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i 

82–463 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–48] 

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE 

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC—IMPLICATIONS 

FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND 

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 17, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 17, 2013, The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic—Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Policy Options ............ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 17, 2013 ....................................................................................... 37 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 2013 

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC—IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Abrams, Elliott, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 3 

Hof, Ambassador Frederic C., Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the 

Middle East, Atlantic Council ............................................................................. 5 

Yacoubian, Mona, Senior Advisor, Middle East, The Stimson Center ................ 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Abrams, Elliott ................................................................................................. 45 

Hof, Ambassador Frederic C. ........................................................................... 53 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 41 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 43 

Yacoubian, Mona .............................................................................................. 67 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 83 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 93 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 87 

(1) 

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC—IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 17, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, 

ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

to receive testimony from independent experts on the security situation in Syria. Today we have with us Ambassador Fred Hof, Mr. 

Elliott Abrams, Ms. Mona Yacoubian, and they are going to provide 

their insights into the conflict in Syria. Thank you all for joining 

us here today. 

We are now in the third year of the conflict in Syria. The United 

States estimates that at least 93,000 Syrians have died. Additionally, the Obama administration has finally confirmed the Intelligence Community’s assessment that the Assad regime has used 

chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, against the opposition multiple times in the last year. With the now verified use 

of chemical weapons, a stated red line by the Obama administration, and a mounting humanitarian crisis, increased regional instability, spreading sectarian violence, the trajectory of the conflict in 

Syria appears to be heading in the wrong direction in an already 

unstable region, threatening U.S. interests. Moreover, a recent 

string of military gains by the Assad regime, supported by Iran and 

Hezbollah, has fueled the perception that Assad is winning. Meanwhile, the United States has a largely incoherent and disjointed 

policy to address the situation in Syria. 

Whether one is in favor of or rejects the idea of U.S. military 

intervention in this crisis, it remains critically important that this 

committee continues to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 

military options that may be available to address the conflict in 

Syria, to include the objectives, limitations, and risks of each. Because the U.S. has vital national security interests at stake and 

our warfighters might once again be tasked with a complicated 

mission in a time of fiscal austerity, our panel of experts will provide further insight into the U.S. policy options, and I look forward 

to your testimony. 
2 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate our panelists 

being here. I look forward to their testimony and any ideas they 

have on how to deal with what is an enormously complex series of 

challenges. I think the chairman laid out correctly how important 

the region is and how large the humanitarian crisis is right now 

in Syria. An increasingly ethno-sectarian civil war has led to 

deaths of nearly 100,000 people. Millions more have been displaced 

or fled Syria. The Assad regime is brutal to its own people, not legitimate. 

We need a legitimate government in Syria, and I think we all 

agree on those points. The troubling thing is what do we do about 

it. And I think one of the most important policy shifts that we need 

to understand as a country is the limitations on what the U.S. can 

do. Our military cannot simply plop down anywhere in the world 

and fix a situation. Oftentimes it can make it worse and certainly 

comes at great cost in terms of lives and in terms of resources for 

the U.S., and my personal opinion is that Syria is one of those 

places we should be very, very careful about. 

I have not yet seen a plan that shows what our military can do 

to improve the situation. We do not have reliable partners in Syria 

that we can work with. It is a constantly changing, evolving, and 

difficult to assess situation. Sending arms into that does not strike 

me as a positive idea, and certainly, you know, military involvement on behalf of the U.S., I have not seen a plan that shows that 

that will improve the situation. 

Regrettably that leaves us with a diplomatic track. I mean, it is 

clear what we want. We want the Assad regime to step down and 

a reasonably stable government to replace it that has the support 

of the Syrian people, and that is easy to say, very difficult to 

achieve. We have important partners in the region, including Jordan and Israel. We should work as closely as possible with them 

to try and find a reasonable alternative, but this is going to be a 

difficult problem. I don’t see a solution to it anytime soon. I believe 

the U.S. just needs to be careful not to make it worse and not to 

leap before we look. 

But I look forward to the testimony of the experts to give us any 

further ideas on how we should proceed with our policy, and I 

thank the chairman for holding this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Each of you has a very impressive resume ́. I am 

not going to read it. But you have extensive knowledge on the subject that you are going to cover. We really appreciate you taking 

the time to be with us today. Let’s start with Mr. Abrams. 
3 

STATEMENT OF ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for this invitation. I will try to be brief. You have got my 

written testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. All of your written testimonies will be inserted 

in the record without objection. Thank you. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. There is a humanitarian disaster in 

Syria, we all know that. Nearly 100,000 people dead, about a million refugees, perhaps a million one, and perhaps 4 million displaced persons, and we are addressing that through U.N. [United 

Nations] agencies and other bodies. The question is whether we 

need to do more, whether to support the rebels or even use military 

force. In my view, the answer to those questions is yes because otherwise what we face in Syria is an Iranian victory, an Iranian victory that would be a great blow to U.S. interests. 

The continuation of the conflict is itself a threat to U.S. interests 

and U.S. allies. There are more than half a million refugees in Jordan, which is a potential source of great instability there, and it 

is growing. I remember talking to the King and others when it was 

100,000, 200,000, they feared it would be 250. Now the fear is of 

a million refugees. And as the conflict continues, more and more 

jihadis arrive in Syria, and we have to wonder about their role not 

just today but tomorrow, after the conflict, in Lebanon or in Jordan 

or on the Syrian-Israeli border. But I think the worst effect would 

be our defeat by Iran, and that is exactly how it would be seen in 

the region and around the world. On one side Iran, Hezbollah, and 

Russia supporting Assad, on the other side supposedly the United 

States, the Europeans, and our Sunni Arab friends in the Gulf supporting the rebels, opposing Assad. 

Does it matter who wins? I think it does because around the 

world but especially in the region our friends and our enemies are 

going to judge our willpower, and they are going to judge our influence, and they are going to judge our power by the outcome of this 

conflict. Should we prevail and the Assad regime be replaced by a 

Sunni regime oriented towards Syria’s Sunni neighbors like Jordan 

and Turkey, it is a huge defeat for Iran and Hezbollah and Russia. 

Such a defeat for Hezbollah, a terrorist group with global reach, is 

very much in our interests, but even more importantly the rise of 

Iranian power in the region would have been seen to be stopped 

if the Assad regime falls. That is hugely important. Syria is Iran’s 

only Arab ally. It provides Iran with Mediterranean ports and a 

land bridge to Hezbollah and Lebanon and through Hezbollah, a 

border with Israel. That all changes if Assad falls. 

What happens if we decide this game is not worth playing and 

the war goes on until Assad more or less crushes the rebellion? 

First, many more refugees threatening the stability of Jordan and 

Lebanon. Iranian ascendancy, strengthening Hezbollah inside Lebanon and strengthening Iran throughout the Middle East. An 

emboldened Iran, seeing a lack of American desire to confront it is 

logically more likely to become more aggressive in Bahrain, watch 

out for the future of the 5th Fleet, in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, which is heavily Shi’a, and in its own nuclear program. Surely 

a display of a lack of American willpower in Syria is going to per-
4 

suade many Iranian officials that we may say all options are on the 

table but in reality they are not. 

So what should we do to prevent an Iranian and Hezbollah victory? First, I do think we have waited too long to provide military 

help to the rebels, a view that in a sense I share with former Secretary of State Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Gates who 

over the past year before they left office favored that kind of aid, 

a position that the President rejected. I believe we should step up 

the flow of weaponry to prevent their defeat as the weaponry flows 

in from Russia basically to the Assad side. 

I know people say we have no side, there is just jihadis, and it 

is true that there are plenty of them there and more of them as 

time goes by. To me that is all the more reason to strengthen those 

on the rebel side who are Syrians and who are not jihadis, not only 

so that they win and win faster but so that they are more powerful 

when the conflict is over. 

I don’t favor, secondly, a no-fly zone. I think that is a formula 

for a long-term and difficult commitment of American military resources. What I do favor is a one-time strike at Assad’s air assets 

and air bases. If we eliminate or greatly weaken Assad’s ability to 

use air power, we will significantly tilt the battlefield toward the 

rebels. We will do it militarily, psychologically, and politically. That 

seems to be the position if the news reports are right, and they 

have not been denied, that Secretary of State Kerry recently took. 

There is an objection that this strike is impractical, can’t be 

done, too dangerous, air defenses of Syria impregnable. You know, 

my answer to that is, tell that to the Israelis who have been able 

to strike inside Syria three times that we know of. How is it possible that they can do it and we, with our stealth technology and 

with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, we can’t do it? I just, 

frankly, don’t believe it. 

Mr. Smith said he hadn’t seen a military plan. I think this committee should demand a military plan, secretly obviously, but if you 

haven’t seen a military plan, it is because the military doesn’t want 

to give you one. They should be forced to give you a sensible one, 

not with General Dempsey’s 700 sorties, frankly, but a serious one 

that looks at what the Israelis have done, and says here is what 

we can do. 

The second objection is we can’t act without a Security Council 

resolution. You know, we went through this in the Balkans in 1995 

and 1998, and President Clinton made I think what was the right 

decision in 1998 in Bosnia when he used American military power 

for national security and humanitarian reasons without a U.N. Security Council resolution. The question I would put is if for our national interests we need to do this, if that is the decision you reach, 

will you allow Vladimir Putin to stop you in the U.N. Security 

Council? 

This clock is not telling me my 5 minutes are up, but they must 

be just about up, so let me hope that I can address some of the 

questions that these comments give rise to, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for inviting me and inviting me to be part of a panel 

that is as distinguished as Ms. Yacoubian and Ambassador Hof. 

Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR FREDERIC C. HOF, SENIOR FELLOW, RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. HOF. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, members of the committee, 

thank you very much for inviting me today. I hope to be of some 

use to you in your deliberations. You have my statement, and I will 

follow the example of Elliott Abrams and just hit some of the highlights of mine. 

What are our national security interests in Syria? 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador—— 

Mr. HOF. Yes? 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you speak directly into the microphone? 

We are having a little trouble hearing. 

Mr. HOF. Is that better? 

The CHAIRMAN. That is better. 

Mr. HOF. Okay. What are our national security interests in 

Syria? What is it we want to achieve? How should we go about trying to get what it is we want? President Obama has suggested that 

it is the effects of regime-inspired chaos on Syria’s neighbors that 

engages, quote, the serious interests, unquote, of the U.S. in the 

Syrian crisis. Among these neighbors is a NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] ally, Turkey; a close security partner, Jordan; 

a country whose independence and well-being we have always tried 

to support, Lebanon; and a country where many Americans have 

recently made the ultimate sacrifice, Iraq. All of these countries, 

some more than others, are being swamped by refugees and associated resource and security problems by the Assad regime’s practice 

of hammering rebel-held populated areas with artillery, with aircraft, and occasionally even with Scud missiles. 

It is a terror campaign that makes no pretense of seeking military targets. The regime’s objective is that of a terrorist, to persuade civilians through the application of random deadly violence 

to make decisions at the expense of one’s enemy. Beyond the four 

countries being directly victimized by regime terror, Israel’s interests are engaged by the spillover of violence into the Golan Heights 

and the threat to Jordan’s security. Even Egypt, in the midst of its 

own chaos and turmoil, is providing a refuge to tens of thousands 

of Syrians. 

If our interest centers on allies and friends in the region, what 

are our objectives? Three—in my view, three come to mind. First 

would be the enhanced security and stability of regional allies and 

friends in the face of Syria’s chaos and the Assad regime’s tactics 

of mass terror; the second would be political transition in Syria 

away from the regime, including the removal from Syria of all Iranrelated military elements, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda affiliates; and, third, the replacement of the Assad regime with an inclusive national unity government, one committed internally to recovery, reconciliation, accountability, reform, and rule of law, one 

committed externally to regional peace and stability. Across the 
6 

range of these objectives there would be a constant updating of contingency plans related to weapons of mass destruction. 

Now, as I said, the key problem affecting allies and friends is the 

regime’s mass terror campaign against vulnerable populations. 

Ending it should be our top priority, and diplomacy is always the 

first weapon of choice. The U.N.’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria recently reported that the regime’s tactics, quote, constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 

gross violations of international human rights law, unquote. If we 

are not already doing so on an insistent, sustained basis, we should 

be urging Moscow to rein in its client. We should make it clear to 

Russia that if the terror campaign subverting our allies and friends 

does not stop, we will reserve the right to take steps we deem appropriate to secure our interests. 

To the extent we consider military options at all in connection 

with Syria, it should be, in my view, in the context of helping allies 

and friends secure themselves from the regime’s murderous tactics. 

We would not under any circumstances want American boots on 

the ground in Syria. We would not wish to consider unmanned or 

manned aerial systems entering Syrian airspace, and unless and 

until we are persuaded that the peaceful diplomatic campaign has 

run its course unsuccessfully. Even then we would still have the 

option of watching the terror campaign proceed unabated while 

pouring more resources into Syria’s neighbors so that they could 

better cope. 

We should keep in mind that no-fly zones would not address the 

biggest of the killers, artillery. We could not proceed with any kind 

of strike options without the full cooperation of Turkey, Jordan, 

and other key partners. Although U.N. authorization would not be 

possible, U.S. unilateralism is something to be avoided. 

As we pull out the stops diplomatically to stop the terror campaign, we should try to stabilize the situation on the ground by seeing to it that vetted rebel units in Syria get what they need in 

terms of military equipment, weaponry, and training, working 

through the opposition’s Supreme Military Council. The regime has 

a well-established record of conducting massacres in places it can 

reach on the ground. Most weaponry for the mainstream opposition 

will not come from U.S. stocks, yet the U.S. should be in charge 

of the process of determining who gets what. Will all weapons shipments without fail get to the intended recipients? No. No more in 

Syria than they did in World War II when air-dropped into occupied France. The jihadists and the regime are already armed to the 

teeth. The Syrian nationalists are the ones who need the help. 

Their ability to defend territory and reverse the current momentum 

will have a direct and positive impact on refugee flows. If objectives 

and strategy are key components of foreign policy, they are life and 

death items when it comes to military operations. If American diplomacy cannot stop the terror campaign, the President will need 

options to consider. He may well decide to focus on supporting the 

neighbors through increased assistance. To the extent he looks at 

military operations, he will want in the context of objectives to define the mission as narrowly as possible: To destroy or significantly 

degrade the ability of the Assad regime to terrorize civilian populations with artillery, military aircraft, and missiles. He will be in-
7 

terested in methodologies that minimize U.S. and collateral casualties, knowing full well there are no such things as surgical strikes. 

He will want to assess carefully the likely reactions of key players, 

the regime, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. He will want buy-in from 

at least two of the neighbors, Turkey and Jordan. He will want to 

avoid the proverbial slippery slope. 

Syria’s revolution is not, after all, America’s to win or lose. Once 

the mission is accomplished and the mass terror campaign either 

ended or reduced significantly, the direct military role of the 

United States would be ended. If Iran, for example, elects to intervene massively in Syria, sending its army across Iraq, obviously 

new calculations in the White House, the Pentagon, and elsewhere 

will be set in motion. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there should be no illusion in any event 

that military intervention will necessarily be a silver bullet and unintended consequences will be ubiquitous regardless of what one 

does or fails to do. Yet those who try to shut down the debate by 

demanding ‘‘tell me how it will end’’ should apply the same standard to alternatives, especially that of passively watching developments unfold. In an era of diminishing defense resources brought 

about in part by sequestration and at a time when a tiny percentage of Americans bear the burden of defending this country, we 

should not be going out of our way to search for ways to apply military force in various parts of the globe. If we elect to act with kinetic lethality in Syria, the objective should be tied tightly to the 

situations our allies and friends find themselves in as a result of 

the Assad regime’s survival tactics. 

The question is not one of the United States taking ownership 

of Syria’s future. That future belongs to Syrians. Our main task is 

to decide what we want and how to go about getting it, keeping in 

mind that supporting allies and friends is where American national 

interests are surely engaged in the case of Syria. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hof can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Yacoubian. 

STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN, SENIOR ADVISOR, MIDDLE 

EAST, THE STIMSON CENTER 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, for inviting me to speak this morning. I very much appreciate the opportunity to address the complex topic of the security situation in Syria and its implications for the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you the same thing, if you could 

move that microphone. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Okay. Is that better? 

The CHAIRMAN. That is better. Thank you. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Okay. I would like to make three points this 

morning in my first remarks. First, the Syrian uprising I think, as 

has already been noted, has evolved from peaceful protests to a sectarian civil war with significant regional spillover. The conflict has 
8 

resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. The military situation on 

the ground suggests that Syria’s civil war could endure for years. 

Over the past few months the Syrian Army has consolidated its 

control over some key areas. However, Syria will not return to the 

status quo ante. Vast swaths of Syrian territory remain largely out 

of the regime’s control and under the sway of proliferating armed 

groups. However, rebel groups remain unable to coalesce and continue to lack unified command and control structures. Radical elements have been gaining ground, imposing their harsh version of 

Islamic rule on civilian populations. Armed groups inside Syria are 

growing more fractious and have increasingly started to turn their 

arms on each other. Numerous reports indicate an increasing number of foreign fighters in Syria. The net effect of both regime and 

rebel actions suggests that Syria is entrenched in a protracted military stalemate with neither the regime nor the rebels emerging victorious. No military solution exists. Instead the resolution will have 

to be political, coming via negotiations. 

Second, the United States has significant national security interests in Syria. Syria’s geostrategic location, its growing importance 

as a jihadist arena, and its vast chemical weapons stockpile endow 

it with immense strategic significance. Syria borders several countries in which the United States has major equities—Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. The conflict’s outcome could directly impact 

their stability. Meanwhile, Syria is particularly attractive to 

jihadists, perhaps even more so than Iraq. It is a Sunni-majority 

country bordering Israel, affording jihadists a key opportunity to 

pursue their goal of a transnational caliphate that includes Jerusalem. The specter of jihadist elements or the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah gaining access to chemical weapons would 

constitute a key threat to U.S. national security interests. 

Third, while it is important to keep all options on the table, I do 

not believe the U.S. military should become further engaged in 

Syria at this point. Syria’s complexity cannot be overemphasized, 

and our on-the-ground knowledge of this conflict is very limited. 

The downside risks of various military options are considerable. 

While arming is perhaps the least expensive option and requires 

the lowest level of U.S. commitment, it is fraught with risk. Effective vetting is very difficult, despite our growing relationship with 

elements of the Syrian armed opposition. Arming could lock us into 

a dangerous escalation dynamic by provoking commensurate increases in arms to the regime. From a civilian protection standpoint, arming is perhaps the worst option, presenting the greatest 

risk of civilian harm. And finally, flooding Syria with arms today 

will make post-conflict stability and reconstruction significantly 

more difficult. 

Enforcing a no-fly zone or establishing humanitarian safe zones 

requires a much more significant investment of U.S. resources. The 

potential for unintended consequences would be high, as this option 

could be long and messy and still not guarantee civilian safety. The 

potential for mission creep is significant. Numerous questions arise 

surrounding the extent and duration of these options. Regime 

change in Syria could emerge as a necessary next step, dramatically increasing the stakes for the United States. While I remain 

skeptical about the effectiveness of military options, I do believe 
9 

that the limited use of force could be an effective lever for moving 

Syria towards negotiation. 

Circumstances could arise in which the limited use of force, specifically targeted air strikes, may alter the strategic calculation of 

key players on the ground and pave the way toward negotiations. 

Of course, the risks of air strikes are also significant. To minimize 

these risks, standoff weaponry should be employed. The use of surgical military strikes should necessarily be embedded in a wellconceived political and diplomatic strategy. 

To conclude, the United States cannot afford to ignore Syria, yet 

as Fred has also said, there is no silver bullet for resolving Syria’s 

conflict. Military options are not likely to be successful unless they 

are embedded in a broader coherent strategy. While this hearing’s 

focus is on the pros and cons of greater U.S. military involvement 

in Syria, the political and diplomatic dimensions of U.S. strategy 

toward Syria should take precedence. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for your very thoughtful comments. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian can be found in the 

Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I remain convinced that this is very, very complicated, and as I have heard from others, there is no silver bullet, 

there is no simple answer. People say we should use diplomacy. I 

have assumed that for the last 3 years we have been doing that, 

but I don’t know what progress has been made. People say that we 

should use military force. What would that be? Air Force standoff 

weapon strikes? All of those cost money and have risks. At a time 

when we are cutting a trillion dollars out of our defense, cutting 

back, you know, a third of our aircraft are grounded now, people 

are not—they are not up to speed. We couldn’t put a man in an 

aircraft right now and say go. If we launched some of these strikes 

and maybe killed some Russians that are there, how does that escalate it? If we do go in, how far are we willing to go? We are still 

in Afghanistan and supposedly negotiating a bilateral security 

agreement to leave some troops there. We know that if sequestration continues, we will be cutting another 100,000 force out of our 

Army. Of course, this is on Syria, we are not talking about Egypt, 

but that is also in the headlines now every day, and we saw, we 

see the problems with our precipitous leave from Iraq without leaving any force behind is now, you know, greeted every day with violence in that area. So the world is becoming more dangerous every 

day while we are cutting back our ability to do anything about 

these issues. 

So what I would like to ask, I think probably each of you agree 

that the U.S. does have national security interests. I would like if 

you could just briefly state what specifically are our national interests in Syria. You covered some in your opening remarks, but if we 

could just, you know, name two or three, that would be helpful, and 

do you agree that the administration could be doing more to secure 

U.S. interests within the conflict in Syria and that could include 

applying military resources, and what military courses of action 

should not be deployed and why? 

Mr. Abrams. 
10 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our national security 

interests include the stability of Jordan, a long-time ally, preventing jihadis and/or Hezbollah from getting control of Syrian 

chemical weapons, preventing the Syrian regime from using chemical weapons again, and I would add preventing an Iranian victory 

that leads many countries in the region, but particularly Iran, to 

the conclusion that the United States is withdrawing from the region and that it can safely advance its own interests, become a hegemonic power in the region and safely develop nuclear weapons despite our policy that it should not be permitted to do so. 

Do you want to stop there or address the question of what—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let’s do that one, and then we will—if you could 

come back to the last one. 

Mr. HOF. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think there is a range of national security interests here, and Elliott has mentioned several of 

them. To me, there is one in particular: The stability and wellbeing of allies and friends in the region. This I think is where the 

United States needs to hang its hat and put together a strategy 

that is focused on enhancing the stability and security of our allies 

and friends in the region. That can take you in any number of directions, but I think that there is absolutely no alternative other 

than to have an objective and an accompanying strategy, and I 

think our central interest here has to do with friends and allies. 

There are others, but the danger is if we adopt some of the others 

as the centerpiece of our objectives and strategy, we are more inclined, I think, to end up owning the problem. So I would—you 

know, my advice would be focus on allies and friends. That is the 

real national security interest here. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I would concur with both Elliott and Fred. I 

think in the case of Syria, it really does revolve around its 

geostrategic location. The fact that it borders so many key U.S. allies and that we are already seeing such destabilizing effects of its 

spillover, today alone I think the news reports said there were errant mortar shells that fell in the Golan, you had an assassination 

in Lebanon, continuing attacks in Iraq at a time when Iraqi stability is already so fragile following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. 

So I think from my perspective, I would agree, it is really where 

Syria is located, the fact that there is a significant chemical weapons stockpile there, and now a growing jihadi presence, the ability 

for this conflict to destabilize the entire region, a region which is 

of immense importance to U.S. national security interests I think 

suggests that it is of critical importance that we pay close attention 

to what happens in Syria. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I think you have made very good arguments to our national security interests so that we should be involved. Now militarily, what should we do and what shouldn’t we 

do? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my testimony, I worry 

a good deal about a no-fly zone. Mona touched on some of the same 

questions as to why a no-fly zone—we remember this from Iraq— 

can become an extremely long-lasting and expensive and dangerous 

effort. In my view there is an option for air strikes. I am 

unpersuaded by the U.S. military position right now that, you 

know, you can’t do anything until you have done in General 
11 

Dempsey’s words 700 air sorties to suppress Syrian air defenses. I 

think there is an option. I think you have not been given that option. I think the President has apparently not been given that option because the military for very logical reasons really doesn’t 

want to do that. But I think it exists. We have the power in the 

eastern Mediterranean, we have the 6th Fleet, we have bases in 

the region, and it just strikes me as really odd for us to be in a 

position of saying, well, the Israelis have the ability to do this, but 

the United States doesn’t. You would have to choose or obviously 

the military would have to choose what are the targets in terms 

of Syrian air power, and Fred has mentioned the question of artillery, but what are reasonable targets? If one were doing a one-time 

strike for political, psychological, and military reasons, what are 

the air bases? How many fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters could 

one damage in, let us say, 1 day of strikes? 

But I am struck by the message that we leave if after 2 years 

really the position of the United States is this is all awful but, you 

know, there really isn’t anything we can do, there is literally nothing we can do. The red line the President drew was supposedly 

turned into military support for the rebels, but we read in the 

newspapers that in fact there has been no military support for the 

rebels, so we are in the position of saying we have zero options. I 

don’t think that is a position the United States is actually in, and 

I think we should frankly be asking the military to come up with 

a plan that surely can be created. 

Mr. HOF. Well, Mr. Chairman, it has been—I did some quick 

arithmetic, it has been 23 years since I wore the uniform of the 

United States Army. I am a little bit reluctant, you know, to tell 

military experts how they should go about doing the job. What is 

essential here is that our military get some guidance from the 

Commander in Chief in terms of objectives and strategy. 

You asked if there are any particular applications of force that 

ought to be avoided. I think there is a broad consensus that avoiding the insertion of American boots on the ground is important. I 

can’t conceive of any contingency where American boots on the 

ground would be required or desirable in Syria. 

A no-fly zone, extraordinarily expensive, extraordinarily resource 

rich in terms of sustaining, and as I think I mentioned in my opening comments, it does not touch the one weapon of terror that is 

driving this crisis, and that is the use of field artillery against populated areas. I think I would suspect that if the President, Defense 

Department, Joint Chiefs take a careful look at one potentially 

good option, it would be a series of air strikes using to the maximum extent possible standoff weaponry aimed at eliminating or 

seriously degrading the ability of this regime to do the kinds of 

things that are putting our allies and friends in jeopardy. 

This is not necessarily a silver bullet. It doesn’t necessarily tilt 

the military balance on the ground significantly, but I think we 

have to keep in mind what the objective would be and in this case 

what the military mission would be. It would be to significantly— 

it would be to eliminate or significantly degrade the ability of the 

regime to conduct these mass terror operations, and it would be 

employed, in my view, only when we have satisfied ourselves that 

the diplomatic alternatives are just not there, just not working. 
12 

You asked, Mr. Chairman, or you commented about you presumed that diplomacy has been going on. To the best of my knowledge—and I have been out of this business in the U.S. Government 

since September of last year—to the best of my knowledge, the emphasis of our diplomacy with the Russians over the past several 

months has been on the potential reconvening of a Geneva peace 

conference. I don’t know the extent to which we have really been 

focusing with the Russians on what their client is doing inside 

Syria to imperil allies and friends of the United States. We may 

be doing it. I am not aware of it. My suggestion is if we are not 

doing it, that is really where the emphasis needs to be. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Just very briefly. Again, I would also be opposed 

to a no-fly zone because of the enormous costs, the downside risk, 

the potential for significant mission creep. As I noted in my oral 

testimony and also in my written testimony, I am also opposed to 

the option of arming the rebels for the very many reasons I laid 

out, primarily the concern and risk that arms could end up in the 

wrong hands, the potential for deeper escalation of the conflict, and 

we have already seen a significant doubling down of support by 

Iran and Russia to the regime. I would argue in part because of 

the small gains that the rebels were making. So I think we risk 

getting locked into an escalatory dynamic, but I also think it is 

very important to consider the negative effect on civilian protection 

that funneling more arms into a chaotic zone of conflict like Syria 

could have, and indeed I think if much of what we are talking 

about is understandably motivated by the moral outrage that I 

think all of us have at seeing the suffering of the Syrian people, 

I think civilian protection should be a critical element in any such 

decision. I, too, though, think that there is potentially a place for 

targeted air strikes, in part to degrade or—I don’t know about 

eliminate, but certainly degrade the regime’s ability to inflict harm, 

but I also think there is importance there, particularly if it is done, 

and I think it should be done, in alliance with others in the region 

or as part of a coalition to signal resolve about where our red lines 

are, what we are and aren’t willing to tolerate, and finally and perhaps maybe most importantly, I believe there could be potentially, 

depending on the choice of targets, the ability to use targeted 

strikes as a lever to try and shift the calculus of key players on the 

ground and perhaps move the conflict more toward one of negotiation because ultimately I think that is where it is going to have to 

go. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. In listening to this testimony, I think we 

are all trying to imagine a world that doesn’t exist, which is a 

world where we could, in fact, impact what is happening. As Mr. 

Abrams said, we want to win. I think that is true. I mean, there 

is no question that if the Assad regime survives as a close ally of 

Hezbollah and Iran, we would rather have the other outcome. We 

would rather Assad not be there, we would rather have a government in Syria that doesn’t support Hezbollah, that is not a close 

ally of Iran. We would rather have that. But what you have all 

made clear is what we would rather have is simply not on the 

table. I mean, it is not like, you know, these targeted air strikes 
13 

and all of this is sort of like saying well, we can’t eliminate the hornet’s nest, so let’s just put a stick in it to make ourselves feel better, you know, because we don’t like it, we can’t just sit here and 

do anything about it because targeted air strikes are not going to 

win, okay? You know, no matter what the target, a one-time air 

strike? I mean, you know, it is probably going to wind up killing 

some civilians. It might in a minor way degrade some of Assad’s 

ability, but it certainly isn’t going to put us in a position to win. 

All it would do is to some degree perpetuate the stalemate on a 

slightly different scale. So personally from everything that you 

have said and from what we have heard from the chairman, there 

is just no good option from a military standpoint that is going to 

move us towards the win that I think we would all like to have. 

It is not going to happen, you know. Assad has the support of Iran. 

I mean, we had a tough enough time stabilizing Iraq, and Iraq had 

limited support from Iran, but it didn’t have Russia there shifting 

the weapons. And that was when our military was much, much 

more well-funded than it is right now. So I think we need to get 

off of this notion that it is frustrating to do nothing, therefore we 

have to do something. You know, a ton of instances in life you 

make a mistake when you are just frustrated by not doing anything, so just lash out in a certain way. None of what has been put 

on the table here strikes me as helpful. 

So the question I want to ask is the one point that has been 

made that I completely agree with is our allies—Turkey and Iraq 

and Jordan and Israel—and, you know, what threatens them, what 

threatens them about what is going on in Syria. Well, one of the 

biggest things that threatens them is the refugee crisis, so dropping more bombs on the population isn’t exactly going to help the 

refugee crisis, you know, and I guess to some degree what I am arguing for here is to contain the insanity as much as we can to within Syria. It is also worth pointing out that Israelis’ military strikes 

have been very targeted, and they have been targeted to a specific 

purpose, to stop the shipment of weapons in one case to Hezbollah. 

I mean, we could do that, if there was a given cache of weapons 

that we didn’t want to go from point A to point B, we could hit it. 

But it wouldn’t in any way significantly degrade Assad’s ability to, 

you know, to fight the war that he is fighting. So the Israel example is not helpful at all in terms of what we would be capable of 

doing. 

What could we do and what should we do to try to contain this 

within Syria? Because the other point about arming the rebels and, 

Ms. Yacoubian, I agree with you completely, those arms are bouncing all over the place. I mean, there has been reports of some of 

the arms that has been helped that were supposedly going to the 

Free Syria Movement that wound up in the hands of the Assad regime, that wound up in the hands of jihadists. You know, shuffling 

more weapons in there also doesn’t help stabilize the region. How 

can we contain this so that it doesn’t—what can we do to help the 

refugees, what can we do to help Jordan because, you know, doing 

a little pin prick on the military side that clearly won’t put us in 

a position to win, and I personally feel having, you know, talked 

to the Pentagon extensively about this, won’t even really significantly shift the balance of power in any way that is advantageous 
14 

to us. If we can get off of that and think about what our strategies 

could be to contain it to Syria, to try to protect Jordan, to try to 

protect some of our allies, I would be curious, you know, what 

thoughts you have on that. 

Mr. Abrams, I guess we will start with you. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thanks, Mr. Smith. I have to say, I don’t think it 

is possible in the sense that if you have a country that comes 

under—let’s say Assad wins, comes under essentially Iranian domination because he will owe his survival to Iran. 

Mr. SMITH. Keep in mind, that is what existed up to 2 years ago. 

I mean, you mentioned, you know, Assad, his support for 

Hezbollah, his support from Iran, that was the status quo before 

this started 2 years ago. So we have lived in that world. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I would—— 

Mr. SMITH. Not happily, I will grant you, but we have lived in 

it. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Again, I don’t fully agree with that. Before this war 

broke out, yes, he had an alliance with, of sorts with Russia and 

with Iran, but his survival in power was not clearly and directly 

dependent on them and not just in aid. It is not just aid. There is 

an Iranian expeditionary force in Syria, there are Hezbollah troops 

in Syria, so he is directly dependent on them. If that is the situation in a country that is 74 percent Sunni, I think you will see a 

continuing outflow of refugees. 

Now, we can increase the aid to Jordan. I think, in fact, you have 

been very generous to Jordan. I would like to see more Gulf aid. 

They have now been very generous toward Egypt in the last couple 

of weeks. I would like to see the level of aid to Jordan increased, 

but you would be leaving a situation, I think, which is quite unstable because you would be leaving a regime there that had just 

slaughtered 100,000 of its own population, and the regime is still 

in power. Why would those people stay in that country under the 

domination of that regime when they could go to Sunni neighbor 

countries and try at least to have a safer life? I would also say, to 

be fair to me, I think, we are not talking about pin pricks. We talk 

about a one-time series of strikes on Assad’s air power. He was not 

initially using air power 2 years ago. He began to use air power 

when he needed it. 

Mr. SMITH. But you seriously think that a one-time strike, no 

matter how robust it is, would lead to the Assad regime losing—— 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think that a—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Or even significantly degrade their ability to stay in power? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think a one-time strike that largely eliminated 

Assad’s air power and his ability to use those bases as well for a 

period of time would affect the military balance. If he didn’t need 

to use air power, he wouldn’t be using it. That is my thought. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. HOF. Well, Mr. Smith, I think you have, you know, you have 

articulated some reservations here that do illustrate the central 

point. You know, there are no silver bullets here, and in the context of Syria, which is really the classic problem from hell, this is 

largely a matter of choosing the least worst of some unpalatable options. Those of us who are suggesting that the Commander in Chief 
15 

and the military consider some military options here really are not 

doing so, sir, out of a sense of frustration or out of a desire to have 

to be seen to be doing something. We have an objective problem 

here affecting allies and friends in the region. There are 1.8 million 

refugees now. The U.N. is estimating that that number could easily 

double by the end of this year. This problem is being driven by 

something very specific. It is the regime’s survival tactic of choice, 

which is to use massed fires, both from the ground and from the 

air on populated areas that are beyond its physical control. Now, 

would a series of air strikes necessarily decisively affect the balance in Syria and lead to military victory by some other side? Probably, probably not. But is this the American objective here? Is it 

the American objective to win a military victory in Syria, to take 

ownership of the Syrian revolution? I don’t think it is. I think we 

need to focus very closely on what the objective would be here. If 

we come to the conclusion that diplomacy is not really going to 

work—— 

Mr. SMITH. Sorry, if we could skip to the really critical part of 

what you just said—— 

Mr. HOF. Yeah. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. And say what you think that objective 

would be, since it is not, not winning. 

Mr. HOF. Yeah. 

Mr. SMITH. What would that objective be? 

Mr. HOF. I think the objective would be to destroy or seriously 

degrade the ability of the regime to do this campaign of mass terror. It would entail destroying significant amounts of artillery, air, 

and missile assets. Would it involve bombing civilians? Certainly, 

certainly not deliberately. Will there be collateral effects? Of 

course. Any of us who have ever served in the military understand 

this. Collateral effects, American casualties should be assumed. 

There are no cost-free options here. 

Mr. SMITH. And my problem is at the end of that, you know, 

based on every military plan I have seen, the Assad regime still 

stands, the jihadis are still there, and maybe Assad is able to bomb 

fewer civilians. How many fewer I don’t know. At the end of that, 

what have we really achieved in terms of shifting the situation in 

any way out of the terrible situation that it is right now? 

Mr. HOF. We have probably given our allies and friends a period 

of relief. Whether—you know, whether or not it decisively affects 

the situation on the ground, I don’t know that anybody could predict that. 

Mr. SMITH. The other question about this is, as has been pointed 

out, Hezbollah is sending stuff to them, Iran is sending stuff to 

them, Russia is sending stuff to them, and we go in, you know, 

take out 50 of their aircraft. What is to stop, you know, Russia 

from selling them 50 more? What is to stop Iran from sending another brigade in? 

Mr. HOF. Yeah, it would probably be difficult to resupply if, you 

know, if associated support systems are engaged, air fields and so 

forth. But, look, it is not our job to secure a military victory for the 

Syrian revolution. If Assad is actually going to be better off without 

an Air Force, without helicopters, without major parts of his missile force, with major parts of his artillery gone, so be it. I don’t 
16 

think he is going to be in a better situation. That is not the same 

thing as predicting that this is the long sought silver bullet. 

If I could make just one comment on the arming of rebels. I agree 

entirely that Syria is awash in arms, but look where they are located. The regime has just about everything it needs. The jihadists, 

largely with support from private sources in the Gulf, have a great 

deal. Who are the people that are looking for support here? They 

are the folks in the middle. They are the Syrian nationalists who 

are actually trying to produce a decent result here. Sure, we and 

our allies can cut them off, but what does that do? What does that 

do for them? What does that do for us? 

Mr. SMITH. It is not a matter of cutting them off. 

Mr. HOF. I suppose if we want the violence to stop, one alternative here, I guess, would be a regime victory, but I don’t think 

that that is the kind of result that is going to be good either for 

Syrians or their neighbors. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am sorry, I am going to stop my time now. I 

know there is other people want to speak. I am taking way, way 

too much time. I am sure other questions will come up that Ms. 

Yacoubian can address. I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me at least initially change the subject briefly. A couple of you have mentioned 

the chemical weapons. I appreciate the fact if there is a complete 

collapse and chaos that involves Jordan, Turkey, Israel, the biggest 

issue we could imagine, if, as most people say, this thing is going 

to stalemate most likely for the foreseeable future, it seems to me 

that the chemical stockpile and especially the chemical weapons 

getting in the hands of the jihadists is the greatest direct national 

security danger that we face, and yet at least a couple of you said 

never any boots on the ground, under no circumstances, et cetera, 

et cetera. So talk to us a little bit about how you see this chemical 

weapons stockpile, the danger it poses to us, and are there no circumstances under which limited military action, maybe even boots 

on the ground would not be appropriate to prevent attacks against 

the homeland or attacks against our allies in Europe or the region? 

Mr. HOF. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. I guess I will start. 

Chemical weapons in the hands of jihadists would definitely be 

a bad outcome here. Chemical weapons in the hands of a regime 

willing to use them against the people of Syria is the circumstance 

that is staring us in the face right now. And to me, this is the most 

alarming of circumstances because it is an actual fact. And it is one 

of the reasons perhaps—in the mind of the President of the United 

States, it is probably the central reason why he sees a transition 

from the Assad regime to something better as essential. 

In terms of the specifics of how this would be handled and 

whether or not there would be contingencies potentially involving 

American boots on the ground, I have to say, Congressman, I am 

skeptical even in those circumstances. But I think that this is probably a question better addressed to the Department of Defense in 

closed session. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Anybody else choose to weigh in on that? 
17 

Mr. ABRAMS. Just to say that I have to assume that there have 

been—and there have been some press reports—that there have 

been lengthy discussions between the U.S. military and the Israeli 

military about this question. And there is a question as to what the 

Jordanians or Israelis or Turks might be able to do directly, maybe 

with help from the U.S. that would avoid a direct U.S. military role 

in that. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Maybe just very briefly, I mean, my understanding is that in terms of boots on the ground, it would potentially require a significant commitment of forces. I have heard 

70,000 or 75,000, which is obviously no small number. Unfortunately I think the options are quite limited. Beyond the thought of 

working with allies, there is also the potential of working through 

groups that we are training and working with now in covert programs. 

But I would also, if I could, just take a moment to talk or bring 

the conversation back briefly to the question of targeted strikes. 

One, there is also the thought—although if the stockpiles are transferred or loss of control takes place, I think that leaves one with 

very few options. But there is the thought of potentially using targeted military strikes to disable delivery systems of such weapons. 

But I think for Mr. Smith’s benefit, I just wanted to slightly differentiate my position on targeted strikes. That I see them, again, 

as something that would have to take place as part of a broader 

political strategy. And from my perspective, it is not so much the 

military value of such strikes but rather the question of whether 

the use of targeted strikes could alter the calculus of key players 

on the ground, those who are currently supporting the regime, to 

disavow support for the regime. Is there a way—and it is a very 

open question—that targeted strikes could be employed in the use 

of a broader political strategy to try and seek negotiations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you 

for being here. 

If I could pick up on what you were just saying, Ms. Yacoubian. 

In terms of a broader strategy, one of the things that we know is 

that we didn’t necessarily entertain the question of what next when 

it came to Iraq particularly. And where have you seen those discussions occurring now? I mean, to what extent—we have talked a little bit about what a post-Assad regime would look like. It is probably pie in the sky right now to think exactly in terms of that. But 

what kinds of discussions should we be having right now that we 

are not having? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Thank you for your question. I think we have 

to, one, start to think more creatively to the extent possible. I think 

we all agree it is absolutely a problem from hell. I think we all 

agree frankly on the analysis with regard to the situation on the 

ground. The question is, how do we get to some place. And unfortunately I think at this point, a democratic, multi-confessional, inclusive Syria just does feel like a very far off ideal. But at a minimum, 

how do we try to minimize Syria’s spillover? And how do we think 

more, frankly, creatively about external players? And I do think 

Russia has a very important role to play. There has been no small 
18 

amount of time, I know, and effort devoted to trying to sort of pull 

the Russians around. I understand the frustration that that has 

yet to yield much. I still think it is a very important venue to continue to pursue. I do think we have to think a bit more about Iran 

and its role. It is a key—perhaps the staunchest supporter of the 

Assad regime. I don’t know what the answer is. Is there a way to 

bridge some of these deeper regional security concerns, whether it 

is Iran’s nuclear capabilities and its role in Syria? I just think that 

when we talk about the projection of U.S. power, we think largely 

in military terms. And I think we really need to be thinking more 

in terms of leadership, our role as the key global power, how can 

we do more to sort of coalesce a group of key allies, including Russia, who is not an ally but has a key role to play in this. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I want to move on. Mr. Ambassador and 

then Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. HOF. It is an excellent question. And the issue of what is 

next in Syria, what follows this regime is all important in my view. 

I think we need to approach this first of all with a sense of modesty. There is no way the United States is going to be able to 

micromanage an end result in Syria. This is not something that we 

are going to be able to control. Can we influence it around the 

edges in constructive ways? I would say that if we don’t try our 

best, the answer is going to be inevitably no. I don’t think we 

should start from a sense of hopelessness here. I think the Syrian 

opposition, the mainstream opposition is in the process right now 

of establishing an executive council of some kind that is going to 

try to establish itself on Syrian territory in liberated zones. I think 

this is something the United States really needs to follow up on. 

Until there is an alternate government on Syrian territory, a government that pulls together people who are, indeed, dedicated to 

the idea of one Syria, a nonsectarian Syria, a Syria of citizenship 

and rule of law, until that exists on the ground, people who are 

still supporting this regime because they don’t know what the alternative is will continue to support the regime. So in my preferred 

strategy, that is a key direction to go in. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Abrams, I am sorry, you only have 

22 seconds. But I hope you can do that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I will be brief. 

I think the problem is that those kinds of people who Fred Hof 

is talking about are not getting money and weapons from the Gulf. 

The more extreme elements are. And we are not backing those people—Syrian nationalists—with anything like the—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. For the record, do you have metrics that you would 

suggest in order to actually vet those groups? I mean, do you think 

that we are looking at that? For the record. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

each of you for your contribution to this discussion. This is somewhat of a difficult one because I agree with—Ms. Yacoubian. 

Is that close at all? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. It was perfectly fine. 
19 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. On the fact that we have a problem on 

the issue of the projection of power being a deficiency of leadership. 

I want to follow up on what Mrs. Davis was saying. We see that 

Hezbollah is relevant in Syria. Iran is relevant in Syria. Russia is 

relevant in Syria. And because of the vacuum of leadership that we 

have in the United States, it seems as if we are not relevant in 

Syria. I don’t know that anyone could clearly state what the articulated policy of this administration is with respect to Syria. And 

therefore, the options of what we should do are obviously difficult 

to conclude. 

So my question is going to have two parts. First, I think each of 

you are advocating that we do need to be relevant and that certainly we don’t want an outcome where Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia are the determining relevant players without American leadership. And in doing so, then I would like if you could give us some 

sense of what should our goal be. Obviously there are a number of 

options as to what the goal should be—secure weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, some argue regime change. In Libya, 

it was an issue of—the articulated goal was to protect civilians 

from mass murder. What in your eyes as we see this situation 

should be the articulated policy of the United States? 

And then secondly, Mr. Abrams, I am very concerned with the 

prospect of—you had indicated, you know, with a robust strike, we 

could significantly diminish Syria’s capability both air and their 

military bases. I was a significant critic of the administration’s policy in Libya because of the concern that it could result in the weapons stockpiles in Libya becoming unsecured. We did see later that 

that was one of the results. 

So I am concerned that an action of robust strike or no matter 

how limited it might be might actually have that same outcome, 

that, in fact, by our diminishing Syria’s ability to secure its own 

weapons stockpile that we might create an issue, where, in fact, 

those weapons fall into the hands of jihadists or those who would 

pose us a threat. 

I would love your thoughts. Mr. Abrams. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. What should our role in Syria be? I 

mean, we have talked about the role of trying to help U.S. allies— 

for example, Jordan, Turkey, Israel—deal with the crisis in Syria. 

Inside Syria, I think the way I would put it is, our goal should be 

to prevent the continuation of power or installation of a hostile regime, hostile to us, and dependent on Hezbollah and Iran for its 

survival because such a regime is going to be a tremendously destabilizing factor permanently in the region. 

Just on your point on the air strikes. Yes, I think what happened 

there is we, in a sense, collapsed the government of Libya, and it 

was replaced by anarchy. So that gets us back to what I think Fred 

Hof was saying. One of the reasons for trying to establish an alternative government and build up its strength now is to prevent that 

moment or period of complete anarchy when there is no control 

over the Syrian military and military stocks. That is a risk that is 

run. I don’t think it is run by a series of air strikes that are aimed 

primarily at Assad’s air power. But I think it is run by a collapse 

of the regime if that collapse is followed by nothing, by anarchy for 

months. 
20 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Abrams. Ambassador. 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, in terms of what our goal should be in 

the context of Syria, number one, enhance the security and stability of our allies and friends in the region. Number two, transition, political transition away from this regime. Three, replacement 

of the regime with something decent. Those are broad goals. They 

have obviously got to be filled in with a detailed strategy—diplomatic and perhaps military—to go about it. The proliferation problem. Yes, it is there. But again, the biggest problem is the one that 

is staring us right in the face. A regime sitting on an enormous 

stockpile of weaponry, conventional and unconventional, and a regime that has a track record for transferring weaponry, including 

Scud missiles, to terrorist organizations. We need to look at contingencies, obviously; but we shouldn’t forget at all what is staring us 

right in the face with the current situation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

panel for what has been a very fruitful discussion. Obviously these 

are critically important issues to our national interest, and we certainly appreciate your contributions to this dialogue today. 

I think that the argument that has been raised today about some 

type of limited strikes have merit. And I take from your discussion 

here today the fact that it would, in fact, degrade Assad’s military 

capability in some way. I also believe, too, it seems to me that 

there is a strong psychological benefit to some type of a limited 

strike, is what I am hearing. 

Let’s face it, the rebels at one point were doing pretty well. And 

then with the Hezbollah coming into the region and some other 

things that have occurred, the tide has shifted. And now it seems 

that Assad’s forces are the ones that are dominating. And certainly 

that has had an effect on the rebels’ ability to coalesce and to fight 

with a coherent strategy. So it seems to me that it also would send 

a message to the nations of the region that the United States does 

see this as a vital national interest and that we do and are willing 

to put skin in the game. 

There is also the troubling fact that there have been approximately 100,000 people that have been killed in this conflict. And 

without some demonstrable action, it appears that the world community is willing to stay silent with that many people having been 

killed. I am also troubled by the fact that the Assad regime has 

used WMD [weapons of mass destruction] on its own people, and 

there has still been no demonstrable response on the part of the 

world community. And in my mind, that only appears to embolden 

them to keep doing it again. So I would disagree respectfully with 

the ranking member who would say that this is not going to have 

any benefit at all. 

Can you comment again further on its ability to degrade, a limited strike, degrade the Assad regime’s military capability but also 

the psychological benefit boost that this may give to the rebels but 

also the psychological effect that it might have on Russia being 

then forced to the table to help actually be willing to sit down and 

broker some type of a peace effort. 

Can you comment on the things that I have mentioned? 
21 

Mr. ABRAMS. If I can start, Mr. Langevin. I take your point, and 

I agree with the point. And I think that where we stand now is, 

if you are looking at this from the Iranian or Russian point of view, 

there is no American position. Are the Americans going to react if 

you send an Iranian expeditionary force into Syria? Apparently not. 

Are the Americans going to react if you use chemical weapons 

against the population several times over? Apparently not. So why 

should you give anything up at the negotiating table? There is no 

pressure on you. There is no American pressure. So I think this action would have that kind of impact. 

If your goal is a successful negotiation, it is more likely you will 

get one, I think, if we take that route. And it will also have an impact on the ground because, as I noted before, Assad did not initially use air power. That is something he started doing when 

things were going badly for him. And I, therefore, assume—and I 

think it is reasonable—that denying him the use of a lot of his air 

power would have an impact on the battle on the ground. 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, when John Kerry became Secretary of 

State, one of the central points he made about Syria was that having a Geneva negotiation of some kind is a really good idea. It is 

a good objective, provided one key thing happens. And that is, 

Assad’s calculation has to be changed. He has said this numerous 

times in numerous places, both publicly and privately. Changing 

Assad’s calculation. Right now, that calculation is changing. It is 

changing in the wrong direction. He has got Hezbollah and Iran all 

in. He has Americans debating whether the positive forces in Syria 

are worthy of any kind of support at all. I think in this case I 

would tie a military operation directly to a military mission. There 

may be additional benefits, but I wouldn’t necessarily count on 

them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here today. If you look back on the history of Syria, but for 

the chemical weapons, isn’t this just the latest iteration of a long 

process that these folks go through periodically either on their own 

or forced from the outside to reset the political structure within the 

country? The French tried in the 1920s to, in effect, set up a bit 

of a partitioning within the country. Can you talk to us about 

whether or not that is a rational approach to—going back to Ambassador Hof’s comments early on that the clearest national security interest articulated so far other than the chemical weapons is 

the chaos inside Syria and its impact on its neighbors. And so if 

we could get to eliminating that chaos within the country, would 

partitioning be a step in that direction? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Thank you. Maybe I will take a quick stab at 

that. 

My sense is that partition is not the way to go in Syria, that it 

would dramatically increase the already significant levels of human 

suffering, that you could see all kinds of instances of ethnic cleansing and other things. I think that the territorial integrity of Syria 

and maintaining its cohesion should be a key goal in all of this at 

the end of the day, that the end state of Syria should be a cohesive 

Syria that remains—— 
22 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Speak to this then: What does reduce the 

violence inside the country? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Well, again, I think from my perspective, this is 

a long—this is a very difficult issue. I mean, I would want to 

maybe take a little bit of issue with what you started your question 

with, which is how we got to where we are. I think we need to bear 

in mind that what has happened in Syria comes within the context 

of broader change that is sweeping the Arab world. It did start as 

peaceful protests. There is a significant yearning amongst the Syrian people to live peacefully and democratically and so on. My own 

sense is, though, that seeking to divide the country or allowing the 

divisions that are already permeating to take hold would not constitute—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Well, not necessarily quibbling over 

what triggered this latest dustup. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Conaway, I think one has to remember, it is 

a 74 percent, 75 percent Sunni country. There is no way that that 

minority Alawite regime allied to the Shi’a Iranian regime is going 

to be able to remain in power except through brute force. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

President Obama said using chemical weapons was a red line. 

The press has reported—open source reporting—that chemical 

weapons have been used. The chairman said that he thinks the administration is about to confirm that. 

Being that the biggest player on the field shouldn’t bluff, if it has 

actually happened or happens in a big wide-scale event. Let’s clearly eliminate the question as to whether or not it has actually happened. Let’s say he throws it at one of the opposition’s strongholds 

in a big event. What would be your advice to the administration? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the President should prove that he was not 

bluffing. And whether it is through a very substantial provision of 

arms to the rebels or direct military action by the United States, 

I think the regime has to be harmed. It needs to be damaged so 

that it learns a lesson that this is not going to be tolerated and 

that it will come out worse if it does it again. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. HOF. I think, Congressman, that back on June 13, the administration acknowledged openly that chemical weapons have 

been used. This is a hard conclusion that people have come to. You 

know, there are some lingering questions about chain of command 

and all of that. But chemical weapons were used. The administration said that its response was going to be to increase significantly 

assistance to the armed opposition. I believe that has been translated into a desire for weapons targeted to vetted elements of the 

Syrian armed forces. I definitely think that needs to happen and 

quickly. And more importantly, the United States, I think, has to 

play a central role, kind of an umpiring role in deciding who gets 

what from major sources because under no circumstances will 

weaponry coming out of American sources be the major source of 

weaponry. We need to play a big role in deciding the stuff that is 

coming out of Gulf countries and elsewhere. Where is it going? 

Make sure it goes to people that we want it to go to. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
23 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I 

want to pick up on your answer and sort of looking at the next 

steps. If the administration’s stated objective is to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Syrian conflict that involves President 

Assad stepping down, then as we are looking at which weapons go 

where, we are going to potentially be dealing with all the groups 

that are involved, what steps should the United States take in our 

engagement with these opposition groups and regional actors to increase the likelihood of this post-conflict transition process that will 

lead to stability in Syria? Are we then saying that these groups get 

some of these arms, these don’t? How do we do that? 

Mr. HOF. Yes. Thank you for your question. It is a rather complex process of picking and choosing. For quite some time now, various departments and agencies of the United States Government 

have been diligently involved in trying to determine who inside 

Syria needs to be supported, okay. Over the last several months— 

indeed, over the past year, a real track record has been established 

in terms of providing nonlethal assistance to various groups, individuals inside Syria. So it is not as if we are flying blind here. 

Okay. I think that the vetting has been thorough. As I mentioned 

earlier, if we expect 100 percent success, it is just not going to happen. It is inevitable in a complex operation of this kind that some 

things will get to the wrong people. But the wrong people, believe 

me, are already flush in weaponry. 

I think the key element here, beyond providing arms, is working 

with allies to make sure that supplies coming from elsewhere go 

to the right people. And then working very closely with the Syrian 

opposition, as difficult as that is—and believe me, I know how difficult it is—to get an alternate government established on liberated 

Syrian territory. This will be the key step to trying to influence a 

decent outcome in Syria. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Well, but opposition groups have refused to 

even participate in the Geneva II peace conference. So is it reasonable to have an expectation that we think that we can influence a 

level of change within this opposition so that they will all come to 

the table? Is that what you are saying, that we are going to tie access to resources to you must come to negotiations? Is that what 

you are saying? 

Mr. HOF. I am persuaded that Secretary Kerry and his staff will 

be able to persuade the Syrian opposition to attend a Geneva II 

conference, if such a conference comes about. I mean, we have to 

keep in mind the purpose of Geneva. It is transition from the current regime to a national unity body. Okay? If the opposition is 

convinced that that is the purpose and that is why people will get 

to Geneva and they will be able to exercise a veto basically—all of 

this is in the Geneva agreement—I am convinced the opposition 

will be there, that it will not permit the regime to show up and debate an empty chair. And I think Secretary Kerry can bring that 

off. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Abrams, did 

you want to add to this? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 
24 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I think that the Geneva process is certainly ultimately the way to go. But I personally am skeptical about the use 

of arms to sort of entice rebels to go, in particular because I think 

whether or not—even if we are able to coerce them to the table, I 

think the real question is, how much influence on the ground 

would those rebels that would come to the negotiating table have? 

And I think increasingly, we are seeing a situation in which more 

extreme elements, those associated with Al Qaeda and others, are 

having more and more impact on the ground. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of you have stated that one of the key threats in Syria are 

the stockpiles of chemical weapons I think falling into the wrong 

hands. I believe that Israel has done four air strikes by—well, it 

at least has not denied—four air strikes into the region to interdict 

the movement of weapons that they felt obviously that would fall 

into the wrong hands. We support Israel militarily through aid. 

Syria is on their border, clearly in their sphere of influence. All of 

you I think have stated in one form or another that Israel’s interests and U.S. interests are the same. So why is it then that greater 

U.S. involvement is needed, given Israel’s capability to intervene in 

the region? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Coffman, my answer to that would be that we 

are in a sense playing two different games here. Israel has a narrow goal, which is to prevent the movement of weaponry to 

Hezbollah. That is basically what they are doing. 

On the broader question of relations between Syria, Hezbollah, 

Iran, U.S.-Iran, U.S.-Russia, who rules Syria, what happens to Jordan, that in a sense is a higher level game that a superpower can 

play. But I don’t think you can say to Israel, look, you are in 

charge of the whole region, and you have got to determine the outcome of the war in Syria. I don’t think you can say to them that 

we are going to stay out of this, your job is to police Syria. 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, the only point I would add to that—and 

I am sorry if I sound like a broken record—chemical weapons in 

Syria are already in the wrong hands. They are in the hands of a 

regime that is neck deep in criminal activity and a regime that has 

a proven track record for proliferation over the years. So I just 

hope we don’t lose sight of that particular point. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Maybe I will just very quickly add, I think the 

Israelis have themselves said they have no interest in getting directly involved in Syria. I think they are very wisely protecting 

their own interests, doing what they feel they need to do when 

their red lines are crossed. But I think understand that, for them, 

I don’t think it is in Israel’s interest nor do I think it is in the region’s or our interests for Israel to become more directly involved 

in Syria. 

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of a resolution, I think all three of you 

dislike the notion of partition. And I served in Iraq in 2005–2006 

with the Marine Corps, and I know that it was floated in the Congress at that time about partitioning Iraq. And there were whole 

provinces that fell on one side of the sectarian divide or another. 
25 

But Baghdad had communities certainly that were on one side or 

the other. But Baghdad was a mix between Shi’a and Sunni. I understand in Syria that there are specific areas that are dominated 

by Alawites versus Sunni Arabs. Is there a viable solution that 

would, in fact, maybe even either divide the country or create sort 

of a loose federation, as in the case of Iraq with the Kurds and the 

Sunnis and the Shi’a? 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, I think if that kind of a solution is going 

to come about either on a permanent or an interim basis, it will 

be the product of events inside Syria. The key difference, of course, 

is in Iraq we were an occupying power. We actually had a good 

deal to say about the future of Iraq’s political shape. In Syria, an 

analogous situation does not exist. I agree with Mona Yacoubian 

that for Syria territorial integrity at the end of the day I think is 

important. But the key point is I think it is important to almost 

all Syrians. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY [presiding]. Mr. Johnson from Georgia, 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Abrams, I believe 

it was you that I heard earlier this morning talk about the fact 

that the U.S. should—I don’t want to say apply pressure. I am not 

sure that you used that terminology. But there should be some 

work to cause the Russians to become more responsible in terms 

of their support for the Assad regime. 

Is that a fair characterization? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I do believe it. I think actually it was Mona 

Yacoubian who talked more directly about that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

Ma’am, since you talked about that, let me ask you, what impact 

does the Edward Snowden drama have on our ability to encourage 

the Russians to change their behavior? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. That is a terrific question. And I have to confess, I haven’t thought about it in terms of the impact on Syria. 

But I think the extent to which there is greater mistrust—and it 

is already a fairly tortured relationship—can’t help in terms of our 

ability to work with the Russians or convince them. 

But I would say this, I do think in terms of trying to understand 

Russia’s calculations with respect to Syria, that whereas, I, as an 

analyst, and I think others had initially thought there was more 

common ground between the U.S. and Russia with respect to Syria. 

I think what I am seeing is that from the Russian perspective, the 

precedent of international intervention leading to the unseating of 

a regime is anathema. And I think they look to Libya as the prime 

example and seek to avoid that at all costs. So I think the extent 

to which there is greater mistrust in the U.S.-Russian relationship, 

the extent to which the Russians feel that they are somehow going 

to be led down a path that from their perspective leads to an outcome that is untenable, I think it makes it all the more difficult. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Either one of you gentlemen care to respond? 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, I think the only thing I would add to 

that—and again, it is an excellent question. And I hadn’t thought 

of the Snowden aspect of this either. 
26 

I certainly don’t think that there should be any sense of a tradeoff here. I think we need to be very, very, very direct in a professional way with the Russians, saying, look, your client is hurting 

our allies and friends. He is doing it in a way that is entirely gratuitous, a way that has no objective military purpose. It is terror on 

a mass scale. We want you to weigh in with your client and make 

it stop. 

Now whether or not Moscow has the objective ability to bring 

that about is another question altogether. Bashar al-Assad may 

just tell them, thanks for your views on national security, I am 

going to do what I feel like doing. But it seems to me at a minimum, at a minimum, this is where we really need to be pressing 

Moscow. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it your belief that the points that you have 

made have not been made by this administration to the Russian 

people or to the Russian leadership? 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, I don’t know the answer to that question. I think what I do know is that our emphasis with Moscow 

over the last 3 months or so has been on trying to resurrect the 

Geneva process and bring about a Geneva II conference. Whether 

or not there has been a specific sustained diplomatic campaign focused on the Russians and the behavior of their client, I honestly 

don’t know. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Anyone else want to comment? 

All right. 

Okay. Well, what will a relationship between the U.S. and Syria 

look like if Assad is able to retain power? 

Mr. ABRAMS. If Assad is able to retain power, I don’t think we 

can re-establish a relationship with him, not after the mass murders that he has committed, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 

100,000 dead, the use of chemical weapons. I don’t see that has any 

future. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Scott from 

Georgia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I had to step 

out for a minute. If you answered some of my questions, I apologize. 

But, Ambassador, you made the statement that Syria’s revolution is not America’s to win or lose. I wrote it down when you said 

it. And I agree with you. I don’t think that the crisis in that country rises to the level or national interest that we should intervene 

militarily. I think there is broad support for the humanitarian assistance, both from myself and from many others. And I think 

there is just a tremendous amount of agreement that we must support our allies—Israel, Jordan, Turkey—in that area. 

My concern from the testimony comes from the fact that each of 

the three of you have suggested that in some way, shape, or form, 

the U.S. could get involved militarily, whether it be with targeted 

air strikes or other things, essentially trying to carry out a mission 

of removing Assad. And you have also each indicated that we 

should not put boots on the ground. 
27 

So my question is, if the United States does not put boots on the 

ground to secure the chemical weapons that Assad currently has, 

who do you intend to have secure those weapons? 

Mr. HOF. I will take a stab at that, Congressman. I think over 

the past 18 months, the Department of Defense, in consultation 

with Israel and perhaps others, has conducted a very, very serious 

planning process that addresses that question in some detail. I am 

not familiar with the contours of that process, Congressman. And 

I think the question you are posing is an excellent one. I think it 

is probably better posed to the Department of Defense in closed 

session. And I would just add, speaking for myself as a former military officer, I am not looking for an excuse for U.S. military intervention in Syria as the first option, okay. My sense of priority has 

to do with our friends and allies in the region and how they are 

being swamped by the gratuitously violent terroristic campaign of 

this regime, okay. If an end to that can be brought about diplomatically, I am 110 percent in favor of that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ambassador, I apologize. We only get 5 minutes. 

If I could move though. Assad is a bad guy. Gaddafi was a bad 

guy but the U.S. made a decision to take Gaddafi out but not secure his weapons. And I think serious questions remain about 

where his weapons are throughout that whole region of the world 

now because we did not secure the weapons. And my question 

again gets back to, if Assad goes, what happens to the chemical 

stockpiles? And aren’t they more likely to end up in the hands of 

Hezbollah? And while Assad has used chemical weapons, certainly 

some of the people that are trying to get those weapons would use 

them—they are not going to sit on them. They are going to use 

them in a much broader and, I would say, immediately after they 

get those weapons systems. And they will hit Israel, and they will 

hit our other allies with them. So how do we secure the chemical 

weapons after Assad is gone? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Could I just jump in and say, in the case of Libya, 

he had nonconventional weapons. He had a nuclear program which 

we did secure. 

Mr. SCOTT. We secured it first. 

Mr. ABRAMS. First. So that prior to that sort of last act—at that 

point, you were talking about conventional weapons only but you 

were not talking about nuclear, chemical, or biological. 

Mr. SCOTT. That is right. And that makes this more complex. 

Mr. ABRAMS. It does. 

Mr. SCOTT. We secured them first. 

Mr. ABRAMS. The weapons were there. I would say, I think if 

Assad starts to move those weapons to Hezbollah, I think we see 

Israeli action, whether we like it or not. 

Mr. SCOTT. Sure. 

Mr. ABRAMS. If the regime falls, then I think that is the question 

that, like Fred Hof, I think the Americans, Jordanians, and Israelis 

and maybe the Turks have been talking about now for about a 

year, who does what to secure those weapons in case of anarchy? 

Mr. SCOTT. My point is somebody has got to put boots on the 

ground. And I want to make sure that it is the United States or 

our allies that are taking possession of those chemical weapons, to 
28 

destroy them, not somebody who is going to turn around and use 

them against those very allies that we are there to protect. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. Thank you for 

your testimony. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi from California for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I have I guess a legal question. Do 

air strikes amount to an act of war? Ambassador. 

Mr. HOF. Yes, I would say they do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. The Constitution says that then the 

U.S. Congress must authorize those strikes. 

Secondly, this area is fraught with many schisms—religious, tribal, and the like. There has been very little discussion here at this 

table about the Shi’a-Sunni schism, about the Alawites, the Kurds, 

even Christians. And I think we really need to take that into account as we try to figure out what to do here. One of our colleagues 

at an earlier hearing on this said, is it America’s role to be the executors of the defunct British Empire? Well, that is my question to 

you gentlemen and lady. Is that what we are really doing here? Are 

we trying to keep together something that the British put together 

essentially a century ago? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I will take an initial stab at that. I mean I think 

there are certainly concerns that with Syria, we are seeing potentially the unraveling of the Sykes-Picot agreement that organized 

the 20th century post-World War I, post-Ottoman Levant. And I 

think that would have very significant repercussions for stability in 

the region. So I view it more as a question of stability or, by contrast, the destabilizing impact of Syria’s current conflict. 

For me, I think one issue that we haven’t talked much about beyond the question of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, which is significant 

and I think you are now seeing as a result of Syria a zone of sectarian conflict that stretches from the Mediterranean to beyond 

Baghdad, in particular the Sunni-Shi’a dimensions of it. I also 

think we need to think very seriously about the disposition of the 

Christian minority in the Levant and in the Arab world more 

broadly who are feeling increasingly under threat. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Now that you are thinking about it, what are 

your thoughts? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Well, my thoughts are I think that we need to 

look for a Syria—and again, unfortunately, I think the Syrian opposition could and should do much more to attract members of the 

Syrian minority, the Christian minority in particular, as well as 

the Alawites. They, I think, have not really created a vision of a 

post-Assad Syria in which minorities would feel that they would 

not only survive but thrive. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Ambassador. 

Mr. HOF. I think, Congressman, there are plenty of Christians, 

Kurds, and even Alawites in the Syrian opposition. I think that opposition has said the right things about the future of minorities in 

Syria, about the need for a Syria in which Syrian citizenship 

trumps all other forms of political identification. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And this would be about as successful as our 

previous effort in Egypt. 

Mr. Abrams, your thoughts on this. 
29 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would refer to something I said before. It is a 74 

percent Sunni country. It is, therefore, natural that it would be 

ruled by Sunnis, we would hope with all of the usual guarantees 

for human rights protections for those who are not part of that 

group. The only way you are going to ever rule that country by an 

Alawite or Shi’a group is by force. That is the only way it is going 

to be done henceforth. That is really the only way it was done 

under the Assads, father and son. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just another question in the last moment. Refugee support. 

Is it appropriate for the United States to provide significantly 

more support to Turkey, Jordan, and perhaps Lebanon with regard 

to refugees? Should we be doing that? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. We are the largest provider of humanitarian assistance. I think the role the U.S. could play at this point is perhaps to play more of a role to encourage in particular our Gulf allies who have significant resources at hand to provide more. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In other words, we have done enough. Ambassador. 

Mr. HOF. The big problem that still faces us, Congressman, is inside Syria where the regime blocks the United Nations from reaching rebel-controlled areas. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I agree with the idea of getting the Gulf allies to 

do more. You have authorized an awful lot of money. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Final point. I got 2 seconds. And for the record, 

should the United States be putting pressure on Qatar and others 

in the Gulf to cool it? Or increase? Could you provide that for the 

record? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Bridenstine from Oklahoma for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Abrams, I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate the testimony of everybody 

here. 

I do have a concern. I think you are greatly overestimating the 

effectiveness of a 1-day air strike option. And I will say that. I am 

a Navy pilot. I flew Operation Southern Watch in Iraq. I flew Operation Shock and Awe in Iraq. That was the most effective probably 

war effort in American history, and it took 2 weeks in order to 

have the desired effects of getting our troops all the way to Baghdad and getting us in a position to win. The statue of Saddam came 

down. You mentioned that it was an overestimate of 700 sorties in 

order to take out the air defense systems of Syria. I was just going 

to ask, what do you think would be an appropriate number of sorties to take out the air defenses of Syria? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Mr. Bridenstine, I would say that is one of the reasons that I don’t favor a no-fly zone because you may well have to 

do that. Where I think that is an exaggeration is that if you were 

doing this the way the Israelis have done it, why do you need to 

take out the air defense systems? You are doing this from outside 

Syria. You are using, presumably, cruise missiles as well as air-toground missiles. 
30 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. But it goes to desired effects. The desired effect, according to you, is to severely degrade the capacity of Assad 

to use air assets and air bases. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Right. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One-day strikes without first preempting the 

air defense systems, I just don’t think that is a realistic scenario. 

And as far as air defenses, I haven’t looked at the Syrian order of 

battle as far as air defenses go. But I imagine they have a Russian 

system possibly that might have, you know, eight nodes, four radars, four missile defense batteries all distributed and networked. 

I mean, we are talking about a very large strike package to eliminate that one system. The reality is, 700 sorties is very realistic to 

degrade their air defense systems. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I don’t dispute that. My question is, what can you 

achieve if you don’t go into Syria and, therefore, require that? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And let me just follow up for a second. 

Let’s say we do that 1-day air strikes, and let’s say the desired 

effects are there, which I am very skeptical of. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Right. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And I say that with all due respect. 

But let’s say we did that. The next question is, what is the response from the Russians? Does that mean they are going to go 

home? Does that mean they are not going to provide any more 

weapons? Does that mean they are not going to provide any more 

support? Or does it mean they are going to escalate? And I would 

argue that if they know that our strategy is a 1-day air strike, then 

they are, indeed, going to escalate, knowing for sure that we would 

de-escalate. And I am not saying that we would de-escalate. But I 

go back to what Mr. Turner said earlier. We have a problem with 

leadership here in the United States. And if the Russians believe 

that their escalation will warrant our de-escalation, then it is in 

their best interest to continue to escalate. And I guess what I 

would ask you is, what would be your assessment as to our response once Russia escalates? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, on the latter point, I think escalation would 

only be additional arms sales to Syria. But as Fred said, that depends to some extent on what is left of the airpower infrastructure 

in Syria whether they can do that. 

The Russians have not really responded, for example, to Israeli 

air strikes. Presumably they would want to sell more to Syria, and 

they like getting paid for it. But I want to go back. I think the 

questions you have asked can be answered best by the Pentagon. 

That is, suppose you were told you may not go into Syria. You have 

got to do it, in a sense, from border areas, and you can use cruise 

missiles. What can you achieve? 

In informal conversations I have had with some people in the 

American military, they have suggested they could achieve a lot. 

That is not the official position of the Pentagon. And I think you 

are going to need to push very hard to get answers to those questions. But I think it would be worth doing so because in a sense, 

you are saying I am speculating, and you are right. And I am speculating because the Pentagon has never really given us the answers to this. They don’t want to but they should be pressured to 

do so. 
31 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that. I yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman yields back. Ms. Shea-Porter for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

Mr. Abrams, I was looking up some of your comments in previous 

conflicts. And you had stated in one of your articles that—and I am 

going to quote, ‘‘In Lebanon, the administration has cooperated 

with the Saudi Arabian Government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shi’a 

organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part 

in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A byproduct of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile 

to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.’’ 

Do we really know what we are doing? 

Mr. ABRAMS. As I read about some of the things that are happening in Syria, I think that is a very fair question. But if we don’t 

know what we are doing here in Syria, which is now we are in the 

third year, it is really an indictment of, to some extent, the administration, to some extent, frankly, the leadership of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. That is, if in the third year we can’t distinguish who are jihadis and who are Syrian nationalists with 

whom we might wish to work, why is that? How is it really possible 

that we are 3 years—or in the third year into this and we don’t 

know? It seems to me that is either a failure of policy or it is a 

failure of carrying out the policy by CIA. You know, I just don’t understand how it is possible that with 3 years of work we would not 

know the answers. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, it seems to me that at one point we are 

worried about Shi’a and at the next point we are worried about the 

Sunnis, and we just seem to flip them. And the word that we always use to describe the guys who we are against at the moment 

are the ‘‘extremists.’’ So my question to you is, aren’t they all fairly 

extremist when they are out there fighting and killing one another? 

I know we have all heard of some pretty gruesome stories coming 

from the rebels, the ones that were initially portrayed to us as 

those who were going to save Syria. 

And so my worry here—and I think we should all be concerned 

about this—is that as they look at us and try to figure out where 

we are and that region tries to figure out where we are, we are not 

really clear exactly ourselves. So to step into a conflict—as heartbreaking as it is and as devastating as it is. And I have a family 

friend who is actually missing there in Syria. So as heartbreaking 

as all this is, I don’t think we are really—you know, to bring in any 

kind of weaponry or to bring in any kind of force right now, we 

don’t understand the consequences. And by reading your words 

then and looking now, I am concerned that in 3 years we will be 

writing something different. 

So I would like to open that up. Would you like to comment? I 

see you nodding down there. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Well, I very much share your concerns. And I 

think that is what I elucidated in my written testimony as well, 

that I think we need to be humble about how complicated things 

are in Syria. It is a situation that is evolving very quickly. We have 
32 

very few, if any, assets on the ground. But I also want to just underscore one of the points you made which I take to heart. And 

that is the use of the term ‘‘extremist’’ and what it means to qualify 

a particular group as extremists. Typically in the past or in the 

context of Sunni extremism, we use it when we talk about 

jihadists, those that are affiliated with Al Qaeda. But as you rightly point out, there is a documented instance of a pretty horrific 

atrocity being committed by someone with the Farouq Brigade 

which is considered a brigade that is—and I don’t like to use the 

term ‘‘moderate’’ either—more moderate. I think when one begins 

to understand the dynamics at play in Syria, the depth of sectarian 

hatred, the term ‘‘extremist’’ becomes a bit blurry. 

In my mind, he certainly, by committing an act of cannibalism, 

committed an atrocity that is extraordinarily extreme. And I don’t 

think we would want to be supporting or sending arms to such a 

group either. So I would simply underscore your point. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And it is an awful, awful position, but I am 

struck by the silence of the world at large and wondering if they 

are showing good judgment, better judgment, worse judgment, but 

I would just say that we shouldn’t race in when we are not exactly 

certain about what the consequences will be. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would only just reiterate, but this didn’t start 2 

weeks ago, it started more than 2 years ago. If our intelligence 

agencies cannot really identify which group is which, I think that 

is a remarkable intelligence failure. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Nugent from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, I appreciate this 

panel. The recurring theme, I think, particularly as you talk about 

this started over 770 days ago, I don’t think the options have gotten any better. I agree with you that I don’t believe that our intel 

is very actionable in regards to, you know, we are concerned about 

chemical weapons falling into the wrong hands. I am just not certain who those wrong hands are. You know, we talk about the 

Assad regime and Hezbollah, but when you start talking about 75 

percent of the population is Sunni, and we heard testimony that 

whether it is extremist or moderate, I am not so sure what moderate means in the vernacular of what we are talking about. So I 

guess I am at a quagmire in regards to, you know, what are we 

doing. I mean, I understand the stated idea is to have Assad go, 

but I haven’t heard a clear response as to who the heck is going 

to replace him and how is that going to affect our friends in the 

region. Right now they have an issue as it relates to, you know, 

people coming over their borders and trying to secure and trying 

to feed and trying to take care of and keep unrest down because 

of what that brings, but that might be minor compared to the 

issues that we could be unleashing upon them if, and like once I 

said, who is the right folks who are going to have control over 

chemical weapons? Can anybody help me understand who the right 

folks are? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Can I just make one little stab at that? Certainly 

the right folks are not international terrorists. That is to say—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Absolutely. 
33 

Mr. ABRAMS [continuing]. People connected to Al Qaeda or 

jihadis from around the world. I mean, that in a sense, that is the 

easy part of the answer. The harder part of the answer is distinguishing among Syrian groups, which are the ones with whom we 

might wish to cooperate and which are the ones that we would 

never wish to cooperate with and which we would try to keep out 

of power in Syria. 

Mr. NUGENT. But do we actually have the control to try to keep 

someone out of power in Syria? 

Mr. ABRAMS. All we can do, I think, is strengthen the people who 

we would like to see stronger. We can’t really prevent—certainly 

some of our Gulf allies we can try to influence, but we can’t prevent 

private citizens from pouring money into groups that we wish that 

they wouldn’t help. So it seems to me all we can do is to say, well, 

these are some groups that look good to us, that look better to us, 

we would like them to be stronger today and as part of the fight 

over the post-Assad Syria, and we haven’t really been doing much 

of that. 

Mr. NUGENT. Do any of you think that—you know, I have heard 

you mention about, you know, projecting some air power, whether 

it is standoff or whatever to strike, and I guess to punish the Assad 

regime because you are really not going to probably have a dramatic effect on his ability to inflict serious pain on those, but there 

are those that want us to send additional arms or heavy weapons. 

Do any of you subscribe to the idea that that is going to be the way 

out? Or does that create additional problems? 

Mr. HOF. Congressman, I think the choice before us right now in 

the face of a very significant intervention on the part of Iran and 

Hezbollah is whether or not we are just going to stand back and 

witness, you know, the military defeat of people who we have, indeed, gotten to know quite well over the last couple of years. I don’t 

think that anybody is going to make the argument that providing 

weaponry to vetted Syrian rebels is going to be the decisive gesture 

that wins the conflict in Syria. The goal here, I think, is a good 

deal more modest. It is to stabilize a situation on the ground 

which, if not stabilized, could conceivably lead to the worst of all 

possible outcomes, and that would be a military victory on the part 

of a regime that is responsible for upwards of 100,000 deaths already. 

Mr. NUGENT. One last thing. So the more involved we get, the 

stronger the motivation is for, I believe, Iran and Hezbollah and 

Russia to ramp it up because for the same reasons we don’t want 

to lose, they don’t want to lose, and I will leave it at that. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Just quickly, and I am going to follow up in a moment on that point because that is what I wanted to ask about a 

little bit. One thing we haven’t mentioned throughout this whole 

hearing, and just for the record should be, is if we were to decide 

to do anything, even a, you know, more limited strike, the DOD 

[Department of Defense] has said they would need a supplemental, 

they would need Congress basically to vote for the money to pay 
34 

for it. That is a rather significant impediment to getting there. I 

just thought it was worth pointing out for the record. 

Then following up on the point about, you know, we have heard 

all along that, you know, well, if we let this happen, it reduces our 

influence because we look weak, and there is nothing worse in the 

world apparently than looking weak. But the question that I have 

is over the course of the last 12 years now in Iraq, in Afghanistan, 

in Libya we invested certainly in the case of the first two an enormous amount of money, well over 6,000 lives between Iraq and Afghanistan. I confess I haven’t looked recently at the number of 

wounded, but it is pushing close to 100,000, trillions of dollars, and 

went all in, okay? Took out three regimes. On that very basic level, 

unquestionably we won, you know. We took out a regime to establish the fact basically, you know, if it is important to us, we are 

going to put the resources in, and we are going to do this, which 

is kind of part of the argument for why we can’t stand back and 

watch Assad. At the end of that process, do we have that type of 

influence in those parts of the world? Did it, in fact, enhance our 

credibility? The tone of my voice, you know, suggests my answer 

to that question. No. You know, 6,000 lives, 100,000 wounded, a 

trillion dollars, all right? And it did not increase our credibility one 

lick. In fact, in many, many minds in that part of the world, it did 

the exact opposite. It made them once again resent us trying to 

mess in their part of the world. 

So even if we invested the resources, even if we could, quote, win 

and actually take out Assad, I completely reject the premise that 

somehow that is the path to having this part of the world bow 

down before our wishes, and there is an enormous, enormous cost 

to this ridiculous philosophy that, you know, once a conflict has 

started you have to put everything into it to make sure you win 

because otherwise you will look weak, you know, otherwise your influence will go down. Have we learned nothing over the course of 

the last 12 years from our three efforts where we went all in and 

at the end of it, it didn’t come out with us being feared and having 

that influence. The world is vastly more complex than that, and I 

guess if there is one thing I hope from Syria and everything else 

is that we begin to get the message out there in the world, particularly in the Middle East, that the U.S. doesn’t control it because 

at this point if something bad happens there they blame us for it. 

If there is some way to sort of ramp back the expectations and the 

ability of the United States of America to reach into this region of 

the world and fix everything for good, or for ill for that matter, that 

is something that I think we ought to do. So all this talk about 

what we have to do something because otherwise people will think 

we don’t have influence doesn’t just miss the point, I think it is 

dangerous, and I will give you a moment to respond to that. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, just my brief response. If that is the view of 

the United States, it is—becomes the view, it is a misfortune that 

the President said Assad must go and then said there is a red line 

on chemical weapons because you shouldn’t say those things if you 

don’t mean them. The President has said he doesn’t bluff. He 

shouldn’t bluff, no President should bluff. So that puts us in a very 

unfortunate position because the President has said some other 
35 

things like I will prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, and 

you can’t keep saying those things if you don’t actually mean them. 

Mr. SMITH. Yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. One quick one on the impact on Israel 

and its continued safety, particularly in the Golan Heights and others. Assume that this thing just continues to muddle along, can you 

give us your perspective of what you believe the impact will have 

on Israel and its issues? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I can start. I think they will take care of 

themselves on the question of arms transfers. I think the greatest 

concern from their point of view is the stability of Jordan and what 

kind of regime ends up being in power in Syria, and if what you 

have is a regime that is essentially a cat’s paw now for Hezbollah 

and Iran, then that I think is dangerous for the whole region. 

Israel’s security depends on two things—one, their ability to defend themselves, but, two, their alliance with the United States. So 

if the perception in the region is that the United States is withdrawing, is less active, is unwilling, for example, to take on Iran, 

maybe unwilling to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon 

state, that that will affect their security. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Ambassador Hof. 

Mr. HOF. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that, you know, from 

the Israeli point of view, I think the key near-term problem is, indeed, as Mr. Abrams said, the security of the Hashemite Kingdom 

of Jordan in the Syria context. Beyond that, you know, I suspect 

the Israelis are evaluating the position of the United States, the attitude of the United States, the leadership of the United States in 

the context of the one issue that totally dominates Israeli politics 

these days, and that is Iran and what the United States would 

eventually bring to the table in that context. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. Ms. Yacoubian, any comments? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I have nothing to add. Thank you. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Thank you. Anything quickly on the— 

should we read too much or too little into the assassination of one 

of the Free Syrian Army’s lead generals, Hamami, by the jihadists, 

is that one-off or is that something that we think we will see more 

of that kind of internal violence within the opposition groups? 

Mr. HOF. I expect, Mr. Chairman, we are going to see more of 

it, and I think one thing to keep in mind here, the presence of 

jihadist groups in Syria is a direct product of the tactics the regime 

has used against its opponents from the beginning, and the presence of jihadist elements in Syria is a gift that keeps on giving to 

the Assad regime, and in its ability to try to take control of a narrative, in its ability to try to convince us that the only choice that 

is out there is the Assad regime or a group of people engaging in 

cannibalism. This will be that regime’s ultimate victory if they are 

able to sell that narrative. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Ms. Yacoubian, do you have a comment? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Yes, if I could just add, and it is not a one-off. 

We have had violence already taking place between elements of 

those groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and elements of the Free Syrian Army. I would only add, I think, unfortunately it heralds perhaps a second far more dangerous phase of the conflict in Syria, 

which is one in which you have armed groups fighting each other 
36 

to try and define this country. You are seeing increasingly civilians 

chafing under the strictures of fairly, fairly extreme Islamic rule in 

certain parts of the country where the regime has receded. So unfortunately I think that it is something to be very wary of and a 

concern going forward. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you very much for your comments 

today. Not a lot of pretty picture over there, but as the photographer said, if you want a pretty picture, you have got to bring me 

a prettier face. So thank you all very much, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 17, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 17, 2013 

(41) 

Opening Statement of Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon 

"The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic-Implications 

for U.S. National Security and U.S. Policy Options" 

July 17,2013 

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony from independent experts on the 

security situation in Syria. Today, we have with us Ambassador Fred 

Hof, Mr. Elliott Abrams, and Ms. Mona Yacoubian to provide their 

insights into the conflict in Syria. Thank you for joining us today. 

We are now in the third year of the conflict in Syria. The United 

Nations estimates that at least 93,000 Syrians have died. Additionally, 

the Obama administration has finally confirmed the intelligence 

community's assessment that the Assad regime has used chemical 

weapons, including the nerve agent Sarin, against the opposition 

multiple times in the last year. With the now verified use of chemical 

weapons a stated redline by the Obama Administration and a 

mounting humanitarian crisis, increased regional instability, spreading 

sectarian violence; the trajectory of the conflict in Syria appears to be 
42 

heading in the wrong direction in an already unstable region -

threatening U.S. interests. Moreover, a recent string of military gains by 

the Assad regime, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, has fueled the 

perception that Assad is winning. Meanwhile, the United States has a 

largely incoherent and disjointed policy to address the situation in Syria. 

Whether one is in favor of or rejects the idea of U.S. military 

intervention in this crisis, it remains critically important that this 

committee continues to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 

military options that may be available to address the conflict in Syria -

to include the objectives, limitations, and risks of each because the 

U.S. has vital national security interests at stake and our warfighters 

might once again be tasked with a complicated mission in a time of 

fiscal austerity. 

Our panel of experts will provide further insight into the U.S. 

policy options. I look forward to your testimony. 

2 
43 

Opening Statement of Hon. Adam Smith, 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic-Implications for U.S. 

National Security and U.S. Policy Options 

July 17, 2013 

Thank you, you Mr. Chairman, and thank you also to our witnesses here today. 

We appreciate you coming to help us think through how the United States should 

respond to the ongoing conflict in Syria. 

Syria presents us with an enormously complex series of challenges. An 

increasingly ethno-sectarian civil war has led to the deaths of nearly 100,000 

people. Millions have been displaced internally or driven out of Syria and into 

neighboring countries whieh are themselves strained to care for these refugees and 

in some cases threatened with destabilization. Iran and Russia are arming the 

Assad regime, Hezbollah and Iranian units are fighting for the regime, and foreign 

fighters have streamed into the country to fight for both the regime and the 

opposition, including an al Qaeda affiliate. The opposition itself, both on the 

political and military levels, is fractured and prone to infighting. On top of this, 

Syria has an enormous arsenal of chemical weapons, which seem to have remained 

secure to date, but which greatly concern everyone who looks at the situation there. 

The United States does not have many good options to positively impact the 

situation on the ground. All of us would like to stop the killing, end the threat of 

terrorism, control the chemical weapons, end Syria's role as Iran's conduit for 

weapons to Hezbollah, and help the Syrian people achieve peace and democracy. 

But the options that are presented to us, no fly zones, arming some portion of the 

rebels, or even air strikes on Assad's remaining air force, are unlikely to 

accomplish these goals. And none ofthem are likely to build a cohesive, moderate 

opposition that, even if they won, is likely to be a democracy that respects all of 

Syria's ethnic groups, is capable of combating extremism, and is a net contributor 

to regional security. 
44 

Faced with all of this, my conclusion is that the right path for the United States at 

the moment is to work with the international community and the Russians where 

we can to bring the Assad regime and the political opposition to an agreement on a 

transitional government in Syria. The so-called "Geneva II" track is not likely to 

be easy and it may not be successful. But ifit works, it is the least bad option for 

Syria and the region. 

While the diplomatic track is progressing, I believe we need to work with our 

regional allies and countries in the neighborhood, to deal with the fallout from 

Syria and to prepare for the worst. We should be doing as much as possible to help 

Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq deal with the refugee problem. We need to 

share as much intelligence with our regional allies as we can to forestall extremists 

from spreading from Syria to other countries or from taking advantage of the 

Syrian situation to cause local sectarian and ethnic conflicts. We should work with 

Israel to stem the flow of weapons to Hezbollah and to enhance their security. And 

we should work with everyone we can to help ensure the security of Syria's 

chemical weapons-it is not in the interests of anyone to have those fall into the 

hands of al Qaeda or any other extremist group. I know that we are doing some of 

this, but I hope our witnesses can help us think through what more we can do in 

this areas and other areas to help contain problems stemming from the Syrian 

conflict. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairnlan for holding this hearing, and thanks to our 

witnesses for appearing today. I yield back. 
45 

COUNCILon.. 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

July 17,2013 

The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab 

Republic - Implications for u.S. National 

Security and u.S. Policy Options 

Prepared statement by 

Elliott Abrams 

Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Before the 

House Armed Services Committee 

United States House of Representatives 

1" Session, 113th Congress 

Hearing on The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic - Implications for 

US, National Security and US, Policy Options 

Mr. Chairman and iv1embers of the Committee: 

Thank you for this invitation to appear hefore you to discuss the situation in Syria and how it affects U.S. national 

interests. For today's hearing, I ,vill not dwell on past errors in U.S. policy that have led to the dire situation \ve nmv 

face. \Vc can debate them, but we are where we arc today. 

In Syria today we see an Iranian expeditionary force, bolstered by an estimated 2,000 troops from Ir,m's ally 

Hczbollah and armed by Russia, seeking to crush a popular rebe1Hon. Syria is 75 percent Sunnt, so the Alawite Assad 

regime and its Shia supporters in Tehran and Lebanon will never win the support of the Syrian people to rule that 

country. The only hope for Iran, I-Iezbollah, and Assad is to kill enough rebel fighters and civilians to end the uprising. 

At this point they have killed an estimated 100,000 people and done immeasurable damage to Syria's economy and 

infrastructure-and they \vi11 keep on killing and destroying. 
46 

\Ve and many other countries arc addressing this humanitarian disaster through various forms of aid to United 

Nations bodies and other groups. But the question our country faces is whether to do more~whether to support the 

rehels or to usc military force ourselves. In my view the ,-tns,ver to both questions is yes, because an Iranian victory in 

Syria would be a great blow to American interests. 

The continuation of this conflkt is itself a threat to U.S. interests and allies. For example, there are already roughly a 

half-million Syrian refugees in Jordan, and that number is rising steadily. Jordan does not have the resources-the 

money, but also other resources such as water-to sustain that number, and it could easily soon he 600,000, 700,000 

and even at some point a million. This strain threatens the economy of Jordan and its security. The Kingdom of Jordan 

is one of our key allies in the Middle East and stability there should be a prime concern of ours. 

As the conflict continues and more and more jihadis arrive in Syria, we must also wonder about their role tomorrmv 

in L('hanon and along the Syrian-Israeli border. Their grovving presence in the area is another serious threat. 

But worse yet for us would be our defeat by Iran-and that is exactly how it would be seen. On one side, Iran, 

} IczboUah, and Russia support Assad; on the other, the United States, EU, and our Sunni Arab friends from the Gulf 

support the rebels. Docs it matter , ... ho wins? Yes-because around the world but especially in the Middle East ames 

and enemies will judge the power, influence, and willpmver of the United States and our friends by the outcome of this 

conflict. 

Should \ve prevail and the Assad regime be replaced by a Sunni regime oriented toward Syria's Sunni neighbors, this 

will be a huge defeat for Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Involvement in Syria is already arousing discontent among 

Lebanon's populace, including Shia \vho wonder why their sons arc dying for Bashar al~Assad, and a defeat in Syria 

will undermine 1 1ezbollah inside Lebanon. Its power has be('n rising there for decades; now, a turning point might be 

reached and it might start declining. Given Hezbollah's global reach as a terrorist group, that's very much in our 

interest. 

Similarly and even more importantly, the rise ofIranian power in the region would be seen to have been stopped if the 

Assad regime fans. Iran's influence has also been vie",/cd as growing stcadily- partly due to the demise of a hostile 

Sunni regime in Iraq (at America's hands) and to growing Iranian influence there; partly to Iran's perceived role in 

places like Y cmen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Pnwince; partly to Jran'5 steadily advancing nuclear program; 

and partly to the sense that America, the overwhelming power in the Middle East since \\lnrld \Var II, lacked the 

desire or ability to stop Iran. If we defeat Iran in Syria, all this is changed and what King Abdullah of Jordan once called 

the "Shia crescent" stops being cemented. 

Remember that Iran's only Arab ally is Syria, which also provides it with Mediterranean ports and a land bridge to 

HezhoHah in Lebanon-and through Hezhollah, Iran gets a border with IsraeL This all changes if Assad fans. 

Conversely, what happens jf we decide the game in Syria is not worth the fight, and the war goes on until Assad more 

or less crushes the rebellion? NIany more refugees, threatening stability in Jordan and Lebanon. Iranian ascendancy, 

strengthening Hezbollah inside Lebanon and Iran throughout the Middle East. An emboldened Iran, seeing a lack of 

American desire to confront it, is logically more likely to hecome more aggressive in Bahrain, the home of our Hfth 

Fleet, in Saudi Arabia's heavily 5hia Eastern Province, and in its own nuclear program. Surely a display of American 

lack of will power in Syria will persuade many Iranian officials that while we may say "all options are on the table," in 

reality they are not-so Iran can proceed happily and safely toward a nuclear weapon. 

So what should \ve do, to prevent an Iranian and Hczbollah and Russian victory over our side, the United States, 

European allies, and our Sunni allies? 
47 

First, we waited far too long to provide military help to the rebels, a view that I share with former Secretary of State 

Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Gates. You will recal1 news reports that they calleu ti')r such aid in internal 

administration discussions last summer-a year ago. I am not privy to the exact level and composition of aid being 

given today, but [ hope it is not too little too late, and \ve do know that it is very late. One reason this war in Syria has 

gone OIl so long, and seen so many reverses for the rebels, is that Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have been more 

dedicated and generous to their side than we have to ours. \Ve and our allies should step up the flow of weaponry. and 

do that fast. 

I am well aware that many will say we have no "side" in this conflict, especially because thousands of opponents of the 

Assad regime are jihadis. To me, that is all the more reason to assist and strengthen those rebels who are Syrians and 

who are not jihadis, nol only to win this war faster but to give them the upper hand when the war is over and a new 

government must be formed. 

According to nevvs reports, the aid promised by the Obama administration several weeks ago has not moved; the 

rd,cls have gotten nothing. In part this is said to be due to concerns about proper vetting of potential r{'cipients. It's 

impossible for me to jude who has the better of that argument. but I find it difficult to believe that our intelligence 

agencies are completely incapable of distinguishing among the groups. And as to anns getting into the wrong hands, 

well, they are today almost entirely in the wrong hands. \Ve need to act if we would like to see some of them in the 

right hands. 

Second, I do not favor a no-fly zone. That seems to me to be a long-term commitment of military resources, day after 

day after day, and we know from the Iraq experience how difficult that can be. instead, I favor a one-time strike at 

Assad's air assets and air bases.\Ve kn()w that the use of air power, fixed 'wing and heli(()pter, has been a huge 

advantage for the regime in its struggle to survive and prevail. If \ve eliminate or greatly weaken Assad's ability to use 

air power, we will tilt the battlefields toward the rcbels--militarily, politically, and psychologically. According to news 

reports, in taking this position I ally myself with Secretary of State Kerry who also favors it. 

1 would add that the T louse and Senate intelllgence committees are said to have a second doubt ahout supplying some 

weapons to the rebels, which is that alone this action would have too little impact. It would not much change and 

certainly not transform the situation on the ground, some members arc said to argue. I agree with that argument, and 

that is another reason why I favor both aid to the rebels and a strike at Assad air assets. 

The first ohjection to such a strike is practical: too dangerous, we are often told, given Assad's impregnable air 

defenses. General Dempsey was reported to have said to Secretary Kerry that we would need 700 air sorties to take 

down Syria's air defenses. This strikes me as absurd, frankly, and my response is "tell that to the Israelis." They h,lYC 

three times, that I kno\\! of, struck inside Syria. How is it possible that they can do it and we-who have stealth 

technology they lack, and far stronger forces in the Sixth Fleet and nearby bases-----cannot? The Israelis did not enter 

Syrian air space, apparently using air to ground missiles. Can \ve not do this, in addition to using sea~based cruise 

missiles? My own conversations with military officers suggests that we can. \V c would not, this way, ellminate all of 

Assad's air power. every base, every aircraft-but we would eliminate the bulk of it. So we should. 

The second objecton is that we cannot act without a UN Security Council resolution. Obviously we will not get one, 

given Russia's support for Assad. The Committee may take that vie\v, but it has not ahvays been the American view. 

President Obama's ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, wrote this analysis of the change in Clinton administration 

thinking about intervention in Bosnia in 1995: 
48 

\Vhy was the summer of 1995 any different? \Vhy the emergence of a firm consensus on a concerted strategy now 

when it had eluded the Clinton administration for over two years? The answer, in part, lies in the horrors ·witnessed by 

Srcbrcnica-a sense that this time the Bosnian Serbs had gone too far. That certainly proved to be the case in the 

Pentagon, where Defense Secretary William Perry and Jes Chairman John ShalikashviH took the lead in pushing for 

the kind of vigorous air campaign that \vas finally agreed to in f ,0ndo11, The real reason, however, was the palpable 

sense that Bosnia was the cancer caring away at American foreign policy, in the \vords of Anthony Lake, Clinton's 

nalional security adviser. U.S, credibility abroad was being undermined perceptibly by what was happening in Bosnia, 

and by the America's and NATO's failure to end it. ["Decision to Intervene: Flow the \Var in Bosnia Ended," by Ivo I L 

Daalder, Brookings, December 1998, http://w\'n\/,hrookinps.cdu/researchfarticlcsI1998! I') ibalkans-daaldcrJ. 

1 would suggest to you that we are in a similar situation. with American credibility being undermined and our inaction 

in Syria in the face of the Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian challenge "eating away at American foreign policy." And of 

course, the Clinton administration finally decided to act in Kosovo in 1998, under (he NATO umbrella, without a UN 

resolution. If we conclude that the humanitarian and national security justifications for action arc sufficient, I v·/Ould 

urge that we not be stymied from acting hy the interests of Mr. Putin's Russia. 

Mr. Chairman, these comments no douht give risc to many questions and [look forward to discussing them with 

members of the Committee. I am grateful to you for inviting me today anti for holtiing this hearing on the very grave 

situation in Syria, 
49 

COUNCIL01L> 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

1777 F Street, NW, Washington. DC 20006 

tel 202.509.8400 fax 202,S09.84()O www.cfr.org 

Elliott Abrams 

Elliott Abrams is senior fel1mv fot' Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (eFR) in 

Washington, D.C. He served as deputy as"istant to the president and deputy national security adviser in the 

administration of President George \V. Bw;h, \vhere he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle Ea">t for the 

\Vhitc House. 

Mr. Abrams was educated at Harvard College. the London School of Economics, and Harvard Law School. 

After serving on the staffs of Sen. Henry M. Jackson and Daniel P. Moynihan, hcwas an assistant secretary 

of state in the Reagan administration and received the secretary of state's Distinguished Service Award 

from Secretary George P. Shultz. In 2012, the \Vashington Institute for Ncar East Policy gave him its 

Scholar~Statesman A\vard. 

Mr. Abrams was president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in \Vashington, D.C., from 1996 until 

joining the \Vhite House stafr. He was a member of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom from 1499 to 200! and chairman of the commission in the latter year, and in 2012 was 

reappointed to memhership for another term, Mr. Ahrams is also a member of the u.s. Holocaust 

Memorial Council, which directs the activities of the u.s. Holocaust Memorial Museum. He teaches u.s. foreign policy at Georgetowll University's School of Foreign Service. 

Mr. Ahrams joined t11E' Bush admini<;tration in June 2001 as special assistant {'o the president and senior 

director of the NSC for democracy, human rights, and international organizations. From December 2002 

to Fehruary 2005, he served as special assistant to the pre<;ident and senior director of the National 

Security Council for Near l':ast and North African affairs. I Ie served as deputy assistant to the president 

and deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy from Februal'Y 2005 to January 2009, 

and in that capacity supervised both the Near East and North African Affairs and the democracy, human 

rights, and international organizations directorates of the l'\SC. 
50 

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51 

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2 
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3 
53 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR FREDERIC C. HOF 

Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East 

House Armed Services Committee 

The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic 

Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Policy Options 

July 17, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee, I am honored to have been invited 

to share with you some thoughts about the situation in Syria and u.s. policy options for dealing with this 

problem from hell. Having served for slightly more than a year (until September 2012) as special advisor 

to the Secretary of State for transition in Syria, I can attest to the fact that there are no easy or glib 

answers in this matter; there are no silver bUllets in our government's holster. To choose a policy 

direction in the case of Syria is, by definition, to choose between profoundly unattractive and risky 

options, of which inaction itself is one. 

The reason this is so has to do with the nature of the problem. In mid-March 2011 a group of teenagers 

in the economically depressed Syrian city of Deraa decided it would be fun and in keeping with Arab 

Spring activities elsewhere in the region to spray paint anti-Assad regime slogans on the walls of 

buildings. Regime security forces rounded them up, beat them, separated some from their fingernails, 

and denied their parents' access to them. Peaceful protests broke out spontaneously. The regime 

responded with deadly violence. By so doing - by demonstrating its contempt for an aggrieved citizenry 

already contending with a lack of economic opportunity - the regime dropped a match on the dry tinder 

of economic hopelessness in Syria's secondary cities and their suburbs. 

The Assad regime knew it would be swept from Syria if it permitted peaceful protest to flourish. 

President Bashar AI Assad had a choice: deal with the protests politically, arresting criminals in his 

security services and generously compensating their victims; or respond with deadly force. He chose the 

latter. This choice caused the protests to spread, and as they did the regime persisted with its program 

of lethal force, mass incarcerations, and torture. Quite deliberately it channeled something it could not 

handle - peaceful protest - into something it thought it could handle: armed resistance. 

By succeeding in snuffing out peaceful protest in favor of armed resistance, the Assad regime put Syria 

on the fast-track to destruction. Most of the protestors were Arab Sunni Muslims, an ethnic-sectarian 

group accounting for roughly two-thirds of Syrians. The regime itself was dominated by Alawites, who 

account for about twelve percent of the population. As resistance spread the regime found it would 

have to rely disproportionately on military units, armed intelligence operatives, and criminal bands that 

were overwhelmingly Alawite in composition and therefore relatively reliable. This largely AlawiteSunni Muslim confrontation attracted to Syria a range of foreign Sunni jihadists, including some from 

Iraq who had enjoyed longstanding relationships with the Assad regime's intelligence services. The 

entry of foreign jihadists was and is a gift that keeps on giving to the Assad regime, which uses their 

presence to attract and justify the support of Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, and to try to persuade Syrian 

minorities and others that the alternative to corrupt, family rule in Syria is a reign of terror under the 

auspices of Islamist barbarians. 

1 
54 

By opting for violence, therefore, the regime inescapably opted for a largely sectarian battle. By so 

doing it attracted foreign Sunni jihadists: enemies of the regime on the surface, but a lifeline in fact. 

Today, Syrians looking for a third way between rule by a criminal family and rule by primitives must face 

a very unpleasant fact: the very presence of foreign jihadists in Syria is enabling the regime gradually to 

take control of the narrative; to assert, with near-perfect cynicism, that it and it alone is the alternative 

to savages who remove and eat vital organs from living human beings; and to assert, with perfect 

mendacity, that there is nothing Syrian about the Syrian revolution. The jihadist presence in Syria, 

augmented by a narrative that falls on the receptive ears of Americans who understandably fear foreign 

entanglements and those who correctly see AI Qaeda as America's deadly enemy, is making us hesitate 

to support those seeking a civilized third way, making us doubt our ability to do anything useful in the 

Syrian context, and therefore making relative inaction a comfortable default position for many. To the 

extent the Assad regime, on life-support courtesy of Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, can persuade the West 

to adopt an attitude falling somewhere between moral equivalence and "a plague on all houses," it can 

anticipate staying alive long after many observers pronounced it all-but-dead. 

We can stipulate, therefore, that the way this conflict has evolved now makes it very hard for American 

officials to define a way forward featuring solid footing. Perhaps the best starting point is to define 

what we want. What are our national security interests in Syria? What is it we want to achieve? How 

should we go about trying to get what we want? 

President Obama has suggested that it is the effects of regime-inspired chaos on Syria's neighbors that 

engages "the serious interests" of the U.S. in the Syrian crisis. Among these neighbors is a NATO ally 

(Turkey), a close security partner (Jordan), a country whose independence and well-being we have 

always tried to support (Lebanon), and a country in which many American service people recently gave 

their lives (Iraq). All of these countries some more than others are being swamped by refugees and 

associated resource and security problems by the Assad regime's practice of hammering rebel-held 

populated areas with artillery, aircraft, and missiles. It is a terror campaign that makes no pretense of 

seeking military targets. The regime's objective is that of a terrorist: persuade civilians, through the 

application of random deadly violence, to make decisions at the expense of one's enemy. Beyond the 

four countries being directly victimized by regime terror, Israel's interests are engaged by the spillover 

of violence into the Golan Heights and the threat to Jordan's security. Even Egypt, in the midst of its own 

political turmoil, is providing a refuge to tens of thousands of Syrians who have fled their country's 

chaos. 

Others have defined U.s. Syria-related interests in terms of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, the 

desirability of defeating a range of adversaries on Syrian soil, securing weapons of mass destruction to 

prevent their dissemination, neutralizing AI Qaeda elements, and so forth. Some of these defined 

interests could produce objectives that might easily lead to American ownership of the Syrian 

revolution. Others - those having to do with WMD and AI Qaeda - might logically lead one to back a 

regime that has manipulated both to its advantage. Standing with allies and friends would seem to be a 

prudent basis for deciding objectives and strategy. 

2 
55 

Using the allies and friends aspect of the Syrian crisis as the national interest foundation, what is it we 

would want to achieve? What would be our objectives? 

Three objectives come to mind: enhanced security and stability of regional allies and friends in the face 

of Syria's chaos and the Assad regime's tactics of mass terror; political transition in Syria away from the 

regime, including the removal from Syria of all Iran-related military elements (including Hezbollah) and 

AI Qaeda affiliates; and the replacement of the Assad regime with an inclusive national unity 

government, one committed internally to recovery, reconciliation, accountability, reform, and rule of 

law; one committed externally to regional peace and stability. Across the range of these objectives 

would be the constant updating of contingency plans related to WMD. 

If these are our objectives, how would we go about achieving them? What are the key elements of the 

strategy we would pursue? Clearly we would want it all to add up, ideally, to the achievement of all 

three objectives. 

The central problem affecting allies and friends is the regime's mass terror campaign against vulnerable 

populations. Ending it should be our top priority, and diplomacy is always the first weapon of choice. 

The UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria recently (June 4, 2013) reported 

that the regime's tactics "constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross violations of 

international human rights law." If we are not already doing so on an insistent, sustained basis, we 

should be urging Moscow to rein in its client. We should make it clear to Russia that if the terror 

campaign subverting our allies and friends does not stop we will reserve the right to take steps we deem 

appropriate to secure our interests. 

To the extent we consider military options at all in connection with Syria, it should be in the context of 

helping allies and friends secure themselves from the regime's murderous tactics. We would not, under 

any circumstances, want American boots on the ground in Syria. We would not wish to consider 

unmanned or manned aerial systems entering Syrian airspace unless and until we are persuaded that 

the peaceful diplomatic campaign has run its course unsuccessfully. Even then we would still have the 

option of watching the terror campaign proceed unabated while pouring more resourceshumanitarian, economic, and security - into Syria's neighbors so they could better cope. We should 

keep in mind that no-fly zones would not address the biggest of the killers: artillery. We could not 

proceed with any kind of strike options without the full cooperation of Turkey, Jordan, and other key 

partners. Although UN authorization would not be possible, US unilateralism is something to be 

avoided. 

As we pull out the stops diplomatically to stop the terror campaign, we should try to stabilize the 

situation on the ground by seeing to it that vetted rebel units in Syria get what they need in terms of 

military equipment, weaponry, and training, working through the opposition's Supreme Military Council. 

The regime has a well-established record of conducting massacres in places it can reach on the ground. 

Most weaponry for the mainstream opposition will not come from U.S. stocks. Yet the U.S. should be in 

charge of the process of determining who gets what. Will all weapons shipments, without fail, get to 

their intended recipients? No: no more in Syria than they did during World War II when air-dropped 

3 
56 

into occupied France. The jihadists and the regime are already armed to the teeth. The Syrian 

nationalists are the ones who need the help. Their ability to defend territory and reverse the current 

momentum will have a direct and positive impact on refugee flows. 

As we try our best to help the mainstream armed opposition stabilize the ground situation, we should -

with the help of the Friends of the Syrian People prepare the Syrian opposition to establish, on Syrian 

territory and as soon as possible, a governmental alternative to the regime. Such a government would 

require recognition, resources, and help with self-defense. Yet a government featuring people and a 

program designed to appeal to those grudgingly supporting the regime as a default position would 

present the long-awaited, essential, decent alternative to the Assad regime. Such a government would 

also unblock massive amounts of humanitarian assistance frozen outside of Syria awaiting the 

permission of the regime to move into rebel-controlled areas. If the Geneva process were to go 

anywhere, this government could serve as the interlocutor with the current government in Damascus, 

producing a post-Assad national unity government. Mobilizing the international community to promote 

a respectable and effective alternative to Assad and the nucleus of post-Assad governance should be a 

major US diplomatic priority, notwithstanding all of the difficulties presented by an often fractious 

Syrian opposition. 

As we work with the opposition to prepare to govern inside Syria, we should keep the door open to a 

Geneva peace conference and help the opposition configure a coherent, representative, and legitimate 

negotiating team. In order to secure the cooperation of the Syrian opposition, however, we must keep 

in mind the purpose of Geneva, as stated in the agreement reached on June 30, 2012: to create, on the 

basis of mutual consent, a transitional governing body exercising full executive power. The purpose of 

Geneva is to move into a transitional governing arrangement, one preserving state and governmental 

institutions to the maximum extent possible consistent with human rights standards. If Assad or any of 

his coterie are to playa role in Syria's transitional governance, it would only be with the consent of the 

Syrian opposition. Although it is very unlikely to transpire, a near-term negotiated end to this nightmare 

can preserve Syria and secure its neighbors. 

As we pursue a multifaceted diplomatic campaign, all elements of which are designed to secure Syria's 

neighbors, transition the regime, and replace it with something decent, we should also be working with 

partners to design a post-Assad multinational stabilization force to work with a new Syrian government 

to help protect vulnerable populations and neutralize undesirable stay-behind elements. Ideally such a 

force would be under UN auspices or authorization. U.S. combat service support and even combat air 

support might be vital. Yet no American boots should be on the ground in Syria. Helping post-Assad 

Syria stabilize itself will, of course, enable millions of Syrian refugees to return home from the 

neighboring countries. In this connection, the creation of an international interim reconstruction fund 

for Syria will also be important. 

The objectives and strategy outlined here are heavy on the diplomatic side, but do not rule out military 

intervention entirely. If objectives and strategy are key components of foreign policy, they are life and 

death items when it comes to military operations. If American diplomacy cannot stop the terror 

campaign imperiling U.S. allies and friends, the president will need options to consider. He may well 

4 
57 

decide to focus on supporting the neighbors through increased assistance, To the extent he looks at 

military options he will want, in the context of objectives, to define the mission as narrowly as possible: 

to destroy or significantly degrade the ability of the Assad regime to terrorize civilian populations with 

artillery, military aircraft, and missiles, He will be interested in methodologies that minimize US and 

collateral casualties, knowing full well that there are no such things as surgical strikes, He will want to 

assess carefully the likely reactions of key players: the regime, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, He will want 

buy-in from at least two of the neighbors (Turkey and Jordan) he is trying to help, And he will want to 

avoid the proverbial slippery slope, Syria's revolution, after all, is not America's to win or lose, Once the 

mission is accomplished and the mass terror campaign either ended or reduced significantly, the direct 

military role of the US would be ended, If Iran (for example) elects to intervene massively in Syria, 

sending its army across iraq, obviously new calculations in the White House, the Pentagon, and 

elsewhere will be set in motion, 

There should be no illusion, in any event, that military intervention will necessarily be the long-sought 

silver bullet And unintended consequences will be ubiquitous, regardless of what one does or fails to 

do, Yet those who try to shut down the debate by demanding "tell me how it will end" should apply the 

same demand to alternatives, especially that of passively watching developments unfold, in an era of 

diminishing defense resources brought about by sequestration and at a time when a tiny percentage of 

Americans bears the burden of defending this country, we should not be searching for ways to apply 

military force in various parts of the globe, if we elect to act with kinetic lethality in Syria the objective 

should be tied tightly to the situations our allies and friends find themselves in as a result of the Assad 

regime's survival tactics, indeed, if the regime survives, the results will be bad for its neighbors and 

catastrophic for Syria, The question is not, however, one of the U,S, taking ownership of Syria's future, 

That future belongs to Syrians, Our main task is to decide what we want and how to go about getting it, 

keeping in mind that supporting allies and friends is where American national interests are surely 

engaged in the case of Syria, 

5 
58 

@) ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Published on Atlantic Council (http'Uwww aClls org) 

.!::!2!J:lli> User 

Frederic C. Hot 

Biography 

Frederic C. Hof 

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center for the 

Middle East ~J. On March 28, 2012 President Obama conferred on 

Ambassador Hof the rank of ambassador in connection with his new 

[lJ 

duties as special advisor for transition in Syria. Amb. Hofwas previously the special 

coordinator for regional affairs in the US Department of State's Office of the Special Envoy 

for Middle East Peace, where he advised Special Envoy George Mitchell on the full range 

of Arab-Israeli peace issues falling under his purview and focusing on Syria-Israel and 

Israel-Lebanon matters. He joined the Department of State in April 2009 after serving as 

president and CEO of AALC, limited company, an international business consulting and project finance 

firm formerly known as Armitage Associates LC. 

Amb. Hofs professional life has focused largely on the Middle East. In 2001 he directed the Jerusalem 

field operations of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee headed by former US Senate Majority 

Leader George Mitchell and was the lead drafter of the Committee's April 30, 2001 Report. In 1983, as a 

US Army officer, he helped draft the "Long Commission" report which investigated the October 1983 

bombing of the US Marine headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Both reports drew considerable 

international praise for fairness and integrity. 

A 1969 graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Amb. Hof began his 

professional career as an Army officer. He is a Vietnam veteran and served as a US Army Middle East 

foreign area officer, studying Arabic at the Foreign Service Institute in Tunisia and receiving a master's 

degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. He served as US Army attache in Beirut, Lebanon and later 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian Affairs. 

Amb. Hof has written extensively on Arab-Israeli issues. He is the author of Galilee Divided: The Israe/-

Lebanon Frontier, 1916-1984 (Westview Press, 1985), Line of Balt/e, Border of Peace? The Line of June 

4, 1967 (Middle East Insight, 1999), and Beyond the Boundary: Lebanon, Israel and the Challenge of 

Change (Middle East Insight, 2000). He has also written many articles on Jordan Valley water issues. His 

writing on the Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon and (by virtue of his work on the "Mitchell" Committee) IsraelPalestinian tracks of the Middle East peace process has contributed positively to the body of literature 

promoting Arab-Israeli peace. 
59 

His awards include the Purple Heart, the Department of State Superior Honor Award, the Secretary of 

Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal and the Defense Superior Service Medal. He resides in Silver 

Spring, Maryland with his wife, Brenda. 

Recent Interviews: 

Panorama Interview with Frederic C. Hot PI 

AI-Arabiya I June 12, 2013 

Middle East Expert Warns Syria 'Getting Worse' {'{ 

Austrialian Broadcasting Corp. I June 18, 2013 

Conflict in Syria Contines to Degrade {51 

NPR I June 8, 2013 

BBC's Kim Ghattas Report on US Policy on Syrian Crisis {51 

BBC I May 29, 2013 

A Candid Discyssion with Frederic Hot {7j 

Foreign Policy Association I May 3, 2013 

political Solution in Syria 

[8[Radio Rai 1 I March 30, 2013 

Assisting Armed Rebels in Syria 

[9[PBS NewsHour I March 15, 2013 

Analysts See Shift in US Response to Syrian Conflict {101 

NPR I March 11, 2013 

US Perspective on Syrian Civil War {111 

Orient TV I March 8, 2013 

Syrian Conflict !121 

Radio BBC 5 Live I March 7, 2013 

Crisis in Syria [13] 

AI Arabiya I February 1,2013 

Joyce Karam Interviews Frederic C. Hot on Syria Crisis {141 

AI Hayat I January 11, 2013 

president Bashar Assad' His Inner Circle and His Options [15[ 

NPR I January 8, 2013 

Assad Calls tor Talks but Denoynces Opposition [161 

BBC I January 6, 2013 

No Diplomatic Solution in Syria 

[17[CNN I December 12, 2012 

As Syrian Rebels Receive Endorsement Will They Also Get Military Assistance? {181 

PBS NewsHour I December 12, 2012 
60 

Syrian Conflict Coyld Escalate in Many Directions {H{ 

NPR I December 9,2012 

International Community Strategize for Ending War {20{ 

PBS NewsHour I December 8,2012 

Political and Military Pressure Tightens On Damascys 

{21{ NPR I December 1, 2012 

Publications: 

Syria: Blackberry Diplomacy (22] 

MENASource I July 11, 2013 

Syria' The Allies Angle {231 

MENASource I July 1, 2013 

Syria: War and Peace (24] 

MENASource I June 28, 2013 

Syria' The President Speaks {25] 

MENASource I June 24,2013 

Syria: The G7+1 Communique 1261 

MENASource I June 19, 2013 

Syria' A Crossing for its Own Sake? {271 

MENASource I June 14, 2013 

Syria: Is Geneva II the Key? 

{28IMENASource I June 13, 2012 

Syria' Seven Qs and As on Military Intervention 1291 

MENASource I June 11, 2012 

Syria: Hezbollah's Military Intervention 

{301MENASource I June 5,2013 

Syria' Steps to Resolve the problem from Hell 

[31IMENASource I June 4, 2013 

Syria' Is a No-Fly Zone on the Table? {32{ 

MENASource I May 30,2013 

Syria: America's Stake {33{ 

MENASource I May 23,2013 

Syria: Will Geneva Happen? Should it Happen? [341 

Viewpoint I May 20,2013 

Syria: Geneva Resurrected? [35] 

Viewpoint I Mav 8, 2013 
61 

Syria' Keeping One's Eye on the 8all [3" 

Viewpoint I May 7. 2013 

Syria: The Chemical Weapons Red Line 

(37)Viewpoint I May 1. 2013 

Syria and Geneva: No precondition. but a Certain Result [38] 

Viewpoint I April 25, 2013 

Syria: Defending the Indefensible [39] 

Viewpoint I April 22, 2013 

Consent of the Governed' A New Middle East Political Order? [40] 

Viewpoint I April 15, 2013 

The No Fly Zone Conundrum 

[,,)Viewpoint I April 08, 2013 

A New Syria Must Have US Support [42] 

Washington Post I March 27, 2013 

Syria: Is Iraq the Wrong Lesson? [43] 

Viewpoint I March 26,2013 

The United States Europe and the Case of Syria 

[44)Viewpoint I March 25, 2013 

Syria' A Slippery Slope? 

[45)Viewpoint I March 18, 2013 

Syria's Opposition' Ready or Not? [46] 

Viewpoint I March 11, 2013 

Can Syria Survive? [47] 

Viewpoint I March 8,3013 

Syria: Kerry's Opening to the Free Syrian Army [48] 

Viewpoint I March 5, 2013 

Syria: From Objective to Strategy ['9] 

Viewpoint I February 22, 2013 

Syria' Thinking Strategically [5ll] 

Viewpoint I February 19, 2013 

The President's Decision-Making on Syria 

(51)Viewpoint I February 12, 2013 

Syria' Transitional Government and US Choices 

[52)Viewpoint I January 29, 2013 

Syria: Strategy for What? [53] 
62 

Viewpoint I January 23, 2013 

Syria: Is It Too Late? [541 

Viewpoint I January 14, 2013 

Forming a Syrian Opposition Government: The Time is Now [551 

Viewpoint I January 8, 2013 

Syria 2013' Will the Poison Pill of Sectarianism Work? [561 

Viewpoint I January 3, 2013 

Syria's Time is Running Out [57[ 

Foreign Policy I December 19, 2012 

Syria: Seven Key Points [581 

Viewpoint I December 13, 2012 

The Dublin Meeting and its Meaning for Syria [591 

Viewpoint I December 07,2012 

Syria: Has the Bubble Burst? [601 

Viewpoint I December 05,2012 

Source URl: http·I/www.acus.org/users/frederic-c-hof 

Links: 

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[2] http://www.acus.org/program/hariri-middle-east-center 

[3] http://www.acus.org/newshof104 

[4] http://www.abc.net.auI7.30IcontentI2013Is3784533.htm 

[5] http://www.acus.org/news/frederic-hof-us-military-and-political-options-syria-npr 

[6J http://www.acus.org/news/frederic-hof-obama-administrations-hopes-solution-syria-bbc-world-service 

[7] http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/20 13/05/03/a-candid-discussion-with-frederic-hofl 

[8] http://www.acus.org/news/frederic-c-hof -political-solution-syria-radio-rai-1 

[9] http://www.acus.org/news/frederic-c-hof-assisting-armed-rebels-syria-pbs-newshour 

[10] http://www.acus.orgfnewsffrederlc-c-hof -us-response-syrian-conflict-nprs-morning-edition 

[11] hUp:l/www.acus.org/news/frederic-c-hof-us-policy-syria-orient-tv 

[12] http://www.bbc.co.uklprogrammeslb01r1878 

[13] http://www.acus.org/news/hof-crisis-syria-al-arabiya 

[14] http://alhayat.com/Details/471490 

[15] http://m.nprorglnewslWorldl168883337 

[16] http://www.bbc.co.uklprogrammeslp012ph66 

[17] http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/12/backlash-to-u-s-moves-in-syria/ 

[18] http://www .pbs.orglnewshourlbbtworldlju[y·dec12Isyria2 _12-12 html 

[19] http://www.npr. orgI20121121091166819229Isyria·conflict·cou[d·escalate·in-many·directions 

[20] http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bbJworld/july-dec12/syria2_12-0S.html 

[21] http://www .npr. orgI20121121181167549822Ipolitical-and·military·pressure·tightens·on·damascus 

[22] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-blackberry-diplomacy 

[23] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-allies-angle 

[24] hUp:Jlwww.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-war-and-peace 

[25] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-president-speaks 

[26] http://www.acus.org/viewpoinVsyria-g71-communiqu%C3%A9 

[27] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-crossing-its-own-sake 

[28] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-geneva-ii-key 

[291 http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-seven-qs-and-military-intervention 

[30] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-hezbollahs-military-lntervention 

[311 http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-steps-reso!ve-problem-heII 
63 

[32] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-no-f1y-zone-table 

[33] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-americas-stake 

[34] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-wHl-geneva-happen-should-it-happen 

[35] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-geneva-resurrected 

[36] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-keeping-ones-eye-bal! 

[37] hUp:l/www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-chemical-weapons-red-line 

[38] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-and-geneva-no-precondition-certain-result 

[39] hUp:llwww.acus.org!viewpointlsyria-defending-indefensible 

[40] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlconsent-governed-new-middle-east-political-order 

[41] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlno-f1y-zone-conundrum 

[42] http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-syria-must-have-us-support/2013/03/26/126d4654-962a-11 e2-ge23-

09dce87f75a i_story. html 

[43] http://www.acus.org!viewpointlsyria-iraq-wrong-Iesson 

[44] hUp:llwww.acus.org!viewpointlunited-states-europe-and-case-syria 

[45] hUp:llwww.acus.org/viewpointisyria-slippery-slope 

[46] hUp:llwww.acus.org/viewpointlsyrias-opposition-ready-or-not 

[47] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlcan-syda-be-saved 

[48] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-kerrys-opening-free-sydan-army 

[49] http://www.acus,org/viewpointlsyria-objective-strategy 

[50] hUp:llwww.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-thinking-strategically 

[51] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlpresidents-dedsion-making-syria 

[52] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-transiHonal-govemment-and-us-choices 

[53] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-strategy-what 

[54] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-it-too-late 

[55] hUp:l/www.acus.org/viewpointlforming-syrian-opposition-government-time-now 

{56] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria-2013-will-poison-pill-sectarianlsm-work 

[57] http://www.foreignpo!lcy.com/articiesf2012/12/19!sydas_time_is_running_out 

[58] http://www.acus.org/viewpointlsyria~seven-key~points 

[59] http://www.acus.org/viewpointldub!in~meeting~and-its-meaning-syria 

[60] http://www.acus.org'viewpointlsyria~has-bubble-burst 
64 
65 
66 
67 

The Security Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic: 

Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Policy Options 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, July 17,2013 

Mona Yacoubian, Senior Advisor, Middle East, The Stimson Center 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the House Al1l1cd Services Committee, for inviting 

me to speak this moming. I very much appreciate this opportunity to address the complex topic 

of the security situation in Syria and its implications for the United States. The timing for this 

important hearing could not be better as the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, and U.S. 

policy makers face a series of extraordinarily difficult questions on how to respond. 

In preparation for this hearing, I was asked to consider a number of key questions revolving 

around the issue of whether the U.S. military should be further engaged in Syria and if so, to 

what end. The current discussion in Washington has focused on a number of military options 

including the enforcement of a no-fly zone, the creation of a humanitarian cOlTidor or buffer 

zone, and the arming of Syrian rebels. 

In addressing potential benefits and limitations of various military options currently under 

consideration, I was also asked to elaborate on the strategic objective that would be achieved 

through greater U.S. military engagement in Syria as well as to articulate why the situation in 

Syria is significant to U.S. national security interests. 

The Security Situation in Syria 

Before tackling these thomy questions, I would like to first offer my assessment of the current 

sccurity situation in Syria. Now well into its third year, Syria's uprising is by far the most brutal 

of the Arab revolts. It rapidly evolved from a peaceful protest movement to an armed uprising in 

the face of brutal govemment repression. The Syrian regime has spared no effort to put down the 

uprising, including the use of airstrikes and ballistic missiles against civilians and the alleged use 

ofchemical weapons. Unfortunately, Syria's crisis has now morphed into a sectarian civil war 

with significant spillover effects on Syria's neighbors, particularly Lebanon and Iraq. 

The conflict has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe. More than 100,000 Syrians have been 

killed, primarily civilians. The United Nations estimates nearly 2 million refugees have fled 

Syria, while more than 4 million Syrians are intemally displaced. Even larger numbers of Syrians 

are in need of humanitarian assistance including food and medical aid. Concems over the spread 

of disease and malnutrition are mounting. Syria has witnessed significant devastation, including 

widespread destruction of public infrastructure, schools, mosques and homes. 

As the conflict grinds on, the military situation on the ground suggests that Syria's civil war 

could endure for years. Over the past few months, the Syrian army has succeeded in 

consolidating its control over some key strategic areas. Assisted by a doubling down of military 

support from Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah, the Syrian regime secured 

an important military victory in Qusayr. It is now waging a battle to re-take Homs, Syria's third 

largest city. The regime has also worked to root out rebels iYom the Damascus suburbs. It may 

also seek to re-take Aleppo, mired in a brutal stalemate for nearly a year. Taken together these 
68 

gains would mark an important consolidation of regime control over Damascus and the strategic 

corridor leading to the Mediterranean coast where Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's Alawite 

sect has established a secure area. 

However, Syria will not return to the status quo ante. Vast swathes of Syrian territory remain 

largely out of the regime's control. While the armed groups have not managed to seize control 

of any of Syria's major cities, they do control large areas of the countryside as well as the 

provincial capital of Raqqa on the Euphrates River. The Kurdish region of northeastern Syria is 

increasingly autonomous, while Sunni-dominated areas north and east of Aleppo are under the 

sway of aImed rebel groups. It is difficult to envision how the Syrian army would be able to retake all of this lost territory. 

At the same time, rebel groups remain unable to coalesce and continue to lack unified command 

and control structures. Indeed, if anything armed groups inside Syria are growing more fractious 

and have increasingly started to turn their arms on each other - a deeply conceming sign for the 

future. In addition, numerous reports suggest an increasing number of foreign fighters are 

entering the Syrian arena. Arab jihadists from North Africa, Egypt and the Gulf, as well as 

fighters from as far afield as Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Caucasus are joining the battle. 

From the uprising's start, the Syrian opposition, both armed and unarmed, has been riven with 

personal and ideological rivalries. Unfortunately, they have not managed to unite around a clear 

vision of a post-Assad Syria. Moreover, the external opposition lacks significant support inside 

Syria. Meanwhile, the political opposition inside Syria has been eclipsed by the anned groups as 

the country descends deeper into civil war. 

Three emerging trends among the armed groups suggest a deepening and protracting of Syria's 

contlict, with dim prospects for a resolution any time soon. 

First, radical elements among the armed groups-particularly those espousing a 

Salafi-jihadist ideology, appear to be gaining ground and imposing their ways on the 

civilian popUlation. This trend was brutally illustrated in an episode last month when 

Islamic extremists tortured and then publicly executed a IS-year-old boy for allegedly 

committing blasphemy. The incident is perhaps the most egregious, but not the only such 

example. Increasingly, civilians are chafing at the strictures ofhardlinc jihadists whose 

harsh interpretations of Islamic rule collide with the more tolerant approach that has long 

characterized Syria. 

Second, as ideological divisions and competition for control among armed groups 

intensify, rival rebels are increasingly fighting each other. Sporadic episodes of 

intra-rebel fighting have been reported over the past several months in various areas of 

rebel control. In Raqqa, for example, members of the al-Nusra front, an al-Qaeda aligned 

group, have engaged in battles with members ofthe Farouq brigade which is allied with 

the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Last week several FSA fighters in Idlib province were 

killed in intense fighting with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), another AIQaeda affiliated group. The jihadist extremists beheaded the FSA battalion commander 

and his brother. In another episode last week, a senior FSA commander was shot dead by 

ISIS elements in the coastal governorate of Latakia. 

Third, even among "moderate" armed groups, acts of sectarian extremism have 

been documented. The most egregious case concerned an atrocity committed by a 
69 

commander (since renounced by the group) with the Farouq Brigade, considered among 

the more moderate ofthe armed groups. In a widely viewed video, the commander cut 

out and ate the heart of a slain Syrian soldier. The episode underscores Syria's deepening 

sectarianism and legitimizes fears among Syria's minority community that there would 

be no place for them in a post-Assad Syria. As the Sunni-dominated armed opposition 

increasingly resorts to sectarian violence, Syria's Alawite and Christian communities will 

likely adhere to their reluctance to disavow the Assad regime which increasingly may be 

perceived as the lesser of two evils. 

Implications of Syria's Military Stalemate 

The net effect of both regime and rebel actions on the ground suggests that Syria is entrenched in 

a protracted military stalemate that could last years. In this scenario, the regime would maintain 

its control of Damascus, perhaps Horns, and possibly other key cities, as well as the ancestral 

Alawite homeland in western Syria. Proliferating anned groups would continue to battle both the 

regime and, increasingly, cach other. Yet, neither the regime nor the rebels would emerge 

victorious. 

As the fighting continues, Syrian civilians will suffer the greatest toll. Refugee flows are already 

projected to grow to 3.5 million by year's end. Jordan's resources are already stretched thin 

from hosting nearly half a million Syrian refugees and additional inflows could tip the country 

into a period of significant instability. Lebanon will also bear a significant impact should its 

Syrian refugee population~currently one million~continue to swell, particularly given its 

delicate confessional balance. 

The conflict's sectarian aspects will likely grow more acute, with destabilizing consequences for 

the region. SyTia is increasingly an arena of competition for regional proxies of Iran and the 

Sunni Gulf states. This proxy dimension further complicates the conflict, deepening its sectarian 

aspects. Already, Lebanon and Iraq, have witnessed a notable escalation in sectarian strife related 

to Syria's fallout. Iraq has been plagued with the worst spate of sectarian violence in five years. 

Enflamed sectarian tensions in Lebanon could fmiher deteriorate into prolonged instability. 

Indeed, as the Syrian conflict's boundaries grow more blurred, a dangerous sectarian dynamic is 

sweeping the region from the Mediterranean to Baghdad and beyond. 

In this scenario, which I believe to be the most likely, no military solution exists to the Syrian 

conflict. Neither the regime nor the rebels will be able to gain a sufficient military advantage to 

vanquish the other side. If a military victory is to be had, it would come at a huge price, nothing 

less than the country itself. The pursuit of all-out military victory would in essence lead to the 

complete destruction of Syria. 

Instead, the resolution will have to be political and will need to come as the result of 

negotiations. History suggests that it could take some time before the parties are ready to come to 

the negotiating table. Lebanon's civil war endured for 15 years before it ended via the Ta'if 

accord. The key questions for U.S. policy makers center on whether levers exist which can 

accelerate the path toward negotiation. Can the strategic calculus of the Syrian conflict's key 

protagonists be shifted toward favoring a political outcome? How do we get there? What 

leverage can be used by the United States and other external actors to shift the paradigm toward 

negotiation? Can military intervention playa role in shifting the calculus? 
70 

Syria's Significance for U.S. National Security Interests 

Syria's geostrategic location in the heart of the Arab world, its growing impOliance as ajihadist 

arena, and its vast chemical weapons stockpile endow it with important strategic significance for 

U.S. national security interests. 

Geostrategic location. Syria borders several countries in which the United States has 

significant equities: Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. As such, the Syrian conf1ict's 

outcome could directly impact the stability of countries holding crucial importance to the 

United States. It has already adversely affected stability in Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. 

Moreover, the Syrian conflict's sectarian spillover has the potential to destabilize the 

entire region, with the possibility of cascading crises in Jordan, Iraq and even further into 

the Gulf In addition, Syria borders Lebanon, home to Hezbollah, a potent U.S. adversary. 

Jihadist arena. Certain aspects ofthe Syrian arena make it particularly attractive to 

jihadists, perhaps even more than Iraq. First, unlike Iraq, the majority ofSyTia's 

population is Sunni Arab (65%), living under the harsh rule of an Alawite minority for 

more than four decades. Salafi jihadisls consider Alawites to be apostates and have long 

called for the overthrow of the Assad regime. Second, the pmticular brutality of the 

Assad regime's repression of the Sunni opposition, unleashing ballistic missiles and even 

chemical weapons on its civilian population, has deepened jihadist rage against the Assad 

regime, making the imperative of its overthrow even more urgent. Third, Syria shares a 

border with Israel, bringing the jihadists even closer to their goal of a transnational 

caliphate that includes Jerusalem. While Iraq provided an opening to bring the jihadist 

struggle more directly into the Arab world than Afghanistan, Syria affords the 

opportunity to fight the battle at the region's heart. 

Chemical Weapons (CW) stockpiles. Syria is reported to have one ofthe largest 

chemical weapons stockpiles in the world. It possesses stocks of sarin, mustard gas, and 

possibly the nerve agent VX. U.S. and other intelligence agencies report with a high 

degree of certainty that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons, namely sarin, on a 

small scale against armed opposition groups, possibly on multiple occasions. 

The combination of these three elements: geostrategic importance,jihadist arena, and CW 

stockpiles comprises a potent mix that could dramatically threaten U.S. national security 

interests. In particular, thc specter ofjihadist elements or Hezbollah gaining access to chemical 

weapons would constitute a key threat to U.S. national security interests. Similarly, Syria's 

descent into all-out chaos, given the presence of jihadists and chemical weapons in the hem of 

the Arab world, would pose a threat of significant magnitude to U.S. regional allies. 

Assessing U.S. Military Options in Syria 

While it is important to keep all options on the table, I do not believe the U.S. military should 

become further engaged in the Syrian crisis at this point. Syria's complexity cannot be 

overemphasized, and our "on-the-ground" knowledge of the conflict is deeply limited. The 

downside risks of various military options under consideration-ti'om arming to enforcing a nofly zone-are considerable. Syria's growing chaos-marked by deepening rivalries among the 

armed groups and growing influence ofjihadist extremists-is not propitious for U.S. military 

engagement. Indeed, the use of force-whether direct or indirect-could exacerbate rather than 

improve the situation on the ground, with dire consequences for the United States and the region. 
71 

Arming the rebels. I will focus primarily on the question of arming the rebels, currently a 

topic of fierce debate. While arming is perhaps the least expensive option and requires the lowest 

level of U.S. commitment, it is fraught with risk for U.S. national security interests and would 

further endanger S)Tian civilians rather than enhance their protection. Among the key risks 

inherent in arming: 

Effective vetting is very difficult. Despite our growing relationship with certain 

elements of Syria's armed opposition, ensuring that weapons do not end up in the wrong 

hands is a difficult proposition at best. First, our understanding of these rapidly 

proliferating and evolving groups remains limited given our absence on the ground inside 

Syria. Moreovcr, arms arc fluid; they are the currency of war, moving seamlessly from 

hand to hand. Youtube videos already attest to sophisticated weapons purchased fi'om 

Croatia by Saudi Arabia ending up in the possession of al-Qaeda militants in Syria. In 

addition, recent press reports indicate that Iranian-backed Shiite militias fighting for the 

regime have U.S. weapons, perhaps captured, stolen, or purchased on the black market. 

Both examples highlight that it is virtually impossible to guarantee that U.S. arms 

flowing into a chaotic Syrian arena could not one day end up with those who would do 

harm to the United States or our allies. 

Arming will further escalate the conflict. Arming necessarily accelerates the Syrian 

conflict's dangerous escalation by provoking a commensurate (or possibly 

disproportionate) increase in arms flows to the Syrian regime by its allies. The past few 

months have already witnessed a dramatic increase in Iranian and Russian military 

support to the regime, likely spurred by earlier rebel gains. The pursuit of a military 

"edge" over the regime is an illusory quest that will more likely lock us into an escalatory 

dynamic, further protracting the connic!. As an increase in arms to the rebels is met by 

heightened arming of the regime, urgent rebel requests for greater and more sophisticated 

U.S. weapons will undoubtedly follow. Moreover, with intra-rebel fighting gaining 

prominence, U.S. arms could also end up fueling these battles rather than the fight against 

the regime. 

Syrian civilians will suffer. The understandable moral outrage over the suffering of the 

Syrian people has prompted urgent calls for the United States to "do something." Yet, 

from a civilian protection standpoint, anning is possibly the worst option. In a February 

2013 report evaluating the impact of various military interventions on civilians, the 

Center for Civilians in Conflict noted that arming "presents the greatest risk of civilian 

harm" mainly due to misuse and unintended proliferation. While not on the same scale as 

the Syrian regime, Syrian rebels are increasingly accused of committing human rights 

abuses and war crimes. Civilians have been caught in the middle of a widening conflict, 

suffering the greatest casualties. Sending more arms into the conflict will likely only 

increase the hann done to civilians. 

Taking sides in a sectarian civil war heightens threats. Syria has now evolved into a 

sectarian civil war with regional spillover. By funneling arms to one side, the United 

States is explicitly taking sides and potentially exposing U.S. interests to a wider range of 

threats. The United States paid a high price for engaging in Lebanon's civil war in the 

I 980s, most notably with the embassy and marine barracks bombings. 

Post-conflict challenges. Flooding Syria with arms today will make post-conflict 

stability and re-construction significantly more difficult. Previous conflicts, including 
72 

most recently in Libya, have demonstrated that recovering anns in a post-conf1ict zone is 

challenging at best. Arms proliferation increases the likelihood for militias to remain in 

place post-contlict, dramatically reducing the possibility of establishing peace and the 

rule of law. Anns may also flow out of Syria to other conflicts, fueling instability 

elsewhere. 

Enforcing a no-fly zone/creating humanitarian corridors or buffers. This subset of options 

necessarily requires a much more significant investment of U.S. resources. It would also entail 

the cooperation of Turkey and Jordan whose national security interests would also need figure 

into the arrangements, adding yet another layer of complexity. 

The potential for unintended consequences would be high. The direct use of force in Syria would 

constitute an act of war, directly exposing the United States to a far more significant set of risks. 

Such options also entail far more severe repercussions should they tail. I am not a military 

strategist, but my basic understanding is that enforcing a no-fly zone or creating humanitarian 

safe zones would necessarily demand a significant commitment of U.S. force, could be long and 

messy, and still not guarantee civilian safety. Indeed, civilians would likely be casualties as part 

ofthese operations. Syria reportedly has one of the most sophisticated air defense systems in the 

world. Neutralizing Syria's air defenses would require a major commitment oftorce, with a high 

likelihood of collateral damage. 

Moreover, the potential for "mission creep" is extremely high. Numerous questions arise 

surrounding the extent and duration ofthese options. What would be the end goal? What if it is 

not successful? What are the next steps'? Regime change in Syria could emerge as a necessary 

follow-on option, dramatically increasing the stakes for the United States. In essence, engaging 

the U.S. military more directly via the enforcement of a no-fly zone or the creation of 

humanitarian safe zones stipulates a far deeper U.S. commitment with a greater likelihood that 

the United States ends up "owning" the Syria problem, at a potentially significant cost of U.S. 

blood and treasure. 

Use of force as part of a broader negotiation strategy. While I remain skeptical about the 

effectiveness of military options in the current environment, a bigger strategic question 

concerning the use of lorce as a means to reach negotiations is worth considering. 

Circumstances could arise in which the limited use of force, specifically targeted airstrikes, may 

alter the strategic calculations of key players on the ground and pave the way toward 

negotiations. Such circumstances are not easy to discern, but could revolve around a confirmed, 

large scale chemical weapons attack killing a significant number of civilians. Other egregious 

acts resulting in either large-scale civilian casualties and/or major spillover into one of Syria's 

neighbors could also serve as a platfonn for the limited use of force. 

Of course, the risks of targeted airstrikes are also significant. To minimize these risks, the use of 

standoff weaponry, likely ship-borne missiles, would be in order. Such strikes would need to be 

undertaken in concert with key allies. Equally important, the use of surgical military strikes 

should necessarily be embedded in a well-conceived political and diplomatic strategy that seeks 

to resolve the cont1ict through negotiations. Target selection should aim to both strongly signal 

US. and allied resolve and also to prompt key actors on the ground to shift their calculus. An 

effective strategic communications strategy would also be a necessary component ofthis option. 

While the potential Jar "mission creep" also exists with limited surgical strikes, the risk could be 
73 

minimized if this option is undertaken with clearly-defined objectives that seek to directly 

address an egregious act and alter the cost-benefit analysis of key actors on the ground. 

Conclusion 

The United States cannot afford to ignore Syria. Yet, there is no "silver bullet" for resolving 

Syria's conflict. Military options are not likely to be successful unless embedded in a wellconceived political and diplomatic strategy. While this hearing's focus is on the pros and cons of 

greater U.S. military involvement in Syria, the political and diplomatic dimensions of U.S. 

strategy toward Syria should take precedence. To the extent possible, the United States should 

work to help bring the Syrian contlict toward resolution by working through international and 

regional channels to find a political solution to the contlict. Understanding that this could take 

time, the United State must work to assuage the human suffering that has accompanied the 

contlict, leveraging support fi'om both regional and international actors to address Syria's 

growing humanitarian crisis. As well. the United States should seek to insulate regional allies 

from Syrian spillover and help tamp down regional tensions. 

U.S. military options should be evaluated in this broader context. Ultimately, U.S. military 

options should be deployed in the service of a broader political and diplomatic strategy. A more 

aggressive U.S. military posture in the absence of a deeper, coherent strategy is unlikely to bring 

Syria closer to resolution, improve humanitarian conditions, or minimize regional spillover. In 

fact, such involvement could exacerbate the situation. 

Moreover, greater U.S. military involvement in Syria must be assessed not only in terms of 

whether it would bring Syria closer to resolution. The impact of military engagement must also 

be measured on an Arab world that is fraught with tension and in the midst of destabilizing 

change. Across the region-from North Africa to Egypt to the Levant and the Oulf--U.S. 

engagement has been met with suspicion and at times, outright hostility. Policy makers and 

military planners therefore must also assess the impact of greater U.S. military engagement on 

this volatile region more broadly. 

Finally. the American public has also expressed deep skepticism about the merits of greater U.S. 

military engagement in Syria. While respondents appear to be supportive of humanitarian 

assistance, even the most limited of U.S. military options -arming the rebels has been met with 

disapproval. Americans have no appetite for U.S. engagement in a third Middle Eastern war. 
74 

o.jona YaC015b,all: I ,-perb' (he "l'm~(ln Ceuter i I'rHgmMlC "lep" for (,Iohal Sectlnl~ 

TO 

MIDDLE EAST/SOUTHWEST ASIA 

Mona Yacoubian JOined the Stimson Center in November 2011. Her work focuses on the Arab Uprisings, 

that expiores the dynamics propelling the Arab revolts and seeks innovative poiicy solutions that will ensure 

that the region embarks on a path towards peace and prospenty, Ms. Yacoublan also co-directs the 

She previously served as a Special Advisor 

and Senior Program Offl-cer on the Middle East at the US Institute of Peace, where her work focused on 

Lebanon and Syria as weU as broader Issues related to democratization m the Arab world. MS.YacQublan has 

worked as a consultant on the Middle East for several years. From 1990-1997, she served uS the North 

Africa analyst at the US Depelltment of State, 

Ms. Yacoubian 15 a frequent commentator on the Arab world and IS a member of the Counci! on Foreign 

Relations. She was a Fulbright Scholar In Syria (1985-86) and held an International Affairs Fellowship with 

the Council on Foreign Relations, Ms. Yacoubian has an MPA from Harvard University's Kennedy School of 

Government and a SA from Duke University. 

12, 2014, Tnternational Business 

Times 

2013, Foreign Affairs 

May 10, 2013, CNN.com 

March 7,2013, Council on Foreign Relations 

February 2013, Stimson Center 

February 21, 2013, Foreign Policy 

February [, 2012, Stimson Center 

December 10, 2012, Stimson Center 

September 21, 2012 in The Hif/ 

202.z38-9604 
75 

o.jona YaC015b,all: I ,-perb (he "l'm~(ln Ceuter i I'rHgmMlC "tep" for (,Iohal Sectlnl~ 

30, 2012, Ai Monitor 

23, 2012, The Monkey Cage 

18, 2012, Stimson Center 

May 29, 2012, Council on Foreign Relation 

f'.-1ay 1, 2011, AI MOnitor 

March 30, 2012, Room for Debate, New York Times 

March I, 2012, Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy 

February 23, 2012, Stlmson Center 

2011, The Hi!! 

"Syna and the New Iraq: Between RlVahy and Rapprochement," in Iraq, 1t;; Neighbors and the United 

States: Competition, CriSiS, and the Reordering of Power, edited by Henn Barkey, Scott Lasensky, and 

Phebe Marr (United States Institute of Peace, 2011) 

December 1, 2011, Foreign Affillrs 

(Peace 

Bnef) October 2011, U.s. institute of Peace 

2011, Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy 

-Go,eN,m"ntai "'goni"tl,,",," In Seismic Shift: Understanding Change In the Middle East, May 

20]1, Stimson Center 

May 2011, Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy 

April 18, 2011, U. S. Institute of Peace 

November 2009, U.S. Institute of Peace 

Middle East Journal, Summer 

2009 (SUbscription reqUired to access full article) 

R,p/atjons, CounCil Special Report No. 

33, June 2008 

in TIle Challenge of 

Isiamists for EU and US Poitcies: Conflict, Stabifity and Reform, SWP and USIP, November 2007 (Link to 

complete publication) 

(US Institute of 

Peace, 2007) 

(U.s. Institute of Peace, 2005) 

18, 2013, Interview on WH'I'Y's 

"Radio Times with Marty Moss-Coane" 
76 

o.jona YaC015b,all: I ,-perb (he "l'm~(ln Ceuter i I'rHgmMlC "tep" for (,Iohal Sectlnl~ 

18,2013, Interview 

on SiriusXf'<l's. "The Morning Briefing with Tim Farley" 

EditIOn 

Mormng Ed!tlon 

Journal 

2013, Interview on (-SPAN Washington Journal 

2013, on C~SPAN 

May 30, 2013, at Council on Foreign Relations 

j\1ay 14, 2013, on NPR Morning 

May 12, 2013, on COY 

Apnl 24, 2013, on NPR 

March 10, 2013, CSPAN's Washington Journal 

" December 18, 2012, Center for National Poiicy 

December 9,2012, on C-SPAN's Washington 

October 25, 20l2, National Council on US-Arab Relatlons 

Institute 

KQED Radio (NPR affiliate) 

NewsHour 

FM (Los Angeles, California) 

Washington, DC) 

WHY'( 90.9 FM, Philadelphia, PA) 

Washington, DC) 

Peace 

September 27, 2012, Middle East 

September 17, 2012, Forum with j\1ichael Krasny 

September 14, 2012, on Encounl-ef, a VOA news radio program 

11,2012, on PBS 

June 3, 2012, on C-SPAN's Washington Joumal 

17,2012, 

15, 2012, Inside Syria (AI Jazeera) 

December 23,2011, KPFK 90,7 

17,2011, Diane Rehm Show (NPR affiliate WAMU 88,5 FM, 

June 23, 2011, Arab American Institute 

18,2011, Bloggingheads.tv 

14,2011, Radio Times with Marty Moss-Coane (NPR affiliate 

February 2, 2011, Blogglngheads,tv 

January 26, 2011, Kojo Nnamdl Show (NPR affiliate WAMU 88,5 FM, 

«.,an"'""w, 2010, Middle East Institute 

2009, u.s. Institute of 
77 

i\1Ulld YJ~OllbIJJ11 !"l~rb i rhe SlIIll'>OI1 Center, PrJgmnllC Step, forGlob31 Seelln!} 

July 9, 2009, KOJo Nnamdl Show (NPR affiliate 

WAMU 88.5 FM, Washington, DC) 

February 5, 

2009, Council on Foreign Relations Podcast 
78 

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(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic fOlm not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: ___ !..!M~o.!.!n!.!a!..Y~a~co~I~lb~i!.!!a.!.!n,--______ _ 

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79 

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2 
80 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 17, 2013 

(83) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Mr. ABRAMS. I believe our intelligence agencies are in touch with a wide variety 

of groups, as are friendly and cooperative agencies of other governments. Presumably we are looking for individuals who are, first of all, Syrian rather than foreign, 

and who have no known connection to AQ or any group related to it. And we would 

be looking for effectiveness in the current fighting: good leadership, skilled use of 

whatever arms they have, ability to recruit. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 17, 2013 

(87) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The U.N. envoy to Iraq told the U.N. Security Council yesterday 

that ‘‘Iraqi armed groups have an increasingly active presence in Syria’’ and that 

the conflict in Syria was spreading to Iraq, as Iraqi groups reportedly take up arms 

against each other in Syria. Iraq just had its bloodiest four months in 5 years, with 

nearly 3,000 people killed and over 7,000 injured. Coupled with Hezbollah’s strong 

support of the Assad regime and the spike in violence in Lebanon tied to Syrian 

involvement, this has all the signs of a dangerous regionalization of the Syrian civil 

war. How much further might this spread without further aid or intervention by the 

U.S. and its allies? Does it still make sense to think of this as a Syrian conflict? 

If the Syrian war ended tomorrow, how much of this conflict would persist in other 

venues, such as sectarian conflict in Iraq or Lebanon—in other words, is Syria now 

a pressure valve for other simmering regional conflicts? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Syria’s civil war is now a proxy war, due to the introduction of Iranian and Hezbollah troops, and due to the massive refugee flows it is now a source 

of regional instability. In my view, the remaining questions are how long it will go 

on and who will win. If Assad survives due to Iranian help, Iran and Hezbollah will 

have defeated the United States, EU, and our Arab allies and power relationships 

in the entire region will have changed. Syria is in my view less a pressure valve 

for other conflicts than a cause for exacerbating them—and a means for Iran and 

Hezbollah to diminish the influence of the United States in the entire region. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I share concerns that have been expressed about aid, particularly 

lethal aid, being directed to some of the more extremist elements of the Syrian rebel 

groups. Is the United States doing enough to coordinate with other aid-donating 

countries to dry up such aid and focus efforts on less extreme elements, and if not, 

what more can and should be done? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I don’t believe we can coordinate effectively with others if we are 

not in this game. Why should they take our advice? If we want to influence who 

gets aid, as we should, we will have to start providing aid ourselves. Then we’ll be 

in a good position to know more, and to influence whom our allies are assisting. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What are the United States and partner countries, particularly 

those with significant refugee populations such as Jordan and Turkey, doing to combat the spread of radicalism within the refugee camps? As these camps grow larger 

and more established, is there a need to provide more robust efforts, and what 

might these look like? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Both governments are trying to police the camps, using combinations 

of border controls on who gets in, police in the camps, intelligence work, and military patrols near the camps. I hope and assume we are in close discussions with 

both governments about the security challenges they face and how we might help. 

Intelligence sharing and financial aid to their military and police agencies would 

seem to be helpful. But fundamentally we must rely on them to protect themselves 

and let us know when help is needed. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am deeply concerned that the spillover of both refugees and violence into Lebanon could further destabilize that country, particularly as the full effects of Hezbollah’s overt support of the Assad government lead to increased sectarian tensions. Beyond addressing the conflict inside the borders of Syria, is there 

more that the U.S. and its partners can do to prevent destabilization of the Lebanese government, or is it now inextricably tied to the Syrian conflict? Can Hezbollah 

and the Assad regime be decoupled, or is Hezbollah now in too deep to change 

course? Can you explain the impacts of Hezbollah’s decision to back Assad on its 

standing within the region? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Hezbollah has cast its lot with Assad, presumably at the call of Iran 

but in its own interests as well. It is already paying a price in the region and inside 

Lebanon: once seen as a bold opponent of Israel and popular for this reason among 

Sunnis, Hezbollah is now seen as a Shiite group willing to sacrifice Sunnis, and indeed its own country, for Shia group interests and Iran. Hezbollah and the Assad 

regime will be decoupled now in only one way: the demise of the Assad regime. For 

now, while war continues in Syria, instability in Lebanon is guaranteed and unavoidable. There isn’t much we can do in Lebanon to change this. For example, the 
88 

Lebanese Army is refusing to police the border with Syria or to challenge Hezbollah, 

so increasing our aid to it does not seem to me an effective route. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What might a successful political settlement in Syria look like, and 

how has that changed since the confirmation of the Assad regime’s use of chemical 

weapons? 

Mr. ABRAMS. A successful political settlement can’t be conjured out of thin air, 

and must reflect the balance on the ground. So if we want a successful outcome, 

the rebels must be winning militarily. It might then be possible to negotiate for a 

new transitional government that represents all Syrian population groups and gives 

real guarantees to prevent violence against the Alawite community. All this is much 

harder now, as time has passed and there has been massive loss of life at the hands 

of the Alawite regime and its regular and irregular forces. The use of chemical 

weapons has the same impact, evoking the desire for revenge. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Historically, how successful has the U.S. been in using the provision of military assistance to empower moderate rebel groups, and what are the 

prospects for using such aid to increase U.S. influence among the Syrian opposition 

groups in particular? 

Mr. ABRAMS. We certainly got great influence with the contras in Nicaragua, and 

I would suggest in Afghanistan too, with the Northern Alliance. When aid is being 

provided by other governments and groups and we provide little, our influence will 

naturally be limited. I do not suggest that any group will become a tool of American 

policy and nothing more, but provision of support will mean we start to build relationships, know whom we are dealing with, know whom to back with more help, 

and give them reason to listen to us. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, has recently stated that the central strategy for Syria is ‘‘capacity-building’’ 

to help prevent violence within Syria from spreading to its neighbors. He specifically 

mentioned that ‘‘The U.S. will leave some Patriot missile batteries and some F–16 

Fighting Falcon aircraft in Jordan and is working with its Iraqi counterparts, the 

Lebanese armed forces, and Turkey through NATO’’ to ensure that they’re prepared 

to account for the potential spillover effects. Do you agree with this approach? 

Mr. ABRAMS. No, I do not. I believe American passivity regarding Syria is extremely dangerous. Gen. Dempsey would leave the Iranian and Hezbollah expeditionary forces in Syria to defeat the rebels and change the entire power balance in 

the Middle East. Our friends and allies are already wondering why Iranian adventurism and even hegemony appears to be acceptable to the United States. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The U.N. envoy to Iraq told the U.N. Security Council yesterday 

that ‘‘Iraqi armed groups have an increasingly active presence in Syria’’ and that 

the conflict in Syria was spreading to Iraq, as Iraqi groups reportedly take up arms 

against each other in Syria. Iraq just had its bloodiest four months in 5 years, with 

nearly 3,000 people killed and over 7,000 injured. Coupled with Hezbollah’s strong 

support of the Assad regime and the spike in violence in Lebanon tied to Syrian 

involvement, this has all the signs of a dangerous regionalization of the Syrian civil 

war. How much further might this spread without further aid or intervention by the 

U.S. and its allies? Does it still make sense to think of this as a Syrian conflict? 

If the Syrian war ended tomorrow, how much of this conflict would persist in other 

venues, such as sectarian conflict in Iraq or Lebanon—in other words, is Syria now 

a pressure valve for other simmering regional conflicts? 

Mr. HOF. What began as a civil conflict in Syria between peaceful demonstrators 

and a regime that responded with deadly violence quickly became a conflict with 

not only regional, but international implications. Foreign fighters from all over the 

world are now flowing into Syria, while the conflict’s spillover effects on Lebanon, 

Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and other neighbors are becoming dire. Syria is both inflaming sectarian tensions across the region and acting as a theatre where long-standing 

animosities in the Middle East are playing out. 

It is likely that the regional effects of the Syria crisis will outlast the conflict 

itself. Resettlement of millions of refugees who have fled to neighboring states, for 

example, will undoubtedly be a contentious and perhaps dangerous process. Resentment between the Sunni majority in the Middle East and various minorities (Shia, 

Alawite, Christian, Druze, etc.) will fester regardless of whether an internationallysupported negotiated political solution is reached in Syria. 

These disastrous effects underscore the need for an end to the violence in Syria, 

but U.S. military intervention is not a panacea. It is crucial that the United States 

have realistic goals in approaching this dilemma. U.S. military action could destroy 

or significantly degrade the Assad regime’s artillery, air, and missile capabilities in 

order to slow the massive civilian slaughter in Syria and stem the flood of refugees 

into neighboring countries. These measures may have other positive effects as well, 

such as changing the overall combat momentum on the ground. Yet such effects 
89 

should not be assumed. The goal would be to mitigate the effects of the Assad regime’s survival strategy on the neighbors and on the region as a whole. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I share concerns that have been expressed about aid, particularly 

lethal aid, being directed to some of the more extremist elements of the Syrian rebel 

groups. Is the United States doing enough to coordinate with other aid-donating 

countries to dry up such aid and focus efforts on less extreme elements, and if not, 

what more can and should be done? 

Mr. HOF. Who gets arms in Syria and from whom is important. The United 

States, its key allies (UK, France, Turkey), and others (Qatar, Saudi Arabia) must 

try to insure that weaponry going into Syria reaches armed groups committed politically to a Syria in which citizenship reigns supreme over ethnicity, sect, gender, and 

all other ways in which people can be divided politically. The United States, in particular, should not be shy about working closely with Turkey to master weapons logistics and end-use. Most importantly, to be credible with Syrians and regional actors in this role, the United States will have to become directly involved in arming 

units now affiliated with the opposition Supreme Military Council; a process that 

may well be underway 

The Chief of the Supreme Military Council, General Salim Idris, has made clear 

his determination to see to it that the right people get the right arms and equipment. He will need the full support of the United States in this endeavor. It will 

not be enough for the United States to supply lethal assistance of its own. It, with 

the cooperation of Turkey and Jordan, must be in charge of the weapons supply 

chain. Only in this way can the risk of arms going to wrong people be minimized. 

Realistically, however, the risk can never be totally eliminated: no more in Syria 

today than in occupied France during World War II. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What are the United States and partner countries, particularly 

those with significant refugee populations such as Jordan and Turkey, doing to combat the spread of radicalism within the refugee camps? As these camps grow larger 

and more established, is there a need to provide more robust efforts, and what 

might these look like? 

Mr. HOF. The United States should continue to provide resources to non-governmental organizations and the United Nations for humanitarian aid and security for 

refugees in order (among other things) to deter and counter political radicalism in 

refugee camps. Episodes in official refugee camps involving recruitment of child soldiers, sexual violence, and exploitation for labor are particularly alarming, as they 

create dangerous breeding grounds for radicalism if allowed to persist and grow. 

Support of the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Turkish governments and their security 

forces is also important as they attempt to uproot these human rights violations. 

As to what the United States and partner countries are actually doing to combat 

the spread of radicalism in refugee camps, it is a question better put to serving officials. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am deeply concerned that the spillover of both refugees and violence into Lebanon could further destabilize that country, particularly as the full effects of Hezbollah’s overt support of the Assad government lead to increased sectarian tensions. Beyond addressing the conflict inside the borders of Syria, is there 

more that the U.S. and its partners can do to prevent destabilization of the Lebanese government, or is it now inextricably tied to the Syrian conflict? Can Hezbollah 

and the Assad regime be decoupled, or is Hezbollah now in too deep to change 

course? Can you explain the impacts of Hezbollah’s decision to back Assad on its 

standing within the region? 

Mr. HOF. Lebanon’s stability is suffering as a result of the conflict in Syria, due 

in no small part to the historical, political, and demographic linkages between the 

two countries. The duration and outcome of the ongoing war in Syria will undoubtedly have implications for Lebanon’s domestic balance of power and political incentive structures. 

However, Lebanon’s ability to withstand crises that will inevitably come its way 

depends upon the strength of its national institutions. To this end, the United 

States should continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces and encourage its role 

as a neutral arbiter in domestic feuds, stress the need for a formal political process 

in Lebanon including the holding of elections, and continue to finance humanitarian 

relief efforts to help the Lebanese government cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. 

Hezbollah’s choice to participate directly in the conflict on the side of the Syrian 

regime indicates that its relationship with the Assad regime, and more importantly 

the Islamic Republic of Iran, is of more strategic importance to it than the role it 

has built for itself in Lebanese domestic politics. It is unlikely at this point to decouple with the Assad regime, as it has demonstrated itself to be an actor with regional 

considerations that trump its domestic agenda. However, it is difficult to predict 
90 

whether the party’s decision-making process will change if the Assad regime suffers 

decisive military defeat in Syria. 

Without a doubt, Hezbollah’s decision to participate militarily in Syria is having 

a negative effect on its reputation both inside Lebanon and regionally. Hezbollah 

has, in effect, seceded from the Lebanese political system to intervene in Syria at 

Iran’s behest. Many Lebanese, including Shia constituents, are questioning the party’s judgment, demanding to know why such a sacrifice is being made for a corrupt 

Syrian regime. The link between Hezbollah’s leadership and Iran is unbreakable. 

Only if the Iranian-Assad regime link is broken can Hezbollah and the regime be 

decoupled. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What might a successful political settlement in Syria look like, and 

how has that changed since the confirmation of the Assad regime’s use of chemical 

weapons? 

Mr. HOF. A successful political settlement in Syria would follow the roadmap 

specified in the June 30, 2012 Final Communique ́ of the Action Group on Syria, convened in Geneva by former U.N. and Arab League Special Representative Kofi 

Annan. The Final Communique ́, accepted by the Permanent Five members of the 

U.N. Security Council, envisions a ‘‘transitional governing body’’ being created by 

opposition-government negotiations on the basis of mutual consent—i.e., mutual 

veto (thereby ensuring that figures viewed as unacceptable by each side would not 

serve). This governing body, a national unity government perhaps, would receive 

full executive powers from those now exercising them. Although the Final 

Communique ́ did not mention the name ‘‘Assad,’’ it was understood by all that the 

mutual consent process would render him and his regime ineligible for any future 

role in the governance of Syria without requiring his resignation or departure as 

preconditions for the negotiations themselves. Therefore, the Assad regime’s use of 

chemical weapons does not alter the diplomatic framework of negotiations. 

The advantage of a political settlement employing the Geneva model would be 

that it would keep in place large segments of the civilian and security bureaucracy, 

something that could facilitate post-conflict security measures, refugee resettlement 

and humanitarian aid. Indeed, serving members of the current and past government—though not members of the family-based regime—might continue to serve in 

a national unity government. Such a scenario would be reassuring to minorities, 

whose status in Syria has been shaken by the Assad regime’s overtly sectarian survival strategy. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Historically, how successful has the U.S. been in using the provision of military assistance to empower moderate rebel groups, and what are the 

prospects for using such aid to increase U.S. influence among the Syrian opposition 

groups in particular? 

Mr. HOF. It is difficult to identify historical models roughly analogous to the complexities of Syria. There have been cases (El Salvador, Afghanistan) where the U.S. 

provision of arms produced desired, if (in the case of Afghanistan) transient political 

objectives. Still, the lessons learned from mistakes in providing military assistance 

to groups that did not share interests with the United States (in a lasting way) 

should not be forgotten. Yet they need not paralyze U.S. decision-making in a conflict that involves national interests of the United States and its allies. General 

Salim Idriss, Commander of the Free Syrian Army, has shown himself to be a capable, moderate, and pragmatic interlocutor of the United States; a person who merits 

U.S. support. And although there can be no realistic guarantee that all weapons will 

at all times reach their intended recipients, the United States has invested considerable time and resources into the vetting of Syria’s armed opposition to minimize the 

likelihood of this happening. The provision of military assistance is perhaps the only 

way that the United States can both boost its relationship with the moderate Syrian 

opposition, and elevate the position of those groups at the expense of two parties 

steeped in terrorism: the regime and extremist militias attracted to the Syrian conflict by the regime’s sectarian survival strategy 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, has recently stated that the central strategy for Syria is ‘‘capacity-building’’ 

to help prevent violence within Syria from spreading to its neighbors. He specifically 

mentioned that ‘‘The U.S. will leave some Patriot missile batteries and some F–16 

Fighting Falcon aircraft in Jordan and is working with its Iraqi counterparts, the 

Lebanese armed forces, and Turkey through NATO’’ to ensure that they’re prepared 

to account for the potential spillover effects. Do you agree with this approach? 

Mr. HOF. Three broad objectives might usefully frame U.S. efforts with regard to 

Syria: (1) enhancing the security and stability of regional allies and friends being 

inundated with refugees fleeing the Assad regime’s terror campaign of massed fires 

(artillery and air) on civilian population centers beyond its control, as well as massacres in places it can reach on the ground; (2) removing from power a family-based 
91 

regime whose desire to survive and the means it employs constitute a palpable 

threat to regional peace; and (3) replacing that regime with a national unity government dedicated to reform, reconstruction, reconciliation, and rule of law, all in the 

context of non-sectarian citizenship and protection of vulnerable populations. None 

of these objectives implies the desirability of American unilateralism or the inevitable advisability of specific means, military or otherwise, to achieve them. 

Nevertheless U.S. strategy must, by definition, aim to accomplish specific objectives: either the three cited above or others approved by the president. President 

Obama has cited the effects of the Syrian crisis on Syria’s neighbors (including allies 

and friends of the U.S.) as involving serious U.S. interests. These effects are being 

caused by the Assad regime’s habit of shelling and bombing populated areas it does 

not control. One approach to the Assad regime’s terror campaign of artillery, aerial, 

and missile assaults on heavily populated areas beyond its control is to continue to 

pour money and other resources into the countries absorbing the resultant refugee 

flows and other forms of back-blast. Another approach is to press Russia diplomatically to oblige its client to stop the mass terror campaign. Should diplomacy fail, 

a third approach could be to undertake a focused aerial campaign of limited duration aimed at destroying or significantly degrading the ability of the regime to terrorize the Syrian populace with artillery, military aircraft, and missiles; a campaign 

that would feature the use of stand-off weaponry and would require buy-in, at a 

minimum, from Turkey and Jordan: two countries that would benefit greatly from 

such an intervention. 

As for the steps articulated by General Dempsey, they are useful on their own 

merit. They do not, however, rise to the level of ‘‘central strategy.’’ 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The U.N. envoy to Iraq told the U.N. Security Council yesterday 

that ‘‘Iraqi armed groups have an increasingly active presence in Syria’’ and that 

the conflict in Syria was spreading to Iraq, as Iraqi groups reportedly take up arms 

against each other in Syria. Iraq just had its bloodiest four months in 5 years, with 

nearly 3,000 people killed and over 7,000 injured. Coupled with Hezbollah’s strong 

support of the Assad regime and the spike in violence in Lebanon tied to Syrian 

involvement, this has all the signs of a dangerous regionalization of the Syrian civil 

war. How much further might this spread without further aid or intervention by the 

U.S. and its allies? Does it still make sense to think of this as a Syrian conflict? 

If the Syrian war ended tomorrow, how much of this conflict would persist in other 

venues, such as sectarian conflict in Iraq or Lebanon—in other words, is Syria now 

a pressure valve for other simmering regional conflicts? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. The regional spillover repercussions of the Syrian conflict are significant and growing. It is no longer makes sense to consider the Syrian uprising 

as a purely Syrian conflict. It has morphed into a sectarian civil war with significant 

spillover into Syria’s neighbors. The sectarian aspect of Syrian spillover is particularly concerning, given the attendant instability and violence. Sectarian spillover 

has been most pronounced in Iraq and Lebanon, two countries with pre-existing sectarian tensions. To a far lesser extent, Turkey has also experience a degree of sectarian instability with its minority Alavi population, provoked by the Syrian conflict. 

Going forward, primary concerns regarding sectarian spillover will continue to focus 

on Iraq and Lebanon. Iraq’s security situation continued to deteriorate through July 

and August continues to spiral downward. More than 1,000 Iraqis were killed in sectarian violence in July alone. Lebanon is witnessing from mounting sectarian violence that has stoked pre-existing tensions. Lebanon’s population is deeply polarized 

over the question of Syria, with Sunnis largely supporting the rebels and Shia 

standing behind the Syrian regime. As both sides have intensified their involvement 

in Syria, the fight has increasingly come to Lebanon. In particular, the Lebanese 

Shiite militant group Hezbollah’s decision to send fighters to Syria in support of the 

regime has provoked increasingly brazen attacks on Hezbollah’s stronghold, likely 

by Sunni radicals. An August 15 car bombing in the Beirut’s Shiite-dominated 

southern suburbs killed 24 people, making it the most serious bombing since Lebanon’s civil war. Even if the Syrian conflict ended tomorrow, it is likely that sectarian violence in Iraq and Lebanon would persist. The region is now in the throes 

of a powerful sectarian dynamic, supercharged by the violence unleashed by the increasingly tumultuous Arab transitions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I share concerns that have been expressed about aid, particularly 

lethal aid, being directed to some of the more extremist elements of the Syrian rebel 

groups. Is the United States doing enough to coordinate with other aid-donating 

countries to dry up such aid and focus efforts on less extreme elements, and if not, 

what more can and should be done? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. The United States is attempting to streamline and manage the 

arming process in Syria, however with very limited, if any, success. While the U.S. 

government has worked assiduously behind the scenes to help unify the Syrian op-
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position, both political and military, it has repeatedly run into significant roadblocks. The U.S. has worked with key Gulf countries, namely Saudi Arabia and 

Qatar, which provide the bulk of military assistance. The appointment of General 

Salim Idriss as Chief of Staff of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the armed 

element of the Syrian opposition, was intended to spearhead these efforts at coordinating and directing military aid to ‘‘moderate’’ elements within the armed opposition. However, General Idriss’s influence with an increasingly factionalized and extreme armed opposition has remained somewhat limited. Moreover, while Qatar has 

reportedly professed a desire to work more closely with the United States, it is not 

clear the Qataris are willing to implement the stringent controls necessary to insure 

that arms do not get into the hands of al-Qaeda-aligned jihadists. While Saudi Arabia is strongly opposed to the establishment of a jihadist enclave in Syria, Qatar 

appears to be less concerned by this potential scenario. Moreover, beyond official 

Gulf support for the Syrian rebels, private donors, particularly from Kuwait, constitute another key source of military support. Private donations to the rebels are 

extremely difficult to track and virtually impossible to control. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What are the United States and partner countries, particularly 

those with significant refugee populations such as Jordan and Turkey, doing to combat the spread of radicalism within the refugee camps? As these camps grow larger 

and more established, is there a need to provide more robust efforts, and what 

might these look like? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I am not familiar with what efforts are being undertaken in the 

refugee camps to combat radicalism. Turkey hosts fewer refugees than Jordan and 

boasts more modernized facilities. Turkey’s well-developed infrastructure and financial well-being also provide greater assurances that the camps are well-managed 

and not overly-crowded. Jordan, by contrast, is increasingly overwhelmed by mounting refugee flows. A recent U.N. report noted that security is a major concern in 

the Zaatari refugee camp—Jordan’s largest camp with 130,000 refugees—where 

both organized crime networks and armed opposition groups operate in the camp. 

Given the high proportion of youth in the camp, jihadist recruitment is an ongoing 

concern. As the refugee flows out of Syria continue to mount, it is increasingly important to insure that there are adequate resources to meet the growing needs of 

both the refugee population and their host countries. In particular, to stave off 

radicalization and recruitment of teenagers and young men in the camps, it is essential that education efforts as well as after-school programming are enhanced. In 

addition, it will be critical to insure that the camps are provided with adequate security. 

http://www.unhcr.org/51f7d9919.html 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am deeply concerned that the spillover of both refugees and violence into Lebanon could further destabilize that country, particularly as the full effects of Hezbollah’s overt support of the Assad government lead to increased sectarian tensions. Beyond addressing the conflict inside the borders of Syria, is there 

more that the U.S. and its partners can do to prevent destabilization of the Lebanese government, or is it now inextricably tied to the Syrian conflict? Can Hezbollah 

and the Assad regime be decoupled, or is Hezbollah now in too deep to change 

course? Can you explain the impacts of Hezbollah’s decision to back Assad on its 

standing within the region? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Lebanon’s fate has long been intertwined with that of Syria—well 

before the Arab uprisings—and the two countries will continue to impact each other. 

Given that Syria’s conflict is project to endure for months, if not years, Lebanon 

must contend with the challenges of a ‘‘new normal’’—a Syria that has descended 

into a bloody, sectarian civil war. Lebanon’s challenges are further heightened by 

Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Syria. Hezbollah’s ‘‘all-in’’ approach to supporting the Syrian regime has resulted in increasing blowback into Lebanon, further 

exacerbating sectarian tensions with an increasingly radicalized Sunni community. 

Hezbollah has made clear that its support for the Assad regime is unwavering, so 

attempts to ‘‘peel’’ Hezbollah away from Syria are not likely to be successful. 

Hezbollah’s decision to support the Assad regime at all costs has constituted a 

critical strategic choice from which there is likely no return. Hezbollah’s policies of 

sending fighters and providing training and other forms of assistance to the Assad 

regime in an increasingly bloody sectarian civil war has essentially transformed the 

organization from a broad-based ‘‘resistance’’ movement with wide popular support 

across the Arab world to a sectarian militia. As a result, Hezbollah has provoked 

the ire of a Lebanon’s increasingly radicalized Sunni community. Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut, the Bekaa and south Lebanon are increasingly becoming an arena 

of confrontation between Sunni and Shia. Most notably, two car bombings within 

the span of one month in Beirut’s southern suburbs are emblematic of a new era 

of violence in Lebanon, directed specifically at Hezbollah. While Hezbollah will 
93 

maintain its position as the most powerful military force in Lebanon, it will increasingly come under threat from such asymmetric attacks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What might a successful political settlement in Syria look like, and 

how has that changed since the confirmation of the Assad regime’s use of chemical 

weapons? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. At this point, it is extremely difficult to envision a successful political settlement in Syria in the short term. Too much blood has been spilled and 

important opportunities for diplomacy and negotiation have been lost. That said, at 

some point, the Syrian conflict will necessarily reach a point where the parties to 

the conflict are exhausted and ready to negotiate. The conflict still seems far from 

that critical point. However, ultimately, the solution to Syria’s conflict will be political rather than military. A successful political settlement in Syria would maintain 

Syria’s cohesion, rather than allowing for the break up of the country into sectarian 

enclaves. Syria would be a multi-confessional democracy with a market economy in 

which minorities feel safe and a part of a new post-Assad Syria. The confirmation 

of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons, albeit on a small scale, only underscores the extent to which the regime will go to maintain its hold on power. This 

in turn suggests that the conflict will endure for some time before there is any hope 

for political negotiations. Unfortunately, the longer the Syrian conflict lasts, the 

dimmer the prospects are for a successful political settlement. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Historically, how successful has the U.S. been in using the provision of military assistance to empower moderate rebel groups, and what are the 

prospects for using such aid to increase U.S. influence among the Syrian opposition 

groups in particular? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. In general, it is difficult to find examples of how U.S. military 

assistance has been successfully used to empower moderate rebel groups. History 

is, however, replete with examples of negative ‘‘blowback’’ from the U.S. provision 

of arms to rebel or insurgent groups. In the Middle East, the most notable example 

is U.S. assistance to the Afghan mujahideen in the war against the Soviet Union 

in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these very weapons became the fuel for radical 

Islamist groups which were the precursor to Al-Qaeda. It is my sense that the provision of military assistance to Syrian opposition groups will only increase U.S. influence in limited instances and for bounded periods of time. Ultimately, groups will 

always act in their perceived self interest, whether or not it aligns with their military benefactors. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, has recently stated that the central strategy for Syria is ‘‘capacity-building’’ 

to help prevent violence within Syria from spreading to its neighbors. He specifically 

mentioned that ‘‘The U.S. will leave some Patriot missile batteries and some F–16 

Fighting Falcon aircraft in Jordan and is working with its Iraqi counterparts, the 

Lebanese armed forces, and Turkey through NATO’’ to ensure that they’re prepared 

to account for the potential spillover effects. Do you agree with this approach? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. I agree with the approach to Syria outlined by General Dempsey. 

Our ability to influence the battle raging on the ground inside Syria is necessarily 

limited since we are wisely not willing to commit to U.S. ‘‘boots on the ground’’ or 

more significant levels of direct or indirect military intervention. Given these inherent limitations, it is essential for the United States to employ whatever resources 

it can leverage to help insulate our allies in the region from Syria’s spillover to the 

extent possible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the U.S. exercising influence over both the Saudi and Qatari 

regimes to prevent them from arming elements of the opposition that threaten the 

interests of the U.S. and our allies and that further lead to instability in Syria? If 

not, why not? 

Mr. ABRAMS. In my view, we have likely had conversations with those governments and conveyed our views. The problem is that we are not players in this game, 

so our views don’t count for very much. One of the benefits of actually arming rebel 

forces is that we would greater influence over both those groups and others who are 

also arming them; in that case, the American call for close coordination would be 

seen as natural. Today we are seen as people sitting on the sidelines trying to tell 

others what the rules are. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please quantify the refugee assistance requirements of both Turkey and Jordan and indicate the current and future assistance that should come 

from the U.S. to meet these requirements. 
94 

Mr. ABRAMS. There are now 1.7 million Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR, and UNHCR says the financial need is for $3 billion, of which $1.125 billion has 

yet been received. The United States and then Kuwait are the most generous 

funders in the cases of both Jordan and Turkey, and there are roughly half a million 

refugees in each country. It is difficult to quantify financial needs because future 

refugee flows are unpredictable. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the U.S. exercising influence over both the Saudi and Qatari 

regimes to prevent them from arming elements of the opposition that threaten the 

interests of the U.S. and our allies and that further lead to instability in Syria? If 

not, why not? 

Mr. HOF. This is, of course, a question better put to serving officials. Suffice it 

to say, however, that the search for clients within the Syrian opposition by certain 

Gulf states and the support for jihadist elements inside Syria from mainly private 

Gulf sources have had an entirely deleterious effect on the course of the Syrian revolution and have played completely into the hands of the Assad regime. There have 

been strong indications in the press that Secretary of State Kerry is trying to ensure 

that all external military assistance—weapons, equipment, training, and intelligence—go through General Salim Idris and the Supreme Military Council. There 

are likewise strong indications that this is the policy and practice to be pursued by 

key Gulf states. Yet this will require constant supervision and verification. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please quantify the refugee assistance requirements of both Turkey and Jordan and indicate the current and future assistance that should come 

from the U.S. to meet these requirements. 

Mr. HOF. This is an excellent question, though one better put to serving U.S. government officials. 

On August 7, President Obama announced more than $195 million in additional 

USG humanitarian assistance to help feed, shelter, and provide medical care for 

children, women, and men affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria, bringing the 

total amount of U.S. humanitarian assistance for the crisis to more than $1 billion. 

This funding supports relief efforts both inside Syria and in neighboring countries. 

For a more detailed breakdown of U.S. assistance, visit the State Department’s official website: http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria 

However, the United Nations has repeatedly warned that the growing needs of 

Syrian refugees and the countries hosting them are far outpacing international commitments to address the crisis. The United States and its allies should therefore 

continue to pledge humanitarian relief to Syria and, perhaps more importantly, find 

alternative methods of delivery (cross-border, for example) that more effectively 

reach intended recipients. Given that the United Nations still considers the Assad 

regime to be Syria’s government, and given that the so-called government can (and 

does) deny permission for United Nations humanitarian aid workers to operate in 

liberated areas of Syria, funding emphasis should also be placed on non-governmental organizations not constrained by the rules applying to the United Nations. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the U.S. exercising influence over both the Saudi and Qatari 

regimes to prevent them from arming elements of the opposition that threaten the 

interests of the U.S. and our allies and that further lead to instability in Syria? If 

not, why not? 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. In the midst of continuing, if not deepening, turmoil across the 

region, the United States continues to try to exercise influence over both the Saudi 

and Qatari regimes to prevent them from arming jihadists and other extremists that 

threaten Western interests. Our success to date has been mixed at best. Saudi Arabia has determined that its own strategic interests would be threatened by the establishment of a jihadist stronghold in Syria. As a result, the Saudis appear to be 

working to insure against arms getting into the hands of jihadists. Qatar, on the 

other hand, has been more willing to allow arms to flow freely into Syria, including 

to radical jihadist elements. To the extent, countries share U.S. interests in preventing arms from going to jihadists, therefore, the U.S. has been relatively more 

successful in exercising influence. However, with countries whose agendas differ 

from that of the United States, U.S. influence is far less notable. In large part, 

wealthy Gulf nations have far greater resources at their disposal than the United 

States and the United States’ ability to influence their policies vis-a`-vis arming the 

extremists remains somewhat limited. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please quantify the refugee assistance requirements of both Turkey and Jordan and indicate the current and future assistance that should come 

from the U.S. to meet these requirements. 

Ms. YACOUBIAN. Of the two countries, Jordan has been far more stretched given 

the large number of refugees it hosts (UNHCR notes that 512,000 have registered, 

while the Jordanian government puts the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan at 

1.3 million.) Jordan estimates that since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the cost 
95 

of hosting Syrian refugees will be $1.68 billion by the end of 2013. Meanwhile, Turkey hosts about 490,000 refugees. Turkish authorities estimate that the cost of 

hosting these refugees [is] approaching $1 billion. As the largest single donor to humanitarian efforts in Syria, the United States has shouldered its fair share of the 

burden. At this point, it is incumbent on wealthy Gulf countries to provide greater 

financial assistance to the effort. Pledges of Gulf assistance totaling $1.5 billion 

have not been fulfilled. 

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