1

Filed 2/26/21 P. v. Seales CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TROY SEALES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A155975

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CR026867)

A jury convicted defendant Troy Seales of murder and shooting at an 

occupied vehicle. He contends that the trial court committed reversible error 

because it restricted the pretrial disclosure of a key witness’s statements to 

defendant under Penal Code1 section 1054.7. He further claims the trial 

court erred in conducting the good cause hearing resulting in the restricted 

disclosure order in camera on an ex parte basis. Defendant finally argues 

that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no 

merit in defendant’s contentions, we shall affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The Alameda County District Attorney filed an information charging 

defendant with the murder of Deandre Adams on or about August 25, 2017 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
2

(§ 187, subd. (a) (count one)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246

(count two)). The information alleged that defendant personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury and death 

(§§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d), 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personally used a firearm 

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (g)). A jury found defendant guilty 

as charged. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, and it 

sentenced defendant to a total term of 50 years to life in prison. Defendant 

appealed.

A. The Prosecution’s Case

On August 11, 2017, defendant’s sister used her Hertz Rental Car 

employee discount to rent a white Dodge Charger, and she listed defendant 

as an additional driver. 

In August 2017, Doneisha Guidry lived with her mother, her two 

children, and Mercedes Tanner in a two-bedroom apartment located on 89th 

Avenue near Olive Street in Oakland, California. Guidry’s cousins, Kendrick 

Riley and his younger brother, Dupree Riley,2 often hung out at her 

apartment.

On August 24, 2017, Kendrick, his son, and his son’s mother stayed in 

the living room of Guidry’s apartment. In the morning of August 25, 2017 

(August 25), Deandre Adams broke Guidry’s car windows. After the 

vandalism, defendant, the father of Guidry’s children, came to her apartment 

in a white Dodge Charger. Kendrick testified that defendant appeared that 

morning, and, at some point, he saw that defendant had a duffle bag. 

Tanner, Dupree, Dupree’s girlfriend, and Naja Sims-Harris (a cousin of 

Guidry, Kendrick, and Dupree) were also at Guidry’s apartment on August 

2 We will refer to Kendrick and Dupree Riley by their first names to 

distinguish them. 
3

25. At some point, Tanner, Sims-Harris, and Dupree walked to the corner 

store. Tanner testified that there were gunshots while they were at the store, 

and she saw a green Honda. Sims-Harris pushed Tanner into the store, and 

Tanner called Guidry to ask if defendant could pick her up. Tanner was not 

sure whether Dupree was inside or outside of the store when she called 

Guidry. Sims-Harris testified that Dupree left and did not come into the 

store with the two women.

Kendrick testified that, after leaving to go to the store with his two 

cousins, Dupree returned to Guidry’s apartment and said that something 

happened at the store. Defendant, Kendrick, and Dupree walked out of the 

apartment together. Kendrick testified that he and Dupree ran to the store 

to check on their cousins, and Dupree carried a gun that fired blanks. 

Defendant picked up Tanner and Sims-Harris at the store in the white 

Dodge Charger and dropped them back at Guidry’s apartment. He then left. 

At about the time defendant dropped off Tanner and Sims-Harris, Kendrick 

and Dupree returned on foot. Kendrick, Dupree, and Sims-Harris spoke 

outside of the apartment building with Dupree’s girlfriend, who was in her 

car. Kendrick, Dupree, and Sims-Harris heard gunshots. Sims-Harris heard 

about four gunshots, saw a dark green Honda driving fast on Olive Street, 

and ran into the apartment. Kendrick and Dupree ran towards the gunshots, 

but when they heard additional gunshots, they ran back to the apartment. 

Around 10:20 a.m. on August 25, Damien Jackson was driving his black 

Audi on 89th Avenue and turned left off of 89th Avenue onto Olive Street. 

After he turned left onto Olive Street, he heard gunshots. He looked in his 

rearview mirror and saw a man shooting an AK-style rifle in his direction 

and a green car driving fast behind him. Jackson made a quick left turn onto 
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90th Avenue and looked over his shoulder. The driver of the green car was 

slumped, and the car was drifting to the right.

Around 10:20 a.m. on August 25, from her mother’s house on the 

intersection of 89th Avenue and Olive Street, Megan Thompson looked out 

the window and saw a man shooting an assault rifle. Thompson described 

the shooter as a thin male about five feet, six or seven inches tall, having 

short black hair, lighter skin color (possibly Hispanic), and wearing a black 

shirt and baggy blue jeans. 

Swazeere Dean, an EMT, lived near the crime scene. On August 25 

around 10:20 a.m., his daughter woke him up and said that someone had 

been shot and crashed their car. Dean rendered assistance to Adams, who 

was in the crashed car and had two bullet holes through his chest. 

Police recovered fourteen 7.62 rifle shell casings on Olive Street 

between 88th and 89th Avenues and a bullet fragment from a car parked on 

Olive Street and 89th. Criminalist Mark Bennet examined the bullet 

fragment and shell casings and determined that they were consistent with 

having been fired from an AK-47 assault rifle or an SKS-type rifle. Inspector 

Hawks, an expert on cell phone data analysis, determined that the cell phone 

defendant had been using moved north from Hayward to San Leandro and 

into Oakland near the crime scene between 9:00 a.m. and 10:18 a.m. on 

August 25. At 10:27 a.m., the cell phone pinged off a tower at 10850 

MacArthur in Oakland and then moved southward to Hayward until 11:08 

a.m.

Video Surveillance Evidence

The prosecutor showed surveillance video from the morning of August 

25. The first video was recovered from 2036 89th Avenue and it showed both 

89th Avenue and the parking lot in front of Guidry’s apartment building. 
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The video showed Adams vandalizing Guidry’s car. It also showed that,

sometime later that morning, defendant parked a white Dodge Charger 

outside the apartment building, got out, and walked to the apartment 

building carrying a dark bag in his right hand.

The video then captured Dupree, Tanner, and Sims-Harris leaving the 

apartment, and subsequently showed Dupree running back into the 

apartment. Very shortly thereafter, defendant, Kendrick, and Dupree left 

the apartment together. Kendrick and Dupree looked around, defendant 

looked around, and defendant got into the driver’s side of his car and drove in 

the direction of the corner store. Dupree then went back inside the 

apartment and came back out. At that point, Kendrick and Dupree ran down 

the street in the direction that defendant had driven. A couple minutes later, 

defendant returned in the white Dodge Charger, dropped off Tanner and 

Sims-Harris, and drove off. Surveillance video captured Damien Jackson 

driving his black Audi on 89th Avenue behind defendant as defendant pulled 

back onto the road after dropping the women off. Kendrick and Dupree then 

returned on foot and spoke with Dupree’s girlfriend, who had pulled up on 

89th Avenue in front of the apartment building. Kendrick and Dupree then 

suddenly took off running, again in the direction that defendant had driven.

The prosecutor also played surveillance video taken from 2006 89th 

Avenue on August 25. At trial, Kendrick confirmed that this video depicted a 

white Dodge Charger that looked similar to the car defendant drove on 

August 25. The white car turned right onto Olive Street at the intersection of 

89th Avenue and Olive Street about sixteen seconds after 10:20 a.m. Damien 

Jackson confirmed that this surveillance showed him driving behind the 

white car and turning left onto Olive Street approximately twenty seconds 

after 10:20 a.m. At approximately forty-two seconds after 10:20 a.m., 
6

Kendrick and Dupree are depicted running on 89th Avenue towards the 

corner of the intersection with Olive Street, and Dupree extends his arm in 

what appears to be a shooting motion with a blank firing gun.

Kendrick’s Statements and Testimony

When the police detained Kendrick on August 25, he told them he had 

been in Guidry’s apartment when he heard gunshots and he did not know 

what happened. Kendrick claimed that he saw a white Dodge Charger 

parked down the street, but he did not tell police who had been driving the 

car. Kendrick did not tell the police that Dupree had a gun or that he had 

been involved in a crime.

On February 21, 2018, Investigator Basa and the prosecutor met with 

Kendrick. Kendrick was “very hesitant” to speak with them, and Basa 

assured Kendrick they would not record the conversation. Kendrick told 

them defendant drove a white Dodge Charger just before the shooting, and 

defendant had showed Kendrick a rifle in a duffle bag that day. Basa served 

Kendrick with a subpoena; Kendrick said that he was afraid to testify and 

feared for his family’s safety. 

On March 5, 2018, Investigator Basa and the prosecutor met with 

Kendrick again. They assured him that their conversation was not being 

recorded and showed him the surveillance video. After watching the video, 

Kendrick said there was no reason for him to lie. He said that defendant had 

been driving the white Dodge Charger on August 25, and defendant arrived 

at Guidry’s apartment carrying a duffle bag. At some point, Dupree came 

into the apartment and said that Adams had shot at him. Defendant came 

out of Guidry’s bedroom with a rifle and said he was going to “take care of 

this.” Defendant, Kendrick, and Dupree left the apartment. When they 

reached the security gate, defendant “racked a round” and hid the rifle inside 
7

his pants. Kendrick and Dupree served as lookouts while defendant put the 

rifle in the white Dodge Charger. Kendrick also said that, after the shooting, 

he overheard defendant on the phone tell Guidry, “You know what I’m about, 

and tell everybody keep their mouth shut.” Further, a day or two after the 

shooting, defendant threatened Kendrick’s safety and told him he had to 

leave. Kendrick told Basa several times that he was afraid to come to court 

to testify, and he took defendant’s threats seriously. 

At trial, Kendrick said defendant showed up at Guidry’s apartment on 

August 25. He remembered defendant asking for a cigarette but claimed he 

did not hear defendant say anything else. He never saw defendant put 

anything in the white Dodge Charger. He could not remember if he saw 

defendant with a rifle that day or if he had told Basa that he had seen 

defendant with a rifle. He could not remember if he told Basa that defendant 

said something like, “I’m about to take care of this once and for all,” or if he 

told Basa that that defendant put the rifle in his pants and told Dupree and 

Kendrick to “keep a lookout” as they left the apartment. Kendrick did not 

remember telling Basa that defendant “racked a round.” Kendrick testified 

that he was aware that surveillance video showed everything, and the video 

was “accurate.” Kendrick also conceded that he was honest with the 

prosecutor and Basa when he spoke to them. He admitted that he lied 

several times when he first talked to police because he wanted to protect 

Dupree.

Milisa English’s Statement and Testimony

On September 10, 2017, police interviewed Milisa English, defendant’s 

ex-girlfriend, after she contacted them. English said that, on the morning of 

August 25, while defendant was at her place, his “baby mama” called and told 

him something had happened. After the call, defendant said he was going to 
8

go “take care [of] this nigga,” and left; he had a duffle bag containing an AK47 rifle and a pistol in his car. When defendant returned a couple of hours 

later, he told English, “I think I killed that nigga.” Defendant explained that 

the guy crashed his car, and defendant did not believe the guy would have 

crashed unless he was dying. 

At trial, English testified that she lied to police about defendant’s 

involvement in the shooting because she had been upset about seeing him 

with another woman. She confirmed that she broke up with defendant 

because she caught him at a casino with another woman. After her interview 

with police, the FBI gave English $2,000 to relocate from her apartment in 

Hayward. 

B. The Defense Case

Me’Ya Dean, Swazeere Dean’s daughter, testified that she heard 

gunshots and a car crashing on August 25, and she saw a black Volvo 

speeding up the street. Investigator Stannard drove three different routes to 

see how far a person could get in twenty-one seconds from the intersection of 

89th Avenue and Olive Street, and then marked his stopping points on a 

chart for the jury to view. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Pretrial Disclosure under Section 1054.7

Under criminal discovery rules, the prosecution must disclose to the 

defendant “[r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports 

of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the 

trial.” (§ 1054.1, subd. (f).) These disclosures must be made at least thirty 

days before trial “unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be 

denied, restricted, or deferred. If the material and information [to be 

disclosed] becomes known to, or comes into the possession of, a party within 
9

thirty days of trial, disclosure shall be made immediately, unless good cause 

is shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or deferred. ‘Good 

cause’ is limited to threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or 

witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of 

other investigations by law enforcement. [¶] Upon the request of any party, 

the court may permit a showing of good cause for the denial or regulation of 

disclosures, or any portion of that showing, to be made in camera. A 

verbatim record shall be made of any such proceeding.” (§ 1054.7.)

Pursuant to section 1054.7, the trial court ordered that defendant, but 

not his counsel, would be restricted from seeing a summary of Kendrick’s 

statements. Defendant argues that his exclusion and his counsel’s exclusion 

from the in camera hearing to determine the existence of good cause violated 

his right to counsel and to due process of law under the federal Constitution. 

He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding good cause 

for the restricted disclosure based on threats or possible danger to Kendrick 

and asserts that the prejudice he suffered therefrom requires reversal of the 

judgment. Defendant’s claims lack merit.

Additional Background

On February 21, 2018 and March 5, 2018, Kendrick made oral, 

unrecorded, statements to Investigator Basa and the prosecutor, and 

Investigator Basa later drafted a detailed summary of these statements. On 

March 13, 2018, the prosecutor filed a section 1054.7 motion seeking to 

restrict the disclosure of Kendrick’s statements to defendant and his counsel, 

or, alternatively, to preclude disclosure to defendant on the ground that 

Kendrick’s safety was endangered. The prosecutor asked the court to conduct 

an in camera review of Investigator Basa’s report of Kendrick’s statements to 

make its decision. 
10

The trial court held an in camera hearing without defendant or his 

counsel on March 13. Immediately thereafter, the court conducted a hearing 

in open court with all parties. The court asked if defense counsel was willing 

to waive defendant’s presence for the proceeding, and defense counsel did so. 

The trial court stated that it had conducted an in camera hearing, and, based 

on its review of the summary of Kendrick’s statements, the prosecutor’s 

declaration supporting the motion, and the prosecutor’s comments in camera, 

the court intended to order the disclosure of the summary of Kendrick’s 

statements with the restriction that defense counsel not reveal its contents to 

defendant. The trial court stated that this would allow defense counsel to 

work with his investigator to prepare for trial.

Defense counsel raised a number of objections to the court’s intended 

ruling, arguing that the prosecutor failed to establish a sufficient threat or 

danger to Kendrick. Defense counsel noted that he was “in the dark” to some 

extent because he had not read Kendrick’s statements. The prosecutor stated 

that he was not requesting an indefinite restriction, and he intended to 

concede that defense counsel could speak to defendant about the statements 

closer to trial. The prosecutor stated that many of the incriminating facts in 

the case were reflected in other evidence, including the statement of another 

witness and surveillance video. Additionally, the prosecutor clarified that he 

had obtained the bulk of the information in the summary of Kendrick’s 

statements from the March 5 interview, his investigator then left the country 

for five days, and the prosecutor brought the motion as soon as Investigator 

Basa returned and authored his report. The prosecutor also clarified that he 

had called defense counsel the week before, told him that he intended to 

bring the section 1054.7 motion, and told defense counsel that the witness 

was Kendrick. Defense counsel confirmed that the prosecutor’s comments on 
11

the timing and substance of the disclosure were accurate, and he had no issue 

with the notice.

After hearing argument, the trial court stated that it understood that 

defense counsel was “in the dark to an extent,” because he had not reviewed 

Kendrick’s statements. Thus, the trial court invited defense counsel to 

provide further argument on the issue and check in with the court on Friday, 

March 16, if he thought it necessary after he read the summary but ruled 

that disclosure to defendant would be restricted for the time being. The trial 

court ordered the in camera hearing be sealed and the prosecutor’s filing be 

kept in a confidential envelope in the court file. On March 16, three days 

before the beginning of jury selection, the trial court lifted its restriction on 

disclosure.3

Defendant Has Not Established Prejudicial Error

We first address defendant’s argument that his exclusion from the in 

camera hearing violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due 

process of law under the federal Constitution. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th 

Amends.) “ ‘ “Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be 

personally present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to 

prevent ‘interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.’ 

[Citations.] Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ‘stage . . . 

that is critical to [the] outcome’ and where the defendant's ‘presence would 

contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 1043, 1098 (Thompson).) 

3 In defendant’s motion for a new trial, defendant states that the order 

was lifted two days prior to jury selection. Jury selection began on Monday, 

March 19, so Friday, March 16 was the last day the court was in session 

before the March 19 date.
12

Initially, it appears that defendant forfeited his challenge by failing to 

object and obtain a ruling in the trial court. Defense counsel received prior 

notice of the March 13 hearing and was present in court that day. The court’s 

minute order reflects that the hearing began at 9:41 a.m. with all counsel 

present, and counsel conferred with the court in chambers. At 10:26 a.m., the 

court granted the prosecutor’s request and conducted an in camera hearing. 

After the in camera hearing, at 10:39 a.m., the court went on the record in 

open court. Defense counsel objected to the court issuing an order restricting 

disclosure of Kendrick’s statements to his client because the prosecutor’s 

declaration did not show that Kendrick was in danger. Defense counsel did 

not object to the court having conducted the in camera hearing with the 

prosecutor. Further, the prosecutor stated for the record that, the week 

before the hearing, he had informed defense counsel that he intended to file a 

motion under 1054.7 related to Kendrick. Defense counsel again did not 

object to the ex parte in camera review, and he confirmed that he had no 

issue with the prosecution’s notice. Defendant forfeited his constitutional 

challenges by failing to object that the in camera hearing should not have 

been held on an ex parte basis. (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 121–

125 (Valdez) [defendant appeared to forfeit challenge that he was denied the 

right to counsel and due process by ex parte in camera hearings under section 

1054.7 by failing to raise the issue below].)

In any event, even if defendant preserved the challenge for appeal, 

reversal would not be warranted. “Contrary to defendant’s assertion, even 

where a court errs in proceeding ex parte, the error is not reversible per se.” 

(Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 125.) In Valdez, our Supreme Court held that 

prejudicial error review applies to evaluation of alleged federal constitutional 

violations resulting from the conduct of ex parte in camera hearings under 
13

section 1054.7. (Id. at pp. 125–126.) In Thompson, our Supreme Court 

reviewed for prejudicial error a claim that the defendant’s constitutional 

rights to counsel and to due process were violated by the conduct of an ex 

parte hearing regarding the discovery of letters in a co-defendant’s 

possession, and ultimately found no prejudice. (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th 

at p. 1098.) 

Likewise, we perceive no prejudice on the record before us. Defense 

counsel was given a detailed summary of Kendrick’s statements on March 13, 

and he enlisted the assistance of his investigator to interview Kendrick. 

Although defendant’s investigator could not locate Kendrick because 

Kendrick apparently had no stable residence, defendant does not challenge 

the timing of the prosecution’s initial disclosure of Kendrick’s statements in 

this appeal, and counsel’s inability to locate Kendrick did not result from the 

court’s order restricting disclosure of Kendrick’s statements to defendant for 

a few days. 

Nor do we perceive reversible error in defense counsel’s inability to 

discuss Kendrick’s statements with defendant for a short period of time. On 

March 16, three days before jury selection, the trial court lifted the order 

restricting disclosure. Opening statements and the presentation of evidence 

began on March 27, and Kendrick testified on March 27 and 28, giving 

defense counsel ample time to discuss Kendrick’s statements with defendant. 

At the March 13 hearing, the trial court informed defense counsel that he 

could seek to revisit the restricted disclosure order if counsel felt it was 

necessary once he reviewed the summary of Kendrick’s statements. 

Defendant did not ask for a continuance or raise any further objections to the 

court’s ruling after the prosecution disclosed the summary to him on March 

13, indicating that counsel was able to effectively prepare for trial. Indeed, 
14

review of the record shows that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined 

Kendrick about his statements and used surveillance video to point out 

inconsistencies with these statements. There was thus no prejudicial error 

under state or constitutional standards. (See Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 

128.)

Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

good cause to restrict disclosure of Kendrick’s statements. Specifically, he 

claims that the vague, generalized assertions regarding danger to Kendrick 

in the prosecutor’s declaration did not establish good cause. We reject 

defendant’s argument because the trial court’s order is presumed correct, and 

defendant failed to provide an adequate record demonstrating error. (People 

v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881 [the trial court’s order is presumed 

correct, and it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate error]; People v. 

Chubbuck (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 [rejecting the defendant’s sentencing 

challenge where he failed to provide an adequate record].) The trial court 

relied on the prosecutor’s in camera statements, Investigator Basa’s 

summary of Kendrick’s statements, and the prosecutor’s declaration in 

making its good cause ruling. Defendant cites to the public hearing 

transcript where his counsel discusses some of the prosecutor’s declaration, 

and he augmented the record to include the sealed transcript of the in camera 

hearing. But the record does not contain Investigator Basa’s summary of 

Kendrick’s statements or the prosecutor’s declaration. Defendant thus fails 

to establish error in the court’s ruling. In any event, even if we were to 

assume the court abused its discretion, for the reasons set forth above, the 

error was harmless under any standard.
15

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant argues that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance 

of counsel by not objecting to the introduction of Milisa English’s statement 

that defendant robbed a Target store. We disagree.

Additional Background

In her September 10 statement to police, in addition to the information 

she provided regarding the shooting, English disclosed that defendant robbed 

a Target store with three others and got away with $60,000. At trial, English 

reluctantly testified because she understood that she could be arrested if she 

did not testify. She claimed that she had fabricated everything that she told 

the police on September 10, including her allegations about the Target 

robbery, a robbery she saw on the news and thought she could “add on” to 

make defendant’s situation worse. She lied because she wanted defendant to 

go to jail. The prosecutor asked if English would be considered a snitch if she 

had been truthful with the police, and she confirmed that was the case. 

English’s statement was played to the jury, including the part about the 

Target robbery. 

After English’s statement was played, outside of the jury’s presence, 

the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed her statement 

with respect to the Target robbery. Defense counsel stated that, with the 

understanding that the prosecutor was not going to seek to introduce 

evidence of uncharged crimes, he had not objected to playing this part of 

English’s statement because his strategy was to argue that English had been 

“reaching for straws” and making up “grandiose” claims. The prosecutor 

stated for the record that, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, he had deleted 

English’s reference to defendant having been in federal prison. He also 

confirmed that he did not intend to introduce any evidence regarding the 
16

Target robbery other than to ask one of the officers who interviewed English 

“whether he had followed up in identifying the people who Miss English 

makes reference to.” 

Analysis

To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show counsel’s 

performance was “deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (People v. Mai (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical 

decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and there 

is a presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. (Ibid.) Courts should not second-guess 

reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the “harsh light of hindsight.” 

(People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212 (Scott).) Counsel’s 

decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the circumstances at the 

time. (Ibid.) To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must also show 

“resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different.” (Mai, at p. 1009.) A reasonable probability is one sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. (Scott, at pp. 1211–1212.) 

Defendant does not satisfy his burden of showing his trial counsel made 

a tactical decision that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

English testified that she lied to the police, and the prosecutor began her 

testimony by introducing evidence that she tried to leave the courthouse that 

day and had to be handcuffed, she did not want anything to do with the trial, 

and she had received a threatening message calling her a snitch. The 

prosecutor clearly intended to show that English was lying on the stand but 

had told the truth in her interview, and defense counsel needed to show the 
17

opposite. Counsel had reviewed English’s statement, and he believed that 

what it conveyed about the Target robbery would be of use to show that 

English was not credible in her interview. We are not in a position to secondguess counsel’s impressions of how a jury would receive English’s statement. 

Defense counsel also highlighted English’s “outlandish tales” to police in his 

closing argument and emphasized that there was no evidence that defendant 

robbed Target. He obtained the prosecutor’s agreement that he would not 

present evidence or argue that defendant committed the robbery, and the 

court instructed the jury that they could only consider English’s statements 

about the robbery to evaluate her credibility. On this record, defense counsel 

made a reasonable tactical decision that we will not second-guess “in the 

harsh light of hindsight.” (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1212.) 

Defendant also fails to show prejudice. His prejudice argument 

depends on the assumption that jurors would have relied on the robbery to 

conclude that defendant was a person of bad character who therefore 

committed the murder. The fallacy in this argument is that English’s 

statement provided the only evidence that defendant robbed Target, and, in 

that same statement, she provided strong evidence that defendant killed 

Adams. Thus, any credence the jurors placed in the evidence of the robbery 

depended entirely on their acceptance of the veracity of English’s statement. 

If jurors did not believe English was truthful about what she told police 

regarding the shooting, it is unlikely they would have believed her statement 

about the robbery. There was also strong additional evidence of defendant’s 

guilt, including Kendrick’s statements to Investigator Basa, the shells and 

bullet fragments recovered, the surveillance showing the events outside of 

Guidry’s apartment leading to the time of the shooting, Damien Jackson’s 

testimony, and the surveillance video of Jackson and defendant driving down 
18

89th Avenue just before the shooting and turning in opposite directions onto 

Olive Street. Defendant thus has not shown that it is reasonably probable 

that English’s statements about the robbery improperly led the jury to 

conclude that defendant was a bad person and therefore committed the 

charged crimes.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, ACTING P. J.

TUCHER, J.

People v. Seales (A155975)