2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/709NOT PRE CEDENT IAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

_______________ No. 03-4089

________________ SHARON BOY D,

Appellant v. JO AN NE BA RN HA RT , COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

____________________________________ On A ppeal Fro m the U nited States D istrict Court For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 02-cv- 01177) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Michael M. Bay lson

_______________________________________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

May 4, 2004 Be for e: S LO VI TE R, F UE NT ES and BE CK ER , Circuit Judges (Fil ed: May 13, 2004)

_______________________

OPI NION

_______________________ BE CK ER , Circuit

Judge. Sharon Boyd appea ls fr om an order of the District Court granti ng the moti on for
sum ma ry judg me nt b y the C om mis sion er an d de nying the c ross -mo tion filed by B oyd. Bec au se th e p arti es ar e f ul ly fa mi li arwit

h the ba ck gr oun d fac ts an d proc ed ur al hi st or y we1 Actuall y Boy d was represe nted bycounsel for a time during the a dminist rati ve proceedi ngs, but

counsel wit

hdrew before thehearing.

2 need n ot set them fo rth, and limit our discus sion to our ratio dec iden di. This appe al is grounded pri marily

on Boyd’s c ontenti ons that she was essentiall y for ced to go through with the he aring bef

ore the Admini strative Law Judge ( “ALJ”) without c ounsel, and that the AL J then did no t adequately deve lop the record
. The other i ssue is whether sub st antia l e vi den ce s upp or ts th e Comm is si one r’ s de te rmi natio n t hat Boy d co ul d pe rf

or m, ata mi ni mum, se den tarywork . We wil l a ffi rm. I. We reject Boy d’s cl aim that she was compelle d to procee d without represent ation, 1 notw ithstand ing h er lam ent tha t she ag reed to proc eed w ith the h earing beca use sh e cou ld not then af ford a law yer. On the form for reque sti ng an administ rati ve heari ng, the Social Security Adm inistration (“SSA ”) advised B oyd of her right to rep resentation. M oreover, prior to the he aring, the Agency sent Boy d two additi onal noti ces advis ing her of he r ri ght to be represented at the a dminist rati ve heari ng. One noti ce incl uded a publi cati on entitled Your Right to Representat ion , wh ich is av ailable a t http: //www.ssa. gov/pubs/ 10075.pdf (Feb. 2002) and wh ich: (1) notes t hat SSA can p rovide a list of available representatives; (2) ex plaine d w hat a re prese ntative could do; (3 ) exp lained wh at a rep resen tative co uld charge; (4) expl ained what fee a clai mant would have to pay ; and (5) provided a tele phone number to cal l if c laimant had any que sti ons about t he right to representat

ion. The AL J also g ave in struction s to B oyd abo ut the a vailab ility of coun sel, off ering to3

continue the hearing for her to secure a repre sentative or anot her attorney . Yet, as M agistrate Judg e A ngell n oted, th ere is n o sug gestion that M s. Bo yd wa s not q ualified to make the deci sion: She is l iter ate, has held s everaljobs i ncluding a short- time posi tion as servi ce supervi sor where she “ supervi sed other people” and “us ed techni cal knowledge or skills .” Sh e als o re ceiv ed s pec ial tra inin g in hos pital ity and hou sek eep ing
. In tot al, Boyd rece ived noti fication of her right to repres entation thr oughout the adm inistrative proc eedin gs on six sep arate o ccasio ns, inclu ding a listing o f ava ilable rep rese ntati on. An d he r prio r co uns el, see supra note 1, was affili ated with one such group, Comm unity Legal Services. We have held that where a clai mant has been notifie d of her ri ght to represent ation and has knowinglywaived that right , la ck of repres entation is no t suf ficie nt, in itself , to ju stify a r em and
. Livings ton v. Califano , 614 F.2d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 198 0). On the basis of the fact s described above, we are s atis fied that Boyd ha d full knowle dge of her ri ght to represent ation and did not pur sue it ; hence she waived the right. II. We also re ject B oyd’s co ntentio n that e ven if she k now ingly w aived her rig ht to counsel, she was prej udiced becaus e the ALJ did not fully develop the record, requiring a remand. The ALJ here adequatelydeveloped the record, which incl uded numerous medica l reports from s pecialists, state agency physicians, and a v ocational exp ert. In additi on, the ALJ questioned Boy d about her a llege d subjective complai nts and2 W e a lso no te t ha t in th e m or e th an tw o ye ar s s in ce th e A LJ de cid ed th is c as e, B oyd

has not sub mitted any additional m edical records, w hich further su ggests that the reco rd was adequatel y devel oped and that she was not pre

judice d.
3 We have also examined t he medical reports of Michael JayKorman, M.D., Matthew V. Gilla ne, P.T. , Gerald E. Dworkin, D.O., Phi lip S. Kim, M.D., and Richar d B. Kanoff, D.O . None of them is at odds w ith Dr. Can der’s evaluation , including those o f Dr. Ko rman , the pu lmon ary specia list. 4 symp tom s. There is no e vidence of pr ejudic e from fail ure to deve lop the record. Boy d argues that t he record ne eded further devel opment due to her alle ged anxiety, but there is no sig ni fic an t ev id en ce of a r ea l an xi ety p ro bl em . M or eo ve r, n o s pe cia lis t n ot ed th at B oyd had a mental i mpairment, and the st ate agency psyc hologis t found no evi dence of a
men tal imp airme nt. In sh ort, there wa s not e nou gh ev idenc e of a men tal imp airme nt to compel the ALJ to obt ain a consul tati ve psy chologic al examinat ion. 2 III. Fina lly, we are satisfied that sub stantial e viden ce su ppo rts the A LJ’s d ecision that, despite her impai rments, Boyd could pe rform sedent ary work in the l ocal and national economy. This findi ng is supported byDr. Leon Cander’s f indings after

physi cal
exam ination and th e Re sidua l Fun ctiona l Cap acity Ass essm ent. 3 M ore sp ecifica lly, both the physical exam ination (objective sign s) and the h istory support this finding. M oreover, the vocational e xpert, based on the medi cal pi cture, opined that a pers on of Boyd’s age, education , vocational prof ile, and residual fun ctional capac ity could perform approximat elytwo hundred job titl es, s uch as: ( 1) a labe l cutter; ( 2) cutter/pos ter; (3)5

bander; and (4) an order clerk. The vocational expert furt her testi fied that allof these job s ex isted in sig nific ant n um ber s in th e loc al an d na tion al ec ono my. Bo yd’s app roach to this fa cet of the ca se is som ew hat ob lique. S he arg ues th at: As state d by this Court

Appellee’ s afores aid burden to rebut Appellant’s prima faci e case is a signi ficant one: “Th e case s dem onstra te that, co nsisten t with th e legisla tive pu rpose , courts have m andated th at leniency be show n in establishing the claimant’s disa bility, and that th e Sec retar y’s r espo nsibility to reb ut it be strictly const rued. ” Dobrowolsky v. Cal ifano , 606 F.2d at 406-407. (Em phas is added ). Pursuant to our above argument s, where Appell ee has fai led to s eek evidence fr om even those t reati ng sources l ong identi fied bythe unrepres ented i ndigent c laimant , and has ot herwise fai led to de velop is sues brought di rectl y t o her attention, it i s clear that Appel lee cannot

sati sfy her “strict burden” to rebut Appellant’s prima faci e case. We have concluded, however, that t he proceedi ngs were not fl awed by the absence of repres entation, t

hat the record was adequatelydeveloped, and that there was s ubstantial evidence s upporti ng the ALJ’s fi nding. The order of the District Court will be a ffirmed.