IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BILLIE SUE ATKINSON, : Civil No. 4:16-CV-1686

:

 Plaintiffs :

: (Judge Brann)

 v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

HAMILTON TOWNSHIP, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This case represents Billie Sue Atkinson’s third foray into federal court.

Atkinson’s original complaint, which wasfiled in August 2014, was dismissed by the

Court as flawed on multiple grounds. See Atkinson v. Judge Carlson et al., Civil No.

3:14-CV-1597. Atkinson then pursued a second lawsuit, which suffered a similar

fate, dismissal, in 2015. Atkinson v. Tioga County, 4:15-CV-1305.

Undeterred, Atkinson has now filed a new complaint, which repeats and restates many of the same flawed claims that led to the dismissal of her prior civil

lawsuit. (Doc. 1.) The plaintiff’s 23-page complaint isseemingly global in its reach,

but is cryptic in its content. Indeed, the complaint is completely indecipherable.

1

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 1 of 13
Thus, the complaint recites no intelligible facts, contains no discernable narrative

thread, and simply alleges in broad and confusing strokes that at various times in

sundry ways the plaintiff’s rights have been ignored. The complaint also suggests

that the plaintiff has previously been a defendant in otherwise unidentified state

criminal proceedings, where the plaintiff feels that her rights have been violated in

some ill-defined ways. Furthermore, the complaint is largely devoid of factual detail

that would enable usto determine what actually happened in this case and when these

events are alleged to have occurred.

In this complaint, the plaintiff has asserted a right to proceed in forma

pauperis, an assertion that we will construe as a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant the plaintiffs leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, but recommend that this complaint be dismissed.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se

complaints filed by persons who seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis which seek

redress against government officials. Specifically, we must assess whether a pro se,

in forma pauperis complaint “failsto state a claimupon which relief may be granted.”

This statutory text, in turn, mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

2

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 2 of 13
of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving

standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal –U.S.–, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint failsto state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court

need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not

3

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 3 of 13
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id. 

In keeping with the principles of Twombly,theSupreme Court has underscored

that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can

be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court

should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a

review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that

they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

4

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 4 of 13
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual

allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level

of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

stated: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

district court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a‘plausible claim for relief.’ In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement

with its facts. 

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed: “The Supreme Court in Twombly set

forth the ‘plausibility’ standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this

approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requiresthe complaint to allege ‘enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570,

5

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 5 of 13
127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual

pleadings ‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.’ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing ‘more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’ Id. A complaint which pleads

facts ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, [ ] ‘stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement of relief.” ’ ” Burtch v. Milberg

Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861, 182

L. Ed. 2d 644 (U.S. 2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a threestep analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629

F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

6

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 6 of 13
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which defines what

a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which

may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible,” id., or when a

complaint “is also largely unintelligible,” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785,

787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly

appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v.

New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v.

Cohen, supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of

Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, dismissal under Rule

8 is proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many

things discussed constituted [a cause of action];” Binsack v. Lackawanna County

Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and

unclear” asto defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, No. 11-1276, 2011 WL 3346787 (Aug.

4, 2011). 

7

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 7 of 13
In our view, these pleading standards apply to all aspects of the Court’s

threshold analysis of a complaint’s legal sufficiency. Thus, we will apply this

analysis both when assessing the adequacy of the factual assertions set forth in the

complaint, and when examining whether a complaint properly invokes the jurisdiction

of this Court.

B. This Complaint Fails to State A Claim Upon Which Relief

Can Be Granted

Applying these legal benchmarks in this case, dismissal of this complaint is

warranted because the complaint fails to meet the substantive standards required by

law, in that it does not set forth a “short and plain” statement of a cognizable violation

of some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Some of

the flaws in this particular pro se complaint are discussed separately below.

1. This Complaint Violates Rules 8 and 12(b)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

At the outset, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because the complaint

failsto comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that: “A pleading thatstates a claim for

relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Dismissal of this complaint is appropriate since it is

well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint

contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

8

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 8 of 13
to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,’ Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir.

2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible”, id., or when a

complaint “is also largely unintelligible,” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785,

787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly

appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v.

New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v.

Cohen. supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of

Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, dismissal under Rule

8 is proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many

things discussed constituted [a cause of action];” Binsack v. Lackawanna County

Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and

unclear” asto defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, No. 11-1276, 2011 WL 3346787 (Aug.

4, 2011). Finally, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is

simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 329 F.

App'x 335 (3d Cir. 2009)(dismissing illegible complaint); Radin v. Jersey City

Medical Center, 375 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App’x 431

(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint failsto clearly identify which

parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509

9

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 9 of 13
(MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006)(dismissing complaint consisting of

approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of

Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006)

(dismissing illegible complaint).

Furthermore, we are also obliged to “sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

when the allegations within the complaint ‘are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to

be absolutely devoid of merit, ... wholly insubstantial, ... obviously frivolous, ...

plainly unsubstantial, ... or no longer open to discussion.’ Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.

528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).

Here, the complaint is prolix, cryptic, incomprehensible and is one of what is

becoming a growing line of nonsensical complaints filed by this plaintiff in this

Court. See Atkinson v. Judge Carlson et al., Civil No. 3:14-CV-1597; Atkinson v.

TiogaCounty, 4:15-CV-1305. The complaint, therefore, failsto “contain ‘a short and

plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2), and [fails to meet Rule 8's requirement] that each averment be ‘concise,

and direct,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App’x 221,

222 (3d Cir. 2007). Further, the averments set forth in the pleading consist of an

10

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 10 of 13
apparent, but incomprehensible, catalogue of complaints, a litany of grievances that

are presented without any context, content, coherence or continuity, making it

virtually impossible to ascertain the legal and factual significance ofthese allegations.

Thus, we are “left . . . having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted

[a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d

Cir. 2011). In such instances, Rule 8 calls for the dismissal of the complaint.

Further, “the allegations within the complaint ‘are so attenuated and

unsubstantial asto be absolutely devoid of merit, ... wholly insubstantial, ... obviously

frivolous, ... plainly unsubstantial, ... or no longer open to discussion.’ Hagans v.

Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173

(3d Cir. 2009). Therefore, “the complaint is subject to dismissal because it presents

a cause of action that [seems to] ‘ “rel[y] on “fantastic or delusional scenarios.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).’

DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir.2009).” Gilboy v. Mellow, 3:CV12-1237, 2012 WL 3957977 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2012) report and recommendation

adopted, 3:12-CV-1237, 2012 WL 3959270 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2012). 

In short, in this case, where Atkinson’s claims: (1) mirror pleadingsfiled in the

past by this plaintiff and dismissed by this Court, see Atkinson v. Carlson, No. 4:14-

11

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 11 of 13
CV-1597, 2014 WL 6901144, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 4:14-CV-1597, 2014 WL 6901139 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3,

2014); (2) persist in “recit[ing] no intelligible facts, and simply alleg[ing] in broad

and confusing strokes that at various times in sundry ways the plaintiffs' rights have

been violated,” Atkinson v. Carlson, No. 4:14-CV-1597, 2014 WL 6901144, at *1

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:14-CV-1597,

2014 WL 6901139 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2014); and (3) the meaning of the complaint is

something that only the plaintiff can discern, we conclude that “[t]here is no question

that [Atkinson’s] claims meet this standard [for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)], as

they rely on fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis.” DeGrazia v.

F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir.2009). 

While civil rights pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to

amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see FletcherHardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007),

dismissal with leave to amend is not necessary when granting further leave to amend 

would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.

2004). Here, taken together, the structural flaws in this complaint are beyond any

form of repair. Therefore, granting leave to amend would, in our view, be futile.

Accordingly, this complaintshould be dismissed without any further leave to amend. 

12

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 12 of 13
III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is GRANTED leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, and IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s

complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, 

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file

with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,

written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is

made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set

forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however,

need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where

required by law, and may consider the record developed before the

magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of

that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall

witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 15th day of August 2016.

S/Martin C. Carlson 

 Martin C. Carlson

 United States Magistrate Judge

13

Case 4:16-cv-01686-MWB Document 4 Filed 08/15/16 Page 13 of 13