1

Filed 2/27/24 Ford v. San Joaquin County In

- Home S u pp ort Services CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

TAMMY FORD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY IN

- HOME SUPPORT

SERVICES,

Defendant and Respondent. C096203

(Super. Ct. No.

STKCVUJR20190001718)

Pro p er p laintiff Tammy Ford was employed to provide in

- home supportive

services to her granddaughter from 2007 until granddaughter died in 2015

. Ms . Ford

claims defendant San Joaquin County In

- H ome Supportive Services owes her wages for

services she provided

. After receiving an adverse decision from the Labor

Commissioner, she sought de novo review in the superior court . The superior court also

found that defendant did not owe her wages and entered judgment in defendant’s favor

.2

Ms. Ford appeals that judgment and challenges determinations and actions of

defendant

. We affirm, conclud ing Ms. Ford ’s challenges are either untimely or lack

merit

.

Statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise

indicated

.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Ford became an In

- Home Supportive Services (IHSS) provider for

granddaughter in 2007

. As early as 2010, the services defendant authorized for

granddaughter included zero hours of protective supervision or paramedical services. In

May 2012, defendant issued a notice changing granddaughter’s authorized s ervices

effective May 1, 201 2

, but leaving unchanged the zero hours of protective supervision

and paramedical services

. S ubsequent notices included 4.5 hours of paramedical services

per week but retained the zero hours for protective supervisio n effective June 1, 2013

,

through August 3 1 , 2014

.

Effective September 1, 2014, defendant decreased the authorized hours for

feeding

, increas ed the authorized hours for various other services , and left unchanged the

zero hours for protective supervision an d 4.5 hours for paramedical services

. Defendant

informed Ms. Ford of the approved hours via notice dated August 8 , 2014 (the August

2014 notice) following a social worker ’s visit to Ms. Ford’s home

. Ms. Ford was present

for the visit as granddaughter was attending school. The needs assessment form the

social worker completed for the visit designated a funding code of “2K

- CFC O

. ” Other

records indicate that granddaughter was moved from the personal care services program

to the Community First Choice Option P rogram effe ctive September 1, 2014.

Ms. Ford requested a hearing before the State Department of Social Services (the

depar tment) chall eng ing the August 2014 notice

. Her request identified several issues,

including a challenge to the paramedical services on the grounds that the social worker

never submitted the requisite forms to granddaughter’s physician. Following the hear ing,3

the department ordered defendant to rescind the August 2014 notice , conduct a

reassessment of granddaughter’s needs with granddaughter present, and issue a new

notice

.

Defendant conducted a reassessment in November 2014 and issued a new notice in

December 2014 increa s ing the authorized hours for various services for a total number of

191 hours and 4 minutes per month (“the December 2014 notice ” )

. Defendant did not

increase the hours for paramedical services or protective sup ervision

.

Ms. Ford appealed the December 2014 notice and disputed defendant’s

determination of needs for several services including paramedical services and protective

supervision

. Specific to paramedical services and protective supervision, the social

worker testified that the necessary forms were sent but not returned while Ms. Ford

testified that granddaughter’s medical providers stated they never received the forms

. In

June 201 5 , t h e department ordered defendant to (1) increase the number of hours for

domestic services, meal preparation, meal cleanup, laundry, and shopping effective

September 1, 2014 ; (2) evaluate any adjustment s to the hours authorized for all categories

to ensure that services provided by a regional center were not considered an alternative

resource effective September 1, 2014 ; and (3) continue evaluating granddaughter’s need

for paramedical services and protective supervision , including obtaining and receiving

the respective forms from her medical providers

.

In J uly 2015, d efendant issued a new notice authorizing 283 hours of services

effective September 1, 2014 , including protective supervision hours and additional

paramedical service hours

. Ms. Ford filed a rehearing request, which the department

denied in Dece mber 2015

. The departmen t informed Ms. Ford that 283 hours of service

was the maximum allowable hours under the IHSS program and instructed her to petition

the superior court if she was dissatisfied with the determination.

In August 201 6

, Ms. Ford filed a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner for

services she rendered to granddaughter from August 11, 2013

, t hrough August 11 , 20 1 4

,4

seeking eight d ollars per hour through June 30, 2014

, and nine dollar s per hour for the

remainder

. The Labor Commissioner issued a decision in defendant’s favor in Decemb er

2018, concluding that Ms. Ford was properly paid for the hours defendant approved and

that the hours for which she sought compensation were not approved by defendant and

therefore not owed

. Ms. Ford appealed the decision in the San Joaquin County S uperior

Co urt

.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of d efendant,

finding as follows : (1) as to defendant’s notices issued before the August 2014 notice

,

Ms. Ford was not authorized to pe rform protective services

, was paid for the authorized

paramedical services , and failed to timely challenge defendant’s determinations regarding

those services ; and ( 2 ) as to the other notices

, evidence established that defendant

properly followed the directi on from the final decisions and implemented the necessary

changes to the relevant time periods

.

Ms. For d timely appealed the judgment

.

DISCUSSION

The I HSS program enables aged, blind, or disabled individuals to avoid

institutionalization by remaining in their homes with proper supportive services.

( § 12300 et seq. ) Those supportive services are defined to include domestic services,

protective supervision, and paramedical services.

There are four pathways to receiving IHSS benefits : (1) the original IHSS

program ( § 12300 et seq.); (2) the Medi

- Cal personal care services program ( § 14 1 32.95);

(3) the IHSS Plus waiver program ( § 14132.951); and ( 4 ) the Community First Choice

Option Program ( § 14132.956). ( Cal

. Health Care Foundation

, In

- Home Supportive

Services (IHSS) 101: Opportunities and Challenges U nder CalAIM (May 2023)

< https://www.chcf.org/wp

- content/uploads/2023/05/IHSSOppsChallengesCalAIM.pdf >

[as of Feb. 2 7 , 2024 ]

, archived at: < https://perma.cc/9Y98

- SR2H > .) IHSS is overseen by

the department and administered by count y agencies like defendant

. ( Norasingh v.5

Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 744

. ) The county agencies “process

applications for [In

- Home Supportive Services] services

, assess applicants’ service needs,

authorize services and service hours,

. . . [at least annually] reassess recipients’ needs,”

and either pay the provider of the services, or pay the recipient who hires the provider.

( Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 574, 57 9 ;

§ 12301.1.) A n IHSS provider is limited to 283 hours of com pensation per month

.

( Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal. 5th 583, 601 ; Department

, Manual of

Policies and Procedures ( Department MPP) § 30

- 765. 111 ( Apr. 14, 2000 )

< https://www .cdss.ca.gov/Portals/9/Regs/ssman3.pdf > [as of Feb. 2 7 , 2024 ], archived at:

< https://perma.cc/9MXY

- 9TL8 > .)

County determinations with respect to IHSS benefits are reviewable by hearing

before the department

. ( Norasingh v. Lightbourne

, supra

, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 745.) If

the claimant received an adequate and language

- compliant notice of the county action,

the claimant must file a request for hearing within 90 days after the notice was mailed or

given to the claimant

, unless (1) good cause exists and the request i s filed within 180

days or (2) other “ principles of equity jurisdiction” apply

. ( Department MPP § 22

- 009

(June 12, 2018) < https://www.cdss.ca.gov/Portals/9/Regs/4CFCMAN.pdf > [as of

Feb. 2 7 , 2024 ], archived at: < https://perma.cc/EZ9Y

- QM7P > ; § 1095 1

, subd s

. (a) & (d)

. )

“Good cause” means a substantial and compelling reason beyond the party’s control,

considering the length of the delay, the diligence of the party making the request, and the

potent ial prejudice to the other party. (§ 10951, subd. (c).) If the claimant does not

prevail in the administrative process and seeks to challenge the decision, the claimant’s

exclusive remedy is to file a writ of mandate petition in the superior cour t within one year

after receiving notice of the department’s final decision

. ( K.I. v. Wagner (2014)

225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1420

, citing § 10962 .)

Here, as to the hours Ms. Ford rendered before July 1, 2014, the superior court

found that Ms. Ford “was not authorized to perform protective services and was paid for6

the paramedical services which were authorized.” Ms. Ford does not dispute these

findings

, and we have no basis to find them unsupported by substantial evidence.

( Nordquist v. McGraw

- Hill Broadcasting Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App. 4th 5 55, 561 [standard

of review].) Instead, Ms. Ford appears to argue that she should have been authorized to

perform pr otective supervision , among other services, “ever since January of 2010” or at

least since April 2012, citing a form granddaughter’s physician completed at that time.

We conclude this claim is untimely.

T he record does not indicate that Ms. Ford timely challenged defendant’s

authorization s for the pre

- July 1, 2014 period. Defendant issued notices as to that period

as late as July 16, 2013

, but the record indicates Ms. Ford did not raise concerns until

after the August 2014 notice

, exceeding both the 90

- and 180

- day time limits for the pre

July 1, 2014 period

. ( § 109 51 , subd. (a).) Nor does the record suggest that the notices

were inadequate, that Ms. Ford provided good cause for her delay

, or that principles of

equity should apply to extend the deadlines

. (§ 109 51 , subds. (a) & (b).) Ms. Ford now

contends she never challenged the relevant notices because granddaughter’s

reassessments occurred in April 2012. This reasoning does not supply good cause or a

basis for equity

. As a result, we canno t reach the merits of her claims regarding the

period before July 1, 2014, including her claims that defendant did not properly assess

granddaughter for protective supervision or that granddaughter’s provider approved

protective supervision in 2012. (See Oliva v. Swoap (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 130, 135

[exhaustion of an administrative remedy provided by statute is a jurisdictional

prerequisite to the courts].)

As to Ms. Ford’s claims for services she rendered on and after July 1, 2014, we are

similarly unable to reach their merits

. After Ms. Ford’s administrative appeal of the

September 2014 and December 2014 notices , the department ordered defendant to make

various changes effective September 1, 2014

, and to continue evaluating granddaughter’s

need for paramedical services and protective supervision

. Defendant then authorized the7

maximum 283 hours of services, including protective supervision hours and additional

paramedical service hours, effective September 1, 2014. Following that authorization,

t he department denied Ms. Ford’s rehearing request . Ms. Ford did not file an

administrative mandamus petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 within

one year , the exclusive remedy for challeng ing the department’s decision

. ( § 10962.)

And she provides no basis for us to conclude that h er choice to file a claim with the Labor

Commissioner satisfies t his requirement. We see no authority suggesting that the Labor

Commissioner has the power to change the hours that defendant or the department

auth orizes under the IHSS program

. B ecause Ms. Ford’s appea l is limited to determining

whether defendant properly authorized granddaughter’s services or Ms. Ford’s hours of

compensation and not whether defendant paid her for the authorized services , we

conclu de it is untimely

. (See Kupka v. Board of Administration (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d

791, 794 [ proceeding for writ of mandate barred if not commenced within the applicable

limitation period].)

Ms. Ford’s separate contention that the trial court erred by refusing to admit

relevant evidence fails for lack of evidentiary specificity and legal argument : Ms. Ford

does not specify what evidence she unsuccessful ly sought to admit

, nor does she argue

how the court erred

. (See Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange (2021) 70 Cal.App. 5th 374, 391

[ challenge to evidentiary rulings forfeited where opening brief does not identify distinct

evidentiary rulings or provide legal argument as to why the rulings were wrong ] .) Her

contention

, including her claim in reply that the trial court a dmitted only two exhibits of

her case

, is refuted by the record showing that the trial court admitted all 64 of Ms.

Ford’s exhibits

.

Lastly, Ms. Ford takes issue with the department’s transition of granddaughter

from the Medi

- Cal personal services care program to the Community First Choice Option

P rogram

. But her claims of material alteration of medical records

, false statements , and

improper notice lack sufficient analysis and citation to autho rity. ( See United Grand8

Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App. 5th 142, 153

. ) And her implied

contention that the Community First Choice Option P rogram reduced granddaughter’s

benefits or Ms. Ford’s authorized hours of compensation has no basis. The Community

First Choice O ption program was made available under the federal Patient Protection and

Affordable Care Act in 2010 and permits participating state s to provide “home and

community

- based

. . . services ” and supports to eligible individuals with intellectual and

developmental disabilities. (42 U

. S.C. § 1396n(k) (1) .) Participating states receive an

increased level of federal reimbursement. ( 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(k)(2) .) Ms. Ford provides

no authority suggesting that defendant’s transition of granddaughter to the Community

First Choice Option P rogram reduced granddaughter’s services or hours or otherwise

significantly affect ed granddaughter’s receipt of services

. Thus, we see no grounds for

Ms. Ford to challenge granddaughter’s transition

. ( S ee Madrid v. McMahon (1986)

183 Cal.App.3d 151 , 156 [test for whether an agency action is subject to challenge in a

hearing is “whether it has a significant effect on the claimant’s application for or receipt

of the aid or other service provided by the county agency”].)9 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice , each party sha ll bear their

own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a) (5) .)

/s/

MESIWALA

, J.

We concur:

/s/

EARL, P. J.

/s/

ROBIE , J.