UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TEAH REBEKKA ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01344

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant, the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “Department of Corrections”) on May 31, 

2024. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff Teah Rebekka Adams (“Adams”) initiated this action by filing a 

complaint against Defendant on August 13, 2023, asserting one count of violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, Defendants’ 

motion for judgment on the pleadings will be GRANTED. (Doc. 16).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from Adams’s complaint. (Doc. 1). Beginning on 

September 10, 2007, Adams became employed as a Correctional Officer for the Department 

of Corrections. (Doc. 1, ¶ 6). She continued in this at-will position for 14 years. (Doc. 1, ¶ 6). 

Adams has a medical condition known as cone-rod dystrophy, which causes progressive 

degeneration of vision. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). In 2020, the Department of Corrections scheduled a 

medical examination for Adams with Dr. Mark. A. DiPillo for Juy 28, 2020 to evaluate her

condition. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11). On August 4, 4040, Dr. DiPillo issued his report, which stated that 

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Adams’s condition would make it “difficult and highly risky” for her to supervise, discipline, 

and control prisoners. (Doc. 1, ¶ 12). On September 15, 2020, the Department of Corrections

responded to Adams’s request for accommodations pursuant to the ADA with a memo which 

confirmed Adams had a medical disability and offered Adams a “Clerk 2” position as a result 

of Dr. DiPillo’s examination. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). The Clerk 2 position did not require Adams to 

supervise inmates and came with reduced pay and benefits. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). Adams responded 

to the memo by submitting two medical reports from eye specialists which contradicted Dr. 

DiPillo’s findings in part. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). Specifically, both specialists opined that Adams was 

capable of performing H1 job classifications, such as roving a housing unit, night shift 

positions, hallway officer positions, or warehouse positions, each of which included limited 

interactions with inmates but seemingly did not result in the same pay or benefits cut. (Doc. 

1, ¶ 14). According to Adams, the Department of Corrections failed to address her 

submissions of additional medical opinions and instead responded by telling Adams that she 

would need to accept the Clerk 2 position or her employment would be terminated. (Doc. 1, 

¶ 16). Adams appealed that decision on three separate occasions without success. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 

17-19). On May 7, 2021, Adams was advised that her medical leave of absence would end,

and she would be required to resign, apply for regular or disability retirement, or accept the 

Clerk 2 position, which is a demotion, according to Adams. (Doc. 1, ¶ 20). Adams did not 

accept the Clerk 2 position, and accordingly, resigned from her position as a Correctional 

Officer. (Doc. 1, ¶ 21). As a result of the events alleged, Adams avers that she suffered 

economic loss and emotional distress. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27-35). Adams has exhausted her 

administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. (Doc. 1, ¶ 25). 

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Adams initiated this action by filing a complaint against the Department of 

Corrections on August 14, 2023. (Doc. 1). On October 24, 2023, the Department of 

Corrections filed its amended answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint. (Doc. 10).

On May 31, 2024, the Department of Corrections filed the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, as well as a brief in support. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17). In response, Adams filed a brief 

in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings on June 24, 2024. (Doc. 22). The 

motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17; Doc. 22).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough 

not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

“Granting a 12(c) motion results in a determination on the merits at an early stage in the 

litigation,” and thus, the movant is required “ ‘to clearly establish [ ] that no material issue of 

fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Inst. for 

Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir. 1991)

(quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). A Rule 

12(c) motion is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, construing all allegations and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019);

Thus, to survive a 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to show 

that the claim is facially plausible, enabling the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 

77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)).

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“In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept all of the 

allegations in the pleadings of the party against whom the motion is addressed as true and 

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 

F.3d 414, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Allah v. Al–Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

When adjudicating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court should generally 

consider only those allegations contained in the complaint, as well as “documents that are 

attached to or submitted with the complaint, . . . and any matters incorporated by reference 

or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] 

items appearing in the record of the case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 

(3d Cir. 2006); see Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 

2010) (court may consider “the pleadings and attached exhibits, undisputedly authentic 

documents attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs’ claims are based 

on the documents, and matters of public record.”). 

III. DISCUSSION

The Department of Corrections argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings 

because it is immune to suit for claims brought under Title I of the ADA. (Doc. 17, at 4). 

Specifically, the Department contends that, as an arm of the state, it is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from Adams’s Title I ADA claim for monetary damages. (Doc. 17, at 

4-5). The Department of Corrections argues that Ex Parte Young, which creates an exception 

to state sovereign immunity for claims seeking prospective relief, does not apply here as

Adams brought this suit against only the Department of Corrections and did not name any 

individuals in their official capacity, as required for the Ex Parte Young exception. (Doc. 17, at 

6). Adams responds that the Department of Corrections waived its sovereign immunity and 

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that the Ex Parte Young fiction applies to Adams’s claim seeking prospective relief via 

reinstatement. (Doc. 22, at 3, 9). This Court agrees with the Department of Corrections.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes private 

individuals from bringing suit against a state, or one of its agencies, in federal court. U.S. 

Const. amend. Xi; see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Such 

immunity may also extend to suits brought against “‘arms’ of a state.” Patterson v. Pennsylvania 

Liquor Control Bd., 915 F.3d 945, 950 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 

512-13 (3d Cir. 2018)); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Edu. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)

(same). A party is considered an ‘arm of the state’ for immunity purposes “when ‘the state is 

the real, substantial party in interest.’” Patterson, 915 F.3d at 950 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 

Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 623 (2002)). The Third Circuit has held that the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is an arm of the state for sovereign immunity 

purposes. See Walker v. Beard, 244 Fed. Appx. 439, 440 (3d Cir.2007) (“because the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it shares in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment 

immunity”); Fattah v. Sabol, No. CIV.A. 3:10-1607, 2012 WL 1005070, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 

23, 2012).

Eleventh Amendment immunity “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts 

of subject matter jurisdiction,” and may be properly considered by way of a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum 

Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the 

nature of the relief sought,” including suits brought by plaintiffs in equity. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 

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at 100 (citing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933)). Eleventh Amendment immunity is not 

absolute, however. There are three narrow exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: 

“1) congressional abrogation, 2) state waiver, and 3) suits against individual state officers for 

prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell 

Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). The Court will address the first two 

narrow exceptions, congressional abrogation and state waiver together, as both exceptions 

are relevant to the parties’ dispute about Adams’s monetary damages claims. The Court will 

then turn to whether Adams’s claim for reinstatement of her employment falls within the third 

exception to sovereign immunity regarding prospective relief against state officers.

A. Adams’S CLAIM FOR MONETARY DAMAGES

The Department of Corrections contends that it is entitled to judgment on the 

pleadings regarding Adams’s ADA claim seeking damages because “all claims asserted 

against a state agency seeking monetary damages brought under Title I of the ADA are barred 

by the Eleventh Amendment[.]” (Doc. 17, at 4). Adams responds that Title I of the ADA 

abrogates the Department’s sovereign immunity and further, that the Department waived its 

sovereign immunity. (Doc. 22, at 3-4).

It is well-established that Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity with respect 

to Adams’s Title I ADA claims. See Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 

166 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (“As noted, in Garrett, the Supreme Court held Congress's abrogation 

of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title I of the ADA was invalid”) (citing Bd. 

of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2001)). Title I of the ADA in 

relevant part provides: “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual 

on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or 

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discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions 

and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (emphasis added). To determine if 

Congress abrogated sovereign immunity, the court must determine whether there is “a 

congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 

means adopted to that end.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004) (quoting City of Boerne 

v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). This “congruence and proportionality” test requires that:

... the court must: (1) identify “with some precision the scope of the 

constitutional right at issue;” (2) examine whether Congress has identified a 

history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states; and (3) 

determine whether the rights and remedies created by the ADA against the 

states are congruent and proportional to the constitutional injury sought to be 

prevented.

Shaw v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. CV 17-229, 2018 WL 6831148, at *5 

(W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2018) (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363).

Applying the “congruence and proportionality” to Title I of the ADA, the Court in 

Garrett determined that “[t]he legislative record of the ADA ... fails to show that Congress did 

in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the 

disabled.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368, 372–73. Instead, congressional findings focused on 

employment discrimination in the private sector, and “Congress assembled only such 

minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the 

disabled.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369–70. Accordingly, the Court held that Title I did not validly 

abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375. Thus, Congress has not 

abrogated the Department of Corrections’s sovereign immunity with respect to Adams’s 

claim for damages under Title I of the ADA.

The Court next turns to whether the Department of Corrections has otherwise waived 

its immunity. Adams argues that the Department of Corrections waived its immunity by not 

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specifically identifying the immunity it sought to assert as Eleventh Amendment sovereign 

immunity in its amended answer and affirmative defenses. (Doc. 22, at 3). Adams further 

contends that the references to the ADA in the Department’s produced administrative record 

amounts to waiver. (Doc. 22, at 4).1

The purpose of requiring parties to plead affirmative defenses is to provide “fair notice” 

to the opposing party about the nature of a defense. See Mifflinburg Tel., Inc. v. Criswell, 80 F. 

Supp. 3d 566 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (“Rule 8(c) applies to affirmative defenses and requires a party 

only to ‘affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(c)). “‘[S]tating an affirmative defense provides ‘fair notice’ without specific factual 

allegations for each element of the defense as long as the defense is logically within the ambit 

of the general factual allegations in the litigation.” Mifflinburg Tel., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 574; 

see also Balon v. Enhanced Recovery Co., Inc., 316 F.R.D. 96, 104 (M.D. Pa. 2016). “The Third 

Circuit has not yet considered whether the Twombly and Iqbal decisions affect the pleading 

requirements for affirmative defenses” however “[t]he consensus of district courts in this 

circuit is that the heightened pleading standard under Twombly and Iqbal does not apply to 

such defenses.” U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Gerber, 380 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438 (M.D. Pa. 2018). 

“Rule 8 provides that a party must merely state, not show, an affirmative defense.” Tyco Fire 

Prod. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011). “[T]he Third Circuit has 

1 This Court is unable to find any cases where a party’s references to the ADA in suit 

or in internal communications amount to waiver of sovereign immunity. This is logical 

because sovereign immunity does not relieve a government entity of its statutory obligations, 

but instead merely limits liability for specific parties. See Cooper v. Comm'r, 718 F.3d 216, 220 

(3d Cir. 2013) (Stating that “[u]nder the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States ‘is 

immune from suit save as it consents to be sued’” without relieving an agency from its 

statutory duties). Plaintiffs can still bring suit via the Ex Parte Young theory against individual 

state officers, as discussed infra.

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held that a ‘defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if [it] raised the issue at a 

pragmatically sufficient time, and [the plaintiff] was not prejudiced in [her] ability to 

respond.’” Mines v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 93-3052, 1994 WL 386362, at *2 (E.D. 

Pa. July 22, 1994) (quoting Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1991)) (quotations 

omitted).

While the Department of Corrections did not support its inclusion of its immunity 

affirmative defense with detailed factual allegations or specify that it was Eleventh

Amendment immunity it sought to invoke, it was not required to do so. (Doc. 10, at 9); see 

Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Eng'g Co., 299 F.R.D. 90, 97 (D.N.J. 2014) (“the heightened 

Twombly/Iqbal standard is not applicable to the pleading of affirmative defenses under Rule 

8(c) which simply requires that party responding to a pleading must ‘affirmatively state any 

avoidance or affirmative defense.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). The Court therefore finds 

that Defendant’s Eighth Affirmative Defense, stating “The Department acted at all times with 

the good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and are therefore immune from liability 

by virtue of qualified or other immunity” provided sufficient notice to Adams that the 

Department of Corrections would seek to assert immunity. (Doc. 10, at 9). The only logical 

immunity available to the Department here is sovereign immunity, as the only named 

defendant in the suit is an arm of the state. (Doc. 1). This should have put Adams on notice 

of the Department’s intent to raise its governmental immunity defense. Further, the Third 

Circuit has held that even when a defense is not included in a party’s affirmative defenses, a 

Court may determine that the party still did not waive such defense so long as the defendant 

raised the issue in a pragmatically sufficient time and the plaintiff was not prejudiced. See 

Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1373 (3d Cir.1993) (“a party may raise an 

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unpled affirmative defense in an appropriate motion.”). In Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, the 

court recognized an immunity defense that defendants raised for the first time in a motion for 

summary judgment. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1374. While this Court finds that Adams was 

on sufficient notice based upon the Department’s Eighth Affirmative Defense, the present 

motion for judgment on the pleadings is an appropriate motion in which it may raise its 

immunity defense. See Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1374 (finding that a defendant did not waive 

its immunity defense even though it raised it for the first time in its motion for summary 

judgment because “it would be inappropriate [. . .] to decide the immunity issue on the basis 

of waiver.”). For these reasons, Adams’s Title I ADA claim for damages against the 

Department of Corrections is barred by sovereign immunity. See Koslow, 302 F.3d at 166 n.3. 

The motion for judgment on the pleadings with regards to Adams’s damages claim is 

GRANTED.

B. ADAMS’S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND EX PARTE YOUNG

The Department of Corrections also moves for judgment on the pleadings because it 

submits that the Ex Parte Young exception does not curtail its immunity regarding Adams’s 

claim for injunctive relief. (Doc. 17, at 6). The Department reasons that it is immune to 

Adams’s claims for prospective relief because Adams brought this suit against only the 

Department of Corrections, not against any state officer, as required for the Ex Parte Young

exception. (Doc. 17, at 6). According to Adams, the Ex Parte Young exception applies to 

Adams’s claim seeking injunctive relief via reinstatement. (Doc. 22, at 3, 9).

To reiterate, Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to “state agencies[, state] 

departments ... and state officials sued in their official capacity.” Larsen v. State Employees' Ret. 

Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (M.D. Pa. 2008). “Suits against state officials in their personal 

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or individual capacity, however, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Larsen, 553 F. 

Supp. 2d at 411. “[A] suit against a state officer seeking prospective relief designed to end a 

continuing violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the theory 

that the action is not against the state because the alleged violation of federal law strips the 

officer of his official authority. Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103). 

Additionally, the prospective injunctive relief exception outlined in Ex Parte Young is 

inapplicable to state agencies. See Walker, 244 F. App'x at 440 (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and 

Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (The Eleventh Amendment 

immunity exception “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which 

are barred regardless of the relief sought.”); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123. “States [and] 

their agencies ... retain their immunity against all suits in federal court.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct 

and Sewer Authority, 506 U.S. at 146. Accordingly, the Department’s motion for judgment on 

the pleadings with respect to Adams’s claim for prospective relief in the form of reinstatement 

shall be GRANTED. (Doc. 16); See Ricker v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 3:21-CV-00467, 

2022 WL 533818, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2022) (“[A plaintiff] is unable to bring a claim 

against [d]efendant DOC for injunctive relief and his claims against it shall be dismissed.”).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment 

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 

2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave 

to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d 

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Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). The 

Court shall grant Adams leave to amend her complaint in an attempt to cure the deficiency 

outlined herein. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 16) is 

GRANTED. Adams’s complaint is DISMISSED. (Doc. 1). Adams shall be granted 28 days 

to file an amended complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: January 13, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

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