1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GORDON L. STROUP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 06-94 Erie

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., J.

Plaintiff, Gordon L. Stroup, commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security denying his claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental

security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et

seq, and § 1381 et seq. Stroup filed applications for DIB and SSI on January 29, 2004, alleging

disability since February 28, 2002, due nerve damage in his neck (Administrative Record,

hereinafter “AR”, 45-47; 60; 262-263). His applications were denied, and he requested a hearing

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (AR 30-33; 35; 265-268). A hearing was held before

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on August 24, 2005 (AR 269-303). Following this hearing,

the ALJ found that Stroup was not entitled to a period of disability, DIB or SSI under the Act

(AR 15-20). His request for review by the Appeals Council was denied (AR 5-7), rendering the

Commissioner’s decision final under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action challenges the

ALJ’s decision. Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. 

For the reasons set forth below, we will deny both motions. 

I. BACKGROUND

Stroup was born on September 7, 1948, and was fifty-six years old on the date of the

ALJ’s decision (AR 16; 45). He is a high school graduate, and previously worked as a retail

manager, sales associate, machine assembler and delivery driver (AR 74; 275-277).

Stroup was evaluated for depression by Kathy Mahood, M.A., on June 16, 1998 (AR 222-

Case 1:06-cv-00094-SJM Document 13 Filed 11/15/06 Page 1 of 14
1The GAF score considers psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness. Scores between 41 and 50 indicate “[s]erious

symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” 

See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR 34 (4th ed. 2000). 

2

224; 229) pursuant to a referral from his family physician (AR 222). He reported suicidal

ideations with no specific plan, emotional detachment, poor appetite, sleep disturbances and poor

memory (AR 222). He was diagnosed with rule out major depression, schizoid personality

features, and assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 50 (AR 229).1 He

was referred to a physician for medication review and diagnostic impression, and was to return

for behavioral and supportive therapy (AR 229). 

Stroup returned to Ms. Mahood on July 7, 1998 and reported feeling “stupid” and

“worthless” with some suicidal ideations “a couple of times per week” (AR 221). Ms. Mahood

reported that his mood was dysphoric, his affect restricted, and although he expressed suicidal

ideations, he was able to contract for safety (AR 221). She noted that he was experiencing a

number of symptoms of depression including agitation, lethargy, insomnia, sadness and feelings

of worthlessness (AR 221). 

Stroup also suffered from neck pain, and a cervical spine x-ray conducted on August 2,

2002 revealed degenerative changes involving the lower cervical spine (AR 107). He was seen

by Robert Symons, D.O. on the same date for follow up examination, who noted a history of

cervical disease (AR 129). Stroup denied suffering from headaches, dizziness, numbness or

tingling, but complained of ear pain (AR 129-130). Dr. Symons reported that he was currently

without symptoms of depression (AR 130). 

An April 21, 2003 CT scan of Stroup’s cervical spined showed degenerative disk changes

in the mid- and lower cervical spine, which changes were noted as “probably not significantly

different when correlated to the patient’s previous plain films of the cervical spine” (AR 106). 

The scan also showed mild to moderate bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6 (AR 106).

Stroup returned to Dr. Symons on April 8, 2003 for a follow up examination (AR 127). 

He denied suffering from pain, headaches, dizziness, numbness or tingling, and was on Ibuprofen

(AR 127). He did not wish to be treated for depression (AR 128). 

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Stroup returned to Dr. Symons on October 8, 2003, and declined to allow further

assessment of a positive screen for depression (AR 127). 

 A November 2003 MRI of Stroup’s cervical spine showed degenerative changes at C4-5;

disk changes at C5-6 and C6-7; mild foraminal and AP canal stenosis at C5-6; mild broad C6-7

disk protrusion, with mild to moderate AP canal narrowing; mild neural foraminal narrowing;

and central bulging at C5-6, without significant neural foraminal stenosis (AR 118). 

On December 30, 2003, Stroup was evaluated for physical therapy for complaints of neck

pain (AR 114). He reported chronic, intermittent pain which radiated into his ears and down his

mid back (AR 114). He claimed his pain was a 7 out of 10, occurred approximately three times

per week and rendered him unable to do much more than sit quietly (AR 114). Stroup reported

that his pain decreased with rest and Ibuprofen but increased with activity (AR 114). He

ambulated independently, had active range of motion in his cervical spine, pain with palpation of

the bilateral cervical musculature and mild muscular spasm was noted in the bilateral traverse

fibers (AR 114). Stroup’s therapist noted that he showed “good rehab potential for stated goals”

(AR 114). On December 31, 2003, Stroup requested a therapeutic home exercise program rather

than traveling to Erie for therapy (AR 115). He was scheduled for one more session “to go

through his program with self advancements” (AR 115).

In December 2003, Dr. Symons requested a neurosurgery consultation for evaluation of

Stroup’s cervical disk disease (AR 101). Dr. Symons noted that Stroup had no loss of strength,

“just pain”, and that he was attending physical therapy and using anti-inflammatories (AR 101). 

Stroup returned to physical therapy on January 12, 2004 and indicated that his pain level

was a 3 out of 10 (AR 120). He reportedly had good short term relief with the use of the

modalities and therapeutic exercises (AR 120). He requested continuation of his exercises and 

cervical heat at home since he had difficulty traveling to the facility (AR 120).

Stroup was evaluated by Vincent Silvaggio, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon in February

2004 (AR 137-138). Stroup relayed a six to seven year history of neck pain which occurred

approximately four to six times per week (AR 137). He described the pain as being in his neck

into the periscapular region, but denied any problems with numbness, parathesias, gait instability

or fine motor coordinate activities of his hands (AR 137). He reported that he had been treated

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with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories, and had two sessions of physical therapy without

significant relief (AR 137). Physical examination revealed no tenderness to palpation of the

midline and cervical spine, good strength in the upper extremities and deep tendon reflexes were

bilateral and equal (AR 138). Dr. Silvaggio reviewed his previous diagnostic studies showing

degenerative disc disease, but found no evidence of any clinically significant instability (AR

138). He informed Stroup that his symptoms were mainly axial neck pain with no radicular pain

and there was no evidence of any weakness (AR 138). Dr. Silvaggio recommended conservative

treatment measures and encouraged him to enroll in physical therapy (AR 138).

Cervical spine x-rays conducted on February 27, 2004 showed disk space narrowing at

C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7 with significant change in alignment at C4-5 from flexion to extension,

suggestive of ligamentous instability (AR 193). 

On March 2, 2004, K. Loc Le, M.D., a state agency reviewing physician, reviewed the

medical evidence of record and concluded that Stroup could occasionally lift and carry up to 20

pounds; frequently lift and carry up to 10 pounds; stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday; sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; was unlimited in his pushing and pulling

abilities; and could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl (AR 154-155).

On March 16, 2004, Dr. Symons assessed Stroup with cervical radiculopathy (AR 191). 

On March 17, 2004, he was evaluated for continued physical therapy treatment (AR 189). He

reported that a neurosurgeon recommended continuation of conservative treatment (AR 189). He

claimed he had severe discomfort, a pain level of 8/10, limited cervical range of motion,

paresthesias and discomfort on the right side of his face (AR 189). The therapist reported that his

strength was within normal limits and deep tendon responses were 2/4 in his upper and lower

extremities (AR 189). Therapy consisted of moist heat, electrical stimulation and ultrasound

(AR 189). Stroup was provided a therapeutic exercise program for cervical range of motion,

isometric strengthening and stretching (AR 189).

On March 24, 2004, Stroup reported a decrease in his level of discomfort following

modalities, and indicated that his pain level was 3/10 (AR 188). On March 26, 2004, he had

some pain relief from therapy, but continued to have numbness on the side of his neck which

extended down the paraspinal muscles and into the infrascapular area (AR 187). He claimed that

Case 1:06-cv-00094-SJM Document 13 Filed 11/15/06 Page 4 of 14
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when his pain was present it was severe, but on the date of therapy his pain level was 1/10 (AR

187). 

On April 7, 2004, Stroup reported to his therapist no significant change in his level or

pattern of discomfort, and rated his pain as 7-8/10 (AR 185). He claimed that exercises did not

result in any significant improvement (AR 185). Stroup was discharged from physical therapy

secondary to “no progression” (AR 185). 

Stroup returned to Dr. Symons for follow up on May 27, 2004 (AR 180). Stroup reported

that he had been seen by an orthopedic surgeon in Pittsburgh who had recommended surgery but

he declined (AR 180). He was taking Ibuprofen three times a day for pain (AR 180). He rated

his pain as a 4, and had no changes in mobility, balance, strength or ability to care for himself

(AR 182). Stroup reportedly felt down, depressed and hopeless, and claimed he had little interest

or pleasure in doing things (AR 182). Dr. Symons noted that Stroup’s positive screen for

depression revealed that he did not meet the criteria for major depressive disorder and he had no

symptoms requiring intervention (AR 181). 

On January 13, 2005, Dr. Symons’ treatment notes reflected that pain was “not a

problem” on that date, but contained a comment that Stroup had chronic back/neck problems

(AR 245). Stroup reported no changes in mobility, balance, strength or ability to care for himself

(AR 245). In addition to Ibuprofen, Prozac was added to his medication regime for his

depression (AR 244). Stroup declined counseling for his depression (AR 244). 

On February 4, 2005, Stoup’s Ibuprofen was replaced with Piroxicam (AR 251).

On March 25, 2005, Stroup reported that he had been taking his medication, did not have

any side effects, and felt his medications had helped with his depression (AR 238). He again

declined counseling (AR 238). 

Dr. Symons reported on August 17, 2005 that Stroup’s depression was stable (AR 258).

Stroup and a vocational expert testified at the hearing held by the ALJ on August 24,

2005 (AR 269-303). Stroup testified that he was able to drive and required no assistive device to

walk (AR 277). He claimed that he suffered from right ear and neck pain which was

unpredictable, and that he had good days and bad days (AR 278-280). He testified that he

suffered from pain episodes approximately four to five times per week, and when it became

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intense, he had to remain motionless for sometimes as long as seven or eight hours (AR 286). 

Stroup indicated that he was beginning mental health treatment the week after the hearing (AR

282). He testified that he had not sought mental health treatment for approximately five years

prior to the hearing (AR 282). He claimed his symptoms were getting worse which prompted

him to seek treatment (AR 282). Stroup testified he was able to attend to his personal needs,

help with routine household chores, but no longer had any interest in outside activities or hobbies

(AR 283-284). He claimed to have sleep problems and a lack of energy (AR 289). 

The vocational expert testified that Stroup’s skills from his past position as a retail

manager were transferable to sedentary and light jobs which were semi-skilled in nature,

including the positions of order clerk and inventory control clerk at the sedentary exertional

level, and customer service clerk at the light exertional level (AR 298-300). The vocational

expert further testified that these positions would be eliminated if such an individual was limited

to simple, repetitive, routine type tasks (AR 300-301). Finally, the vocational expert testified

that only the customer service position would be eliminated if such an individual was limited to

no more than incidental interaction with the public (AR 301). 

After the administrative hearing, Stroup was seen by James Cousins, a social worker, on

August 29, 2005 for complaints of depression (AR 255). Mr. Cousins reported that Stroup was

initially seen in June 1998, kept one appointment, then dropped out of treatment (AR 255). He

reportedly continued to struggle with feelings of hopelessness and helplessness, anger, suicidal

thoughts and isolation (AR 256). He claimed he felt no effect from the Prozac (AR 256). Mr.

Cousins diagnosed him with dysthmia, and referred him to Carol Teresi for medication review

(AR 256). 

Stroup was seen by Carol Teresi, CRNP on September 2, 2005 for treatment of

depression (AR 252). He reported that Prozac had been of no benefit to him since he started

taking it in January 2005 (AR 252). He claimed he felt hopeless, had low energy, lied on the

couch all day, was irritable and easily frustrated and “could not imagine going out to work” (AR

252). On mental status examination, Ms. Teresi reported he had mild anxiety, his mood was

down, he was appropriate and logical, his thoughts were relevant, and his concentration, impulse

control and judgement were good (AR 253). She found his insight fair, since he had been

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depressed “a long time and did not seek help” (AR 253). She diagnosed Stroup with major

depression, recurrent, severe without psychosis, rule out dysthymia, rule out generalized anxiety

disorder or other anxiety disorder, and assigned him a GAF score of 50 (AR 253). Ms. Teresi

discontinued the Prozac and started Celexa (AR 254).

Following the submission of the recent mental health treatment records, the ALJ issued a

written decision which found that Stroup was not entitled to a period of disability, DIB or SSI

within the meaning of the Social Security Act (AR 15-20). His request for an appeal with the

Appeals Council was denied making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner

(AR 5-7). He subsequently filed this action. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the determination of the Commissioner unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Richardson v.

Parales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It has been defined as less than a preponderance of evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Jesurum v. Secretary of the

United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the payment of disability insurance

benefits to those who have contributed to the program and who have become so disabled that

they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Title

XVI of the Act establishes that SSI benefits are payable to those individuals who are similarly

disabled and whose income and resources fall below designated levels. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). A

person who does not have insured status under Title II may nevertheless receive benefits under

Title XVI. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). In order to be entitled to

DIB under Title II, a claimant must additionally establish that his disability existed before the

expiration of his insured status. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (c). The ALJ found that Stroup met the

disability insured status requirements of the Act (AR 16). SSI does not have an insured status

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requirement. 

A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable

to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine when an individual meets

this definition:

In the first two steps, the claimant must establish (1) that he is not

engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and (2) that he suffers

from a severe medical impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-41 (1987). If the claimant shows a severe medical

impairment, the [Commissioner] determines (3) whether the

impairment is equivalent to an impairment listed by the

[Commissioner] as creating a presumption of disability. Bowen,

482 U.S. at 141. If it is not, the claimant bears the burden of

showing (4) that the impairment prevents him from performing the

work that he has performed in the past. Id. If the claimant satisfies

this burden, the [Commissioner] must grant the claimant benefits

unless the [Commissioner] can demonstrate (5) that there are jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ferguson

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 117.

The ALJ resolved Stroup’s case at the fifth step. At step two, the ALJ determined that his

degenerative disc disease was a severe impairment, but determined at step three that he did not

meet a listing (AR 17). At step four, the ALJ determined that he could not return to his past

work, but retained the residual functional capacity to perform work at the light exertional level

(AR 18). At the final step, the ALJ determined that Stroup could perform the jobs cited by the

vocational expert at the administrative hearing (AR 19). The ALJ additionally determined that

his allegations regarding his limitations were not totally credible (AR 19). Again, we must

affirm this determination unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

Stroup argues that the ALJ erred in not fully crediting his testimony as to his functional

limitations resulting from his subjective complaints of pain, erred in his evaluation of the medical

evidence with respect to his alleged mental impairment, and erred in finding that he has the

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residual functional capacity to perform light work. He also challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the

testimony of the vocational expert, since the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert did not

include all of his alleged functional limitations. We shall address each of these arguments in

turn. 

A. Credibility determination 

Stroup first argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective complaints of pain and

in finding that his testimony was not entirely credible. Testimony of subjective complaints of

pain is entitled to great weight, particularly when supported by competent medical evidence. 

Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3rd Cir. 1979). Where such testimony is reasonably

supported by medical evidence, an ALJ may not discount such evidence without contrary medical

evidence. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.1981). Even when not fully confirmed

by objective medical evidence, subjective complaints must be seriously considered. Id. at 972;

see also Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1068 (3d Cir.1984). Although the ALJ is required

to give great weight to the claimant's testimony of subjective complaints of pain, he has the

discretion to reject partially, or even entirely, such subjective complaints if they are not fully

credible. Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir.1974).

When considering subjective complaints, the ALJ is entitled to discredit a claimant's

testimony, but must state the facts upon which the conclusion is based, which must be both clear

and reasonable. Atkins v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 383, 389 (E.D.Pa.1988). Relevant factors include

the claimant's statements, appearance, and demeanor; medical signs and laboratory findings;

treatment and response; and physicians' opinions regarding credibility and severity of claimant's

subjective complaints. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *3. The

ALJ is also constrained to consider only those complaints of pain or other symptoms which can

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence, and other evidence. 20

C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Moreover, the claimant must produce medical signs and laboratory findings

showing the existence of a medical impairment which results from anatomical, physiological, or

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psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms alleged. Id. Deference must be given to the ALJ's determination in issues of

credibility when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision, so long as the ALJ discusses the

issue and his finding is supported by substantial evidence. Alvarez v. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, 549 F. Supp. 897, 899-900 (E.D.Pa.1982).

We find that the ALJ evaluated Stroup’s subjective complaints of pain consistent with the

above standards. The ALJ recognized that Stroup had a history of low back pain secondary to

degenerative disc disease at C4-5, C5-6 and C6-7, mild foraminal and canal stenosis at C5-6,

mild broad C6-7 protrusion with mild to moderate canal narrowing and mild neural foraminal

narrowing, and central bulging at C5-6, which was confirmed by a CT scan and MRI of the

cervical spine (AR 17). The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Stroup’s assertions concerning his

limitations were not totally credible (AR 19). In support of his conclusion, the ALJ pointed to

Dr. Salvaggio’s evaluation in February 2004, wherein Stroup denied numbness, paresthesias, gait

instability, and poor fine motor coordination, and stated that he had only been treated with

Ibuprofen (AR 17). He noted that Dr. Salvaggio’s physical examination revealed that Stroup was

in no acute distress, had no tenderness and had good strength and sensation (AR 17). The ALJ

further noted that while progress notes showed he sought treatment for neck pain, he admitted

Tylenol controlled his pain and his physical examinations were unremarkable (AR 17). 

Based upon the ALJ’s discussion of the evidence, we find that the ALJ’s determination

that Stroup’s testimony was not fully credible is supported by substantial evidence. The

treatment notes do not depict a totally disabling neck and back impairment. For example, while

Stroup complained of pain at his initial physical therapy evaluation, his therapist opined that he

showed “good rehab potential for stated goals” (AR 114). In February 2004, he denied any

problems with numbness, parathesias, gait instability or fine motor coordinate activities of his

hands, his physical examination was unremarkable and Dr. Salvaggio found no evidence of any

clinically significant instability (AR 137-138). In May 2004 and January 2005, he reported no

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changes in mobility, balance, strength or ability to care for himself (AR 182; 245).

We reject Stroup’s argument that the ALJ’s credibility determination is flawed since

multiple treatment attempts were taken without control of his symptoms, and years of treatment

records corroborate severe pain episodes. Plaintiff’s Brief pp. 9-10; 12). To the contrary,

Stroup’s conservative treatment history supports the ALJ’s determination that his subjective

complaints were not entitled to full credence. The record reflects that his condition was not

serious enough to warrant surgical intervention (AR 138), and that he actively participated in

physical therapy for a limited time frame, preferring instead to undergo a home exercise program

(AR 115), and that he took no more than basic anti-inflammatories for several years (AR 101;

127; 137; 180; 251). Moreover, treatment notes reflect that on several occasions Stroup reported

that pain was not a problem for him (AR 203; 208; 245).

Nor are we persuaded that the ALJ committed error by failing to fully credit Stroup’s

complaints of debilitating pain based on his work history. See Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d 412,

415 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1981) (noting that, when claimant has worked for a long period of time, his

testimony about his work capabilities should be accorded substantial credibility). Despite

concluding that Stroup’s complaints were not entirely credible, the ALJ did not totally discount

them. Rather, he credited them to the extent that he determined that Stroup could not return to

his past relevant work and reduced his residual functional capacity to light work. We therefore

find no error in the ALJ’s credibility assessment. 

B. Evaluation of medical evidence relative to Stoup’s alleged mental impairment

We reach a different result however, with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical

evidence relating to Stroup’s alleged mental impairment. Stroup claims that the ALJ failed to

analyze his September 2005 mental health evaluation, specifically the assessed GAF score of 50. 

Plaintiff’s Brief p. 12. We agree. The ALJ stated at the administrative hearing that the “key to

the case” revolved around Stroup’s mental health situation, and he considered a mental health

evaluation “imperative” in resolving Stroup’s claim (AR 301). In his decision, however, the ALJ

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makes no more than a passing reference to the September 2005 evaluation, concluding that no

evidence suggested that his alleged depression imposed any significant limitations. The ALJ did

not address Stroup’s GAF score of 5O in his determination, which indicates “[s]erious symptoms

(e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” 

See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR 34 (4th ed. 2000). 

Pursuant to the final rules of the Social Security Administration, a claimant’s GAF score

is not considered to have a “direct correlation to the severity requirements.” 66 Fed.Reg. 50746,

50764-65 (2000). Nonetheless, the GAF remains the scale used by mental health professionals to

“assess current treatment needs and provide a prognosis.” Id. As such, “it constitutes medical

evidence accepted and relied upon by a medical source and must be addressed by an ALJ in

making a determination regarding a claimant’s disability.” Colon v. Barnhart, 424 F. Supp. 2d

805, 812 (E.D.Pa. 2006); see also Santiago-Rivera v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 2794189 at *9

(E.D.Pa. 2006) (case remanded since claimant’s GAF score of 50 indicated serious symptoms

and ALJ failed to discuss score); Span v. Barnhart, 2004 WL 1535768 at *7 (E.D.Pa. 2004)

(absent from ALJ’s discussion was any meaningful indication of how he considered claimant’s

GAF scores or discounted their significance); Escardille v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 21499999 at *7

(E.D.Pa. 2003) (case remanded because ALJ failed to mention claimant’s GAF score of 50 which

constituted a specific medical finding that claimant unable to perform competitive work). 

The Commissioner argues that even if the September 2005 mental health evaluation were

sufficient to show that Stroup had significant mental limitations, he would not be able to meet the

Act’s strict durational requirement, namely, that an individual cannot be found disabled unless he

is unable to perform any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve months. Defendant’s Brief

p. 20. While the Commissioner may be correct, the fact remains that the ALJ did not articulate

any reason for his apparent rejection of the GAF score, and we may only review the decision on

the basis upon which it was made. Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 43, 43-44 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2001)

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(“the grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the

record discloses that its action was based”); see also Robletto v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 2818431 at

*9 n.7 (E.D.Pa. 2006) (rejecting Commissioner’s argument that GAF score did not reflect a

historical view of the claimant’s level of functioning for a twelve month period, noting that even

if the ALJ chose to discount the claimant’s score on that basis, this did not relieve his obligation

to address his reasons for doing so in his opinion). 

Because the ALJ is required to give some reason for discounting the evidence he rejects,

see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3rd Cir. 1994), and the ALJ’s decision here fails to address

the 2005 GAF score evidence, we are unable to conclude that his decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Given the potential materiality of Stoup’s GAF score, we are of the opinion

that a remand is appropriate so that the ALJ can specifically address this evidence. 

C. RFC and Vocational Expert testimony

Finally, Stroup contends that the ALJ erred in his residual functional capacity

determination and erred in relying on the testimony of the vocational expert. Since we have

determined that remand is appropriate with respect to Stroup’s alleged mental impairment, we

need not address the ALJ’s RFC determination, inasmuch as the ALJ will necessarily re-evaluate

Stroup’s RFC in the course of considering the evidence of his mental impairment. Likewise, we

need not resolve the adequacy of the ALJ’s hypothetical at this time. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, Stroup’s motion for summary judgment shall be

denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment shall be denied. The matter shall

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum

Opinion. In addition to the ALJ’s reexamination of the evidence relative to Stroup’s alleged

mental impairment, the ALJ is free to seek additional evidence and/or call a vocational expert if

he feels it is necessary. An appropriate Order follows. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GORDON L. STROUP, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 06-94 Erie

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of November, 2006, and for the reasons stated in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 9]

is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 11] is DENIED. The

case is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings

consistent with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion. 

The clerk is hereby directed to mark the case closed. 

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. 

 

 

 

Case 1:06-cv-00094-SJM Document 13 Filed 11/15/06 Page 14 of 14