This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1127

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Dario Jothzan Abla-Salmeron,

Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2015

Affirmed

Kirk, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-13-3514

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. 

Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Robert D. Sicoli, Elizabeth R. Duel, Sicoli & Garry, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota 

(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KIRK, Judge

Appellant Dario Jothzan Abla-Salmeron challenges his criminal-sexual-conduct 

convictions, arguing that the district court erred by admitting (1) testimony from the 
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victim regarding her belief that appellant was in a gang and (2) expert testimony 

regarding rape-victim behaviors and common rape myths. We affirm.

FACTS

On May 18, 2013, J.B. went out for dinner, drinks, and dancing before briefly 

stopping at a friend’s house. She left the friend’s house around 2:15 a.m. on May 19. As 

she was walking the five blocks to her house, J.B. heard someone behind her say “guera.” 

J.B. interpreted the term to mean “American white girl,” and thought that the speaker 

might be someone she knew. J.B. turned around and saw appellant, whom she did not 

know. According to J.B., she turned to keep walking, but appellant pushed her down to 

the ground, held her down, took off her pants, and sexually assaulted her both vaginally 

and anally. After about ten minutes, two people walked around the corner and appellant 

started to run away.

R.C. testified that he was walking with a friend when he heard a woman screaming 

and a “commotion.” R.C. saw appellant and J.B. “on the curb” and noticed that J.B. was 

not wearing pants. Appellant walked away, and R.C. asked J.B. if she was all right. 

After J.B. responded that appellant had raped her, R.C. ran after appellant, telling him to 

come back because J.B. said he had raped her. According to R.C., appellant responded, 

“Yeah. Go ahead. You use her next. Your turn next.” R.C. then punched appellant, and 

the two fought. During the fight, R.C. called 911.

Appellant’s girlfriend then pulled up in an SUV, picked up appellant, and started 

to drive away. Responding police officers saw the SUV disregard a stop sign and drive 

away from the scene “at a fast rate of speed.” They conducted a traffic stop of the SUV 
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about two blocks away from the fight and identified appellant and his girlfriend. One 

police officer noticed that appellant had abrasions to his face, unzipped pants, and 

smelled of alcohol. Sperm cells collected from J.B. during a sexual-assault exam later 

matched appellant.

In contrast to J.B.’s testimony, appellant testified that J.B. approached him as he 

was walking home, acted affectionately toward him, and offered to have sex with him on 

the ground. Appellant stated that they had consensual sex, both vaginally and anally. 

After they finished, appellant walked away. As he did so, two men approached him and 

demanded appellant’s money. He alleged that R.C. told him, “If you don’t give money, 

I’m going to accuse you that you were raping her.” Appellant believed that he had been 

set up for a robbery.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count of first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The jury 

found appellant guilty of both charges. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing J.B.’s testimony 

that she believed appellant was in a gang.

During her direct testimony, J.B. explained that she initially hesitated to talk to the 

responding police officers because she was scared that appellant was in a gang. She also 

hesitated to go to the hospital and refused to identify the person who assaulted her at the 

scene for the same reason. J.B. told the police officers why she was scared, but admitted 

that she had no knowledge of appellant’s gang membership.
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On cross-examination, J.B. repeated her admission that she had no evidence 

appellant was in a gang. The defense attorney then asked J.B. about her ongoing fear:

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: [H]as anybody given you a reason 

to be afraid?

J.B.: Afraid of what?

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: I don’t know. You keep 

mentioning that you’re afraid, that you’re scared, and that 

you’re scared today still.

J.B.: That’s because I believe that he is in a gang. I believe 

that. I don’t have any information, but the . . . West Side has 

many Latino, Mexican gangs.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So you still believe that my client is 

in a gang?

J.B.: I don’t have information that says that he is, but that’s 

what I believe. Yes.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So no information. That’s just 

what you believe?

J.B.: Right.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Okay. And that’s enough to make 

you scared?

J.B.: Yes.

. . . .

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Has anybody affiliated with my 

client tried to contact you?

J.B.: No.

. . . .

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Have there been any threats made 

to you from anybody that has any connection to [appellant]?

J.B.: No.

Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked J.B. why she had recently moved to a new 

house. J.B. explained that her car had been broken into and that “somebody had put 

blood on [her] door.” But J.B. agreed with appellant’s attorney that she had no reason to 

suspect appellant or anyone connected to the case of involvement in these incidents.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by allowing J.B. to testify regarding 

her belief that appellant was in a gang. “Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound 
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discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of

discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). On appeal, appellant 

bears the burden to show both that the district court abused its discretion and that he 

suffered prejudice. See id. The erroneous admission of evidence does not require 

reversal unless “the error substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” State v. Nunn,

561 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1997). 

Appellant first suggests that J.B.’s testimony about appellant’s gang membership 

was irrelevant because gang membership is not an element of the charged offenses. 

Appellant is correct that gang membership is not an element of criminal sexual conduct. 

See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1, .344, subd. 1 (2012). But “‘[r]elevant evidence’ 

means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is therefore not 

limited to the elements of charged offenses. Appellant argued at trial that J.B. consented 

to vaginal and anal intercourse. J.B.’s initial reluctance to talk to police officers, go to 

the hospital, and identify appellant could be interpreted as evidence of consent because 

these facts could suggest that J.B. thought she had no reason to seek medical treatment or 

police intervention. As a result, J.B.’s explanation that her actions were based on fear 

that appellant was in a gang was relevant to a determination of her consent. See Minn. R. 

Evid. 401; State v. Grayson, 546 N.W.2d 731, 736-37 (Minn. 1996) (concluding that 

testimony regarding the defendant’s view of white women was relevant to an evaluation 

of his version of events).
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Appellant also suggests that J.B.’s testimony was irrelevant because it violated his 

First Amendment rights. “[T]he First Amendment protects an individual’s right to join 

groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs.” Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 

159, 163, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (1992). But “there is no per se barrier to the admission 

of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations where the evidence is relevant.” 

Grayson, 546 N.W.2d at 738. Unlike in Grayson, where the supreme court concluded 

that cross-examination regarding the views of Malcolm X was irrelevant and a 

constitutional error, appellant was not questioned about his beliefs or associations and the 

jury was not invited to attribute certain beliefs to appellant. See id. To the contrary, 

appellant was not accused of gang membership and J.B. was clear that she had no 

evidence to corroborate her fear of gang membership. J.B.’s relevant testimony did not 

violate appellant’s First Amendment rights.

Appellant next argues that the challenged testimony was “unduly prejudicial.” 

Even relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. “[G]ratuitous 

testimony about a defendant’s gang membership or bad character may be unduly 

prejudicial.” State v. Jackson, 726 N.W.2d 454, 463 (Minn. 2007). Appellant again cites 

Grayson, in which the supreme court concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice “far 

outweighed” the evidence’s probative value when the prosecutor made no attempt to 

connect testimony about Malcolm X’s views to any issue in the case. 546 N.W.2d at 737. 

But unlike in Grayson, J.B.’s fear of appellant’s gang membership was referenced 

extensively by both sides and was connected to J.B.’s consent and credibility. The 
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defense attorney cross-examined J.B. and others about the credibility of J.B.’s fear, and 

argued in closing that J.B. was not a credible witness because there was no record 

evidence of gang membership.

Appellant suggests that the most problematic evidence concerned J.B.’s statement 

that she moved because her car had been broken into and “somebody had put blood on 

[her] door.” We are troubled that the state introduced this evidence on redirect without 

providing notice to the defense. But these incidents, which occurred months after the 

alleged criminal sexual conduct, were unrelated to the charges or the issues at trial. In 

addition, J.B. agreed with appellant’s attorney that she had no reason to suspect appellant 

or anyone connected to the case of involvement in these incidents. And appellant’s 

attorney assured the district court that he was not requesting a mistrial or any curative 

instructions regarding this testimony. Given the other evidence of appellant’s guilt, 

including testimony from both J.B. and R.C., we cannot conclude that J.B.’s testimony 

“substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” See Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 907.

We conclude that any prejudice created by J.B.’s testimony did not substantially 

outweigh the probative value of the evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. J.B. repeatedly 

stated that she had no actual evidence of appellant’s gang membership and that she did 

not suspect appellant of involvement in the incidents at her home. Because J.B.’s 

testimony was relevant to the issue of her consent and because she admitted that her fear 

was based solely on a belief rather than actual evidence of gang membership, appellant 

has not met his burden to show that he suffered prejudice. See Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony 

regarding rape-victim behaviors and common rape myths.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting expert testimony 

regarding rape-victim behaviors and common rape myths. “Rulings concerning the 

admission of expert testimony generally rest within the sound discretion of the district 

court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Mosley, 853 

N.W.2d 789, 798-99 (Minn. 2014). The erroneous admission of expert testimony 

requires reversal “only when the error substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” 

State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 374 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).

Minn. R. Evid. 702 permits qualified experts to testify regarding information that 

“will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 

Under rule 702, expert testimony regarding nonscientific information “is admissible if: 

(1) the witness is qualified as an expert; (2) the expert’s opinion has foundational 

reliability; [and] (3) the expert testimony is helpful to the jury.” State v. Obeta, 796 

N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011). Here, appellant only challenges the helpfulness of the 

expert’s testimony. 

Because typical rape-victim behaviors “may lie outside the common 

understanding of an average juror,” expert testimony on these behaviors may be helpful 

to the jury. Id. at 293. In Obeta, the supreme court limited its analysis to the 

admissibility of expert testimony regarding the specific rape-victim behaviors of “delayed 

reporting, lack of physical injuries, and submissive conduct during the alleged assault.” 
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Id. at 288. As a result, appellant argues that expert testimony can only be introduced in 

sexual assault cases when these behaviors are present. 

Even if appellant is correct, the record shows that these three behaviors were 

present here. J.B. testified that she spoke to the responding police officers about ten 

minutes after the alleged assault. But J.B. also stated that she did not immediately 

approach the officers, who were looking for her, because she was scared. J.B.’s delay 

and reluctance to approach the officers contradicts the first common rape myth that 

victims will immediately report the attack. See id. at 293. J.B. also testified that she 

sustained scratches and bruising. But the sexual-assault examiner testified that there was 

no evidence of tearing or injury to J.B.’s vagina. This testimony contradicts the second 

rape myth that victims “suffer severe physical injuries—including vaginal injuries.” See 

id. Finally, J.B. testified that she did not resist as appellant took off her pants and that she 

unsuccessfully tried to crawl away during the assault. J.B. “tried” to fight back, but could 

not move due to appellant’s weight. The sexual-assault examiner also noted that there 

was no evidence of defensive maneuvers or injuries. These statements contradict the 

third rape myth in Obeta that “victims will forcefully resist their assailant.” See id. 

Because the three rape-victim behaviors present in Obeta were also present here, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony.

We further note that the expert here only provided testimony regarding the 

delayed-reporting behavior. The expert explained that “[t]here is really a wide range of 

behaviors from victims” of sexual assault and that “there are a high number of victims 

who, in fact, don’t report sexual assault” because they are ashamed, are afraid others will 
10

not believe them, or are afraid of retaliation. This testimony was particularly relevant in 

light of J.B.’s testimony that she thought the attack was her fault and that she was 

reluctant to report the attack to the responding police officers. Consistent with Obeta, the 

expert did not opine that J.B. was credible or that a sexual assault had occurred. See id. at 

294. In fact, the expert testified that she had no knowledge of the facts of the case. The 

expert’s testimony therefore met all of the Obeta requirements for admission.

Because the expert’s testimony regarding typical rape-victim behaviors and rape 

myths was relevant and helpful to the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the expert testimony.

Affirmed.