An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-370

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

IN THE MATTER OF: Surry County

No. 12-JT-25

K.M.D.

Appeal by respondent from order entered 7 November 2013 by 

Judge William F. Southern, III in Surry County District Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 July 2014.

Susan Curtis Campbell for Surry County Department of Social

Services, petitioner-appellee.

Raleigh Divorce Law Firm, by Lauren R. Hinzey, for guardian 

ad litem.

Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner III, for respondentappellant.

DILLON, Judge.

Respondent appeals from an order terminating his parental 

rights to his daughter Kelli1 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a)(1) and (3). He challenges the court’s findings

regarding the applicable statutory grounds. He also contends

 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the minor.
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that the court abused its discretion by terminating his parental 

rights. We affirm.

On 18 April 2012, the Surry County District Court entered a 

juvenile adjudication order concluding that three-year-old Kelli

was an abused and neglected juvenile. The court found that on 4 

March 2012, drugs, drug paraphernalia, and items used in the 

manufacture of methamphetamine were found in the home that the 

child shared with her mother, that the child’s mother was both 

using and selling methamphetamines, and that other adult members 

of the household were consuming methamphetamines and other drugs 

regularly. The court also found that respondent was 

incarcerated in the North Carolina Department of Correction, 

where he had been since 28 October 2011. On 10 January 2013, 

the court entered an order relieving the Surry County Department 

of Social Services (“DSS”) of reunification efforts and 

directing DSS to initiate proceedings to terminate the parental 

rights of both parents.

On 1 March 2013, DSS filed a motion to terminate parental 

rights. Following two hearings, the court filed an order on 7 

November 2013 terminating respondent’s parental rights on 

grounds pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in that he 

neglected Kelli and the neglect is likely to be repeated, and
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pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (a)(3) in that he failed 

to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for Kelli while 

she has been in foster care. The child’s mother consented to 

adoption.

We review a court’s order terminating parental rights to 

determine whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence and whether the conclusions of 

law are supported by the findings of fact. In re Shepard, 162 

N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. review denied sub nom 

In re D.S., 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 42 (2004). We review de 

novo the court’s conclusions of law. In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 

142, 146, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 

368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009). We review for abuse of discretion 

the court’s determination that it is in the juvenile’s best 

interest to terminate parental rights. In re T.M.T., 367 N.C. 

165, 171, 752 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013).

Respondent contends the court’s findings of fact regarding 

his prior neglect of Kelli and the evidence regarding repetition 

of that neglect are insufficient to support termination of his 

parental rights. A court may terminate parental rights pursuant 

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) if it concludes that the 

parent has neglected the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)
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(2013). A child is neglected if the parent fails to provide 

proper care, supervision, discipline or a safe environment. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013). When a court has 

previously adjudicated the child as neglected, the court must 

consider the probability that the child will be neglected if 

returned to the parent’s care. In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 

715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984).

Respondent has been incarcerated during the entire time 

Kelli has been in foster care through the date of the hearing to 

terminate parental rights. “Incarceration, by itself, is 

insufficient to establish neglect in a termination case, but it 

is relevant to whether a child is neglected.” In re J.K.C., ___ 

N.C. App. ___, ___, 721 S.E.2d 264, 270 (2012). According to 

the court’s findings of fact, respondent has a lengthy history 

of alcohol abuse and has been convicted of numerous criminal 

offenses involving alcohol and drugs, including seven 

convictions of driving while impaired. He was incarcerated in 

2002 for driving while impaired, during which incarceration he 

did not participate in the DART program. In 2005 and 2006, 

respondent was incarcerated again for driving while impaired, 

during which incarceration he did participate in the DART 

program. During 2007, respondent participated in an outpatient 
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alcohol abuse counseling program. Notwithstanding his 

participation in these rehabilitation programs, respondent 

continued to consume alcohol and to drive while impaired, 

culminating in his incarceration during the time of these 

juvenile proceedings. Respondent does not challenge these 

findings of fact. Given respondent’s long and largely unabated 

history of criminal activity and drug and alcohol abuse, which 

resulted in respondent’s multiple incarcerations and inability 

to provide proper care, supervision, and care of his child, we 

conclude it was reasonable for the trial court to find it likely 

that the neglect by respondent will continue in the future.

Having determined that termination of parental rights 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is supported by the 

findings of fact and the evidence, we need not address 

respondent’s arguments concerning termination of parental rights 

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). In re Parker, 90 

N.C. App. 423, 424, 368 S.E.2d 879, 880 (1988).

We next consider respondent’s contention that the court 

abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights. In 

determining whether termination of parental rights is in the 

best interest of the child,

[t]he court shall consider the following 

criteria and make written findings regarding 
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the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the 

juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of 

parental rights will aid in the 

accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 

juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and 

parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship 

between the juvenile and the proposed 

adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 

other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). While this statute 

mandates consideration of all of these factors, the court is 

required to make written findings of fact only regarding those 

factors which are relevant. In re D.H., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 

753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014). Great deference is to be given to a 

trial court’s discretionary decision and the appellate court may 

not overturn it unless “it was so arbitrary that it could not 

have been the result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 

312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).

Here, the court made the following findings of fact in its 

order:
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30. The permanent plan for the minor child 

is adoption.

31. The juvenile is almost five (5) years 

of age, having been born [in October 2008].

32. The court finds that the likelihood of 

adoption of the juvenile is high.

33. The termination of the respondentfather’s parental rights will allow the 

child to be adopted.

34. The bond between the juvenile and the 

father is very good.

35. The relationship between the juvenile 

and the proposed adoptive parents, is very 

strong. The juvenile has been in the care 

of the proposed adoptive parents since 

October 5, 2012.

While the child has been placed with the 

current foster parents, she has received 

intensive in-home counseling and the foster 

parents have been actively involved in her 

counseling. Additionally, during the 

current placement, the child has continued 

to have contact with the father and the 

father’s extended family.

We conclude the foregoing findings represent a reasoned 

decision. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the court’s 

order terminating respondent’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

Judge Robert C. HUNTER and Judge DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).