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VOTING RIGHTS ACT AFTER THE SUPREME 

COURT’S DECISION IN SHELBY COUNTY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION 

AND CIVIL JUSTICE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 18, 2013 

Serial No. 113–35 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL JUSTICE

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Chairman 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Vice-Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Chief Counsel 

DAVID LACHMANN, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 18, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil 

Justice ................................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution 

and Civil Justice ................................................................................................... 2 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 5 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 6 

WITNESSES 

J. Christian Adams, Attorney Election Law Center, PLLC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Robert A. Kengle, Co-Director, Voting Rights Project, Lawyers’ Committee 

for Civil Rights Under Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

Hans A. von Spakovsky, Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 43 

Spencer Overton, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law 

School 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 52 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Material submitted by the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on the Constitution and Civil Justice 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice ....................................... 73 

Prepared Statement of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 

Inc. ................................................................................................................. 75 

Prepared Statement of the National Urban League ...................................... 84 

Joint Prepared Statement of Asian Americans Advancing Justice and 

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund ................................ 87 

Letter from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) ........................................... 96 

Prepared Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ........... 99 

Prepared Statement of Gary R. Redding, Legal Fellow, on behalf of the 

Rural Coalition .............................................................................................. 108 

(1) 

VOTING RIGHTS ACT AFTER THE SUPREME 

COURT’S DECISION IN SHELBY COUNTY 

THURSDAY, JULY 18, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

AND CIVIL JUSTICE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:06 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Trent Franks, 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Franks, Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, 

Chabot, King, Smith of Missouri, Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt, 

Jackson Lee, and Deutch. 

Also Present: Representative Lewis. 

Staff present: (Majority) Paul Taylor, Majority Counsel; Tricia 

White, Clerk; (Minority) David Lachmann, Subcommittee Staff Director; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. FRANKS. The Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil 

Justice will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the Committee at any time. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court this term held 

that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which sets out the formula 

that was used to determine which state and local governments 

must comply with the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements, is unconstitutional and can no longer be used. Those 

preclearance requirements made certain jurisdictions subject to 

special procedures when they changed their voting laws, such that 

they had to have their laws approved by the U.S. Attorney General 

or a three-judge panel of the U. S. District Court for the District 

of Columbia before those laws could go into effect. 

Section 4 set forth a formula for determining if a jurisdiction was 

covered by the preclearance requirements. That formula, based on 

data from 1965, applied the preclearance requirements to those 

states or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device 

as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1st, 1964, and had less 

than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election. 
2 

In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another 5 years and 

extended the coverage formula in Section 4 to jurisdictions that 

had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or 

turnout as of 1968. In 1975, Congress reauthorized the Act for 

seven more years and extended its coverage to jurisdictions that 

had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or 

turnout as of 1972. In 1982, Congress reauthorized the Act for 25 

years, but did not alter its coverage formula. In 2006, Congress 

again reauthorized the Voting Rights Act for 25 years, again without changing its coverage formula. 

The Supreme Court majority in Shelby County wrote that, ‘‘the 

Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the 10th Amendment, the power to regulate 

elections,’’ and that states have ‘‘broad powers to determine the 

conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.’’ It 

held that the Voting Rights Act departed from these basic principles by suspending, once again, ‘‘all changes to state election law, 

however innocuous, until they had been precleared by Federal authorities in Washington, D.C.’’ 

As the Court stated, ‘‘In 1966, we found these departures from 

the basic features of our system of government justified. At the 

time, the coverage formula, the means of linking the exercise of the 

unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted it, made 

sense. Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.’’ 

The Court noted that in the covered jurisdictions, ‘‘voter turnout 

and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of Federal decrees are rare, and minority candidates 

hold office at unprecedented levels. The tests and devices that 

blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for 

over 40 years.’’ 

While the Court recognized that the 15th Amendment commands 

that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account 

of race, and it gives Congress the power to enforce that command, 

it held that, ‘‘The amendment is not designed to punish for the 

past. Its purpose is to ensure a better future.’’ 

To serve that purpose, Congress, if it is to divide the states, must 

identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes 

sense in light of current conditions. 

Finally, the Court made it clear that its decision ‘‘in no way’’ affects the permanent nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, nor did its decision 

affect Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, which allows courts on 

a case-by-case basis to put states and political subdivisions under 

preclearance requirements based on current violations that unconstitutionally limit voting rights. 

And with that, I am going to yield to the Ranking Member for 

his opening statement. Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today we review the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Shelby County v. Holder. As the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee when we reauthorized the Voting Rights Act in 2006, I 

had the privilege of working on a bipartisan and bicameral basis 

with the then-chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, 

the then-chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot, our Ranking 
3 

Member, Mr. Conyers, and the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Watt, in guiding the reauthorization through the Congress. 

We spent months reviewing the evidence, gaining a firm grasp 

of the current state of voting rights and the impediments to the exercise of the franchise as it exists in the present day. We were persuaded, as were an overwhelming majority of the Members of this 

House and every single Member of the Senate who voted, that the 

remedies contained in the special provisions were still necessary 

and were well suited to the challenge of voting rights. 

We did consider revising the formula challenged in Shelby County but determined that the existing formula still served as a useful 

and effective method of applying Section 5 where needed. That determination was not based solely on the questions focused on by 

the Court and identified by Congress in 1965 but by the full weight 

of the evidence we found in 2006. 

The Court, arrogating to itself the quintessentially congressional 

power to decide what facts are relevant and what constitutes an 

appropriate remedy, struck down the formula in Section 4, eviscerating and rendering a nearly dead letter the preclearance provisions of Section 5. 

Congress long ago made the correct determination that requiring 

voters to go to court after they had already been disenfranchised 

rendered voting rights unenforceable and encouraged local political 

leaders to rig the system to their advantage. To be clear, the Voting Rights Act is not solely about racial animus. It is about political 

power. It is not a matter of determining whether one part of the 

country is ‘‘more racist’’ than another but only whether certain jurisdictions engage in conduct requiring special scrutiny to protect 

the right to vote. 

Excluding minorities from effective participation in our democracy renders them something less than full citizens. Here, Justice 

Scalia was dead wrong. The right to vote in a free and fair election 

is not a racial entitlement but rather the birthright of every American regardless of race. 

As a far more forward-looking and intelligent Supreme Court 

said in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, ‘‘Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 

unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 

rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote 

must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.’’ 

The Voting Rights Act has stood for a half-century as a testament to our commitment that everyone must have an equal share 

in the governance of our Nation if our democracy is to have any 

claim to legitimacy. While it is true that we have made substantial 

progress in our Nation since 1965, much of it attributable to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and our other civil rights laws, it 

is also true that we are not yet free of efforts to manipulate the 

system in ways that disempower minority groups. 

As we stated in the Committee’s report to accompany the 2006 

reauthorization issued by this Committee, ‘‘Despite the substantial 

progress that has been made, the evidence before the Committee 

resembles the evidence before Congress in 1965, and the evidence 

that was present again in 1970, 1975, 1982 and 1992. In 2006, the 
4 

Committee finds abundant evidentiary support for reauthorization 

of the Voting Rights Act’s temporary provisions.’’ 

We reviewed the extent to which the kinds of first-generation devices have been addressed and found that Section 5 had improved 

voter participation in covered jurisdictions, just as the Court’s majority later noted. We also observed that, ‘‘Sections 5 and 8 have 

been vital prophylactic tools protecting minority voters from devices and schemes that continue to be employed by covered states 

and jurisdictions.’’ We went on to note, ‘‘The Committee received 

testimony revealing that more Section 5 objections were lodged between 1982 and 2004 than were interposed between 1965 and 

1982, that such objections did not encompass minor inadvertent 

changes. The changes sought by covered jurisdictions were calculated decisions to keep minority voters from fully participating in 

the political process. This increased activity shows that attempts to 

discriminate persist and evolve such that Section 5 is still needed 

to protect minority voters in the future.’’ 

So the voluminous evidence we compiled showed clearly that the 

need in the covered jurisdictions remained. We also showed at that 

time that the rate of Section 2 reversals of voting rights changes 

in covered jurisdictions was more than twice the rate in non-covered districts across the country. So the voluminous evidence that 

we compiled showed clearly that the need in the covered jurisdictions remained and that the special provisions were necessary and 

effective in protecting voting rights in those jurisdictions. 

Rather than proving that the formula in Section 4(b) was obsolete, the statistics cited by the Court demonstrated the continuing 

need and effectiveness of Section 5. That brings us to today’s hearing. I strongly believe that the facts we found in 2006 made a compelling case for retaining Section 5 and applying it to covered jurisdictions, which include, I might add, my own district in New York 

City. 

What we need to do as a first order of business before we start 

to look at what we might do to address the Court’s decision is to 

determine the impact of that decision. Just as we moved with great 

care and deliberation in 2006 in a bipartisan manner, I would urge 

Members not to put the cart before the horse by trying to examine 

specific cases and possible remedies until we have a better understanding of where we are right now. 

I know that not every Member of this Committee supported the 

reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, but I hope that we can 

nonetheless work cooperatively in the same bipartisan spirit that 

guided our 2006 deliberations to address the Court’s decision. 

I hope the witnesses can address some of the following questions. 

What remains of the Voting Rights Act? What is the status of voting changes precleared or denied preclearance since 2006? Are any 

jurisdictions still covered by Section 5? If so, based on what? What 

tools does the Justice Department still have to fight voter disenfranchisement? 

There are obviously applications of the Voting Rights Act upon 

which Members of this Committee strongly disagree. I would hope 

that rather than allowing ourselves to get bogged down with the 

most controversial cases of the day, we take a step back, look at 

Section 5 and at what the Court did. Ultimately, as our experience 
5 

since 1965 has clearly shown, the specifics change over time, but 

the need for preclearance has remained constant. The value of Section 5 has been its ability to respond in real time to constantly 

changing efforts to disenfranchise voters. I hope we can keep our 

focus where it belongs and lead to some progress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

And I would now yield to the Chairman of the full Committee, 

Mr. Goodlatte from Virginia. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

holding this hearing. 

Last month, the Supreme Court struck down one part of the Voting Rights Act, namely Section 4, which automatically placed certain states and political subdivisions under the Act’s Section 5 

‘‘preclearance’’ requirements. Those preclearance requirements prevented voting procedures in covered states from going into effect 

until the new procedures had been subjected to review and approval either after an administrative review by the Department of 

Justice or after a lawsuit before the Federal district dourt for the 

District of Columbia. 

When the Voting Rights Act was first enacted, the jurisdictions 

automatically subject to these special ‘‘preclearance’’ requirements 

were identified in Section 4 of the Act by a formula setting out certain criteria for coverage. The first element in the formula was that 

a state or political subdivision of the state would be covered if it 

maintained on November 1, 1964, ‘‘a test or device’’ restricting the 

opportunity to register and vote. The second element of the formula 

provided that a state or political subdivision would also be covered 

if the Director of the Census determined that less than 50 percent 

of persons of voting age were registered to vote on November 1, 

1964, or that less than 50 percent of persons of voting age voted 

in the presidential election of November 1964. 

In Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down this method 

by which jurisdictions were automatically deemed covered by the 

preclearance provisions, finding that the original coverage formula 

was, and I quote, ‘‘based on decades-old data and eradicated practices . . . In 1965, the states could be divided into two groups: 

those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter turnout 

and registration, and those without those characteristics. Congress 

based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today, the Nation 

is no longer divided along those lines, Yet the Voting Rights Act 

continued to treat it as if it were.’’ The Court further criticized Section 4’s formula as relying on ‘‘decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems rather than current data reflecting current 

needs.’’ 

Now it is important to note that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, other very important provisions of the Voting Rights Act remain in place, including Sections 2 and 3. 

Section 2 applies nationwide and prohibits voting practices or 

procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or the ability to speak English. Section 2 is enforced through Federal lawsuits 

just like other Federal civil rights laws, and the United States and 

civil rights organizations have brought many cases to enforce the 

guarantees of Section 2 in court, and they may do so in the future. 
6 

Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act also remains in place. Section 

3 authorizes Federal courts to impose preclearance requirements 

on states and political subdivisions that have enacted intentionally 

discriminatory voting procedures in violation of the 14th and 15th 

Amendments. If a state or political subdivision is found by the Federal court to have discriminated in voting, then the court has discretion to retain supervisory jurisdiction and impose preclearance 

requirements on the state or political subdivision until a future 

date at the court’s discretion. This means that such state or political subdivision would have to submit all future voting rule 

changes for approval to either the court itself or the Department 

of Justice before such rule changes could go into effect. Again, Section 3’s procedures remain available today to those challenging voting rules as discriminatory. 

I think it is absolutely critical that we make sure that the rights 

of those to register and vote in the United States, regardless of 

race or gender or national origin or other protected areas, be preserved, and that we encourage all Americans to register and vote, 

and that we protect those rights. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today, to hearing their assessment of the ramifications of the Court’s decision. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

And I would now yield to the Ranking Member of the Committee, 

Mr. Conyers from Michigan. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Franks. 

What a day. I just left a Nelson Mandela celebration of his life 

and legacy. He is 95 years old today, and here we are at this very 

critical juncture in terms of Shelby County. Now, the Voting Rights Act is the crown jewel of our Nation’s 

civil rights laws. Claiming seniority but not age, I was a newly 

elected Member of Congress in 1965 and was privileged to vote in 

favor of that act when it passed this Committee in the House. 

Many Members hold the Act in an almost sacred place, like our colleague John Lewis, who shed his blood and nearly his life in support of its passage. 

Without question, the Act has been an unqualified success, helping rid our Nation of legal barriers to voting discrimination, paving 

the way for the election of the first African-American in our history 

to the White House. 

But these successes do not mean that the work of the Voting 

Rights Act is complete. And for that reason, my colleague, Jim Sensenbrenner, and I compiled a voluminous record in support of reauthorization of the Act in the year 2006. This record in many respects greatly exceeded previous reauthorization efforts. Most importantly, we carefully followed the parameters set out in the City 

of Boerne v. Flores in updating the Act so that it would pass legal 

scrutiny and protect voters from well-documented continuing discrimination. 

In response to legal challenges to the Act following 2006, we asserted congressional authority to enact voting rights legislation 

under the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments of the Constitution in 

two separate amicus briefs. We were confident that the United 

States Supreme Court, following precedents set in South Carolina 

v. Katzenbach and the City of Rome v. United States, would uphold 
7 

the constitutionality of the Act. This explains why I and many of 

my colleagues, most legal commentators were deeply disappointed 

by the Court’s 5-4 decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated the coverage formula or trigger in Section 4(b) of the Act 

as being outdated. 

As a result of Shelby, Section 5 of the Act, which requires 

preclearance for jurisdictions covered by Section 4(b), is effectively 

suspended. Section 5 is the Act’s key provision requiring covered 

jurisdictions to obtain advance approval from the Department of 

Justice or a three-judge panel before they can implement voting 

changes. The suspension of Section 5 immediately enables jurisdictions with a clear and recent history of discrimination to dilute the 

impact of minority voting through redistricting and to implement 

procedures that could create barriers to the ballot box. 

In addition, the suspension of Section 5 preclearance deprives the 

Justice Department of a critical tool that has been used to protect 

the voting rights of minority citizens in jurisdictions with a history 

of discrimination. 

Although the Supreme Court has invited Congress to pass an updated coverage formula, the opinion left unresolved several important questions. The most immediate of these issues pertains to the 

current state of existing voting rights enforcement law during the 

interim between this ruling and the enactment of any new coverage 

formula. 

Fortunately, today’s hearing provides an important opportunity 

for us to address this issue and others presented by Shelby. I want 

to thank again Committee Chairman Goodlatte and Subcommittee 

Chairman Franks for promptly scheduling this hearing. We must 

use this opportunity to promptly craft a legislative solution that enables the Justice Department to effectively enforce the rights of minority voters in covered jurisdictions within the contours of the 

Constitution. 

I know every Member of this Committee to be fair individuals of 

good faith, and I pledge to work with every one of you to respond 

to the Supreme Court’s decision on a bipartisan basis. It is therefore my hope that immediately after this hearing and over the recess we can begin the process of informal discussions with each 

other in order to protect our citizens’ voting rights to the fullest extent possible consistent with our Constitution. 

I hold up a record entitled ‘‘Department of Justice Objections 

under Section 5.’’ Between the years 2000 and 2012, there are 

scores of voting changes that were objected to or withdrawn. It is 

important to our discussion today as we discuss how Congress will 

continue to address states and political subdivisions that may still 

be engaged in voting discrimination. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

And without objection, other Members’ opening statements will 

be made part of the record. 

I just want to thank everyone for their presence here today, and 

I will now introduce our witnesses. 

Our first witness is J. Christian Adams, counsel to the Election 

Law Center. Mr. Adams previously served in the Civil Rights Divi-
8 

sion of the Department of Justice as a career attorney in the voting 

section. 

Our second witness is Robert Kengle, the Acting Co-Director of 

the Voting Rights Project of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 

Rights Under Law. Mr. Kengle previously served for over 20 years 

in the Department of Justice voting section. 

Our third witness today is Hans von Spakovsky, Senior Legal 

Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Mr. von Spakovsky previously 

served in the Justice Department as counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, where he worked on enforcing the 

Voting Rights Act. 

Our final witness today is Professor Spencer Overton of the 

George Washington University Law School. Mr. Overton has also 

served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the 

Department of Justice in the Office of Legal Policy. 

We are very grateful for all of you being with us today. 

Now, each of the witnesses’ written statements will be entered 

into the record in its entirety, and I would ask that each witness 

summarize his or her testimony in 5 minutes or less. And to help 

you stay within that time, there is a timing light in front of you. 

The light switch will turn from green to yellow, indicating that you 

have 1 minute to conclude your testimony. When the light turns 

red, it indicates that the witness’ 5 minutes have expired. 

Before I recognize the witnesses, it is the tradition of the Subcommittee that they be sworn, so if you would please stand to be 

sworn. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered 

in the affirmative. 

I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Adams, and if you will 

please turn your microphone on before speaking, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF J. CHRISTIAN ADAMS, 

ATTORNEY ELECTION LAW CENTER, PLLC 

Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Nadler. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify in this important matter. 

Separating fact from fiction about the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County is essential to chart future effective and 

constitutionally permissible civil rights enforcement. 

Reports of the demise of the Voting Rights Act have been greatly 

exaggerated. What remains of the Voting Rights Act? Everything 

else. It is simply hype to suggest that the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Shelby has left voters in America unprotected. Deliberately stoking fears, deliberately targeting certain racial groups for 

disinformation, deliberately ignoring the multiple protections which 

remain in the Voting Rights Act does a disservice to the Nation 

and to civil rights. 

In Shelby County, the Supreme Court found that in 2013 these 

half-century-old triggers had become obsolete. Mississippi was captured, but so was New Hampshire. Arkansas, the epicenter of 

school desegregation in 1957, was not covered, but Michigan was. 

Some counties in North Carolina were covered, but neighboring 

counties weren’t. Virginia, a state which elected a Black governor 

and twice voted for President Obama, was captured by Section 4. 
9 

When the coverage formula was written in 1965, My Fair Lady 

had just won the Oscar for Best Picture, My Girl by the Temptations topped the charts, and Bonanza was the most watched show 

on television. 

Our Constitution vests states with the power to run their own 

elections. This diffusion of power is designed to protect individual 

liberty. Yet in 1966, the Court properly justified Section 5’s intrusion into state sovereignty because some states had engaged in 

‘‘widespread and persistent discrimination,’’ which the Court characterized as an ‘‘insidious and pervasive evil.’’ This language demonstrates the heavy empirical burdens necessary to justify Federal 

intrusion into state sovereignty. 

Does ‘‘widespread and persistent discrimination’’ manifest as an 

‘‘insidious and pervasive evil’’ in 2013? Obviously the Supreme 

Court thinks no, at least as it pertains to the triggers of the invalidated Section 4. 

In Shelby, the Supreme Court also rejected the concept of socalled second-generation structural racism to justify continued Federal oversight in 15 states. According to the Supreme Court, genuine, direct, and immediate racial discrimination alone justifies 

Federal intrusion into state sovereignty, not vague and attenuated 

so-called second-generational structural discrimination. 

The Court made it clear that only certain current conditions 

could justify a Section 5 coverage formula. Among the touchstones 

listed in Shelby are: blatantly discriminatory evasion of Federal decrees; lack of minority office holding; tests and devices; voting discrimination on a pervasive scale; flagrant voting discrimination; 

rampant voting discrimination. Federal intrusion into powers reserved by the Constitution to the states must relate to these empirical circumstances. 

The Court in Shelby also concluded that Congress weakened the 

constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in 2006 when it altered 

the Section 5 standards. Beginning in 2006, submitting jurisdictions were forced to prove a negative, thus increasing the constitutional injury to states. 

A 2009 objection in Kinston, North Carolina, demonstrates this 

abusive and legally indefensible position that will be adopted by 

the Justice Department in that file. Kinston, a majority Black jurisdiction, in a referendum, decided to dump partisan elections and 

move to non-partisan elections. The DOJ, exploiting the 2006 reauthorization burden shift, objected to the change. The objection was 

explicitly based on the indefensible and immoral position that 

Black voters would not know for whom to vote if the word ‘‘Democrat’’ was not next to a candidate’s name. 

But the Voting Rights Act remains alive and well. Section 2 is 

the nationwide prohibition on racial discrimination, and it remains 

in full force and effect. Unfortunately, the Justice Department has 

failed to bring a single Section 2 case in over 4 years. They have 

left it to private plaintiffs to sue, such as they did in Fayette County, Georgia. 

Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act also remains the law. This is 

the opt-in provision where oversight under Section 5 can still follow. After Shelby, Section 203 and Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights 
10 

Act are still in full force and effect to protect minority language 

voters. 

And finally, Section 11 of the Voting Rights Act, really, in my 

view, the heart of the Voting Rights Act, remains in full force, protecting against voter intimidation, threats or coercion. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adams follows:] 
11 

Subcommittee Chainnan Franks, Ranking Member Nadler, and members of 

the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testifY in this important matter. Separating 

fact from fiction about the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shelby County is 

essential to chart future effective and constitutionally permissible civil rights 

enforcement. I served for five years as a career attomey in the Voting Section at 

the United States Department of Justice from 2005 through 201 O. There, I 

investigated and brought a range of cases to protect minority rights under the antidiscrimination and minority language provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and also 

cases to enforce obligations under National Voter Registration Act/ Help America 

Vote Act. 1 reviewed preclearance submissions under Section 5 of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

Reports ofthe demise ofthe Voting Rights Act have been greatly 

exaggerated. Those who say that the Supreme Court decision in Shelhy means an 

end to protections in the Voting Rights Act are peddling hype. In fact, they are 

peddling the most dangerous and disingenuous sort of hype. Deliberately stoking 

fears, deliberately targeting certain racial groups for disinformation, deliberately 

ignoring the multiple protections which remain in the Voting Rights Act does a 

disservice to the nation and to civil rights. 

2 
12 

Tn ""he/hy County, the Supreme Court characterized the Section 4 triggers as 

"extraordinary and unprecedented." By 2013, these 1965 triggers had stagnated 

into a scattershot rule to force 16 states to seek federal approval for thousands of 

small voting changes. Mississippi was captured, but so was New Hampshire. 

Alabama was subject to Section 5, but so were New York and Alaska. Arkansas, 

the epicenter of school desegregation in 1957 was not covered, but Michigan was. 

Some counties in North Carolina were covered, and neighboring cOlmties weren't. 

Virginia, a state which elected a black governor and twice voted for President 

Obama was captured by Section 4. 

By 2013, the Section 4 triggers appeared obsolete, and the Supreme Court 

agreed in She/by. 

When the coverage fonllula was written in 1965, My Fair Lady had just won 

the Oscar for Best Picture, My Girl by the Temptations topped the charts and 

Bonanza was the most watched show on television. The Supreme Court in Shelby 

recognized what most Americans now recognize and appreciate: elections in 2013 

bear no resemblance to elections in 1965. 

The Supreme Court's characterization in Shelhy ofthe burdens imposed on a 

covered jurisdiction in 2013 is similar to the Court's characterization in 1966 in 

South Carolina v. Kat:::enbach ofprec1earance obligations as "stringent and 

3 
13 

complex." The burdens are significant. Our Constitution vests states with the 

power to run their own elections. This diffusion of power is designed to protect 

individual liberty. The Founders knew that centralizing control of elections would 

eventually threaten individual freedom. 

High Burden to Justify Federal Oversight 

Yet in 1966, the Court properly justified SectionS's intrusion into state 

sovereignty because some states engaged in "widespread and persistent 

discrimination," which the Court characterized as an "insidious and pervasive 

evil." This language from Katzenhach demonstrates the heavy empirical burden 

necessary to justifY federal intrusion into state sovereignty. Does "widespread and 

persistent discrimination" manifest as an "insidious and pervasive evil" in 20137 

Obviously the Supreme Court thought the answer is no, at least as it pertains to the 

scattershot triggers of the invalidated Section 4. 

In Shelby, the Supreme Court rejected the concept of so-called "second 

generation" structural racism to justifY continued federal oversight of elections in 

15 states. Congress should heed the warning. According to the Supreme Court, 

genuine, direct and immediate racial discrimination alone justifies federal intrusion 

into state sovereignty, not vague and attenuated so-called "second generational 

structural" discrimination. 

4 
14 

The Court made it clear that only certain current conditions could justity a 

formula for Section 5 coverage. Among the touchstones listed in Shelhy are: 

"blatantly discriminatory evasions offederal decrees," lack of minority office 

holding, tests and devices, "voting discrimination 'on a pervasive scale,'" 

"flagrant" voting discrimination, or "rampant" voting discrimination. Again, pay 

close attention to the Supreme Court. Federal intrusion into powers reserved by 

the Constitution to the states must relate to these empirical circumstances. 

Triggers built around political or partisan goals cannot withstand Constitutional 

scrutiny. 

These extraordinary conditions in 1965 were what justified the extraordinary 

remedy of Section 5 oversight in 1965. Without such current extraordinary 

conditions, Congress may not impose modem extraordinary remedies on certain 

states. 

2006 Reauthorization of Section 5 Weakened Constitutionality 

The Court in Shelby also concluded that Congress weakened the 

constitutionality ofthe Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirements in 2006 

when it altered the Section 5 standards. Beginning in 2006, submitting 

jurisdictions were forced to prove a negative. Congress required them to prove the 

absence of "any" discriminatory effect by inserting "any" into Section 5. Any 

5 
15 

means any. The Justice Department Civil Rights Division has taken the 2006 

amendments literally when reviewing submissions like Georgia's proof of 

citizenship requirement to register to vote, or South Carolina's voter identification 

law. The DOJ adopted a de minimis trigger for interposing an objection despite 

mitigating facts and objected in multiple instances - including in Georgia and 

South Carolina. 

Stubbomly following the 2006 amendment to require an absence of "any" 

discriminatory effect also caused the Department to object to voter identitication 

laws. The objection in South Carolina cost state taxpayers $3.5 million and federal 

taxpayers untold millions, after South Carolina was forced to seek court approval 

of voter identification laws. The Supreme Court plainly recognized that the extra 

hurdles Congress imposed in 2006 weakened the constitutionality of the 

preclearance regime. 

DOJ's Abuse of Power Using Section 5 

Some groups and activists who disagree with Shelby prefer that states nm a 

gauntlet ofWashinbrton bureaucrats before they may implement voting changes. 

Unfortunately, some of those same groups have participated in abuses of power. 

These abuses tainted Section 5 enforcement before ",'helby. Simply, the Justice 

Department has colluded with racial interest groups and behaved inappropriately 

6 
16 

while conducting Section 5 reviews. This conduct has cost federal taxpayers 

millions of dollars in sanctions. Those who supported continued use of Section 5 

are either unfamil iar with these abuses, or are comfortable with them. 

For example, in.!ohnson v. Miller (864 F. Supp. 1354,1364 (S.D. Ga. 

1994)), the United States District Court sanctioned the Voting Section $594,000 

for collusive misconduct by DOJ Voting Section lawyers. A federal court noted 

that the ACLU was "in constant contact with the DOJ line attorneys." 

Pronouncing the communications between the DOJ and the ACLU "disturbing," 

the court declared, "It is obvious from a review ofthe materials that [the ACLU 

attomeys'] relationship with the DO] Voting Section was infol1nal and familiar; 

the dynamics were that of peers working together, not of an advocate submitting 

proposals to higher authorities." After a Voting Section lawyer professed that she 

could not remember details about the relationship, the court found her "professed 

anmesia" to be "less than credible." 

Abuse of power in the Section 5 process is not confined to Johnson v. 

Miller. As recently as this May, the Justice Department Voting Section used the 

Section 5 process to extract legally indefensible concessions from states that a 

federal court would never impose. Tn places like Rock Hill, South Carolina, the 

Voting Section permitted blatantly unconstitutional district lines to survive in order 

to prop up the electoral success of multiple election officials based on tlleir race. 

7 
17 

A 2009 objection in Kinston, North Carolina, shows the outrageous, abusive 

and legally indefensible positions the Voting Section will adopt using Section 5. 

Kinston, a majority black jurisdiction, in a referendum decided to dump partisan 

elections for town office and move to nonpartisan elections. The Voting Section, 

exploiting the burden shift and plain requirement that Kinston prove the absence of 

a negative, objected to the change. The objection was explicitly based on the 

morally and legally indefensible position tllat black voters would not know for 

whom to vote ifthe word "Democrat" was not next to a candidate's name. 

The legally indefensible abuse of power in the Kinston and Georgia 

redistricting objections are just a couple of many others. Congress actually relied 

on some of these abusive and meritless objections when Congress reauthorized 

Section 5 in 2006. These abusive and meritless objections polluted the record in 

2006, but no plaintiff ever challenged them, and Congress took no testimony 

regarding tlleir merits. 

Voting Rights Protections Are Alive and Well Post-Shelby 

Contrary to the hype surrounding the She/hy decision, the Voting Rights Act 

remains alive and well. Multiple federal protections against discrimination in 

voting are still on the books. These permanent provisions of the Voting Rights Act 

8 
18 

can still be utilized by private parties and the Justice Department to protect voting 

rights. 

Section 2: Nationwide and Permanent Protections Remain in Force 

Section 2 is the nationwide prohibition against racial discrimination. It 

remains in full force and effect. 

Ifwitnesses from the Department of Justice ask Congress to reverse the 

outcome in Shelhy, Congress should ask them a few simple questions: 

First, why hasn't the Justice Department utili~ed Section 2 olthe Voting 

Rights Act to initiate and bring a single lawsuit since President Obama )vas 

inaugurated? Indeed, this administration's record of Section 2 enforcement is 

nonexistent. 

Second, il discrimination in voting is so pervasive and widespreadjustilying 

renewed Section 5 coverage, why hasn't your Justice Department brought a single 

case to address a single instance ofthe problem that you purport exists using 

Section 2? 

Third, since taking office, why has your administration effectively switched 

off Section 2 enforcement - is it inefficient management, or a policy decision to 

ignore the law.? 

9 
19 

While the Bush administration vigorously enforced Section 2, enforcement 

under the current administration has been essentially dormant. Tn fact, the current 

administration hasfailed to initiate a single Section 2 investigation which resulted 

in an enfhrcement action since January 20, 2009. I initiated and brought the very 

last Section 2 case in March 2009, United States v. l'ov.,-n of Lake Park, FL, (S.D. 

F1. 2009).1 This case was started lmder Attorney General Michael Mukasey in 

2008. General Holder only inherited the case in the final stages of preparation for 

filing. Not a single Section 2 case has been filed by the Justice Department in the 

subsequent 52 months. 

If discrimination in voting remains a problem, you would hardly know based 

on recent Section 2 enforcement activity. Either discrimination in voting doesn't 

exist anymore at levels necessary to justify federal oversight under Section 5, or, 

the Justice Department has decided not to vigorously enforce the law. 

General Holder's failure to enforce Section 2 is noteworthy considering the 

loud (and in hindsight, completely disingenuous) criticism ofthe Bush 

administration's civil rights record. Consider Wade Henderson of the Leadership 

Conference on Civil Rights. On March 22, 2007, he complained to this Committee 

about the purported lack of Section 2 cases brought by the prior administration, 

complaining: "the [Civil Rights] Division must deal with and respond to growing 

1 Three other Voting Section lawyers also helped bring the case. 

10 
20 

distrust among minority communities who feel increasingly abandoned and 

marginalized by the Division's litigation choices and priorities." 

When Henderson made this complaint, the Division was in the process of 

litigating two Section 2 cases: United States v. Osceola County, FL (M.D. Fla 

2005) and United States v. Village of Port Chester, NY (S.D.N. Y. 2006). In 

preparing this testimony, I could find no complaints to the media from Mr. 

Henderson about the fact the current administration has not brought a single 

Section 2 case since r filed United ,','tates v. Town ofl,ake Park, Fr (S.D. Fla. 

2009), when r was a lawyer at the DOJ in March of2009. The investigation ofthe 

Lake Park case was approved by the prior administration. rhus, the current 

administration has not initiated and brought a single ,')'ection 2 lmllsuit. 

In December 2009, Assistant Attomey General Thomas Perez criticized the 

prior administration's Voting Section before the American Constitution Society: 

"Those who had been entrusted with the keys to the division treated it like a buffet 

line at the cafeteria, cherry-picking which laws to enforce.,,2 The enforcement 

record three years removed from Perez's 2009 bravado at ACS paints a very 

embarrassing portrait ofthe Division's voting rights enforcement. 

2 Cited in Serwer, The Battle for Voting Rights, lhe American Prmpecl, January 8, 2010. 

http://prospect.orglarticle/battle-voting-rights-O. 

11 
21 

The Holder Justice Department has abandoned the Section 2 field and forced 

private plaintiffs alone to bring cases. 

It's not as if Section 2 cases don't exist. Why did the Justice Department 

refuse to bring a Section 2 case against Fayette County, Georgia, in 2010 that the 

NAACP eventually brought and won?3 Certainly it wasn't for a lack of resources, 

as the Voting Section had plenty of capacity to add a single case to their docket. If 

a lack of resources is offered as a reason, then more effective and decisive 

managers should be installed. 

Under Section 5, states had the burden to prove a negative and demonstrate a 

total absence of discriminatory intent or effect. Naturally, a Section 2 case shifts 

the burden to the plaintiffto prove a case. Given the fact millions of plaintiffs 

every year in thousands of courts carry this burden, it should prove neither 

shocking or insUTInountable to Justice Department lawyers. 

Finally, I am currently litigating a Section 2 case arising out of Guanl. 

There, my client, a retired Air Force Major, was denied the right to register to vote 

on a government run political status plebiscite. He has publically stated that he 

begged the Department of.l ustice to help him, to no avail. Emails reveal that even 

3 Read the District Court judgment at 

http://www.naacpldf.orgifiles/case_issue/GA%20State%20Conference%20NAACP%20v%20Fa 

yette%20County%20BofC%200pinion.PDF. 

12 
22 

an assistant United States Attorney on Guam opined that the challenged law is 

illegal 4 Yet the Voting Section has failed to act. TfCongress is looking to 

strengthen voting rights, it might look to Guam as ajurisdiction subject to federal 

civil rights laws that imposes limitations on the right to vote reminiscent ofthe 

racially motivated grandfather clauses from an era before the Voting Rights Act. 

Congress might also ask the Department of Justice why it has refused to enforce 

Section 2 and other civil rights laws in Guam. 

Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act 

Section 3 ofthe Voting Rights Act remains the law. This is the "opt-in" 

provision of the Voting Rights Act. A plaintiff, including the Attorney General, 

can ask a federal court to place a defendant under Section 5 oversight once a 

violation of the law has been established. What is most useful about Section 3 is 

that it would seem to satisfy .','he/by's mandate that federal oversight of state or 

local elections be closely matched with the need. In other words, the oversight is 

congment and proportional with the problem. 

Section 5 preclearance obligations triggered through Section 3 would 

certainly pass Constitutional musterpost-She1hy. Oddly, plaintiffs have rarely 

4 The District Court of Guam denied Maj or Davis standing to sue. The Attorney General has 

unquestioned standing to sue under 42 U.S.C Section 1971 (another cause of action) and it is my 

opinion that had the Voting Section vigorously defended his voting rights, this matter would 

already be resolved. The case is currently on appeal before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. 

13 
23 

used this provision even though Voting Rights Act violations are now more 

common in jurisdictions not covered by the unconstitutional Section 4 triggers -

including Osceola County (FL), Euclid (OH) and Blaine County (MT). If racial 

discrimination is as pervasive as some argue, then surely the Section 3 opt-in 

triggers will offer a way to resurrect Section 5 coverage for offending jurisdictions. 

In United States v. Ike Brown, the United States District Court (S.D. Miss.) 

found that the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Conmrittee, and its 

Chairman Ike Brown, engaged in conduct constituting voting discrimination in 

purpose and effect. No relief was sought under Section 3 because Noxubee 

County was already a Section 5 covered jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this 

chronology reveals the defects and obsolescence of the old enforcement of Section 

5. 

In 2010, the Department of Justice was unwilling to conduct a Section 5 

review of a comty legislative plan in Noxubee Comty (MS) to ensure that it had 

neither a discrinrinatory purpose nor effect. One problem with the plan is that it 

was written by the defendant in u.,','. v. Ike Rrown. In any other Section 5 review, a 

redistricting plan created in part hy a delendant who had heenfound liahle for 

intentional discrimination would have tripped an extensive Section 5 review 

process. But because the defendant and plan author was black, and the victims ol 

the intentional discrimination ·were white, the Justice Department Voting Section 

14 
24 

did not review the legislative redistricting plan as it would have Ilthe races heen 

reversed. Why? Because Assistant Attorney General Torn Perez has plainly stated 

that Section 5 does not protect white voters - even though in Noxubee County, the 

need for protection was acute. 5 

Congress should ensure that Section 3 opt-in triggers protect all Americans, 

not just some Americans. 

Section 203 and 4(e) Minority Language Protections 

After Shelby, Section 203 and Section 4( e) of the Voting Rights Act remain 

in full force and effect. Section 203 protects the electoral process for those who do 

not speak English well. Section 4(e) protects any Americans who were educated in 

Puerto Rico under the American flag, but now live in the United States. Whether 

or not minority language voters are protected will depend in large part on whether 

the Justice Department vigorously enforces the law. 

During the Bush administration, the DOJ Voting Section brought a record 

number of cases to enforce Sections 4( e) and 203 of the Voting Rights Act. As 

with Section 2, enforcement of minority language protections has fallen off 

significantly in the last four years. 

5 See, http://w"Wwjustice.gov/oig/reports/2013/s1303.pdf.at 93. 

15 
25 

The Bush administration brought 28 cases under Sections 203 and 4( e), and 

the Obama administration has, thus far, brought seven. Those concerned with 

vigorous protection of minority voting rights after Shelhy should seek more 

vigorous enforcement of Section 2. 

Section 11 (b) of the Voting Rights Act 

Perhaps the most important provision of the Voting Rights Act is Section 11, 

and it remains in full force and effect after Shelby. Section II(b) is the provision 

of the law which prohibits intimidation, threats or coercion directed toward voters, 

or those aiding voters. The attempt to intimidate, threaten or coerce a voter is also 

actionable. This provision is the most basic part of the law passed in 1965. 

Simply, Americans are free to vote without threats of violence. The last Section 

ll(b) case brought by the Justice Department was filed January 7, 2009. It was 

United States v. New Black Panther Party, et aI, (E.D. Pa. 2009). 

Thank you for your time and attention. 

Date: July 18,2013 

Respectfully submitted, 

J. Christian Adams 

### 

16 
26 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the witness. 

And I will now recognize our second witness, Mr. Kengle. And, 

sir, if you will please turn on your microphone before speaking. Mr. 

Kengle. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. KENGLE, CO-DIRECTOR, VOTING 

RIGHTS PROJECT, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL 

RIGHTS UNDER LAW 

Mr. KENGLE. Good morning, Chairman Franks, Ranking Member 

Nadler, Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Bob Kengle. I 

am co-director of the Voting Rights Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in Washington, D.C. The Lawyers’ Committee was formed in 1963 at the request of President 

John F. Kennedy to bring together the members of the private bar 

to combat racial discrimination. We are celebrating our 50th anniversary. The job is not yet complete. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning on behalf 

of the Lawyers’ Committee concerning the Supreme Court’s decision in the Shelby County v. Holder case and its implications. 

I had the honor of serving over 20 years in the voting section at 

the Department of Justice, where I litigated numerous cases under 

Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. I also supervised 

a number of Section 5 submissions and Section 5 objection analyses. I have been a member of the Voting Rights Project at the 

Lawyers’ Committee since 2007, and I have continued to work on 

a broad range of voting rights matters, including the Shelby County 

case. 

In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that the 

coverage formula contained in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act 

is unconstitutional for purposes of determining the jurisdictions to 

which the preclearance requirements of Section 5 would apply. As 

a result, preclearance review under Section 5 is now in suspended 

animation. 

My written testimony today stresses that stopping racially discriminatory voting changes before they are put into effect is what 

made Section 5 so unique and so successful. Voting is the fundamental preservative right in our country. It endangers all other 

rights when voting is denied or abridged on account of race. 

The existing Federal voting rights laws all have their strong 

points, but only one screens out discriminatory voting changes before they take hold, Section 5—and Section 5 has been paralyzed 

by the Shelby County decision. 

Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, preliminary injunctions 

are extremely rare, even in the most meritorious cases. Section 2 

is a vital and powerful tool. It is constitutional. But as it stands 

today, Section 2 is not an adequate substitute for Section 5. 

Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, which provides a form of 

preclearance by court order, is an after-the-fact remedy because it 

requires a Federal court to first find serious constitutional violations before it can order any type of preclearance. 

Let me stress, racial voting discrimination needs to be stopped 

before it takes hold. It would be a political and moral abdication 

to say that we need not be concerned if discriminatory voting practices can be used for years while lawsuits to stop them wind their 
27 

way through the courts. But as the law stands now, that is what 

you should expect to occur as a result of the Shelby County decision. 

As you consider today’s testimony, I want to stress four important points about the Shelby decision. First, the Supreme Court did 

not find Section 5 unconstitutional. The case was a direct attack 

on the constitutionality of Section 5; the Court did not find it unconstitutional. 

Second, the Supreme Court did not hold that racial discrimination no longer exists. In fact, the Court’s opinion said voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. I agree with that part 

of the decision. 

Third, the Supreme Court did not undermine the retrogression 

principle, which serves as the Section 5 effect standard. The retrogression standard was the product of the Supreme Court’s decision 

in 1976 in the Beer case, and the Supreme Court repeatedly has 

upheld it in other cases. 

Fourth, the Supreme Court did not restrict classes of evidence 

upon which Congress can rely to target remedial measures. Congress can look at all probative evidence of discrimination. 

As I discussed in detail in my testimony, the suspension of Section 5 leaves a critical gap in the Federal protections for the right 

to vote. The Shelby County decision completely upends the traditional process, the traditional standard for dealing with discriminatory voting changes. Now, it falls to the Justice Department and 

private groups to identify discriminatory changes between the time 

they are adopted and implemented, gather enough evidence to 

state a claim, carry the burden of proof, and persuade a court to 

issue a preliminary injunction. If any of those steps fail, then the 

discriminatory change can go into effect unstopped. 

Despite the best efforts, I think that is what is going to happen. 

In some cases, we can expect that to occur. 

Congress does not intrude on states’ rights when it enforces the 

15th Amendment by appropriate legislation. States have no reserved right to use racially discriminatory voting laws. 

I once again respectfully thank the Chair, the Ranking Member, 

and the Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kengle follows:] 
28 

Testimony of Robert A. Kengle 

Co-Director, Voting Rights Project 

Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 

Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 

of the Committee on the Judiciary 

United States House of Representatives 

Hearing on "The Voting Rights Act After the 

Supreme Court's Decision in Shelby County" 

July 18,2013 
29 

Chairman Fr(tnk.~, Ranking Member Nadler, and Members of the Hou.~e Judiciary 

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, on behalf of the Lawyers' Committee for 

Civil Rights Under Law, concerning the Supreme Court's decision in Shelhy COllllly I'. Holder, 

133 S.Ct 2612 (2013), and its implications. In that case, the Supreme Court held 

unconstitutional the coverage formula contained in Section 4(b) ofthe Voting Rights Act, 42 

USc. § 1 973b(b ), for detennining the jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirements of 

Section 5 of the Act, 42 US.c. § 1973c. 

My name is Bob Kengle, and T am Co-Director of the Voting Rights Project at the 

Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a non-partisan, non-profit organization. The 

Lawyers' Committee was formed in 1963 at the request of President John F. Kennedy to partner 

with the private bar to advance the cause of civil rights. We continue to work with law firms 

around the country litigating cases to combat racial inequities and have been very involved in 

issues impacting voting rights. The Lawyers' Committee played a major role in the 2006 

reauthorization of Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act by organizing the National 

Commission on the Voting Rights Act The Commission conducted several fact-finding 

hearings and submitted a lengthy report to Congress which became a part of the reauthorization 

record. We aJso lead Election Protection, the largest non-partisan voter protection program in 

the country. Finally, the Lawyers' Committee has an active litigation program, including 

litigating matters under Sections 5 and 2 of the Voting Rights Act and other federal and state 

voting laws. 

With other attorneys at the Lawyers' Committee, I was actively involved in briefing the 

Shelby COllnty case on behalf of a Shelby County resident, Mr. Bobby Lee Harris, who 

intervened to defend the constitutionality of Sections 4(b) and 5. The Shelby COl/illy decision 

has been criticized from a range oflegal perspectives, and the Lawyers' Committee believes the 

case was wrongly decided. 

Tn short, the Supreme Court put fonn over function by applying an overly literal reading 

of Section 4(b) as reauthorized in 2006. The evidence in the massive Congressional record in 

2006, to which the Lawyers' Committee substantially contributed, showed a recent and persistent 

pattern of voting discrimination in the Section 4(b) covered jurisdictions since 1982 (when 

Sections 4(b) and 5 were last reauthorized by Congress), including numerous and repeated 

Section 5 objections and Section 2 violations. There was overwhelming bipartisan support for 

the 2006 reauthorization. In my view the Court provided no good reason for giving less 

deference to Congress' judgment in 2006 concerning current conditions than the Court had done 

in each of its previous cases upholding the constitutionality of Congress' 1965 enactment of 

Section 5, and its 1970, 1975, and 1982 reauthorizations. 

- 1-
30 

That being said, my testimony today is not to persuade you that the Supreme Court made 

what may prove to be a mistake of historic proportions. Instead, my goal is to put the Supreme 

Court's decision into context and to provide a perspective on its implications based upon my 

experience and that of the Lawyers' Committee in enforcing federal voting rights laws. 

My experience includes over twenty years of service in the Voting Section of the Civil 

Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice. As a line attorney, special counsel and deputy 

chiefT litigated and supervised a broad range of cases under Section 5 and Section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, the Constitution and other federaJ voting rights laws, and I supervised the 

review of numerous Section 5 submissions and objections. I have continued to focus on voting 

rights cases since joining the Lawyers' Committee in 2007. 

Everyone here today would surely agree that one of Congress's most important 

responsibilities is to enact efl'ective federal laws to prevent and deter racial voting discrimination. 

As the Supreme Court observed over a century ago, the right to vote is fundamental "because [it 

is] preservative of all rights." Yick Wo I'. Hopkins, I 18 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). The majority 

opinion in Shelby COllnty recognized that "voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that." 

The immediate issue facing us now is what the Shelby County decision means for achieving the 

objective of eradicating racial discrimination in voting in all its forms. 

I will begin by discussing what the Shelby COllnty decision held and how it affected the 

law, then note some important legal issues that the decision did not address, discuss the practical 

impact of the ruling, and finally discuss the implications of the decision for voting rights 

enforcement. 

In light of the Shelby Coullty decision, it is imperative for Congress to conduct a prompt, 

thorough and bipartisan process to update the 2006 record regarding the nature and extent of 

current voting discrimination and to assess the legal tools that remain available to combat such 

discrimination. Based upon our experience and anaJyses, the Lawyers' Committee submits that 

this examination will show that the laws on the books will not be effective to stop racially 

discriminatory voting changes from being implemented and enforced, a task at which Section 5 

was singularly successful, and that Congress therefore needs to act to put effective statutory 

remedies in place. The right to vote free from racial discrimination is protected by two 

constitutional amendments which Congress has the enumerated power to enforce by appropriate 

legislation. Congress has ample legal authority - and the moraJ responsibility - to address the 

problem. 

How the Shelby County decision (~ffected the law 

In its Shelby COl/lily decision the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to Sections 

4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as reauthorized by Congress in 2006. Section 5 

requires federaJ review of changes affecting voting in "covered" jurisdictions before those 

changes are implemented. Section 4(b) as adopted in 1965, and amended and reauthorized in 

- 2-
31 

1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006, provided a set offonnulas to identify which jurisdictions would be 

"covered". This approach maintained the electoral status quo in covered jurisdictions so that 

discriminatory voting practices could be screened out through Department of Justice 

administrative reviews, or less frequently by judicial review in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Columbia. While Section 5 was in force, thousands of discriminatory voting changes 

were blocked by DOJ objections. 

The Supreme Court held that the Section 4(b) coverage fonnula as reauthorized in 2006 

cannot constitutionally be used for enforcing the Section 5 "preclearance" remedy. The 

Supreme Court's holding requires preclearance coverage to correspond closely with current 

evidence of the types of voting discrimination that Congress seeks to prevent or deter. 

Considering the array of arguments that were advanced to attack the consti tutionality of Section 

5, this was a narrow decision in legal terms, albeit one with a wide-ranging impact. 

The Court gave perhaps the most literal possible reading to the text of the statute and 

found that the Section 4(b) fonnula, as reauthorized in 2006, did not relate to current evidence of 

discrimination. The Court did not tind an adequate link between the coverage formula contained 

in Section 4(b) and Congress' 2006 findings that an ongoing pattern of voting discrimination has 

continued in the covered jurisdictions. 

The Court highlighted the difference in type between the evidence of depressed voter 

turnout and voter registration employed for the 1965, 1970 and 1975 coverage detenninations, 

and the more recent evidence in the 2006 record, which primarily concerned minority vote 

dilution in one fonn or another. 

The Court also stressed the federalism burdens of targeted preclearance coverage in terms 

of the "sovereignty of the states," and stated that the 2006 Amendments to Section 5 had 

increased the federalism burden on covered jurisdictions. 

What the Shelby County decision did not do 

The Supreme Court did not find Section 5 unconstitutional. Despite the vigorous 

facial attack mounted against Section 5, the Supreme Court did not hold, nor did the majority 

opinion even suggest, that Congress lacks the power to adopt a preclearance remedy - that is, to 

suspend all voting changes in particular jurisdictions pending federal review to screen the 

changes for racial discrimination. Therefore, the Court did not overrule - or bring into question 

- the Court's prior decisions in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 US. 301 (1966) and City of 

Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), which strongly upheld the power of Congress to 

adopt and reauthorize the preclearance remedy. 

The Supreme Court did not hold that racial voting discrimination no longer exists. 

The Court's opinion explicitly stated that racial voting discrimination still exists. Indeed, at the 

same time the Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County, it had before it an appeal from a Section 5 

- 3-
32 

declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in which a 

three-judge court unanimously found that parts of Texas' Congressional and State Senate 

redistricting plans were the product of intentional racial discrimination. 

The Supreme Court did not restrict the classes of evidence upon which Congress 

can rely to target remedial measures such as preclearance. The Court did not adopt certain 

extreme arguments made by Shelby County that Congress could not employ evidence of 

minority vote dilution as a basis for reauthorizing preclearance coverage. Similarly, the Court 

did not adopt Shelby County's comparably extreme arguments that only adjudicated violations of 

intentional voting discrimination - such as the recent Texas redistricting case - could justify the 

preclearance remedy. For example, in City of Rome the Court credited and highlighted evidence 

of Section 5 objections in upholding Congress' 1975 reauthorization of Section 5, and the Court 

gave no indication in Shelhy County that it meant to overrule or in any manner question that 

aspect of the Rome decision. More broadly, the Shelby COllnty Court did not disturb the 

longstanding principle that Congress can appropriately prevent and deter unconstitutional voting 

discrimination by prohibiting a somewhat broader class of conduct than what is directly 

prohibited under the Constitution. 

The Supreme Court did not undermine the "retrogression" principle - which serves 

as the Section 5 effect standard. The Supreme Court also did not adopt the arb'llment 

advanced in some amiclis briefs that the Section 5 retrogression standard conflicts with the Equal 

Protection Clause. Retrogression occurs when a voting change places racial minorities in a 

worse electoral position than under the existing voting practice. In other words, the retrogression 

standard protects against backsliding. The Supreme Court itself settled upon the retrogression 

standard in 1976 in its decision in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 - and repeatedly 

reaffirmed this standard in subsequent cases - as the proper interpretation of the Section 5 

prohibition on voting changes that "have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 

account of race or color, or [membership in a language minority group]." 

The Supreme Court did not set rules for distinguishing "current" evidence of voting 

discrimination from outdated evidence. This is puzzling in light of the fact that the Shelhy 

County opinion hinges upon the conclusion that Congress failed to employ what the Court would 

consider "current evidence" in the Section 4(b) coverage formula. Although this is a point upon 

which reasonable people can differ, I hope that this lack of b'llidance does not unduly complicate 

Congress' consideration of potential legislation. On an issue of this gravity, I think it was a 

serious omission on the Court's part to leave "current" undefined, so long as the Court is 

reluctant to defer to Congress' judgment on the issue. 

The implications of the Court's "equality of states" discussion are unclear. The 

Court did not indicate what etIect, if any, this doctrine would have upon any future coverage 

formula However, I do not see the Court's discussion adding very much to the Court's 

reasoning, apart from serving as a means of emphasizing the need for keeping the coverage 

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33 

fonnula in step with the times. Thus, I do not believe that this doctrine adds any unique element 

to what Congress must consider with respect to any new coverage fonnula that it might consider 

based upon current evidence of voting discrimination. 

The Court's opinion barely mentioned City 0/ Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 

This surprised many legal observers. The Boerne line of cases had formed the core of Shelby 

County's legal theory, and was the subj ect of extensive briefing in the lower courts in this case 

and in the preceding case, Norlhwesl Auslin Municipal Wilily f)islricl No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 

193 (2009). However, the Court conducted its review under the standard that it had announced 

in the Northwest Austin case: that Section 5 "imposes current burdens and must be justified by 

current needs." Id. at 203. The Court thus left unresolved the question of whether it considered 

a Boerne analysis necessary to the review of Fifteenth Amendment remedial legislation, or more 

generally, to legislation combatting racial voting discrimination under either the Fourteenth or 

Fifteenth Amendment. 

The Court's decision did not affect the operation of Section 3(c) ofthe Voting Rights 

Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1973a(c). Under Section 3(c), informally known as the Act's "bail-in" 

provision, federal courts may order preclearance for jurisdictions not covered by the Section 4(b) 

fonnula as a remedy for adjudicated violations of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 

There are 17 jurisdictions which have been the subject of Section 3(c) orders (including, for 

example, Arkansas, New Mexico and Los Angeles County). Several parties in the Texas 

redistricting cases pending in Washington, D.C. and Texas federal courts have recently filed 

motions seeking to have the courts impose Section 3(c) coverage on Texas, as a result of the 

D.C. district court's finding of intentional discrimination in Texas's post-2010 statewide 

redistrictings. 

The practical e.ffect 0/ the invalidation o/Section 4(b) 

The most prominent effect of the Shelby COllnty decision is to suspend Section 5 review 

indefinitely. That is, Section 5 remains on the books, but no jurisdictions - other than those 

subject to Section 3(c) court orders - are presently required to obtain preclearance before 

implementing new voting practices. The Department of Justice has issued "no determination" 

letters to jurisdictions which had Section 5 submissions pending at the time of the decision, and 

has posted an advisory on the Voting Section web site regarding the Shelhy Couffly decision. See 

httpJ/ww¥,ijustice.gov/crt/aboutlvotl. 

Consequently, racially discriminatory voting changes are no longer suspended before 

they may be enforced. As discussed in in the following section, it now falls to pri vate citizens 

and the Department of Justice to first identify racially discriminatory voting changes in the 

Section 4(b) jurisdictions, and then to build an affinnative case against them, based upon other 

legal provisions, and to do so before those changes are implemented. Congress' longstanding 

commitment to preventing and deterring racially discriminatory voting changes stems from a 

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34 

recognition that once such changes are implemented, it is already too late, because they hann a 

fundamental right that can never be fully restored after implementation has occurred. 

One important but less obvious effect of the Shelhy COllnty ruling will be to cut off the 

unique and centralized flow of information about changes in voting practices and procedures that 

had been relied upon by the public and the Department of Justice. In my experience, this 

centralized flow of information was one of the principal reasons that Section 5 proved to be so 

remarkably successful in facilitating the enfranchisement of minority citizens in the covered 

jurisdictions, and in protecting that progress from being subverted by backsliding. I do not 

believe that the impact of the Shelby COl/llfy decision can truly be understood without discussing 

this in some detail. 

The scope of the Section 5 preclearance requirement was always interpreted broadly by 

the Supreme Court to encompass any and all "enactment[s] which altered the election law of a 

covered State in even a minor way." Allen v. Srate Board a/Elections, 393 U.S 544,566 

(1969). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "[t]he [Fifteenth] Amendment 

nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." Gomillion v. 

Lightfoot, 364 US. 339, 342 (1960) (quoting Lane 1'. WilSall, 307U.S 268,275 (1939)). The 

Department of Justice and the public were able to rely upon Section 5 submissions to accurately 

catalogue the voting changes actually being made in the covered jurisdictions. There was a 

powerful incentive for covered jurisdictions to comply with the preclearance requirement, 

because the failure to obtain preclearance before implementing a covered voting change was 

grounds for a federal court to enjoin the voting change via a preliminary injunction or temporary 

restraining order. As a result, Section 5 provided a reliable, comprehensive, and up-to-date 

inventory of voting changes. 

There simply is no fallback source for that basic information. No federal procedure 

requires states and political subdivisions to identify or report voting changes in advance of their 

use, and I am not aware of any state with such a requirement. While states today typically 

provide tools on their legislatures' websites to search and obtain copies of bills and acts, 

problematic voting changes can be embedded in arcane local legislation or amendments. Since 

home rule is now the norm in most states, most voting changes are enacted at the local level, and 

pre-implementation information about voting changes adopted at the local level is hit or miss at 

best. 

Of course, even a comprehensive list of voting changes does not identify which ones 

might be discriminatory. The Section 5 process was structured to etliciently place the relevant 

information before the Department of Justice to allow the Department to identify and follow up 

on potentially discriminatory voting changes, while the great majority of changes were 

precleared within the initial 60-day review period. Because the submitting jurisdictions had the 

burden of proof, they were required to provide sutlicient information for the Department of 

Justice to assess the purpose and effect of proposed voting changes. In many cases, relatively 

- 6-
35 

little infonnation was required to preclear, while in other cases (including every objection that I 

can recall) the Department requested specific and detailed information from the submitting 

jurisdiction. 

The types of information typically needed to conduct a Section 5 review of a potentially 

discriminatory change varied according to the type of voting change, but frequently a request for 

additional infonnation would ask for some or all of the following infonnation: population data, 

maps of political boundaries, election returns, voter registration and turnout data, and precinct 

boundaries and polling place locations. Information about the voting change's adoption, 

including minutes, recordings, alternative proposals, and a narrative description, also were 

requested as needed, especially if the circumstances indicated the possibility ofa racially 

discriminatory purpose. In addition, letters requesting more information typically would 

fonnally invite the jurisdiction to explain questionable decisions and to address particular 

concerns. As a result, neither the Justice Department nor the public was required to race the 

clock to gather this basic infonnation, while covered jurisdictions had no incentive to stonewall 

or drag their feet in tenns of providing it. 

Another benefit of this flow ofinfonnation was that it permitted the citizens ofthe 

covered jurisdictions to learn the full facts about the voting changes that would affect them, and 

to make informed comments about them. Discriminatory voting changes are frequently enacted 

by recourse to misinformation, the withholding of relevant information, or a manipulation of the 

legislative process. 

Furthennore, I have no doubt that the knowledge that there would be a federal review 

process - during which members of the minority community would have the opportunity to learn 

the details of, and comment upon, proposed voting changes - in fact deterred many 

discriminatory changes from ever being adopted. 

Consequences for voting rights enforcement 

Impact on pending appeals. Shortly after the Supreme Court issued the Shelhy County 

decision, the Court vacated two Section 5 judgments issued by three-judge courts in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia, one of which denied preclearance to three 

statewide redistricting plans for the State of Texas (Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d. 133 

(D.D.C. 2012)), the other of which denied Section 5 preclearance to Texas' 2011 photo 

identification law (Texas 1'. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012)). Both cases were 

pending on appeal to the Supreme Court at the time of the Shelhy County decision. 

Impact on post-2006 Section 5 objections. The Shelby COllnty decision did not address 

the status of Section 5 objections issued after the 2006 reauthorization pursuant to the 

unconstitutional coverage fonnula. This important issue may be addressed fairly soon by one or 

more federal courts. 

-7 -
36 

Implications for future voting rights enforcement. The rationale for Section 5 was 

always, as the Supreme Court explained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328, to 

"shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil [of discrimination 1 to its 

victims" within the covered jurisdictions. The She/hy Coutlfy decision completely reverses that 

approach. It now falls to private parties and to the Justice Department to identify discriminatory 

voting changes in the window between their adoption and implementation, gather enough 

evidence to state a claim for which private parties and the Justice Department will have the 

burden of proof, and persuade a court to issue an injunction. If anyone of those steps should 

fail, then the discriminatory change will proceed to be implemented and do its damage 

unimpeded. 

There is currently no source that provides a reliable, comprehensive, and up-to-date 

canvass of voting changes. For private citizens to attempt to track all of the infonnation that 

Section 5 did - even with the cooperation of election officials - would be a never-ending task. If 

election officials are not required to report or cooperate, then there is no possibility of reliably 

knowing what voting changes are being enacted in which jurisdictions. As it now stands, more 

discriminatory voting changes can be expected to "slip through the cracks" undetected and to 

take effect, despite the best efforts of the Justice Department and concerned citizens. 

Affected citizens generally lack ready access to the substantial basic information 

needed for voting rights litigation. This information, which is at the disposal of jurisdictions, 

will generally not be readily available to affected citizens without Section 5 review. Even in 

states that have sunshine or freedom of infonnation laws, obtaining such infonnation can involve 

time lags, expenses, and incomplete production requiring follow up or even litigation. In states 

lacking such laws, the relevant information may be strategically withheld to deter legal 

challenges. As a consequence, the process of assembling the necessary factual infonnation to 

bring an affirmative legal challenge can extend far beyond the implementation date of a voting 

change. Because many voting rights claims require expert testimony, potential plaintiffs also 

must shoulder the up-front costs of expert witnesses; while expert fees are compensable to 

prevailing parties under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.s.c. § 1973, the road to that 

recovery can last years. These burdens in obtaining and developing the evidence can be 

expected to result in more discriminatory voting changes taking effect than would occur if 

Section 5 were still operational. 

Section 2 of the VRA is not an adequate substitute for Section 5. One of the 

arguments frequently made against Section 5 is the assertion that Section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act provides all of the protections necessary to deal with today's voting discrimination. 

Congress considered this question in 2006 when it considered whether to reauthorize the 

preclearance remedy and disagreed. Based upon my experience in having litigated and 

supervised a number of both Section 2 cases and Section 5 cases, I also disagree with that 

contention both on theoretical and real-world grounds. I am confident that the Lawyers' 

Committee and other voting rights practitioners can use Section 2 to eventually invalidate some 

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37 

discriminatory voting changes that would have been blocked from ever taking effect under 

Section 5. That hardly shows that Section 2 can accomplish all that Section 5 did. The fact is 

that Section 2 will not do so. 

The "results test" under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was adopted by 

Congress in 1982 primarily to address pre-existing vote dilution. The Section 2 "results test" 

provides a means for the Department of Justice or private plaintiffs to challenge an election 

practice that has already generated a pattern of racially discriminatory results. It requires a court 

to ultimately assess the "totality of the circumstances" in order to determine whether "the 

political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 

equally open to participation by members ofa class of citizens protected by [Section 2]." The 

litigation objective in a Section 2 case is to displace the statlls quo and have the federal court 

order a non-discriminatory procedure into effect. 

The Section 2 results test has a somewhat complicated background. It was adopted by 

Congress in 1982, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in City ofMohile I'. Holden, 446 

U.S. 55 (1980). In the Mobile case the Supreme Court held that a claim of minority vote dilution 

brought under the Constitution requires a finding of intentional discrimination. As enacted in 

1965, Section 2 tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment and essentially served to 

provide the United States and private plaintitTs with a statutory right of action to bring racial 

discrimination claims. However, the 1982 amendment of Section 2 (enacted at the same time as 

a 25-year reauthorization of Sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA) added what is known as the "results 

test." Congress concluded that constitutional litigation under the Mobile standards would not be 

sufficient to address the extent of voting discrimination. The Section 2 results test incorporates 

the basic constitutional standards for minority vote dilution applied in the Supreme Court's 1973 

decision in White 1'. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), onto which the Supreme Court engrafted an 

"intent" element in 1980 in its Mohile decision. Many federal courts have upheld the 

constitutionality of the 1982 amendment to Section 2, although the Supreme Court has not ruled 

upon the issue. 

Section 2 "results" claims can be broken down into two basic categories. One category 

involves allegations of some form of minority vote dilution, and the other category includes 

everything else. The great majority of Section 2 litigation has concerned the first category, i.e., 

one form of vote dilution or another. In particular, dilution claims involving the use of either atlarge elections or racially gerrymandered election district boundaries have been the primary 

targets of attack. The Section 2 legal standards have evolved largely in that context. The 1982 

Section 2 amendment had a huge impact in dislodging numerous dilutive at-large election 

systems in favor offairly-drawn single-member district election systems. Working in tandem in 

the covered jurisdictions, Section 2 forced a change in discriminatory election systems, while 

Section 5 prevented backsliding or evasive tactics from undermining the resulting progress. 

Much of the electoral success by minority candidates in the covered juri sdictions is due to this 

interplay between Section 2 and Section 5. 

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38 

The ability to successfully bring claims not involving minority vote dilution under 

the Section 2 results test is uncertain. The category of "everything else" (that is, Section 2 

results claims not based upon dilution) includes challenges to voter registration procedures, 

candidate qualifying procedures, voter qualifications and disqualifications, voting methods and 

locations, poll worker hiring, voter assistance, and prerequisites to voting. These cases under 

Section 2 have been relatively infrequent and occasionally successful, but the legal standards for 

them are not nearly so well-developed as for dilution cases. By contrast, a number of Section 5 

objections were interposed to these types of voting changes over the years, and the Section 5 

retrogression standard showed itself to be well-suited for dealing with these types of problems. 

believe that the ability to efIectively address discriminatory changes of these types under the 

current Section 2 results test is uncertain. 

Preliminary injunctions under Section 2 will block fewer discriminatory voting 

changes from going into effect than preclearance reviews under Section 5. While Section 2 

can be used to challenge a voting change before it is implemented, for many reasons Section 2 

litigation will be unable to consistently block discriminatory changes from going into etIect, as 

Section 5 did so remarkably well. 

1 have mentioned some of the practical problems with putting together a preimplementation Section 2 case. One cannot reasonably expect all voting changes to be 

adequately and timely publicized under current laws. Even for changes that are known, the 

window between final adoption of a voting change (when a case would become ripe to litigate) 

and the date on which the change is first to be used will often be quite narrow. Jurisdictions are 

likely to make that window as narrow as possible if they have concerns about potential litigation. 

Nor can it reasonably be expected that jurisdictions will make readily available the relevant 

information to support a motion for a preliminary injunction under Section 2 so as to allow for 

effective litigation within that window. To the contrary, jurisdictions with concerns about 

potential litigation have a strong (if not good) motivation to be uncooperative in providing 

relevant information. 

Furthermore, the governing legal standards for Section 2, and the equitable concerns 

involved in granting preliminary injunctions, make preliminary relief unusual even for the most 

meritorious cases with well-developed evidentiary records. For example, the Department of 

Justice was unsuccessful in obtaining a preliminary injunction in its Section 2 vote dilution case 

against the at-large election system in Charleston County, South Carolina, even though the 

district court granted summary judgment to the United States with respect to the three GiflRfes 

preconditions that lie at the heart of a successful Section 2 vote dilution case, and both the 

district court and the Fourth Circuit eventually found a Section 2 results violation. Similarly, the 

Department of Justice was unsuccessful in obtaining a preliminary injunction in 1990 in its 

Section 2 vote dilution case against Los Angeles County's redistricting plan, even though both 

the district court and the Ninth Circuit eventually found intentional discrimination. 

-10 -
39 

I do not presently have a comprehensive listing of cases in which courts have granted 

Section 2 preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders. My best estimate at this time 

is that the total number of such cases since 1982 is in the range of 10 to 15 - no more than a tiny 

fraction of all Section 2 cases. 

I litigated two such cases. One case involved a blatant effort to retroactively disqualify 

two Hispanic candidates for mayor in Cicero, Illinois. Because that case featured a "smoking 

gun" admission by the incumbent mayor's spokesman that one of the Hispanic candidates had 

been targeted, it is not typical of current voting discrimination, which usually takes more subtle 

forms. The other case involved a majority vote requirement for the City of Memphis, Tennessee, 

which was preliminarily enjoined in 1992 on the basis of two very extensive expert witness 

reports and numerous declarations and exhibits. The evidence of intentional discrimination was 

extremely strong in that case, but the majority vote requirement had been enacted by referendum 

in 1966 when public debate about the law was not very circumspect. 

As you know, under Section 2 the burden ofprooflies with the plaintiff, at the 

preliminary injunction stage no less than at trial. This of course is the general rule in civil 

litigation and for most purposes it is the logical approach. However, this burden works against 

the objective of blocking discriminatory voting changes before they can harm voters. Section 5, 

in contrast, by design froze the status quo while all new voting practices could be screened for 

discrimination with the relevant information in hand. Because the submitting jurisdictions had 

the burden of proof, in both administrative reviews and Section 5 declaratory judgment actions, 

stopping discriminatory voting changes was not a game of "catch me if you can." Where a 

jurisdiction has a current record of voting discrimination, or there otherwise is reason to believe 

that a voting change is racially discriminatory, it makes sense to shift the burden, at least to some 

extent, from the citizen to the jurisdiction. 

The costs and repercnssions of Section 2 litigation are far greater than Section 5 

administrative review. In those cases where Section 2 litigation successfully blocks a 

discriminatory voting change, the cost to all involved - in terms of judicial resources, attorney 

costs, and expert witness costs - will routinely exceed the costs that Section 5 administrative 

review would have entailed by a very large margin. In addition, a jurisdiction that loses a 

Section 2 case will have less discretion in shaping a remedy than ajurisdiction attempting to 

overcome a Section 5 objection. And, a jurisdiction that loses a Section 2 case on the grounds of 

discriminatory purpose may well find itself back under preclearance under Section 3(c). While 

previously covered jurisdictions should be wary of rushing to adopt voting changes that had been 

deterred by Section 5 if only for these practical reasons, my expectation is that a number of such 

jurisdictions will take the Shelby County decision as a green light to forge ahead with 

discriminatory voting changes and take their chances in Section 2 litigation. 

Constitntional litigation cannot compensate for the snspension of Section 5 review. 

In addition to Section 2, racial discrimination claims can be brought under the Fourteenth and 

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40 

Fifteenth Amendments. Such claims require proof of a racially discriminatory purpose. 

Congress explicitly recognized the ditliculties that this requirement poses for addressing 

problems of minority vote dilution when it passed the Section 2 results test in 1982. Since that 

time, federal courts have become increasingly open to claims of legislative or deliberative 

privilege, which pose a major barrier to a plaintiff being able to fully develop a discriminatory 

purpose case, even after discovery has been completed. In my experience the deposition 

testimony of decision-makers under oath can play the critical role in getting to the bottom of 

voting discrimination. On occasion there may be sutlicient circumstantial evidence to build a 

purpose case without such testimony, but there is no doubt that shielding legislators from 

testifying about discussions and events during the legislative process substantially insulates 

discriminatory voting changes from the scrutiny they deserve. 

For these reasons, Congress must act in keeping with the bipartisan tradition of the 

Voting Rights Act to weigh the current evidence of voting discrimination, rej ect the complacent 

suggestion that inaction will sutlice, and enact appropriate legislation to effectively prevent and 

deter discriminatory voting changes from taking force. 

Once again, on behalf of the Lawyers' Committee, I respectfully thank the Chair, the 

Ranking Member and the Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit this 

testimony and to testify today. 

- 1Z-
41 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Kengle. 

I would now recognize Mr. von Spakovsky for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF HANS A. von SPAKOVSKY, 

SENIOR LEGAL FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After Shelby 

County, the Voting Rights Act remains a powerful statute whose 

remedies are more than sufficient to stop those rare instances of 

voting discrimination when they occur. There is no need for Congress to take any action. 

Section 5 was a temporary, 5-year emergency provision, but it 

was renewed four times, including in 2006, for an additional 25 

years. 

It was an unprecedented, extraordinary intrusion into state sovereignty since it required covered states to get Federal approval for 

voting changes. No other Federal law presumed that states cannot 

govern themselves and must have the Federal Government’s consent before they act. 

Now, the coverage formula of Section 4 was built on the disparity 

between Black and White participation because of the widespread, 

official discrimination in 1965 that prevented Black Americans 

from voting. That is why it was based on registration and turnout 

of less than 50 percent in the 1964 and then 1968 and 1972 elections when it was renewed. But the coverage formula has never 

been updated in 40 years to reflect modern turnout. 

Now, there is no question Section 5 was needed in 1965, but time 

has not stood still. In fact, the Census reports, the May 2013 report—I have a copy of it right here—on the November election 

showed that Blacks voted at a higher rate than Whites nationally 

by more than 2 percentage points. This same report shows that 

Black voting rates exceeded those of Whites in Virginia, South 

Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, which were covered in 

whole by Section 5; and in North Carolina and Florida, portions of 

which are covered by Section 5. Louisiana and Texas, which are 

also covered, showed no statistical disparity between Black and 

White turnout. 

As Judge Steven Williams of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 

pointed out, jurisdictions covered under Section 4 have higher 

Black registration and turnout than uncovered jurisdictions. They 

have far more Black officeholders as a proportion of the Black population than do uncovered ones. And in a study of Section 2 lawsuits, Judge Williams found that the five worst uncovered jurisdictions have much worse records than eight of the covered jurisdictions. 

With no evidence of widespread voting disparities between the 

states, continuing the coverage formula unchanged in 2006 was irrational. It is the same as if, in 1965, Congress had passed Section 

5 and said coverage will be based on the 1928 Hoover or 1932 Roosevelt elections. 

Section 5 was also unprecedented in violating fundamental 

American principles of due process since it shifted the burden of 

proof from the government to the covered jurisdiction. While such 

a reversal of basic due process may have been constitutional given 
42 

the extraordinary circumstances in 1965, it cannot be justified 

today. 

Congress also made a fatal mistake when it expanded the prohibition of Section 5 in 2006. As the Court said, the bar that covered 

jurisdictions must clear has been raised even as the conditions justifying that requirement have dramatically improved. 

Finally, two other serious problems should be noted. The effects 

test of Section 5 has led to a virtual apartheid system of redistricting. Rather than helping eliminate racial discrimination in voting, Section 5 has provided a legal excuse for legislators of both 

parties to manipulate district lines and isolate voters based on 

their race. 

Second, the Civil Rights Division has abused its power on Section 

5 on numerous occasions. In the Johnson v. Miller case, a Federal 

court severely criticized the Division for its unprofessional behavior 

and the Division’s implicit commands to the Georgia legislature 

over how to conduct its redistricting. That cost taxpayers $600,000 

awarded to Georgia. 

In the 1990’s, a Louisiana Federal district court similarly criticized the Division, saying it was using its power ‘‘as a sword to implement forcibly its own redistricting policies.’’ That case cost the 

American public $1.1 million in attorney’s fees awarded. 

In 2012, the Division sent a legally preposterous letter to Florida 

claiming that the state government was violating Section 5 because 

it was not preclearing the removal of non-citizens who had not registered to vote, despite the fact that that is a Federal felony. 

The heart of the VRA today is Section 2. It applies nationwide. 

It won’t expire, and it bans racial discrimination in voting. 

Section 3 is also there. It can be used to supervise any jurisdiction with a pattern of racial discrimination. A court can appoint 

Federal examiners and place a jurisdiction in the equivalent of Section 5 preclearance so that all voting changes have to be 

precleared. Why reinstate Section 4 when Section 3 already provides preclearance for those jurisdictions who have proved to be recalcitrant in this discrimination area? 

Section 11 prohibits anyone from intimidating or threatening or 

coercing voters. Section 203 and 404 protect language minority voters. And none of this discussion even mentions the National Voter 

Registration Act, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 

Voting Act, and the Help America Vote Act, which also all have 

protections for voters. 

There is no evidence of widespread, systematic discrimination in 

the covered states or that they are any different from other states, 

and there is no reason for Congress to take any action. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. von Spakovsky follows:] 
43 

lU Mnnncilusd/$A"fll/lf, I:. · WIUII/"!I/(1/i DC 1(J001 ' (21)2) 5" 6 ... 441)0' ';/lJg~ ,,'1: 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The VotingRights Act after the Supreme Court's 

Decision in Shelby COllllly 

Testimony before the 

Committee Oil the Judiciary, 

Subcommittee 011 fhe Constitutioll 

U"Ued States House 0/ Represelltath'es 

July 18, 2013 

l:Ians A. von Spako\'sky 

Senior Legal Fellow 

The li crihlgc Foundation 
44 

Intrutluctiull 

My Mme is lions A. von Spakoysky. I I am a Sellior Legal Fellow in the Center 

for Legal and Judicial Stutlies at The Berilagc Fourulation and MalUlller oflht CiYil 

Justice Reform Initiatiye. The "iews I express in this leStimnny are my own. Hild should 

not be COl1 stmetl as represellling any oflicial position of The Herituge Foundation. 

I apprecitllc tht invitation 10 be here today to discuss Shdby Coumy I'. lf d~,J 

1I1Id the enforcemellt oflhe Votirng Rights Act. The Voting RJghts ACI is Qnc of the most 

impol'\Jll1t 3tules ever passed b)' Congn.'SS 10 guarnmee Ihe riQ.htto vOIO frel' of 

discrimination. Aner tile U.S. SlJpreml' Court's correct decision ill Shelby County, the 

VRA rIlmruns a powerful sl3lute whose remedies ore more thall sufficient to prolC(:\ all 

Americans. Botll the Justice DepMmenl and pri vlI~ pm1ics have the ability to stop those 

mrt inslanee~ of volin!!. discriminatinn when they occur using the vnrious provisions of 

the VRA that protect indiyidual .;itil',cns whtllllhcy register and vOle. 

Prior to joining the Heritnge FoundPtion, I was (I Commissioner un th~ Federal 

Election Commission f"r tWQ years. Before that I spent four years 3t the Departmem uf 

Jusliceas a caret:r ciyil service lil""),er in the Civil RJghlS Diyision. I started 8S !llrial 

1I\1()mtly and was promoted to he COUllSl:l lo the Assistant Attomey Gener~J for Civil 

I The Heritnge Foundation is II public policy, research, tlllU educa tional orgllllization 

l't'COgnized 85 CKempt under scctiull 501(cXJ) of the Intemnl Reycnue Code, It i~ 

privately supported and reccive~ no funds from any government Q\ MY vcL . nor does il 

perform any govemm('nt or other contract work. lbe Heritage F'ollndnlion is the most 

broadly supponed think tnnk in the United States. During20 11 , it had nearly 700.000 

individual. loundation. 31m oorpo)r~tc suppon~'fS representing CYL'T}' slate in the U.S. Its 

20 11 in~ome Callie from the following sourceS: 

Indiyidl.L:lls 

Foundations 

Corporations 

711% 

'7"" 

'" 'Ibe lOp fi ve eorpor:lle givC\'S prc,vidc<l The Heritage Foundation with 2% of Its 201 I 

income. The Heritoge Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting 

lim) ofMcGllldrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage 

FOlmdmion upon requeSt. Member.! of11le Heritage Foundatiull swfTtestify as 

individllills discussing their own independent rcsc'~f<: . The vieW$ expressed nrc their own 

and do 1I0t rcflcet lln illsti luti ll 1 po~ilion for The Ilerilage Foundation or ils board of 

trustccs. 

ag~ I ofll 
45 

Rights. where [ helped eoonlinll\(' the enforcement offcderal voting rights laws. 

including the Voting Rig/lts Act Wid the National Voter Heg;stration Act. I IVllS 

privileged to be involved in dozc!:'ls of cases on behalf of Amerie811S of&1I backgrounds 10 

enforce their righl to l1.'gjsl~'T and ~ote io our elecli(ms.J 

The. S helby COUll ty o Mod Section 5 

As the Supreme Court said in its dedsioo, ~hjslory did not end in ]965." Section 

5 was originally passed as II temporary, emergency pro~ision BellO expire aner 5 years. 

It WIIS instt.'3d renewl-d four tillleS, indudillg ill 2006 lOr Ito additional 25 yl'W"S 

Sectinn 5 WIl5 un nnpreccdcmed. cxtraordinary intrusion into state sovereignty 

since it required eo~ered states 10 gel the approval of the fedcral government for voting 

ehanges made by state and local officials - either the Depanment of Justice or a threejudge court in the Distriet ofColllmbia. No ut]x'r ft.-dcral Iltw presumes thaI slales canllot 

go~cm tllem."clves as their !cgislntures dccid~ and must have the fedl'1"ol! g!)vemment's 

consent before Ihey aet. As the Supreme Court sa id, Section S "employed extnwnlinary 

ml'llSures to address 001 extraordinary problem," 

S('Ction 5 was llI'!cl'Ssary 1.11 1965 bt:callSe of the \"'idespread, onidal 

discrimination that prevented ~k Americans fl"()m registering and voting as well as the 

cuns!.ant attempts by ll1Cal jurisdi ctions 10 evade federal court de\:rccs, Th~ 

disfranc hisement mte was so bad Itlnt only 27.4 percent of bl:«:\(.c; were registered in 

Georgia in 1964 and ooly 6.7 percent in Mississippi, compart.>d 10 white registration of 

62.6 peret.·utaud 6Q.9 pef<x:nt, reilfl'-'Ctively. Tlml disparity be1.wccn ~ck and white 

rcgiSlrnlion (and turnout) \\IllS a direct fI!l>ult of the horrendous discriminalion suffcred by 

bloo); residents of those Slalt.-s. 

Thl' cOI'ernse fornl ula ofScction 4 was based on dlJI disparity Wid Congress 

spI'"Cifieally csil,;n~-d it to eaptun, those Slates Ihal .. ,:ere engaging in sueh blatant 

discrimination, 111115, CQvernge IJI nder Sectiou 4 was basN on a jurisidietion rnaimllining 

a tcsl or device as a prcrcql.l ~ite 10 ~oling as of Nov. I. 1964, and rcl!iS r~tiol l or lumonl 

of less 111110 50 percent in the 1964 election. Rcgislmtit)TI or tumon! orless thnn 50 

percent in the 196& and 1972 cil.'(:tiollS was added in successive rcnewals oftlle law. 

l1\al was Ihe last lime the covern.te fornlll!a was revis<.-d, and Sl'Ction <I did not cmplo)' 

, I was also, memb<!roflM firsl ilOllnl of Ad~1son ofllle U.S. Eltclion AssISln_ Commission. lspent 

five years In i\t!~nta, GoortiII. 0fI the fllllOil Counl)' iloord of RegisualiOfl Ind Elect!Of\5, ,"hlch is 

,..sp.""lble foradmini~.rin&dCClioos;n tbe lugCS! cOllnly in <kotila.. cl)Umy!hBIIo ~Imos! half 

Africao·Amcriun. In Virr,inla, t M'Ne.l for th= y.:~!"51lS lhe ViteChalnnM or!IIeF.irfa~ COlInI)' 

E~toml Boord. ,"hich II!!mini1lCntl«liofli in (he largn l counly In thaI stoIC, J fomlerly servIN! on lhe 

Virgini. Ad~jSO<)' BOlird 10 (he U.S. Co·mmi,sicn 00 Civil Riglll., lilave pUbJiMcd exte"sively rm 

dw;"'ru;, volfng, and civil ri&,u. iss"".,. including IIIe m"nagemc:m or th. Civil Right. Div;";"n and lhe 

handlill'; oritll.nrmcenlel~ usJKlll'libili!ics. I .m a 1984 !;I3dualeorlhc V""derbih UniverSil)' Scl"",l or 

La," and ..... h·Ct! a B.S. fron! 1M M:w:ocl!~115 Insti!U!e ofTcclUioLoj!,)' in tQ81 . 

Page 2 of 9 
46 

InOTCcum::nl infonllll1ion on regi:;tmtion and turnout when Section 5 was last rencv.'ed in 

2006. 

Section 5 was needed in 1965. Bm as the Court rt:t"Ognized. time Iw not stood 

s!i1l and "(nlcarly SO ycar later, things have chwl£ed dramatically." The ~ystematic, 

\Ilidcsp~ad discrimination against black votcrs has IQIlgsince disnppcurod. As Ihe Court 

n."C(Ignized in the NlJrI/i .... l'l·( AWl/in case in 2009: "Voter turnout lind rcgistmti(ln rates 

now uppro~ch parity. Blatantly discriminmory evasions offcderal decrees arc rnre. And 

minority candidates hold office Ill! unprecedented levels.'~ 

As an example, in Georil ~ u!ld MiSllissippi. which had such high 

diSCllfT1lflchisemcnt rnles in 1964 .. black registration actually exc(.~ded white registration 

in the 2004 elcction, j ust two years before Congress was considering Ihe renewal of 

Section 5. Bluck registrtltion exceeded white registration by 0.7 pereC!li in Georgia and 

by 3.8 percent in Mississippi. The Census Bureau's May 2013 report on thc2012 

election showed that blacks w.>te.:1 at a higher mte than whitc,~ oationaJly (66.2 p.:rccm vs. 

64.[ pt:rcent).s 

Thai same report shows lilal block voting r,lIes cxcee<lt-d thllt ofwhi\cs in 

~in ll, South Carolina, Georgia, Aluooma, and Mississ!ppi, which wcre covcn:d in 

whole by Section S. and in North Carolina. and Florida, portions of which wcre covered 

by Section S. Louisirum and Tcx:as, which were aloo COVCf(.-d by Section 5, $howed 1\0 

statistic.ally signifknnt disparity \).:tWCi!1\ black lind whitc tumout.~ Minority registration 

:md turnoul lire colls tent! y high,:r in the fonnerly covercdjurisdic\iolls than in the re5t 0" 

the nation. 

No one can rulioMlly claim thot th..,rc is still widespread, officiol discrimination 

in any of the covered SUItes. or that there D.J'C any marked differences betwccn stotcs such 

as Gt'Orgia. which was covered, lind Sioles slICh as MllSSachusett!>, which was 00\ covered 

(exeept that MElSS3Chusctts hIlS worse turnout of its minority eitiuns). As the Supreme. 

Colll1llpprovingly notcd and as Iudg.., Stephen F. Williams pointed out in his disst.1u in 

the District ofC'.<llumbia Court or App.:als,juri.wictions oovercd under Section 4 hove 

"higher bl~k registration ;ll1d IUIlleut" th3n nonC\)vered jurisdictions.1 CovcJ'\'(\ 

jurisdictions also '"'hovefar mare. blook officchold!!rs as a proportion ofthc black 

population than do uncovered Ol'i'es.'~ [n a study thilt looked at lawsuits filcd undcr 

'N<I!1'nWl'$! Aus!in Ml1II. Util. DI$>. N., One~. H.,lde •. 557 U.S. t93. 202 (2009) . • TIl,. Dlve~if>'ing F.1",,'lJrme - YOlil11l j~,,,e< by 11«" "It/J !lilp.Me Origin m 10/1 (a",/o.lrt!, /?""""j 

£JeNj(J/'~. UN!l1;IJ ST"11..."i"CF.NSllSBll"EilO, 1'20-568 (May 20 13). ' Pi&ore 5, N ..... mspanlc l¥bile Voting IUd ... Compared lu BllOCk VOfing Ra!e.: 20t 2. , Sh(olbyColtllty~. tl.,kl ..... , 619 F.Jd 848.1191 (D.C. Cit. "2012) • 67') F.3d aI8,)2. 

I'al:!c .l of!! 
47 

Seclion 2 of the VRA. Judge Williams found thai the "five wurst uncovered 

jurisdiclions ... lmve worse n.'Cords than eight oflhe covcredjurisdiclions:.o 

Arizon.1 and Abska, whkh "'tore covered lmdcr Section 5, had not hod a 

!>Uccessful S .. 'C(ion 2 law~uit ever IiJcd againSI them in the 24 years I'\!viewed by tbe 

study. The increa.'iCd number Ilf current black officeholder.; i~ additional assurance Ihal 

official, syslemie discriminotol'}' actions are highly unlikely to recur. 

Witbout evidence ofwidC:Sl'read voting disparities among the SlHtcs., continuing 

Ihe coverage formula unchanged in 2006 .... 'Us irrational. As the Court SlIid in the Shelby 

COl/lily decision, Congress "did lIotllS(' the record it compiled to shape a coverage 

fomJuln grounded in current eonditions.~IO Instead. itl'l:enacloo Seclion 4 "based on 40-

yeRr-(lld facls having no logical felotion to the present dlly.~l1 It was no difl'erenlthan if 

Congress in 1965 had based the <,overa!lc formula oot on what had happened in the prior 

year's I.'leclion in 1964, bUI had lnstcad optoo to base coverage on rcgistrnlioll and turnout 

from lhe I-ioover ern in 1928 or the Roosevelt elcction in 1932. 

Section 5 was also unpret:edcntcd in the wily it "illinted fundlilllental American 

principles otdue process: it shifi,~d the burden of proof of .... TOngdoing from the 

government to the covered jurisdiction. Unlike all olher federal statutes Lilat require the 

government to prove a violation Qf fcdenl! law, covcred j lLrisdietions were put in Ihe 

position of having 10 prove u nC!lativc - thaI u voting chaltge was not intelltionally 

discriminatory or did not have a discriminatory effcct. While such a reversal of basieduc 

lTlCCS.~ roay have been em1.~lilUt;o l! ven The eXTraordinary circUmstanCes prcscnt in 

1965, it callool bejustilied today . 

Congress also made onntht'r fatal mistake when it f<: p{lnd~J the prohibitions in 

Section 5 in 2006. TIWl- Supreme Court had warned Congress Ihal broadl'lling Section S 

covernge would "cxacerbat~ the lI bstantial rederalism costs thaI the prcclcaroncc 

procedure already exacts, perlmps to the e.~ tenl ofrJ.lsing concems about § 5'5 

constitut;ofUllity.,,11 As the Coun. said in Shl.'lby GOIlnly, "too bar Ihm cOv('-red 

jurisdictions must clear has been raised even as theconditionsjustifying that requirement 

have drnmllticoJly improvcd."ll 

Finally. two olher serious. problems must be 00100 wilh how Section 5 was 

inlt'rpretcd and ~Ilforccd. Fil'lit, the elTecIS" test orSeclion ~ bllS led 10 a vi!1Ua1 

llpartheid 5yslcm of redistricting, cllusing I'llCC 10 become a predominant factor in 

redistricting ill c0vcrcdjurisdiclions. Jurisdictioll.'l nrc onen furced to engage ill racial 

· 6i9f'JdaI897 . 

.. Shc:lb ~ e"''''1y. Stip Op. al 21. 

"Shelby COIml),. Slip Op. a121 , 

oJ R.,.., v. I) .... , .. Pari'" School Doord, l28 U.S. 320.336 (:!OOO). 

" Shelby COllllly, Slip Op. at t().17. 

Page 4 of9 
48 

discriminatinlltll !11cct the Sectio,n 5 s13l1dard and create majority-mioority districts. 

Ratilcr 1hun helping elimilUlte radal discrimilUltiou ill voting. Section 5 has pctpCtUilted it 

in redistricting llnd provided a leglll excuse for Icgislawrs ofboth parties to engage in 

such disrriminat(u), Ilchavior who:n drawing boundary lines. mnnipulatiug district lines 

alld isolaLinll p.'1rticular voters ba.sl. .. d entirely on their mce. This is the exact opposite of 

the intention of the VRA. which the Supreme Court said was to "cucourogc the tmnsition 

10 II sock1.y where rouu uo longer mailers: ~ society where integration and color-blindness 

are notjUSI qualities 10 be proud of, but ore simple facts ofUfe .. ·I~ 

Se«lnll, the Civil Rights Divisioll of the, Justice DCp!lrulient hill! abused its 

authority and power under Section 5 on UUnlcrous occasions, Somh Corolinn was forced 

10 spcud $3.5 miJ1ion in 20 12 Iiti,gIIting II specious objection filed by the Div;sion againSI 

its voter ID law. A federal court found lhut there w~~ no basis for the objection. 

Similarly, during we Clinton administration, the American tltXp!lyers were forced 

to ,):Iy ovcr $4. 1 million in attorneys' fees and costs awarded 10 defendants folsely 

o~'CUst-d of discrimination by ihe Division. including in several Seclion 5 cases. 

For c~amp le . in Johlw>n v. Milfcr, whkh il\volved Owrgia's 1992 legislutive 

redistrictil)g plan, a fedcml court severely eritici 7.e<1 the Division fitr its unproft'ssionol 

relationship with Ihe i\CLU. the ~profC8scd amnesia" of its lawyel'li when queslioned by 

the court over their activitiC$ (wnich Ihe court found "less then credible), and the 

Diyision's "implicit commu l\ d.~~ to tho:l Oo:l(lrgiu legislature ovcr how 10 eondlltt its 

redi~trictitlg .l! 1111S case cost American Ulxpayers ahno~1 5600,000 in Ollomeys' fees nnd 

costs awar -d to Georgia. 

The district Court foulld that the "wosideroble ioOuence of ACLU advocaey 00 

the vOling rights decisions uftbe United Stmes Attorney General is 'ill embarrassmcnt."I ~ 

The court was surprised th311he .Justice Department "was so blind 10 Ihis impropriety, 

especially in II role as .sensitive I\:j thul of preserving the flUldamcntsl righllo vOle.,,11 Ai; 

the U.S. Supreme Court found, instead of basing its d~'(." sion on Georgia's redi~'lrict ng 

plan on whethcr there Will; evidence or discrimination as !\."quircd under Section S, -it 

WQuld appear the Gnvcmment was driven by ils JXIliey of mR...:imi:t.:inll. majority-black 

districts."" 

In related cases filed in the carly 1990s. II federal district court similarly criticil.cd 

the Division, finding that it was trying 10 usc its power "as a sword to implement forci bly 

10 ('.eot\Ii. v, Mbcrol\, 539 U.S. 401. 4''l(j-49t (2003). 

~M F.SUjIp. 13504 (S,P. Cia. 199~). a:ff'd. Milltrv, Johnson, 5 \5 U.S.!XJO ( !99S). 

J<lhll.~n 't, Milk-r. 8M F.Supp. 81 13t\8, n 1<1. 

"Miller v. John",,", 515 II,S. ' 1924-9:15. 
49 

its own redistricting policies.,·li The court found thoU the UluisialUl IcgislO(ure 

"succumbed to the illcgitimolt- preclearancc dcmands oftho:.Justice Department" that 

"imp...'TJl1issibly cnCC/uroged - na)', mllndlltcd _ racial gerrymllnderi g."~ Those eases 

cost the American public S 1.1 mi Ilion in attorneys' fees and eosts awnrded \0 Louisiana 

In 2012, the Division scm II legally prcposteroUli letter to Florida cluiminlllh.:lt tile 

SU!!C government was violating Section 5 because it hlld not ptedelll\'d the stale's 

~mo\'ul ofJlO(lCilizcns who had unlawfully registered to vote (th'e Florida counties ore 

covcred under Section 5). This despite the fact that noncili7.cns commit a fedcrul fe lony 

when they illegally rcgi~tcr to vole. As the Federal Proser;rlliQI1 0/ Election Of!elf;iItS 

nw'Hl~1 for fcdcrol pl"OM'cutnrs, published by the CrimilUlI Division orthe Justice 

Department. explains on pages 6"/·69, submitting false citizenship infomlillion in nrdcr·to 

register to Vale viohu~'5 18 U.S.C. §§ 1051(f) and 911. 

11,e Supreme Conn's decision in Shelby COlmly was correct under the fOCIll, \he 

IIIW, und our COllstilution. St'Cticon 5 was needed in 1965 - it is nOlnet:·ded today Wid the 

oovcr.lge fornlula ofSt'Ction 4 00 longer reflects ourten! e.mditions. Treating difTeTCnt 

stotc"s differently can no longer b~justilicd. 

Congressional Action aft er Shelby Coon I}' 

'I1te question now [x.'Com'!5 whether Congress should take !Ill)' IIClioliS as a result 

or this decision. TIle answer to that question is nu .~ The other pmvisiuns of the VRA 

are more than adequate 10 provide the Justice Dcpanment and privllte panies with th¢ 

tools they nc<.-d to go after discrimination on tllOse infrequent oecasions when it docs still 

o<:eur. 

The "heart" of the VRA tooay is Secllo112, 001 S«tion S. Section 2 appli\-'5 

nationwide, 110tjlllo1 in Ii limited llumber of states and countil!S. ~nd it is pcnnancnt; it will 

ncverexpirc. It forbids !Illy ~slandard, pmelicc. or procedure" Ihat "n.'lIullS in a denial or 

abridgement of the fisht of any c itizcn of the United States 10 VOtc on !lCcount ofrnce or 

c()lor~ or memb~rship in a l!IIlguage minority. Discriminatory measurcs or aclions cun be 

stopped before an election through tcmpllmry restmining ordCfl\ wLd injunclions. Private 

plainlilTs can ha"e their unorney!!' fees 3nd eosts reimbursed if they 3re the prcv3i1ing 

party. Section 2 was not lit issue in Ihe SIre/by Clllinty case and the Supreme Coun's 

decision in 110 way afT,-'C1S the Il'::nnanent. nationwide ban on racial discrimination in 

voting found in §2." 

Section 2 is Ill) effective remedy when it is utilized by the Civil Rights Division of 

the Justice Department. During !be eight yellrs oflhe Bush administration, the Division 

" IIRYs v. SlaleofLouis;""". 839 F.Sol'!'. 1188, 1196 (W.D. \..;0. 199J~ 

" ,Ioys. v. S!Blll ofLoul~iOllll, 936 F.supp.J60, 369 (W.D. LII. 1996). 

Page 6 of9 
50 

fik"d 17 Section 2 lawsuits and ()htaincd one out-of-court settlement. The curreut 

adminisll'3lion has barely ulili~.td Section 2, having filt"d unly one lawsuit ~i noo it came 

into office. and Ih31 suit was IIttually the outcome of un investigation started during lhe 

Bush administration. A ~~nt report by the Inspector General of the Justicc Departmcm 

concluded that thc "Slatistic:1I c::"idcnce did 00\ supj>On" the claim that the BLl.~b 

oumiuistl'lltioll Will; hostile to Sec'tion2 ca,;cs. particularly in light of the faetlhnt Ihc 

uumber uf cast-os hrought during lhe Bush ttdministr.ltion far e~ct'(.-dcd the number of 

cascs brought during the curren! administrntion.,.21 lbe decreasing number ofScction 2 

eases maybe an indication that diserimination is abating, fllnher deJllOllStl1lting that 

t"llforcemcntlhl'Ollgh Section 5 is not essenlial, or evcn necessary. 

In order to meet lhe n:quiremcnts of the CouSlitution. 10 justify fedt'1'8.l 

~"Upcrvision, a new Section 5 would Iulve to identify those jurisdictions for which Section 

2. bcrau~ of systemic racial discrimination, would nOI be efleclive. ThaI will not be 

possible b«:ause there is no evid,mce of systemic racial discriminatioo in vOling in the 

SUite:; fm1l1<:rly covered uuder Seo~ti{jn 4 . 

The lack of Section 5 clIlbrcement docs not mcnn jurisdiction~ cun never be 

nvcrsc.:n by federal oulhorilies. Another provision of the VRA. Section 3. cun be U51:d to 

SUP<"MSC any jurisdictions that bave a pallem of racial discrimiO~lion in vOling. While 

the Supreme Coun ~1ruck down the eoveruge fonnulu OfScclion 4. Section 3 was not an 

issue in Shelby CuwllY. Sct'\ion 3 hus mrely been used. bUI it allows both for federnl 

c~aminers and prior approval of voting chauge:;. 

Ifajurisdiction bas enga,!!:ed in !'('pcutcd discrimination and 11 court finds it is 

necessary to prevent future discriminnlioll. Section 3 pro\'ides tlmtthat the Cbun can 

CSSL'tltiaJly plpce Ihe jurisdiction rinto the L"quivalent of Section 5 eoveruge. Under a 

Section 3 finding. "no votingq1.lll,lific1ltion or prerequisite 10 vOling. UT standard, prn(lticc, 

or procedure willI respeci to vOIing different from Ihat in force or effect ot the time the 

procecdiog was commenced slmll be cuforced unless" the coun or the Anorney Geneml 

hall prcclcared the chunge and found that it "docs 1I0t have the purpose <lnd will nol have 

the effect of denying or abridging the right II! vote." This pl'C(lll'arolllc~ thus bt'WllV:S a 

tool to remedy discriminlltion th ,t has been proven in court. mther thuu Section 5's 

blankCI burden on all jurisdictions. regardless of their actual history and actions. 

The poin( here is Ihm the Supreme Court ill She/by COllmy found lhat tm: gcneral 

conditioml ill coverctl states touay do notjuslify their C011linucd e)[eeplion from gC\1eral 

constitutional principle:; and stric:tures. However. a CO<ll't can still appoint fed .. '!".,!1 

examiners and plaee a panicularjurisdiclioll im() the equiva!ent of Section 5 prcdCllfllnee 

ifit finds sufficient evidence of current discrimination under S~'Cliol\ 3's rcquirelnents. 

II A Rev\ewoflht Opemliooi "fl/le V.)/ing Scclill!1 oflheCivit Ri&Jlll Oivi51oo, Office: of lnspN!or 

Oener.I, U.S. Department or JIISlK:c (Man:~ 20U), pageJ2. 

Pllge 7 of., 
51 

Also, unlike the due process prob-lcms inherent in Se<:tion 5, S~'Clion 3 does tlot shift the 

burden of proof for pl'C(:leafWLee to eoverL-djurisdicliolls /In/i! the government or 8 

privute pl!lintifTh.1s pm~'efr that the jurisdiction h!\S engnged in discrimination. 

The VRA has other provi:,iolLq that tllso remllin in force to protect voters. This 

includes Section II , which prohibits anyone from intimidllting. threntenins, or coercing 

lillY person for voting or nUempti.ng to vOle. Sections 203 and 4{f)(4) require certain 

jurisdictions to pnlVide bilingual registration lind voting molerials, including ballots, as 

wdl ItS inlerpre1.ers and IrnnslutOJ'S. 

Conclusion 

The Supreme Coun correctly found tht the ~'Overal:c fonnuJa ofScction 4 does 

not reflect cum'n1 conditions IUId is therefore ullConstitulional. As the Court concluded, 

-.here is no valid reason 10 insulme the coverage fommlp from review merely because il 

was pre\'iously enacted 40 years ago."u If Congress had first considered it in 2006, "il 

plainly could JJ{)t have cuactoo the present coverage fonnula" because it Hwould have 

heel! imuionnl for Congress 10 distinguisll betweeu State in such a fundamental way 

based on 40·yellN1Jd data, when todIlY'~ IUli stic~ tell un cL11ireJy differont story.'.1J 

The other provisions oft/It: VRA sueh liS Section 2 and Section J provide strong 

federal provisions to rem¢dy Voting discrimination if and when it occurs. My discussion 

of the robust pro\'isions of the VRA that guarnntee the riglll 10 vote docs nol even inclilde 

themallyoillerprot ...Clions for yt,lcrs thO\ exist outside oftlN:: VRA in the National Voll,:r 

Registration Act, the Unifonn ..... J and Ovcrscll.~ Citizcns Absentee Voting. Act, and Ille 

Help Amcrica VOling Act. 

TIlere is no reason fot Con~ss to take nny 8etion 10 reinstate the covenL~e 

fonnula ofSre\ion 4. There is, lt1 fact, no evidence Ihat particulnr states are engaged in 

systematic discriminati(ln that w!)uldjustify treating them differently rrom other states. 

,. ShelbyCO\Lnty. Sflp Op. &123. 

" Shelby COWII)", Slip Op. aL 23·24. 
52 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. von Spakovsky. 

Now I would recognize Mr. Overton for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF SPENCER OVERTON, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. OVERTON. Thank you, Chairman Franks, Ranking Member 

Nadler, and Members of the Subcommittee. As a native Detroiter 

and as a graduate of Hampton University, it is a special privilege 

to have an opportunity to testify before Mr. Conyers, Mr. Scott, and 

Mr. Goodlatte. 

Our country was founded on the principle that we are all created 

equal. We have made amazing progress in this country in the last 

50 years. Our progress is one reason that we are viewed as the 

world’s leading democracy. 

Unfortunately, even today, evidence shows that too many political operatives still maintain power by unfairly manipulating election rules based on how voters look or speak. 

For example, in 2011, in Nueces County, Texas, the rapidly growing Latino community surpassed 56 percent of the county’s population. And in response, county officials gerrymandered local election districts to weaken votes by Latinos and make sure Latino voters would not control a majority of the county commission seats. 

In 2006, in the City of Calera, Alabama, Ernest Montgomery was 

the only African American on the 5-member Calera City Council. 

City officials redrew district lines to drop Mr. Montgomery’s district 

from 70 percent African American down to 30 percent African 

American. And as a result, African American voters in the district 

were not able to elect the candidate of their choice, and the city 

council lost its sole African American member. 

Unfortunately, without Section 5 to block this type of racial manipulation, Americans in many areas like Nueces County won’t 

have the thousands and sometimes millions of dollars needed to 

bring a lawsuit to stop these unfair changes. 

This local manipulation, local manipulation, is a real problem. 

Over 85 percent of the changes rejected as unfair under 

preclearance were at the local level. I am talking about city councils, county commissions, other positions. Many of these are nonpartisan. And note that the discrimination in many of these cases 

is not related to turnout or registration at all. Indeed, high turnout, 

high registration may prompt, may trigger the discriminatory acts. 

Now, some may say that the solution to this problem is more 

lawsuits. I disagree. Lawsuits can cost thousands and sometimes 

millions of dollars. Lawsuits require massive discovery and fishing 

expeditions through boxes of paperwork, hiring expensive experts 

to interpret and piece together data, and this expense is not just 

on the victims of discrimination, but these are expenses borne by 

the Department of Justice, by the jurisdictions that implemented 

the change, and eventually by all of us through our tax dollars. 

Another problem is that lawsuits can take years. Too often, lawsuits don’t stop unfair voting rules before they are used in elections 

and harm voters. In contrast, preclearance was relatively quick, efficient, inexpensive. Preclearance also generally prevented discriminatory practices before they became effective. 
53 

Perhaps the most important point is that preclearance was comprehensive. Preclearance deterred jurisdictions from adopting many 

unfair election rules because officials knew each and every decision 

would be reviewed. With litigation, political operatives know that 

many voters won’t have the information or the money to bring a 

lawsuit. 

Political operatives know that it is very likely that this underthe-radar discrimination will never be challenged. 

Fortunately, Congress can solve these problems by updating the 

Voting Rights Act. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused on 

the coverage formula in the 1960’s and ’70’s. The Court did not find 

that the preclearance process itself was unconstitutional. Indeed, it 

explicitly acknowledged that Congress has the power under the 

15th Amendment to prevent voting discrimination. 

Another important point is that the Voting Rights Act is not a 

partisan issue. There have been other times in the past when we 

as Americans have seemed divided in our politics. The 1960’s were 

turbulent. But Republicans and Democrats came together to pass 

the Voting Rights Act, and every reauthorization since that time, 

Republicans and Democrats worked together, as you know, despite 

so many politically divisive issues. In 2006, Congress came together 

under the leadership of Mr. Conyers and Mr. Sensenbrenner and 

renewed the Voting Rights Act with an overwhelmingly bipartisan 

commitment. 

So we should be proud of our significant progress, but we still 

have work to do. We all agree that voting rights violations are 

wrong, that discrimination is wrong. We should all work together 

to update the Voting Rights Act and to ensure that voting is free, 

fair, and accessible for all Americans. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Overton follows:] 
54 

United States House of Representatives 

Committee on the Judiciary 

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 

Hearing on 

The Voting Rights Act 

After the Supreme Court's Decision 

in Shelby County 

Testimony of Spencer Overton 

Professor of Law 

The George Washington University Law School 

July 18, 2013 
55 

Chairman Franks, Ranking Member Nadler, and Members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee 

on the Constitution and Civil Justice: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today regarding the Voting Rights Act after the 

U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shelhy Co/lI1ly v. Holder 1 T am a tenured Professor of Law at 

The George Washington University Law School. 1 regularly teach a voting law course, and in 

previous years 1 have taught courses on civil rights and the law of democracy generally. My 

scholarship focuses on voting rights and other election law issues. I am also a Senior Fellow at 

Demos. From 2009-2010, I served as Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Legal 

Policy at the U.S. Department of Justice, where T worked on various policy issues, including 

policies related to the Voting Rights Act, the Military and Overseas Votcr Empowerment Act, 

and the National Voter Registration Act. 

Shelb)! County Invalidated Coverage Formnla Referencing 1960s and 1970s Data 

In Shelby ('Ollnty, the Court held unconstitutional the Section 4(b) coverage formula that 

determined which jurisdictions must comply with the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of 

the Voting Rights Act. 

Section 5 requires federal preclearance of changes affecting voting in "covered" 

jurisdictions before the changes are implemented. Section 4(b) as originally adopted and 

updated provided formulas that identified as "covered" jurisdictions with a voting test or device 

and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 general 

Presidential elections 2 

In Shelby COllnty, the Court stated "a departure from the fundamental principle of equal 

sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sutllciently 

related to the problem that it targets," and that "current burdens ... must be justified by current 

needs." 

The Court believed that in the past the 4(b) coverage formula based on tests and low 

turnout from 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections was "sufficiently related to the problem,"-that it 

was "rational in both practice and theory," "ret1ected those jurisdictions uniquely characterized 

by voting discrimination," and "Iink[ed] coverage to the devices used to effectuate 

discrimination." The Court observed that "[t]he fornlUla looked to cause (discriminatory tests) 

and etfect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those 

jurisdictions exhibiting both." 

In contrast, the Court believed that the coverage formula based on 1964, 1968, and 1972 

turnout and tests was not tailored to address discrimination today. The Court noted that 

Congress altered the coverage fonnula in 1970 (adding counties in California, New Hampshire, 

and New York), and 1975 (adding the States of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, and several counties 

in six other states), but not in 1982 or 2006. Specifically, the Court stated: 

11]] S.C!. 2612 (2013). 

2]n 1975 -1est or device" \vas amended to include areas that proyided I<:nglish-only voting materials ,:..:here at least five percent of 

yoting-age cit1zem; ·were members ofa single language minority group. 

2 
56 

Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The 

formula captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration 

and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned 

nationwide for over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in the 

covered States have risen dramatically in the years since. 

The Court did not believe that the record Congress amassed in 2006 establishing vote 

dilution and other discriminatory practices was tied to text of a coverage formula based on 

turnout, registration rates, and tests from the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, the Court reasoned: 

Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula 

grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based on 40-yearold facts having no logical relation to the present day. The dissent relies on 

"second-generation barriers," which are not impediments to the casting of ballots, 

but rather electoral arrangements that affect the weight of minority votes. That 

does not cure the problem. Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting 

such efforts simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the § 4 

coverage fonnula, which is based on voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote 

dilution.. [W]e are not ignoring the record; we are simply recognizing that it 

played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us today. 

The Court explicitly limited its holding to the 4(b) coverage formula based on election 

data from the 1960s and 70s, and stated that "Congress may draft another formula based on 

current conditions." 

While the Court observed that states generally regulate state and local elections and that 

federal preclearance is "extraordinary," the Court did not find the Section 5 preclearance process 

unconstitutional. Instead, it explicitly recognized that "voting discrimination still exists," that 

"any racial discrimination in voting is too much," and that Congress has the power to enforce the 

Fifteenth Amendment to prevent voting discrimination. Further, the Court's decision did not 

affect Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, which allows federal courts to order preclearance as 

a remedy for violations of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment (commonly known as "bail 

in"). 

Section 2 Litigationlnadeguate Substitute for Loss of Preclearance 

While the holding in Shelby County was limited to invalidating the coverage formula, the 

decision has a significant impact. It effectively suspends Section 5 preclearance in all 

jurisdictions other than the handful currently subject to a Section 3(c) "bail in" court order. 

Absent Congressional action that updates the Act, it will be more difficult to prevent and deter 

political operatives from manipulating voting rules based on race. 

Some have asserted that Section 5 is unnecessary because the Department of Justice or 

private parties can bring a lawsuit under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This is wrong. 

While Section 2 is important, litigation is an inadequate substitute for the Section 5 preclearance 

process. 

3 
57 

Litigation Not Comprehensive: Preclearance was comprehensive-it deterred 

jurisdictions from adopting many unfair election rules because officials knew every decision 

would be reviewed. In contrast, litigation requires that plaintiffs have the information and 

resources to bring a claim, and therefore litigation misses a lot of under-the-radar manipulation. 

Even states and localities that post new bills online or are subject to freedom-or-information laws 

generally do not disclose the unfair aspects of their voting changes. 

Litigation More Expensive: Preclearance also put the burden to show a change was fair 

on jurisdictions-which enhanced efficiencies because jurisdictions generally have better access 

to infonnation about the purpose and effect of their proposed election law changes. Litigation 

shifts the burden to affected citizens-who must employ experts and lawyers who fish for 

information during drawn-out discovery processes. This drives up the cost of compliance to the 

Department of Justice, to affected citizens, and to jurisdictions. 

Litigation Not Tailored to Non-Dilution Claims: Section 2 has well-developed 

standards to challenge unfair minority vote dilution in the context of at-large elections and 

racially-gerrymandered election district boundaries. The litigation standards, however, are not 

sufficiently developed to address non-dilution claims such as challenges to voting locations and 

candidate qualification procedures. In contrast, the Section 5 retrogression standard was wellsuited to address non-dilution claims. 

Preclearance Protects Voting Rights in Local Elections: The preclearance process 

was particularly valuable in local elections, which are often nonpartisan. While national media 

outlets and political pundits may focus on voting rules that affect federal and state oilices, the 

unfair manipulation of local election rules is a significant problem. At least 86.4% of all unfair 

election changes blocked by preclearance since 2000 would 1101 have affected federal elections. 

That's because even when federal, state, and local elections are conducted at the same time, 

many important changes are confined to the local level, including local redistricting, 

annexations, and changes to candidate qualifications, the method of elections, and the structure 

of government. 

In Nueces County, Texas, for example, the rapidly-growing Latino community surpassed 

56% of the county's population, and in response county officials gerrymandered local election 

districts to dilute the votes by Latinos. 

Without Section 5 protections to block this type of racial manipulation, Americans in 

many areas like Nueces County will not have the thousands and sometimes millions of dollars 

needed to bring a lawsuit to stop these unfair changes. Further, much of this local manipulation 

will not attract significant national media attention and will go unchallenged. 

Bail-In Currently Inadequate: The Section 3(c) bail-in process is insufficient to 

address the problems above because it currently requires a finding of intentional discrimination. 

Courts often tlnd voting rights violations based on effects without explicitly finding that a 

jurisdiction engaged in imentional discrimination. Evidentiary problems with proving 

intentional discrimination drive up litigation costs for the Department of Justice, aggrieved 

voters, and jurisdictions. Bail-in is often a good solutions-oriented remedy for all parties, but 

4 
58 

currently bail-in consent decrees generally require that a jurisdiction sign a decree that 

acknowledges it engaged in unconstitutional activity (intentional discrimination), and the stigma 

of intentional discrimination can sometimes deter otherwise constructive agreements. 

Significant Voting Discrimination Persists: Too many political operatives in 

previously covered jurisdictions continue to maintain power by unfairly manipulating voting 

rules based on how voters look or speak. Congress determined as much during the last 

reauthorization, and such discrimination has occurred since that time in various jurisdictions like 

Nueces County, Texas. While (he Court in She/by Counly invalidated the coverage formula 

because it was based on data from the 1960s and 1970s, the Court acknowledged that "voting 

discrimination still exists" and that "any racial discrimination in voting is too much." 

Conclusion 

In the last 50 years we have made significant progress on voting rights. Unfortunately, 

after She/by County I'. Holder political operatives have more opportunity to unfairly manipulate 

election rules based on race. The Court in Shelby ('Ollllly stated that the purpose of the Fifteenth 

Amendment is "to ensure a better future," but the future will be worse if Congress fails to act. 

Fortunately, Congress has the power to prevent discrimination and update the Voting 

Rights Act. An updated Voting Rights Act will help not just voters of color, but our nation as a 

whole. Protecting voting rights provides legitimacy to our nation's efforts to promote democracy 

and prevent corruption around the world. We all agree that racial discrimination in voting is 

wrong, and Congress should update the Voting Rights Act to ensure voting is free, fair, and 

accessible for all Americans. 

5 
59 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

And we will now proceed under the 5-minute rule with questions, 

and I will begin by recognizing the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Goodlatte, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to thank all four of our witnesses. This has been a very 

good exposition of the Shelby County case and the current status 

of the Voting Rights Act. As I said in my opening remarks, it is 

absolutely critical that we protect the rights of all Americans to be 

protected in their rights to register and to vote, and it is important 

to recognize the many provisions in the Voting Rights Act that 

have been upheld, including the opportunity to have preclearance 

in circumstances where a court finds that a jurisdiction has engaged in a discriminatory action that results in barring people from 

having the opportunity to register or to vote, and it is important 

that this Committee makes sure that we continue to protect that 

right. 

I had intended to yield my time to former Chairman Sensenbrenner, who is not a Member of this Subcommittee but who, as 

Chairman of the full Committee, was presiding at the time the Voting Rights Act was last extended, and I am now advised that he 

is not able to return because of a scheduling conflict. 

I am going to have to leave myself, and so I know there are some 

other Members of the full Committee who are not Members of the 

Subcommittee, including, I believe, Ms. Jackson Lee and Mr. Watt. 

I understand Mr. Watt does not desire time. So, Mr. Chairman, I 

will yield the balance of my time to the gentlewoman from Texas 

and allow her to ask questions of the panel. 

Again, my apologies to the panel for having to leave, but also my 

thanks to each of you. I think this has been a very good exposition 

of the status of the law, and at this time I yield to Ms. Jackson 

Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman for his courtesies, 

and to the Members as well, to their courtesies, and I want to go 

right to Mr. Overton because he directly commented on two points 

that were raised in the majority opinion, and that was the extensive registration of African Americans and the turnout of African 

Americans. 

Let me pose two questions. Turnout is like a roller coaster. It is 

up and down, and there may be some thrills. The registration itself 

likewise goes in spurts depending really on the candidate, maybe 

the issue. Off-year elections may be lesser than elections that are 

not. 

Is it not the barriers—when you think of the 13th and 14th 

Amendment, one giving the vote, one giving citizenship, it was an 

unfettered vote, except as guided by what was then the law. Can 

you speak to that point? Is it not the discriminatory barriers that 

the Court should look at and have chronicled from 2006 on, as opposed to registration and turnout, which is, in essence, in cycles? 

Mr. OVERTON. Well, thank you very much for your question, and 

you are right in terms of the 14th and 15th Amendment are not 

focused simply on this just formal right to vote in terms of the 

right to cast a ballot, but also to cast a meaningful ballot. 
60 

You will remember that the purpose of Section 5 in terms of 

preclearance was to recognize that there may be devices that we 

don’t understand that will undermine minority voting rights, and 

as a result we need a tool that is flexible that can adapt to new 

devices that suppress minority votes or dilute minority voting—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So in essence, if I might, preclearance is to get 

rid of the barriers so that your vote can be unfettered when you 

go to the polls, as opposed to doing it after the fact. 

Mr. OVERTON. That is correct, but that would also include, for example, Nueces County, where you have 56 percent Latino, a large 

Latino turnout. So that may be a high registration, high turnout 

rate, but one draws districts in a way to ensure that Latinos will 

not control three of the five commission seats but are only confined 

to two of the commission seats. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is why the preclearance is vital. 

Mr. OVERTON. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the enforcement section or an enforcement section such as what Section 4(b) was is vital as well, and 

a Section 2 claim does not equal the preclearance authority. 

Mr. OVERTON. That is absolutely right, in large part because it 

is just a different administrative tool. You know, litigation has its 

place in some situations. But when we talk about an administrative tool—we have it in many other areas like antitrust, et cetera, 

where we have a tool that efficiently prevents, deters discrimination, and does it in a way that is not high cost in the way litigation 

is, is comprehensive. Section 5 was an important tool. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman, and the I thank the 

Committee for their kindness. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. FRANKS. If I could, before we move on here, I just noticed 

that Congressman John Lewis was in the room, and I wanted to 

recognize and express our honor that you are among us here today, 

sir, and we appreciate it. You are an icon in this movement, and 

we are very grateful that you have joined us. 

Mr. CONYERS. All I wanted to do was to add on to your statement 

an invitation, if you would permit, for him to sit on the dais. 

Mr. FRANKS. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I yielded back, but I just want to add my 

appreciation for the leadership of Mr. John Lewis and the statement of the Edmund Pettis Bridge, and he lives that statement 

every day. I thank him for his courage. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I would now recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Committee for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask Mr. Kengle. We know that Section 5 was judged necessary, and Section 4 to determine who is under Section 5, because 

without preclearance the Federal Government was always playing 

a whack-a-mole game with local jurisdictions. You would knock 

down one discriminatory practice, they would come up with three 

others. By the time you knocked them down, they came up with 

two more, and you never caught up, and people were always discriminated against. 
61 

Given the effective dismemberment of Section 5 by Section 4 

being held unconstitutional, two things. Is Section 3 enough to protect against voting discrimination, as we have witnessed it post2006 reauthorization? And why are there such a few number of 

cases in which jurisdictions have been bailed into the preclearance 

regime under Section 3? 

Mr. KENGLE. I don’t think Section 3 is going to be enough. One 

of the points that I noted earlier was that Section 3 is a two-step 

process. In other words, a plaintiff, or DOJ for that matter, cannot 

just go to a court and say we think that there is reason to have 

this jurisdiction subject to the preclearance process, so please give 

us an order to that effect. 

What has to occur is that the district court has to find that there 

have been violations of the racial discrimination protections of the 

14th or 15th Amendment. And so that means that in practical 

terms the plaintiff seeking 3(c) coverage has to prove that there 

was intentional discrimination within the jurisdiction. 

In my written testimony, I identified some of the burdens that 

are associated with proving intentional discrimination. This was a 

subject that was extensively debated in 1982 when Congress 

amended Section 2 to include what is now known as the results—— 

Mr. NADLER. Why didn’t we at that time add the results to Section 3 also? 

Mr. KENGLE. I’m sorry? 

Mr. NADLER. When we added the results or effects test to Section 

2, why didn’t we add it to Section 3 at the same time? Or was that 

just—— 

Mr. KENGLE. Well, I think that—I don’t know the answer to that. 

I think that the answer to that is that Section 3 was seen as an 

analog to Section 5. Section 5 was not being amended. At that time 

it was reauthorized, but it was not otherwise amended. And so I 

think that Section 3 was not changed in that way because it was 

seen as providing a judicially-based counterpart to Section 5. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Now, let me ask you one further question. 

Then I have a question for Mr. Overton. 

Every time we have felt the need to reauthorize the Voting 

Rights Act, we developed and carefully studied a massive record 

before we did so. In 2006, we had over 15,000 pages documenting 

ongoing and persistent election-related discrimination, and documenting the utility of preclearance. 

Now, given the broad powers conferred upon Congress under the 

15th Amendment, and given the exhaustive record of voting discrimination compiled by the Congress, can you explain the problems around the Court’s departure from their traditional deference 

to Congress as justified in Katzenbach v. South Carolina and City 

of Rome v. United States? In other words, how did they get around 

their traditional deference to Congress, our massive documentation 

of the current need, and still declare it unconstitutional? 

Mr. KENGLE. Did you want Mr. Overton to respond first? 

Mr. NADLER. Either one of you. Mr. Overton, go ahead. 

Mr. OVERTON. Well, you know, the Court in Shelby County was 

focused on this text in terms of these election years of ’64, ’68, and 

’72. I think Congress came at this from the standpoint of amassing 
62 

an incredibly significant record, 15,000 pages, over 90 witnesses, 20 

hearings, that was just massive but maybe not tied to that language in ’64, ’68, and ’72. So I really read the Court as not even 

looking at that massive record because it said, hey, it is not tied 

to this formal language that is in the statute of ’64, ’68, and ’72. 

Mr. NADLER. So you don’t think, then, that it flowed from a 

Boerne analysis that we have to have congruent and proportional—— 

Mr. OVERTON. Well, I definitely think Congress was very aware 

of the standards and went out of its way to build a very strong 

record that would pass muster in terms of a Boerne analysis or a 

Katzenbach analysis. But I just think that there was a bit of a mismatch between Congress and the Court in terms of Chief Justice 

Roberts really focused on the text of those 3 years. 

Mr. NADLER. Can I just ask Mr. Kengle to comment on the same, 

last question? 

Mr. KENGLE. Yes. I didn’t spend a lot of time in my written testimony going into the details about the Court’s opinion in the case 

because I wanted to address the practical significance. But in terms 

of the Court’s application of the standard, the Boerne doctrine was 

curiously absent from the Court’s discussion, and it is not clear to 

me to what extent the Court would apply some additional type of 

Boerne gloss to a future case as opposed to simply following the 

standard that the Court set out in North West Austin, which is 

what it followed in this case, that current burdens have to be justified by current needs. 

The thing about the Court’s textual approach and really laserlike focus on the text of Section 4(b) is that in other contexts the 

Supreme Court has looked at the actual function and the harmonious operation of the provisions of the statute and what Congress 

logically meant to intend when it interpreted other portions of the 

Act. I am thinking in particular of the Sheffield case, and even the 

North West Austin case, because in looking at the bailout provision 

in North West Austin, the Court did not really take the literal 

reading of the statute. It took a result that it felt was necessary. 

So in other cases, the Court has departed from the strict text of 

the Act. In this case, it chose not to. But my view is that is water 

under the bridge and we need to now move on to address the current evidence and take the appropriate next steps. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. My time is expired. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman. 

And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. If 

it is all right, I will start with you, Mr. Adams. I wondered if you 

could just generally describe for us the process by which lawsuits 

under Section 3 of Voting Rights Act are filed. And this section, of 

course, is still intact; correct? 

Mr. ADAMS. Yes. Section 2—Section 3 coverage, of course, can be 

triggered by finding that there is intentional discrimination under 

Section 2, and the Supreme Court has laid out a rather complex 

but predictable roadmap. Under Section 2, you have to satisfy 

something called the Gingles preconditions, and then you have to 

go through the Senate factors, of which there are seven. I should 

note that that is for a vote dilution claim, a redistricting claim, if 

you will. I have brought non-vote dilution Section 2 cases. I 
63 

brought two of them, and you have a slightly different analysis, but 

it is still applicable. 

There has been testimony and commentary that you can’t bring 

it in a non-vote dilution legislative redistricting context. That is 

just not true. 

So you have to prove these Gingle preconditions, and then you 

have to march through the Senate factors. I want to point out two 

of these issues. 

One, Gingles 3. Gingles 3 is a causality requirement that racial 

polarization is causing minorities to lose elections. Senate factor 1 

is a history of official discrimination. So you can still have effective 

enforcement of civil rights if you simply show there is discrimination and that minorities are losing elections because of being minorities. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. von Spakovsky, would you add anything to 

that? On Section 2 and 3. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Yes. It is very interesting hearing people 

say that we need this administrative process. Like I said, it violates fundamental due process. The government is supposed to 

prove its case, not the other way around. I am sure it would be 

very easy if we allowed the government to simply jail individuals 

when they were accused of crimes, and then force them to prove 

that they were innocent. That is basically what Section 5 did. 

I don’t deny that discrimination still occurs, but Section 2 and 

Section 3 are powerful weapons to do that, and particularly Section 

3. Look, what the Supreme Court said was you can’t put this blanket Section 5 preclearance requirement on all these states based on 

40-year-old data, particularly given the most recent evidence of 

how that kind of discrimination has disappeared. You can’t do a 

blanket imposition of this. 

But Section 3 allows you to put in a preclearance requirement for 

specific jurisdictions if the government goes to court and actually 

proves they engage in racially discriminatory behavior and they are 

going to do it in the future. That is something you can do. You can 

win those cases, and it is not just the government that can bring 

these. The ACLU has a huge voting rights project that brings many 

cases. I just checked their assets. Their assets as of 2012 were $360 

million. They have the ability to bring cases like this if the Justice 

Department is not, but the Justice Department in the past has 

brought Section 2 cases when it was required. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me ask a general question to all of you, and 

anyone that feels inclined to respond, we can start down here and 

just go down the line. 

But looking at modern voter registration and voter turnout rates 

in the several states, what do you think they tell us about racial 

progress in America since 1965? Mr. Adams? 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, as I say in my written testimony, America 

bears absolutely no resemblance in 2013 to 1965, and that is exactly what the Supreme Court recognized when it found these triggers to be out of date. So we simply don’t have the America where 

whack-a-mole was necessary because we don’t have jurisdictions 

throughout the South who are going to play whack-a-mole anymore 

like they did in 1964. In some places it is worse than the South 

in the North, and that is what was so upside-down about the trig-
64 

gers, is you saw more voting discrimination cases in places like Euclid, Ohio and Osceola County, Florida, which is a non-covered 

place, and Blaine County, Montana then you did in the South. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Kengle, do you have any thoughts there? 

Mr. KENGLE. Yes. What I would want to say about that is that 

in the South, looking at the situation today, I think what you see 

in the South in the covered states is that Section 5 and Section 2 

have wrought an historic transformation in the political process, 

that compared to where we were in 1965, there has been tremendous progress in terms of voter participation and voter turnout. 

There is no question about that. It is one of the great achievements 

of the Voting Rights Act. It has taken a lot of work. It didn’t happen automatically. But it has been a great achievement. 

But voter registration and voter turnout are not all of the story. 

When you look at the story, and I saw this when I worked in the 

DOJ because there were a lot of Section 5 submissions that came 

in in the 1980’s when I began of voting changes that had been enacted in the 1970’s, and what you saw was that as time went on, 

the increases in voter registration and turnout among minority voters had prompted discriminatory changes to election systems; in 

other words, adding a majority vote requirement or going to atlarge elections, abandoning single-member district elections, 

changes that were diluted in nature. 

So Section 2 addressed that problem in 1982. There is an excellent book called Quiet Revolution in the South that chronicles how 

both Section 2 and Section 5 brought about this change. But the 

fact that that success has occurred does not indicate that that success is permanent or that that success cannot be jeopardized. It can 

be jeopardized. I am very concerned that it will be jeopardized if 

jurisdictions believe that they have the green light to engage in 

voting discrimination and that they can sit back and wait to be 

sued, and then just drag the process out through years of litigation 

and the courts. 

The number of Section 2 cases in which a court has issued a preliminary injunction is very, very small. I don’t have a whole list. 

It is a small fraction of all Section 2 cases. It is not a ready remedy. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Kengle. 

And with that, my time has expired, and I would now recognize 

the distinguished Ranking Member of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to come back to the head of the Lawyers’ Committee 

for Civil Rights Under Law, which incidentally has done a very superb job of keeping us on track. I have been to a number of the 

sessions. Let me just raise a concern about the structure of the new 

enforcement regime that might replace the one disabled by the 

Shelby County decision. 

What impact does the opinion have on the status of preclearance 

matters currently under review or pending prior to the Court’s ruling? 

Mr. KENGLE. Well, the immediate—we saw one impact right 

away, Mr. Conyers. There were two appeals pending in the Supreme Court from the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
65 

One was a case involving—well, both cases involved the State of 

Texas. One concerned redistricting and one concerned voter ID. 

The Supreme Court vacated the District Court judgments in both 

of those cases and remanded the cases back down, presumably for 

dismissal. There have been some motions filed in those cases, so 

they may not be fully over yet. But the Court vacating the judgment I think is an indication that the Court considers the judgments in those cases that were issued by the D.C. court to now be 

moot because they were done pursuant to an unconstitutional targeting formula. 

Because the impact on Section 5 objection letters I think is going 

to be the subject of some litigation in the Federal courts pretty 

soon, I am a little wary of predicting exactly what the outcome is 

going to be, but I think there is going to be a very vigorous argument that any objection issued from 2006 onward has now been invalidated. There may be some arguments against that, but I think 

there is going to be a very strong push to have all of those found 

to be invalid, and that would mean that the jurisdictions would 

then be free to go about implementing those objectionable changes 

unless they have been repealed or superseded by other legislation. 

Mr. CONYERS. So we should be worried or hopeful? 

Mr. KENGLE. I think it is ground for concern. I think that the 

Committee and Subcommittee need to look closely at the record of 

what has occurred after 2006. That is one of the things that we had 

not attempted to do today, is provide a sort of comprehensive assessment of what has occurred after 2006. I feel strongly that that 

should be the subject of future hearings where it can be concentrated on in detail and that it can be put in the context of the 

other recent and current evidence of voting discrimination. 

Mr. CONYERS. Professor Spencer Overton, in the 1997 case of 

City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court stated that Congress 

must develop a complete record before acting legislatively, and to 

tailor its legislative response to that record to ensure that its legislation was ‘‘congruent and proportional.’’ 

Now, what kind of problems perhaps has the Court created for 

Congress as it chooses to legislate voting rights enforcement in the 

future? 

Mr. OVERTON. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Well, one significant 

problem is that there is one less tool in terms of preventing racial 

discrimination in voting, and it is a significant issue. It has certainly been documented. In terms of the Court making that move, 

essentially the Court focused on—as opposed to focusing on Congress’ record, it focused on the terms of the statute and got into 

this notion of sufficiently related and current burdens being justified by current needs in terms of those years ’64, ’68, and ’72. 

I do want to just kind of add, Mr. Conyers, when I came into this 

building today, I went through a metal detector, and that wasn’t 

a due process violation. It was not sending me to jail. There are 

not metal detectors everywhere. When I go to McDonald’s, there 

are not metal detectors. It is just where there might be a problem 

here. The metal detector is less expensive than some other security 

devices. It prevents problems before they occur, right? 

Preclearance is a reasonable device when targeted at particular 

areas to deal with problems. 
66 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you so much. 

My time has expired. I thank the Chair. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I would now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing 

we are holding here today, and I am listening to our witnesses and 

thinking back at that reauthorization time of the Voting Rights Act 

back in 2006. I would first remark on Mr. Overton’s comment that 

preclearance is a reasonable device. I would think also that voter 

ID would be a reasonable device. And when I look across the country and try to accumulate problems we might have with elections, 

I don’t know where to go look, and I wouldn’t deny that it likely 

exists in places in the country, and probably in smaller areas, 

much smaller areas than when this act was first passed. But I 

wouldn’t know where to go look to find real voter intimidation and 

real discrimination. The first place that comes to mind to me when 

I utter those words is Philadelphia. 

So I think there is more damage to the integrity of our election 

system that comes from lack of voter ID than might come from 

voter intimidation. And when I think about the discussion about 

bringing up the Voting Rights Act and perhaps rewriting it, that 

would mean that the authorization would be also subject, and I 

question the wisdom of an authorization that would last for more 

than a generation, 25 years. Thomas Jefferson declared a generation to be 19, in case anybody is quibbling. 

So the 25-year reauthorization in 2006 I thought was imprudent. 

It is one of the reasons I voted against it. I think we need to have 

a lot more improvement in the integrity of the individual ballot, 

and I think we know that, but there is a political barrier in the 

way. I think if we bring up the Voting Rights Act and we have an 

opportunity then to open it up, I think multilingual ballots become 

a question. There is no logical reason that ballots should be in anything other than in English. If you take a citizenship test, you have 

to demonstrate proficiency in English. 

I would turn first to Mr. Adams and ask if the Voting Rights Act 

were either allowed to expire or be repealed, is there a constitutional protection there for the issues that are covered in the VRA, 

and how would you expect that might be worked? 

Mr. ADAMS. Well, obviously somebody can bring a 1983 action 

under the 15th Amendment, which guarantees the right to vote 

free of racial discrimination. But, of course, Section 2 also incorporates those concepts. 

You mentioned voter intimidation. Just last week, a state judge 

in Mississippi determined in a ruling, threw out the results of an 

election because of voter intimidation by a political operative working for somebody named Rodriguez Brown. This is a proven case 

of voter intimidation. Will anybody do anything about it? Will there 

be a Federal case brought? Somehow, I suspect not. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Adams. 

Also, if I remember Mr. von Spakovsky’s statement, to the extent 

that African American voter turnout is actually higher in the noncovered districts than in the covered districts, did I hear that correctly? Could you elaborate a little bit? 
67 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Black turnout is better in covered, what 

were covered jurisdictions than non-covered jurisdictions around 

the country; in fact, consistently so. Table 5, which is a map from 

the Census report in May, is really dramatic. I mean, it shows 

Blacks out-voting Whites largely in the covered states. 

Mr. KING. Can you explain why that is? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I’m sorry? 

Mr. KING. Can you explain why that is? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Well, one of the reasons, I think, is because 

of Section 5 and the Voting Rights Act, and because the kind of 

systematic discrimination you had in 1965 has virtually disappeared. 

And if I could make a point here, people keep saying, well, with 

this gone, these jurisdictions are going to return to acting that way. 

Well, that ignores a very important point. In 1965, there were no 

Black elected officials in the covered states. That is not true today. 

In fact, all the statistics and the court findings show that those 

covered states have a much larger number of Black elected officials 

than other parts of the country. That is true in states like Georgia 

and Mississippi. And the idea that those officials are themselves 

going to start to discriminate or put up with that kind of discrimination, that is just not a reality. 

Mr. KING. Okay. But what you have said, I think, is that the 

Voting Rights Act has worked in these covered districts and has 

brought the Black turnout up a little higher than it is in the noncovered districts. So does that imply that there is discrimination in 

the non-covered districts, or how would you explain the statistical 

variance? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Well, we know there is discrimination in 

uncovered jurisdictions because there are Section 2 lawsuits that 

are filed, as Mr. Adams pointed out, in places like Euclid, Ohio and 

other areas. Disparity in turnout between different races isn’t always due to discrimination. It is sometimes just people not being 

interested in particular candidates. I think Ms. Lee talked about 

the cyclical nature of elections. 

But the point is, if Congress is going to have Section 5 coverage 

based on the Section 4 formula of low turnout, then there are many 

other places in the country that have never been covered under 

Section 5 that ought to be covered in any new version of this law. 

Mr. KING. I thank you. 

I would just ask unanimous consent to ask an additional question, if the Chair would indulge me? 

Mr. FRANKS. Without objection. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, and I thank the Members of the Committee for allowing it. I was very interested when I heard Mr. von 

Spakovsky say about apartheid redistricting, and I don’t know that 

that is going to be revisited in this hearing if I don’t bring it up. 

I come from a state that has anything but that. We have a statutory directive that, without going through the definitions in the 

language, it essentially prohibits the gerrymandering by race or by 

party. We end up with, I think, logical districts that are compact 

and contiguous. From that perspective, I see the gerrymandering 

that Mr. von Spakovsky has brought up in this hearing, and myself, I would recommend looking at other states drawing districts 
68 

like that without regard to race, ethnicity, the residency of any incumbency, and logical, compact, contiguous. 

So I would ask Hans if he would speak to that and just elaborate 

a little bit more for the benefit of the Committee, please? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Look, I don’t think it is a good idea when 

you take cities, for example, where the residents, no matter what 

the race, have similar interests, similar public policy problems, and 

you divide them up into differing districts just based on race so 

that particular individuals or particular races can get elected. I 

mean, that leads to many different problems. It does not help integration. It does not help bring us together, which is what the Voting Rights Act was intended to do. 

But, to be quite frank, politicians like it because it produces very 

safe districts for them where they don’t get competition. I don’t 

think that is a good thing. Some of the witnesses here may agree 

with me that they don’t think that is a good thing, and that is a 

direct result of Section 5 and the way it is administered by the U.S. 

Justice Department. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much. I thank all the witnesses and 

yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is now recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Overton, I just wanted to comment on that last one. Are 

overly safe, over-packed districts oftentimes violations of Section 5? 

Mr. OVERTON. Often they are not violations of Section 5, but I 

think it is important to recognize—— 

Mr. SCOTT. An over-packed district where—— 

Mr. OVERTON. Well, certainly an over-packed district would be a 

problem and would be retrogressive here, right? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. OVERTON. But I just want to also note that in a place like 

Nueces County, Section 5 prevented the discrimination that occurred in Nueces County in terms of the racial districting that discriminated against Latinos. So, it is important. 

Mr. SCOTT. I just wanted to point out that when you get these 

overly safe, over-packed districts, they can violate Section 5 on 

their own. 

One of the concerns I have is not the statewide problems but the 

little problems that can occur in small counties, school board elections, town councils, when nobody is looking. And we know that all 

voting changes are not discriminatory. They can be unpopular. 

They can have political effects, but not discriminatory. You could 

have one group wanting more taxes, less growth, more education. 

There could be a lot of reasons why a plan may be unpopular, but 

who would do the initial threshold analysis to ascertain whether or 

not it is discriminatory under Section 5 or if you don’t have Section 

5, Mr. Overton? 

Mr. OVERTON. Well, the benefit of Section 5 is that jurisdictions 

generally have access to information, and they provide that basic 

information to either the Department of Justice or to a Federal 

court to obtain preclearance. So we don’t have a situation where 
69 

voters, who may not have a lot of resources, have to hire experts 

and lawyers and go through discovery and that kind of thing. 

Mr. SCOTT. So the threshold analysis to ascertain whether or not 

there is a discriminatory effect is done by the jurisdiction, and if 

you do not have Section 5, that burden is on the potential victims 

of that discrimination who may not have the money. 

Mr. OVERTON. That is correct, and that drives up costs not just 

to the plaintiff, these victims of discrimination, but it also drives 

up costs in terms of expert fees and lawyers’ fees to the jurisdictions, as well as to the Department of Justice. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if the victims do not have the resources to do the 

analysis, without Section 5, what happens? 

Mr. OVERTON. Discrimination persists. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, what happens to the officials who are the perpetrators of the discrimination? 

Mr. OVERTON. They go unchecked. They win elections. They are 

entrenched, and they benefit from racial discrimination. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, Mr. Kengle, you mentioned the vulnerability of 

any preclearance that was denied since 2006 because of the Shelby 

case? 

Mr. KENGLE. There is the potential that that will occur, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Why would you not at least go back to 2009? Because 

the Austin utility case had the opportunity to find the formula unconstitutional and did not. 

Mr. KENGLE. I’m sorry, I did not—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, in 2009, you have the Austin utility case where 

the formula, Section 5, was reviewed but it was not found unconstitutional. 

Mr. KENGLE. The North West Austin case, you mean? 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. 

Mr. KENGLE. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Why would you go all the way back to 2006 and not 

2009 for that debate? 

Mr. KENGLE. I suppose there could be an argument that you 

would not go back. I think that probably the argument against upholding those objections would be based on the idea that from 2006 

on, the Section 4(b) formula was unconstitutional, and therefore it 

couldn’t legally be the basis for denying preclearance. The argument would be that it would be retroactive. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I have another question I am trying to get in 

real quickly to Mr. Adams. 

You mentioned the bailout and the bail-in. If the original formula 

was constitutional in the late ’60’s, why have not the bail-in and 

bailout provisions kept the list up-to-date and modern? What needs 

to be done to the bail-in and bailout provisions? 

Mr. ADAMS. I am perplexed why nobody used the bail-in provisions, Justice or private plaintiffs. One of the things that needs to 

be fixed in the bail-in provisions is an inconsistency that exists in 

the current statute. It says the Attorney General may seek in a 

case brought with the Attorney General involved. But yet, the Attorney General does not have standing to assert a 15th Amendment claim, an intentional discrimination claim on behalf of somebody else. They can only assert a statutory claim. 
70 

So Section 3 has an inherent defect in its language now that 

ought to be fixed, to either add results or effects tests or to clarify 

that the Attorney General can pursue a 15th Amendment claim. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one additional question? 

Mr. FRANKS. Without objection. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Overton, a great deal has been talked about registration and 

turnout numbers. You alluded to the idea that perhaps when turnout becomes proportional, you are even more vulnerable to little 

schemes and devices. Can you talk about that? 

Mr. OVERTON. Yes, sir. A point here is that it is not consistent 

in terms of turnout levels among covered and uncovered states. 

There are many counties where minority turnout is much lower if 

you look at the precinct and county level. And also, if you just look 

at Latinos and Asian Americans who are citizens and voting age 

population, that trails Whites and African Americans. Obviously, 

Latinos and Asian Americans are protected in terms of Section 5. 

But your broader point was it is not just turnout. This notion 

that once a group can actually challenge the status quo from a political standpoint, political operatives then have the incentive to 

sometimes manipulate rules to maintain power, and they are not 

reflecting the will of the people. 

So there may be some racially polarized voting, and people may 

vote in terms of racial lines. I am not trying to make any judgment 

on that. The problem is when politicians, as opposed to reaching 

out to those voters and including them and mobilizing them and 

trying to win over their vote, win elections by manipulating rules 

that dilutes the votes of those communities or suppresses the votes 

of those communities. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

And I now recognize Mr. Deutch for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, writing the majority opinion in Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the Voting Rights Act employed 

extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem of 

pervasive discrimination in suppressing the right to vote. The Chief 

Justice pointed out that in 1965, Section 4’s preclearance formula 

was the kind of strong medicine needed to address racial discrimination in voting, an insidious and pervasive evil which had been 

perpetuated in defiance of the Constitution. 

Today we begin the task of updating the preclearance formula to 

reflect today’s America, and I thank the Chairman and Ranking 

Member for holding this hearing. 

In the ’60’s, we could rely on overtly racist laws to trigger 

preclearance in the Voting Rights Act. For example, the use of literacy tests to establish if ‘‘someone has the moral character’’ worthy of the right to vote. These are the laws that John Lewis and 

so many other brave Americans fought to dismantle, and it is an 

honor to have you here today, Mr. Lewis. 

And while there may be fewer overtly racist laws on our books 

today, when pundits and commentators and TV hosts say that racism is behind us, we are avoiding an important discussion that has 

got to take place, and I, frankly, think that this is a good place for 

it to start. 
71 

Racism is still here in this country. It just takes a different form. 

Jim Crow, I would suggest, has been replaced with a far more subversive and far-reaching system of institutionalized racism. So as 

this Congress works on a new preclearance formula, I humbly suggest that we look beyond the scope of laws passed by states that 

directly impact minorities at the polls and begin looking at the racially biased application of state laws more generally. 

For how healthy is the democratic process in any state if we see 

institutional racism enshrined in our laws or the application of 

those laws that limit minority access to the polls, as well as their 

basic equal protection under the law, laws that too often prevent 

minority communities from having a true and full voice in local, 

state, and Federal elections? 

Three examples. There has been much discussion about Stand 

Your Ground laws in connection with the recently concluded Zimmerman trial. There are 23 states with self-defense laws in which 

there is no duty for a person to retreat from an attacker. Nine of 

these states, including my state of Florida, permit a person to 

stand your ground and use lethal force when being attacked. Unfortunately, studies show that Stand Your Ground laws mainly protect White people who shoot a Black person. 

How healthy is our democracy when, according to an Urban Institute analysis of FBI data, White people who kill Black people in 

Stand Your Ground states are 354 percent more likely to be cleared 

of murder charges? Can anyone argue that Stand Your Ground 

laws and the use of such laws reflect modern racial bias in state 

laws and should be considered here in this context as we modernize 

our preclearance for the Voting Rights Act? 

The second example. We see institutional racism in the application of our drug laws. Blacks and Whites may use marijuana at 

similar rates, but Black Americans are nearly four times more likely to be arrested than Whites, according to the ACLU. State and 

local governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against minority communities, placing hundreds of thousands of people into the criminal justice system. Shouldn’t we ensure that states who throw young Black Americans in jail at a disproportionately higher rate than White Americans for the same offense are also not passing laws to further disenfranchise minority 

voters? 

And then the third example is this, and it is more pertinent and 

specific to this discussion. We see institutional racism in the flood 

of new voter ID laws. Studies show that as many as 11 percent of 

eligible voters do not have government-issued photo ID’s. Why do 

many minority voters lack IDs? Often they don’t need them. Minorities are less likely to have a driver’s license because they are 

more likely to live in urban areas and often more likely to be poor. 

Shouldn’t we recognize that voter ID laws seek to disenfranchise 

certain eligible voters not blatantly based on race but based on requirements that have significantly and intentionally racial ramifications? Isn’t that evidence of institutionalized racism, and 

shouldn’t that merit extra Federal scrutiny and preclearance in 

those states that have passed those laws? 

Racism has grown more insidious, more subversive, and more 

subtle in the 50 years since the Voting Rights Act, but it has not 
72 

gone away. We have too much yet to do. It is no wonder why African Americans in Florida and across America so often feel like 

their voices, if not their lives, are being devalued by our laws. It 

may be harder for us to pinpoint racism, but that does not mean 

it has been abolished. We in the United States Congress have a 

constitutional duty to ensure that we are doing everything in our 

power to protect every voter. 

So as we go through this process, shouldn’t we be brave enough 

to acknowledge that if any state law reflects institutional racism, 

that preclearance of laws affecting the right to vote in those states 

should be required? And shouldn’t the concept of voter suppression 

be broadened to include the more subversive, the frankly much 

more sophisticated ways that institutionalized racism has reared 

its head? 

These are difficult questions, and we are not going to have time 

to discuss them here today, but I hope as we go forward with this 

discussion of the Voting Rights Act we are willing to have the 

brave conversation that I think will help us immensely here on this 

Committee, and ultimately will serve our country well. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank all of the participants—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. FRANKS. The gentle lady is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Out of courtesy, might I just acknowledge as 

well Barbara Arnwine, who is in the audience, who is the President 

and CEO of the Lawyers’ Committee, a decades-long advocate, Mr. 

Chairman. 

So I thank you very much for allowing me to do so, and I conclude by wishing for continued hearings of this Committee in light 

of what we have heard today, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentle lady. 

I want to thank all of those who have attended here today, and 

I hope this hearing and others hastens the dream of the Founding 

Fathers to recognize that we are all created equal and that one day 

that recognition of the human dignity of every last one of God’s 

children will be recognized equally and forthrightly. 

I do want to note that all Members will have 5 legislative days 

with which to submit materials for the hearing record. 

I would thank the witnesses and thank the Members in the audience, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(73) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, we review the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County 

v. Holder. As the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee when we reauthorized the 

Voting Rights Act in 2006, I had the privilege of working on a bipartisan and bicameral basis with the then-Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, 

the then-Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot, our Ranking Member, Mr. 

Conyers, and the Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, in guiding the reauthorization though the Congress. 

We spent months reviewing the evidence, gaining a firm grasp of the current state 

of voting rights—and impediments to the exercise of the franchise—as it exists in 

the present day. We were persuaded, as were an overwhelming majority of the 

members of this House, and every single member of the Senate who cast a vote, 

that the remedies contained in the special provisions were still necessary, and were 

well-suited to the challenge of voting rights. 

We did consider revising the formula challenged in Shelby County, and determined that the existing formula still served as a useful and effective method of applying section 5 where needed. That determination was not based solely on the 

questions focused on by the Court and identified by Congress in 1965, but by the 

full weight of the evidence we found in 2006. 

The Court, arrogating to itself the quintessentially congressional power to decide 

what facts are relevant, and what constitutes an appropriate remedy, struck down 

the formula in section 4, eviscerating, and rendering a nearly dead letter, the 

preclearance provisions of section 5. 

Congress long ago made the correct determination that requiring voters to go to 

court after they had already been disenfranchised, rendered voting rights unenforceable, and encouraged local political leaders to rig the system to their advantage. 

To be clear, the Voting Rights Act is not solely about racial animus; it is about 

political power. It is not a matter of determining whether one part of the country 

is ‘‘more racist’’ than another, but only whether certain jurisdictions engage in conduct requiring special scrutiny to protect the right to vote. 

Excluding minorities from effective participation in our democracy renders them 

something less than full citizens. Here, Justice Scalia was dead wrong: the right to 

vote in a free and fair election is not a ‘‘racial entitlement,’’ but rather the birthright 

of every American, regardless of race. 

As a far more forward-looking Supreme Court said in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, 

‘‘Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 

unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 

scrutinized.’’ 

The Voting Rights Act has stood for a half-century as a testament to our commitment that everyone must have an equal share in the governance of our nation if 

our democracy is to have any claim to legitimacy. 
74 

While it is true that we have made substantial progress in our nation since 1965, 

much of it attributable to the Voting Rights Act and our other civil rights laws, it 

is also true that we are not yet free of efforts to manipulate the system in ways 

that disempower minority groups. 

As we stated in the Committee’s report to accompany the 2006 reauthorization, 

Despite the substantial progress that has been made, the evidence before the 

Committee resembles the evidence before Congress in 1965 and the evidence that 

was present again in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 1992. In 2006, the Committee finds 

abundant evidentiary support for reauthorization of VRA’s temporary provisions. 

We reviewed the extent to which the kinds of ‘‘first generation’’ devices have been 

addressed, and found that section 5 had improved voter participation in covered jurisdictions, just as the Court’s majority noted. We also observed that ‘‘Sections 5 and 

8 have been vital prophylactic tools, protecting minority voters from devices and 

schemes that continue to be employed by covered States and jurisdictions’’ 

We went on to note, 

The Committee received testimony revealing that more Section 5 objections were 

lodged between 1982 and 2004 than were interposed between 1965 and 1982 and 

that such objections did not encompass minor inadvertent changes. The changes 

sought by covered jurisdiction were calculated decisions to keep minority voters 

from fully participating in the political process. This increased activity shows that 

attempts to discriminate persist and evolve, such that Section 5 is still needed to 

protect minority voters in the future. 

So the voluminous evidence that we compiled showed clearly that the need in the 

covered jurisdictions remained, and that the special provisions were necessary and 

effective to protecting voting rights in those jurisdictions. Rather than proving that 

the formula in section 4(b) was obsolete, the statistics cited by the Court demonstrated the continuing need and effectiveness of Section 5. 

That brings us to today’s hearing. I strongly believe that the facts we found in 

2006 made a compelling case for retaining Section 5, and applying it to covered jurisdictions which include—I might add—my own New York City district. 

What we need to do, as a first order of business, before we start to look at what 

we might do to address the Court’s decision, is to determine the impact of that decision. Just as we moved with great care and deliberation in 2006, and in a bipartisan 

manner, I would urge members not to put the cart before the horse by trying to 

examine specific cases and possible remedies until we have a better understanding 

of where we are right now. 

I know that not every member of this Committee supported the reauthorization 

of the Voting Rights Act, but I hope that we can nonetheless work cooperatively, 

in the same bipartisan spirit that guided our 2006 deliberations, to address the 

Court’s decision. 

I hope the witnesses can address some of the following questions: 

• What remains of the Voting Rights Act? 

• What is the status of voting changes pre-cleared or denied preclearance since 

2006? 

• Are any jurisdictions still covered by Section 5? If so, based on what? 

• What tools does the Justice Department still have to fight voter disenfranchisement? 

There are obviously applications of the Voting Rights Act on which members of 

this Committee strongly disagree. I would hope that, rather than allowing ourselves 

to get bogged down with the most controversial cases of the day, we take a step 

back, look at Section 5, and at what the Court did. Ultimately, as our experience 

since 1965 has clearly shown, the specifics change over time, but the need for 

preclearance has remained constant. The value of Section 5 has been its ability to 

respond in real time to efforts to disenfranchise voters. I hope we can keep our focus 

where it belongs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
75 

LDF 

DEfEND EDUCATE EMPOWEI! 

Sta tement of 

She rrilyn Ifill 

President & Director-Counsel 

& 

Rya n P. Haygood 

Director, Political Participation G roup 

& 

Lesli e M. Proll 

Director, Washin gton Offi ce 

NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 

United Slates House of Representatives 

Committee on th e Judicia ry 

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 

Hcaring on 

"The Voting Rights Act Afte r the 

SUllrcme Court's Decision in 

Shelby County" 

Raybu rn House Office Building, Room 21 4 1 

,July 18, 201 3 

11 :001l.m. 
76 

LDF 

011 behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. Inc. r'LDF"), we 

are pleased to submit this statement 10 Ihe Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil 

JusliCI!, House Judiciary Commince, in COllnection with the hearing, "The VOIing Rights 

Act Aller rhe Supreme Court'S Decision iJl Shelby County," We are grateful 10 

Chllinl1sn Trent Franks. Ral1l,;illg Member Jerrold Nadler lliid Members of the 

Subcommittee for holding this important hearing in response 10 the United Slates 

Supreme Court '5 devastating ruling last month in Shi>lhy COl/lily, AI(lh(lllla v. /loldt'/', and 

we welcome this essential dialogue about the value and imperative of political inclusion 

and l'quality. principles thaI the Voting Rights Act was enaclt!d \0 protect Passed 81thI.' 

height ortlle Civil Rights Movement, the Voting RigJlIs Act is widely regarded as one of 

the grea test pieces of civil rights legislation in oo.lr nation 's history'. It continues to be of 

critical importance to LDF' s cliems, and to vOters of color morc broadly, as an essential 

protection in defending and el'tpanding tile right 10 vote for voters of color, as well as 

language minorities. 1 

Notwithstanding the Voting Rights Ac(s essential role as our democmcy's 

discrimination checkpoint, and our continuing need for its critical protections, on June 

25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court in Sll1'fby CUllllly, AllIlilmw v. Hollin 

Founded under the dirt'Cuon of Thurgood MlIrshllll. LDF hllS been a pionL'Cr in the effurts 

to secu!'\;. protect. and "chance the \'ot,ng nghts of pcQPIc of wlor in this MtiQu, particularly 

thow of Black Americans. LDF has been in\<ol\"cd in !\Carly all of the prcccdc11I·scuing litigation 

relating to the voting rights ofpcOpl(: ofoolQT since Ill; founding In 1940. LDF also has pl~YLxI a 

significant advocacy role in the ~n:ICtmcn t of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent 

reauthorizations in 1970. 1975. 19H2. and 2006. LDF defended thc Voting Rights Act before dlc 

Supn:mc Coun most recently m ShflbJ' (01111/)'. Aln/xHlw v HufJc~ 
77 

LDF 

(M She/hy COl/lilY"), in a radical ael of jlldicial overreach, struck down a key provisionSection 4(b) (a ~ known as the "coverage provision")---of Ihe Voting Rights Act I In so 

doing, Ihe Supreme Court eiTC{:lively rendered S~lion j of the Voling Rights Act, Ihe 

"preclearance provision," inapplicable? 

By invalidating Seclioll 4(b)'s coverage provision. the Suprell,c Coun disregarded 

Congress's authority under the 141h and 1St!, Amendments to enacllegislalion \0 defend 

those amendments' gUllr.lntees-an authority appropriately invoked by Congress in ils 

2006 reauthorization of the VOling Rights Act. Congress, in reauthorizing the Voting 

Rights Act, undenook an c)(tensive examination, based on many months of hearings, to 

identify the places that ~hibi ted the kind ofpersistetlt racial discrimination in votiny that 

required the specilk prophyla: .. is offered by Section 5's preclearance structure. TIte 

Supreme COllO'S decision in !)1wlby C/JIllily has left millions of minority voters without a 

key prot~tiol1 to stop discrimination in voting hejbre it occurs. in places that require 

strong medicine to address the efTects of both the history and ongoing reality of racial 

discrimination in voting. 

Responding to the Supreme Court's SJI<'lby COl/lilY decision must be a top priority 

for Congress In Ihe hours following the decision, a number of officials from 

jurisdictions formerly covered by Section 5, including Texas, Mississippi. and NOllh 

570 U.S, __ (20 13) (slip Op., ;11 24). 

Section ~lb) idcn!,fioo 15 plac..:s (hal SecMn j protected Including; Alabama. Tc.",as, 

Mississippi, Louisi:ma, Ariwna, North Carolin.l. Soulh C~roJina. Georgia. Florida, AI;lS~a. South 

Dakota, Vi rginm. MIchigan.,. New York. :lJ1d C:tIirontin bcl::311SC of the longst3ndillg nod ongoing 

nature of racial dlscnmination in "011"& JI1 these areas. 

2 
78 

LDF 

Carolina. made clear their intentions 10 move forward with voting changes [hal will 

adversely afrect access to political participation among communities of color.

4 [\ is. 

therefore, imperative Ihat Congress respond aggressively and expeditiously to safeguard 

the righls of Black, Latino, Asian American, American Lndian, and Alaska Native voters 

in those situations in which Ihey are the most vulnerable 10 discrimination in voting. 

'This statemel1t will address three topics thaI are cenTral to Congress's response \0 

the Supreme COUll'S Siw/by Comlly decision ' (1) the expansive 2006 Congressional 

record that reflects the need for strong protections for vOlers of color from discrimination 

in those places formerly covered by Section 5 orthe Voting Rights Act; (2) Ihe problem 

that, left without Section 5's protections, communities of color in formerly covered 

jurisdiction~ are vulnerable to the myriad of discriminatOry voting changC5. particularly at 

the local level. thaI will arise in jurisdictions now emboldenLod by Ihe Supreme Court's 

Shdby COlIl/ly decisiOll: and, (3) Congress's ability to address the Shelby COllllly decisiOll 

and to protect vulnerable communities from racial discrimination in voting, 

~'e, e.g" Ryan K. Reilly, Harsh "/i'XlIS Vorer I/J !.ov.' '/nmwJilllely ' Takel' Efficl Aj/er 

l'oJ"'.!: Hlghts ACI Rlllmg. ll-IE HUFFINGTON POST. JUIIC 25_ 2013. 

http://,,,w\\,.huffinglonpost.coml20 13/06115/te;Qs-volcr-id-la\\'_ n _3497714.hll11l (Tc:o.::l'! Attom\!) 

Gencr:tlannouncing, within hours ofthc Shelby d~clsion. th:ll .. the st:ltc's ~O r ID 1:1" will lake 

dTcCI lmmt'diatcly." as may n.-diSJricting m~p~): G~off Pcnder. Nt'XI June, Mi,U , VOler.! IIIIISt liMe 

I/J; Secretory of SloJ., n.'I'('ols time (or illlpl<,mentation. THE. CLAR[ON LEDGER, June 25. 

20 13, hnp:/I11'" II .c!arionledger.oom/anicle!20 IJ0626/N EWSO IfJ0626QQ 18/Nc ~I·Jul1e-M issl'OIers-nlusl-1D (t-lississippi Sccrcl.ary of Slale e:o.:pressing his intention to move forward 10 

implemenl Mississippi 's voler [D I;)" III June 201 4): SWlellwl!I from AII!Jffley General R"y 

COt/pt'r on u.s, SlIjlrPlIIC rOt,rl o.'<:,¥iol/ "n VUling RighI,,' A.'I, June 25, 20 13. 

hltp://www ,ncdOJ ,govfNcws-and-AJcnsINcws -lWlc~s-3n()-Adl'1 soricslPrc ssRcicascslSL.11C!1ICnl-from-A llomey.(;cncr:t.l -Roy-Coopcr-on-U·S ,asp~ (Nonh CaroIi l1~ Altom~'Y 

General c.\prcssing dIal the Stale Cicn~r:tl Assembly is "noll' considcnng Icgisl:lI1011 thaI 

would Urnil early I"oling and n:quirc "oler 1,0 ,") . 

3 
79 

LDF 

The 2006 Congressional record reflects thr need for ~1I ong Ilrnlecliolls for voters of 

color in those places formerly co\'t red b)' Section 5 of the Voting Rights Aer. 

In 2006, during Ihe last reaulhori~ation period, Congress received more testimony 

lind infomJlI!iOI) abOlI1 (he voting experience of citizens of color, both in and outside the 

jurisdictions covered by Section 5, than il had during any prior reauthorization. OWf II 

len-month period, the House and Senate Judiciary Commil1ees held 21 hcnrin)l,S. recei ved 

testimony bOlh in suppan of and against reauthorization from over 90 witnessesincluding. state and federal officials. litigalors, scholars. and private eiti zens-and 

amassed more than 15.000 pnges of record evidence. A bipartisan Congress ultimately 

detemtined-by the overwhdming vote of 390-33 in the House and 98-0 in the Senate'-

that persistent and adaptive voting discrimination remained a pervasive problem in the 

now formerl y-covered jurisdictions. and that withoul Section 5 "minority citizens will be 

deprived of the oppon ~lIlil y to c,'(erclse their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, 

undermining the sigoilic3m gains made by minorities in the last 40 years ·,6 As 

Representative James Sensenbrenner. then-Chair of the House Judiciary Committee. 

observed, the 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act lYa~ based on "one of the 

mOSt ClXtensive considerations of any piece of legislation that the United Slatcs Congress 

has dealt with in lite 27 1/2 years that I have bet!n hOllored to serve as a Member of this 

s..". 152 Congo Rec. 14,303-304. 15.325 (2006) 

Pub. L No. 109-246, 110 Stal. 57R, § 2(b}(<)) (2()1)/i) 

4 
80 

LDF 

body.',7 The expansive record before Congress demonstrated 1h81, while voters of color 

have made undeniable progress, unconstitutional discrimination remained common. 

persistent. and adaptive in the- lhcn-covcredjurisdiclions. Between 1982 and 2006, the 

Depanment of Justice blocked over 600 vOling changes under Section 5 after determining 

that the changes were di,crimina ol)' ~ Evidence in Ihe COllgressional record revealed 

lhlll II majority of these objections were based, at least in part, on purposeful 

discriminalion.

9 

Without Section 5', pTot« tions, ,'uleu of color itTI,' vulnerable 10 Ihe myriad 

discriminntory "oling chllnges t haI will arise in f(lnn erly coyered j uriscl ictiolls now 

emboldened by the SUllremf Court's Sflelhy Cmlll')' decision. 

Notwithstanding Congress's carefully-considered judgment in reauthorizing 

Section 5 orthe Voting Rights Act in 2006, the Supreme Court's Shdhy CQIIII/)' decision 

has deprived voters or color or a vital tool necessary to prevent racial discrimination in 

1'00ing. Even as our country has made sigllificalll progress in combating racial 

discrimination in our political system- in great measure because or ule protections 

afforded under the Voting Rights Act- the ongoing record orracial discrimination ma~es 

plain that there are continuing efforts in many places to deny voters or color the 

opportunity to participate eql.lally in Qur shared democracy Thesc efforts reqnire an 

aggressive response. Within hours or the Sltelby Cnllll/), decisioll, ror example. Texas 

Allomey General Greg Abbol\ announced that the State planned to "immediately " 

• 

152 Coug. Rcc. 14,230 (2{){)6). 

H. R.Rcp. No. I09-47!1.3121. 

No~cmocr I, 1{)O5 Heanng, at I~O-Xl , 

5 
81 

LDF 

implement a 2011 voter-identification la'" which had previously been blocked by a 

Section 5 federal COUI1 as the most discriminatory measure of ils kind in the country. to 

Abboll likowise announced Ihat Ihe Slate may implement redisuicting maps.!1 

MissiS5ippi and North Carolina quickly followed SUil, announcing that they also planned 

\0 adopt discriminatory vOIing changes thaI Section 5 may have blocked,n These 

changes threaten \0 undennine hard-fought gains \0 expand democracy for people of 

color. 

These are not isolated posl-ZOO6 cllons \0 discriminate in formerly covered 

jurisdictions. In 2008 in Alaska, Section 5 rejcCloo plans 10 eliminate precincts in several 

Native villages, which would have required voters \0 travel by air or sea 10 cast a baliot tl 

In 2008 in Calera. Alabama. the county in which the ~1'<llby CellllllY case originated, 

Section 5 reillstated the city's only African American city council member after he lost 

his seat when the Black voting-ase population was inexplicably reduced from 79'% to ju~t 

29% '~ Attempts to dilute or deny voters of color full access to the political process 

threaten to take root in an accelerated basis across the country. and particularly in 

" " ,-

See gllpra n " 

Jd. 

/d. 

" Sr. of Alaska FederatIOn of Natiws. N 0/. as Amici Curi"" 'n Supp. o f Rc~"p lS , at App. 

32-36, m'o/Iablo, m hnp:llwww.na...cpldf.org/filcs.icascjssuclShclb).-

Brict%200f".QOAmici'V.,20Curiac%20t11~%2()Nav3jOo/.2()Notion pdf 

I. Sr. of Resp·t.-Intcr\"cnors Earl CUIHlingbam, /'1 (1/ .. at 19-20, lJ\"{J//ab/c (II 

hllp.llll WI" .n:l:lcpldf.orglfllcs/casc _,ssuc/12-

%o/..20bs'Y...20Earl",QOCullningham%2Oct%20a1. pdf. 

6 
82 

LDF 

formerly-covered jurisdictions, nO\\l emboldened by Ihe Shelby COl/lilY decision, which 

do not have Section 5 to operate as an initial check on discriminatory voting changes. 

In panicular. in [he wake of the She/by COllllly dlX:ision, two of ihe gravest risks 

10 voters of color in formerly-covered places arise from the fact that, without the 

prophylactic protections of Section S. (1) officials in fonnerly covered jurisdictions will 

now make changes \0 voting laws without providing notice to voters. alld (2) 

discriminatory voting measures wi11 now have \0 be challenged ({fter, rather than he/ore, 

such changes take effect. The challenges are likely 10 be panicularly pronounced for 

voters of color at the local level, where Section 5 blocked more than 85% of proposed 

voting changes betwt'<!n 1982 and 2006, rather than at the state_leveLll For example, in 

Kilmichael, Mi~sissippi, in 2001, the white mayor and all-white Board of Aldc'rman 

attempted 10 lake the eXlraordinary step of cancelling elections to prevent Black citizens 

from electing the candidate of their choice after the 2000 Census showed Ihat Blacks had 

become a majorilY of the CilY and \Vere poised, for Ihe very first lime. to elect Iheir 

candidates of choice to the city counsel. 16 Voters of color ill places like Kilmichael. and 

SCores of local communities in the previously covered jurisdiclion~ across the United 

Siaies more broadly, are vulnerable to future attempts to dilute or deny their righllO VOle 

It is precisely in those local communities where Section 5 has been so Iransfomlalive by 

giving voters of color opportunities to robustly participate in the political process. 

" Justin Lc,';n, ~cllo/! 5 M Sim"lac/1/lII. YALE LJ. ONLINE 151 (2013), 

h"p .II :tlcJ:mjournal.0rW20 13/06/{)7I1cvin.html 

~ October 25, 2005 (HisIOIY) ~anng. at 161ti-1 9 

7 
83 

LDF 

DffiND EDUCATE EMI'OWER 

Allhe same lime, in the absence of S«1100 5's application anywhere be<:atise of 

the Shl!fby CUI/lilY decision, discriminatory voting measures now will h~ve to be 

challenged through li tigation uJier they take effecl, through !:;I\se-by-case litigation under 

Se<:1ioo 2 of the Votillg Rights Act (~nd perhaps state Inw) that is time-consuming, cosIly. 

and pemlils mcial discrimination 10 take root in the electoral process he/o/'(' i1 can be 

remedied Congress made clear during the 2006 reaulhori7..ation ThaI Section 2 litigation 

by itself is an inadequate response \0 the persistent and adaptive problem of racial 

discrimination in voting in certain parts of our country, 17 

Congress ca n and nJUst protect vulnerable commUlJitie5 from racia l discriminHlion 

in voting in the wake of the Sileiby Cmlltry decision 

Congress can and must respond aggressively to protect voters of color from racial 

discrimination followi ng the Supreme Coun's ruling in SlIdhy COIlllly. Representative 

John Lewis, who was severely beaten during the Selma to Montgomely March that led to 

the passage of the Voting Rights Act, has described the Supreme Coun's dC'Cision in 

Sill'lb), lOlllllY "as a dagger 10 the heart orlhe Voting Rights Act.,,11 Congress. however. 

has the power to respond. as it did in 2006. to protect voters of color from the material 

harm resulting from the Supreme Coun's Slwlh), COIIIII), dC'Cision. 

" H. R. Rcp. No. 109-4 7~. lit 57. 

" PrcS5 Rcli:alII:, Rl.'fI. Jwm 1.I.'Il·i)· (.('/I~' ('UUfl /);"CI$lon 'Q /X1.!:grr · I" (ile HI.'QrI of Vvilng 

Accest. June 25. 2013. hltp ;/ljohIlJcwis houso gov pr~ss rclcaseJrcp jobn k"is-<:alls--rourt· 

dccision-%E2%80%9C --dagger%E2%1!O%9D-hcart-\ oting-acccss. 

8 
84 

Nationa,l 

Urban League 

Empowen'ng Communities. 

Changing Lives. 

Statement for the Heorlng Record 

Belore the 

House Subcommittee on the Constttvtlon and Civil Justice 

House Committee on the Judiciary 

"The Voting Rights A.ct after the Supreme Court's Decision 

In Shelby County" 

July 18, 2013 

Chairman Franks, RanKing Member Nadler, memb&s of the Committee, 

thonk YOli for Ihe opportunity 1o present our "jews on what must be the highest 

priority for 'titS Congress and our nolion · preserving our democratic process by 

restoring the protections of Ihe Voling Rights Act. Vital protections thot were 

shipped by the U.s. Supreme Courl in Its devastating 5-4 decision on june 25, 

2013, in Shelby County. AiobomcJ v. Holder. The National Urocrn league has one 

unequivocal menage to both tl()u~eJ of Cong-fen - ul$pend gridlock, com& 

together OJ in the post, and fix the Voting Rights Act NOWI 

The Supreme Court's deci5ion in Shelby is, quite fronlo::'Y, ominous fot our 

democracy, and yes, lot African Americans who Io::now all too weil lhe high and 

often Irogic price Ihol was paid 10 secure their right 10 o!e, If Is beYond worry 

Ihol as we commemorale the 50'~ anni~ersary ol lhe Grea t March on 

Washington, at the height of IhE! Civil Rights Movemenl- we slill find ourselves 

Hghling to ensure that every U, S._ citizen can eXefclse this most fundamental 

right. 

The Voting Rights Act wa!; necessary in 1965 and remains so In 2013. If the 

~olef suppression tactics employed by numerous slates in Ihe 2012 elections 

oren" evidence enough, con5id!~r that in the first lour months of Ihis yeoralone, 

restrictive voting bills have been introduced in mOle Ihan half Ihe states, In focI 

withinlwo hours of the Supreme Courl's declsion, lhe slate of Texas declared il 

would now implement the voter 10 low that hod previously been ruled the most 

discriminatory low of lis k.ind in the coonlry, The Stale Is also considering 

implementing a 2011 redistrictln!;;1 plan Ihol was fourd to be discriminatory 

agoinsl lhe slale's minority volers, 
85 

According to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which is closely monitoring 

how states subject to the Section 4 formula are responding to the Shelby 

decision, a still growing list of states indicate they do intend to implement new 

discriminatory voting changes. The states include Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 

North Carolina, South Carolina and Texas.' 

The Supreme Court's decision is a direct blow to 50 years of progress 

towards voter equality and to the dream that Dr. Martin Luther King so 

passionately and purposefully shared with us in 1963. As Georgia Congressman 

John Lewis, who was brutally beaten during the Selma to Montgomery march 

that led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 put it, "the Supreme 

Court put a dagger in the heart of the law." 

Some point to the reelection of President Obama and the record voter 

turnout as a reason to say "All's well" without acknowledging that these 

achievements have occurred because of the VRA, which is all the more reason 

to immediately restore its protections. Moreover, with 16 months to go until the 

2014 midterm elections and with states--including Texas and others -- rushing to 

enact voter suppression measures, we cannot afford business as usual with our 

political system at continuous logger heads. 

2 

In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the coverage 

formula today is based on decades-old data and racist practices. Yet, Judge 

Roberts ignored thousands of pages of evidence presented over the course of 

20 hearings that resulted in a bipartisan Congress overwhelmingly re-authorizing 

the Voting Rights Act in 2006. Justice Roberts also passed over new evidence in 

the 2012 election: the long lines at the polls, onerous voter ID requirements and 

registration procedures, and other measures clearly designed to make voting 

more difficult for certain communities that proved that discrimination and racism 

are still threats to democracy and efforts to protect the right to vote are still 

sorely needed. 

The National Urban League is acutely aware of the importance of the 

voting franchise. In response to the unprecedented campaign in dozens of 

states to make it more difficult to vote through restrictive ID requirements, 

onerous registration procedures, cut-backs in poll hours, early voting and other 

measures, the Urban League launched its Occupy the Vote effort, which 

reached more than 150,000 citizens around the country. 

The National Urban League will remain as diligent as ever in defending 

and protecting the rights that were so hard fought - and died - for during the 

Civil Rights Movement of the 1950's and 1960's. We will mobilize our communities 

to push Congress to abandon party lines and partisanship and act immediately 

in the best interest of our nation and our democracy by enacting a new and 

1 "How Formerly Covered States Are Responding To The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Act Decision," NAACP Legal 

Defense Fund, July 1,2013 
86 

responsible 21st Century formula for Section 4. We cannot focus on a 

celebration of progress until we ensure a continuation of the very equality and 

opportunity that are at the core of the country. 

3 

Established in 1910, the National Urban League is the nation's oldest and largest 

civil rights and direct services organization serving over 2 million people each 

year in urban communities in 35 states and the District of Columbia. 
87 

O\ ... IAN AMUUU~) ASI~n Aminta" 

ADVANCING le2al O\!len!e 

JUSTICE "nd Edut_:lII"n rund 

Joint tat nl~lIt of 

Asiau AI1I~ritaus Advft ndng Ju tk~ lind 

Asian AllI ricnn rg 1 DrFenn. 3ml £duutMlII Fund 

Ilcrorf the 

SuhconlOniu tl' 011 Ih r ConJlitutioll .lIld Ch'i, _1"Slite 

Chuunill e-e on Ihf Judidary 

UniTed r5 lI oU5f or RfllrfS( ntatiVfJ 

IJ f~rin g 

"Th( Voling Riglus Art rll'r thf. SUl'r(mr.Cour1's D«is,on ill Slorlby CounlyM 

Jut.l· 111, 2013 

Inl m.llIe" o" 

Enlbrcement of the Vming Rigbts Act of 1965 {VRA) has been crilical in IIrel'enliuJ!, actual 

and Ihreatened diSCrimination aimed at Asian Americllns in national and loo;;al elections; 

Conlin",;n!;, discrimination tn votin~ and nH)r" J!,L'TIern!iy against Asian American~ ,emain. 

especially in lifeRS of new gro"'lh "ueh as the South 8I1d is likely to worsen ~ a resuh of the 

decision in She/h)' ", I/o/tier Asian Americnn voters have be.!n left more 1'Ulnerable 10 II'rongdQer$ and hale suITered a serious roil-back in ~Ieir ri!1h1 to vote Asian Americans Advancing 

Justice (-'Advancing Justicc") wd the Asian American l.e!!,,1 Def...,." wd Edu~ation Fund 

~AALOEr) submil this t~Slimon)' to du~idale the precarious landscape of As'w American 

votinl! riKhts.n wake of the SupR'me Coun -~ deeisiOll in Shelby," HU/d<!T and respectfully ask 

lhat it be entered inlo the record _ 

OQ!"nj7lUion~1 rnFo rm~lion 

AdVlndnl! JUSIIcC and AAl.OE:F ire organiutlions that promme the constitutional and civil 

ril!ht~ of A§ian Americans. includi!1g the right of AsiRn Amcrlcans 10 panicipate in the Un;lw 

State._ politicaillrocess, 

Advanci~!( Justice. is a ~ational affiliatioll of four civil rightS nonprofit organilati0l15 that 

joined logethet in 201l 10 pmAl0t" a fair and equitable !iOCiety for all by working for civil and 

human ri!,!hlS nod empowering Asian Americans and Pacific slander~ and other underr.eIVM 

cummunities. Our member Ofl!3nizalions life. Asian Amerieans Advancing Justice I Chicag.l 

(fomltrl)' Asian Anlerican 111>lilul<' - Ihe leading lIan-Asian organiulion ill Ihe Midwe,t 

dedic,!Ited 10 empowering the Asian American community Ihrough advocacy. research. 

educatiOll. leader5hill develollment. and cOlilition·building). Asian Americans Advancing Justice 

I AAJC (formerly Asian American J ustice Center - a natiOflllI organization tllat advanc~ the civil 

and human rightS of Asian AmeriCallS and builds and prOll'01es a fair Ind equitable SOtict)' fDr nil 
88 

through public education, policy analysis and research, policy advocacy, litigation, and 

community capacity and coalition building); Asian Americans Advancing Justice I Asian Law 

Caucus (formerly Asian Law Caucus - the nation's oldest legal organization defending the civil 

rights of Asians and Pacific Islanders, particularly low-income, immigrant, and underserved 

communities); and Asian Americans Advancing Justice I Los Angeles (formerly Asian Pacitic 

American Legal Center - the nation's largest legal organization serving Asians and Pacific 

Islanders, through direct legal services, impact litigation, policy advocacy, and leadership 

development). Advancing Justice was a key player in collaborating with other civil rights groups 

to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act in 2006. In the 20\2 election, Advancing Justice conducted 

poll monitoring and voter protection etforts across the country, including in California, Florida, 

Georgia, lllinois, Texas, and Virginia 

AALDEF is a 39-year-old national civil rights organization based in New York City that 

promotes and protects the civil rights of Asian Americans through litigation, legal advocacy, and 

community education. AALDEF has monitored elections through annual multilingual exit poll 

surveys since 1988 Consequently, AALDEF has collected valuable data that documents both 

the use ot~ and the continued need for, protection under the VRA. Tn 2012, AALDEF dispatched 

over 800 attorneys, law students, and community volunteers to 127 poll sites in 14 states to 

document voter problems on Election Day. The survey polled 9,298 Asian American voters 

Advancing Justice-AAJC and AALDEF filed an amicus brief with the US Supreme Court 

in Shelhy County, Alahama 1'. Holder on behalf of 28 Asian American groups. The brief urged 

the Court to uphold Section 5 of the YRA, demonstrating that Section 5 was necessary to protect 

the voting rights of Asian Americans in areas such as political representation and discriminatory 

voting changes in light of the ongoing discrimination experienced by Asian Americans. This 

testimony draws heavily on the examples documented in our amicus brief 

Voting Discrimination Against Asian Americans Continues to Exists 

Asian Americans I continue to face pervasive and current discrimination in voting, 

particularly in jurisdictions that were previously covered for Section 5 preclearance 

For example, in the 2004 primary elections in Bayou La Batre, Alabama, supporters of a 

white incumbent running against Phuong Tan Huynh, a Vietnamese American candidate, made a 

concerted effort to intimidate Asian American voters. They challenged Asian Americans at the 

polls, falsely accusing them of not being U.S. citizens or city residents, or of having felony 

convictions2 The challenged voters were forced to complete a paper ballot and have that ballot 

vouched for by a registered voter In explaining his and his supporters' actions, the losing 

incumbent stated, "We figured if they couldn't speak good English, they possibly weren't 

1 The nol1on of "AsIan American" encompasses a broad diversity of ellmicihes, many of v.Inch h.1ve lnstoncally 

suffered their O,\Y11 ullique forms of discliminatioll. Discllminatioll against Asian Amelicans as discussed here 

addresses both dlscriminntion aimed at specific ethnic groups along with the discrimination directed at Asian 

Americans generally 

:2 ,See H.R Rep. No. 109-478. at 45: .'iee also Cnallenged .1s;an ballot.'; in council race stir discriminalion concern, 

Associated Press State & Loeal Wire, Aug. 29, 200-1., avaiiuhie ul http://ne"\ys.googlc.com/newspapers?nid 

~1 H 17 &dat~20040HJO&id~cc4dAAAAl BAJ&sJ id~w(>cEAAAAl BAJ&pg~666H,5IW> 1 H4. 

2 
89 

American citizens.,,3 The Department of Justice (DOJ) investigated the allegations and found 

them to be racially motivated" As a result, the challengers were prohibited from interfering in 

the general election, and Bayou La Batre, for the first time, elected an Asian American to the 

City Council. 5 

In another example, from the 2004 Texas House of Representatives race, Hubert Vo's 

victory over a white incumbent prompted two recounts, both of which affirmed Vo's victory 

over the incumbent's request that the Texas House of Representatives investigate the legality of 

the votes cast in the election. The implication was that Vo's Vietnamese American supporters 

voted in the wrong district or were not U.S. citizens. Vo's campaign voiced concern that such an 

investigation could intimidate Asian Americans from political participation altogether." Vo's 

election was particularly signiticant for the Asian American community because he is the first 

Vietnamese American state representative in Texas hi story 7 

Also in 2004, New York poll workers required Asian American voters to provide 

naturalization certificates before they could vote.' At an additional poll site, a police officer 

demanded that all Asian American voters show photo identification, even though photo 

identification is not required to vote in New York elections. If voters could not produce such 

identification, the officer turned them away and told them to go home. 9 

Asian American Voters Lose Protection Against Discrimination Due to She/hI' Decision 

Overt racism and discrimination against Asian Americans at the polls persist to the present 

day and will worsen without Section 5 to combat such behavior. Prior to the Supreme Court's 

Shelby decision, voting rights advocates used Section 5 to protect Asian American voters in 

redistricting, changes to voting systems, and changes to polling sites. The following are current 

examples of harmful actions against Asian American voters that were stopped by Section 5, but 

now that the coverage fonnula has been struck, and most jurisdictions are no longer covered by 

3 See DeWayne Wickham, rr71y rCHelf fToting Rights AC(I Ala. Town provides answer, USA Today. Feb 22, 2006. 

available at http"l/\-\'\'\'\\ .usaloday .comlne\\s/opinionledllorialsll006-02-21-fofUm-votlllg-acl_ A.him 

.J See H.R. Rep. No. 109-47g. at -1-5: .'iee also Press Rclc<'lsc, U.S. Dcp"t of Justice, Jus/ice Department/o l\iomlor 

UecflOfls lfl iVew }ork. U"aslllngtofl, and .~/ahall1a, Sept. 1 J, 200-+, avmlahle at http://w\\'w.justicc.goy/opa/pr/200-1-/ 

Septemberl04_ crt _615 him C-'In Bayou La Batre, Alabama, the Department \Ni11 monitor the treatment of 

Vietnamese-American voters.") 

'i 5,'ee Wickham, supra. 

(-, ,See Thao L Ha, The Vietnamese Texans. inAsian Texas 28..1.-85 (hwin A Tang ed. 2007) 

o;;'ee Test of Ed Martin, Trial Tr at :150'15-2J, jJerez v. ]Jerr:v, 835 F. Supp 2d 209 (W.D Tex. 2011) (hereinafter 

"Marlin TesL"): TesL of Rogene Colverl, Trial Tr. 01420:2-421:13, Perez. 835 F. Supp. 2d 209; TesL of Sarah 

Wmller, Trial Tr. 01425:18-42610, Perez, 835 F. Supp. 2d 01209 

8 Ne\\' Yorl ... Cit~, has the nation's largest Asian American population for places Eli:tabeth M Hoeffel. Sonya 

Rastogi, Myollng OukKim & Hasan Slwhid. U.S. Census Bureau. The Asian Population: 2010. at 12 tbL3 (2012). 

available at \\ ww .census.gov/prodleen20 lOlbnefs/e20 lObe-II.pdf. Most of the e.'W111ples of Secllon 5' s success in 

this blief dIm" flDm the Asian Amelieall expelience in New York City because of its sizeable Asian Amelican 

population and because it is one of the few places in the eountly cove~ed under both Section 5 and Section 20] 

9 ,See Continuing Need for Section 203 . s Provisions for Limited English Proficient Voters, Healing Before the S 

Judiciar;' Comlll., 109th Congo 37 (2006) (testimony ofM1rg..1Tet Fung, AALDEF. Exec. DiL): Letter from G. 

Magpantay, AALDEF Staff Attomey. to J Ravit?, Exec. OiL, Ne,,' York City Sd. of Elections (June 16,2(05) 

(submitted to Congress). 
90 

Section 5, Asian Americans are once again vulnerable to nefarious discriminatory actions such as 

these that will weaken their voting rights and power 

For example, discriminatory redistricting plans continue to be drafted in states with large 

Asian American communities. As shown in Perry 1'. Perez, 132 S. Ct 934 (2012), the Texas 

Legislature drafted a redistricting plan, Plan H283, that would have had significant negative 

effects on the ability of minorities, and Asian Americans in particular, to exercise their right to 

vote. 

Since 2004, the Asian American community in Texas State House District 149 has voted as a 

bloc with Hispanic and African American voters to elect Hubert Vo, a Vietnamese American, as 

their state representative. District 149 has a combined minority citizen voting-age population of 

62 percent 10 Texas is home to the third-largest Asian American community in the United States, 

growing 72 percent between 2000 and 20 to. 11 

In 2011, the Texas Legislature sought to eliminate Vo's State House seat and redistribute the 

coalition of minority voters to the surrounding three districts. Plan H283, if implemented, would 

have redistributed the Asian American population in certain State House voting districts, 

including District 149 (Yo's district), to districts with larger non-minority populationsl2 Plan 

H283 would have thus abridged the Asian American community's right to vote in Texas by 

diluting the large Asian American populations across the state. 13 

In addition to discrimination in redistricting, Asian American voters have also endured 

voting system changes that impair their ability to elect candidates of choice. For example, before 

2001 in New York City, the only electoral success for Asian Americans was on local community 

school boards. In each election - in 1993, 1996, and 1999 - Asian American candidates ran for 

the school board and wonl4 These victories were due, in part, to the alternative voting system 

II, 5,'ee Unltcd States and Defendant-Intervenors Identification of Issues 0, l'exas v. [/niled .')'Iales, C.A. No. 11-1 ]OJ 

(D.D.C), Sept. 29,2011, Dkt. No. 53. 

II Asian American Center for Advancing Justice,./l C0111111I111i(v oj Contrasts: .1sian.1menums in the Unifed ,Slales 

2011, App. B, at 60 (2011). availahle at http://ww,\'.advancingjusticc.org/pdf/Collll11uni1y'_ oC Contrast.pdf. 

(hereinafter -'r:ommllfll~V o!Cmfrasfs'"). 

1~ See Martin Test. fit 350:25-352:25. District 1+9 ""'QuId have been relocated to a county on the other side of the 

State, \O\"here there are few minority yoters. ,See http"llgisl.tlc.state.tx.us/do\:nlioadlHouseIPLANH283.pdf. 

13 In IflCt, it ,""as only due to Section 5 that the Texas Legislature \\as not able to dilute the Asian American 

conullunity's nght to vote. Ad,"<lncing Jusllce-AAJC's pnrtner, tlre Te:\.<ls Asifln-Amenc<ln RedistrictIng Initmtive 

(T AARI), working with a coalition of Asian American and other eiyil rights organizations, paltieipated in the Texas 

redistIicting process and adYoefltcd on the DistIict 1-1-9 issllc. Despite the eOllllmllrit~y· s best efforts, the T eXHS 

Legislature pushed through this problematic redistricting plan. Ho\veyer, because of Section 5's preclearance 

procedures, Asian Americans and other minorities had an avenue to obJect to the Texas Legislature·s retrogressive 

plan. and Plan H283 was ulli111ately rejected as not complying \\ith Section 5. See Texas \to United States. c.A. No. 

11-I3OJ (D.D.C). Sept. 19,2011, Dkt. No. ~5. 113. Indeed, AALDEF submitted an amicus blicfto the D.C District 

Court illustrating how the Texas plan retrogressed the ability of Asian Americans to c1ect a candidate of their choice 

and ,"iolated Sec lion 5. Ho\\ever, the U.s. Supreme Court vacated the District Court of the District of Columbia's 

ruling suspending Te.\.as' redistricL1ng lllap flS moot in light of their decision in Shelby 

j..J /)'ee Lynette Holloway, This Just In: jf,~v 18 ,School Board Election ReslIlI.'i. N.Y. Tiutes, JUlte 13, 1999, available 

01 http://www.nyilllles.eomIl999! 0611 1/1lyreglon/maklllg-it-work-thls-just-ln-may"-1 g-sehool-board-c1ectlonresults.html: Jacques Steinberg, School Board Election Results. N.Y. Times, June 23. 1996, available at 

lrttp· I Iwww.n)1imes.com/j 996/06/23 IllYIegion!lleigbborhood-repOlt -new -york -up-close-scbool-boald-electioll4 
91 

known as "single transferable voting" or "preference voting." Instead of selecting one 

representative from single-member districts, voters ranked candidates in order of preference, 

from "I" to "9.,,1' In 1998, New York attempted to switch from a "preference voting" system, 

where voters ranked their choices, to a "limited voting" system, where voters could select only 

four candidates for the nine-member board, and the nine candidates with the highest number of 

votes were elected16 This change would have put Asian American voters in a worse position to 

elect candidates of their choice. 17 

Furthermore, the ability of Asian Americans to vote is also frustrated by sudden changes to 

poll sites without informing voters. For example, ever since AALDEF began monitoring 

elections in New York City, there have been numerous instances of sudden poll site closures in 

Asian American neighborhoods where the Board has failed to take reasonable steps to ensure 

that Asian American voters are informed of their correct poll sites. Voters have been 

misinformed about their poll sites before the elections or have been misdirected by poll workers 

on Election Day, thus creating confusion for Asian American voters and disrupting their ability 

to vote 

In 2001, primary elections in New York City were rescheduled due to the attacks on the 

World Trade Center. The week before the rescheduled primaries, AALDEF discovered that a 

certain poll site, LS. 131, a school located in the heart of Chinatown and within the restricted 

zone in lower Manhattan, was being used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for 

services related to the World Trade Center attacks. The Board chose to close down the poll site 

and no notice was given to voters. The Board provided no media announcement to the Asian 

language newspapers, made no attempts to send out a mailing to voters, and failed to arrange for 

the placement of signs or poll workers at the site to redirect voters to other sites. In fact, no 

consideration at all was made for the fact that the majority of voters at this site were limited 

English proficient, and that the site had been targeted for Asian language assistance under 

Section 203 1 ' With Section 5 no longer applicable in most jurisdictions, disruptive changes to 

polling sites, voting systems, and redistricting plans can now occur unfettered, wreaking havoc 

on Asian American voters' ability to cast an effective ballot. 

results.html; Sam DillolL, Elhnic ,)tlUis A,.e Revealed;'1 r"olingjor ,','chools, N.Y. TUlles, May 20, 1993, Ilvailable al 

http·lh,yw\v.Il)1imes.com/1993/05/20/11yregion/etlmic-shifts-are-revealed-ill-votillg-for-schools.html. 

I') S'ee Thomas T. Mackie & Richard Rosc, The International Almanac of Electoral History SOX (.1d cd. 1991) 

16 ,)'ee 1998 N. Y. Scss. Laws 569-70 (McKinlley) 

j-; AALDEF utIlized SectIon 5 10 protect Asian American volers in NY by providing comments urging DOJ to 

oppose the change and deny precle,u3nce as the proposed change would make Asian Americans worse off. DO] 

intelposed 1m objection and prevented the voting change fIDm taking effect. See Letter from M. Fung, AALDEF 

Exec. Dir., and T. Sinha. AALDEF Staff Attomey, to E. Johnson. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Oct. 8, 1998) (submitted to 

Congress ,,\-ith AALDEF Report and on file ",ith counsel) S'cc also. Voting Rights Act: Section 5 or the ActHistor:v, Scope, and Purpose, Hearing Before lhe H. Subconml. on the Const., H. Judiciary Com111., 109th Cong, 

1664-66 (2005) (appendL\.to statement of the Honorable Bradley J. SchloLllliln, U.S. Dep't. of Jllstice) (provldmg 

Section 5 objection letter to Board and sllnlll13rizing changes made to the yoting methods, along with overall 

objections to the changes) 

l~ The voters v.'ere only protected fro111 this sudden cl13nge 1113t would have caused significant coufusion and lost 

votes because DOJ issued an objection under Section 5 and iufonned the Board th .. 1t the Ch..111ge could not take 

effect. The elections subsequently took place as originally planned at I.S I] I. and hundreds of votes were cast on 

September 25. See AALDEF Report at 41 
92 

Discrimination Against Asian Americans Creates a Barrier to Voting 

Discrimination against Asian American populations is of particular concern given the 

perception of Asian Americans as "outsiders," "aliens," and "foreigners." 19 Based on this 

perception, at various points in history, Asian Americans were denied rights held by U. S. 

citizens. Remnants of the sentiment that evoked these denials persist today and continue to harm 

Asian Americans 

This shameful history of extensive discrimination against the Asian American community in 

the United States is well known. Until 1943, federal policy barred immigrants of Asian descent 

from even becoming United States citizens, and it was not until 1952 that racial criteria for 

naturalization were removed altogether21l Indeed, history is replete with examples of antiimmigrant sentiment directed towards Asian Americans, manifesting in legislative efforts to 

prevent Asian immigrants trom entering the United States and becoming citizens 21 

Legally identified as aliens "ineligible for citizenship," Asian immigrants were prohibited 

from voting and owning land 22 Both immigrant and native-born Asians also experienced 

19 ;;-;ee, e.g.. Claire Jean Kim, The J(acw/ FnangulatlOll (~f.;..J.SlGll Amcncons. 27 Pol. & Soc'y 105. 10X-16 (1999) 

(describing history of whites perceiving Asian Americans as foreign and therefore politically ostraci7ing them). In 

2001, El comprehensive survey revealed thHt 71 % of adult respondents held eilher decisively negEltive or parti[lll,Y 

negallve athtudes tow,ud ASIan Amencans. Committee of 100, American Attitudes Toward Chinese Amc1'lcans and 

Asians 56 (2001), available allrttp"//'YWW.ColllluitteelOO.orgipublicatiolls/ sUTvey/C lOOsun;ey.pdf. R.1cial 

Icprcscnt2ltions and stereotyping of Asian Ameriealls, particularly in well-publicized installces where public figures 

or the mass media express such aHitudes, reflect and reinforce an image of Asian Americ,ms as '-different," 

"foreIgn, ,. and the "enemy;' thus sllgmatiLing Asian Americans, heightening racial tensIOn, and lllshgatmg 

discrimination. Cyntlria Lee, Be,vond Black and While: Racializing .dsian Jlmerican.'i in a ,')'ooely Obsessed l-vifh 

0'J.,6 Hastings Women's LJ. 165, IXI (1995): Spencer K. Tumbun, Comment, If'en Ho /.ee (Jnd Ihe Consequences 

o/h.iuiurlllg .>-lswn .>-lmertcan Stereotypes, 7 UCLA Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 72, 74-75 (2001): Terri Yuh-lin Chen. 

Comment, Hate Violcnce as Harder Patrol: An Asian American TheOl), (?f Hatc Violence, 7 Asian L.r 69, 72, 74-75 

(2000): Jerry Kang. Note, Racial TJolence AgainstAsian Americans, 106 Hm\". L. Rev. 1916, 1930-31 (1993): 

Thiel1}' Devos & :M..1hzannR Bal1.1Ji, "1merican = /fllife.'?, 88 J. Personahty & Soc. PsychoL 447 (2005) 

(documenting empirical evidence of implicit beliefs that Asian Americalls are not '·Amelican"). 

20 See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126,22 Stal. 58, 58-61 (prohibiting immigration of Chinese laborers: 

repealed 1943); Immigratiou Act of 1917, ell. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 8N-98, alld IUlllligratiou Act of 1924, ell, 190,43 

Stat. 153 (banning inllIrigration from almost nll countries in the Asia-Pacific region, repealed 1952), Leti Volpp, 

J)lvestmg C'Jtlzens!llp: On Aswn Amencan HIS/Of:V and the /.(}SS o/Citlzens/lIjJ 7hrough .Harnage. 5J UCLA L. 

Rey ~05, 415 (2005) 

21 See, e.g.. Plrilippines Independence Act of 193..1., ch. 8..1.,..1.8 Stnt. 456, ..1.62 (imposing nlllllL11 qnota of fifty Filipino 

immigrants: amended 19~6); Immigration Act of 192..1.. eh. 190, ..1.1 Stat. 151 (deny'ing entry to virtuall~' all Asians; 

repealed 1952): Scott Act or lXxg, ch. 1064, 1,25 Stat 50-+, 504 (rendering 20,000 Chinese re-entry certificates null 

and \oid); NaturaliLationAct of 1790. ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (providing one of the first 1[1\-\'s to timit naturnliLation to 

aliens \\' ho ",.'ere "free \\rute persons" and thus, in effect, e.\.cludmg African-Amencans, and later, ASI..1n Americans: 

repealed 1795). 

"See Ozawa v. ['lilted States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922): see, e.g., CaL ConsL art. II. § 1 (1879) Cno native of 

Clrilh1 . shall ever exercise the priyileges of an elector in tlris State"); qvama v. Calijtwnia, 332 U.S. 633, 662 

(19~8) (NIUlphy, 1.. cOllCUlling) (noting tllat Califonria's Alien Lalld Law ·',\·as designed to effechL.1te a purely mcI..1l 

discrimination, to prohibIt a Japanese alien from owning or using agricultural land solely' because he is a Japanese 

alien") 

6 
93 

pervasive discrimination in everyday life23 Perhaps the most egregious example of 

discrimination was the incarceration of 120,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry during World 

War II without due process 24 White immigrant groups whose home countries were also at war 

with the United States were not similarly detained and no assumptions regarding their loyalty, 

trustworthiness and character were similarly made 2 ' 

Racist sentiment towards Asian Americans is not a passing adversity but a continuing 

reality, fueled in recent years by reactionary post-9111 prejudice and a growing backlash against 

immigrants26 Numerous hate crimes have been directed against Asian Americans either because 

of their minority group status or because they are perceived as unwanted immigrants 27 In 2010, 

the nation's law enforcement agencies reported 150 incidents and 190 offenses motivated by 

anti-AsianfPacit1c Islander bias28 

Discriminatory attitudes towards Asian Americans manifest themselves in the political 

process as well. For example, during a 2009 Texas House of Representatives hearing, legislator 

Betty Brown suggested that Asian American voters adopt names that are "easier for Americans 

to deal with" in order to avoid difficulties imposed on them by voter identification laws29 

Although this statement did not physically obstruct any voters from reaching the polls, it made 

clear that the Asian American community's voice was unwelcome in American politics and 

notably cast Asian Americans apart from other "Americans." At a campaign rally during the 

2004 US. Senate race in Virginia, incumbent George Allen repeatedly called a South Asian 

23 People v. Brac(v, 40 CaL 198,207 (1870) (upholding Im'\.' providing lhat "No Indi[lll. or Mongolian or Chinese. 

shall be pelmitted to give evidence in favor of, or against, any ,O\'hite man" against F0U11eellth Amendment 

cllflllcllgC): see also Gong Lum v. RICe, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding segregation of Asi<'1ll schoolchildren) 

24 ,"J'e(' Exec. Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizmg the llltemment); see also KorenzatslJ v. 

[,'nUcri ,Slales, 323 U.S. 21-1- (1944) (upholding the illtenlluellt under strict scrutiny revie"w). 

25 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, 2-1-0--1-2 Q\1urphy_ L dissenting) (noting ll1:1t similarly situated Americ[ln citiLens 

of Oennan and Itahan ancestry were not subjected to the "ugly abyss of racism" of forced detentIon based on racist 

assumptions that they ,"ere disloyal, "subyersiye.'· and of "an enemy race," as Japanese Americans were): NatsH 

Taylor Saito. Inlemlnent:'>', i'hen and Vow: Consfilll1ionai Accollnlahilily in Post-9! II /--/.merica. 72 Duke F. for L. & 

Soc. Change 71. 75 (2009) (noting '~thc presumption made by' the militar~y and sanctioned by the Supreme Court that 

Japanese Americans, unlike German or Italian Americans, could be presumed disloyal by virtue of their national 

origin·'). 

2(, S'ee U.S Dcp't of Justicc, COl~frol1ling lJiscriminafion in the J)ost-9! II r,'ra: Challenges alld Opportunities Ten 

Years Later, at 4 (Oct 19,2011) (noting tl1:1tthe FBI reported a 1,600 percent increase in [lnti-Muslim hate crime 

inCIdents 1112001), available ar hltp:!I\'\. \""\"" jusllce.gov/crtl publicalions/post911lpost911sunlllut_report_2012-

04.pdf 

r See, e.g .. id., at 7-9 (discussing numerous incidents of post-9/11l1:1te crimes prosecuted by the DOJ) 

2~ Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Hale Chme S'lalisfics (2010), available al http"l/\\I-"\,,.fbi.gov/aboutusl cjTs/ucrlhatc-crimcl20 1 ()/tab lcs/tab1c-I-incidcnts-offcnscs-victims-and-known-offcnders-by -bias-motivation201il.xls . 

2Y R.O. Ratcliffe. Texas La:l-vJ1/aker ,Suggesls Asmns Adop! Easier Sames, Houston CllIDll., Apr. 8, 2009, available at 

http://,,,"ww.chron.com/ncws/houston-tcxas/articlc/ Tcxas-lawmaker-sllggcsts-Asians-adopt-casier-namcs1550512.php. 
94 

volunteer for his opponent a "macaca" - a racial epithet used to describe Arabs or North Africans 

that literally means "monkey" - and then began talking about the "war on terror"'" 

Incidents of discrimination and racism like these perpetuate the misperception that Asian 

American citizens are foreigners, and have the real effect of denying Asian Americans the right 

to fully participate in the electoral process. These barriers will only increase as the Asian 

American population continues to grow Asian Americans have become the fastest growing 

minority group in the United States. While the total population in the United States rose 10 

percent between 2000 and 2010, the Asian American population increased 43 percent during that 

same time span." 

The fastest population growth occurred in the South, where the Asian American population 

increased by 69 percent.·12 With the coverage fonnula struck and no current Section 5 coverage 

for these states, Asian Americans are susceptible to extensive discrimination, both in voting and 

other arenas. When groups of minorities move into or outpace general population growth in an 

area, reactions to the influx of outsiders can result in racial tension.,l3 Thus, as Asian American 

populations continue to increase rapidly, particularly in the South, levels of racial tension and 

discrimination against racial minorities can be expected to increase. 34 

31) /)'ee Tim Craig & Michael D. Shear, ./1I1en Quip Provokes Oil/rage, Apologv; Name lnsulls Webb Volunteer, 

Wash. Post, Aug. 15.2006, avmlahle at http://,,\vl,Y."\vashingtollpost.com/,,v-dYIl/contcnti 

articlc!2006lORIl +I AR20060R I-l005R9 html 

31 ,See Hoeffel ef aI., supra note 5, at 1,3. The U.S. CensLls Bureau data in this briefrellects fIgures for ASHlll 

Americans ,yho repOited themselves as -'Asian alone." Counting the Asian American COllllllUllity's rapidly gro"\yillg 

lllultimcini popllintioll, who ICPOltcd ns ,. Asian nIoHe or in combination." this gwwth mte is .t6 percent. ('ommuni(y 

of Contrasts_ supra, Ell 15. 

J~ Id. at 6. 

33 See Gillian Gay nair. Demographic shifts helpedfuel anti-immigratIOn policJ! in Va., The Capital (Feb. 26, 2009), 

availab Ie at http 1 l..,v,"\'v"", .hometm:vnannapolis.com! ne,,,,'sl gov/2009102126-1 OlDemographic-shifts-helped -fuel-alltiimmigration-policy -in-Va.html (noting that longtime residents of Prince William COHnty, Virginia. perceived that 

their quality of life , ..... as diminishing as Latinos and other minorities settled in their neighborhoods): James Angelos, 

'lYle Circaf j)jvidc, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2009 (describing ethnic tensions in Bellerose, Queens. New York, where 

the South Asian population is gro ... \ing). available at hUp.lIVt\v\\.nytimes.com!20091021221 

nyregionithecity/22froL.html? _r=3&page""Elllted= 1; RamOl1.:1 E. Romero and Cristobal Joshua Alex, Immigrants 

becoming targets oj alfacks, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 25, 2009 (describing tlle rise in anti-Latino yiolence 

where the immigration debnte is heated in New York, Pcnnsylvmria, Texas, nnd Virginia): Sma LilL .'In Ethnic ,~71iji 

is in Store, L.A Times, Apr. 12,2007, at Bl (describing protest of Chino Hill residents to Asian market opening in 

lhelf conllllUIrity where 39% of residents ""ere Asinn), available al http-J/articles.lnllmes.com/2007/apr/12/10caVmeclullolrillsl2. 

'1-1 In 2011, the gro ....... th of immigrant communities and rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Alabama led to the passage 

or H B 56. the toughest immigration enrorcementla\\ in the country'. Also in 2011, sl... ... te lawmakers in other 

southern states. including Georgia and South C[lrolil1.:1. bunched efforts to deny the [lutomatic right of citiLenship to 

the U.S.-bom chlldren of undocumented innnlgrants. S'ee Shankar Vedalltam, State Lawmakers Taking A11ll at 

Amendment Granting Birthright Citizenship, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 2011, avai/ahle at 

hltp.lln""w. \\ashillgtonposl.com!wp-dj·ll!contenU[lrtideI20 1110 1/051 ARlO 110 1050313cJ..html: see also Umfed 

States v. Wong Kl1J1 Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding FOlirteenLh Amendment grunts U.S. citiLenship to nativebom children of alien parents). At the federal level, Alabama members oftlle U.S. House of Representatives cosponsored legislation to enact tlris restriction. Biltilligirt Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (2011). 

Thls blll was reintroduced in 20 I J and co-sponsored again by Alabama Representatives, as well as leglslators from 

Ari7.ona. Georgia. and Texas. Birthright Citizenship Act of2013, H.R. lcJ.O. 113th COllg., (2013) 
95 

Such discrimination creates an environment of fear and resentment towards Asian 

Americans, many of whom are perceived as foreigners based on their physical attributes. This 

perception, coupled with the growing sentiment that foreigners are destroying or injuring the 

country, jeopardizes Asian Americans' ability to exercise their right to vote free of harassment 

and discrimination. Given the discrimination against Asian Americans and immigrants that 

persists as these populations continue to grow, the lack of Section 5 protections will be 

problematic for these communities. 

Conclusion 

American citizens of Asian ancestry have long been targeted as foreigners and unwanted 

immigrants, and racism and discrimination against them persists to this day. These negative 

perceptions have real consequences for the ability of Asian Americans to fully participate in the 

electoral and political process. Section 5 of the VRA was an effective tool in protecting Asian 

American voters against a host of actions that threaten to curtail their voting rights. However, the 

Supreme Court's recent decision dismantling the coverage formula has left a large gap in 

protections for Asian American voters that requires Congressional action. We look to Congress 

to work in a bipartisan fashion to respond to the Court's ruling and strengthen the VRA as it did 

during the 2006 reauthorizations and each previous reauthorization. We respectfully offer our 

assistance in such a process. 

9 
96 

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100 

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ofthunost impo<1M)t and I_' .fr<e<i,'< p;.,c...ufd.;1 righIJ 1.".loti"" .,...,.pas<cd, Mil bo, 

5I""'I!1y wppon«i tile YR ... ,lid i1> " .. "",i<Ht! .in<.: in _" a1must SO Y''''' ogo. 

n.. .. oo«oo Mill. VRA i. "ndeJti.oble. It h .. h.lped '" .Iimin&te dilOOrin'iM!OQ' lwriof. to r.1I 

<wi< pa:1kipalloo f<>r ",ill""', of ... mcrit:"".,,1nd t... spvl<cd "",jf",.nI odv."",. for "'luaJ 

",Idiul par!i<ipMion .t all ,",,,, of so'-emmom. In (lie )""'" iIrunOOl'Lely 1ft .. f"l"&P of tit< 

VAA, Afri<:an Am<ri<an "" .. rcgiMttiO<l 'n • ..-d <lront,'i~lIy. and lite ""In .... <>f Atrial! 

... "'oric ..... 1¢c1Od '" Jlltnl'" offj"" i~ fj,-..fuld in fj,'. )'UB,-' fodo)' lh<:ro are """" tIton 

9.0()(l A';".,.,. "'"",,,,,on .1«1Od olf",i.,,,' inclwJin~ the fir>! Arrican ... mericaD ..... ida\(. Manyof 

th_.!o<t<d offid.h _ front juritdicljO<l' lItol "= ptOI\\Otcd by IIIe precl"""",,~ PfO"i ....... of 

s..:,iort 5 "rll,. YIlA,' Surtly, IheUn,'cd Sate< _Id DOt""'" made"",h jlItIgn'>,,,itI>oottlte va .... 

1lte ,,"-'" .. <>fill. V RA ill imprtl'l'i"8 "';tt<lfi'), ", ... pMicip3'l"'" Ind i"""'''i''llll>o "llmbot- of 

African A~ .I"<'lcd oIIlciols .. not • doemo:IoI!Ira'K>n 1M! tho """""Iioru. 0{1I>: VIlA ... no 

""'S'" ~. 1'0 lite w,uraI)', <X1<", i';C COfI"" .. ",,,,1 «SI,mort)' I'i<>m 2006 bofut< ~ of 

Ih< "'<1'., .. CSI '"'tc,,,,joo """ "'boeq".,1t .. ideot<:.< ohcr\o th., Se<:tion ~'. p"",itarante ~"irem." .. «>nIln ... to ....... "U crud.1 .. !tgoard ror tho ~IIO ."'" ror mill"",,, of d';,ent, '" ,0Ct6 -,,!,.-:= 

--,.; .... ::.;-,,---------------- _ 'so< H,R.Itq>, N-o I~13_ .. 1l1:l_O(2(1o)&j, .......... iIllOO(jU.s.0CA,N. 611 

_ .- 'Idol II, -.= 'SHa..r.tkt OO>i4ron& _0.0_. 'I1t< v<fitt llipt. "",_1be Scoi>.rod j(~. ill - ' ';;: Qui .. 

"";:..~ _Tan in .... SooIlo 371, .l81-M (o..t.Jl..-0.._ " _ !flafm," «I~. lI>IIl), 

---,.- _'"7"'''=-
97 

Congress found that "the hundreds of objections interposed [and} requests for more information submitted 

followed by voting changes withdrawn from consideration by jurisdictions covered by (Section 5]" 

evidenced continued discrimination.4 and that many of the Jaws blocked by the Department of Justice 

pursuant to Section 5 closely resembled attempts to disenfranchise voters before passage of the VRA.. 

Proposed laws blocked by Section 5 have included discriminatory redistricting plans~ polling place 

relocations, biased mmexations and de~annexatjons, and changing offices from elected Lo appointed 

positions.s After extensive hearings and very thorough consideration, the House concluded that these 

proposed voting changes) successfully prevented by Section 5 of the VRA, ..,,,erc "calculated decisions to 

keep minority voters from fully participating in the polidcal process," showing that "attempts to 

discriminate persist and evolve, such that Section 5 is still needed to protect minority voters in the 

future.'16 

Seven years laterl the protections of Section 5 continue to be just as necessaI)', Actions by a number of 

covered states in the hours and days immediately following the Shelby County decision striking down the 

fomula in Section 4 of the VRA, efiectively gutting Section 5, demonstratc how crucial Section 5's 

preclearance provision continues to be in protecting minority voting rights. Shortly after the decision, 

Texas Attorney General Gregg Abbott announced that the state's voter ID law and a redistricting plan, 

boili of which had been previously blocked by Section 5, would go into effect immediately. The tirree 

judge panel that had reviewed the Texas voter ID law and denied preclearance iu 2012 fOlmd that "based 

on ilie record evidence before us, it is virtually certain that these burdens will disproportionately affect 

racial minorities. Simply put, Illany Hispanics and African Americans who voted in the last election will, 

because of the burdens imposed by SB 14, likely be unable to votC.,,7 Without Section 5 safeguards, that 

discriminatory voter ID bill is nov·/ in ciTect. Similarly, unnecessarily restrictive Yoter ID laws in Norlh 

Cmolina.,. South Carolina, Alahama, Mississippi and Virginia are all moving fOllVard, despitc scant 

evidence of in~person votcr fraud and the great potential to disparately Impact minority voters. Another 

pending bill in North Carolina threatens to reuuce collcgc age voting by preventing students' parents from 

claiming them as dependents on their tax returns if Lhe student regjsters' to vote at his school address, In 

less than one month since the Supreme COUlt struck down the preclearance formula ~- effectively ending 

preclearance unless and lmtil Congress creates a ncw formula ~~ lav. s that threaten to reverse the progress 

made by the VRA are moving fonvard. 

History provides important, sobering lessons about what can happen when protections for minority voting 

rights are rolled back. After the Civil War, Congress moved swiftly and decisively to cnfranchise African 

American mcn. Onder the supervision of federal troops, more than 700,000 Atrican American men were 

registered to vote in the South by 1868, a 75 to 95% registration rate'. The 1St

]1 Ame.ndment was ratified 

in 1870, and the Enforcement Act of 1870 prohibited discrimination in voter registration and created 

criminal penalties for interfering with voting rights. These combined efforts and federal protections led to 

unprecedented rates of African American participation in elected government. By thc end of 

Reconstruction, 18 African Americans had served in statewide office In Southern states, there were eight 

African Americans in Cnngress from six different states, and more than 600 A frjcan Americans served in 

state legislatures.s When Reconstruction ended in 1877 and the Supreme Court struck down key porlions 

of the Enforcement Act, progress quickly rcversed. Southern states began implementing racial 

gerrymandering, followed by more brazen efforts to disenfranchise African American voters, including 

poll taxes, litoracy tests, whites-only prtmaries, and grandf<~ther clauses. By Lhe early 1900's, 90 percent 

'Pub. I.. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(4)(A). 

5 H.R. RJ::P. NO. 109-478, at 36. 

I> Jd al21. 

'No. 12-cv-128, 2012 U.S. Di,t LEXIS 127119, at '86 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012). 

IIUric Faller, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863~1877, at 353. 355,538 (1988). 
98 

of African Americans in the D(jep South had been disenfranchised by these schemes. The widespread, insidious disenfranchisement of African American voters only endeLl in J 965, with passage ofthe VRA. 

To be sure, the United States is very different today than it was after Reconstruction. Yet the possibility of repeating history by reversing decades of progress on improving minority voting rights looms large. The Supreme Court majority in She/by County ignored extensive congressional findings of ongoing election discrimination·- instead substituting its own view that a muscular VRA is no longer needed. We certainly hope that one day the protections of tile Voting Rights Act "\-viII no longer be necessary and that all eJigible voters will be able to vote, free from discriminatory barriers. Unfortunately, that Llay has not yet come. Congress ml.lst act to create a new formula, restoring the safeguards of Section 5 preclearance and protecting minority voting rights. 

In his speech proposing the VRA, President Lyndon Johnson said, "Many ofthe issues of civil rights are 

very complex aod most difficult. But about this there can and should be no argumcnt. b\'ery American citizen can and must have ao equal right to vote. There is no reason v"hich can excuse the denial of that right There is no duty which \veighs on us more heavily thao the duty "\-ve have to ensure that right.,,9 

Almost 50 years later, President Johnson's words ring true today. We urge Congress to work swiftly and decisively to enact a ncW formula for Section 4 of the VRA, restoring the Act's crucial voting rights protections and ensuring to every American citizen an equal right to vote. 

S~~JL BmTy Curtiss Lusher 

National Chair 

,A 

Abral1am H. F oxman 

~ational Director 

<:I President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 1 Pub. Papers 281, 282 (March 15, 1965), available at btrQJ~LQj.liliL<!L\"'m·ullyndo!!:J)<).i.[L~!lQ$.9J!!m~.c:.c.h-\"swfilm;,/pJc.sjdent-iQhD.sons1ill..Q9ial~.!D~!;l.:Jo-{he':fon~'resS::lh~·wameric5'h1J.:I!tQIl.!.lliQ. 
99 

ACLU 

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

Arne.rican ll..i bcrt 'S Union 

SL3tt nll!n' Suhndssion f or 

~ VOling Rights Act nfte r the Supreme Court's Dfl:ision in Sh elbJ eli/lilly" 

e:lr in ~ Bl,> ro ..... the u.s. lIoLlSl' or ta ~ Commiul't' on Ihe J udiclary 

uI Jl~l nllll ('(' on Ihf ConSlilUliuli lind Chi] J ustice 

Introd uction 

Submil1t'd hy 

l.;luru W. Murphy 

Di~cl0r 

AC1.U W~sh in~l un .A·£i!il li comc.-: 

and 

Dehorah J. Vagin~ 

Sellior .c!!.i~ 13Iiv c CQunsd 

ACLU W~'hing on Ixgisluli H,Orfkc 

July l~. 2013 

Th~ American Civil I.ill<.'njc,~ Uni()~l (ACI.U). un bc h~l { III ~ ovcr halt a miUil)B cml).:~. 

enuolle., additional !; upp"ncr~ 11n<l uCl;\";m. and lifly-Ihrcc aOili~lC~ n~lj')nwj()c. i~ plcastJ h) 

,ubm;1 lhh .laK'111cnl rHr thl- hearing. 11,~ 1'0111/11 Highls ACllljicr III~ "pr c Cm""S /Jeri.<ioll ill 

Sh~/b.l' Crmmy. We Ihunk Ihc Suocommillce for Ihi, hc:uin.s- anJ IIf!!,C a hipanisan rc:,pcmll 10 

ensure key ro l~"Ct ions in the V()Iin,g iJ: ht ~ Act at'\: restQI'I.'<i (ollowing the Supreme Coun's 

,](Ods;,," in Shelby em"'f), ". II IJld~".1 

' SllClby C""'U ~" U(.Ililcr, I)) S. C[.161112'lJJ). 
100 

The ACLU is a nationwide. non-partisan organintion working daily in courts. Congress. state 

legislatures. and communities across the country to defend and preserve the civil rights and liberties 

that the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee everyone in this country. The ACLU 

works at the federal. state. and 10callcvc1 to lobby. litigate. and conduct public education in order to 

both expand opportunities and to prevent harriers to the hallot hox. 

Wilh one of the largest voting rights dockels in the nation. the ACLU's VOling Rights Project. 

established in 1%5. has filed more than 300 lawsuits to cnforce thc provisions of the Voting Rights 

Act and the U.S. Constitution. The cun-cnt docket has over a dozen active voting rights cases from 

all parts of the United Slales. including Alaska. Califomia. Florida. Georgia. Iowa, Kentucky, 

Montana. Penmylvania. Virginia, Washington. Wisconsin. and Wyoming. The ACLU is also 

engaged in state-level advocacy on voting and election reform all acro" the country. 

The ACLU was co-coumel in both of the recent Supreme Court cases Shell)), County v. Holder and 

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (lTCA), and in Shelby County, represented among olher 

clients, the Alahama State Conference of the NAACP, to defend key provisions of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

In addition. the ACLU's Washington Legislative Office is engaged in federal advocacy before 

Congress and the executive branch on a variety of federal voting malters and was one of the leading 

organizations advocating for the Voting Rights Act extensions of 19X2 and 2006. We issued repm1s 

on the continued need for the Act" and provided expert teslimony on racial discrimination in the 

then-covered jurisdictions.' 

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has proven to be one of the most effective civil rights statutes in 

eliminating racial discrimination in voting. For almost half a century. the Act has been utilized to 

ensure equal access to the ballot box by blocking and preventing numerous forms of voting 

discrimination. Unfortunatcly, the recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the 

coverage fonnula of Section 4(b), which determines which jurisdictions are subject to preclearance. 

With the loss of Section 4(b), Section 5 has been rendered virtually obsolete, resulting in the loss of 

the most innovative and incisive tools against racial discrimination in voting, including preclearance 

and notice to DOJ of voting changes. The overwhelming evidence of the continued need for the 

Voting Right Act means that Congress must restore the ability for enforcement of Section 5 through 

2 Laughlin McDonald and Daniel Leyitas, The Case .for Extellding and Amendillf? the Votin!? Rights Act. Voting Rights 

J.iligalion, 1982-2006: A Reparl of {he Voting Rights Project (~r the American Ciril liberties Union. (March 2006), 

available at hl!n:/lw\vw adu,ur(l-!vlJlinC>-lii'tlJl)fca~c-cxtcndino--and-am('ndin('-'voiin<:r-rJf>hb-acL; Caroline Fredrickson 

and Deborah.T. Vagins. Promises to Keep: The If1lpao of the Foring Rights Act ill 2()06, ACLU (March 20(6), arailable 

at hHp:l/www.Dcln ore:!votl1F'f-rights!nromises-keep-imp2ct-yotill(t-ri(thrs-Jct-2006 

1 See An introduction to the t,'xpiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal issues Relating to Reauthorization: 

Hearing Before ,)·enate Judicial), Committee, 1091h Congo (2006) (testimony of Laughlin McDonald, Director, ACLU 

Voting Rigllts Project), available at hllilJr\o'vww.<!dllJ]rt/v('1.U!~ri[d.!!';!l!estinlnnv-1:nl\.;hliD-mcd0I11!l!:-l-directof-(li::lll§: 

:,:pnng~Jjghti~PJ\::jc~t·h01.l$~_-Jl.ldld[JJy-::s_~~h(Q; 111e Voting Rights Act: l!;vidence 0/ Continued Nad: Hearing H(~/ore the 

Subcof1lm. on the COllstitutioll qj" the H. Comm. on the Judiciary. 109lh Cong (2006) (leslimony of Nadine Slrossen, 

President, ACT ,U), available at h1tn:/I\"·\\'vi.' . .iic]u.(1rgG:Q!j!!.g:-.riQ.hts/~tl!.telnent-:Jclu..:r.residelJt-l:!ili.li!!~l!!Q1i..~5uhlnjtrC(l: 

!illlXOlnmittt'c-conli.1:.!.!illi.Qrill~Iili.!!g· 

2 
101 

the creation of a new coverage formula that appropriately captures recent racially discriminatory 

vOling praclice~. 

Pollowing the decision in Shelby County, the ACLU will continue to devote substantial energy and 

resources to defending the right to vote for all. We look forward to working with this 

Subcommillee in restoring the critical rights we have lost in ensuring all voters have access to the 

ballot free from discrimination. 

I. Bipartisan History of the Voting Rights Act 

Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to enforce rights guarameed to minority voters 

nearly a century before by the Pourteenth and Pifteenth Amendments. Although these amendments 

prohibited states [rom denying equal protection on the basis o[ race or color and [rom 

discriminating in voting on account of race or color, African Americans and other minorities 

continued to face disfranchisement in many states. Poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses 

were used to deny African American citizens the right to register to vote, while all-white primaries, 

gerrymandering, annexation, and at-large voting were used widely to dilute the effectiveness of 

minority voting strength.4 

The passage of the Act represented thc most aggressive steps ever taken to protect minority voting 

rights. The impact was immediate and dramatic. In Mi"issippi, African American registration went 

from less than 10% in 1964 to almost 60% in 196H; in Alabama, registration rose from 24% to 57%. 

In the South as a w.hole, African American registration rose to a record 62% within a few years of 

the Act's passage.' The Department of Justice (DOJ) has therefore called the Act the "most 

successful piece of civil rights legislation ever adopted."" But the promise of the Act has not yet 

been fully reali£ed. l'rogre" has been made, bUl despite the Supreme Courl's recent decision, lhe 

full gamut of the Act's protections is still needed today. 

In the 4H years since its passage, the Voting Rights Act has guaranteed millions of minOlity voters a 

chance to have lheir voices heard in federaL slale, and local govemmenls across the counlry. These 

increases in representation translate to vital and tangible benefits such as much-needed education, 

healthcare, and economic development for previously underserved communities. Prior to the Act's 

passage, African American communilies had been denied resources and opportunities for many 

years; their issues were often ignored and discounted. Ol1iciab elected when equal voting 

opportunities arc afforded to minority citizens have been more responsive to the needs of minority 

communities.7 

4 Predrickwll & Vagins, supra note 2. 

5 See Victor Rodriguez, Sec/ion 5 a/lhe Voting RighI,) Act of 1965 after Bot!me: The Bt:ginning a/the lc;nd of 

Preclearam;e', 91 CAL. L. REV. 769. 7B2 (2003). 

f, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, lntroductiol1 to Federal Voting Rights raws. 

h ttT'!:i /'.""\"1./\':. H'ldoi. eov/crtivQrinQ./tlJ troiilltr~Lll1!.l.l.. 

7 l"rcdrickson & Vagins. supra note 2, at 2. 

3 
102 

As President Ronald Reagan noted upon signing the 19R2 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, 

the right to vote is "crown jewel of American liberties."g Recognizing this importance, Congress 

has passed every Voting Rights Act reauthorization and extension by overwhelmingly bipartisan 

votes. The I%S Act passed the Senate 77-19. and the House 333-RS.'J The 1970 extension passed 

the Scnatc 64-12. and the Homc 234-179. 10 The reauthori7ation in 19);2 garnered similar support 

passing RS-X in the Senatell and 3X'l-24 in the House12 Congress last extended the Act in 2006, 'lXo in the Senate and 390-33 in the House, concluding Ihal Ihe coverage formula enforced by Section 

S was needcd for at least another 2S years. Including the 2006 reauthorization. the last three 

extensions havc been signed by Rcpublican presidents. 

In 2006, the congressional fact-linding elI011 built a strong case for the continuing need to maintain 

the Voting Rights Act's protections. The resulting record included more than 750 Section 5 

objections by DOT that blocked the implementation of some 2.400 discriminatory voting changes; 

the withdrawal or modification of over SOO potentially discriminatory voting changes after DO.T 

reljuested more information; lOS successful actions to require covered jurisdictions to comply with 

Section 5; 25 denials of Section 5 preclearance by federal courts; high degrees of racially polarized 

voting in the jurisdictions covered by Section 5; and reports from tens of thousands of federal 

observers dispatched to monitor elections in covered jurisdictions.13 In total, the record included 

over 15,000 pages of testimony and reports and statements !i'om over 'lO witnesses in over a dozen 

hearings.'" 

Although signilicant progress has been made as a result of the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 

eljual opportunity in voting still does not exist in many places. Discrimination on the basis of race 

and language still deny many Americans their basic democratic rights. Although such 

discrimination today is often more subtlc than it used to be, it is still current and mmt still be 

remedied. 

n. Shelby County Y. Holder 

Unf011unale1y, on June 25, 20l3, Ihe Supreme Court, in Shethy COLli/tv v. Holder. invalidated the 

coverage formula in Section 4(b), which defines who is subject to Section 5 pre-clearance. 

" Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amenc1ments of 19~Q (June 29, 19~Q), availahle at 

http://YI.,'w\v.pre')idcncv.ucsh.edn!\ys!?pld=42f58.8. 

9 See Senate Roll Call Vote No. 78 (May 26, 1%5); House Roll Call Vote No. 32 (Feb. 10. 1%4), available at 

MI2dbloc~tej}.£b.oro/dQcumfuh!.56377\)7!derail; House Roll Call Vote No. 87 (July 9,19(5), ayailahle at 

httn://www gm'track.m/C{)J)('fres.;:/votes/R9-1965/hg7 

10 See Senate RoU Call Vote No. 342 (Mm. 13, InO); House Roil Call Vote No. 151 (Dec. 11. lYW), available at 

blIP:!jdDcH~fH;:h.on~/dQ£umell1~j.2Q377g7/det(111. 

11 See Senale Roll Call Vole No. 190 (June 18, 1982). 

12 See House Roll CaU Vole No. 242 (Oct. 5. 1981). 

il...aughlill McDonalJ, DOli 't ,)'trike DOWII S'ertioI15. hllp:"/"""'\, ·,v.aclll.Of2./blof!..I\'n(in<)-riQ.h!siJonl-slrikc··Juwll-~cLUon·"5 

(Mar. G, 201]); see also H. R. Rep. No. 109-478 (2006); S. Rep. No. 109-295 (2006). 

14 Deborah 1. Vagins & Laughlin McDonalJ, ))'upreme ('auJ1 Put a Dagger in the Heart afthe Voting Rights Act. 

http://ww\v.3.('l!J ord"hlod,rc,tin"'-l1rl1fs/suprcDlC"-COtll't -put -c]32:.,"'cf-heart -votinc:-rl ,,,fits-act (July 2. 2013) 

4 
103 

Tn 200R. the City of Calera. a subsidiary of Shelby County, Alabama. sought to make over 170 

annexations, in conjunction with changes to its redistricting plan. Together, these changes would 

eliminate the city's sole majotity African American district, which had elected an African American 

candidate - who was the City's lone African American councilperson - for the previous 20 years.'; 

In its submi"ion to DOJ, Calera admitted that it had already adopted the annexatiom without 

recei ving preclearance. DOJ objected to both the unprecleared annexations, as well as the 

redistricting plan. Notwithstanding this dcniaL Calcra went on to conduct City Council elcctions 

with both thc annexations and the rejected plan in place. causing the city's sole African American 

councilmember to lose his seal. DOJ was then compelled to bring an enforcement action under 

Section 5 to enjoin certification of the results of the illegal election. After a coment decree was 

reached with a ncw prec1eared plan. the city's lone majority African Amcrican district was restored, 

and black votcrs in Calera succeeded in electing their candidate of choice. Shelby County 

subseljuently challenged Sectiom 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act as facially unconstitutional. 

The Supreme Court invalidatcd thc coverage fOlmula in Section 4(b). which defines which 

jurisdictions arc subject to Section 5 preclearance. The C0U11 found that while "voting 

discrimination still exists." Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. on the basis 

that the coverage fOlmula had not been updated recently and no longer rellected current conditions 

of disclimination. Therefore, the formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting 

jurisdictions to preclearance.'6 Section 5's continued operation thus depends on establishing new or 

expanded coverage, which complies with the Court's decision. As the Court noted: "LwJe issue no 

holding on section 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula 

based on current conditions.,,17 Without congressional action through the creation or expansion of 

a coverage formula. the kind of discrimination occun'ing in Calera, Alabama and elsewhere cannot 

be subject to the preclearance mechanism that stops discriminatory voting changes before they take 

effect and U.S. citizens lose their right to vote. 

lil. Recent Examples of the Impact of Section 5 

Section 5 has been particularly effective in stopping discriminatory state and local voting changes 

from going into effect. It is imp0l1ant that the safeguards of Section 5 continue to apply in those 

jurisdictions with recent and egregious examples of discrimination. The elimination of precincts. 

changes in polling locations. methods of electing school board or city council members, moving to 

at-large distlicts. annexations, and other changes can have the pnrpose or effect of denying or 

abrillging the fight to vole on the basis of race~ color. or membership il1 a language Ininority group, 

Recent examples, since the 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, of such discriminatory 

voting measures blocked by Section 5 arc numerous. As the Court acknowledged, "voting 

discrimination still exists: no one doubts that.,,18 In those areas where voting disClimination 

continues to exist, Section 5 must be enforced, and a coverage fonnula is needed to achieve this. 

15 Letter from Grace Chung Baker, Acting Assistant Attorney GeneraL to Dan Head (Aug. 25, 2008). (B'ailable at 

hliu:/!WVi\II.', i llHICC, '-'uv/c£Uahuu!Jvo[/sec Smuls/l 08250-S.pJf. 

lC Shelby County v. Hotder. (,79 P. 3d R4R (20t2) 

/"/ ))7Ielbv County, LB S Ct. at 2012. l'ld.· . 
104 

Without this important function. millions would be disfranchised. What remains of our legal 

avenues aIler Sheibv County is not enough. The following are a few very recent examples: 

In 2006. Randolph County. Georgia, allempted to reassign the Aftican American Board of 

Education Chair's voter registration district from a seventy percent African American voting 

population to a seventy percent white voting population19 These changes were done in a 

special closed door meeting the sole purpose of which was to change the voter registration 

dist11ct of the Chair. In a unanimous vote. the all-white members of the Board of Registrars 

voted for the district change. Section 5 prevented this blatantly discriminatory change from 

taking place. 

In 2007. Mobile County, Alabama attempted to change the method of selection for filling 

vacancies on the county commission from a special election to a gubematotial 

appointment20 After carcfully considcring information providcd by the county, censm data, 

public comments. and infonnation from interested parties. DOJ found that the change would 

have a retrogressive effect, diminishing the opportunity of min0l1ty voters to elect a 

representative of their choice to the commission. Following the DOJ objection, Mobile 

County withdrew its request for the voting change. 

In 2007, Buena Vista Township in Allegan County, Michigan attempted to close a voter 

registration center located at a Secretary of State branch o1lice 2l The branch offices 

constituted 79.13% of total voter registrations for the Township. and the specific branch 

closure would have closed the only branch in a majority-minority township. resulting in the 

nearest branch being a one hour and forty minute round trip on public transportation with no 

other viable branch alternative for registeting to vote. 

In May 200H. Alaska attempted to eliminate precincts in several Native villages, which 

would force many Native Alaskans to travel to precincts 33 to 77 miles away. unconnected 

by roads. and accessible only by air or water. 22 Two weeks after DOJ asked for additional 

infOlmation on why these changes were neces>ary. the State decided agaimt moving forward 

with these precinct consolidations. 

In 2009. Georgia implemented an error-filled voter regimation verification system that 

matched voter registration lists with other gove111ment databases?"' Individuals who were 

identified as failing to match were nagged and reLjuired to appear on a specific date and time 

at the county courthouse with only three days' notice to prove their voter registration. The 

19 Letter from \Van J. Kim, Assistant Attomey General, to Tommy Coleman (Sept. 12, 2(X)G). availahle at 

hrtp:l/wv,-\v.iusrice.f(o-',//cniJhollt/vmJsec S/pdfs/l 09! 20o.ndf 

20 Leller [rom Wan J. Kim. A"islalll Allorney General. lo John J. Park. Jr. (Jan. 8.2007), available at 

nttu://v,rv,I\\', justi~e. g{w/Cli/abcmtlVnt£.sec 2iPJli'sJl () 10S07 .pdf. 

21 T .etter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting As-;htant Attorney General. to Brian DeBano and Christopher ThoTlla~ 

(Dec. 26, 2007). available al hnpj/'Yy.,~wl1J5t!£~-,-gQy~~~t!/~lQQJJ-thQtL~QL_~!t~QXsLLL22QQ1.1tdf. 

22 Suzanna CalJ.welL Voting Rights Al't: lVhat does ruling l1u;'anfor Alaskam?, Alaska Dispalch, .TUlle 25. 2013. 

httn.;L0'V/\Y.:1l1.U.5 kaui ~parcLl.c01 n!anicle/20 j lOG:f5ivotin2. -ri £.ht'i -;Jl:r -what -tloe~211JiJl£.:1llean -<1 lIDJ:.::;-ms23 Letter from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to ThurbeI1 E Baker (May 29, 2009). available at 

http://wW\r;,:.justice.(fo':/cn/abolit/Yot/s('(' 5/pdf'l;1 {J,52:>09.Ddf 

6 
105 

verification systems errors disproportionately impacted minority voters. Although 

representing e'-!ual shares of new voter registrants, more than 60% more African American 

voters were llagged for additional in,-!uiry then white voters. In addition Hispanic and Asian 

registrants were more than twice as likely to be flagged for further verification as white 

voter registration applicants. Section 5 stopped this retrogressive voter registration provision 

from continuing. '111e objection was later withdrawn on the mistaken premise that the state 

had signilicantly changed the dalabase matching system24 

A locality in Texas sought to reduce the number of polling places for local and school board 

elections in 2006 from H4 polling placcs to 12.25 Morcovcr, the assignment of votcrs to each 

polling place was incredibly unbalanced. The polling place with the smallest proportion of 

minOlily vOlers would have served 6.500 voters while the site wilh the largest proportion of 

minority votcrs would havc served ovcr 67.000. [,ollowing a DOJ complaint. a three judge 

court entered a consent decree prohihiting the locality from implementing the change 

without lirst obtaining prec1earance.26 Section 5 prohibited this change due to the 

retrogressive elrec!. 

In Charles Mix County, South Dakota, after the first Native American candidate was poised 

to hecome a county commissioner, the county increased the number of county 

commissioners from three to five 27 Native Americans would only have been able to elect 

the candidate of lheir choice in one of the five new districts as opposed to one of the lhree 

original districts. This racially discriminatory impact in addition to comments admitting 

discriminatory purpose led DOJ to object to the proposcd plan. 

Between 2009 and 2012, three Georgia counties proposed redistricting changes to their 

county commissions and board of education. which would have altered the division of 

African American populations in the countics. resulting in a retrogression effect on their 

ability to elect minority members and diluting the CUlTent minority representation on the 

eommissiom and board. 2R Through Section 5, plans that would have reduced the level of 

African American voting strength and reduced their ability to elect their candidates of choice 

were prevented. 

24 ))'ee generally Kathy T"ohr, Georgia Allmved to Continue Voter Ver(ficatioll. NPR, Sept. 14, 2010 . 

.bn121L.!·(\y.Y'Lnpr,nrgL!~lppbft'S/st(2D:ilitill:YJ2tm.Z&OTvId=J29~5559:z.. 

25 T.ener from Vlnn 1. Kim. Assiswnt Attol1ley General. to Renee Smith Byas (May 5, 200fi). available at 

h[!p:!/v,,'\.vw,j ll~lkc, vvv/cn!:tbuu!lvol/::'C'C 5/pJrs/1 050S0(.>.ndf. 

'0 United States v. N. II'llTis Montgomery Cmty. Coli. Dist .. Civil Action No. II OG-24R~ (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4. 200G) 

(consent decree judgment) 

27 Letter [rom Grace Chung Baker, Acting As~istant Attorney GeneraL tv Sara Fmnkenstcin (Feb, 1 L 20mn. available 

at http://'\'';v'/w~i.!lli..th;,c ,oov/~rtJabollU\'ot!\;C 5ffij:Jrs/l_5)21 ill~~t 

ll( T .etter from Thomas E. Perez. Assl>;tant Attoilley General, to Walter 0, Elliott (Nt)\'. 30. 2009), m'ailable at 

blU!.:!lvt:\:'Qy.j1!~ti_~>?cgoyjrclj!abQ:ntJYQ1(.5G~_.:'';Q9JS!LlUOS)~~,pctf; Letter from 'I'homas E, Perez. Assistant Attomey 

General, [0 Michael S. Green. Palrick O. Dollar, and Cory O. Kirby (Apr. 13,2(12). availahle at 

!:lj!r:/hv\~stice.2.oyjC1tj()b.c.l.ut/'ilOt-j~C/ndf"/l 04JJJ1Jtflf; T.etter from Thomas n Pere7, Assistant Att0111ey 

General. to Andre\J,f S. Johnson and n. Jay Swindell (Aug. 27. 2012). available at 

httD:llww\r./ illsticC.£ovicrt/abont/yot/sec 5indf'lll Og2712.pdf 

7 
106 

Also in 2012, Galveston County, Texas submiued a redistricting plan for its commissioners 

court reducing the number of districts for clecting justiccs of the peacc and constables.29 

00.1 found that the process leading up to the proposed plan involved the deliberate 

exch"ion from meaningful involvement in key deliberatiom of the only member of the 

commissioners court elected from a minority ability-to-elect precinct. Pollowing changes to 

the rcdistricting plan made by thc county, DOJ approved thc revised plan?O 

IV. Section 5 Provides Necessary Protections Unavailable In Other Laws 

The protectiom that exist in Section 5, and enforced through Section 4, provide a powerful tool for 

detening state and local governments from adopting discriminatory election procedures and 

preventing discriminatory practices that have been adopted from being enforced.3t This 

preclearance requirement is a fundamental clement of the Voting Rights Act that docs not exist 

elsewhere, and has been rendered largely usele" by the Shelbv County decision. 

There arc several uniquc c1emcnts of Section 5 that arc particularly valuable in defeating 

discrimination in voting. First, Section 5 requires those jurisdictions included in a coverage fmmula 

to submit all proposed election changes to DO.l or the federal District Court of the District of 

Columbia prior to implementation.32 This functions as a notice mechanism giving DO.l a level of 

knowledge regarding voting changes superior to rdying on coml11unitics and watchdog groups to 

identify voting changes as they arc proposed. As the examples previously discussed demonstrate, 

the majOlity of discriminatory changes take place at the local level where they may be dil1iculL to 

identify if the reporting onus is removed hom the jurisdiction and placed on groups or individual 

voters. 

Second, in evaluating the intent or effect of the change, Section 5 places the burden of proof on the 

jurisdiction requesting the election change to show that the change does not have a "retrogressive" 

effect on minority voters 33 Unlike Section 2, which places the burden on the voter to prove 

discrimination, Section 5' s burden of proof makes it more effective in preventing discrimination by 

requiring the jurisdiction show any change will not have a discriminatory impact prior to the law 

taking effect. The purpose of Section 5 is to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the 

perpetrators" of discrimination in voting to the voters. 34 

Third, Section 5 targets ongoing discrimination in a relatively low-cost way through an 

administrative process. By largely avoiding long and drawn out legal battles, Section 5 avoids the 

~9 Letter from Thomas E. Perez. Assistant Anomey General, to James E. Trainor III (Mar. 5, 2(12). availahle at 

httn://w\vW iustice.f1.m·-jcrt/Dhmltl,-otisec 5Jndfs/] 030512.ndf. 

10 TJ. Aulds, Galveston County: DO} gives green light to count) redistricting map. KHOU. Mar. 24, 2012, available at 

blm:i!V\'\v"'.kt!Ou.cOlnJne,\!;."shwl t1 hborhQpJ-llCWS/(hIlv~l"ton-C"ouJltv--D()J:Jlim.:Jd.~n-liLlht-t(l-..:mmtY-lTIlUi.1lli;1.ir!t: 

l1lap-! 440922R6jltllll. 

31 Shelby COunly, 133 S. Ct. at 2639 (2U13) (Ginsburg,}', diJSenling) (ciling lhe Continuing Need/or Section 5 PreClearance: Hearing /J(:jore the S'ellate Committee Oil the ]udidary, ]09th COIIK., 2d S·ess., pp. 53-54 (2006)). 

32 42 U.S.c. * 19730. 

33 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (197()). 

" South Carolina v. Katzcnbach, 3g3 U.S. 301. 3]g (1%6) 
107 

high costs of case-by-case litigation associated with Section 2 c1aims.'5 Through the simple 

adminislralive process covered jurisdiclions submil proposed changes in wriling to DOJ, Wilhin 

sixly days, the Allorney General can decide whether lo objecl lo the change, If lhere is no 

objection, the jurisdiction may implement the change, If an objection is filed, the jurisdiction may 

submit thc changes directly to a three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia 

for preclearance withoul deference lo the findings from DOJ 36 This method allows for instances of 

discrimination to be identified in real-time, as the change is proposed and before going into effect. 

Although Section 2 is a valuable tool in stopping discriminatory voting practices after they occur, it 

lacks the hallmarks of Sec lion 5 that prevents discrimination from occurring in the firsl place, 

Section 2 does not provide notice of the proposed change, nor can it freeze a change and prevenl it 

from going into effcct. Scction 2 allows victims of discrimination in voting to scck remedies in 

court, but often only after the discrimination occurs, violating the individual's right to vote, 

Moreover, no state,7 or federal conslilulional claim is an adeljuale substitute for Sec lion 5 because 

no other law provides advance notice of the change and uses preclearance lo stop the discriminatory 

practice t,'om going into effect. 

Only when the powerful loob of Section 5 can operate under a new regime, can the goals of the 

Voting Righls Acl be accomplished, 

Conclusion 

The ACLU thanks the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice for 

holding this important hearing to address the Voting Rights Act following the Shelby Count" 

decision, The V oting Rights ACl'S long bipartisan history of prolecling the righllo vote and rooting 

out racially discriminatory changes through Section 5 must continue, Therefore, it is crucial that 

Congress work together to restore and redesign its protections and allow the Voting Rights Act to 

continue to be the crown jewel of civil rights laws, All the other rights we enjoy as citizens depend 

on our ability to vote; it is necessary that we safeguard access to the ballot for every citizen, We 

look forward to working with the Subcommittee on new legislative proposals, 

J5Juslin Levill, S'hadow/Joxing and Unintellded Consequen('es, SCOTIJSBlog (June 25. 2013, 10:39 PM), 

h.t!:rihvwvi,' sconlit"iloQ..C(JiIlilQJJ/o()!~ll(l(hHvhoxino-(Jnsl-lJl1illtellJed-('nll~ql1£.!l{:e"'l 

"42 U.S.c. * 1973c. 

37 See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions. 67 V AND. L RJjV. (fOltheoming 2014) 

l) 
108 

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109 

Assuring Voting Rights for Rural and Farm Communities 

For forty-eight years, the Voting Rights Act has been a historic law benefitting the masses 

of U. S. citizens in their quest to participate equally in America's democratic political 

process. The current and potential threats to citizens' voting rights inform us that the Act 

is necessary even today. We must now modernize the Act to reflect the realities of 

today's political landscape. This statement provides a brief overview of past and present 

voting conditions and limitations in rural and farm communities, the implications of 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the wake of the 5'helby County, Alabama v. Holder 

U.S. Supreme Court decision, and provides conclusions and recommendations for 

updating Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and mal(ing the process for reporting voting 

rights violations more straightforward and practical. 

The Voting Rights Act, a codification of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution, prohibits states from requiring any "voting qualification or prerequisite to 

voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of 

the United States to vote on account ofrace or color." 42 U.s.c. § 1973(a). Prior to the 

Act's passage, non-white citizens and some poor whites in rural America had to satisfy 

certain preconditions before voting, such as paying a poll tax or passing an oral or written 

literacy test that required they demonstrate fluency in English, interpret or read the US. 

Constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar, name local or national elected officials, 

and more. Thanks to workers in the Civil Rights Movement and citizens particularly in 

rural communities, many of whom are still active in the Rural Coalition, the Voting Rights 

Act was enacted in 1965 and has been continually reauthorized, most recently in 2006. 

Yet in 2013, many residents in rural and farm communities across America continue to 

face many of the voting challenges in local, state, and national elections that people in 

1965 faced when the Voting Rights Act was passed. Even today, a high percentage of 

people remain who have difficulty acquiring information about the candidates and the 

issues. Factors that impede their participation include poor and oftentimes still segregated 

education systems that have left them unable to fully read and comprehend information 

about candidates and issues. Lack of access to electricity, computers, and the Internet in 

their homes and communities also limits their ability to follow news, watch political 

debates, and otherwise acquire critical information. Senior citizens, especially, still 

struggle to find transportation to and from voting precincts, which can sometimes be thirty 

or more miles away from their rural homes. Furthermore, the political process that is 

supposed to promote voter turnout often discourages or prevents people from voting 

In 1993, the US. Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) to make 

voting more convenient and accessible by providing a NVRA form for prospective voters 

to register to vote, update their registration information, or register with a particular 

political party. Tn order to establish residency in a state, voting applicants are required to 

swear and affirm that they are a US. citizen. 
110 

Despite these federal provisions and protections, proponents of restrictive voting 

requirements at the state level have in recent times proposed numerous laws to make 

voting even more difficult. Though each state differs in the particulars, the overall effect 

reduces voter participation. Opponents of these restrictive voting requirements and others 

also argue that they disproportionately target communities of color, the elderly, and youth. 

Beginning on January i, 20 i3, the Kansas Secure and Fair Elections (SAFE) Act required 

Kansas citizens registering to vote for the first time to prove their U.S. citizenship. This 

law poses a challenge for rural residents without a car or a ride to a certified iocation, like 

a post office, to get a government or state issued ID or the funds to pay for one. In 

Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 

Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming, former incarcerated citizens with certain felony 

convictions may be permanently deprived of the right to vote, even after they have been 

successfully paroled. In Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, South Dakota and 

New Hampshire, all residents must produce a photo ill to cast a ballot. The hurdles here 

are similar to those who have to provide proof of citizenship to register. 

In 2004, the Arizona legislature passed Proposition 200, the Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen 

Protection Act, to require prospective voters to present documentary proof of citizenship 

to register to vote and a photo identification before receiving a ballot at a precinct. Tn 

Arizona v. The Tilter Trihal Coullcil o/Arizona, TIlC., the Supreme Court invalidated 

Proposition 200. The majority reasoned that it violated the NVRA, which mandates that 

States "accept and use" the standard federal voter registration form, and that the additional 

requirements would-be voters in Arizona had to satisfy were not included in the federal 

fonn. Arizona 1'. The IlIler Trihal COllllcil oj Arizona, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 2252 (2013). 

However, the Supreme Court suggested that Arizona and other states could propose that 

Congress enact additional requirements for the NVRA form. The Tnter Trihal Council, 

133 S.Ct. at 2261. 

In addition to such widespread attempts to weaken federal voting rights protections with 

new or excessive requirements and restrictions, some states are trying to nullify it 

altogether. SheThy Counly. Alabama v. Holder is the most recent case to come before the 

Supreme Court. Shelby County, a mostly white suburb of Birmingham, sought to 

invalidate Sections 4 and 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act by claiming they were being 

punished unfairly for decades old discrimination. Section 5 requires all or parts of sixteen 

states with a history of racial discrimination in voting to get federal approval before 

implementing changes to their voting laws. It applied to all or part of the following: 

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and 

Virginia; forty counties in North Carolina, five in Florida, four in California, three in New 

York, two in South Dakota, as well as ten towns in New Hampshire, and two townships in 

Michigan. Congress chose all or parts of these sixteen states using a formula in Section 4 

to identify where racially discriminatory voting practices had been more prevalent. In 

2006, Congress reauthorized Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act for another 

twenty-five years. 
111 

Shelby County argued that Sections 4 and 5 should be discontinued because its current 

political conditions are no longer racially discriminatory. The Supreme Court voted 5-4 to 

strike down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional. Its formula can no 

longer be used as a basis for requiring certain jurisdictions to "preclear" changes to their 

voting laws with the federal government. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, 

writing for the majority, explained that Section 4's "coverage [formula] today is based on 

decades-old data and eradicated practices," and "the conditions that originally justified 

these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions." Shelby ell/Y., 

Alabama v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2628, 2619 (2013). Furthermore, no holding was 

issued "on [Section] 5 itself, only on the coverage formula." Td at 2632. Conversely, 

Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in her dissent that "the record for the 

2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear [that] second-generation barriers to minority 

voting rights have emerged in the covered jurisdictions as attempted substitutes for the 

first-generation barriers that originally triggered preclearance in those jurisdictions." ld at 

2652. Since the decision, numerous proposals have been made to replace Section 4, the 

most popular probably being to rely solely on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

Advocates for Section 2 point out that it applies nationally, whereas Section 5 (and 4) only 

applies to certain covered jurisdictions. Chief Justice John Roberts writes in Shelhy, 

Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial 

discrimination in voting found in [Section] 2. The current version forbids any 

"standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the 

right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42 

U.s.c. § 1973(a). Both the Federal Government and individuals have sued to 

enforce § 2, see, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,114 S.Ct. 2647,129 

L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) , and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to block 

voting laws from going into effect, see 42 U.S.c. § 1973j(d). Section 2 is 

pennanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case. 

Td at 2632, 2620. 

Thus, in order to protest a voting rights violation, a person has the right to injunctive relief 

under Section 2. However, this can only be done by filing a lawsuit through the courts, 

whereas under Section 4 and 5 action is taken through an administrative process through 

the U.S. Department of Justice. 

These same advocates against revitalizing Section 4 believe that Section 2 is underutilized 

and provides enough protection to prevent racial discrimination in voting. Former career 

attorney in the Voting Section at the United States Department of Justice and House 

Judiciary Committee Voting Rights Act hearing witness 1. Christian Adams believes "if 

discrimination in voting remains a problem, you would hardly know based on recent 

Section 2 enforcement activity. Either discrimination in voting doesn't exist anymore at 

levels necessary to justify federal oversight under Section 5, or the Justice Department has 

decided not to vigorously enforce the law." The Voting Rights Act alier the Supreme 

Court's Decision in Shelby County before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee's 

Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, 113th Congo 10 (2013). 
112 

Constitutional attorney and Senate Judiciary Committee Voting Rights Act hearing 

witness Michael Carvin contends that Section 2 "broadly and effectively precludes all 

actions with a discriminatory 'result'." From Selma to Shelhy COlinly: Working Together 

to Restore the Protections (jf the "oting Rights Act before the U.S. Senate Judiciary 

Comm., l13lh Congo 6 (2013). These testimonies fail to acknowledge that litigation under 

Section 2 of the VRA is untimely, incredibly expensive, and lengthy. 

In 2006, Justice Ginsburg explains in her dissent, "Congress recei ved evidence that 

litigation under §2 of the VRA was an inadequate substitute for preclearance in the 

covered jurisdictions. Litigation occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme 

has already been put in place and individuals have been elected pursuant to it, thereby 

gaining the advantages of incumbency. An illegal scheme might be in place for several 

election cycles before a §2 plaintifJ can gather sut1icient evidence to challenge it." Holder, 

133 S. Ct. at 2640. In addition, Justice Kennedy has pointed out that "Section 2 cases are 

very expensive. They are very long. They are very inet1icient. I think this section 5 

preclearance device has - has shown - has been shown to be very very [sic] successful." 

Nw. Austin .11,11111. Uti!. nist. No. I v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 2509 (2009). Thus, we need 

to stop voting rights violations before they occur. 

Reporting on voting rights violations poses special challenges for the estimated "46.2 

million people, or IS percent of the US. population, [who] reside in rural counties" 

Hope Yen and Hannah Dreier, Census: Rural US loses population/or the first time, 

Yahoo News (J une 13, 2013), http://news. yahoo. com! census-rural-us-loses-populati onfirst -time-040425697 .html. 

The following hypothetical situation is based on a composite of actual experience 

encountered by our members in rural communities. It features Larry and is used to 

illustrate the barriers and challenges to voting faced by people who live in rural 

communities, and the impact on someone who is denied his rightful chance to vote. 

Larry, 38 years old, married, father often-year-old twin boys, and a minimum wage 

factory worker, drives with his family twenty-five miles from his rural community to his 

polling place to vote. On the way, Larry stops for gas and pays $3.67 a gallon for regular 

unleaded gas, the current national gas average. After purchasing $25 for gas for only 6.81 

gallons, the family proceeds to the polling place. 

It is now 1000 AM. Larry and his wife decide to each take a child into their respective 

voting booths. His wife goes into hers but before Larry can make it to his, a poll worker 

stops him. The poll worker tells Larry that his name is not on the voter roll. 

Unbeknownst to him, his name had been removed because his voter identiiication card 

was returned as undeliverable (as happened and was ruled unconstitutional in Us. Stude/li 

Ass 'II Found. e/ al. 1'. Land el aT.). Larry and his wife registered to vote last year during a 

door-to-door registration drive in their rural community. 
113 

Unable to vote or convince the poll worker that he is eligible to vote even though his wife 

was able to, Larry and his family return home, having driven fifty miles round-trip, only 

to have one of two votes counted for the family. 

Larry and his wife sit at the kitchen table and ponder what to do. They are unaware that a 

Section 2 complaint is filed with the United States Department of Justice. The United 

States Department of Justice's website instructs people to "contact the Voting Section at 

Voting.Section(cv.usdoj.gov to make a complaint concerning a voting matter." The 

"Voting.Scclion(a).usdoj.gov" link is an email address. Even if they were aware, they 

could not send the email from their home. 

The rural area Larry's family lives in does not have Internet access. Why? 

National private cable providers are either refusing to provide Internet service to rural 

areas or planning to install it one or two roads a year. Bruce Hall, the owner of Freedom 

Wireless Broadband, explains, "The problem is that many people live away from cable 

lines which could provide broadband (internet access). Com cast and Verizon can offer to 

build a line in order to provide broadband, but the cost to build the line to provide the 

service is astronomical. The broadband company would likely never recoup the costs. It 

costs whatever it does to build that network and (broadband providers are) not ever going 

to make it back in that monthly charge." Kelcie Pegher, Rural areas struggle to/ind 

internet providers, The Daily Record (Feb. 26, 2013), 

http://thedaily record. com/20 13/02/26/rural-areas-struggle-to-tind-internet -providers/. 

Some communities have attempted to establish their own public Internet companies and 

have seen their efforts thwarted or complicated by cable companies working in tandem 

wi th state I egi sl atures. 

In May 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly, heavily influenced by Time Warner 

Cable, passed its bill entitled "An Act to Protect Jobs and Investment by Regulating Local 

Government Competition with Private Business" that will allow "Time Warner Cable [to] 

build networks anywhere in the state but the public sector is limited to its political 

boundaries or very close to them. A public network must to [sic] price its communication 

services based on the cost of capital available to private providers. This means that if a 

city can borrow at a lower rate it cannot use this lower cost to otTer a lower price." David 

Morris, Why is Mighty llme Warner 5,'0 Scared of llny SalisbUlJ!, Ne?, Hutlington Post 

(June 24, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-morris/time-warner-publiccompetition_b_883223.htmI.SO. Time Warner Cable can refuse to expand its internet 

service to rural communities in North Carolina and these same rural communities who 

want to build an infrastructure themselves cannot or will be hindered by the law's 

geographical or rate restrictions. 

A few hours later, Larry and his wife try to recall a local community citizen's organization 

that could possibly help but one does not exist in their community. It is now 2 PM and 

both have to work in the morning at the local factory, so they scratch the idea of driving to 

an organization in a neighboring county. Besides, it would require more gas to drive the 

sixty miles to reach the organization's otlice. 
114 

His wife suggests they call a neighbor who lives two miles away and has dial-up Internet 

or travel twenty-five miles to the closest library. They decide to call the neighbor and 

Larry is invited over. Larry sits down at the computer and the dial-up connection fails to 

connect. The neighbor tells Larry to give it five or so minutes and the connection is slow. 

Once online, Larry doesn't know where to go. 

If Larry did, he would have to go to or use a search engine to find 

the site. Once there, he would have to first find on the homepage where the link to 

"submit a complaint" is under the "Department of Justice Action Center" section. 

Second, he would have to know to click on the link. Third, he would have to scroll down 

to find the "voting rights discrimination" link and know to click on it. Fourth, he would 

come to a page titled "How To File A Complaint" and either click on the "Voting 

Section" link at the top of the page or have to scroll down to the very bottom to find the 

"Voting" section. Fifth, Larry would read that he "can register a complaint [by sending] 

an email message to the Voting Section at Votin2.Scction(qlusdoj.gov." Even for a 

computer savvy person, successfully completing all these steps might prove to be 

daunting. 

Let's say that Larry completed all the aforementioned steps. Larry may see the word 

"complaint" and believe he is unprepared to compose a formal email explaining why he 

was denied the right to vote. Furthermore, he may not have an email address because it 

hasn't made sense to have one since he does not have Internet access at home and 

therefore no computer. 

So, Larry heads back home. It is now 5:00 PM. 

Larry decides to call a local attorney to ask for assistance in filing a complaint. The 

attorney's otlice is thirty-five miles away and his law firm specializes in local civil and 

criminal law, not civil rights law. Despite this fact, the attorney invites Larry to his otlice 

but informs him that he will be charged $75.00 an hour for the consultation and drafting of 

the complaint. 

Larry gives up. He also decided not to vote in the local school board election that 

occurred ten days later. 

These are typical situations faced by our diverse rural, farm member communities in rural 

areas around the country. 

Although Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in Shelby that "voting discrimination still 

exists; no one doubts that," some members of Congress appear to be against working in a 

bipartisan effort to update the Voting Rights Act. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2620. Senate 

Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) called the Voting Rights Act "an important 

bill that passed back in the '60s at a time when we had a very different America than we 

have today." Susan Davis, Congress Unlikely to act on voting rights ru/;ng, USA Today 

(June 25, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/20 13/06/25/congress-
115 

reacts-voting-rights-rulling/24564 77 I. Rep. Goodlatte (R-V A), chairman of the U. S. 

House Judiciary Committee, said that even though Section 4 has been ruled 

unconstitutional, "it's important to note that under the Supreme Court's decision in Shelhy 

County (v. Holder) other very important provisions of the Voting Rights Act remain in 

place, including Sections 2 and 3." Tom Curry, Conservatives not keen on effort to revise 

key sectiun u/Vuting Rights Act, NBCNews (July IS, 2013), 

http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/ _ news/20 13/07 /1S/1954093 S-conservatives-not-keen-oneffort-to-revise-key-section-of-voting-rights-act?lite. Section 3 also requires judicial 

intervention to impose preclearance requirements on a jurisdiction that enacts 

discriminatory voting procedures or laws. What Sen. McConnell, Rep. Goodlatte, and 

others fail to consider, however, are the geographical distinctions that create different 

challenges for voters in urban and rural areas. 

Participation in the voting process is especially critical for rural and farm communities 

because the lack of resources in these areas often correlates directly with lower 

engagement in the voting process and voter turnout Not only do our votes need to be 

counted, but our children need to see us vote in person. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

While Section 2 may provide tools to remedy discrimination for those with the resources 

to access legal assistance and the courts, it is not sufficient to prevent discrimination and 

other tools must be provided to assist communities such as those mentioned here. 

Renewing preclearance and other administrative options that can be used in a proactive 

matter is essential to the protection of voting rights. Section 4 needs to be reviewed, and 

expanded to more areas and situations. Below are some of our recommendations and we 

urge the committee to seek additional input and work quickly to renew this important 

section of the law. 

(1) A new preclearance formula for Section 4 ofthe Voting Rights Act should be 

created by the U.S. Congress. Chief Justice Roberts noted in Shelhy, "Congress 

may draft another formula based on current conditions." We believe this formula 

should include new factors, including data on changes in election participation 

rates as compared to population by race, gender, age and ethnicity data from 2006 

to the present Review factors should include all or parts of US. States that have 

been previously required to have preclearance, or which have a persistent record 

of racial discrimination at the polling places. Whether rural communities have 

real access, including Internet access, to the voter registration system in place in a 

particular locality should also be a factor. 

(2) The section should mandate that citizens who believe their voting rights have 

been violated based on race, age or other factors, may file a petition either on 

paper or online, and the U.S. Department of Justice should be required to 

invoke preclearance based on the receipt of such petition. This option would 

allow citizens to report voting rights violations and to mobilize others to sign-on 
116 

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so voting rights violations can be addressed immediately through an 

administrative process. 

(3) The U.S. Department of Justice should create an ombudsman position to 

solely investigate and address complaints of maladministration or voting 

rights violations. A voter who believes their rights have been violated should be 

able to immediately call the ombudsman on election day on a toll-free number 

with access to a fully staffed office that is open 24-hours a day to submit voting 

rights complaints. This office should also be open throughout the year. 

(4) A "Voter Bill of Rights" should be created and posted in all registrars' offices 

and in each polling place that includes what a citizen can do if he or she is 

denied the right to vote. These options should include clear information on what 

to do to submit provisional ballots, and on using the U.S. Department of Justice's 

website to file a complaint or having a phone number that can be called 

immediately to file a complaint. Furthermore, the U.S Department of Justice 

should provide a more user-friendly way for people to report voting rights 

violations on its website. The link to the "Voting Section" should be placed in a 

more prominent location and the "Voting Section" should have its own web page 

within the site. On that page, it should be explained that people without Internet 

access can submit a complaint by calling the department. 

(5) The U.S. Department of Justice should keep records of the locations from 

which all complaints, whether by phone, mail or electronically, and be 

mandated to investigate and invoke preclearance in areas where complaints 

exceed a set level that should be specified in the revision ofthe law. 

The Rural Coalition, born (!fthe civil rights and anti-poverly rural movements, has worked 

/br 35 years to assure that diverse organizations/i'om all regions, ethnic and racial groups 

and gender have the opportunity to work together on the issues that (!ifect them all. The 

foundation ()f this work is strong local, regional and national organizations thal work to 

assure the representation and involvement of every sector ()f this diverse fabric ()f rural 

peoples and commullities.