[Cite as State v. Jones, 2012-Ohio-1231.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellant : C.A. CASE NO. 24610 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 11CR319 

WILLIAM L. JONES : (Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellee : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 23rd day of March, 2012. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Johnna M. Shia, Asst. Pros. 

Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH 45422 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 

Bahjat M. Abdallah, Atty. Reg. No. 0078504, 15 West Fourth Street, 

Suite 100, Dayton, OH 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} This appeal is brought by the State pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A) and 

2953.08(B). The State asks us to reconsider our holding in State v. Milby, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 23798, 2010-Ohio-6344, on which the trial court relied when it imposed a 

sentence pursuant to R.C. 2750.99 for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 2950.06(A), (F) for 
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failure to verify his residence address. We decline to reconsider Milby, and will affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} The facts of the present case relevant to the error the State assigns are 

essentially the same as those in Milby and subsequent decisions in which we followed Milby. 

See: State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24029, 2011-Ohio-2069; State v. Alexander, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24119, 2011-Ohio-4015; State v. Pritchett, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 24183, 2011-Ohio-5978; and, State v. Alltop, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24324, 

2011-Ohio-5541. 

{¶ 3} In 1981, Defendant was convicted of attempted rape, a second degree felony. 

He was subsequently classified by the court in 1997 as a sexual predator, after Ohio’s version 

of Megan’s Law became effective. That classification imposed address notification and 

verification requirements on Defendant for his lifetime. 

{¶ 4} In 2008, Ohio adopted a version of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), which 

superseded the prior Megan’s Law. The AWA adopted different classifications for sexual 

offenders. It also imposed more stringent registration and notification requirements than 

were imposed by Megan’s Law and increased penalties for their violation. 

{¶ 5} Defendant was reclassified by the Attorney General pursuant to the AWA as a 

Tier III sexual offender. In January of 2011, Defendant failed to verify his residence address 

in violation of R.C. 2950.06, and was charged with an AWA violation. Defendant pled no 

contest to the offense. Instead of the mandatory three year term prescribed by R.C. 2950.99 

for an AWA violation, based on Defendant’s 1981 conviction for a second degree felony, the 

court sentenced Defendant to community control sanctions for a violation of R.C. 2950.06 
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under the prior version of R.C. 2950.99 in Megan’s Law, which is a third degree felony. 

The State appeals from that final judgment. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 6} “THE FELONY SENTENCING STATUTE R.C. 2950.99 IS NOT APPLIED 

RETROACTIVELY WHEN THE CONDUCT FOR WHICH A DEFENDANT IS 

CONVICTED AND SENTENCED OCCURRED AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 

STATUTE OR JANUARY 1, 2008.” 

{¶ 7} The State concedes that, per State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, Defendant’s classification under Megan’s Law as a sexual 

predator has been restored, and that as a result he is subject only to those registration and 

verification requirements that Megan’s Law imposes on him. The State argues that, 

nevertheless, the penalties imposed for an AWA violation by R.C. 2950.99 yet apply, because 

Defendant’s offense occurred after the AWA became effective. 

{¶ 8} We addressed and rejected the basis of the state’s argument in Pritchett, one of 

the cases that applied and followed Milby. Pritchett stated at ¶ 26 and 28: 

Very recently, in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 952 N.E.2d 

1108, 2011–Ohio–3374, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the provision of 

2007 Am.Sub. S.B. 10, which imposes greater penalties on sexual offenders, 

such as Pritchett, for violations of notification and registration requirements 

than applied when they were convicted of their underlying sexual offense, 

violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in Section 28, Article II of the 

Ohio Constitution. 
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* * * 

Under Megan's law (which had been applied to Pritchett in 2005), 

Pritchett with the 2005 prior failure to notify conviction was subject to 

sentencing for a felony of the third degree. As a result of a subsequent 

amendment of the law, Pritchett was instead sentenced for a second degree 

felony offense. That amendment of the law is void, per Williams. The sentence 

the court imposed pursuant to that law is likewise void. It would be a manifest 

injustice to continue Pritchett's incarceration on a void sentence. 

{¶ 9} What we said in Pritchett likewise applies in this case. 

{¶ 10} Finally, we note that the State appealed our decision in Milby to the Ohio 

Supreme Court, and by Entry filed on October 5, 2011, in Case No. 2011-0292, the Supreme 

Court declined to accept that decision for review. 

{¶ 11} The trial court properly applied our holding in Milby, and correctly sentenced 

Defendant for a third degree felony offense based upon the penalty for a violation of R.C. 

2950.06, failure to verify residence address, in effect under Megan’s Law. See: former R.C. 

2950.99(A) (1)(a)(i). 

{¶ 12} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be 

affirmed. 

DONOVAN, J., And HALL, J., concur. 
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Copies mailed to: 

Johnna M. Shia, Esq. 

Bahjat M. Abdallah, Esq. 

Hon. Frances E. McGee