NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-1818

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JARRETT HOBBS,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 1-12-cr-00325-003)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 13, 2015

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 11, 2015)

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OPINION*

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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

Jarrett Hobbs participated in a fraudulent scheme as part of a group law 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

enforcement branded the “Felony Lane Gang.” Traveling from Florida to Pennsylvania, 

the group broke into cars and stole checkbooks, credit cards, and identification 

information. They then forged and cashed the checks at Pennsylvania banks and 

elsewhere. The grand jury charged Hobbs and his codefendants (all of whom have since 

pled guilty and been sentenced) with conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud; 

bank fraud; wire fraud; and aggravated identity theft. For Hobbs’s plea of guilty to the 

conspiracy charge (18 U.S.C. § 1349), the government recommended a three-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility and agreed to dismiss the three other counts of 

indictment. 

Hobbs raised several objections to the Presentence Investigation Report. But 

before sentencing, he and the government agreed that, in exchange for his withdrawal of 

all objections, the government would recommend reduced enhancements for amount of 

loss and number of victims. Consistent with the agreement, the court sentenced Hobbs to 

132 months rather than the probation officer’s recommended 210 to 262 months. Hobbs 

now seeks to appeal, and counsel has moved to withdraw, pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because Hobbs can raise no nonfrivolous argument to 

challenge his sentence. We will affirm and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.1

Counsel’s Anders brief evinces “conscientious examination” of the record for 

appealable issues. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.2 Counsel discussed all prior objections 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 for Hobbs’s violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1349. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

2 Anders requires counsel to conscientiously examine the record, 386 U.S. at 744, and 

“explain to the court why the issues are frivolous,” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 
3

Hobbs raised to the sentence, including those Hobbs withdrew at sentencing, and 

explained why each would be frivolous. First, counsel explained that Hobbs agreed to 

withdraw his objections in exchange for significant reductions on enhancements for loss 

amount and number of victims. Second, counsel concluded that appealing the sentence 

would be frivolous not only because these objections were not raised at sentencing, but 

also because Hobbs’s sentence was well below the sentence he would likely have 

received without the agreement. Finally, counsel discussed the merits of each sentencing 

objection and explained why it would be frivolous. The Anders brief shows counsel 

“thoroughly scoured the record,” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 

2000), and raised the best arguments Hobbs could make. 

Upon independent examination of the record, we agree that there are no 

nonfrivolous arguments Hobbs can make to challenge his sentence.3 The probation 

officer found over $1 million in loss (and $500,000 as Hobbs’s profit) caused by the 

“reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 

undertaken criminal activity” and “acts or omissions . . . that were part of the same course 

of conduct or common scheme.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1), (2). Accordingly, the 12-

level increase he received for a stipulated loss amount of $200,000 was proper. See

 

778, 781 (3d Cir. 2000). “If the court is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated 

the possible grounds of appeal, and agrees with counsel’s evaluation of the case,” it may 

grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 741–42 (citation omitted); 

see also United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2001). 

3 Where, as here, an Anders brief is facially adequate, we confine our review to those 

parts of the record identified by the brief. Youla, 241 F.3d at 301. An argument is 

frivolous if the merits are not arguable. See id. We review the interpretation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. 

Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 309 (3d Cir. 2011).
4

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). Similarly, the court properly applied a four-level sentencing 

enhancement for 50 or more victims. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). The probation officer 

found 250 victims, see PSR ¶ 25, and Hobbs agreed there were at least 50. In addition, 

the court properly concluded that, based on codefendants’ statements, an enhancement 

for Hobbs’s leadership role was appropriate, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and that Hobbs’s 

participation in a fraudulent scheme across multiple jurisdictions to avoid law 

enforcement justified another enhancement, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(10). Finally, Hobbs’s 

criminal history computation was proper because sentences imposed on the same day 

should be considered separately and not as one prior sentence “if the sentences were 

imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).

Because we find no nonfrivolous arguments raised by counsel’s adequate Anders

brief and Hobbs has failed to file any reply raising other issues, we will affirm the 

judgment of conviction and sentence and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.