UN IT ED ST AT ES CO UR T O F A PP EA LS FO R V ET ER AN S C LA IMS

N O
. 05-2286
D ANI EL G. R O SS , A P P EL LA NT ,
V
. J A M ES B. P EA KE , M.D., S ECR ETA RY OF V ETER A N S A FF AI RS , A PP ELL EE
.

Before GREEN E, Chief Judge , and KASOLD , HAGEL, MO ORMAN,

LANCE, D AVIS, and SCHO ELEN, Ju dges.

O R D E R
Not e: Pu rs ua nt

to U.S. V et . A pp R. 30 (a), thi s a cti on ma

y n ot b e ci ted

as prece de nt.
On January 2 , 2 00 8, the Co urt iss ue d a pane l de cis ion

in t he ab ov e-c ap tio ne d a

pp eal , affirm ing a June 20, 2005, Board of Veterans ' Appeals (Board) decisi on
. Se e R os s v. Pe ak e , __ Vet.App. __, No. 05-2286 (Jan. 2, 2008). Priorto the iss uance of Ro ss, two jud ge s re qu est ed full-Court consi deration. Se e Co urt ' s Inter na l O pe rat ingPr oc ed

ure s ¶ V (b) (5)

. Upon considerati on of the foregoing, and there being no majority in f avor of the requestfor fu ll- Co urt co ns ide rat ion , it

is
ORDERED that full-Court cons iderati on is DENIED.
DA TE D: Jan

uary 8 , 2 00 8 PE R C URIA M.

KASOLD , Judge , dissenti ng: The underlyi ng opinion in thi s case addre sses a quest ion of ex ce pt io na l i mporta nc e a ndis inap pa re ntco nfl ic t w it h the Cou rt 's c urre ntca se la w. A t amin imu m, it f ail s to ad dre ss k eyasp ect s that sho uld be dis cu sse d in any cas e inv olv ingstat uto ry and regulator y in te rp re ta tion and an is sue of this importance. Se e R os s v. Pe ak e , _ _ V et. Ap p. __ , N o. 05 -2286 (Jan. 2, 20 08 ).
Th e is su e o f ex cep tio na l i m po rtanc e is wh eth er the award of in cre ase d co m

pe ns ati on ba sed on a d isa bil itythat is sec on dary t o an a lre ad y s erv ice -co nn ect ed

dis ab ili ty ca n be ass ign ed an ef fe cti ve date u

p to on e y ear

ear lie r th anthe date o f an i ncrea sed co m pe ns ati on cla im , whe n th at claim is fi le d wi th in one ye ar following the onse t of the secondary di sabilit y. Se e 38 U.S.C. § 5 11 0(a ); 3 8 C .F .R . § 3. 40 0(o ) (2 00 7).2

Th e p rov isi on s o f 3 8 C .F .R . § 3. 31 0(a ) (2 00 7) p rov ide that whe n "s erv ice co nn ect ion is establi shed [for a secondary condit ion], the secondary c ondition shal l be cons id ere d a part of the original condition." Simple logic dictat es that i f the secondary condi tion is to be tr eated as par t of the ori gin al c lai m , th enit d oe s n ot s tan d a lon e, an d anycla im fo r di sab ili ty c om

pe ns ati on ne c e s s ari ly is a clai m f

or increa sed c ompensation ari sing from the original condi tion. Both statute and regulati on provi de tha t i ncreased compensation may be awarded up to one yea r before the cl aim for inc rea s e d c o m p e n s ati o nis f

il e d , s o lo n g a s th e c la im is f il e d w it h in o n e y e ar o f

th e in c re ase d disabili ty. Se e 38 U.S.C . § 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2). The reliance in the unde rlying opini on on Ellington v. Nic holson , __ Ve t.A pp . _ _ N o. 04 -04 03 , 2 00 7 W L 2 12 60 22 , at *4 (Ju ly 2 5, 20 07 ), ap pe al d oc keted, No. 08-7012 (Fed. Ci r. Oct. 16, 2007), is misplaced. The Court i n Ellington simply and correctl y held that t he effective date of the se condary service- connection claim is not t he same as the original service- connection cl aim. Ellington did not addres s the issue in the underl ying op ini on , and

the Ellington holding and logic are simply inapposite with regard to whe th erthe effective date for a sec ondary servi ce-connect ed disabil ity can be up to one year prior to the date of the clai m f

or increa sed compensation based on thatsecondary dis abilit y. Al tho ug h n ot di scu sse d in th e un de rly ingopin ion , 38 C.F .R . § 3. 15 7(a ), (b )(1 ) (2 00 7) s tat es that a VA o r un if

orm ed ser vic es h os pit al r ep ort

of ex am inatio n o r ho sp ita liz ati on m aybe tre ate d a s an informal claim for increased benefits, and the da te of the c laim will be the date of hospital ization, wh en(1) tho se r eco rds rel ate to a d isa bil itythat is alr ead

y s erv ice co nn ect ed , o r (2 ) th e cl aim specifying the b en ef

it i s f ile d w ith in o ne ye ar o f t

he ex am inatio n o r ho sp ita liz ati on . T he second situati on presented by t his regula tion for permitting an effective date up to one year ear lier t han the date of a claim specificall y envisions a claim for increase d com

pensation based on a disabil ity for wh ich ser vic e co nn ect ion

ha s n ot y et b een

grante d (whic h is pro vid ed in t he fi rst sit uatio n n ote d above). Thu s, u nd er the sec ond situati on, a claim for secondary servi ce connecti on, (which, by de fi nit ion , is no t alre ad

y ser vic e conne cte d), may be granted an ef fe cti ve date up to o ne ye ar e arl ier if ba sed on a V A o r se rvi ce m ed ica l e xam inatio n or rep ort whe n the c lai m

is f ile d w ith in o ne ye ar of that reportand the report is rel ated to an al ready servi ce-connect ed disabil ity. This i s consiste nt wi th t he on e-y ear

ear lie r pr ov isi on

pro vid ed in § 3. 31 0(a ).
Mo reo ve r, t

he un de rly ingop ini on

fa ils to d isc us s th e p urp os e b eh ind the on e-y ear -earli er pro vis ion s. Th ese pro vis ion s are ba sed on a re co gn iti on

that ve ter an s d o n ot a lw ay s f ile the ir c lai m fo r be ne fi ts o n th e v ery

day o f an th e o ns et o f a d isa bil ityor an in cre ase in t

hat di sab ili ty. Thus , ve ter an s ar e p rov ide d o ne ye ar t o f ile a cl aim af ter leavin g ser

vic e in or de r to ob tai n aneff ect ive date as of the day after separat ion, see38 C. F. R. § 3.4 00 (b) (2) (i) -(i i), and can ge t up to one ye ar e arl ier than the date of a claim for i nc re as edcompensation, see38 C. F. R. § 3 .4 00 (o) (2) , and on e y ear earlie r than the da te of a claim t ha t is resubmitted after a l iberali zing change in t he law, see 38 C. F. R. §§ 3. 11 4(a ), 3 .4 00 (p) (20 07 ). The underlying opi nion also has no di scussion of any long-s ta nd ing i nterpret ation by the Se cre tar y o f s tat ute or r eg ulatio n o n th e iss ue of an eff ect ive date up to on e y ear

ear lie r th anthe date of a claim for increased compensation based on a secondary service- connected disabili ty, and absent such an interpretati on the U .S. Suprem e Court's holding in Brow n v . Gar dn er , 513 U.S. 115, 117-18 (19 94 ) – t hat any int erp ret ati ve d ou bt co nta ine d in t

he ve ter an s b en ef

its statut es m

us t be res olv ed3

in the vete ran's favor – would apply. Yet, there also is no di scussion of Ga rd ne r
. The underlying opi nion attempts to dist inguish Woo d v . D erw ins ki , 1 Vet.App. 367, 369 (1991) (cl aim for increase d c om pe ns ation vis-a-vi s a claim for "unemploym ent compensation"), and Dalton v. Nicholson , 2 1 V et. Ap p. 33 , 3 4 (2 00 7) ( cla im fo r in cre ase d c om

pe ns ati on vis -a- vis a cl aim for total disabil ity based on individua l unemployability), by s imply stating the ca ses, as though t he dis tin cti on

is o bv iou s. Ho we ve r, t

he sim ilarit ies an d lo gic be hin d th e d eci sio ns in t ho se c ase s ar gu es for a holding thata claim for com pensation bene fits based on a disabil ity secondary to an alre ady ser vic e-c onne cte d d isa

bil ityis a lso aninc rea sed

co m p e n s ati o n c la im , p art ic u larlygiv enthe m an date of § 3.310(a) that suc h a cl aim is t o be considered part of the ori ginal service-connec ted conditi on. Fi na lly , th e p an el c ite s Ha zen v. Go be r , 1 0 V et. Ap p. 51 1, 51 9 (1 99 7), fo r th e p rop os iti on that an "increase in disabili ty" refers to the next dis abilit y level. Admittedly, Ha zen is a co nf us ingcas e, but two things are clear. Fi rst, Ha zen addresses s ection 5110(b) (2) in the context of an incr easedrat ingc lai m

m ad e af ter a d if fe rent, fi na l B oard de cis ion h ad de nie d an in cre ase an d b eco m e f ina l, such that i t would take CUE t o get an earl ier date, and itis inapposi te to the factsituati on in the un de rly ingop ini on . S eco nd , if the Ha zen dic ta is tak ena s a h old ingan d a pp lie d li ter all y –

that an "increa se i n disability" appli es onl y to t he next higherdisabili ty – then both Woods and Dalton are in conflict wit h H

az en and now w iththe un de rli ng de cis ion . T his is s o b eca us e if the inc rea se i n disabili ty is li mited to the next di sabilit y leve l, t hen tha t t erm could not include unemployability or TD IU , whic h generall y d o n ot p rov ide the ne xt h igh er d isa bil ityrat ing , b ut r ath er the hig he st disabili ty rati ng. For the above st ated reas ons, I respec tfully dissentfrom the de nial of en banc consi deration in the underl ying Ro ss case. Se e U.S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 35 (e) (2)

.