1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________ No. 11

- 1714

______________ In re: Bayside Prison Litigation JEFFREY MORTON, Appellant

v. BAYSIDE STATE PRISON

______________ On Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Ci v . No. 97

- 05127 ) Honorable Robert B. Kugler , District Judge

______________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 11, 2012
BEFORE: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, J R ., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judge s (Filed: April 17, 2012 )

______________ OPINION OF THE COURT

______________ GREENBERG, Circuit Judge

. This matter comes on before th is Court on an appeal by plaintiff Jeffrey Morton from an order entered on February 14, 2011, denying hi s motion under Federal Rule of2

Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate a District Court order entered May 18, 1999, dismissing with prejudice his case arising from his incarceration at the Bayside State Prison in New Jersey . The Court entered the May 18, 199 9 orde r because Morton twice failed to submit a pretrial memorandum within the time fixed for its submission

. After entry of the February 14, 2011 order , Morton moved for its reconsideration but the Court denied that motion with an order and accompanying opinio n entered July 21, 2011. The Court in its July 21, 2011 opinion set for th the background of this matter at length but we nevertheless summarize i t s pertinent history

. 1
This case arose from the homicide of a corrections officer on July 30, 1997 , at the
Ba yside State Prison, an event that led corrections officials to t a k e protective measures
which includ ed an inmate lockdown. These measures triggered responsive litigation
from certain inmates that Morton describes as “a fourteen year saga involving fourtee n jury trials, numerous appeals, and hundreds of claims referred to and heard (by consent) before a Special Master in streamlined proceedings.” Appellant’s B r. at 3. Morton initiated his participation in this massive litigation by the rather commonplace step of filing a pro se complaint on March 2, 1998, in the District Court , docketed as Civ

. N o. 97

- 5609 , in which he complain ed that he had been assaulted during the lockdown

. Morton moved for the appointment of counsel but the Court denied that motion on May 8, 1998. Other inmates also filed individual cases as well as a class action arising out of
the corrections officials’ reaction to the killing . T o manage these multiple actions th e

1 Of course, the parties are familiar with the background of this case as there has been a great deal of litigation arising from the circumstances which led to Morton filing his complaint. See , e.g. , White v. Fauver , 19 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D.N.J. 1998).3

Court on December 31, 1998, enter ed an order consolidating the cases for the sole purpose of case management . The Court , however , at that time did not provide that the
individual cases would lose their individual docket number s though the cases to the

extent consolidated were entitled “In Re Bayside Prison Litigation” and w ere docketed as
Civ

. N o. 97

- 5127 , th e docket number previously assigned to the already pending class
action

. Finally , o n April 9, 2001, the Court consolidated all the Bayside cases for all purposes under Civ. No. 97

- 5127. There were individual procee dings in Morton’s case both before and after the two orders for consolidation

. As germane to this appeal , before the partial consolidation the clerk of the District Court notified Morton on August 4, 1998, to file a pretrial
memorandum on or before Novemb er 4, 1998, but Morton did not do so. Subsequently, on February 1 8 , 1999, after the partial consolidation but before the total consolidation, in keeping with the still individual status of the various cases, a magistrate judge directed
Morton to file the pretrial memorandum by March 1, 1999, but again Morton did not do so. Consequently, the District Court dismissed Morton’s action with prejudice on May 18, 1999, in an order docketed in Civ

. No. 97

- 5609, Morton’s individual case. So far as
we can ascertai n from the docket sheets, t he Court did not send that order to any attorney

as an attorney had not entered an appearance for Morton in Civ. No. 97

- 5609. Th e District Court has never vacated or otherwise disturbed the May 18, 1999 order.
A fter the Distric t Court dismissed Morton’s case, the d efendants in Civ. No. 97

- 5127 moved to dismiss that case and , significantly, in their accompanying brief noted that the Court already had dismissed Morton’s case at Civ

. No. 97

- 5609. Ne vertheless ,4

Morton did no t move to reinstate his particular claim . On March 13, 2002, the Court denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss Civ. No. 97

- 5127,
but the order it entered did not address the dismissal order in Morton’s individual case
which thus rema ined dismissed. Finally, o n March 3, 2010, more than a decade after the
Court had dismissed his action , Morton moved to reinstate h is case and this motion led to the order of February 14, 2011, from which Morton now appeals. 2 The District Court had juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion

. S ee Brown v. Philadelphia Housing
Auth. , 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003)

. T here has been an abuse of discretion when a district court’s decision is based on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Oddi v. Ford Motor Co. , 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).
Morton indicate s that the District Court erred “when it held [that] the motion [under Rule 60(b) was] untimely . . . solely [because of ] the length of time since the original dismissal without consideration of the reasons for the delay” and that th e Court
erred when it refuse d to grant relief under Rule 60(b) “in light of the exceptional
circumstances of this case

. ” Appellant’s B r. at 1.

2 Morton correctly filed his motion to reinstate his claim in Civ. No. 97

- 5127 even though he had filed his claim in Civ. No. 97

- 5609 as all the Bayside cases had been consolidated for all purposes before he filed the motion . C onsequently , the District Court filed the orders of February 14, 2011, and July 21, 2011, in Civ. No. 97

- 5127.5

We recognize that the proceedings in this litigation ha ve been very complex so
that it is understandable that t here has been confusion in the prosecution of the case . Yet Morton explains in his brief that “[i]n February of 2004, in response to an inquiry by Plaintiff’s Counsel Defendants’ counsel provided Plaintiff’s counsel with a copy of the order entered by [th e District Court ] on May [18,] 1999 .” Appellant’ s B r. at 6

- 7. Nevertheless, even though the May 18, 1999 order dismissed his case neither Morton nor any attorney on his behalf filed a motion to have Morton’s case reinstated until March 3,
2010 . I n these circumstances, and for the reasons that the District Court set fort h in its July 21, 2011 opinion, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion when it entered the order of February 14, 2011, and adhered to that order on July 21, 2011.
The order of February 14, 2011, will be affirmed.