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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES M. LAYDEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 05-165 Erie

)

v. )

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, J.

Plaintiff, James M. Layden, commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Layden filed an application for DIB on March 13, 2003,

alleging disability since February 7, 2003 due to depression, anxiety and nervousness

(Administrative Record, hereinafter “AR”, 57-59, 68). His application was denied, and Layden

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (AR 36-40). Following a hearing

held on April 23, 2004, the ALJ found that Layden was not entitled to a period of disability or

disability insurance under the Act (AR 14-24, 164-201). Layden’s request for review by the

Appeals Council was denied (AR 4-6), rendering the Commissioner’s decision final under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action challenges the ALJ’s decision. Presently pending before the

Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will deny

the Plaintiff’s motion and grant the Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Layden was born on March 25, 1939, and was 65 years old on the date of the ALJ’s

decision (AR 15, 57). He is a high school graduate, with past relevant work experience as an

accounts payable/receivable assistant and purchasing manager (AR 69). He currently receives

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$1,225.00 per month in Social Security retirement benefits, and $817.30 per month from his

company pension (AR 17, 171). 

Layden was seen by Raymond A. Haibach, M.D., on September 26, 2002 and reported he

was under a lot of stress at work (AR 127). He complained of tiredness, lack of energy and

sleeplessness (AR 127). Dr. Haibach diagnosed work stress with mild depression, and discussed

the situation with Layden, who was trying to decide whether to retire (AR 127). Layden was

prescribed Prozac (AR 127). 

Layden returned on November 7, 2002 and reported that the Prozac had helped his nerves

“a little bit” but did not help with the stress (AR 126). He still felt tired during the day and did

not sleep well at night (AR 126). Dr. Haibach diagnosed work stress with underlying

depression/anxiety (AR 126). He increased his Prozac dosage, recommended he cease work for

one month, and suggested he see a counselor (AR 126). 

On November 14, 2002, Layden was seen by Glenn T. Bailey, M.A., C.R.C. (AR 143). 

Layden reported that over the last several months his work load had increased, he lost his clerical

help, and felt stressed and overwhelmed (AR 143). He did not believe he could handle the

volume of work, but was fine at home (AR 104). Mr. Bailey found he was pleasant and

cooperative, but was quite nervous and expressed fears of not being able to perform his job (AR

104, 143). Mr. Bailey diagnosed him with acute stress disorder and dysthymic disorder (AR

143). He opined that he appeared to be suffering from the typical symptom cluster normally seen

in individuals experiencing emotional “burn out” (AR 143). 

According to Mr. Bailey, Layden reported that his Prozac had decreased his anxiety along

with his depression, but he still suffered disruptive sleep (AR 143). He indicated that he had

difficulties with concentration, but Mr. Bailey found that that was expected with a severe stress

reaction (AR 143). He found that overall, Layden did not present with any word retrieval

problems, nor did he appear to have any significant memory impairments (AR 143). Mr. Bailey

concluded that his reported memory difficulties were most likely attributable to his depression

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and anxiety (AR 143). Layden was adamant that he wanted to work and found his work

fulfilling, but believed he could no longer maintain the high pressure pace he was carrying for the

company (AR 143-144). Mr. Bailey felt he was sincere in his desire to return to work (AR 144). 

He recommended that Layden not only decrease his work load, but reorganize how he performed

his job (AR 144). Layden was open to his suggestion and to the possibility of working at another

job in the plant (AR 144). He preferred an assistant to help him, but if that was not possible, he

wanted to be reassigned to a different position within the company (AR 144). 

Mr. Bailey recommended that he reduce his work day to four hours per day for the next

thirty days and then undergo a reevaluation (AR 144). He opined that Layden’s employment

environment must be changed or he would deteriorate emotionally, and that returning to the same

stressful environment would be detrimental to his health (AR 144). He was of the opinion that

Layden could recuperate given the right atmosphere and support from his employer, and should

he be able to return to work half time, that would allow him to gradually phase back into his job

and restructure his job so he could function more effectively (AR 144). Mr. Bailey further

opined that if his employer would not accommodate half time work, he would not be able to

function in a full time capacity (AR 144). 

Layden returned to Dr. Haibach on December 6, 2002 and reported he was doing better,

and had decreased his Prozac dosage (AR 125). He indicated that Mr. Bailey recommended he

not return to work full time but only work four hours per day (AR 125). He was considering

resigning from his job, but reported he was thinking and feeling better since he had been off work

for one month (AR 125). Dr. Haibach diagnosed work related stress, improving, and prescribed

Ativan in addition to Prozac to help him sleep (AR 125). He gave Layden a note stating he could

return to work four hours a day beginning December 9, 2002 (AR 125). 

On January 6, 2003, Layden reported that he was still not working because his employer

would not allow him to work part time, although he was anxious to go back to work (AR 124). 

He stated he was doing better at home, and his wife reported that he was less tense, but she was

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concerned about his memory and thought he might have Alzheimer’s (AR 124). Dr. Haibach

diagnosed Layden with improved stress with underlying depression, and opined that he could

have another nervous breakdown if he returned to his old job full time (AR 124). He further

opined that Layden could only work fours hours a day, five days a week, or needed to find a

different position (AR 124). Layden had stopped taking Ativan, but continued taking Prozac

(AR 124). 

On January 27, 2003, Layden reported to Mr. Bailey that he was working full days, but

had only partial duties (AR 103). He claimed he was fatigued by work and did not want to quit,

but could not sustain himself at his current work level (AR 103). 

Layden returned to Dr. Haibach on February 4, 2003 and reported that he had been back

to work for four weeks, had a lot of work related stress and was not functioning well (AR 123). 

He claimed he was up to about ninety percent of his normal work load and felt nervous and

anxious (AR 123). He further claimed that every time he tried to work full time his health

slipped (AR 123). He was still on Prozac and slept better (AR 123). On February 5, 2003, Dr.

Haibach wrote a letter “[t]o whom it may concern” opining that Layden was unable to work at

100% of his work load in his current position due to stress (AR 122). 

On February 19, 2003, Mr. Bailey wrote Dr. Haibach stating that Layden could not

tolerate the high demands placed on him by his employer (AR 142). Mr. Bailey was of the

opinion that since the company would not allow him to work part time, he was not capable of

remaining employed at the company (AR 142). He was further of the opinion that it was beyond

Layden’s endurance capacity should he have to return to work full time (AR 142).

On March 11, 2003, Layden reported to Dr. Haibach that he had not been working for

about a month and was doing “okay,” although he felt somewhat depressed in the mornings since

he did not have to go to work (AR 121). He requested to discontinue the Prozac, and Dr.

Haibach advised him to take one every other day until his prescription ran out (AR 121). Layden

was diagnosed with depression and work related exhaustion (AR 121). 

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Layden returned to Dr. Haibach on May 12, 2003 and claimed he felt “pretty good” and

was no longer taking his Prozac (AR 120). He claimed he would arise in the morning and sit

around until noon, but had joined a golf league and had no problem getting out of bed early to

play golf (AR 120). He was diagnosed with work related stress and fatigue (AR 120). Dr.

Haibach wrote a letter stating that he was unable to work for at least the next twelve to twentyfour months due to stress and depression (AR 119).

Mr. Bailey completed a medical report on May 12, 2003, and opined that Layden had no

impairments in his activities of daily living, social functioning, or concentration, persistence and

pace (AR 136-137). With respect to his content of thought, Mr. Bailey noted Layden was fearful

and tended to obsess about his work situation, and his concentration, recent memory, and

immediate retention and recall fluctuated due to his anxiety (AR 135-136). His prognosis was

good if his anxiety and stress remained low (AR 138). 

Mr. Bailey also completed a medical assessment of Layden’s ability to perform workrelated mental activities, opining that he had a “good” ability to follow work rules; relate to coworkers; deal with the public; use judgment; interact with supervisors; function independently;

behave in an emotionally stable manner; relate predictably in social situations; and demonstrate

reliability; a “fair” ability to maintain attention/concentration, but his ability to make

performance adjustments fluctuated depending on stress; and a “poor/none” ability to deal with

work stresses (AR 139-140). 

On May 15, 2003, Mr. Bailey wrote Dr. Haibach reporting that Layden had stated that his

disability insurance carrier had indicated that his disability claim was “not strong enough” (AR

141). Mr. Bailey stated that his opinion on Layden’s ability to work at the company had not

changed (AR 141). He opined that Layden’s condition was long term, and due to the severity of

his anxiety and depression, he was disabled for the foreseeable future (AR 141). Mr. Bailey

stated “I do not ever expect him to return to work” (AR 141).

On May 22, 2003, Richard Heil, Ph.D., a state agency reviewing psychologist, reviewed

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the medical evidence of record and determined that Layden had only mild restrictions in his

activities of daily living and in maintaining social functioning; moderate limitations in

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no repeated episodes of decompensation of

extended duration (AR 158). Dr. Heil completed a mental residual functional capacity

assessment form, and opined that Layden was “not significantly limited” in his ability to

understand, remember and carry out short, simple and detailed instructions; sustain an ordinary

routine without special supervision; work in coordination with others without being distracted;

make simple work-related decisions; interact appropriately with the general public; ask simple

questions or request assistance; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors; get along with co-workers or peers; maintain socially appropriate behavior; be aware

of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; and travel in unfamiliar places or use public

transportation; was “moderately limited” in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for

extended periods; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be

punctual with regular tolerances; complete a normal workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace; respond appropriately to

changes in the work setting; and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others (AR

145-146). 

Dr. Heil considered Mr. Bailey’s May 2003 assessment, but found that his assessment

was an overestimate of Layden’s limitations and was contradicted by the medical evidence and

other evidence of record (AR 147). Dr. Heil found that the limitations resulting from his

impairments did not preclude him from meeting the basic mental demands of competitive work

on a sustained basis (AR 147). 

Layden, his wife, and Joseph Kuhar, Ph.D., a vocational expert, testified at the hearing

held by the ALJ on April 23, 2004 (AR 164-201). Layden testified that he lived with his wife,

daughter, and his granddaughter (AR 168). He claimed he stopped working as a purchasing

manager since he “just about had a nervous breakdown” and his doctor and psychologist advised

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him not to work (AR 168). He denied suffering from sleep disturbances or difficulties with

concentration, and only had problems with his memory regarding “trivial stuff” (AR 174-175). 

He was able to get along with his family and neighbors, and took no prescribed medication (AR

175). 

Layden testified that during a typical day he was “fairly busy” until 10:00 p.m. (AR 173). 

He walked three to four miles at a local mall, ate breakfast, did paperwork for approximately one

hour, went to a senior’s center for lunch, ran errands, ate dinner, and went to a local health club

approximately three nights per week to exercise (AR 173). He testified that he attended

woodworking classes two nights per week and had signed up for a stained glass class (AR 175). 

He was also halfway through clown college and planned to do community work with children

(AR 175). Layden belonged to a bowling league and played racquetball at the health club (AR

175). He was able to drive, go to the grocery store, and do repairs around the house (AR 173-

174). He claimed he was able to engage in the described activities because they were not

stressful and he could cancel them (AR 189). 

Layden’s wife testified that he was more argumentative while working in 2002 and 2003,

and after he ceased working his condition improved (AR 190-191). Mrs. Layden further testified

that he would not be able to perform any work because he still became a little agitated and could

not handle a “stressful environment” (AR 191-192). 

The ALJ asked the vocational expert if work existed for an individual of Layden’s age,

education and past work experience, who had no physical limitations, but had the following

limitations: experiences some difficulty in the work place and should be limited to simple,

routine and repetitive work not requiring close attention to detail, in a low stress environment,

defined as requiring few decisions (AR 196). The vocational expert testified that such an

individual could perform a job as a stock clerk, janitor cleaner, laundry worker and general

plastic laborer (AR 197). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision which found that Layden was 

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was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance within the meaning of the Social

Security Act (AR 14-24). Layden’s request for an appeal with the Appeals Council was denied

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner (AR 4-6). He subsequently

filed this action. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the determination of the Commissioner unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Richardson v.

Parales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It has been defined as less than a preponderance of evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Jesurum v. Secretary of the

United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable

to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine when an individual meets

this definition:

In the first two steps, the claimant must establish (1) that he is not

engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and (2) that he suffers

from a severe medical impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-41 (1987). If the claimant shows a severe medical

impairment, the [Commissioner] determines (3) whether the

impairment is equivalent to an impairment listed by the

[Commissioner] as creating a presumption of disability. Bowen,

482 U.S. at 141. If it is not, the claimant bears the burden of

showing (4) that the impairment prevents him from performing the

work that he has performed in the past. Id. If the claimant satisfies

this burden, the [Commissioner] must grant the claimant benefits

unless the [Commissioner] can demonstrate (5) that there are jobs

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in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ferguson

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 117. The ALJ resolved Layden’s case at the fifth step. At step two, the ALJ

determined that his major depressive disorder and acute stress disorder were severe impairments,

but determined at step three that he did not meet a listing (AR 15-16). At step four, the ALJ

determined that Layden had the residual functional capacity to perform work that was limited to

simple, routine, repetitive work that did not require close attention to detail, performed in a low

stress environment, defined as one requiring few decisions (AR 16). At the final step, the ALJ

found that Layden could perform the jobs cited by the vocational expert at the administrative

hearing (AR 27). The ALJ also concluded that Layden’s assertion that he was unable to work on

a full time basis was not fully credible (AR 24). Again, we must affirm this determination unless

it is not supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

As an initial matter, we must determine whether additional evidence attached to Layden’s

Motion should be considered by the Court in our review. Layden attached three documents to his

Motion that were not presented or considered by the ALJ or the Appeals Council. The first

document is a letter dated May 2, 2005 authored by Dr. Haibach. Plaintiff’s Motion Ex. A. Dr.

Haibach opined that due to Layden’s problems with work related stress and depression, he was

“unable to do any work at this time” including unskilled labor. Id. The second document, dated

May 19, 2005, is a letter addressed to the Appeals Council authored by Layden. Plaintiff’s

Motion Ex. B. In this letter, Layden states that he tried to obtain the four jobs identified by the

vocational expert, but that the potential employers, after reviewing his health reports, disqualified

him from any employment positions. Id. Layden further states in the letter that the potential

employers required a doctor’s release before they would consider hiring him. Id. The last

document is a letter addressed to Layden from UnumProvident dated January 19, 2005, advising

him that as a result of a settlement with insurance regulators and the United States Department of

Labor, he could request reassessment of his claim for long term disability. Plaintiff’s Motion Ex.

C. 

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A review of the ALJ’s decision and a list of exhibits reveals that this additional evidence

was not considered by the ALJ or the Appeals Council. Pursuant to Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d

589, 593 (3rd Cir. 2001), in order to qualify for a remand option, three requirements must be

satisfied: (1) the additional evidence must be “new”; (2) it must be “material” to determination of

the claimant’s disability benefits claim; and (3) there must be “good cause” for the claimant’s

failure to present the new evidence in a prior proceeding. Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593 (“[W]hen

[a] claimant seeks to rely on evidence that was not before the ALJ, the district court may remand

to the Commissioner but only if the evidence is new and material and if there was good cause

why it was not previously presented to the ALJ.”).

Dr. Haibach states in his May 2, 2005 letter that Layden is “unable to do any work at this

time.” Plaintiff’s Motion Ex. A (emphasis added). This opinion, which disqualifies him from all

work, was written a full year after the ALJ’s decision. Dr. Haibach does not express the view

that Layden was “unable to do any work” during the claimed disability period. Consequently,

this letter is immaterial since it does not relate to the time period for which benefits were denied. 

See, e.g., Wilson v. Halter, 2001 WL 410542 (E.D.Pa. 2001), aff’d in an unpublished opinion,

2002 WL 130415 (3rd Cir. 2002) (medical reports relating to period of time after that addressed in

the hearing are immaterial to the ALJ’s decision and therefore do not warrant remand); Ordo v.

Apfel, 2001 WL 1159856 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (remand not appropriate since new evidence did not

relate back to time period for which benefits were denied). 

Even if the letter of May 2, 2005 could be viewed as an inartful attempt to clarify his

letter of February 5, 2003, which merely expressed the view that Layden was “unable to work at

100% of his work load in his current position”, Layden has offered no explanation as to why he

did not obtain Dr. Haibach’s opinion at a time when it could be considered by the ALJ. 

Matthews, 239 F.3d at 593-95 (“[W]e believe that it is a much sounder policy to require

claimants to present all material evidence to the ALJ and prohibit judicial review of new

evidence unless there is good reason for not having brought it before the ALJ.”). 

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1Section 404.1504 of the regulations provides: “A decision by any nongovernmental

agency or any other governmental agency about whether you are disabled or blind is based on its

rules and is not our decision about whether you are disabled or blind. We must make a disability

or blindness determination based on social security law. Therefore, a decision made by another

agency that you are disabled or blind is not binding on us.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.

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With respect to the letter detailing his attempts to secure unskilled employment, this

evidence is not material, meaning that it is not “relevant and probative” and there is no

“reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the

Secretary’s determination.” Szubak v. Sec’y of HHS, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3rd Cir. 1984). Whether

Layden would in fact not be hired because of his mental impairments is irrelevant to the issues

before the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(a)(3) (“We consider that work exists in the national

economy when it exists in significant numbers either in the region where you live or in several

other regions in the county. It does not matter whether ... [y]ou would be hired if you applied for

work.”); see also Howard v. Bowen, 664 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.J. 1987) (an employer’s reluctance

to hire people who would work for only a short period of time is not relevant under the Act). 

Likewise, we conclude that Layden is not entitled to a new evidence remand on the basis

of the letter he received from UnumProvident informing him that he could request reassessment

of his claim for long term disability since this evidence is also not “material.” First, the letter

merely provides that Layden could seek reassessment of his claim and is not a decision on the

merits of his claim. Moreover, even if Layden was approved for benefits from his company,

findings by a nongovernmental agency are not binding on the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1504.1 

Having concluded that we will not consider the records attached to Layden’s Motion, we

now direct our attention to his arguments relative to the evidence that was before the ALJ. 

Layden essentially argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of his treating physician,

Dr. Haibach and his psychologist, Mr. Bailey, and erred in his credibility determination. We

shall address each of these arguments in turn. 

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Layden first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Haibach and Mr.

Bailey. At the outset we note that a treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight only

when it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques

and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record” see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), and may only be rejected on the basis of contradictory medical

testimony. Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3rd Cir. 1988). When medical testimony

conflicts or is inconsistent, the ALJ is required to choose between them. Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3rd Cir. 1981). In making that choice, a treating physician’s conclusions are to be

examined carefully and accorded more weight than a non-treating physician’s opinion. 

Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 217 (3rd Cir 1984). Where an ALJ chooses to reject the

opinion of a treating physician, he must adequately explain in the record his reasons for doing so. 

Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 266 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“Where the Secretary is faced with conflicting

evidence, he must adequately explain in the record his reasons for rejecting or discrediting

competent evidence.”).

Contrary to Layden’s contention, we find that the ALJ considered his treating physicians’ 

opinions consistent with the above standards. In an opinion dated February 5, 2003, Dr. Haibach

opined that Layden was unable to work at 100% of his work load in his current position due to

stress (AR 122). On May 12, 2003, he opined that Layden was unable to work for at least the

next twelve to twenty-four months due to stress and depression (AR 119). Mr. Bailey opined in

May 2003 that Layden’s condition was long term, and due to the severity of his anxiety and

depression, he was disabled for the foreseeable future (AR 141).

The ALJ declined to give these opinions controlling weight based, in part, upon his

conclusion that the actual determination of disability is expressly reserved to the Commissioner

(AR 21). We find no error in this regard. “The ultimate decision concerning the disability of a

claimant is reserved for the Commissioner.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 (3rd Cir. 2000). 

The pertinent regulations provide that opinions on some issues, including the opinion of whether

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a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability (i.e., is “disabled” or “unable to work”) are

not medical opinions “but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because

they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case. ...” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e).

The ALJ further concluded that Mr. Bailey’s opinion and Dr. Haibach’s opinions were

inconsistent with the other evidence of record (AR 21). A treating source’s medical opinion

concerning the nature and severity of the claimant’s alleged impairments will be given

controlling weight if the Commissioner finds that the treating source’s opinion is “well-supported

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). Here, we conclude that

the ALJ could properly decline to give Dr. Haibach’s and Mr. Bailey’s opinions controlling

weight under these standards.

As noted by the ALJ, although Mr. Bailey clearly opined that Layden could not return to

his position at the company, his reports did not state that he was incapable of performing full

time work in another position (AR 21). Indeed, Mr. Bailey suggested that Layden explore the

possibility of working at another job at the plant (AR 144). He was also of the opinion that given

the right atmosphere and support from his employer, he could return to work part time and

gradually phase back into his job (AR 144). Finally, Mr. Bailey found that he had a “good” or

“fair” ability to perform a number of work-related mental activities, and, although his ability to

deal with work stress was “poor”, his prognosis was good if his anxiety and stress remained low

(AR 138-140). 

Similarly, Dr. Haibach’s opinions did not preclude all work. Dr. Haibach’s progress

notes show that Layden was diagnosed with work stress and mild depression in September 2002,

and Layden was considering retirement (AR 127). In December 2002 Layden was doing better

and had decreased his dosage of Prozac (AR 125). In January 2003, Dr. Haibach noted he was

improving, and recommended he work part time in his current position or he needed to find a

different position (AR 124) (emphasis added). He opined in February 2003 that Layden was

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unable to work in his current position due to stress (AR 122) (emphasis added). By May 2003

Layden reportedly felt “pretty good” and was no longer taking his Prozac (AR 120). 

Layden also argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the opinion of Dr. Heil, the state

agency reviewing psychologist, in discounting his treating physicians’ opinions since he only had

a “slice” of the record to review. To the contrary, Dr. Heil undertook a comprehensive review of

all of the medical evidence and provided a detailed explanation for his opinion that Layden was

not significantly limited or only moderately limited in a number of work related areas (AR 145-

147). It is long-settled that the findings of a non-examining physician may be substantial

evidence defeating contrary opinions. Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3rd Cir. 1991) (ALJ

did not err in rejecting opinion of treating physician in favor of opinions from state agency

physicians, where treating physicians’ opinions were conclusory and unsupported by the medical

evidence). Since the ALJ analyzed the medical evidence consistent with the required standards,

we find that his determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

Finally, Layden challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination. An ALJ must consider

subjective complaints by the claimant and evaluate the extent to which those complaints are

supported or contradicted by the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Subjective complaints must be seriously considered, whether or not they

are fully confirmed by the objective medical evidence. See Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3rd

Cir. 1981). The ALJ as the finder of fact can reject, partially or fully, subjective complaints if he

finds them not credible based on other evidence in the record. Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d

309, 312 (3rd Cir. 1974). The ALJ is empowered to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and his

determination is entitled to deference by this Court. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F2d 871,

873 (3rd Cir. 1983). 

Here, the ALJ found that Layden’s claim that he was unable to work full time was not

fully credible (AR 24). In making this determination, the ALJ considered the medical evidence

of record, the medical opinions, and Layden’s own recitation of his daily activities (AR 16-22). 

Case 1:05-cv-00165-SJM Document 14 Filed 12/27/05 Page 14 of 16
15

We agree with the ALJ that the objective findings (without repeating such findings here) do not

support Layden’s claims that his mental impairments prevented him from engaging in full time

work. Moreover, the ALJ accommodated Layden’s mental limitations in his hypothetical to the

vocational expert by limiting him to simple, routine, repetitive work that did not require close

attention to detail, performed in a low stress environment (AR 16). 

Layden argues that the ALJ’s reliance on his active lifestyle in concluding that he was not

disabled was in error. It is well established in this Circuit that “disability does not mean that a

claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity” nor

does “sporadic and transitory activity ... disprove disability.” Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968,

971 (3rd Cir. 1981). Layden testified that on a typical day he walked three to four miles at a local

mall, ate breakfast, did paperwork for approximately one hour, went to a senior’s center for

lunch, ran errands, ate dinner, and went to a local health club approximately three nights per

week to exercise (AR 173). He attended woodworking classes two nights per week, had signed

up for a stained glass class, and was halfway through clown college (AR 175). He belonged to a

bowling league and played racquetball at the health club (AR 175). He was able to drive, go to

the grocery store, and do repairs around the house (AR 173-174). By his own testimony, Layden

claimed he was “fairly busy” until 10:00 p.m. and his participation in these activities was

relatively consistent (AR 173). Consequently, Layden’s own description of his activities does

not support a conclusion that these activities were sporadic or transitory. We therefore find that

the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

IV. CONCLUSION

An appropriate Order follows.

 

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16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES M. LAYDEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 05-165 Erie

)

v. )

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 27th day of December, 2005, and for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or

alternatively, Motion for Remand [Doc. No. 11] is DENIED, and the Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 12] is GRANTED. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of

Defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff, James

M. Layden. The clerk is directed to mark the case closed. 

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. 

 

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