Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A05-1610-CR-2327 | March 16, 2017 Page 1 of 6

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth A. Bellin

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keenan J. P. Mardis,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 16, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A05-1610-CR-2327

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Terry C. 

Shewmaker, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1502-MR-1

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Keenan J.P. Mardis appeals his conviction for murder, a felony, following a 

jury trial. Mardis raises the following two issues for our review:
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1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

his conviction.

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error 

when it instructed the jury.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 19, 2014, Mardis and others confronted Lenell Williams and 

Ontario Brown on Wagner Avenue in Elkhart, near the Washington Gardens 

apartments. One of Mardis’ companions, Zirei Jackson, began to fight with 

Brown. During the fight, Mardis told Jackson to “take his belt when you knock 

him out.” Tr. Vol. I at 139-40. Brown was wearing a designer belt worth about 

$300.

[4] The fight between Jackson and Brown ended and the two groups began to walk 

away from each other. But then Mardis “came out of nowhere,” “pulled a 

revolver,” and “told [Brown] to give him his belt.” Id. at 145. Brown refused. 

Mardis then shot Brown in the head and killed him.

[5] The State charged Mardis with murder, a felony. At his ensuing jury trial, the 

court instructed the jury as follows, without objection from Mardis’ counsel: 

Under the law of this state, a person charged with a crime is 

presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of 

innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each 

element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove 

his innocence or to prove or explain anything.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 60. The jury found Mardis guilty of murder and the 

court sentenced him to fifty-eight years in the Department of Correction. This 

appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] On appeal, Mardis first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

to support his conviction. In reviewing such claims, “we consider only the 

evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither 

reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59 

N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We affirm the judgment unless no reasonable 

factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Id. Mardis’ only argument on this 

issue is that the State failed to show that he was the person who shot and killed 

Brown.

[7] We cannot agree. At trial, Williams testified that Mardis was the person who 

fatally shot Brown. Williams further testified that Mardis had told Jackson, 

during Jackson’s scuffle with Brown, to get Brown’s belt, which Mardis had 

then also demanded himself, at gunpoint, after the fight.

[8] According to Mardis, Williams was not a reliable witness because “he gave a 

prior contradictory statement to police” in which he had initially stated that he 

did not know who had shot Brown. Appellant’s Br. at 12. It is true that 
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Williams acknowledged that he had initially told police that he “didn’t see 

anything” the night of the murder. Tr. Vol. I at 151-52. But Williams also 

clarified that he had not told the police the truth “the first day . . . [b]ecause [he] 

was scared” of Mardis. Id. at 150. However, after later talking to Brown’s 

mother, Williams informed the police of what he had actually seen. Id. And 

Williams made clear in his testimony to the jury that “from just a few minutes 

after [he] saw [the murder] until [the trial he has] always said . . . Keenan” was 

the shooter. Id. at 151. Mardis’ challenge to Williams’ testimony on appeal 

simply seeks to have this court reweigh Williams’ testimony and reassess his 

credibility, which we will not do.

Issue Two: Jury Instruction

[9] Mardis also asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error when it 

instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence. As our supreme court has 

explained:

Appellate courts may, on rare occasions, resort to the 

fundamental error exception to address on direct appeal an 

otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. However, fundamental 

error is extremely narrow and available only when the record 

reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary 

principles, when the harm or potential for harm cannot be

denied, and when the violation is so prejudicial to the rights of 

the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 640 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted). With respect 

to jury instructions, we usually consider: “(1) whether the tendered instruction 

correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to 
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support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction 

was covered by other instructions that were given.” McCowan v. State, 27 

N.E.3d 760, 763-64 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). We consider the 

instructions as a whole and do not reverse unless the whole of the instructions 

misled the jury as to the law in the case. Id. at 764.

[10] In McCowan, our supreme court declared:

A defendant in a criminal case is per se entitled to a jury 

instruction that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defendant is 

entitled to request the following jury instruction, and the trial court 

must give this instruction if requested: “The presumption of 

innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout the 

trial. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the 

defendant is innocent if you can reasonably do so.” If the 

defendant adds to or varies this language in his request, inclusion 

of that variation remains within the discretion of the trial court, 

under the traditional three-prong analysis established by our 

jurisprudence.

Id. at 766 (emphases added; citations omitted).

[11] Here, again, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

Under the law of this state, a person charged with a crime is 

presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of 

innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each 

element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove 

his innocence or to prove or explain anything.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 60. On appeal, Mardis does not challenge whether 

that language fails to instruct the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent 

until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, he asserts, relying on 

McCowan, that that instruction was fundamental error because it did not also 

inform the jury that it was “required to maintain that presumption throughout 

the course of the trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 12.

[12] Mardis misunderstands McCowan. The court in McCowan was unambiguous: 

the defendant is entitled “to request” an instruction that the presumption of 

innocence continues in his favor throughout the trial, and the trial court must 

give that instruction “if requested.” 27 N.E.3d at 766. But Mardis made no 

such request. Accordingly, the trial court had no burden to instruct the jury as 

Mardis alleges. See id. Indeed, Mardis’ argument on this issue would remove 

the burden of requesting additional information on the presumption of 

innocence in the jury instructions from the defendant and place that burden on 

the trial court. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 212 (Ind. 2016) (stating 

that, to meet his burden to show fundamental error, the appellant must show 

that the trial court erred in not sua sponte raising the issue). Mardis’ argument is 

contrary to McCowan. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court 

committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury, and we affirm 

Mardis’ conviction for murder.

[13] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J, concur.