifying:] “[b]ecause the way EnCase treats deleted files, the software, specific ally EnCase software, will create a folder called logged files. And when it does, it puts all of these deleted files into th e lost files folder because it doesn’t know what to do with them , that is, it cannot associate it with any folder. And En Case admits that once files are deleted the time stamps are unr eliable.” [ Id. ] Dr. Volonino concluded that the time stamps on t he jpeg files that came to her in this case [were] unr eliable. [ Id. at 88]. When questioned about Corporal Roche’s use of FTK, and the fact that the time stamp results were identical to the time stamp results using EnCase, Dr. Volonino [test ified] that she “was not provided with any of [Corporal Ro che’s] results from FTK.” [ Id. at 89]. Dr. Volonino then [testified] that the time stamp results using FTK would be unre liable[] because whether a technician is using EnCase or FTK , when a file is deleted, the file system deletes the time stamp, and the tool kit cannot recreate it. [ Id. at 88]. Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/15, at 6-9 (some internal citations and internal capitalization omitted). In addition to the above evidence, Corporal Roche t estified that, in his opinion, the child pornography did not “inadvertent ly” appear on Appellant’sJ-S20020-16

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computer. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 58. Rather, Cor poral Roche testified: that the child pornography on the computer was the resul t of “at least [three] hours of searching the internet for these images” a nd that “it [was] a fair statement [to say] that on August 11[, 2013,] betwe en th[e] hours of [nine] and 11, [Appellant] went to th[e child pornography] websites.” Id. at 58-59 and 74-75. The trial court then charged the jury. With respec t to the sexual abuse of children count, the court charged the jury as follows:

to find [Appellant] guilty of this offense, you mus t find that each of the following [four] elements have been pro ven beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that [Appellant] possessed, controlled, [or] intentionally viewed th e computer depiction. And we’re going to say that th e term intentionally viewed means that [Appellant] deliber ately, purposely and voluntarily viewed material depicting a child of under 18 years of age engaged in a prohibited se xual act or the simulation of such an act. The term does no t mean the inadvertent or accidental viewing of such mater ial. Second, that the item depicted a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or the simulation of such an act. Third, that the child was at the time under the age of 18. And, fourth, that [Appellant] did so knowingly, in other words, [Appellant] was aware of what she possessed or controlled, she was aware of the nature of its cont ents and that the child involved was under the age of 18. N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 136-137. Appellant did not object to any portion of the tria l court’s jury charge. Id. at 143. 9

____________________________________________ 9 We note that, in response to a jury question, the trial court recharged the jury on the elements for both charges. See N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147. (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S20020-16

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The jury found Appellant guilty of both sexual abus e of children and unsworn falsification to authorities. On December 15, 2014, the trial court sentenced App ellant to serve a jail term of not less than nine months nor more tha n two years less one day, followed by two years of probation. The trial cour t denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 10 Appellant raises three claims on appeal:

[1.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the m otion to suppress statements inasmuch as the statements of [Appellant] below were involuntary under the specia l circumstances of the interrogation when obtained? [2.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the m otion for judgment of acquittal on the conviction for child pornography inasmuch as the information only charge d such crime for knowing possession or control of child pornography, but not for intentional viewing of chi ld pornography, and the evidence did not suffice to pr ove knowing possession or control of child pornography? [3.] Whether the trial court erred by denying the m otion for judgment of acquittal on the conviction for unsworn falsification to authorities inasmuch as the eviden ce did not suffice to prove the element that [Appellant] made a written false statement which she did not believe to be tru e? (Footnote Continued) _______________________ The recharge was, for all intents and purposes, ide ntical to the original charge and Appellant did not object to the trial co urt’s recharge. Id.

10 On April 23, 2015, the trial court granted Appella nt’s motion to extend the deadline for deciding the post-sentence motion. Tr ial Court Order, 4/23/15, at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(b) (“ [u]pon motion of the defendant within the 120-day disposition period, for good cau se shown, the judge may grant one 30-day extension for decision on the [pos t-sentence] motion ”).J-S20020-16

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Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some internal capitalizatio n omitted). 11 Appellant first claims that the trial court erred w hen it denied her motion to suppress the oral and written statements she made to Corporal Roche on August 14, 2013. This claim fails. “Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violati on of the defendant’s rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace , 42 A.3d 1040, 1047-1048 (Pa. Super. 2012) ( en banc ); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). With respect to an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our Supreme Court has declared:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether t he factual findings are supported by the record and whether th e legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Wh en reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we mus t consider only the evidence of the prosecution and s o much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontrad icted when read in the context of the record. . . . Wher e the record supports the findings of the suppression cou rt, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if th e legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as

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11 For ease of discussion, we have re-numbered Appell ant’s claims on appeal.J-S20020-16

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factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Gallagher , 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006). Moreover, we note that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary re cord that was created at the suppression hearing. 12 In re L.J. , 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013). “To safeguard an uncounseled individual’s Fifth Ame ndment privilege against self-incrimination, suspects subject to cus todial interrogation by law enforcement officers must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney.” In re R.H. , 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002) (plurality); Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444-445. “If a person is not advised of his Miranda rights prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers, evidence resulting from such interrogation cannot be used against him.” In re R.H. , 791 A.2d at 333; Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444-

____________________________________________ 12 On October 30, 2013, our Supreme Court decided In re L.J. In L.J. , our Supreme Court held that our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re L.J. , 79 A.3d at 1087. Prior to L.J. , this Court routinely held that, when reviewing a suppression court’s ruling, our scope of review included “the evidence presented both at the suppre ssion hearing and at trial.” See Commonwealth v. Charleston , 16 A.3d 505, 516 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Chacko , 459 A.2d 311, 317 n.5 (Pa. 1983). L.J. thus narrowed our scope of review of suppression c ourt rulings to the evidence presented at the suppression hearin g. In this case, Appellant’s suppression hearing occurred after L.J. was decided. Therefore, the procedural rule announced in L.J. applies to the case at bar.J-S20020-16

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445. However, “[a]n officer’s obligation to admini ster Miranda warnings attaches . . . only where there has been such a res triction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” In re V.H. , 788 A.2d 976, 980 (Pa. Super. 2001), quoting Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1994) (some internal quotations omitted). As this Court has summarized:

The warnings articulated by [ Miranda ] become mandatory whenever one is subjected to custodial interrogatio n. The United States Supreme Court has defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enfo rcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” [ Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444-445]. Police detentions only become custodial when, under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/o r duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitut e the functional equivalent of formal arrest. Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on whether the person is physically deprive d of his freedom of action in any significant way or is plac ed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrog ation. Moreover, the test for custodial interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the law enforc ement officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believ es his freedom of action is being restricted. The factors a court utilizes to determine, under th e totality of the circumstances, whether a detention has becom e so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whe ther the law enforcement officer showed, threatened or u sed force; and the investigative methods employed to co nfirm or dispel suspicions. The fact that a police inves tigation hasJ-S20020-16

- 15 - focused on a particular individual does not automat ically trigger “custody,” thus requiring Miranda warnings. Commonwealth v. Baker , 963 A.2d 495, 500-501 (some internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted). Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress the oral and written statements that she made to Co rporal Roche on August 14, 2013. As noted above, on August 14, 2013, Appe llant “voluntarily and of her own free will” appeared at the police statio n and then engaged in a “friendly” interview with Corporal Roche. Appellan t’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 8 and 15-16. However, during this i nterview, Appellant proffered oral and written statements that were eve ntually used against her at trial. On appeal, Appellant concedes that her interview wi th Corporal Roche that day was non-custodial in nature. Appellant’s Brief at 20-21 (conceding that the interview was non-custodial). Nevertheles s, Appellant claims that the “special circumstances” of this case resulted i n her statements being involuntary and subject to suppression. Specifical ly, Appellant claims:

even a non-custodial interrogation may result in an involuntary statement. A non-custodial interrogati on might possibly in some situations by virtue of some speci al circumstances result in an involuntary statement. See Beckwith v. United States , 425 U.S. 341, 347-348 [] (1976). It is submitted that Appellant’s circumsta nces were special in that Corporal Roche formed the opinion t hat she was reporting child pornography and that it existed on the computer, but that he questioned her motivation. T he interrogation became, at that point, a game of cat- andmouse regardless of how it began. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the statements as invo luntary.J-S20020-16

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Id. at 21-22 (some internal citations omitted). As Appellant correctly notes, in Beckwith , the United States Supreme Court recognized “that non[-]custodial interrogatio n might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances , be characterized as one where the behavior of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confess ions not freely selfdetermined.” Beckwith , 425 U.S. at 347-348 (internal quotations, citations, and corrections omitted). However, the “special circumstances” referenced in Beckwith do not exist in the case at bar. Indeed, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonw ealth, the relevant evidence in this case demonstrates that: Appellant “voluntarily and of her own free will” went to the police station on August 14, 2013 to report that her husband committed a crime; Corporal Roche spoke to Appellant in “the main area of [his] office,” at “a large conference table;” Appellant “was free to leave at any time” during the interview; Corpora l Roche never read Appellant Miranda warnings; although Appellant’s story “seemed unusu al,” Corporal Roche “had no reason to disbelieve the mai n portion of [Appellant’s] child pornography accusations” agains t her husband; during the interview, Corporal Roche “had no belief that c riminal activity by [Appellant] had occurred;” the entire interaction b etween Corporal Roche and Appellant on August 14, 2013 was “friendly;” an d, Appellant left the police station at the end of the interview. N.T. S uppression Hearing, 8/7/14,J-S20020-16

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at 7, 10-11 and 24; Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, 7/10/14, at ¶¶ 8 and 15-16. To quote Beckwith , “the entire interview [in this case] was free of coercion.” Beckwith , 425 U.S. at 348. As such, Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress fails. Next, Appellant claims that the evidence was insuff icient to support her conviction for sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). This claim fails. We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence c hallenge under the following standard:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitt ed at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict wi nner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evide nce and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact- finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude e very possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finde r unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the co mbined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its bu rden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reas onable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire re cord must be evaluated and all evidence actually received mus t be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passi ng upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evid ence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of t he evidence.J-S20020-16

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Commonwealth v. Brown , 23 A.3d 544, 559-560 (Pa. Super. 2011) ( en banc ), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson , 947 A.2d 800, 805-806 (Pa. Super. 2008). According to Appellant, although the Commonwealth c harged her with violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1), the Commonweal th’s Information only quoted a portion of the statute. In particular, Ap pellant notes, the Information only declared that Appellant had “[k]no wingly possessed or controlled” child pornography. Appellant’s Brief a t 12. However, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1) not only criminalizes the kn owing “possess[ion] or control[]” of child pornography, but it also crimin alizes the “intentional[] view[ing]” of child pornography. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 63 12(d)(1). Appellant argues that, since the Information failed to charge her with “intentionally view[ing]” child pornography, she could not have be en lawfully convicted of this aspect of the crime. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant then claims that the “Commonwealth presented no competent evidence o f [Appellant’s] knowing possession or control of the files on or ab out August 14, 2013” – and that the evidence was thus insufficient to supp ort her conviction for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). See id. Appellant’s claim fails for at least two independent reasons. First, Appellant never challenged the sufficiency o f the Commonwealth’s Information at the trial level. Mor eover, during trial, the trial court charged the jury on all aspects of 18 P a.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury t hat, to find Appellant guilty ofJ-S20020-16

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violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1), the jury must find “that [Appellant] possessed, controlled, [or] intentionally viewed the computer depiction” of child pornography. N.T. Trial, 8/19/ 14, at 137 (emphasis added); see also N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 146-147 (during the rechar ge to the jury, the trial court stated: “[t]o find [Appe llant] guilty of [sexual abuse of children,] you must find . . . first, that [Appe llant] possessed, controlled, or intentionally viewed a computer depiction” of ch ild pornography). Appellant did not object to this jury instruction. On appeal, Appellant acknowledges that she failed t o object to the trial court’s jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at 15. How ever, she claims that she still could not have been convicted of “intentional ly viewing” child pornography because “due process does not permit [h er to be] convicted of an uncharged classification of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312( d)(1). Id. This claim fails. Our Supreme Court has long-since abrogated the “bas ic and fundamental error” doctrine in the criminal law are na. See Commonwealth v. Clair , 326 A.2d 272, 274 (Pa. 1974). To preserve an issue for appellate review, it is axiomatic that th e issue must first be raised in the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, wit h respect to erroneous jury instructions, our Rules of Criminal Procedure expli citly declare: “[n]o portions of the charge nor omissions from the charg e may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(b).J-S20020-16

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In the case at bar, Appellant failed to object to t he erroneous jury charge and the trial court was thus never given the opportunity to correct its mistake. This results in waiver of the issue, notw ithstanding the fact that the error implicated Appellant’s due process rights . Certainly, when our Supreme Court eliminated the basic and fundamental error doctrine from our jurisprudence, our high Court anticipated that due process violations would and could be waived on direct appeal. As our Supre me Court declared: “abrogating the [basic and fundamental error] doctr ine in the criminal area may be even more compelling [than eliminating the d octrine from our civil law] since any error that deprives a defendant of due process can more properly be remedied by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Clair , 326 A.2d at 274 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Matty , 619 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Pa. Super. 1993) (where t he information charged the defendant with solicitation to commit t heft by receiving stolen property, but where the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of solicitation to commit theft of services, the defen dant “waived [the] issue regarding the legality of his conviction for solici tation when he failed to object to the court’s instructions to the jury on t he elements of the offense”). Thus, since Appellant failed to object to the trial court’s jury instruction, Appellant “waived [the] issue regardin g the legality of [her] conviction for” “intentionally viewing” child porno graphy. Matty , 619 A.2d at 1386-87. Moreover, since Appellant’s sufficienc y of the evidence claimJ-S20020-16

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was logically dependent upon this Court concluding that the defect in the Information precluded her conviction for “intention ally viewing” child pornography, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidenc e claim necessarily fails. At any rate, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails be cause the evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant “[k]nowingly possessed or controlled” child pornography. As the trial court cogently exp lained:

Corporal Roche testified that [Appellant] presented herself at the [Pennsylvania] State Police Barracks on Augu st 14, 2013, with the subject computer. Corporal Roche fu rther testified that [Appellant] “was essentially bringin g me the computer because she wanted me to take a look at wh at was on it because she wanted to tell me that there was child pornography images on the computer and that t hey were put there by her husband, Matthew Woods.” [N. T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 31]. Finally, with regard to Co rporal Roche’s opinion about the nature of the images that he found, he stated that he “found in excess of 40 ima ges and specifically 43 images of what I believed depicted child pornography of some sort, whether it be the focal p oint of the genital area of a person under the age of 18, c ertainly a prepubescent person or they are engaged in sex of s ome sort or simulation thereof or masturbation. These would all meet the definition of child pornography. [ Id. at 49]. Given the testimony of Corporal Roche, and viewing that testimony in the light most favorable to the Common wealth, it is easy to see how the jury believed that [Appel lant] purposely downloaded images of child pornography on the family’s computer for the purpose of reporting the presence of the images to the Pennsylvania State Police, and all with the goal of having Matthew Woods, her estranged hus band, charged with criminal offenses of a sexual nature. By necessity, such a finding means that [Appellant] kn owingly, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 302(b),] downloaded a nd possessed images containing child pornography. In other words, [Appellant] was aware of her conduct and the nature of her conduct, because it was her express purpose toJ-S20020-16

- 22 - download child pornography, possess these images, a nd take these images to the Pennsylvania State Police; her plan would not [have] work[ed] without these action s. Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/15, at 14-15 (some intern al citations omitted). We agree with the trial court. Therefore, we concl ude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conv iction for sexual abuse of children under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1). Appellan t’s claim to the contrary fails. For Appellant’s final claim on appeal, Appellant co ntends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for unsworn falsification to authorities; the conviction was based upon the w ritten statement that Appellant made on August 14, 2013, in the Pennsylva nia State Police Barracks. Appellant’s claim on appeal is waived. Appellant was convicted of unsworn falsification to authorities under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1). This section declares:

(a) In general. --A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with intent to mislead a public s ervant in performing his official function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)(1). As is apparent, before this Court may consider Appe llant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her Sectio n 4904(a)(1) conviction, this Court must be able to review the entire writte n statement that Appellant made on August 14, 2013. Yet, Appellant has failed to include the writtenJ-S20020-16

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statement in the certified record to this Court. T herefore, we must conclude that Appellant’s final claim on appeal is waived. Commonwealth v. Saranchak , 675 A.2d 268, 275 (Pa. 1996) (“[i]t is appellant’ s responsibility to ensure that any relevant related matter be filed or made part of the original record” and, where appellant fails to ensu re that the certified record is sufficient to review the claims raised on appeal , the claims are waived); Commonwealth v. Kennedy , 868 A.2d 582, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“this Court may not consider anything that is not part of the official certified record: [a]ny document which is not part of the off icial certified record is considered to be non-existent”) (internal quotation s and citations omitted). Judgment of sentence affirmed. Panella, J. joins the decision. Platt, J. concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/11/2016J-S20020-16

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