IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES HOWARD STINSON, :

:

Petitioner :

: CIVIL NO. 4:07-CV-1237

:

v. : (Judge McClure)

:

DAVID J. WAKEFIELD, et al., :

:

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

 April 9, 2010

I. Introduction

Petitioner Charles Howard Stinson (“Petitioner” or “Stinson”), an inmate

presently confined at the Huntingdon State Correctional Institution (“SCI

Huntingdon”) in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, commenced the above action pro se by

filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

(Rec. Doc. No. 1.) Stinson challenges his March 19, 1990 conviction in the

Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. According to the petition, Stinson was

convicted of aggravated assault; burglary (three counts); simple assault; recklessly

endangering another person; criminal trespass (eleven counts); criminal attempt to

commit burglary (eight counts); and criminal attempt to commit theft. On July 21,

1992, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of ten (10) to twenty

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(20) years. (See Rec. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 2-3.)

 Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment. 

(Rec. Doc. No. 29.) Petitioner seeks summary judgment as to the first ground in his

petition that the delay in his direct appeal proceedings violated his constitutional

rights of due process, equal protection, and to a “speedy direct appeal.” (See id. ¶¶ 1,

4-6; Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 8, 9, 11, 13.) He argues that, because Respondents did not file

any opposition to his state petition for habeas corpus in which he sought relief as a

result of the delay in his direct appeal proceedings, they waived any contentions they

had. (See Rec. Doc. No. 29 ¶ 3.) He therefore claims that there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to Respondents having violated his constitutional rights by causing the

delay in his direct appeal proceedings, and that he is therefore entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. (Id. ¶¶ 4-10; Rec. Doc. No. 56, Reply, ¶¶ 8-9.) As relief, Stinson

seeks discharge from his judgments of sentence, with prejudice to re-trial, or a

reduction of his sentence “by a factor proportioned with the delay in direct appeal

proceedings in this matter.” (Rec. Doc. No. 29 ¶ 11.) For the reasons set forth below,

the motion will be denied.

II. Discussion

 Summary judgment is appropriate in a habeas proceeding, as in other cases “if 

the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show

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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4); Rule 11,

Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254; Hilton v. Braunskill, 481

U.S. 770, 775-76 & n.5 (1987) (“[W]here, as here, the need is evident for principles to

guide the conduct of habeas proceedings, it is entirely appropriate to ‘use . . . [general

civil] rules by analogy or otherwise.’ (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294

(1969)). See also Judge v. Beard, 611 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419-20 (E.D. Pa. 2009)

(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 56, are applicable to petitions for

habeas corpus); Wilson v. Beard, 2006 WL 2346277, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2006)

(same); Forman v. Cathel, 2006 WL 840392, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2006) (same).

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that “a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal

court’s habeas power is “‘limited . . . to a determination of whether there has been an

improper detention by virtue of the state court judgment.’” Hassine v. Zimmerman,

160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 168

(3d Cir. 1998)). “Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus

is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually

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led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral

proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation.” Id. (emphasis in original). See

also Thomas v. Miner, 317 Fed. Appx. 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming district

court’s determination that petitioner’s challenge to Pennsylvania Superior Court’s

decision affirming denial of post-conviction relief petition was not cognizable in

habeas petition). 

 In Hassine, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that, where a petitioner 

seeks relief for a claim that his right to due process has been violated by delay in his

collateral proceedings, his remedy, if any, is a lawsuit for damages or a writ of

mandamus rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hassine, 160 F.3d at 955. 

In reaching that holding, the Hassine Court invoked the reasoning of the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals that a “[d]elay in processing [a] collateral claim does not

make the continued imprisonment of the defendant unlawful, and hence, does not

warrant federal habeas corpus relief.” Id. at 954-55 (citing Montgomery v. Meloy, 90

F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 907 (1996); Jackson v.

Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir.) (stating that “federal habeas corpus cannot

remedy a delay in state collateral proceedings because such an error has absolutely

nothing to do with the reason for a defendant's confinement”), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

955 (1997)).

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In responding to the instant motion, Respondents David J. Wakefield, Warden

of SCI Huntingdon, and Tom Corbett, Pennsylvania Attorney General, point out that

they were not named as respondents to Stinson’s state habeas petition in which he

sought relief for the delay in his direct appeal proceedings. (See Rec. Doc. No. 51 at

3-4.) Because Respondents were not parties to that action, there is no merit to

Stinson’s argument that their failure to file opposition in his state habeas action

entitles him to judgment as a matter of law in this action. Further, because they had

no involvement in his direct appeal proceedings, there would be no basis to enter

judgment against Respondents in this action as to Stinson’s claim that his

constitutional rights were violated as a result of the delay in those proceedings. 

5

In the instant case, the claim as to which Stinson seeks summary judgment

arises not from the proceedings that led to his conviction, but rather from his direct

appeal proceedings. In addition, the relief Stinson seeks in the instant motion is not

solely judgment as a matter of law, but also discharge from his judgments of sentence

or a reduction of his sentence. Based on the Third Circuit’s holding in Hassine, and

notwithstanding whether Stinson would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law

against Respondents in this action1

, where Stinson is not entitled to habeas relief as to

the first ground in his petition regarding delay in his direct appeal proceedings, he also

is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim in the form of a discharge

from his judgments of sentence or reduction of his sentence. Therefore, the instant

motion for partial summary judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 29) will be denied. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 29) is

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DENIED.

 s/ James F. McClure, Jr. 

JAMES F. McCLURE, JR.

United States District Judge

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