Cover

The cover focuses on the three faces most responsible for the institution of 

control measures over civilian and military affairs in Russia: President Vladimir

Putin, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery 

Gerasimov. The title of Kremlin Kontrol is used to stress two things, that it is 

from leadership directives that everything of significance in regard to Russian 

national interests is decided or acted upon; and that the system of control over 

civilian and military issues is designed to help neutralize feelings of insecurity 

or vulnerability among Kremlin elites. Cover image attribution:

Vladimir Putin: Kremlin.ru [CC BY 3.0 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0) or CC BY 4.0 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

General Gerasimov: By Министерство Обороны Российской Федерации 

[CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via 

Wikimedia Commons

Sergey Shoygu: By Vitaly V. Kuzmin (http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/512) 

[CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0) or CC BY-SA 

4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) is a component of the US Army's 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 that does guidance-driven, 

unclassified research and analysis of the foreign perspective of the operational 

environment. 

The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect 

the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US 

government. 
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................... v

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1

PART ONE.............................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER ONE: THE NATIONAL GUARD: PUTIN’S PALACE 

GUARD OF CONTROL........................................................................ 7

Introduction .......................................................................................... 7

Russia’s National Guard or Rosgvardiya ............................................. 8

Reasons for the NG’s Creation............................................................. 9

NG Weapons ...................................................................................... 13

Personnel Selections for the NG......................................................... 18

The NG’s Organization and Duties.................................................... 20

Conclusions ........................................................................................ 28

CHAPTER TWO: CADRE CHANGES AND SISTEMA ................ 31

Introduction ........................................................................................ 31

Putin’s Cadre Changes ....................................................................... 31

Sistema: The Unique Russian Operating Environment...................... 43

Conclusions ........................................................................................ 47

CHAPTER THREE: MEDIA CONTROL VIA MANIPULATION 

AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE HALF-TRUTH ................ 49

Introduction ........................................................................................ 49

Manipulating Objective Reality ......................................................... 50

The Methodology of the Half-Truth................................................... 55

Russian Social Media and Those Cyber Attacks................................ 58

Conclusion.......................................................................................... 61

CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN CONTROLS OVER NATIONAL 

AND INFORMATION SECURITY: STRATEGIES, DOCTRINE, 

CONCEPTS .......................................................................................... 63

Introduction ........................................................................................ 63

The NSS: What Should be Followed Closely? ................................... 65

The ISD: What Should be Followed Closely?.................................... 74

The STDS and CRFP: What Should Be Followed Closely................ 79

An Assessment ................................................................................... 83

Conclusions ........................................................................................ 84

PART TWO .......................................................................................... 89
vi

CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA’S METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL 

OVER FUTURE WAR PLANNING: THE THEORY .....................91

Introduction.........................................................................................91

Contemporary Russian Thought .........................................................93

Trends and Forecasting.......................................................................96

Military Strategy .................................................................................98

Forms and Methods...........................................................................100

Operational Concept/Design and the COFM....................................102

CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIAN OFFICERS DISCUSS 

METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL.................................................109

Introduction.......................................................................................109

Learning from Experience ................................................................109

Examining the Thoughts of Important Authors................................110

Trends/Foreign Trends......................................................................111

Forecasting/Foreign Forecasting.......................................................116

Military Strategy/Correlation of Forces............................................122

Forms (Organizations) and Methods (Weapons and Military Art)...127

Operational Design ...........................................................................132

Major Concepts.................................................................................133

Results of the Military Thought Process...........................................141

Conclusions.......................................................................................144

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTROL FEATURES OF ‘THE 

GERASIMOV LECTURES’..............................................................147

Introduction.......................................................................................147

2013 Presentation..............................................................................148

2014 Presentation..............................................................................154

2015 Presentation..............................................................................163

2016 Presentation..............................................................................167

2017 Presentation..............................................................................170

Conclusions.......................................................................................172

CHAPTER EIGHT: REFLEXIVE CONTROL.............................175

Introduction.......................................................................................175

Definitions.........................................................................................176

A Closer Look at the 1990s: Leonenko and Chausov.......................181

21st Century Tactics, Analogies, and Ukraine: A Theoretical 

Discussion.........................................................................................186

Russian RC in Modern Operations...................................................196

Conclusions.......................................................................................197
vii

CHAPTER NINE: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

CENTER AND KAVKAZ-2016........................................................ 199

Introduction ...................................................................................... 199

National Defense Management Center............................................. 199

Kavkaz-2016..................................................................................... 204

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 207

CHAPTER TEN: RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN SYRIA ....................... 209

Introduction ...................................................................................... 209

Russian Equipment Used in Syria: Russian and Western Sources... 212

Forms and Methods of Terrorists: Two Russian Reports................. 217

First the Pullout, then the Declaration to Stay Indefinitely.............. 222

September 2016 to January 2017: A Few Notes.............................. 224

Conclusions ...................................................................................... 227

CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS ......................................... 231

Introduction ...................................................................................... 231

Control Accomplishments................................................................ 232

Putin and Shoygu Summarize 2016: Where is Russia Heading? ..... 239

What Does it all Mean? .................................................................... 242

APPENDIX ONE: RUSSIA’S GENERAL STAFF/COMMANDERS 

ON THE WAR IN SYRIA................................................................. 245

Russia’s General Staff/Commanders on the War in Syria ............... 245

APPENDIX TWO: KRUGLOV ON FORECASTING .................. 261

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.................................................................... 265
viii
ix

FOREWORD

In 2016 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the 

General Staff Valery Gerasimov instituted sweeping changes that have 

reorganized the country’s security forces and reestablished the nation’s 

military prowess. This study, Kremlin Kontrol, aims to describe how 

control over the security services and the military have hastened those 

changes.

The study is divided into two parts. Part One, “The System of 

Civilian Control and Objective Thought,” has four chapters. Chapter One

examines the development of a National Guard, which many view as 

Putin’s personal Palace Guard. Chapter Two looks at cadre changes and 

an internal control mechanism known as sistema. Chapter Three

discusses Russian use of the media and cyber incursions during 2016 to 

manipulate foreign audiences. It also discusses Russia’s methodology of 

the lie. Chapter Four discusses Russia’s 31 December 2015 National 

Security Strategy, and the 2016 Information Security Doctrine and 

Science and Technology Strategy. Part Two, “The System of Military 

Control,” has five chapters. Chapter Five surveys the theory of Russian 

military thought, while Chapter Six discusses Russian officers’ views on 

the theory. Chapter Seven reviews five key speeches Gerasimov made 

over the past four years. Chapter Eight offers some new information on 

the Russian concept of reflexive control and its ability to manipulate 

situations. Chapter Nine examines Russia’s National Defense 

Management Center and how it was used during command and staff 

exercise Kavkaz-2016. Chapter Ten explores the rationale behind 

Russia’s campaign in Syria and how the fighting has progressed. Chapter 

Eleven, conclusions, explores the implications of Kremlin Kontrol.

The study supplements the author’s two prior studies, Recasting 

the Red Star and Military Strategy. It offers an understanding of Russia’s 

political-military control mechanisms today. 

Thomas Wilhelm

Director, Foreign Military Studies Office

2017 
x
xi

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife, our children and their spouses, and 

my grandchildren—thanks to all of you for your encouragement and 

support through the years.
xii
xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is solely responsible for the selection and analysis of 

the material in this work.

There are several people to thank. In particular, the author would 

like to acknowledge the support of three individuals. First, Dr. Harold 

Orenstein, formerly of FMSO, deserves special recognition. He provided 

countless hours to the development of this study, and translated several 

key documents from Russian into English, to include four of the five 

lectures of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. He also edited 

the entire document. His assistance was absolutely vital to the 

publication of this study. Second, special recognition is due to Mr. 

Hommy Rosado, also formerly of FMSO, who designed the artwork for 

the cover and the study’s sections. Mr. Rosado’s images enhance the ties 

between words and concepts. Thanks are also due to Ms. Cindy Hurst, 

who took Dr. Orenstein’s translations and developed English graphics 

for Russian explanations of new-type warfare and reflexive control.

Finally, the author would like to express his thanks to the FMSO 

staff: director Mr. Thomas Wilhelm for ensuring time was available to 

write this study and for his coordination work with the TRADOC staff; 

deputy director Kent Baumann for his development of the final version 

of the study for publication and for ensuring funds were available; and 

Thomas Kruegler for helping with the clearance process.
xiv
1

INTRODUCTION

Authoritarian regimes are, by their very nature, insecure. They 

tend to view Western democracies as an existential threat to their way of 

rule and they fear the development of any type of opposition or protests 

in the streets. In Russia’s case, the latter fear of protests leading to a 

“color revolution” often appears as important as the ISIS threat to its 

southern border. Lacking political legitimacy, they rely on two factors to 

sustain their leadership, patriotism and control. This study discusses the 

latter issue from both a civilian and military point of view.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB operative, is all 

about control. In his excellent book The Invention of Russia, Arkady 

Ostrovsky recounted one conversation about Putin: “Anything you 

control is safe. Anything you don’t control by definition represents a 

threat—that is their mental framework, and a KGB officer is always a 

KGB officer.”1 Ostrovsky notes later that control of the flow of 

information is power in Russia,2 and Putin puts great emphasis on 

control via state media.

This work is divided into two parts. Part One looks at the system 

of control that Putin has either continued or developed anew in his 

twelve years as president. While the focus is on civilian issues, it also 

focuses on the security services in particular as agents of control. 

Chapter One focuses on Putin’s system of control over his own 

security. First it discusses his development of a personnel “Palace 

Guard” in the form of a National Guard. Chapter Two discusses the 

numerous cadre changes Putin made in 2016 to inject new blood into his 

decision-making circle and to balance his security services against one 

another. The chapter also looks at the furtherance of the notion known as 

sistema, which author Gleb Pavlovsky believes will outlast Putin.

 

1 Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, Viking Press, 2014, p. 240. 2 Ibid., p. 280
2

Chapter Three focuses on the topic of the manipulation of 

objective reality by Putin’s various media outlets and his utilization of 

the “half-truth.” Objective truth is absent in Russia unless one considers 

the daily output of propaganda from Russian sources as the most recent 

revelation of “truth.” Putin’s propagandists develop new truths almost 

daily. The chapter goes on to look at Russia’s numerous attempts to 

persuade the world that it had nothing to do with the downing of 

Malaysian Airlines flight 17 or with the doping of its athletes at the 

Sochi Olympics. Both attempts failed to persuade anyone with Russia’s 

version of “truth” outside, perhaps, of his domestic audience. A short 

section on the cyber-attacks associated with Russia’s alleged attempts to 

influence the US elections in November is included in the discussion.

Chapter Four first examines the listing of strategic and national 

interests that were outlined in Russia’s National Security Strategy. It 

then moves on to examine Russia’s new Information Security Doctrine, 

Science and Technology Development Strategy, and Concept of Foreign 

Policy, all new documents released near the end of 2016. They aim to 

exert more control over Russia’s ever expanding geopolitical chessboard. 

In the end, Russia is searching for what it terms equal security, strategic 

stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. 

Part Two is focused on several military aspects of control. These 

include not only command and control issues but also the methodical 

manner in which Russian military analysts establish control parameters 

over their environment.

Chapter Five examines the four components of how Russia’s 

military expects to uncover and exert control over an ever-changing

military environment. Russian analysts continuously monitor emerging

trends that appear to impact the character of war. They use these trends 

to make forecasts about the nature and shape of future conflicts. 

Organizations, weapons, and military art are then created to handle this 

evolving nature of war, and the proper correlation of these forces are 

applied. Chapter Six discusses the views of Russian officers on these 

topics.
3

Chapter Seven examines the speeches that Chief of the General 

Staff Gerasimov made at the nation’s Academy of Military Science. 

Most of the attention was focused on the speech he made in 2013. 

However, there were actually several elements of the 2013 speech, to 

include graphs and tables, which were not covered in the press but are 

included in the discussion here. Gerasimov’s later speeches also had 

some very interesting points to consider.

Chapter Eight examines the Russian concept of reflexive control, 

to include some new discoveries in the way the term is defined and used 

by the military. In the Russian context the concept, in general, consists of 

having an opponent think he is doing something for himself when he is 

actually doing an action for the Russians. 

Chapter Nine looks at Russia’s new National Defense 

Management Center, which is a command and control center that 

allegedly exerts control over three distinct issues: combat, the strategic 

nuclear force, and everyday activities. In the latter part of the chapter the 

recent exercise Kavkaz-2016 is examined for the way it attempted to tie 

control of the military with that of local governors and businesses in a 

way that mobilized the region for the exercise. This is apparently tied to 

how Russia would respond to a major future war. 

Chapter Ten examines Russian actions in Syria and what they 

have accomplished. There have been highs and lows. Here, forms and 

methods of enemy actions are considered, and Russia’s use of its 

aerospace and special operations forces and lessons learned from actual 

combat are discussed. 

Chapter Eleven concludes the work with a discussion of the 

implications of these changes. There are two appendixes, one that covers 

Russian commanders’ comments on the war in Syria; and a brief 

discussion of an article that appeared in late 2016 in Military Thought on 

forecasting.

Overall, the study is unique in its attempt to examine Russia’s 

civilian and military control issues in such detail. Hopefully it will 

achieve its goal of pointing out how Russia is moving toward its goal of 
4

achieving strategic stability and equal security through its exertion of

control over geopolitical, military, and domestic agendas. 
5

PART ONE
6

Image attribution: Dmitry Azovtsev, CC-SA-3.0 Unported, 15 November 

2005, 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0

%BA%D0%B2%D0%B0#/media/File:Kremlevskaya_Naberezhnaja_Mo

scow.hires.jpg,
7

CHAPTER ONE: THE NATIONAL GUARD: PUTIN’S PALACE 

GUARD OF CONTROL

At the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world 

affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of 

insecurity...This thesis provides justification for that 

increase of the military and police power of the Russian 

state...Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy 

Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement in which 

conceptions of offence and defense are inextricably

confused—George Kennan, 19463

Introduction

Authoritarian systems are, somewhat unexpectedly, some of the 

most insecure systems in the world. Those in power envision enemies 

everywhere, both inside and outside their jurisdiction, who want to 

topple them by coups or insurrections, even though they are totally in 

charge of affairs. Kennan’s comments some 70 years ago still resonate 

when examining present day Russia. The instinctive sense of insecurity 

remains, as Putin’s recent reshuffling of cadre and security forces 

appears to imply. Shaking up the system prevents the development of 

factions opposed to the leader.

To protect himself and provide protection and insurance against 

color revolutions, coups, and other perceived threats, it appears that 

President Vladimir Putin has developed three counters: the development 

of a personal protection agency, or Palace Guard, the topic of this 

chapter; continual cadre changes to accommodate generational changes 

or balance the influence of personalities, and an arrangement for 

implementing instructions known as sistema. The latter are the topics of 

Chapter Two. 

This chapter first examines Putin’s development of Rosgvardiya

or National Guard (NG), which serves as a Palace Guard against many of 

 

3 Special Report (insert), “Russia,” The Economist, 22 October 2016, p. 11.
8

the things he fears. It discusses the rationale for the Guard’s creation, the 

weaponry with which it is outfitted, and the personnel who are manning 

the important positions within the Guard.

Russia’s National Guard or Rosgvardiya

Elections in Russia have seldom resulted in the opposition 

actually standing a chance against an incumbent. The fight is for seats in 

the Duma and not real power. Putin thus worries less about competitors 

who want his job and more about internal problems arising from issues 

such as economic shortages or protests over controls exerted by the 

security services (control over Internet access, etc.). As one journalist 

caustically noted, the “enemy within” is more dangerous to Putin than 

“perfidious NATO.”4

These issues have a history, as demonstrated by the manner in 

which Soviet leaders were selected and how they dealt with the 

population. Soviet leaders were selected by the Politburo until 1991, 

when things changed after then-President Mikhail Gorbachev was 

removed from power. Worry over the influence of the population and 

potential presidential contenders apparently was on the mind of thenPresident Boris Yeltsin, who thought a National Guard (NG) would help 

protect the constitutional system and democratic gains. Then Defense 

Minister Pavel Grachev was against the formation of a parallel entity 

even though, at the time, the influence of the siloviki (the power security 

forces) had waned. Yeltsin apparently felt otherwise. 

The idea of converting the Internal Troops of the Ministry of 

Internal Affairs to a NG thus became a point of discussion even then. 

Lieutenant Colonel V. P. Vorozhtsov wrote an article for the journal 

Military Thought on the NG’s pros and cons in 1992.

5 However, the 

concept did not catch on. The idea was raised again in 2003 and 2004 

when Putin carried out his first security force reform, yet once again the 

 

4 Aleksandr Golts, “Congratulations on Your New Special Service,” Yezhednevnyy 

Zhurnal, 6 April 2016. 5 V. P. Vorozhtsov, “Russia’s National Guard: Pro and Con,” Military Thought, No. 1, 

1992, pp. 21-25.
9

idea died on the vine.6 However, by the time the 2014 military doctrine 

was published, Russia felt threatened by attempts to destabilize the 

country from within the state, and therefore a NG again was 

contemplated.7 Most discussions were internal to the administration and, 

as a result, it came as a surprise when, on 5 April 2016, it was announced 

that the NG, a new security agency structure, had been created in Russia. 

This new structure would require changes to 25 laws to establish the NG 

and another 27 to abolish other associated services, so it would take 

some time to legislate the required changes for the transformation to a 

NG. 

The following discussion details how the NG was created. The 

discussion has four parts: the reasons for the NG’s existence; the

weapons that outfit the NG; the manning of the NG, to include who was 

chosen for a position, and why; and a temporal view of how the NG has 

developed since its inception, to include the legislation, personnel, and 

activities associated with the guard. The analytical framework extends 

from April to December 2016.

Reasons for the NG’s Creation

There were a number of reasons listed for the decision to create 

the NG. Aleksandr Sukharenko, director of the Center for the Study of 

New Challenges and Threats to National Security, described tasks, 

powers, and reasons for the NG shortly after its creation. He noted that 

the main tasks of the draft law included the joint protection of law and 

order together with the police; the fight against terrorism and extremism; 

the protection of state establishments and special freight; the protection 

of the territorial defense of the country; and the assistance to border 

guards to protect the state border. Powers included the ability to arrest 

lawbreakers, enter residential premises to conduct searches or arrests, 

cordon off terrain or residential areas, and use physical force, along with 

special weapons and equipment. Two further reasons Sukharenko 

 

6 Tatyana Stanovaya, “The President’s Guard: How Does the New Super-Department 

Change the Siloviki’s Configuration?” Politkom.ru, 11 April 2016. 7 Ilya Kramnik and Konstantin Bogdanov, “The Cardinal’s Guard, A Parallel Army Has 

Been Formed in Russia,” Lenta.ru, 6 April 2016.
10

provided were creating a pro-presidential army for the regime’s 

protection from malcontents or color revolutions; and the president’s 

distrust of the heads of other special services in case of a coup or the 

aggravation of internal political conflicts.

8

Several months later, in November, Aleksandr Khinshteyn, a top

advisor to Colonel-General Viktor Zolotov (whom Putin named as the 

first commander of the NG), was interviewed. His role is to prepare draft 

laws and normative acts for the NG, to provide media coverage of its 

activities, and to create a positive image of the NG. He conveyed a more 

official view for the reasons behind the NG’s creation, stating that the 

aims and objectives are located in the law “On the Troops of the 

National Guard”; and that the NG’s aim is to provide “a response to 

fresh challenges of the time, linked to the rise of extremism and 

terrorism, not so much in Russia as in the world...”9 Khinshteyn added 

that the NG units have missions both internal and external to Russia, 

such as serving with the Collective Security Treaty Organization. He 

noted that the NG was not created to restrict either the Federal Security 

Service (FSB) or other existing operational investigative bodies, and that 

the NG does not have the right to conduct operational investigative 

activities. 

Khinshteyn’s comments, of course, were in response to other 

assertions made about the reasons for the NG’s creation during 2016, 

some of which included the following:

• The edict creating the NG on 4 April stated the reason 

was “for the purpose of ensuring state and public 

security and protecting human and civil rights and 

liberties.”10 In addition to this political goal, there are 

 

8 Aleksandr Sukharenko, “All-Russia City Policeman. Creation of New Security 

Monster Will Scarcely Lead to the Normalization of the Situation in the Country,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 7 April 2016. 9 Yuliya Taratuta, interview with Aleksandr Khinshteyn, “Aleksandr Khinshteyn: The 

National Guard was not Created to Restrict the FSB,” Republic, 18 November 2016. 10 Kira Latukhina, “Forming Up. Vladimir Putin Announces the Creation of a National 

Guard,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 5 April 2016.
11

reports that the reform is a response to the economic 

crisis in the country.11 One journalist wrote that only 

big business could be a threat to Putin, which are 

systemic forces that count on him.

12

• Many believe the NG acts as Putin’s private army and 

provides for Putin’s personal safety, since Putin does 

not fully trust a single security agency structure. The 

NG acts as a counterbalance to the FSB.13 He also 

fears former foreign partners, who he believes manage 

internal critics and encourage coups.

14 He hopes to 

thwart any potential dramatic splits in elite structures.

• Putin is preparing in advance with the NG for the 

potential development of a revolutionary situation in 

Russia, one created by the crisis in Ukraine and the 

sanctions. He wants to prevent a possible “Maidan.” 

He is also aware that there could be a major influx of 

ISIS fighters in the North Caucasus; thus, he needs the 

NG to fight any influx of fighters into Chechnya,15

especially with his Armed Forces busy in Ukraine and 

Syria.

• Further, ethnic Chechens identify with Ramzan 

Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Republic, and are 

loyal to him before anyone else. Their incorporation 

into the NG enables “an extensive and civilized 

purge.” Troops are taken out of regional commands, 

thus out of Kadyrov’s sphere of influence. They are

directly subordinate to the NGs leader and director.16

 

11 Stanovaya, “The President’s Guard.” 12 Tatyana Stanovaya, “Revolution as Coup D’Etat: What Putin Really Fears,” Slon, 5 

May 2016.

13 Mikhail Fishman, no title, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 6 April 2016. 14 Yevgeniya Albats and Ivan Davydov, “Paranoia,” The New Times Online, 11 April 

2016.

15 Dmitriy Gudkov, “Has Putin Begun to Fear Revolution More than Ever?” Sobesednik 

Online, 6 April 2016. 16 No author, “How Putin Closed Down Kadyrov’s Army,” Novaya Gazeta Online, 9 

April 2016.
12

The most elite power units have been removed from 

Kadyrov’s influence on the decision-making plane, 

and “there has been a truncation and demilitarization 

of the factor of the Chechen siloviki loyal to the 

Chechen leader.”17

• The logic of “security escalation” is worrisome to 

Putin, according to another source. The execution of 

Romanian President Ceausescu on 25 December 1989 

was organized by two-star General Stanculescu, the 

same man who had carried out Ceausescu’s order to 

shoot demonstrators just a week earlier.18

• Putin’s NG is designed to allow both the NG and the 

FSB to fight terrorism, taking this task out of the 

FSB’s hands totally, which had a monopoly on the 

mission earlier.

19 He also focuses on the NG’s ability 

to control the circulation of weapons in Russia.

• The NG is the authorities’ guard against an internal 

enemy. The question is “against whom?” TV would 

have viewers believe the NG was set up for the 

population’s benefit, not Putin’s, since “under 

hypnosis [reference to Russian TV] the impossible is 

possible.” The NG is an asymmetric response to 

smear campaigns, such as the Panama offshore 

funds,20 which implicated a friend of Putin’s.

• Those who protested the NG’s development felt it 

would threaten the democratic process and turn Russia 

further into a police state. The NG would be called 

upon to quell protests in particular. The fear is that a 

 

17 Yelena Milashina interview with Petr Zaikin, “How Putin Has Liquidated Kadyrov’s 

Army. Edict on the Formation of the National Guard will have Colossal Consequences 

for Chechnya,” Novaya Gazeta Online, 11 April 2016. 18 Kirill Rogov, “Security Escalation: Why Putin Needs His Own Army,” RBK Online, 

8 April 2016.

19 Ibid. 20 Aleksandr Minkin, “Tsar’s Troops: A Letter to the President,” MK Online, 6 April 

2016.
13

“system of organized impunity” might develop around 

the NG.21

• In particular Putin hopes to use the NG as insurance 

against the development of a color revolution in 

Russia.

The NG will be responsible for domestic arms control and could 

take part in peacekeeping operations abroad.22 It would provide safety 

for the fuel and energy infrastructure and would have the right to 

suspend or limit in emergencies the use of any communication networks 

and means, while exercising priority rights to use them.23 It is reported 

that the NG cannot use special means against pregnant women and 

people with disabilities unless they fight back or participate in an attack 

endangering other citizens’ lives.24

NG Weapons

There are various ways that the NG is authorized to handle 

potential threats to the regime. The law has authorized the NG to use 

weapons against demonstrators, but people should remember that all of

these laws can be implemented in different ways. Whether the NG is 

really prepared to answer with bullets or just scaring people with these 

signals is unknown at this time.

25

Much of the authorized weaponry will be transferred from the 

Internal Troops, which includes various weapons that have been around

for years. These items include rubber truncheons, tear gas, stun grenades, 

tools for smashing barriers, dogs, handcuffs, etc. Internal Troops also

have their own airfields, aircraft, patrol helicopters, trained pilots, and 

 

21 Viktor Khamrayev, “Other-Purpose Forces. Deputies Finish Work on National Guard 

Law,” Kommersant, 22 June 2016. 22 No author or title provided, Kommersant Online, 11 April 2016. 23 Interfax (in English), 12 April 2016. 24 Interfax (in English), 6 April 2016. 25 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “The End of the Current Regime will Come Only When They 

Have Shot Dead the First 10 Demonstrators,” Znak.com, 22 September 2016.
14

unmanned equipment.26 Water cannons and armored vehicles can be 

used if a prosecutor is notified within 24 hours after their use.27 Interior 

Troops possess armored vehicles (Interior Troop website notes BTR82A/82AM, BTR-70M, BRDM-2A, BMP-2, and the BTR-80 vehicles) 

and aircraft (International Institute of Strategic Studies notes Ilyushin Il76, Antonov An-12, An-26, An-72, and 70 helicopters).28 They also have 

a number of jeeps and other vehicles.

However, there has been a discussion over the past several 

months of the need for other weapons, to include the following:

• An eight-barreled nonlethal “flash-bang” stun grenade 

launcher, with a 200-meter range, which can also 

dispense nets to trap rioters. The Lafet universal 

launcher already exists, which can fire 50mm 

grenades. 

• The Applied Chemistry Scientific Research Institute 

says an unmanned aerial vehicle that can deploy 

nonlethal weapons is under study. 

• There are plans to acquire an acoustic nonlethal 

weapon for use in public order situations. The system 

will produce a “controlled behavioral reaction in 

rioters,” with a range of not less than 60 meters and a 

capability of 4 hours of operation.29

• The NG will get 120 Shmel rocket-propelled 

flamethrowers, reportedly of the antipersonnel type 

(this brand was called the Satan Pipe in Afghanistan). 

The Shmel’s modification design for the NG is the 

RPO-A, which can be used when engaging covered 

weaponry in a city or for destroying shelters in 

 

26 Aleksandr Boyko, “Why Russia Needed a National Guard—All Police ‘Military’ 

Subdivisions Gathered Together to be Re-Armed and Used for their Designated 

Purpose,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Online, 6 April 2016. 27 Interfax (in English), 0924 GMT, 6 April 2016. 28 Interfax (in English), 1656 GMT, 22 April 2016.

29 Zvezda TV, 24 April 2016.
15

mountains. The RPO-A “wipes out everything living 

within a range of up to 80 cubic meters.” In open 

terrain it covers 50 square meters and in an enclosed 

space up to 80 square meters. It has been called a 

“sniper flamethrower,” since it can engage targets up 

to 700 meters away.30

• The NG will get sound systems for dispersing 

demonstrations. It is planning to purchase the towed 

non-lethal acoustic impact system, which creates 

“certain behavioral responses” in disturbers of law 

and order. It uses infra-low frequency oscillation 

affecting the central nervous system. Its range is 60 

meters and can operate up to four hours.31

• Primary service weapons will be the AK-74 and AK74M. Special operation forces will be armed with AS 

‘Val’ submachine guns for silent and flameless fire at 

ranges up to 400 meters. Small arms include pistols, 

assault rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, nonlethal 

weapons, and weapons to fight submarine sabotage 

forces.32

• Four tethered balloons will be acquired to surveil 

territory and record violations of the law. The PA-60 

“Dozor” tethered balloon operates at 300-350 meters 

altitude, lifts up to 20 kilograms, and can loiter for up 

to 10 days and nights. The balloons are equipped with 

two video cameras and deliver both a panoramic 

image of terrain and a more detailed one.33

• One source has noted that the NG will “get surplus 

military and special equipment, weapons, and 

 

30 German Petelin and Artur Gromov, “The Guard is Being Ignited. The Russian Guard 

Could be Getting Shmel Flamethrowers,” Gazeta.ru, 5 May 2016. 31 Ibid. 32 Interfax (in English), 11 May 2016. 33 Dmitriy Grigoryev, “Rosgvardiya Will Purchase Four Aerostats from the Defense 

Industry Complex,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 7 August 2016.
16

ammunition free from the Defense Ministry.”34 This 

will also require that the state armaments programs be 

adjusted.35

• The NG expects to get an unspecified number of the 

new BTR-82V armored vehicle in the second half of 

2017. It represents a modernized version of the BTR80, replacing the internal assemblies and running gear 

of the latter. The NG also expects to acquire the BTR82AM model of the APC.36

• Primary vehicle models of the NG include the UAZ, 

GAZ, URAL, and KAMAZ makes, while armored 

vehicles include the Tigr and URAL models. Special 

Forces units of the NG are outfitted with all-wheeldrive vehicles, while military units drive conventional 

and all-wheel-drive vehicles, depending on their 

missions.37

• A source noted on 15 November that the NG will not 

need tanks, but will retain artillery.38

• One Moscow report indicated that the NG will be 

armed with a ZEUS baton that possesses an LED 

flashlight, a laser sight, and the ability to fire 

electronic shocks up to five meters and stun grenades 

from a built in rail. The baton is tied to its owner via a 

special chip code such that if the baton is dropped, it 

will not work if someone else picks it up. The batons 

 

34 No author provided, “Russian National Guard Will Be Able to Obtain Weapons and 

Equipment from the Ministry of Defense,” RIA Novosti, 18 August 2016. 35 Interfax (in English), 4 May 2016. 36 Unattributed report, “BTR-82V Designed for Rosgvardiya Will Enter Service in 

2017,” RIA Novosti, 15 November 2016. 37 Unattributed report, “Russian National Guard to Get New BTR-82V Next Year,” RIA 

Novosti, 13 September 2016. 38 Unattributed report, “National Guard Troops Federal Service Does Not Intend to 

Obtain Heavy Armament, Other Than Artillery,” RIA Novosti, 15 November 2016.
17

will be in use by those responsible for maintaining 

public order.39

With regard to the nonlethal system designed to alter behavior, it 

forms very low frequency vibrations that influence the central nervous 

system. It would be used on disturbers of the peace or those with 

extremist tendencies. Infrasonic vibrations can be formed in the 4-8 GHz 

range, the frequency of vibrations of certain human organs. Already in 

the inventory should be the Shepot system, an acoustic unit embedded in 

the OMON (special purpose mobility unit) officer’s shield, with a 

nonlethal effect on any biological target at a distance of 10 meters. The 

system was to have been delivered in August 2016.40

The latest addition of a key piece of equipment with weapon 

overtones appears to be the so-called unhackable drone, designated as 

the ZALA 16E5. Reportedly these drones are protected against hostile 

takeover by enemy electronic warfare systems. The drone is designed by 

the ZALA AERO GROUP and, according to company spokesman Nikita 

Khamitov, will be delivered at the start of 2017. It was described as 

follows:

The...ZALA 16E5 is capable of carrying out aerial 

reconnaissance while remaining in the air for up to 16 

hours consecutively and transmitting an image to the 

operator at a distance of up to 150 km. The flying drone’s 

built-in equipment includes photographic and video 

cameras, night vision instruments, and a thermal imaging 

device.41

 

39 Dmitriy Litovkin, “National Guard Troops Will Be Armed with Electric-Shock 

Batons. New Batons Contain Flashlights, Laser Pointers, and Can Throw Grenades,” 

Izvestiya Online, 23 January 2017. 40 Yelena Mukhametshina, “National Guard Purchases Sound Systems to Disperse 

Malefactors. On Eve of Elections, Siloviki Preparing for Protest Actions, Opposition 

Figures Claim,” Vedomosti Online, 26 April 2016. 41 Unattributed report, “Federal Service of National Guard Troops to Receive 

Unhackable Drone. Latest Flying Drone Will Identify Attempt to Substitute its Control 

Signal and Return to Launch Position,” Izvestiya Online, 3 November 2016.
18

Personnel Selections for the NG

Putin selected Colonel-General Viktor Zolotov, who worked in 

the KGB’s Ninth Chief Directorate (which provided bodyguards for the 

country’s leaders), to head the NG. The appointment carries with it the 

equivalent title of a federal minister. In the past Zolotov protected both 

Boris Yeltsin and Saint Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak, which is 

where Putin first met Zolotov. Zolotov headed the president’s security 

service from 2000 to 2013, and from 2013 until his NG appointment he 

served as the first deputy of the Interior Ministry. 

Zolotov’s duties include maintaining public order, fighting

terrorism, taking part in the nation’s territorial defense, guarding state 

facilities, and, along with the FSB, protecting the state border. Many, 

however, believe that Zolotov’s first priority is to provide for Putin’s 

personal safety and protection, since Putin does not trust a single security 

agency structure. Zolotov is a trusted friend who will help him resolve 

issues of social instability.42

Zolotov will have six deputies.43 Zolotov’s two first deputies are 

Sergey Melikov and Sergey Chenchik. Melikov is the first deputy and 

Chenchik heads the NG staff. Their transfer from their prior work in the 

North Caucasus to positions of importance indicates that North Caucasus 

threats remain paramount in Kremlin minds. Chenchik is a special case, 

in that journalists referred to him as the “godfather” of Caucasus special 

operations.44 His harsh methods are expected to remain in place to 

confront regional threats such as the return of Russian citizens from 

cooperating with ISIS in Syria. As one source noted, “If we are to 

believe the security agencies information, it appears that an increase in 

activity by groups sympathetic to Islamic State is taking place in the 

 

42 Dmitriy Yevstifeyev and German Petelin, “National Guard for Putin’s Bodyguard—

Why Putin Needs a National Guard,” Gazeta.ru, 5 April 2016. 43 Interfax (in English), 6 April 2016. 44 Arsen Malikov, “New National Guard Special Operations and Appointments Result 

from Intensive Bargaining between Melikov and Chenchik. Newly Created Militarized 

Structure to Make North Caucasus its Main Test Range,” On Kavkaz, 12 October 2016.
19

North Caucasus.”45 Whether the number of threats is accurate or made 

up helps explain, in either case, why there have been increases in NG 

numbers in the area.

Zolotov noted that the instructor group in the Chechen Republic 

had created a regional Special Force Instructor group. The group was 

established on the orders of Ramzan Kadyrov, the republic’s leader. The 

latter noted that he had awarded a number of high-ranking Russia 

military officials with awards,46 which further solidifies his loyalty to 

Putin.

It appears that Putin was not intent on removing all Chechen 

security structures from Kadyrov’s control, since Sharip Delimkhanov, 

Kadyrov’s cousin, is now the chief of the Russian Guard Directorate for 

the Chechen Republic. Delimkhanov is the former commander of the 

“oil regiment,” the unit that specialized in protecting facilities in the oil 

and gas sector.47 He and other appointees to regional directorates of the 

National Guard change the correlation of forces among the security 

authorities, which had consisted of the FSB, MVD, and investigative 

department of the Investigation Committee (SU SK). The struggle 

among them for influence on NG regional directors will result in a new 

correlation of forces, dependent on the rivalry’s outcome.48 Russia now 

has multiple militarized agencies that must find ways to work together or 

wage a final battle for influence.

It was noted that, with the addition of internal troops and OMON 

and SOBR police Special Forces to the NG, spending under the heading 

 

45 Unattributed article, “Caucasus Experts Note Strengthening of Gunmen against 

Background of the Formation of the National Guard,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, 12 October 

2016.

46 Instagram (in English), 1 August 2016. 47 Andrey Kamakin, “Brother behind Brother: National Guard in Chechnya to be 

Commanded by a Relative of Kadyrov. Theory that Creation of New Security Structure 

was Kremlin Attempt to ‘Disarm’ Chechen Head Turns to Dust,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 

Online, 11 October 2016. 48 Ibid.
20

of “Internal Troops” will nearly double to R206.6 billion in 2017.49 In 

terms of personnel, Russian open data sources note that the Internal 

Troops number 170,000 service members; SOBR has 87 units and 5,200 

personnel; and OMON has 160 units and 40,000 personnel. Additionally, 

a NG special task center appears to exist that includes a Zubr mobile 

special task unit of 421 personnel, a Rys special rapid reaction unit of 

200 personnel, and a Yastreb special task aviation formation of 100 

personnel.50 Another report noted that the “Grom” special forces unit of 

the Federal Drug Control Service “will probably” become part of the 

NG, since no other special forces-type units will remain in the Interior 

Ministry.51

Putin has set the maximum number of NG staffers at 2,100 

people, excluding security and service personnel at the buildings and 

including 1,615 military servicemen, 404 employees, and 81 federal 

civilian public-sector workers.52 In October it was noted that Zolotov 

will have seven deputies according to the law (the initial report in April 

stated he would have six) and be allowed to cooperate with defense and 

science facilities to create new equipment and weapons for the benefit of 

the service. There was also a task to “deal with information warfare” but 

no further details were provided. In all, the NG is responsible for some 

100 types of power.53 Zolotov will have one first deputy and the total 

number of personnel will exceed 340,000.54 Of this number nearly 

160,000 came from Interior Ministry divisions. A large number of people 

are needed in order to fulfill the many missions of the NG and to man the 

84 federal bodies that were created and deployed to support the NG.55

The NG’s Organization and Duties

The NG includes the Internal Troops from the Ministry of 

Internal Affairs (MVD), OMON, special rapid-reaction detachment 

 

49 Moscow RosBiznesKonsalting (RBK), 23 October 2016. 50 Interfax (in English), 22 April 2016. 51 Interfax (in English), 25 April 2016. 52 Interfax (in English), 20 September 2016. 53 Interfax (in English), 4 October 2016. 54 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2016. 55 Interfax (in English), 25 November 2016.
21

(SOBR), the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Okhrana (FGUP), and 

other departments. Simultaneously with the establishment of the NG, the 

Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) and Federal Migration Service 

(FMS) were abolished and their functions transferred to the Interior 

Ministry. Putin called the NG a “new federal executive power body.” Of 

interest to planners is that the NG’s intelligence services are analyzing 

the situation in Russia through the use of “preemptive forecasting” 

methods to determine dangerous processes, while NG intelligence 

specialists have “inherited the best traditions and adopted modern forms 

and methods of operation.” Zolotov refers to the intelligence arm of the 

NG as the “military intelligence service.”56

Structurally the NG will consist of a central complex of seven 

districts that correspond to the federal ones and territorial agencies 

within each federation component.57 Its creation will take place in three 

stages. Initially, bodies and divisions will be transferred from the Interior 

Ministry to the guard. By August 2017, procedures and tasks will be 

finalized and regulations adjusted with federal legislation. By early 2018, 

a unified, coordinated structure will be complete.58

In time of war, governors, local self-governments, cities of 

federal significance, and regional administrations of the MVD, MChS

(Ministry of Emergency Situations), FSB, and NG will be subordinate to 

the Ministry of Defense’s military district commanding officers. This 

new command and control system was inspected for the first time during 

the Kavkaz-2016 exercises (see more on the exercise in the section on 

“The National Defense Management Center” in Chapter Seven). It will 

ensure the maintenance of martial law regimes, mobilization efforts, and 

the defense of facilities from enemy sabotage and help prevent mass 

disorders. It was created based on a Putin edict of 18 November 2015. 

The Defense Ministry is charged with implementing all 19 measures 

specified in Article 7 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On Martial 

 

56 Interfax (in English), 3 November 2016. 57 Svetlana Korzinkina, “The Structure of the National Guard Has Been Defined,” 

Izvestiya Online, 6 September 2016. 58 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2016.
22

Law,” where previously the measures were divided among the 

militarized departments and local authorities. Each of the five military 

districts of the Defense Ministry is divided into two parts in wartime: an 

operational-strategic command (OSK) and a wartime military district 

(VOVO). The OSK conducts combat with regiments, divisions, brigades, 

and armies. The VOVO ensures martial law’s maintenance and organizes 

mobilization and territorial defense.59

It was noted in one article that the NG will NOT have its own 

investigative body, which the Interior Ministry and the FSB do have.60

However, special powers will include detention, entry into residential 

and other premises, and cordoning off of areas, structures and other 

facilities.61 Detentions can last up to three hours, and servicemen can 

also check citizen’s identification cards and examine vehicles. Forces 

will be required to explain to anyone detained their rights to legal 

assistance and translation services, to notify family members of their 

detention, and to decline explanations.62 The location of servicemen and 

their families, as well as the location or redeployment sites of NG bodies, 

units, forces, or garrisons will be prohibited in public statements and in 

the media.63 In short, the NG will be somewhat comparable in strength to 

the Armed Forces, will be directly subordinate to the President, and will 

create another military structure which can use force against Russian 

citizens.64 In this manner Putin can not only balance the influence of the 

FSB and the Defense Ministry but also offset some of the power of 

Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya with NG deployments there. 

 

59 Aleksey Ramm, “They will Subordinate the Governors, the FSB, and the Police to 

the Military in the Event of War: All of the Levers of Power will be Transferred to the 

Military District Commanding Officers in the Event of a Declaration of Martial Law,” 

Izvestiya Online, 11 October 2016. 60 Boyko. 61 Interfax (in English), 0844 GMT, 6 April 2016. 62 Interfax (in English), 0920 GMT, 6 April 2016. 63 Interfax (in English), 1041 GMT, 6 April 2016. 64 Ella Paneyakh, “Security Monster. How the Merger of the Ministry of Internal 

Affairs, Federal Narcotics Control Service, and Federal Migration Service will Affect 

Citizens,” Slon, 7 April 2016.
23

Criminal investigations will have to be coordinated with the NG. 

Court bailiffs no longer have MVD support but must call the NG instead. 

Journalist Alexander Golts noted that the guard emerged due to regime 

paranoia of “color revolutions” and the desire to safeguard itself from 

such “threats.” Putin subordinated the guard to himself.65 Guard salaries 

will be on a par with those of the Defense Ministry. MVD servicemen 

will keep their privileges after joining the guard.66 The guard will 

participate in the formation of the Russian State Defense Order through 

the preparation of proposals according to a decree on the troop’s federal 

service. The power agency can combat terrorism and organized crime; 

support legal procedures during a state of emergency or during 

counterterrorism operations; provide state facility and special cargo 

security; assist the FSB in policing the state border; and monitor private 

security activities and the circulation of weapons.67 Remediation efforts 

after an emergency is also a NG function.68 There are also plans 

underway for the NG to protect the Kerch Bridge69 and the Sevastopol 

research reactor. The NG is now in charge of protecting 72 state facilities 

and nearly 300 premises.70

Aleksandr Khinshteyn, noted above, stated that the NG has a 

Directorate for Work with Personnel, which carries out some of the 

functions done by deputy commanders for political work in Soviet times. 

Propaganda and disinformation work will be aimed “at forming the right 

image of the agency.”71 With regard to pay rates, it appears that those 

 

65 Aleksandr Golts, “Racketeering to Acquire a New Player—the National Guard. 

Military Expert is not Surprised at the Broadening of the NG’s Powers and Describes 

the Structure as Just One More Player in the Racketeering Game,” Sobesednik Online, 5 

August 2016.

66 Interfax (in English), 23 August 2016. 67 Unattributed report, “The National Guard will Participate in Forming the Russian 

State Defense Order,” RIA Novosti, 4 October 2016. 68 Sergey Operov and Ivan Safronov, “Ministry of Emergency Powers. A Reform of the 

Law-Enforcement and Security Bodies is in Preparation,” Kommersant Online, 19 

September 2016.

69 Interfax (in English), 1055 GMT, 20 September 2016. 70 Interfax (in English), 1121 GMT, 20 September 2016. 71 Valeriya Markova, “Commenting on His Appointment as Adviser to Rosgvardiya

Head, Khinshteyn Spoke about NKVD’s Heroism,” MK Online, 25 October 2016.
24

NG members under contract will receive ten times the pay per month in 

comparison to those who were drafted into the force. Zolotov will 

receive 54,000 rubles a month, contracted riflemen 10,000 rubles a 

month, and ranking contracted non-commissioned officer (NCO) 18,000 

rubles a month. Drafted riflemen and NCOs will receive 1,000 rubles a 

month and 1,800 rubles a month, respectively.72

With regard to duties, an April 2016 report noted that the NG will 

conduct both planned and unplanned checks on Russia’s fuel and energy 

companies. Planned checks within the high- and medium-hazard 

category are conducted once a year and in the low-hazard category every 

three years. The NG conducts unplanned checks at the president’s or 

government’s requests.73

In addition, some expect that increased competition among 

security forces will affect how the business community conducts itself. 

The NG may become the protector of this racket game and “will seek 

protection money that businesses currently pay to other security 

forces.”74 State facilities that require protection include nuclear power 

stations, top secret defense plants, and ports hosting nuclear ice breakers, 

among others. As a final note, it was stated that both contract personnel 

and draftees will serve in the NG.75 The force will be located in Strogino, 

to the west of Moscow, where the base will serve as a full-fledged 

town.76 The publication of this information contradicts earlier 

announcements that divulging the location of servicemen would be 

prohibited.

A more detailed list of the duties of the NG were described in a 4

July 2016 report. Putin had signed a law on NG forces that listed the 

various duties of the NG as follows: 

 

72 Ivan Petrov, “How Much You Can Earn. National Guard Determines Rates of Pay for 

Draftees and Contract Service Personnel,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 21 August 2016. 73 Interfax (in English), 24 October 2016. 74 Nikolai Petrov, no title, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 15 April 2016. 75 Mikhail Falaleyev, “Everything Legal. Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishes Law ‘On the 

Russian Federation National Guard Troops,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 6 July 2016. 76 No author or title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 13 July 2016.
25

• Enforce the emergency situation regime

• Fight terrorism

• Ensure territorial defense

• Protect special state facilities and special purpose sites

• Address the tasks regarding control over the turnover 

of weapons

• Address the operation of private security agencies

• Protect public order along with the Interior Ministry

• Protect the state borders with the FSB

• Escort special cargoes

• Help secure Russia’s territorial integrity

• Suppress mass disorder in the penitentiaries and 

populated areas

• Have the right to unlock cars to save lives, ensure 

their security, or detain people involved in criminal 

actions

• Use physical force, special means or firearms in the 

event of immediate threats

• Fulfill legal demands and issue warnings

• Apply special equipment to suppress riots or other 

illegal actions 

• Break into residences if necessary

• Check documents and detain suspects for no more 

than three hours77

An October report noted the following tasks/duties for the NG: 

registering every citizen’s fingerprints in a national database; developing 

safety measures for civilian aviation; evaluating the defensive 

capabilities of buildings and other facilities against terrorist attacks; 

forming a network of regional structures to operate alongside military 

defense projects and in time of war; providing public order and territorial 

 

77 Interfax (in English), 4 July 2016.
26

defense; and suppressing potential opposition protest actions).78 The 

guard may also fulfill peacekeeping duties abroad.79

Another duty, external to Russia, would be the use of the NG as a 

peacekeeping force. It could be utilized in Central Asia if Russian 

political, economic, infrastructure, or cultural issues require enforcement 

support. Conflicts in Central Asia could easily spread inside Russia if not 

carefully monitored. It was noted that the “legislative configuration that 

has been created has carefully eliminated all obstacles to the employment 

of NG troops in combatting disturbances in Central Asia.”80 Two units 

most likely to be employed there are the above-mentioned Zubr and Rys 

units. Before they were incorporated into the NG, they were part of the 

Collective Rapid Reaction Force of the Collective Security Treaty 

Organization and thus have had experience in Central Asia before their 

move to the NG.81

Reports indicate that the NG took part in more than 160 antiterrorism operations in conjunction with other services in 2016. It also 

helped protect 15 global and state events.82 Russia conducted several NG 

exercises in 2016, one of which was with China in July 2016 on the 

premises of the Dzerzhinsky Division outside Moscow. Live-fire, 

airdrop, and high-altitude training was conducted. Searches were made 

for subversive and bandit groups in a forest and in a populated area, 

mines were cleared, the “injured” were evacuated, a city was cordoned 

off, and a landing was made on a roof-top by an assault group.83 There 

also have been joint exercises among the NG (and its Mi-8 helicopters), 

the Airborne Troops, and the Internal Affairs Ministry troops. Such 

 

78 The Moscow Times Online (in English), 4 October 2016. 79 RT Online (in English), 2 August 2016. 80 Konstantin Bogdanov, “The Wild Field of Threats. What Russia’s National Guard 

May Be Up Against,” Lenta.ru, 11 May 2016. 81 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2016. 82 Interfax (in English), 25 November 2016. 83 Interfax (in English), 4 July 2016.
27

exercises allow for the strengthening of interaction among the federal, 

regional, and asset groupings.84

There do seem to be worries creeping into the population and the 

press. When the NG was first announced in April 2016, a report 

discussed an exercise scenario involving the NG that had it confronting 

an angry mob of citizens who were upset with increases in municipal 

service charges (heating, light, and water). The article noted that to bring 

folks to their senses, it appears that nightsticks, tear gas, and barbed wire 

will be the answer. Russian authorities are turning to Zubatovism, a 

system of workers’ organizations named for Sergey Zubatov, a czarist 

colonel of the gendarmes whose aim was to monitor workers and divert 

them from political activity under such conditions.85 Khinshteyn, 

however, downplayed the anxiety that the April report implied. He noted 

in his November interview that the law does not allow the NG to use 

weapons in crowded places, unless there is an operational need to free 

hostages, repel a group attack on important facilities, or stop terrorist 

acts.86

However, in December 2016 Riga’s press quoted Alexander 

Maul, the head of the NG’s directorate for the Altai Region, as saying 

that it was the “fifth column” (small groups that try to undermine a larger 

population from within) that needed to be watched by the guard, to 

include a few public organizations funded from abroad.87 This prompted 

a retort from Moscow that the main task of the NG was to combat 

terrorism and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. While the 

comment directly refuted the allegation that the NG was created to fight 

“revolutionary agitators,”88 it was clear that the guard may have other 

“main tasks” that are unspoken.

 

84 Yuriy Borodin, “The First Pancake is Not Lumpy,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 29 September 2016. 85 Aleksandr Golts, “To Rout and Not to Allow,” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 25 April 

2016.

86 Yuliya Taratuta, “Aleksandr Khinshteyn: The National Guard was not Created...” 87 BBC Monitoring, Riga Meduza, 16 December 2016. 88 Interfax (in English), 0700 GMT, 19 December 2016.
28

Another report noted that, according to the First Deputy 

Commander of the NG, Sergey Melikov, the intelligence arm of the NG

will detect threats to the political system in Russia and the security of its 

citizens.89 He added that the role of the guard is to ensure public order 

“without regard for the revolutionary mood of the people or the fifth 

column, or the sixth or seventh or eighth.”90

Another worry centers on rumors that several of Russia’s security 

bodies will be merged into a single powerful agency, which would 

include the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, 

and the Federal Protection Service. The agency would handle external 

threats to Russia, while the NG would handle internal threats to security 

and order.91 Again, however, Khinshteyn stated categorically that this 

will not happen, and that such a security body is not planned.

The formation of the NG, it appears, is well on its way. Tasks for 

2017 include carrying out the second stage of the NG’s creation, 

ensuring public order at the FIFA Confederations Cup, improving the 

effectiveness of the fight against corruption and crime, and neutralizing

terrorists and extremists who threaten Russia.92 In late November 

Zolotov issued an order to establish a board to examine NG activities and 

troop service developments. The board is an advisory body that consists 

of sixteen people, to include Zolotov, deputy directors, the chief of the 

Main Organizational Directorate, and troop district commanders. The 

latter will be in charge of military councils of the NG’s operationalterritorial combined formations, which will be set up in the districts.93

Conclusions

This chapter began with a quote from George Kennan in 1946 

that described a Soviet thought process heavily influenced by an 

 

89 Interfax (in English), 1152 GMT, 19 December 2016.

90 Interfax-AVN Online, 0940 GMT, 19 December 2016.

91 BBC Monitoring (in English), 20 September 2016.

92 Interfax-AVN Online, 25 November 2016.

93 Unattributed report, “National Guard Forms Board to Consider Questions of the 

Service’s Development,” RIA Novosti, 28 November 2016.
29

authoritarian sense of insecurity. The creation of a huge NG to maintain 

internal and social stability in Russia appears to support Kennan’s 

statement some 70 years after it was made. 

Even official Russian sources note that the NG was created to 

ensure domestic stability, and that the Guard’s reach could have 

international implications as well. It can serve as a deterrent or strike 

force, depending on the situation and may have a peacekeeping role.

Further, the inventory of new weapons continues to grow. 
30
31

CHAPTER TWO: CADRE CHANGES AND SISTEMA

Introduction

An examination of President Vladimir Putin’s cadre changes over 

the past few years appear to be based on his belief that new centers of 

power, whether it be in politics or business, might appear. From the reign 

of Vladimir Lenin through that of Leonid Brezhnev, there were few 

changes in the Soviet Union’s decision-making’s methodology and 

purpose. The Politburo was a fairly fixed establishment and only through 

the aging process were changes made in its membership. The 

Communist Party was the only player in politics, there were few 

competing “businesses” under communism, and decision-making itself

lacked transparency. And then the Soviet Union dissolved.

Today, however, thanks to insights provided by numerous 

authors and analysts, Putin’s decision-making capabilities and 

insecurities are becoming somewhat less opaque. While analysts will 

never be able to ascertain his next move with conviction, they can at 

least offer plausible scenarios that he might follow based on such 

knowledge. 

This chapter looks at Putin’s cadre changes that involve the 

movement of reliable characters in a sort of political carousel to prevent 

the development of a strong opposition to his policies. The chapter ends 

with a discussion of the concept of sistema, which former Russian 

insider Gleb Pavlovsky defines as “a style of exercising power that turns 

the country’s people into temporary operating resources, against their 

wills and in breach of their rights.”94

Putin’s Cadre Changes

In 2016 governors, ministers, and key members of the 

presidential staff were replaced and new security structures appeared. 

These changes, when taken in perspective, appear aimed at strengthening 

 

94 Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics under Putin,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, p. 

14.
32

Putin’s control over the decisions regarding the country’s laws and 

responses to threats, both real and imagined. His press secretary noted 

that this was just an effort to improve the state administration’s 

effectiveness, while for others it demonstrated that the “weakening of the 

Presidential Staff as a decision-making center is now obviously under 

way.” The FSB is somewhat stronger. However, this does not mean that 

competing centers of interest have disappeared. For example, one writer 

thought that the State Duma may become the new “power center” of 

Russian politics.95

One of the more intriguing decisions that Putin made in 2016 was 

to move out of key positions several longtime friends who had always 

been some of his biggest supporters. There are several considerations as 

to “why” Putin was motivated to make changes in the various staffs, 

business clans, and security forces that surround him. First and foremost 

is the growing age of these contingents. Younger blood may be needed 

to infuse the system with updated thought that is more appropriate for the 

digital age. Members of Putin’s old entourage had little external 

leverage; thus, it was difficult to do business with the West. Putin is a 

survivor and sees that this informal network of longtime friends was 

going stale, especially in light of the sanctions resulting from decisions 

he had made over the past two years in regard to Crimea, Ukraine, Syria, 

and attempts to influence the US electoral process. Further, over the 

course of a decade, Putin’s long-time friends naturally made new 

friendships and developed trust among themselves. 

This leads to a second consideration, which is that Putin did not 

want to be held hostage by any one of these groups. Putin does not want 

anyone to control him or force him into decisions that were put together 

by several individuals. As one commentator noted, intra-elite rivalry is 

intensifying with the upcoming presidential election and with it, the 

“inevitable subsequent ‘distribution of prizes,’ including posts in the 

 

95 Editorial, “Volodin’s Duma: Will a New Political Course Ensue Following the New 

Reshuffles in the Regime,” Gazeta.ru, 23 September 2016.
33

government and the leadership of major corporations.”96 Finally Putin 

aims to continue to exert control over all of these groups. He has to keep 

balancing these forces while on the lookout for new loyalists worth 

keeping. He is currently experimenting with the placement of young 

technocrats (who owe their careers to Putin) or children of the ruling 

elite (the latter holding state posts) to key positions, testing them against 

the experience of his older supporters. This is not a final version of 

events, but it is certainly a serious trial run that could overturn the 

position of people who have been in key positions for years. Several of 

these changes are described in the discussion below.

In this vein, it is most intriguing to speculate “how” Putin might 

contemplate changes to his retinue, with speculation being the key word 

here. What is offered for consideration below is a speculative thought 

process that approximates the military’s five step method for uncovering 

and addressing changes in the character of conflict. The template covers 

key areas that offer a way to talk about Putin’s cadre changes. The 

methodology is different from the only authoritative voice on the topic, 

which is that of Gleb Pavlovsky, who worked in the Putin administration 

in the past and whose discussion of the concept known as sistema is 

offered in a section below. 

The first step of the template is not the changing character of war

but rather the changing character of politics (age, diversifying bases of 

support, neutering ambitions, and so on). Second, Putin and his advisors

must forecast what future political climate and support he finds most 

important (which groups to interact with that do not present a threat). 

Third he must align or balance forces to keep everyone happy and to 

prevent one group from becoming too strong, much like a correlation of 

forces assessment. Fourth, he must assess the type of organization (form) 

to pursue, such as growing a new elite (or as one Russian commentator 

acknowledges, deal with an evolving Politburo 2.0). Finally, he must 

prepare the proper weapons (methods) of blackmail, innuendo, 

propaganda, active measures, and hacking with which to attack 

 

96 Natalya Korchenkova and Yekaterian Grobman, “The New ‘Politburo.’ Experts 

Sketch out Vladimir Putin’s Inner Circle,” Kommersant Online, 7 November 2016.
34

opponents at home and abroad; and he must utilize political art (methods, 

military art), as exhibited in the various styles he uses to combat 

opponents. 

Of interest is that this method of examining Russian politics 

using a military method offers a different way to categorize political 

warfare in Russia. This is a modern “Game of Thrones” that is full of the 

same intrigue and machinations. Below are some of the statements by 

Russian journalists that fit the template.

• Changing character of politics—“The main motive is 

the objective process of the ageing of the former ‘Putin 

elite,’ which has already reached the 60+ age 

threshold.”97 “The ’dilution’ of natives of Saint 

Petersburg in power began during Vladimir Putin’s 

second presidential term. At that moment in time, he 

began to actively diversify the regional base of his 

support,” political strategist Yevgeniy Minchenko 

says.98 “The old elite has a large catalogue of 

ambitions and grievances, whereas the ‘technocrats’ 

are only just beginning to forge their careers and 

understand perfectly well that they are obliged to the 

president personally for their elevation.”99

• Forecasting—“In the future, the political influence of 

the elite groups whose interaction Putin has been 

moderating for 16 years already will be reduced,” 

Minchenko believes.100 The forecasting process 

appears to be seriously affected by the Russian 

penchant to envision conspiracy theories everywhere 

 

97 Arnold Khachaturov, “End of the Era of the ‘Saint Petersburgers.’ In Russia, It is 

Not the Voters, but the President Who Once Recruited Them Who is Bidding Farewell 

to People Who Have Become Tiresome,” Novaya Gazeta Online, 23 December 2016.

98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.
35

the leadership looks. This not only affects forecasting 

via inbuilt prejudices but also enhances the use of 

political weaponry against presumed opponents.

• Correlation of forces—“The mass importation of 

executive cadres from Saint Petersburg that took place 

during Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term 

determined the configuration of forces in Russian 

politics for years ahead.”101 “In order to retain power 

in his own hands, an authoritarian leader needs to 

continually change the balance of power between the 

elite groups; otherwise, one of them could become too 

strongly entrenched.”102 This includes Putin’s circle of 

politicians, functionaries, and businessmen who 

participate in the adoption of major decisions.103

• Organizations—“A regrouping of forces has begun in 

the upper and middle echelons of the Russian 

nomenklatura.”104 Vladimir Putin is “testing people 

originating from various strata.”105 The current 

“politburo” membership includes Defense Minister 

Sergey Shoygu; Rosneft boss Igor Sechin; State Duma 

Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin; Rostech State 

Corporation boss Sergey Chemezov; Rossiya Bank 

boss Yuriy Kovalchuk; businessman Arkadiy 

Rotenberg; Premier Dmitriy Medvedev; and Moscow 

Mayor Sergey Sobyanin.106 “All of them are 

nonpoliticized cadres without clan interests who are 

 

101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Editorial, “Putin’s Game of Styles. Experience, High Poll Numbers, and Control 

over the Siloviki Allow the President to Complete any Steps, Even Liberal Ones,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 8 November 2016. 104 Korchenkova and Grobman. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.
36

functional and effective and know their business.”107

“Maintaining the old elites, who are noticeably losing 

their effectiveness, is becoming too expensive. On the 

Russian political spectrum, the ‘technocrat’ is not so 

far away from the ‘establishment liberal.’”108 “This 

new generation of central bureaucracy represents a 

‘new Putin draft.’”109 “Putin is growing a new elite and 

testing these people, who by no means constitute 

technocrats alone,” Minchenko concludes.110 The main 

organization that Mincheko has discussed is known as 

“Politburo 2.0.” Putin believes it has become too

influential and thus must be reformatted.111

• Weapons—political influence via propaganda, 

blackmail, innuendo, jailing, trumped up charges, 

active measures, and hacking

• Political art—“The President is the master of various 

styles, that he can play with them, and change 

depending on the situation, without allowing anyone of 

the groups to become stronger and while maintaining 

control over them. At the same time he always has the 

personnel at the ready to embody any style in 

practice.”112 This is a “game inside the elite aimed at 

preserving a balance between the various forces and at 

ensuring their obedience or resubmission to the 

national leader.”113 Various styles have included a 

moderate reformist mode, a left-wing populist mode, 

and the patriotic mode.114 The editorial notes, 

 

107 Khachaturov 108 Ibid.

109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Editorial, “Putin’s Game...”. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid.
37

however, that for real liberalization, conditions are 

needed that do not exist at the present moment in 

time.115

This five-step template, which is speculative only, does offer analysts 

searching for a way to examine Putin’s cadre changes a specific 

methodology for understanding political change.

It should be noted that perhaps the most prominent voice, 

mentioned above, in Russia in regard to “groupings” of elites has been 

Yevgeniy Minchenko, whose Minchenko Consulting company has been 

preparing “Politburo 2.0” reports about all of the elites in Russia and 

with whom they are aligned. It is not known just how authoritative his 

reporting is, but it is definitely of interest as a model for consideration. 

Minchenko defines a politburo member as one who possesses all 

types of resources, to include financial, security-related, and regional 

resources.116 He believes that there is tension between politburo 

members working in the Kremlin and those working in the White House, 

or legislative branch. This includes political tension over the promotion 

of specific draft laws.117

Russian sources explained the cadre change discussion that 

started in the spring of 2016 in an entirely different way, with no 

mention or reference, of course, to the five-step template. There were 

three areas where change seemed to be occurring. A report in May noted 

that at the time Russian politics included several dozen individual 

players with their own clienteles. They only entered into agreements 

with one another to achieve specific objectives, with Putin as their 

arbiter. Another group was people moving into key jobs from the 

Presidential Security Service, people whom Putin has come to trust. A 

final group involved the gradual introduction of generational change into 

 

115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid.
38

the top echelons.118 The discussion that followed in June, July, and 

August involved much speculation.

In June 2016 Gleb Pavlovsky, who wrote the excellent discussion 

of Sistema that is highlighted in the next section, noted that there was a 

de-politicization process underway in Russia where decisions and 

authority were now in the hands of a single leader. Policies are hidden 

from the populace due to a monopoly over the political agenda. This, in 

turn, “darkens the national leaders’ thinking and prompts them to have 

dangerous reveries and grim fantasies.”119 The authorities are averse to 

change but, if Putin’s ratings fall, everyone will have to deal with the 

unintended consequences of such an event.

Between 28 and 29 July 2016, the discussion over personnel 

changes appeared to reach its apex. One 28 July 2016 report noted that in 

a single day Putin had replaced several governors, regional 

representatives, and one ambassador (Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine). 

Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that the reshuffle aims 

to improve the effectiveness of state administration, and that the changes 

were not directly related to the September Duma elections.120

A second 28 July 2016 article noted that the rotation of personnel 

was long-expected, and it could be designed to “defuse intra-elite 

conflict that had come to a head.”121 Analysts believed that if the newly 

designated authorities could generate a desire for renewal, opposition 

demands could then be somewhat neutered. Thus, the idea behind the 

movement of personnel at the time was to defuse the amount of protest 

before the elections for the State Duma in September. Putin, the article 

notes, changed governors in regions where the protest sentiments were 

strongest. Complaints cannot be made against new people. Some of the 

 

118 Aleksey Makarkin, “Murov’s Resignation is a Serious Political Success for Viktor 

Zolotov, Who at One Time Was His Ally,” Politkom.ru, 26 May 2016.

119 Gleb Pavlovsky, no title offered, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 3 June 

2026.

120 RT Online (in English), 28 July 2016. 121 Yekaterina Vinokurova, “New ‘Putinian Draft.’ Experts: Filling the ‘Vertical’ with 

Siloviki Will Facilitate their Demystification,” Znak.com, 28 July 2016.
39

appointments went to people in shoulder boards instead of suits, which is 

yet another way to indicate the type of control and discipline that Putin 

desires. However, this move may backfire, as people may soon see that 

iron hands cannot handle difficult problems.122

A third article on 28 July, an editorial, offered yet another 

perspective on the changes. It noted that the reshuffling appeared to be a 

special operation and not a rotation, as the majority of the new 

appointees were people in uniform. In hindsight, however, there 

appeared to be some rational logic behind the changes, as all four 

governors who lost their jobs had troubles of some type. In three of the 

four regions people from Putin’s personal bodyguard were installed. In 

this way, Putin is building a new internal vertical axis of power to purge 

threats of a coup. Putin may be worrying about handing over power in 

either 2018 or 2024. He believes, it seems, “dependable and loyal people 

from the close entourage on whom one can rely would be needed not 

only in Moscow but also throughout the country,” according to this 

editorial.123 There has since been a rumor, offered by Valery Solovey,

that Putin may be “absent from the public space for several months in 

2017 or else appear only extremely rarely.”124 Solovey has managed 

some credible reporting from behind the Kremlin walls in the past.

In a final 28 July article, the authors discussed the use of the 

siloviki to replace current appointees. This indicates that the group in 

favor at the moment is clearly the power ministries, particularly the 

Federal Protection Service and the FSB. Finally, some of those removed 

were placed in positions as presidential plenipotentiary representatives. 

This indicates they could be in places of rest at the moment and could be 

summoned back to the fray at any time.125

 

122 Ibid. 123 No author, “The Law, Uniforms, and Order. What Lies behind the Biggest Personnel 

Reshuffle of Recent Years?” Gazeta.ru, 28 July 2016. 124 Andrey Kamakin, interview with Valery Solovey, “Storm in 2017: Putin May Be 

Replaced by Successor in a Few Months’ Time,” MK Online, 11 November 2016. 125 Kirill Martynov, Nataliya Zotova, and Dmitriy Rebrov, “Day of Reshuffles. What do 

Dismissals and Movements in Regional Elites on Eve of Elections Mean,” Novaya 

Gazeta Online, 28 July 2016.
40

On 29 July, a report noted the speed with which the cadre 

changes were made: “at intervals of 5-10 minutes a succession of 15 

edicts were published” that resulted in the replacement of three 

plenipotentiary representatives in the federal districts, four governors, 

and one Federal Customs Service leader. At the same time the NG

acquired a second first deputy leader and Russia’s ambassador to Kiev 

was relieved of duty at his own request.126 Three of the four 

gubernatorial vacancies were filled by special services personnel. 

Putin only appear to trusts the loyalty of those closest to him, 

such as members of the security services. He gains two advantages from 

utilizing them in the regions: the population notes that he is aware of 

their problems and is taking care of them with people he trusts; and the 

elites sense that Putin will not put up with those who do not perform. 

Putting security service personnel in these jobs indicates that he wants 

only professionals and those he credits as being trustworthy to run the 

region. The population feels it is getting good leadership. These moves 

also steal the opposition’s agenda if they are running on corruption

charges against the incumbent.

127 Once they are removed, the opposition 

has no time to record wrongdoings by their replacements. In effect Putin 

is sending loyalty (in the form of his security service or praetorian 

guards) to the regions as much as forward-thinking officials. This 

strengthens his vertical hierarchy with members of the siloviki. Clearly 

these decisions were made in advance, as witnessed by the 15-minute 

release of the edicts. Perhaps this is even being done in preparation for 

the presidential elections of 2018.128

In another 29 July article, the argument was presented that a 

complex equilibrium has been created among cadres. Each department 

and directorate is moving forward based on its own endeavors. The FSB 

 

126 Dmitriy Kamyshev, Petr Kozlov, and Yelena Mukhametshina, “Fall Reshuffle Could 

Follow Summer Personnel Reshuffle; Functionaries and Experts Expect Next Wave of 

Dismissals and Appointments after Duma Elections,” Vedomosti Online, 29 July 2016. 127 Ibid. 128 Darya Garmonenko and Velimir Razuvayev, “Putin Continues to Stake on the 

Siloviki. Kremlin’s Cadre Deck Still Mainly Contains Chekists and Generals,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 29 July 2016.
41

and the Personal Security Service appear to be the leading power 

executioners at the moment. There must not be a final victor, the article 

noted, but rather the maintenance of an unstable balance among key 

actors. This balance is maintained in many ways. In the recently formed 

NG, for example, its chief is a member of only the larger, not smaller, 

Security Council. Simultaneously the FSB was reformatted and 

strengthened to combat corruption and security in the economic sphere. 

The overall effect on the siloviki is that they are, to a degree, afraid of 

one another’s powers, which is a form of checks and balances based on 

fear. The system continues to operate as long as competition is preserved 

and there is no winner. A victor, according to the rationale of those who 

are insecure in their position, may decide to form an opposition or create 

conditions for a coup, so Putin will keep a close eye on competitors.129

In August 2016 Putin made some significant personnel changes 

that, in effect, removed several heavyweights from important jobs, but, 

in a roundabout way, still kept them in his inner circle. Much of the 

movement was cosmetic, and when viewed more deeply reflects a way to 

gain better control over matters of state and decision-making. The 

removal of Sergey Ivanov and appointment of his deputy, Anton Vayno, 

as head of the presidential staff may be the most significant. Initial 

thoughts were that Ivanov had fallen out of favor with Putin, but this was 

not the case. Rather, his move to another job was planned long ago 

between just Putin and him. Ivanov is now an envoy on environmental 

and transport issues. Some felt perhaps Putin was shielding figures of 

importance such as Ivanov from the difficulties of dealing with sanctions 

and offering them a freer path to the Presidency in case Putin decides 

(highly unlikely) against extending his presidency in 2018. Ivanov, 

however, noted that he is still a permanent member of the Security 

Council and talks with Putin at least once a week. He is still the 

Chairman of the Board of Directors at Rostelecom as well, so these ideas 

appear to have little weight. 

 

129 Yekaterina Shulman, “Why the ‘War of the Siloviki’ is Not What We Think It Is,” 

Slon, 29 July 2016.
42

Vyacheslav Volodin was moved from the position of presidential 

staff first deputy to speaker of the State Duma. This ensures better 

control over the Duma. Both Volodin and Vayno are Putin insiders who 

owe their careers to him. Volodin’s move may mean the transfer of 

domestic policy influence from the Kremlin administration to the lower 

chamber. It will be easier to adopt constitutional amendments or laws 

that require two-thirds of the deputies’ consent.130

Volodin is replacing Sergey Naryshkin, another Putin insider, 

who is moving to head Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Sergey 

Kiriyenko, head of Rosatom, is replacing Volodin. A former prime 

minister of Russia in 1998, he will apparently oversee domestic politics. 

It thus remains to be seen whether a dual-domestic center is being 

developed or whether Volodin will remain in charge and Kiriyenko will 

merely be a figurehead. Many expect the office to be just symbolic. 

Meanwhile the security services continue to project their influence over 

the rest of the nation in this time of intense sanctions.

There are rumors that the presidential election could be moved up 

from 2018 to 2017, which means that the preparation of loyal cadres for 

such an event may also be moved up, which would also account for the 

changes thus far. Further, there is a tendency within administrations such 

as Putin’s to establish competing hierarchies who offer different types of 

personal relationships and devoted loyalty. Contrasting a new cadre 

against the established security forces of Putin’s background is one such 

competition; another would be Putin’s relationship to his friends from his 

days in Saint Petersburg. He is putting trusted friends into all three of 

these relationships, thereby solidifying his hierarchy of power from 

multiple angles.

Such changes reflect Putin’s ability to increase control over what 

he foresees as required of his staff and ministers in the coming years. 

Some believe the age of some of his older comrades comes into question 

as well, but this does not seem to be the most serious cause for change. 

Rather, the change more likely reflects the ability to establish the 

 

130 Editorial.
43

security services everywhere and have forces ready to stunt protests 

while encouraging compliance. The latter is particularly important in this 

age of uncertainty for Russia, strapped as it is with the extended effect of 

sanctions on the domestic economy. 

Sistema: The Unique Russian Operating Environment

Until April 2011 Gleb Pavlovsky served as an advisor to the 

Presidential Administration of Russia. Based on his wealth of 

background information, he wrote a fascinating article published in the 

May/June issue of Foreign Affairs that described how decisions are made 

in the Kremlin and the infrastructure that supports such methods. This 

decision-making and management procedure, known as sistema, has long 

defined Russian politics and society and will outlive Putin, in 

Pavlovsky’s opinion.131 Pavlovsky’s comments came before the late 

summer 2016 Putin purge of several leading political figures.

First, what is sistema? Pavlovsky defines the term as “a style of 

exercising power that turns the country’s people into temporary 

operating resources, against their wills and in breach of their rights.”132

Alena Ledeneva, in her 2013 book Can Russia Modernize?, defined the 

term a bit differently: “the paradoxical ways in which things get done in 

practice—adhering to official rules and formal procedures but also 

following unwritten codes and practical norms.”133 She adds that the 

term applies to contemporary Russian governance.

Pavlovsky states that the term has become a method for making 

deals and goes beyond politics and ideology, combining the idea

that the state should enjoy unlimited access to all national 

resources, public or private, with a kind of permanent 

state of emergency in which every level of society—

businesses, social and ethnic groups, powerful clans, and 

 

131 Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics under Putin,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, 

pp. 10-17. 132 Ibid., p. 14. 133 Ibid.
44

even criminal gangs—is drafted into solving what the 

Kremlin labels ‘urgent state problems.’134

Unlimited access to all resources certainly implies extensive control.

Second, what are the characteristics of sistema? Pavlovsky writes 

that sistema “relies on indirection and interpretation rather than 

command and control.” The approval system is at once indecisive and 

vague. A proposal takes the form of otmashka, which means “go-ahead” 

in the sense not so much as an order but rather as a license “to act in a 

desired direction.”135 The term is applied to projects deemed priemlemo

(acceptable), offering a sense of indifference to details. As a result “That 

is why today, significant actions on Russia’s part rarely stem from 

Kremlin directives but rather result from a sort of contest among 

Kremlin-related groups each seeking to prove its loyalty.”136 Perhaps this 

is why in February 2015 Boris Nemtsov was gunned down in cold blood, 

with one group (Chechens) reaching out to demonstrate its “loyalty” to 

Putin.

One constant group that supports sistema is a ruling team that 

protects its grip on power. As an example, Pavlovsky noted how 

gubernatorial elections work. Putin approves a candidate, following 

internal negotiations within the Kremlin. There is deal making among 

cabinet members, local businesses, and alternate candidates. Anointed 

candidate’s form campaign headquarters. Local businesses then compete 

and express loyalty to the candidate (as motivation, the former are 

threatened with losing what they have).137 Another characteristic is that 

when problems (falling prices, etc.) arise new “urgent state problems” 

are found. This is because sistema has no retreat mode, and governing is 

about contending with the existence of norms and circumventing 

 

134 Ibid. 135 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 136 Ibid., p. 12. 137 Ibid., p. 15.
45

them,138 often with the creation of new realities (which are often 

contrived).

Third, besides Putin and his staff, who are the players in sistema? 

Pavlovsky writes that the team that put Putin into the Kremlin is still 

governing Russia with only minor adjustments. According to Pavlovsky, 

they have never told Putin “you can’t do that” and he does not consult 

them for strategic advice. At meetings Putin asks questions, they provide 

answers and there is no discussion.139 Putin has conducted two purges, 

however, of staff workers. The first occurred after he retook the 

presidency from Dmitry Medvedev in 2012, and the second occurred at 

the end of September 2016. 

Pavlovsky writes that very important players in Putin’s sistema

are “curators,” semiofficial figures “through whom state governance 

flows.”140 Curators are project managers and political bureaucrats who 

operate through personal agents under the authorization of the Kremlin. 

Most importantly, perhaps, is that the curator “is not responsible for his 

agents’ actions” and agents can be punished nearly at will. Curators are 

easier to set loose than to rein in,141 as lower level curators try to “outdo 

one another in their demonstrations of loyalty to Putin, with increasingly 

worrying results.”142 Curators serve as buffer zones from their agents’ 

actions and the Kremlin’s directives.

And what about Putin? Pavlovsky states that Putin and his staff 

are competent, especially Vladislav Surkov and his political strategy 

skills. Putin himself, due to his penchant for gambling and hypocritical 

nature, has encouraged, whether intentional or not, that the Russian state 

is his property. His decision-making appears rational and absent of 

eccentricity.143 His rise to the role of being the sole sovereign has taken 

place gradually. His state-sponsored elections are orchestrated to 

 

138 Ibid., pp. 16-17

139 Ibid., p. 12. 140 Ibid., p. 13. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid., p. 17. 143 Ibid., p. 10.
46

maintain his aura of legitimacy. The latter have also been developed over 

the years as Putin has attained charismatic authority, where legitimacy 

comes from people who believe in him.144

How does Putin apply sistema? From 2000 to 2012 the first 

version of Putin’s system, known as “managed democracy,” was in 

place. During this period, for wealthy players, when contracts, sales, or 

mergers reached a specific level they had to see Putin to explain their 

project. If Putin accepted their agreement it was “placed on deposit.” 

After 2012, however, Putin added another layer of uncertainty, noting 

that he is only “kept up to date with the situation.” As a result, visitors 

leave with a vague idea of what they are to do, trying to remember every 

word Putin said, as these are the only license for acting that they have.145

Pavlovsky noted the following:

Thus, ‘orders’ become ‘deals’; in Putin’s sistema, 

governance requires the temporary appropriation of the 

state regulator by groups of players. While participating 

in this game, a player may alternate his roles, moving 

from private entrepreneur to law enforcer, while 

continuing to benefit from the deals.146

Putin does not reveal his goals. His decision-making “has become almost 

purely reactive. It is based not on goals but rather on current threats.”147

Pavlovsky notes the following at the end of his discussion of 

sistema:

Putin’s Kremlin team has been extremely skillful at 

nationalizing private resources and, in a sense, privatizing 

Russian politics. But they will have no idea how to run 

 

144 Ibid., p. 16. 145 Ibid., p. 11. 146 Ibid., p. 14. 147 Ibid., p. 12.
47

Russia when Putin is gone...the only way he [a new ruler] 

will be able to rule is through sistema.

148

Pavlovsky has clearly been able to stay in touch with the sistema mode 

of thought. He may not, of course, know about any subtle changes to the 

system since his departure in 2011. Still, the architecture he describes is 

of interest to those outside the system. In many ways sistema appears to 

be a combination of political art, where groups of people and “players” 

are the regimes weaponry.

Conclusions

Cadre changes reflect Putin’s desire to keep a balance of forces 

among his security institutions in order to prevent one force from 

assuming primacy over another. Pavlovsky claims that the Kremlin uses 

a decision-making procedure known as sistema, which is built around the 

premise that the state should enjoy unlimited access to all national 

resources, public or private. Sistema works by keeping the country in a 

kind of permanent state of emergency, which is required, from the state’s 

perspective (real or contrived), to solve urgent state problems. 

It thus appears that a system is in place to serve as a Palace Guard

of sort for Putin’s rule. Analysts should be on the lookout for further 

changes to this complicated security system based on checks and 

balances of competing entities.

 

148 Ibid., p. 17.
48
49

CHAPTER THREE: MEDIA CONTROL VIA MANIPULATION

AND THE METHODOLOGY OF THE HALF-TRUTH

The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth—indeed, their 

disbelief in its existence—leads them to view all stated facts as 

instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another—George 

Kennan, 1946149

Introduction

Interestingly, Kennan’s observation about Russia’s leadership 

(and the instinct of its population to believe much of the TV 

programming to which it is subjected) once again is as true today as it 

was during the Soviet era. Changing narratives, manipulations of 

objective reality, and the use of the abject denial of specific events (and 

creation of alternate views of such events) continue to operate in two 

ways, internally and externally. Internally, the use of these techniques 

helps shore up faith in the government, which sees an existential threat to 

its rule everywhere and thus continually searches for support. As The 

Economist noted recently:

Unable to deliver economic growth, the Kremlin needs to

cook up reasons to keep the population in a constant state 

of mobilization against external threats. The way the 

propagandists tell it, Russia is surrounded by enemies and 

can only be defended by Mr. Putin. The past is reshaped 

to fit this story...the government has commissioned new 

history books...150

In that sense the mobilization of the population is no different than the 

way information is used to support sistema, as discussed in the preceding 

chapter. 

 

149 Special Report (insert), “Russia,” The Economist, 22 October 2016, p. 11. 150 No author provided, “The Battle for Russia’s History: Remember, Remember,” The 

Economist, 5 November 2016, p. 43.
50

Externally, Russia’s reality is forced on Western democracies in a 

different way through the exploitation of a democracy’s free press and 

open platform of discussion. Recently, the British Army ran a 

propaganda war game designed to test Russia’s peacetime information 

actions. They found out quickly that responses to Russian accusations 

were time consuming and nearly impossible to rebut. Verifying the 

situation proposed by Russia, drawing up a statement in response, and 

getting the wording approved by the Defense Ministry take hours or 

days. By that time not only has the Russian disinformation been spread 

widely on social media but also other accusations now take center stage. 

Even credible rebuttals receive little attention. Further, in regard to 

manipulating physical actions via the media, the war game proposed that 

when British soldiers are stationed in the Baltics a Russian-backed plot 

somehow could involve soldiers in brawls to discredit and undermine 

their presence.151 Perhaps these are some of the nonmilitary actions that 

Gerasimov proposes in Chapter Five below.

This chapter examines how Russia manipulates objective reality

and utilizes the methodology of the half-truth through the work of 

Russian media outlets. It is vital to point out, however, that it is “state” 

media that is referenced here as the culprit. There are still a few outlets 

in Russia for REAL objective reporting, and those voices require our 

continued respect and admiration. Retired Major General Oleg Kalugin, 

who was in charge of Soviet counterintelligence, indirectly 

complemented these journalists when he noted that “people who are well 

informed and get their information from different sources inevitably start 

thinking.”152

Manipulating Objective Reality

Perhaps one of the best discussions of how Russia manipulates 

the truth is Arkady Ostrovsky’s new book on the topic, The Invention of 

Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War. Ostrovsky is a 

 

151 Deborah Haynes, “War Game Proves UK is No Match for Russia in Propaganda 

Battle,” Times Online, 17 December 2016. 152 Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s 

War, Viking Press, 2015, p. 97.
51

Russian-born journalist who has written for the Financial Times and is 

currently the Russia and East European editor for The Economist. He has 

hundreds of contacts in Russia and used them well in the preparation of 

his book. It is a gripping tale of how reality is created and, when 

necessary, recreated to cover up problems or to reorient the population’s 

focus and help them forget problems at hand. 

In the book’s introduction Ostrovsky writes that Ukraine’s war 

with Russia, which was buoyed by Russia’s attempt to correct its Cold 

War losses and feeling of rejection by the West, unleashed a new reality 

that has corrupted Russia’s sense of decency and morality, turning 

“xenophobia and aggression into a norm and civility into an offense.”153

Related to this emotional construct are some of the last words spoken by 

Boris Nemtsov, the liberal politician who was gunned down in 2015 near 

the Kremlin. Just hours before his death he had stated that “Russia is 

quickly turning into a fascist state” with propaganda akin to Nazi 

Germany’s.154

Ostrovsky’s important book is thus about how Russia is using the

media to create a new internal and external reality for its citizens, its 

diaspora abroad, and liberal international media outlets. First, the media 

are creating a reality based on lies or replacing lies that were dismantled 

when the Soviet Union collapsed and lost its legitimacy. This required 

creating core values and reality out of things that did not exist. The new 

reality is harnessed with the power of TV to foster patriotism, 

collectivism, state power, and the primacy of the state in support of 

Putin. Second, main characters (ideologists, television executives, and 

editors in charge of the message and the media) “composed the storyline, 

produced and broadcast it, and in the process led the country from 

freedom to war.”155 The book, as a result, is the story of the “Russian 

brand” that these people invented. The words and images they produced 

concealed facts and invented an alternative reality supported by lies and 

 

153 Ibid., p. 2. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid., p. 6.
52

repressions. Today TV remains the medium that perpetuates Putin’s 

power and stirs hatred toward the West.

Ostrovsky notes several times that the “TV image is 

everything.”156 It has remained, from Soviet times to today, the primary 

way that Russian citizens acquire news. As Konstantin Ernst, the director 

of Channel One, noted: “Our psyche is set up in such a way that only an 

artistic form can explain the time we live in.”157 In regard to Ukraine, 

Ostrovsky writes that without Russian TV, the war in Ukraine would not 

have started.158 TV works like a psychoactive agent, a hallucinogen that 

does not just distort reality but invents it.159 The media and TV are 

driven by the methodology of the half-truth, which is based on the 

concept that there is no such thing as “truth,” just objective reality as 

created by the Kremlin. For this reason Ostrovsky even has an entry 

under “media’ in his index of “invents reality.”160

Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s political advisor, is, in Ostrovsky’s 

words, a master of manipulations and simulacra. When things do not go 

Russia’s way, an illusion of change is created, a new narrative 

developed, and a new reality created.161 Russia is thus continually 

reinvented to fit Putin’s latest response to sanctions, doping charges, or 

some other humiliation. With regard to Ukraine, one of the welldocumented creations of reality occurred on July 12, 2014, when 

Channel One interviewed a Ukrainian woman who told a heartwrenching story:

The woman said she had witnessed the public execution 

of a three-year-old boy, who was crucified in the crowded 

main square of Slavyansk when Ukrainian forces retook 

it. She provided the gory details: the Ukrainian 

‘animals’...cut into the little boy’s flesh and made him 

 

156 Ibid. See, for example, p. 87. 157 Ibid., p. 319. 158 Ibid., p. 318.

159 Ibid., p. 319. 160 Ibid., p. 365. 161 Ibid., p. 309.
53

suffer for an hour before he died. The woman added that 

the boy’s mother was then tied to a tank and dragged 

along until she too was dead.162

Ostrovsky noted that this totally fabricated story aroused hatred among 

the populace, as did the use of stories to inflame Jewish pogroms in 

prerevolutionary Russia. The point of such an information war is to draw 

the civilian population into the conflict.

Putin, of course, has either guided this effort or been guided 

himself by the characters mentioned above. He and his ensemble of 

propagandists work from the idea that the West betrayed Russia and is 

continuously trying to surround it. He believes that America’s policy is 

based on “arrogance, exceptionalism, and impunity”163 (it is hard to find 

three words that better fit Russia’s leadership, but that is a debate for 

another time). Media executives, among them several oligarchs or 

bureaucrat-entrepreneurs who initially controlled television stations and 

thus internal propaganda, fought for Putin’s attention, usually through 

expressions of extreme loyalty to him. Their media empires gradually 

eroded as Putin came to realize that media control is a prerequisite for 

power in Russia. 

This conviction has resulted in state control over TV stations 

such as NTV. Putin has rejected Yeltsin’s federalism and stolen political 

independence, Ostrovsky writes.164 Incredibly, Putin continues to feel 

insecure in his position, it seems, and thus is continually obsessed with 

thwarting any chance for a “color revolution” to occur in Russia, 

preventing Russia’s encirclement by other nations, and a constant need 

for internal protection, as witnessed by his recent creation of a 340,000-

man national guard.

In July 2016 this obsession with security was expressed in 

another way, this time via a State Duma Deputy’s recommendation to 

 

162 Ibid. p. 319. 163 Ibid., p. 324. 164 Ibid., p. 326.
54

impose a ban on the distribution in Russia of Pokemon Go, a popular 

mobile game, which, the deputy noted, could be involved in espionage or 

even terror attacks. This would be accomplished through the transfer of 

photographic or video recordings on the mobile device of facilities and 

areas in Russia (which indicates Pokemon Go is more of a security risk 

than drone or satellite images). Communist Party member Denis 

Voronenkov noted the following:

It is common knowledge that the structures responsible 

for psychological warfare in the United States are 

attempting to create by means of video games a future 

war pattern suitable for Washington’s goals and purposes 

to the fullest extent, a high-technology and cutting-edge 

‘war of the 21st century,’ a war in an American way.165

`

A recent report from the US Center for Strategic and 

International Studies and the Bulgarian-based Center for the Study of 

Democracy was titled “The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian 

Influence in Eastern and Central Europe.” While the study did not focus 

on the manipulation of objective reality (as Ostrovsky did), it noted that 

Russia is employing covert economic and political measures to 

manipulate countries and discredit democratic models. Hostile activities 

attributed to Russia include bribery, propaganda, disinformation, and use 

of the Internet to undermine opponents and institutions.166

Late in 2016, Liz Wahl, a former Russia Today (RT) presenter, 

was interviewed at EurActiv.com. She noted that the ultimate aim of 

Russia’s media disinformation machine is to destabilize the West. Since 

RT constantly criticizes everything American, it becomes a 

psychological echo chamber. She noted that RT creates false equivalence 

and pushes the idea that there is only perspective, not objective truth. She 

rejects the RT’s relativist point of view, which, in her opinion, has 

become shameless in its bid to create chaos, confusion, and division. 

When it comes to stories about Russia, RT offers a surge of 

 

165 Interfax (in English), 20 July 2016. 166 No author or title provided, EurActiv.com (in English), 13 October 2016. 
55

unsubstantiated information and false conspiracy theories. Wahl 

concludes that there is a fundamental difference between opinion and a 

manipulation of facts.167

The Methodology of the Half-Truth

Russia has constructed a methodology, which appears to involve 

five steps, to discredit an opponent’s assertions about its actions. It is not 

used in all instances, however. When an event happens (the downing of 

MH17, for example) the initial response is to (1) deny guilt and 

involvement and to immediately (2) begin creating evidence of another 

side’s involvement. This involves finding elements of another nation’s 

forces or assets in the area or simply fabricating their existence. Next, (3) 

reasons for the other side’s forces being in the area are developed, that is, 

why they would have taken part in the action under consideration. 

In the MH17 case, Russia made a spectacle of the event, with 

most emphasis on (2) above, i.e. creating other versions of what 

happened. The Russians offered three or four versions of events, hoping 

that one would catch fire and be taken as truth by the international 

community. Meanwhile, the Western account of what happened stayed 

the same from the very beginning of the assessment. The guilty party 

was identified and the story line leading to the party’s identification was 

clear and based on several layers of analysis by the international 

community. Russia had earlier shot down Ukrainian military transport 

planes and, when radar picked up an airliner, troops on the ground 

assumed it was another Ukrainian military airliner. The plane was 

followed and shot down, and Russians in the area celebrated the action. 

Even radio intercepts at the time indicted the Russian air crew. When it 

was apparent that this was a civilian airliner, the air waves went silent. 

There were photos of the Buk air defense system that shot at the plane 

departing the area minus one missile. All evidence pointed to Russian 

and surrogate involvement.

Over the coming months, several alternative scenarios were 

 

167 Karolina Zbytniewska interview with Lis Wahl, no title, EurActiv.com (in English), 

22 December 2016.
56

presented by Russia as to what had occurred. When the final report by 

independent observers had been prepared, Russia tried yet again to 

preempt the report by offering literally the day before the report’s release 

a new version of what had occurred, even though it had over two years to 

prepare and offer such a report. The Netherlands version included video 

evidence that was, in the end, irrefutable. To date, the Russians still have

not accepted the report’s conclusions. They will most likely try to 

manipulate these findings yet again for their own purposes.

In the meantime, Russia takes the findings of other nations or the 

international community and will (4) state that these are merely 

information attacks against Russia. These attack accusations are 

accompanied with a statement from Russia that the reason for the attacks 

is that events, in the case of an accusation from the US, are “not 

unfolding according to the US’s scenario.” It then follows that there will 

be (5) pleas that the other side exhibit “common sense” and end its tone 

and rhetoric, with the added statement that Russia is “detached from 

unnecessary emotion.” Meanwhile, Russian citizens are denied access to 

much of the countervailing information. It is also important to note that 

the five-step methodology usually does not work with cyber events, as 

the accusing side rarely wants to provide the perpetrator with evidence 

that gives away sources and means.

A more recent example of covering up or using parts of the big 

half-truth (or “lie”) is the recent Olympic doping scandal that rocked 

Russia. Its athletes in Sochi in 2014 and elsewhere since 2011 were 

found to have been using performance-enhancing drugs that were 

covered up during urinalysis. It took many months for the Russian sports 

authorities to admit to this charge, but in mid-December 2016 they 

finally did. However, the same authorities added that the reason Russian 

athletes used such drugs was because there was worldwide use of them 

during the Olympics and the Russian athletes were only trying to level 

the playing field. Of interest, of course, is that, according to this 

scenario, there should have been many athletes from other nations caught 

in the doping net, but such charges simply have not appeared. 

Internal warnings are another thing, however, and something to 

which the population pays special attention. Russian citizens are never 
57

told the rationale behind some of the warnings, meaning that not only is 

no alternate information offered but also no information on the current 

dilemma at hand. With no other source of data, Kremlin directed 

developments are bound to catch on with the populace since there is no 

other rebuttal source. Take, for example, the October mobilization 

development of various sectors of the economy for no apparent reason. 

On 10 October 2016 the Saint Petersburg governor authorized storing 

enough grain to provide 300 grams (two-thirds of a pound) of bread per 

resident for 20 days, which resonates in a city that endured a 900-day 

siege by Germans in World War II. The next day Parliament and 

government officials with relatives abroad were informed to bring them 

back to Russia immediately. Fliers were spread asking residents in a 

Moscow district to contribute money to hasten construction of a bomb 

shelter in case of nuclear aggression.168 Two weeks later civil defense 

plans were dusted off, with 40 million people, i.e., more than one-fourth 

of the population, rehearsing responses to chemical and nuclear threats. 

Some businessmen offered to build nuclear bunkers for private citizens, 

starting at $24,000, which would house a family of four for only up to 

eight hours.169

Was this a way to distract citizens from economic hardships, to 

intimidate the West, or both? The problem is that the falsification of 

reality in ways such as this to manipulate fears cannot always be 

controlled. It can result in catastrophic miscalculations for both 

perpetrators and recipients. This is especially so when RT head Dmitry 

Kiselev threatens the West with nuclear weapons, when ultranationist 

Vladimir Zhirinovsky notes that if Hillary Clinton was elected, World 

War III would follow,

170 or a recent Russian weather reporter who had a 

screen behind him that showed a nuclear blast over Omaha, Nebraska.

As one analyst noted about these nuclear and world war references

 

168 Michael Khodarkovsky, “Playing with Fear: Russia’s War Card,” The New York 

Times International Edition, 27 October 2016, p. 15.

169 Thomas Grove, “In Russia, Cold War Is Hot,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 

2016, p. A9.

170 Khodarkovsky.
58

But a nuclear-armed world is no sandbox, and budding 

war hysteria in a huge country afflicted with imperial 

nostalgia, one-man rule, a looming demographic crisis, 

ethnic tensions, and a declining oil-dependent economy 

cannot be dismissed lightly...Russia’s military and its 

nuclear arsenal remain the only aces in Mr. Putin’s hand. 

So the Kremlin can be expected to continue escalating its 

disinformation and propaganda.171

Russian Social Media and Those Cyber Attacks

There are numerous social media sites in Russia, and several 

clearly have a manipulative flavor. According to a US source, two of 

them that were especially provocative during the US elections are 

“Katehon” and “Just Trump It.” The former is a right-wing Christian 

think tank aligned with Putin. At one time during the election campaign 

it circulated anti-Clinton conspiracies, such as a purported Clinton link to 

mysterious murders. The latter website is linked to the International 

Russian Conservative Forum, composed of far-right leaders from St. 

Petersburg. A greater fear is that these two sites and others like them 

could merge Russian interests with far-right agitators in the US and 

Europe. The result is an “amplification” effect of these obscure voices 

and distorted messages that enables them to present their views to a 

credulous, young Internet audience. Sometimes their messages become 

mainstream. Russia is quite adept at spreading propaganda through such 

proxies.172

With regard to Russian cyber-attacks, this is a phenomenon that 

has taken place over the past decade in numerous nations around the 

world. Germany, Sweden, Lithuania, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Georgia, 

Ukraine, France, and Denmark are but a few of the countries that have 

directly blamed Russia for attacks on their systems. Scott Borg, President 

of the US Cyber Consequences Unit, notes that Russia has tried to 

influence local elections in three or four eastern European counties as 

 

171 Ibid. 172 Mike McIntire, “How Putin Fan Pushed Trump From Overseas,” The New York 

Times, 18 December 2016, p. 25.
59

well as Germany. A member of the German Council of Foreign 

Relations noted that the Russians tailor the attacks to the circumstances 

of each country.173 And such incursions have been going on even longer 

against the US, since at least the mid-1990s.

It was the alleged (by US intelligence agencies) Russian cyberattacks against the Democratic National Committee (DNC) that have 

garnered the most news over the past several months. President Obama, 

at his traditional year-end news conference, implicated Putin in the 

attacks, noting that not much happens without Putin’s permission in 

Russia and that these attacks happened at the highest levels of the 

Russian government. On 29 December the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a document 

known as Grizzly Steppe, which outlined Russia’s malicious cyber 

activities. The report noted:

This document provides technical details regarding the 

tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and 

military intelligence services to compromise and exploit 

networks and endpoints associated with the US election, 

as well as a range of US Government, political, and 

private sector entities.174

Russia has worked to disrupt elections and undermine democratic 

values not just in the US but in several European countries as well. A 

New York Times (NYT) report stated that, with regard to the US, what 

began as an information-gathering operation eventually turned into an 

attempt to harm one candidate (Hillary Clinton) and leave the other 

candidate alone. Private e-mails and confidential documents appeared 

online day after day. Some leading democrats resigned over the releases 

while others were simply silenced by revelations. The crux of the issue 

became this: did Russia move beyond espionage and instead deliberately 

 

173 Robert Windrem, “Timeline: Ten years of Russian Cyber Attacks on Other 

Nations,” downloaded from http://www.nbcnews.com/pages on 27 December 2016. 174 “GRISSLY STEPPE—Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,” Joint Analysis Report, 

29 December 2016, p. 1.
60

try to subvert American democracy by manipulating public opinion and 

thus help influence votes and thereby the winner of the election?

Admiral Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, 

noted that “this was a conscious effort by a nation-state to attempt to 

achieve a specific effect.”175

Investigators of the DNC hacking included the CrowdStrike 

security firm, which recognized the work of two advanced persistent 

threat (APT) groups from Russia: Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear. The 

former, the NYT’s article noted, may be associated with the Russian 

Federal Security Service (FSB) and the latter with the military’s Main 

Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The concern, however, was that the 

activity had transferred from espionage to political sabotage. An 

operative named Guccifer 2.0, who CrowdStrike believed administered a 

Russian-run site, released the DNC’s battle plan and budget for 

countering the Republican National Convention. 

Later, as Guccifer had promised, WikiLeaks dumped 44,000 or so 

private DNC e-mails (with attachments) and those of Hillary Clinton into 

the public domain just before the Democratic National Convention. 

WikiLeaks thus became an even bigger problem than Guccifer. Some of 

the e-mails infuriated Bernie Sanders, Clinton’s opponent at the time. 

WikiLeaks continued to release e-mails day after day over the last month 

of the campaign:176

They disclosed the contents of Mrs. Clinton’s speeches to 

large banks, which she had refused to release. They 

exposed tensions inside the campaign, including 

disagreements over donations to the Clinton Foundation 

that staff member thought might look bad for the 

candidate and Ms. Tanden’s [a key Clinton supporter] 

complaint that Mrs. Clinton’s instincts were 

 

175 Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger, and Scott Shane, “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian 

Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.,” downloaded 14 December 2016 at 

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-... 176 Ibid.
61

‘suboptimal.’177

With the focus solely on the DNC and Clinton, whom Putin does 

not like, and with the lack of attacks against Republicans, there appeared 

to be the intent to damage the credibility of one of the contestants in the 

US Presidential race. However, the Wall Street Journal in midDecember reported that the Republican National Committee thwarted the 

same Russian hackers who penetrated the DNC. However, the effort was 

less aggressive, as only a single e-mail account linked to a departed 

staffer was targeted. The CIA, the report notes, believed the Russian 

hackers intended to harm the Clinton candidacy and boost Donald 

Trump’s chances.178

In early January the declassified report became available. It said 

that US intelligence concluded that the Russian government wanted to 

undermine public faith in the US democratic process and denigrate 

Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. The intelligence agencies have 

“high confidence in their judgments.”179 The agencies also noted that the 

Russian operation was only the most recent in a long-standing desire to 

undermine liberal democracies.180 In the past, Russian involvement has 

been documented in the Ukrainian elections, and both the German and 

French governments have warned voters about such occurrences as they 

ready for elections in 2017.

Conclusion

This chapter focused initially on how Russia forces its version of 

reality on Western democracies through the exploitation of a 

democracy’s free press and open platform of discussion. The West’s 

attempts to verify situations proposed by Russia and draw up a statement 

in response (and getting the wording approved) can take hours or even 

 

177 Ibid. 178 Shane Harris, Devlin Barrett, and Julian E. Barnes, “RNC Security Foiled Russian 

Hackers,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 December 2016, pp. A1, A5.

179 Shane Harris, Damian Paletta, and Carol E. Lee, “Putin Ordered Hacking, Spies 

Say,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7-8, 2017. 180 Ibid.
62

days. By that time not only has the Russian disinformation been spread 

widely on social media, but also other accusations now take center stage. 

Even credible rebuttals receive little attention. 

Russia continues to mobilize the population through explanations 

of conspiracies and external threats to the nation’s survival. In most 

cases Russian propagandists exploit the use of perspective over truth. 

Russia’s media presentations around the world on Sputnik or Russia 

Today are clear attempts at manipulating audiences with their version of 

objective reality, which may, in fact, differ tremendously from that of 

democratic nations. Further, Russia has learned to deflect criticism of its 

own failures with what was described as the methodology of the halftruth, a method that often follows familiar steps. When Russia does 

admit to a wrong, it then attempts to cover that “mistake” up by stating 

that others do the same and Russia is only trying to “level the playing 

field.” 

Russia has become expert at using social media to influence 

events. This is often accomplished through the use of trolls or other 

surrogates to enhance the Russian perspective and exploit the free press 

of open democracies. 

Finally, it is important to note that Russia attempted to put many 

resources together during the last US presidential election. It was able to 

influence voters, some believe, with a deluge of negative information 

about one of the candidates. Democracies worldwide must be on the 

lookout for such techniques as they move nearer to their next electoral 

process.

The warning is quite clear. Democratic constituencies must 

remain very skeptical about news reports from Russian sources in 

particular. They bank on persuading with perspective and not the truth. 

Mental barriers to such input must be developed for both citizens and 

governments to recognize the methodology of the construction of an 

objective reality that is based on fake news or facts taken out of context.
63

CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN CONTROLS OVER NATIONAL 

AND INFORMATION SECURITY: STRATEGIES, DOCTRINE, 

CONCEPTS

Introduction

In 2016 new strategies, doctrines, and policies appeared in 

Russia. On the final day of 2015 President Vladimir Putin approved the 

nation’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). The strategy is important 

for it offers the basic roadmap of interests that appear to drive Russia’s 

political and military leaders in their quest for stability and, in the 

Russian lexicon, equal security. Without knowledge of this strategic 

overview, it is much harder to visualize where Russia’s priorities lie in 

its geopolitical quests to right what Russian President Vladimir Putin 

describes as not only a “wrong” but the greatest geopolitical tragedy in 

the history of the world, the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Other documents were prepared and published or discussed as 

2016 progressed. First, a new Information Security Doctrine (ISD) was 

published, designed to supersede the 2000 version. The new ISD

discusses national interests in the information sphere, a host of 

associated terms, information threats to Russia, and strategic goals to 

ensure information security.

Next, Putin signed decrees in regard to a new Science and 

Technology Development Strategy (STDS) and a new Concept of Russian

Foreign Policy (CRFP). To date, the actual text of the latter two have not 

been published; thus, they will not be discussed in the same detail as the 

NSS and the ISD. 

There is another important distinction to point out in regard to the 

understanding of the word “doctrine” in the US and Russian lexicons. In 

Russian, doctrine is the equivalent to the US concept of policy. The US 

term “doctrine” is equivalent to the Russian term military art. Thus, the 

Russian ISD is equivalent to an information security policy in US 

terminology.
64

As 2017 unfolds, it is important to stress that Putin has developed 

strategies, doctrines, and policies that serve as control agents over 

planning processes for his military and security agencies. He stated that 

“it is necessary to closely monitor any changes in the balance of power 

and the military-political situation in the world...”181 He also added in 

late 2016 that “Russia’s new ISD was approved; and a bit earlier, a 

STDS. The guidelines they set concern all bodies of power, including 

military and security agencies.”182 At year’s end he also highlighted the 

nation’s security and military achievements (especially weapon 

improvements) during the year and laid out tasks for Russia’s defense 

establishment.

For Putin, developing new weaponry was closely tied to 

equalizing Russia’s balance of power with the West. In November 2016 

he stated that he will use modern technology (lasers, hypersonic 

weapons, robotics, and weapons based on new physical principles) to 

maintain the strategic balance of forces in the world. Such technological 

improvements and new developments are enabling him to shape the 

environment by neutralizing the military threats he enumerated that are 

aimed at Russia, such as information wars, strategic missile defenses, 

and global strike concepts.183 He has responded with strategic 

deployments of Iskander-M short-range ballistic and cruise missiles 

systems, Kaliber missiles, and Bal air defense systems in Kaliningrad, 

Crimea, and other areas. The intent of such weaponry is to deter potential 

enemies in important areas of Europe. The possession of unique 

technologies allows Putin to believe he maintains control over Russian 

sovereignty. Meanwhile, almost out of the public focus due to tensions in 

Europe, Russian forces continue to further militarize the Arctic. 

Putin longs to promote the interests of Russian companies on 

global markets. This is accomplished by creating favorable conditions 

for the development of non-resource exports and protecting products 

 

181 Rossiya 24 Television, 22 December 2016. 182 Ibid. 183 Rossiya 24 Television, 18 November 2016.
65

from unfair competition.184 He thus continues to shape the environment 

in pursuit of national interests, whether it be protecting energy deposits 

or attempting to threaten neighbors into submission with weapon 

deployments. Again, the purpose of strategic stability and equal security 

is to establish control over the environment.

This chapter will examine how Russian aims to control its 

external and internal security environments through the documents listed 

above.

The NSS: What Should be Followed Closely?

The NSS analysis below focuses on two very different elements 

of the strategy. The first issue is merely statistical. It examines the 

number of times specific verbs and nouns are used to describe the 

content of the NSS. Verbs such as creates, shapes, defines, focuses, 

blames, and worries and nouns like interests, priorities, stability, threats, 

goals, and struggles dot the strategy, and refer to both international and 

domestic issues. They help indicate where emphasis is placed and how 

serious it is. Verbs indicate potential confrontation (the word “struggles” 

is highlighted for this case), and nouns such as “threats” do the same. 

The second, and much lengthier, issue examined in the NSS is the 

concerns expressed in the document. Two items stand out: first, Russian 

concern over internal stability, which coincides with an authoritarian 

regime’s tendency to be insecure and search out existential threats to the 

regime; and second, Russia’s attempts and abilities to persuade and 

threaten in order to shape the environment in pursuit of its national 

interests and make Russia greater than it already is. 

Putin’s strategic desires, as expressed in the strategy, appear to 

have been followed. In March and November 2016 Putin’s actions, and

statements by others on Russian TV, indicated positive 

accomplishments. One March report encapsulated a Putin NSS worry as 

follows: “The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes, and 

inciting domestic instability and conflicts is becoming increasingly 

 

184 Interfax (in English), 7 December 2016.
66

widespread.”185 This worry over internal threats apparently had finally 

manifested itself completely after the events in Ukraine, which motivated 

Putin to address issues discussed at length in Chapters One and Two, his 

development of a National Guard and his cadre changes, both designed 

to ensure loyalty and stability. 

The NSS is defined as 

The basic strategic planning document defining the 

Russian Federation's national interests and strategic 

national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the 

sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at 

strengthening the Russian Federation’s national security 

and ensuring the country's sustainable development in the 

long term.

186

It consolidates the efforts of the organs of state power, and is the basis 

for shaping and implementing state policy. Understanding Russia’s 

national interests and priorities helps visualize where political and 

military emphases will be placed to establish control over the 

environment in the coming years.

Nowhere in the document is the term strategy actually defined, so 

its definition is left to the discretion of the reader as to the source he 

chooses to define strategy. Of the terms “indirect,” “asymmetric,” and 

“nonmilitary,” which the Russians use to describe their military theory 

and actions, the document only used indirect and nonmilitary, offering 

each only once. The more often referenced US terms for Russian military 

actions, such as “hybrid” and “new generation” were not used, and 

neither was the Russian term “new type” for describing future war 

templates.

 

185 Velimir Razuvayev, “Second Wave of Chekists Come to Power -- Kremlin Finishing 

Building Power Vertical to Govern Country,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online’ 4 March 

2016. 186 “The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy,” President of Russia website, 

31 December 2015.
67

However, other terms were used quite often. “National,” “state,”

“security,” and some form of the word “develop” were each used over 

100 times. Some form of the term “economy” was used 97 times, 

“organ” 79 times, “formation” 54 times, and “military” 52 times. Some 

form of “create” (ing, ed, tion, etc.) and “implement” were used 37 times 

each, “information” 36 times, “stability” 35 times, “threat” and 

“strategy” 24 times each, “power” and “culture” 23 times each, “law” 22 

times, some form of “equal,” “moral,” and “values” 14 times each, and 

“priority” 13 times.187 Of course this assumes that the same word was 

used each time in the translation. For example, the Russian for “moral” 

could have been “moral’nyi” or “dukhovn’y” or “nravstvenn’y.”188

There was one word and one concept of special interest. The NSS

used the word “struggle” on two occasions, but the sentences containing 

the word may be among the most important in the document. “Struggle”

indicates an active confrontation among various factors for control, 

where East meets West. There is a struggle underway, the NSS notes, for 

resources, access to markets, and control over transportation arteries. 

There is also a struggle for influence in the international arena, which 

includes the use of political, financial-economic, and information 

instruments. 

The concept of “special interest” is the “indicators for evaluating 

the state of national security,” factors that will purportedly allow Russian 

security officials to know if the NSS is being fulfilled. Thus, the struggles 

(resources, markets, transport arteries) and indicators should be followed 

closely over the coming years.

 

187 When a statement in the strategy appears off base (or statements in the ISD

document), brackets follow the statement with this author’s short counter explanation or 

description of what was omitted from the Russian contention. As an example, while 

Russia states it wants to ensure strategic stability, the phrase is followed by this type of 

reference: [in Ukraine, Russian actions have done the opposite, exacerbating and 

weakening strategic stability]. Sentences/words not in brackets are taken directly from 

the NSS. Some words are placed in bold just to help the reader focus on what is 

important.

188 Example offered by Dr. Harold Orenstein.
68

The sections that follow will describe in more detail some 

important concepts found in the NSS. First, the Russian Federation’s 

objective is defined in the document as the attempt to acquire as many 

equal partners as possible in various parts of the world. Goals include 

national defense goals, which are defined as the creation of conditions to 

develop and ensure military security. According to the document, goals

are achieved by implementing military policy through strategic 

deterrence, preventing armed conflict, improving military organizations 

and forms and methods for armed force deployments, and increasing 

mobilization readiness. Second, strategic deterrence is noted to be the 

result of interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, 

economic, information, and other measures, to include maintaining the 

capacity for nuclear deterrence. Strategic interests and priorities, values, 

and future partners are also highlighted below, along with numerous 

threats to national security.

Concerns and Warnings: The National Security Strategy

The NSS aims to create favorable internal and external conditions 

for realizing national interests and strategic national priorities [this is 

perhaps its overarching goal]. It is stated to be the basis for shaping and 

implementing policy, and is based on the interconnection between 

national security and the country’s socio-economic development. 

Western analysts should be on the lookout for the conditions that Russia

is trying to create.

The main concept found in the NSS is to protect the individual, 

society, and the state against internal and external threats. National 

security includes the country’s defense and all types of security (state, 

public, information, environmental, economic, transportation, energy, 

and individual). Russia wants to protect the rights of compatriots abroad 

[this was discussed twice in the NSS] and resolve and settle international 

problems and ensure strategic stability [in Ukraine, they have done the 

opposite, exacerbating problems]. The rising generation is being fed 

values that shape a proper attitude toward Russia’s history [a history that 

has been rewritten by today’s authorities]. Western analysts should be on 

the lookout for ways Russia’s military and political leaders look to 

enhance strategic stability.
69

The NSS notes that the US and its allies are trying to contain 

Russia via political, economic, military and information pressure. In the 

meantime there is a struggle underway for resources, access to markets, 

and control over transportation arteries. There is also a struggle for

influence in the international arena, which includes the use of political, 

financial-economic, and information instruments. Russia, on the other 

hand, is offering its leadership in exploiting Arctic resources [by 

militarizing the Arctic]. The principles of equal and indivisible security 

are not being observed [there were four mentions of the equal security 

concept; the Soviet-era term “equal security” has now returned to the 

lexicon. It envisions equal security as, for example, the placement of 

weaponry in Cuba to offset proposed missiles in Poland. If both sides are 

threatened with deployments, then equal security exists according to this 

line of thought].

Russia worries about the militarization and arms-race processes 

developing in regions adjacent to Russia [even though Russia has 

blatantly militarized the Arctic and caused Western/NATO responses to 

Russian actions in Ukraine]. NATO’s buildup is a threat to Russian 

national security, the strategy notes. The document adds that stability 

opportunities are shrinking due to US missile defense systems that are 

implementing the “global strike” concept, and to deployments of 

strategic nonnuclear precision weapons systems and weapons that could 

be deployed in space. The US has used a persistent block approach in 

international relations with the EU and NATO [no mention is made of 

Russia’s block approach, such as its advancement of the Eurasian 

Economic Union in 2013 to lure Yanukovich away from the EU, the 

formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or the BRICS

partnership]. The West has tried to counter integration processes and has 

created seats of tension in the Eurasian region [Russia has created its 

own seats of tension in the region, including instability in the Baltics, 

whose countries feel they could be next on Russia’s intervention list.]. 

The NSS blames others for overthrowing legitimate political 

regimes and provoking instability [Russia ignores that it attempted to 

lure Yanukovich away from the EU and offered fixed elections in 

Crimea and at home]. Russia writes that migration flows demonstrate the 

non-viability of regional security systems. Some countries aspire to 
70

information and communication technologies to achieve geopolitical 

objectives, sometimes unlawfully, by manipulating public awareness and 

falsifying history [no one has manipulated the media recently more than 

Russia, rendering its own objective reality through the rewriting of 

history books]. Stability is weakened by financial, trade, investment, and 

technological policies of others that aim to resolve geopolitical tasks. 

Russia is focusing efforts on strengthening its internal unity. 

The document lists the following strategic interests: 

strengthening the country’s defense and national accord and ensuring the 

inviolability of the Russian Federation’s (RF) constitutional order 

[except when Putin changes it for him to remain as president]; raising 

living standards; preserving and developing culture and moral values; 

increasing economic competitiveness; and consolidating the RF’s status 

as a leading world power. Strategic national priorities include: national 

defense, state, and public security; economic growth; science, 

technology, and education; healthcare and culture; ecology; and strategic 

stability and equal strategic partnership. National defense goals are to 

create conditions for development and ensure military security. Goals

are achieved by implementing military policy through strategic 

deterrence, preventing armed conflict, improving military organization 

and forms and methods for armed force deployment, and increasing 

mobilization readiness. Strategic deterrence is the result of interrelated 

political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information, 

and other measures, such as maintaining the capacity for nuclear 

deterrence. Military organization is to be improved though identifying 

existing and potential military risks and threats. The nature of modern 

war is studied. National defense is based on rational sufficiency and 

effectiveness, to include responses that use nonmilitary methods and 

means, peacekeeping and diplomatic mechanisms, military-technical 

cooperation, and arms control and legal instruments. 

The NSS states that some countries aspire to utilize information

and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, 

including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history [still 

used extensively by Russia’s media and hackers, to include attempts to 

sway public opinion during the US presidential election]. Threats to 

state and public security are foreign state intelligence services, the 
71

activities of terrorist and extremist organizations, radical public 

associations [which include nongovernmental organizations] that incite 

color revolutions, criminal organizations, and information and 

communication technologies that disseminate the ideology of fascism, 

criminal offenses, corruption, and national disasters. An increase in the 

effectiveness of oversight bodies is desired, as well as the eradication of 

conditions and causes of corruption [ironic, considering the extent of 

corruption in Russia, to include the arrest of Russia’s economic minister 

for corruption]. 

The system for identifying and analyzing threats to the 

information sphere is being improved [which could include limiting the 

type of information Russian citizens receive]; protection of citizens from 

extremist, foreign special services, and propaganda structures is being 

increased; and technical support for law enforcement agencies is 

improving [better System of Operational Investigative Measures 

(SORM) equipment, a domestic deterrence issue based on appearing to 

care for the population while systematically watching their every move 

on the Internet]. “Quality of life” strategic objectives include developing 

human potential, satisfying material, social, and spiritual needs, and 

reducing social and property inequality. 

Economic threats to Russia include eleven points of concern: 

low competitiveness; dependence on external economic circumstances; 

the lagging development of future technologies; lack of protection for the 

financial system against foreign capital speculation; information 

infrastructure vulnerabilities; imbalances in the national budget system 

and the deterioration of the state’s raw-materials base; reduction in the 

extraction of strategically important minerals; labor shortages; corruption 

and criminalization; and restrictive economic measures imposed on the 

RF. Provisions must be made for ensuring stability of the 

macroeconomic situation; increasing state management’s efficiency; 

strengthening the financial system; ensuring a balance in the budget 

system; increasing the attractiveness of Russian jurisdiction; reducing 

critical dependence on foreign technologies; developing high-tech 

sectors and the defense industry complex; creating strategic reserves of 

mineral and raw-material resources; forming a single transport space; 

widening the use of state-private partnership instruments, such as in the 
72

Arctic; stimulating the development of small and medium-sized 

business; reducing informal employment; ensuring the balance of 

interests of the indigenous population and migrant workers; and 

developing more international business contacts and attracting foreign 

technologies [this is the opposite of what was stated earlier]. 

In the science and technology (S&T) sphere it is important to 

develop scientific potential; develop a national innovation system; form 

a system of basic and applied scientific research; develop promising high 

technologies (genetic engineering, robotic engineering, biological, 

information, communications, cognitive technologies, and 

nanotechnologies); ensure Russia’s leading positions in the spheres of 

basic math, physics, chemistry, biology, technical sciences, and 

humanitarian and social sciences; and enhance education with traditional 

Russian spiritual-moral and cultural-historical values. One threat to 

national security in the sphere of protecting citizens’ health is to limit the 

availability of psychoactive and psychotropic substances for illegal 

consumption. The NSS notes that “the network of US military-biological 

laboratories on the territory of states adjacent to Russia is being 

expanded.” 

Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values include the priority 

of the spiritual over the material, the protection of human life and rights 

and freedoms, and other factors (family, service to the homeland, etc.). 

Threats to national security include the erosion of these traditional 

spiritual and moral values, a propaganda of permissiveness and violence, 

racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, attempts to falsify Russian and 

world history, and encroachments upon cultural objects. Culture is 

strengthened by taking measures to protect Russian society against an 

outside influence from ideologies, values, and destructive information 

and psychological impacts on Russia; implementing control in the 

information sphere; and preventing the spread of extremist products, 

propaganda of violence, and racial, religious, and interethnic intolerance. 

Creating a state order for Internet resources and other information outlets 

is required.

Foreign policy relies on international law and the principles of 

equality and noninterference in states’ internal affairs. Long-term steady 
73

development to ensure strategic stability includes freeing the world of 

nuclear weapons, strengthening universal reliable and equal security, and 

other factors that influence global strategic stability. Strategic 

cooperation with the People’s Republic of China is a key factor in 

maintaining global and regional stability, and India is also playing an 

important role. The RF states it is interested in a full-fledged partnership 

with the US on the “basis of coincident interests.” This involves 

economics, arms control measures, the nonproliferation of nuclear 

weapons, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and settlement of

regional conflicts. Also of interest is developing equal and mutually 

“beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic.”

Strategic stability for the RF is fostered under the following 

circumstances: preserving the stability of the system of international law; 

honoring international arms limitation treaties; preparing for a reduction 

of nuclear potentials; contributing to the strengthening of regional 

stability through participating in the reduction and limitation of 

conventional armed forces; considering peacekeeping as a way to settle 

armed conflicts; contributing to the formation of an international 

information security system; and participating in UN activities to 

alleviate disasters. The RF wants to develop relations with NATO based 

on equality in order to strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 

The RF finds NATO’s increased activity toward Russia’s borders and the 

building of a missile-defense system unacceptable. 

The NSS is executed on a planned basis and makes 

comprehensive use of political, organizational, socio-economic, legal, 

information, military, special, and other actions developed as part of 

strategic planning. With regard to information, the following was 

highlighted:

The information basis for implementing this Strategy is 

provided by the federal strategic planning information 

system, which incorporates the information resources of 

organs of state power and local self-government, and also 

by the systems of distributed situation centers and state 

scientific organizations. In implementing this Strategy, 

particular attention shall be paid to ensuring information 
74

security in light of strategic national priorities. The RF 

Security Council has a coordinating role in the 

information and information-analytical support for the 

implementation of this Strategy and also in its amendment 

once every six years...

Indicators for evaluating the state of national security are the 

citizens’ degree of satisfaction with the protection of their rights and 

freedoms; the proportion of modern models of arms and military and 

special equipment; life expectancy; per capita GDP; decile coefficient 

(ratio of income to the most and least prosperous ten per cent of the 

population); inflation; unemployment; proportion of expenditure of the 

GDP on science, technology, and education; proportion of expenditure of 

the GDP on culture; and the proportion of territory of the RF not 

conforming to environmental standards. 

The ISD: What Should be Followed Closely?

The ISD is described as a strategic planning document. It is 

divided into five parts with 38 sections. The December ISD was 

preceded by a draft information security doctrine in June that contained 

five parts but only 34 sections. 

One foreign analysis of the ISD noted that the document is a 

vague plan that bolsters the military’s propaganda output and ratchets up 

controls over the Internet in Russia.189 Other nations followed suit in 

their analysis, noting that “control” is one of the key objectives of the 

document. 

Russian analysts who studied the ISD focused on other issues, 

noting that the doctrine emphasizes the country’s information 

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the maintenance of social stability, 

where human and civil rights, as well as crucial information 

infrastructure, are protected. One report advocated the need for offensive 

information warfare. Retired Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, President 

of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, stated that Putin’s signature 

 

189 Paris AFP (North European Service), 6 December 2016.
75

on the doctrine means that “information warfare, which consists of 

information and psychological operations, has joined the ranks of the 

most important threats to the security of the Russian Federation.”190

Further, he noted that strategic deterrence in the information arena 

assumes offensive operations, adding that:

...we need to not only defend ourselves from information 

propaganda in information warfare by countering all 

slander, lies, and distortions of historical truth. It is now 

necessary to take active offensive measures. This requires 

the development of specific materials for doing this. Here 

there must be both a theory of the issue as well as the 

technology for preventing conflicts.191

Ivashov believes a responsible individual is needed to manage the 

processes of information deterrence, and it requires a staff to define 

theoretical designs and to plan information/psychological operations to 

deter aggressive acts. Forces and assets need to be designated.192

The ISD initially defined a number of terms. It defined 

information security in the following manner:

The state of protection of individuals, society, and the 

state from internal and external information threats that 

ensures the protection of the constitutional rights and 

freedoms of men and women; a worthy quality and 

standard of living for citizens; the sovereignty, territorial 

integrity and stable socioeconomic development of the 

Russian Federation; and the defense and security of the 

state.193

 

190 Unattributed article, “Expert. Information War has Become One of the Main Threats 

to Russian Security,” RIA Novosti, 6 December 2016.

191 Ibid. 192 Ibid.

193 “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia 

Website, Edict No. 646, dated 5 December 2016. 
76

There were several other terms of importance. National interests 

in the information sphere are the objectively meaningful requirements of 

individuals, society, and the state for ensuring security and stable 

development, specifically as they relate to the information sphere. 

Threats are factors that create or inflict damage to national interests in 

the information sphere. Means to ensure information security include 

legal, organizational, technical, and other assets used by forces. 

Information infrastructure is the aggregate of information facilities, 

systems, sites on the Internet, and communication networks on Russia’s 

territory or those territories under the RF’s jurisdiction. 

The forces required to enforce information security are listed as 

state organizations (and their units and responsible individuals). RF 

legislation authorizes agencies of local self-governments and other 

organizations to resolve information security tasks as well. Means to 

ensure information security include legal, organizational, technical, and 

other assets used by information security forces.

With regard to specific terms, forms of the word “ensure” were 

used 81 times. “Threats” were noted 21 times, “information sphere” 16 

times, “infrastructure” 15 times, “interest” and “stability” 11 times each, 

“goals” 10 times, “sovereignty” and “integrity” 9 times each, 

“information space” 6 times, “tasks” 7 times, and forms of the word 

“control” 7 times. There was 1 use of the term “trend” and 4 uses of the 

term “forecast.”

National interests in the information sphere included five points: 

securing and protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of men 

and women relating to information; ensuring stable an malfunction-free 

functioning of the information infrastructure; developing technologies 

and the electronic branches of industry; providing the Russian and 

international public valid information relating to the state policies of the 

RF regarding socially significant events; and promoting the formation of 

an international information security system aimed at countering threats

that upset strategic stability, strengthening partnership with equal rights, 

and protecting RF sovereignty in information space. 
77

Information technologies are producing new threats. Now, 

geopolitical goals can be achieved via trans-border exchanges of 

information that damage security and upset strategic stability. Some 

countries use technical attacks on information infrastructure for military 

purposes. Technical intelligence methods are being strengthened and the 

assets of intelligence services for conducting information and 

psychological operations aimed at destabilizing internal political and 

social situations are expanding. This undermines the sovereignty and 

violates territorial integrity of other states. A noticeable trend is the 

increase in the volume of material in foreign mass media that contain 

prejudicial assessments of the RF’s state policies. Russian journalists are 

not permitted to perform their professional activities. Various terrorist 

and extremist organizations use information warfare mechanisms, and 

computer crime is growing.

The five initiatives for ensuring information security in the 

defense arena are strategic deterrence and the prevention of military 

conflicts due to the use of information technologies; improving the 

system of information security, to include information warfare forces and 

assets; forecasting, detecting, and evaluating information threats; 

protecting RF interests in information space; and neutralizing 

information and psychological attacks. There are ten initiatives for 

ensuring information security in the state and public security. Some are 

deigned to preclude foreign control of the RF’s facilities and 

transmissions over networks. Others include countering propaganda of 

extremist ideologies; suppressing activities that damage national 

security, increasing the security of critical information infrastructures; 

securing command and control systems, preventing violations of the law; 

protecting information with state secrets; improving methods and means 

to secure products; increasing the effectiveness of implementing state 

policies; and neutralizing information operations directed at eroding 

traditional spiritual and moral values.

Economic initiatives in the information sphere are developing 

information technologies, eliminating Russian’s dependency on foreign 

information technologies, increasing competitiveness among Russian 

companies, and developing a domestic competitive electronic 

component. Science, technology, and education initiatives in the 
78

information sphere include developing science and engineering 

capabilities, creating technologies resistant to attacks, creating advanced 

information technologies, developing human resources in the 

information security field, and protecting citizens from information 

threats.

A strategic goal is to ensure the formation of a stable system of 

conflict-free inter-state relations in information space. Initiatives include 

defending Russia’s information sovereignty, ensuring effective 

counteractions to another country’s use of technologies that are 

inconsistent with international law, creating legal mechanisms to prevent 

and control inter-state conflicts, ensuring cooperation equal under the 

law, and developing a system for managing the Russian segment of the 

Internet.

Information security is ensured when legislative, legal, law 

enforcement, judicial, oversight, and other forms of activity of state 

organizations are combined. This requires joint work among the State 

Duma, Federation Council, Central Bank, Military Industrial 

Commission, and other executive and interdepartmental organizations 

created by the president and government. System participants also 

include the mass media and mass communication organizations, 

organizations conducting activities that create and operate information 

systems, and organizations involved in ensuring information security. 

State organization tasks include improving the forms and methods of 

interaction among forces ready to ensure information security. Vertical 

lines of control and centralization must be strengthened and analytic and 

scientific and technical aspects improved. 

A principle of state organizations is that they must observe a 

balance between citizen requirements for a free exchange of information 

and the limitations that are associated with the need to ensure national 

security, including information sphere security. A sufficient number of 

forces and assets will be determined by monitoring information threats. 

The acknowledged principles and norms of international law and treaties

must also be observed. Information security tasks include ensuring the 

protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens and organizations, 
79

forecasting and detecting information threats, and evaluating the 

effectiveness of measures designed to ensure information security.

The closing paragraph of the doctrine noted that it is being 

executed based on “branch strategic planning documents” of the RF. The 

Russian Security Council will develop a list of priority initiatives for 

ensuring information security that will take “the provisions of the 

strategic forecast of the RF into consideration.” 

The STDS and CRFP: What Should Be Followed Closely

As noted above, the actual texts of both the STDS and CRFP

have not been released as this study goes to print. Therefore the short 

analysis below relies only on press releases about the documents.

Putin convened a meeting of the Council of Science and 

Education in late November to discuss the draft STDS. He noted it is 

equal in status to the NSS. The purpose, he noted, is to develop new 

knowledge while continuing to spend on fundamental science as a share 

of GDP, establish a strong technology base that supports rapid economic 

growth, allocate funds to teams based on a competitive basis, and 

organize a modern system for managing S&T developments to exclude 

duplication of effort. Putin added that the number of researchers under 

the age of 40 has increased by a third over the past ten years, which is an 

encouraging sign.194

Presidential aide Andrey Fursenko spoke next and called for a 

research and technology development governance system that would be 

up to the task. He defined the STDS in the following way:

The Strategy is a framework document defining the 

objectives, the main principles, areas, stages and 

anticipated results of developing science and technology. 

Importantly, the document provides for the possibility of 

 

194 President of Russia Website, (in English), 23 November 2016.
80

adjusting and implementing national policy in this area 

and formulates specific mechanisms for doing so.195

Fursenko suggested bringing the level of funding up to two percent of 

the GDP and accelerating the growth of private investment, since at the 

moment state investment amounts to nearly 80 percent of research 

funding.196

Vladimir Fortov, the President of the Russian Academy of 

Sciences, was the next speaker. He stated that 20 various research 

concepts, views, and forecasts have been prepared for the Strategy. He 

recommended against a super-centralized organization model for 

research, suggesting instead a multi-channel financing model. He was 

not overly happy with reform measures, noting that the size of the 

bureaucracy has grown and bogged scientists down.197

Dmitry Peskov of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives stated that 

the Strategy is a foundation for supplying Russian companies with 

competitive advantages in new markets. He sees three external 

challenges outside of funding: the digital economy; new biology, which 

is confronting a new philosophy of nature; and (Peskov did not directly 

identify a third wave) different models for organizing labor, research, 

and sales. Companies such as China’s Alibaba offer a digital platform 

that sells goods and creates competitive advantages many times higher 

than Russia’s. Start-ups such as Uber undermine Russia’s traditional 

markets. He stated that to respond to these challenges “the answer lies in 

a blend of fundamental research, market technologies, and fundamental, 

future-looking values.”198

Moscow State University (MSU) Rector Viktor Sadovnichy 

stressed the importance of two things. First, it is imperative that Russia 

not fall behind in the chase to use Big Data. He recommended that a 

 

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.
81

civilian supercomputing center be built (to complement a Supercomputer 

Technology Center, which he said “probably already exists”), and that 

MSU could increase the capacity of its computer to the exaflop level. 

Second, it is necessary to keep young researchers at home. MSU has 

created laboratories for talented young people between 25 and 27.199

This civilian recommendation seems to lag behind what has already been 

built in the military, where at least eleven so-called science companies 

were developed to offer young talented recruits a chance to study with 

senior analysts and help prepare new equipment for electronic warfare

and cyber, artillery, and other forces.

Initially, explanations of Russia’s new CRFP were purely 

descriptive. RIA Novosti listed many of the main points of the document, 

breaking them down into categories covering the USA, NATO, the EU, 

terrorism, the Middle East and Afghanistan, the Asia-Pacific, the Arctic 

and Antarctica, and a final category that included the United Nations, an 

arms race in space, the media, and information security.200 Follow-on 

commentaries focused on specific issues in the CRFP, such as the call 

for a political settlement in Syria, how NATO has violated the principle 

of equal security, the necessity of maintaining the UN’s Article 51 (right 

of self-defense) in light of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, how the growth of force factors is undermining 

strategic stability, and how soft power tools have grown in 

importance.201

One Interfax report on the CRFP was, from a US point of view, 

hypocritical to say the least. It quoted the document and noted that 

Russia would fight against military interventions that violate the 

sovereignty of states. The report notes that Russia “intends to prevent the 

carrying out, under the pretext of implementing the ‘responsibility to 

protect’ concept, of military interventions and other forms of outside 

 

199 Ibid. 200 RIA Novosti, 1 December 2016. 201 See, for example, numerous reports from Interfax (in English), 1 December 2016.
82

interference...”202 Yet this was exactly what Russia has done in Crimea 

and Eastern Ukraine.

Two reports were particularly negative about the new CRFP. A 

Moscow Times article stated that the concept emphasizes a growing 

Kremlin willingness to use force in order to achieve its goals. Russia’s 

policies will develop according to the situation and will react to or 

preempt moves by other players. The focus is on projecting Russia’s 

status as a key decision-maker, and this has become the “most important 

strategic driver of Russian foreign policy.”203 The article states that a 

radical innovation in Russia’s foreign policy has appeared, that being the 

recognition that military force can help achieve strategic foreign policy 

objectives. Force helped stop NATO’s enlargement in Ukraine, for 

example, after other foreign policy tools failed. Finally the CRFP

indicates that Russia wants few constraints on its international actions.204

Another article noted that the ISD and CRFP indicate that 

international ties and the information sphere are areas of alarm and 

danger, and both represent a battlefield between the West and alternative 

centers of power and influence. The article stated that this is 

“conservatism squared, and then multiplied by a confrontational 

worldview.”205 Russia’s citizens seem to have been ignored. These 

documents are not designed to offer new technologies to raise citizens’ 

living standards, but rather to prevent the West from using Russian 

deficiencies for pressure or blackmail. Security concepts call on the 

country to be closed and distrustful toward the whole world, responses 

which hail from the Soviet past.206

 

202 Interfax (in English, 1421 GMT), 1 December 2016. 203 Vladimir Frolov, no title provided, The Moscow Times Online (in English), 6 

December 2016.

204 Ibid. 205 Editorial, “Security Council as Think Tank. Structure That Thinks in Categories of 

Last Century Responding to Challenges of a New Century,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 

Online, 8 December 2016. 206 Ibid.
83

An Assessment

In November Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev 

offered that, in spite of the challenges and threats to Russia, the nation is 

consistently working to realize its vision of global security. Russia’s 

main objective is to ensure its interests, to create conditions for socioeconomic development, to strengthen and protect its sovereignty and 

constitutional order; and to work with the US, based on equal rights and 

mutual respect of each other’s interests.207

Putin’s emphasis on strengthening the nation’s strategic interests 

has resulted in significant progress in several areas in 2016 [note: items 

in bold and in brackets indicate things that, in this author’s opinion, have 

been accomplished]:

• Strengthening the country's defense, ensuring the 

inviolability of the Russian Federation’s constitutional 

order, sovereignty, independence, and national and 

territorial integrity [Russia has been able to test

numerous weapons and implement lessons learned in 

Syria regarding deployments, mobilization potential, 

and especially aerospace and naval capabilities; one 

thing Russia has not accomplished but continues to try 

to do is to keep ISIS out of Russia’s soft underbelly in 

the North Caucasus and preserve its territorial 

integrity]

• Strengthening national accord, political and social 

stability, developing democratic institutions, and 

refining the mechanisms for cooperation between 

the state and civil society [national accord remains 

strong for continued Russian actions in Syria, as 

witnessed by Putin’s strong following; during 

Kavkaz-2016, the military’s National Defense 

Management Center was exercised accordingly as the 

 

207 Interview with Nikolay Patrushev, “Nikolay Patrushev: US Missile Defense Can 

Destroy Facilities on the Ground,” RIA Novosti, 1 November 2016.
84

military provided control over civilian entities during 

the exercise scenario. The latter was designed for 

actions to take if a state of emergency is declared in 

Russia’s Southern District, for example, if ISIS gains 

a foothold there]

• Preserving and developing culture and traditional 

Russian spiritual and moral values [Russia’s 

traditional support of Syrian President Assad and its 

traditional and long-standing Middle East policy 

remain intact, along with well scripted geopolitical 

moves in the area supporting Iranian and Hezbollah 

capabilities; Assad stated that Russia was asked to 

participate in Syria due to its morals. He noted that 

this meant Russia is there to destroy terrorism, not 

because it wants something in exchange] 

• Consolidating the RF's status as a leading world 

power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining 

strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships 

in a polycentric world.208 [Russian actions in Syria 

and Ukraine, in the eyes of many nations, have

enabled it to reclaim much of its old glory as a 

military power and threat, as witnessed by worries all 

over Europe as to what Russia might do next]

Conclusions

 The security environment that these documents project is holistic, 

taking in culture, values, economics, science, national interests, health, 

education, and a host of other issues. The overall focus is on the welldocumented desire to maintain strategic stability. Overall, many of the 

issues raised in the NSS were discussed piecemeal over the past two 

 

208 Moscow President of Russia website 31 Dec 15, Russian Federation Presidential 

Edict 683 approving appended text of “The Russian Federation's National Security 

Strategy.”
85

years. The NSS is just the first place they have all been brought together.

Many points of the latest version were repeats from the 2009 NSS.

The NSS presents concern over the state of international relations 

between Russia and the West, while relations with the East, especially 

China and India, are listed with more enthusiasm for their continued 

cooperative ventures. Still, the document offers openings for potential 

areas of cooperation with both NATO and the US. It is not known if 

Russia’s offer of some conciliation is designed to find a way to reduce 

the sanctions that were imposed on the nation after its acquisition of 

Crimea and intervention into Eastern Ukraine. It is doubtful that this is a 

sincere offer to change its behavior; rather the goal would be US 

acquiescence. It is clear that those speaking after the document’s release 

underlined this point of potential cooperation repeatedly, but gave no 

indication of the rationale behind it.

Domestically there is concern over the potential impact that 

economic and national security threats present to Russia. Suggested ways 

to get out of the current morass are listed. There is also a list of 

indicators to allow people to evaluate the current state of national 

security in Russia and thus whether it is making progress in its desire to 

protect national security. The Kremlin appears to see the NSS as a 

roadmap that outlines the important aspects for shaping domestic and 

international policy, as well as the interaction between national security 

and socio-economic affairs. The NSS makes clear that Russia is 

blameless for the consternation in the international community that it 

caused with regard to Ukraine, such as the fact that NATO is now near 

Russia’s borders (which it was not before the events of 2014 in Crimea 

and Eastern Ukraine).

It is apparent that not everyone is happy with the document, most 

likely due to the current shape of the economy. For example, a report in 

Vedomosti Online (Business Online) indicated concern in that 

community. On 20 January the site noted that “practically all of Russia’s 

top officials except maybe for the President have admitted that the 

economy is in a severe crisis.” Further, the article notes that “the authors 

fail to notice that the economy is closed off and shrunken, including as a 
86

result of the policy of ‘protection of the country’s interests’, by cutting 

itself off from world trade, finances, and technological competition.”209

To help ensure economic stability in the coming years, the NSS

notes that a series of areas are considered “off limits” to foreign 

governments, such as Russia’s national interests and stakes in specific 

geopolitical property, in particular, the Arctic. These warnings are made 

quite clear in the document. It is also off limits to allow intrusions into 

Russia’s domestic propaganda apparatus as well, since, in the Kremlin’s 

view, the impact of foreign information and communication systems on 

the population may threaten regime survival. The document places blame 

on nongovernmental organizations and individuals for upending stability 

in Russia as well. State-owned TV and other media outlets, assisted by 

FSB control of the Internet, are ways to ensure information security.

Through the publication of the NSS, Russia has demonstrated a 

mixture of some realism, such as a discussion of the threats to the nation, 

alongside excuses for their current situation, such as failing to admit or 

take into consideration the effect of its actions, which have produced the 

new threats on its borders. Russia wants a return to great power status, 

and the Kremlin sees energy resources and military power as two of the 

most important paths to glory, along with developing more creative and 

innovative theorists. 

While the NSS is an important document, Putin’s January 

announcement on S&T issues may be even more important. He stated 

that a strategy on S&T issues is crucial for a state to maintain its 

sovereignty and territorial integrity, and one will be ready in the fall

(2017). International prestige and power projection capabilities come 

from a good S&T strategy that offers high-tech methods to counter 

threats from within and without. The sum total of information control, 

military modernization, energy security, and S&T advances can also be 

read as the Putin entourage’s method of guaranteeing regime survival. 

 

209 Pavel Aptekar and Andrey Sinitsy, “Sacred Security Strategy: Special Services 

Refine Document That is Increasingly Disconnected from Reality,” Vedomosti Online

(Business Online), 20 January 2016.
87

The regime wants the population to focus on what it is doing for it, not 

what it has done to it. 

Finally, if one were to summarize Russia’s NSS, it would be 

impractical not to mention what Russia really is after: strategic stability, 

a balance of forces, equal security, and the ability to maintain its 

deterrence potential in order to guarantee the nation’s sovereignty and 

territorial integrity. These are all talking points stressed in the NSS. They 

also represent a lexicon through which the West can engage Russia, 

since the latter is willing to talk. However, Russian authorities have a 

responsibility too—to admit its guilt in the creation of the current 

situation on its borders. Areas where the West erred were duly noted, but 

Russia refuses to admit its role as it tries to fool the international 

community. The downing of MH17 is but one example. Equal security 

also requires equal responsibility when mistakes are made. The 

Kremlin’s unwillingness to acknowledge its mistakes and continued 

propaganda that it was the West alone that worsened the international 

situation, makes engagement with the country all the more difficult for 

the US.
88
89

PART TWO
90

Image attribution: The Imperial Cannon (Tsar Pushka) in Moscow 

Kremlin, Public Domain, 22 August 2005, 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0

%BA%D0%B2%D0%B0#/media/File:Tsar_Pushka_2005.jpg
91

CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA’S METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL 

OVER FUTURE WAR PLANNING: THE THEORY

Future wars will be launched by electronic warfare 

forces, which protect friendly forces, block foreign 

propaganda disinformation, and strike at enemy EW 

forces and assets; they blend with strategic operations of 

the armed forces and with aerospace operations, 

augmented by cruise missiles, and reconnaissance ‘outfits 

(UAVs, robots)’ delivering strikes and fires; strategic 

goals in future wars require that information superiority 

is assured over the enemy; Russia should look out for 

new-type wars (hybrid), including those actions to 

influence the behavior of the armed forces of Russia or to 

instigate internal tensions in society.210

Introduction

Over time, specific elements of Russian military thought have 

evolved, which offer Defense Ministry planners a way to consider future

war scenarios in a methodological manner and thus create an assertion of 

control over the evolving military environment. The analysis informs 

force structure and advises when and how to apply power or, more 

recently, utilize nonmilitary methods. Overall, the process seems logical. 

It is difficult to pinpoint a similar US process.

The Russian military’s well-constructed prism of thought is used 

to predict or respond to potential conflict. Like most analyses, it also 

contains a historical aspect that relies on the close examination of actual 

combat experience, whether domestically generated (Afghanistan, 

Chechnya, Syria) or through the study of how foreign powers or 

coalitions (US, Great Britain, NATO) have used military capabilities. 

 

210 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 45.
92

The essence of the construct or prism stems from Soviet, and now 

Russian, reliance on what appears to be a five-step process, which has 

apparently remained intact over the years. First, there is a need to 

recognize key aspects of the trends in the evolving character of warfare, 

such as the growing importance of nonmilitary methods (diplomacy, 

deterrence, etc.) and the continued application of advances in science and 

technology that offer new and innovative ways to achieve superiority. A 

trend of special interest is developments in science and technology with 

military applications. 

Second, based on this analysis, forecasts are made of the ways 

that warfare may be conducted in the future. Forecasts are predictive but 

also continually evolving, as one should expect, as trends change, 

resulting in new constructs. There appears to be a strong mathematical 

process involved in forecasting, if Russian sources are to be believed. 

For example, in a 1975 Russian book on forecasting there is a chapter 

titled, “Mathematical Forecasting.”211 Forecasts also influence how the 

initial period of war is to be understood, that is, which weapons and 

strategies will be unleashed.

Third, based on trends and forecasts, military strategy is 

formulated to contest these findings and prognostications. An assessment 

of developing the appropriate correlation of forces along strategic axes is 

considered.

Fourth, forms (organizational constructs, such as cyber or Special 

Forces units with specific missions) and methods (various types of 

weaponry that new science and technology advancements produce; and 

the appropriate military art [principles of warfare, the appropriate 

patterns of maneuver, asymmetric thought, reflexive control initiatives, 

etc.]) are developed and applied to the situation. Adjustments to the 

COFM are then made as a result of this analysis.

 

211 Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, Military 

Publishers, Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, 1975, p. 279.
93

Finally, an operational concept is developed and thinking begins 

on establishing a correlation of forces and means (COFM) for 

operational art, a procedure that ensures a strategic advantage for Russia 

in important sectors and axes, while also supporting the forecasted 

construct. 

It is important to note that the process is dynamic and continually 

evolving. For example, even after COFM and forms and methods 

decisions have been made, new discoveries in trends can cause changes 

to the first two. An outline in graphic form of the five-step process is 

located at the end of this chapter.

Contemporary Russian Thought

The more experience-based aspect of Russian military thought 

involves studying both domestic and foreign experience for lessons 

learned. This experience is added to the five-step process as needed. For 

example, internationally there was a close analysis conducted of all US 

military actions over the past 25 years. Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and other conflicts were all closely studied, with 

appropriate lessons extracted. Some (such as the standoff actions of 

NATO that involved air power but not ground power) were applied 

domestically, in particular during the second war with Chechnya that 

began in late 1999. Syria, on the other hand, not only had a Kosovo 

corollary (no Russian use of ground power), but also offered a chance to 

test weaponry and aerospace capabilities outside of a training area.

Perhaps most important of all, when taken as a whole, these two 

aspects result in the application of a military logic that fits the 

circumstances and results in a strategy. This is the most important aspect 

of military art. It might be surmised, then, that the dynamic and 

continuous interaction of the elements results in the development of a 

strategy. The idea that the process results in a logic fitting the 

circumstances coincides with a definition of strategy that Russia’s Chief 

of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov noted: “each conflict has a logic 

all its own.” The elements of military thought evolve into a peculiar 

logic consistent with the circumstances that various geopolitical 

situations present.
94

These two aspects of military thought have resulted in various 

strategic and operational developments through the years due to their 

comprehensive and creative input. In the 1980s Russian thought was 

highlighted by the development of Marshall Ogarkov’s use of 

operational maneuver groups (operativnaya manevrennaya gruppa or 

OMG), thinking assisted with strong input from General of the Army 

Makhmut Gareev (Russians noted after Ogarkov’s passing that OMG 

meant, in Russian, the Operativnaya Myshleniye [thought] Gareeva). 

Gareev, now in his 90s, still advises Russian military leaders. In the 

1990s Major General Vladimir Slipchenko wrote on so-called sixth 

generation warfare and planetary warfare, which described war’s 

changing character from one generation of weaponry to the next. Such 

thinking is creative and on a par with that conducted in other nations. For 

example, Chinese thought in the late 1990s included Slipchenko’s look 

at the theory of unrestricted warfare. The turn of the century and beyond 

has witnessed many other Russian theorists developing these topics 

further, from indirect and asymmetric input to such thoughts as newgeneration and new-type warfare, all of which are discussed in more 

detail below.

Gerasimov provided an excellent example of the contemporary 

use of Russian military thought in December 2016. During an interview 

on Rossiya 24 Television, he noted that NATO had no grounds for 

concern over Russia’s deployment of new units (three divisions) a few 

hundred kilometers from the alliance’s eastern borders [the divisions are 

a COFM adjustment]. This was due to NATO’s “destructive, provocative 

character”212 [which totally ignored the numerous Russian incursions 

into Baltic and Scandinavian airspace over the preceding months that had 

caused NATO concern]. A few days earlier Russian Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov had noted that NATO’s deployments [a few battalions] 

near Russia were disproportionate to the threat. [Hardly, it seems, in light 

of Russia’s deployment of three divisions.] Gerasimov went on to add 

how many new pieces of equipment (5,500) had been added to the 

Russian force, to include 300 new and 500 modernized tanks and 

armored vehicles, which appeared to be a bit of information deterrence 

 

212 Rossiya 24 Television, 15 December 2016.
95

directed at NATO. He stated that modern methods of fighting were a 

training priority during the year and summarized his interview in the 

following manner:

This year, the armed forces have attained a higher quality 

of inter-service cooperation. The increase in training of 

personnel has been achieved thanks to the application of 

modern domestic and foreign experience and the practical 

mastery of new forms and methods of combat activity by 

the forces.213

Thus, in this short interview, he made a reference to the COFM and he 

directly referenced combat experience, forms and methods, and types of 

equipment and modern ways of fighting, not to mention that the 

improvements were based on the trends and forecasting he envisioned.

There are two important lessons that US analysts, military 

advisors, and military planners should take whenever they examine 

Russian military thought. First, as in any sports endeavor, teams work 

against the offensive and defensive setups of their future opponent in 

practice. In international affairs, one must understand how a future 

opponent thinks and organizes or the intellectual confrontation and 

perhaps the initiative and the next battle will be lost. Whether it be 

Russian military thought patterns or those of ISIS, it is important to 

comprehend what to expect from an opponent. Second, potential 

opponents look at confrontations differently than the US does. As a 

result a creative US analyst (advisor, and/or planner) may find new and 

innovative ways to consider the application of power by studying other 

militaries. These two advantages of studying the “red pen” must always 

be addressed as opponents are either sized up or when looking for new 

avenues of thought.

The following chapter takes a look at the four basic elements of 

Russian military thought. The terms “forecasting,” “correlation of 

forces,” and, most often, the “forms and methods” of warfare continue to 

 

213 Ibid.
96

appear in the speeches of important officers, such as Chief of the General 

Staff Gerasimov. They are defined and discussed below.

Trends and Forecasting

In the 21st century three significant trends in the “nature of armed 

struggle” 214 are, the shift toward aerospace (longer range, greater power 

and accuracy, possibility of consecutive and simultaneous attacks across 

the entire theater of operations by piloted and pilotless aerial 

vehicles);215 the move from positional confrontations to the evolution of 

exchanging of fire from a distance (PGMs, etc.), with critical 

infrastructure (control, economic, and logistic systems) targeting 

priorities along with air defense systems, airfields, and aircraft as key 

objectives in the initial phase of war; manpower is not a priority 

target;216 and the role played by information superiority, specialoperations forces, and EW (to disorganize control); network centric 

methods used to control actions, which are characterized by increased 

operational speed and efficiency.

217 Perhaps even more important, Chief 

of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov’s 2013 speech included trends 

(tendencies) in the title of his presentation, indicating its importance as 

the start point for making any analysis of the international military 

situation. 

In a 1975 Russian book on forecasting, Forecasting and Military 

Affairs,

218 authors Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov stated that a 

forecast “was what may occur,” while a plan was defined as “what is 

supposed to occur.”219 Forecasting was more specifically defined as “the 

 

214 S. V. Kuralenko, “Tendencies in the Changing Character of Armed 

Struggles in Military Conflicts in the First Half of the 21st Century,” Voennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 2012, pp. 40-46. 215 Ibid., p. 41. 216 Ibid., p. 43. 217 Ibid. 218 Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, Moscow 

1975, translated into English by the DGIS Multilingual Section, Secretary of State 

Department, Ottawa Canada, Published under the auspices of the United States Air 

Force. Words in brackets are this authors, not those of Chuyev and Mikhaylov.

219 Ibid., p. 6.
97

study of the military-political situation, the pattern of future war, the 

prospects of developing strategy, operational art, and tactics [methods], 

the qualitative and quantitative composition of the means of armed 

conflict (one’s own and the enemy’s [COFM]), the prospects for the 

development of the war economy in the future, and also the forecasting 

of the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans.”220 Four types of military 

forecasting were described. They were military-strategic, operationaltactical, military-economic, and military-technical. 

Military-strategic forecasting was said to examine the “character 

of a war” under certain conditions determined by a variety of input 

data.221 It looks at the character and means of conducting future wars that 

may occur. A forecast is made of objectives, missions, plans, and the 

composition of the Armed Forces of friendly and enemy countries

[COFM]. In 2013, to demonstrate the continuity of this term in military 

affairs, in an article in Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er (VPK), Gerasimov 

noted that “each war has a unique logic all its own,”222 which closely 

approximates the 1975 idea of examining the character of war under 

“certain conditions determined by a variety of input data.” Chuyev and 

Mikhailov defined military-economic and military-technical forecasting 

(operational-tactical forecasting will not be covered) in the following 

manner. Military-economic forecasting is “inseparable from the 

forecasting of the economy of the entire country (or even a number of 

countries linked by common aims and problems), and is inextricably 

bound up with all divisions of the military forecasting system...”223

“Data” for military-economic forecasting are provided by militarystrategic forecasting, which provides information on the possible nature 

of armed conflict, as well as the potential and the projected scale of the 

effect of the use of the Armed Forces on the economy. Military-technical 

forecasting provides information about the potential characteristics of 

 

220 Ibid., p. 14. 221 Ibid., p. 17. 222 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013. 

This source was used before the actual speech of Gerasimov was received by FMSO.

223 Chuyev and Mikhaylov, pp. 17, 19.
98

models of weapons and military equipment, and the prospects for 

development of particular weapon types and systems [methods].

224

Further, there are short-term (precise, detailed, 5 years), medium-term 

(5-10 years), and long-term (vectors, general directions, over 10 years) 

types of forecasting.225

This explanation of forecasting makes one consider what might 

be termed “strategic-technical” forecasting. In the past, Lenin and Engels 

used to state on occasion that technology determines tactics. In this day, 

with rapid advancements in technology and Russia’s focus on new issues 

like planetary theaters of war, it would be fair to assert that now 

“technology determines strategy,” since technical developments

(satellites, reconnaissance-strike complexes, etc.) can now significantly 

influence strategic thought and ways to attack an opponent. New 

technologies continue to complicate assessments of future war, requiring 

that they be reexamined more often than in the past. 

Military authors S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, who are 

two of Russia’s most popular military authors, offered examples of 

short- and long-term forecasting. They noted that short-term forecasts 

envision future wars as launched by EW forces [forms], which will 

protect friendly forces, block foreign propaganda, disinformation, and 

strike at enemy EW forces and assets. They will blend with strategic and 

aerospace operations, with the latter augmented by cruise missiles and 

reconnaissance “outfits (UAVs, robots)” delivering strikes and fires. 

Many of these assets are available today. Long-term forecasts predict 

that strategic goals will not be achieved in future wars unless information 

superiority is assured over the enemy.226

Military Strategy

The 1971 Officer’s Handbook describes strategy as a division of 

military art that investigates the principles of preparing for and waging 

 

224 Ibid., p. 19. 225 Ibid., p. 14. 226 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 45.
99

war as a whole, as well as its campaigns. It is a direct instrument of 

politics, and is common to all branches of the country’s services within 

the framework of a unified military strategy. Strategy has theoretical 

(principles of war planning, logistical support, troop control, and 

territorial preparation) and applied (specific questions on the preparation 

and execution of strategic attack, defense, and other operations) 

aspects.227

Strategy is further described as a scientific theory that elaborates 

the fundamental methods and forms of armed combat on a strategic scale 

and produces war’s guiding principles. Strategy’s theory influences 

military doctrine and, at the same time, strategy implements doctrine 

directly in the elaboration of war plans and the preparation of the country 

for war. In wartime, military doctrine drops into the background 

somewhat, since in armed combat military-political and militarystrategic considerations take the primary lead roles, depending on the 

specific situation. Consequently, war or armed combat is governed by 

strategy, not doctrine.228

The 1983 Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary stated that 

Soviet military strategy is determined through the policies of the 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union and exerts an inverse influence on 

policy.229 Of course, the Communist Party no longer rules Russia. 

Military strategy, however, remains interlinked with the country’s 

military doctrine and is defined as follows:

A component part of military art, its highest domain, 

encompassing theory and the practice of the preparation 

of a country and its armed forces [AF] for war, the 

planning and conduct of strategic operations and war as a 

whole. The theory of military strategy investigates the 

 

227 S. N. Kozlov, Editor, The Officer’s Handbook, Ministry of Defense Publishing

Company, Moscow, 1971, as published in English by the United States Air Force, 

1971, pp. 57-58. 228 Ibid., p. 65. 229 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 711.
100

patterns, mechanisms, and nature of war, the modes and 

methods of its conduct. It formulates the theoretical 

principles of planning as well as the preparation for and 

conduct of strategic operations and war as a whole.230

That is, military strategy examines the unfolding nature of war and plans 

accordingly to formulate the proper planning to confront new trends and 

tendencies in war’s character; and to fulfill forecasts with the proper 

ingredients. [for a definition of correlation of forces and means, see 

“operational design” below].

Forms and Methods

Second, the forms and methods used to employ forces hold a 

significant place in Russian military thought. They are often ignored in 

the West, perhaps because they appear almost neutral in meaning, if a 

clear meaning can be surmised. Actually both terms are very important. 

They have direct relevance as to how the military takes advantage of 

war’s changing nature, as well as how future war might be conducted. 

Gerasimov mentioned them eleven times in his popular 2013 speech, yet 

hardly anyone noticed or commented on them. 

According to the Russian military encyclopedia, forms of 

military operations are employed in conformity with the scope or scale 

of combat. They include operations, engagements, combat, and strikes. 

They also include combat arms capabilities, the objectives of military 

operations, and the nature of assigned missions.231 New-generation wars, 

for example, were forecasted by Chekinov and Bogdanov (and no one 

else, by the way) to radically alter the character and content of armed 

struggle in the following manner, with both traditional and nontraditional 

forms.

Intensive fire strikes against seats of national and military power, 

and also military and industrial objectives by all arms of the service, and 

 

230 Ibid. 231 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 782.
101

employment of military space-based systems, EW forces and weapons, 

electromagnetic, information, infrasound, and psychotronic effects, 

corrosive chemical and biological formulations in new-generation wars 

will erode, to the greatest extent possible, the ability of the adversary’s 

troops and civilian population to resist. It is also expected that 

nontraditional forms of armed struggle will be used to cause 

earthquakes, typhoons, and heavy rainfall lasting long enough to damage 

the economy and aggravate the socio-psychological climate in the 

warring countries.232

A Military Thought article in 2008 stated that the meaning of the 

term “form” describes the organization of the substance of the modes of 

combat actions. It represents the goal-oriented, organizational (to include 

command and control aspects), spatial, temporal, and quantitative 

confines of the Armed Forces’ employment. It is the organizational side 

of troop actions.233 EW units fit this criteria, as do combat units of all 

sorts.

Methods include the aggregate of forms, modern techniques, and 

procedures employed in a specific logical sequence to achieve effective 

solutions to problems of military science. This is an applied area of the 

methodology of military theory and practice. It can be general and thus 

used for research of any type, or it can be more specific, such as 

determining the procedure of solving a specific problem.234 A 2010 

Military Thought article described methods (ways) as a sequence and 

technique for employing forces and means to fulfill tasks in an operation. 

Authors M. G. Valeyev and N. L. Romas, unhappy with this dictionary 

definition (which they cited from a 1997 Military Thought article), 

defined a method of warfare as a specific way that troops accomplish 

their mission by employing actions characteristic of a method’s essence, 

 

232 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New–Generation 

War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2013, pp. 13-25. 233 O. V. Korol and N. L. Romas, “Form of Military Actions: On the Meaning of the 

Category,” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), from Vol. 3 2008 of the Eastview 

publication Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, pp. 

149-153 (in English). 234 Ogarkov, p. 440.
102

combination of processes, techniques, and rules of their use.235 For 

example, a technique might be to take an opponent by surprise. Analysis 

suggests that troop armaments (that is, weaponry’s development) and the 

principles of military art (which could be simultaneous or consecutive 

actions involving strategy, operational art, or tactics) have the greatest 

impact on methods.236

Thus, the somewhat benign-sounding terms “forms and methods” 

of actions are actually very important, for they relate to the manner in 

which future wars may be conducted. Specific issues, such as the manner 

in which disinformation, the principles of war, the use of cunning, and 

other military actions, can be found therein. Forms and methods also 

include nonmilitary, indirect, and asymmetric methods. Gerasimov 

pointed this out in his 2013 article, which listed both traditional forms 

and methods and what he called “new” forms and methods. During a 

November 2016 General Staff Academy lecture series to Southern 

Military District officers, several lectures were delivered on the “forms 

and methods of employing troops and organizing work when conducting 

combat operations.”237 Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, speaking at an 

education conference in November, noted that training assumes special 

importance “under conditions of large-scale Army and Navy rearmament 

and development of new forms and methods of combat operations.”238

Clearly, forms and methods are key indicators as to how future war will 

be organized and perhaps even conducted. 

Operational Concept/Design and the COFM

A final element of traditional Russian military thought is the 

integration of operational design and COFM. The operational design or 

 

235 M. G. Valeyev and N. L. Romas, “Choosing Methods of Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ 

(Military Thought), No. 6 2010, p. 4. 236 Ibid., p. 5, 6, 8. 237 Southern Military District Press Service, “Representatives of General Staff Military 

Academy Participate in Training Officers of the Southern Military District Command 

and Control Organs,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation website, 24 

November 2016.

238 No author provided, “Shoygu Told about the Role of Military Education under 

Rearmament Conditions,” RIA Novosti, 23 November 2016.
103

concept results from an assessment of the changing character of war, 

forecasts of its potential appearance, and the forms and methods of 

employing a force against forecasted threats, particularly during the 

initial period of war. An operational concept or design (zamysel 

operatsii) is defined in the following manner:

A broad outline of forthcoming combat operations. It 

includes: direction or axis of the main attack and other 

thrusts (area of concentration of main efforts); sequence 

and modes of accomplishing the adversary’s defeat; 

procedure of delivery of fire for effect and, in a nuclear 

war, nuclear weapons as well; force groupings and 

tactical order of battle (disposition).239

A related term is the operation plan (reshenie na operatsiyu). It is 

defined as follows: 

The manner, procedure, modes and methods of 

accomplishing an assigned mission as specified by a 

commander. It includes the concept of operations 

(commander’s concept), missions assigned to the troops 

(forces), fundamentals of teamwork and coordination, 

support, and the organization of command and control. 

The operation plan (battle plan) is the basis of command 

and control of troops (forces). It is made as a result of 

mission briefings and estimates of the situation.240

The resulting operational concept or design includes an assessment of 

where to place forces along which strategic axes, that is, how to employ 

a correlation of forces that offers Russian forces the advantage they 

desire, whether it be for victory or just survival if confronted by a 

superior force. 

 

239 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 264. 240 Ibid., p. 634.
104

In 1984, in an article in Military Thought, author N. N. 

Kuznetsov noted that the laws of armed struggle include the dependence 

of the course and outcome of an armed struggle on the correlation of 

combat power of the forces of the opposing sides...the dependence of 

forms and methods of operations on weapons, equipment, and personnel, 

and the interdependence of the forms and methods of operations being 

conducted at different levels.241 To demonstrate continuity of thought, in 

2014 Gerasimov stated that institutes should make a determination of the 

optimal COFM and means of the Armed Forces of the Russian 

Federation, their qualitative and quantitative make-up, and the forms and 

methods of their combat employment.242 Chekinov and Bogdanov, 

writing in the same year, noted that innovations must be taken into 

consideration, along with changes in the forms and methods of fighting, 

and that an improved version of the COF is now used in various 

calculations of the RF Ministry of Defense research organizations.243

Thus there is continuity in the use of specific terms.

The Military Encyclopedic Dictionary defines the term COF 

[used here by the following authors instead of COFM] as follows: 

An objective indicator of the combat power of opposing 

forces, which makes it possible to determine the degree of 

superiority of one force over the other. It is determined by 

comparing quantitative and qualitative characteristics of 

subunits, units, combined units, and armaments of 

friendly and enemy troops (forces). It is calculated on a 

strategic, operational, and tactical scale throughout an 

 

241 N. N. Kuznetsov, “On the Categories and Principles of Soviet Military Strategy,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 1984, p. 34. 242 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved 

by the President of the Russian Federation,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin 

of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22. 243 S. G. Chekinov and S. A.Bogdanov, “Military Futurology: Its Origin, Development, 

Role, and Place within Military Science,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8 

2014, p. 26.
105

entire area of operations, in the main sector and in other 

sectors.244

When developing strategy against a potential adversary, the 

latter’s “political, economic, scientific and technical, military, 

ideological, demographic, psychological, geographic, and other factors” 

are considered as part of the correlation of forces, according to a 1968 

Military Thought article, in order “to uncover intentions, plans, 

capabilities, concepts, and methods.”245 Strategy requires a continuous 

reassessment of the capabilities of potential adversaries and results in 

updated modeling of the COF between nations. Superiority was viewed 

at the time as nothing but a favorable opportunity. Now information 

superiority offers more than just opportunity. It offers a chance to 

capture the initiative in war and thereby control the initial period of war.

A 1969 Military Thought article noted that the decisive role in 

battle is played by the commander’s skill, which, in author S. 

Tyushkevich’s assessment, is another aspect of the COF.246 Tyushkevich 

added the following: timely logistic deliveries are “most essential” to 

COF; an effective change in the COF comes about through the offensive; 

prepare forecasts ahead of time to anticipate events and facilitate 

corrections to plans; and, in addition to evaluating quantitative and 

qualitative factors, commanders can uncover hidden factors that have the 

capability of influencing the COF.247

With conventional forces, the COF changes slowly. Nuclear 

weapons obviously can change the COF immediately, according to 

Tyushkevich. As capabilities change with the addition of high-tech 

 

244 N. V. Ogarkov, Main Editor, Voennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ (Military 

Encyclopedic Dictionary), 1983, Moscow: Military Publishing House, p. 691. 245 V. Sokolovskiy and M. Cherednichenko, “Military Strategy and its Problems,” 

Military Thought, No. 10, 1968, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from 

Military Thought (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 3-17. 246 S. Tyushkevich, “The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War,” Military 

Thought, No. 6 1969, as translated and printed in Selected Readings from Military 

Thought: 1963-1973 (in English), Volume 5, Part II, pp. 57-71. 247 Tyushkevich.
106

assets, the COF changes much more quickly and can become dependent 

on the function of time. The methods and means of using the time factor 

are interrelated with the element of surprise, which can change the COF 

quickly when properly employed. A commander’s intellectual input can 

also change the COFM in spite of the more objective quantitative and 

qualitative factors before him. Objective opportunities are dependent on 

a commander’s ability to see them and employ his subjective analysis.

The diagram below offers an image of the thought process: 

There are several examples of the COF at work today. For 

example, three new divisions and a new commander, Lieutenant General 

A. V. Kartapolov, have moved to the Western Military District. This has 

dramatically changed the COF. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, Deputy 

Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, noted that 

Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish military contingents in the Arctic are 
107

very weak, implying that the COF is in Russia’s favor there. He adds that 

the lack of US Armed Forces in the European Arctic makes it difficult to 

consider an armored battle in the Arctic ever occurring. Gareev noted in 

2010 that now we are dealing with a correlation of direct and indirect 

actions, while Gerasimov noted in 2013 that there is a correlation of 

military to nonmilitary actions to consider. In 2014 Gerasimov and the 

Chekinov and Bogdanov “team” continued to talk about forecasting and 

the COF. 

To summarize there has been continuity in the elements that 

compose Russian military thought that result in strategies. This 

continuity for the past 50 years indicates that the process is deterministic 

according to its elements and varies only based on the type of 

improvements in weaponry and the military’s understanding of the 

changing character of war.
108
109

CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIAN OFFICERS DISCUSS 

METHODOLOGICAL CONTROL

Introduction

A look at just a few article titles over the past several years 

indicates the breadth and depth of the research on conflict studies in 

recent times: “changing trends in armed struggles,” “the art of war in the 

21st century,” “military futurology,” “technosphere warfare,” and 

“forecasting future war’s nature and content” are but a few of them.

This chapter examines the work of officers who have written on 

various aspects of the Russian military thought process. Also examined 

is the way that Russian officers view Western thought processes. For 

example, when Russian views of trends are discussed, they also wrote on 

foreign trends as well. Both perspectives are described below.

Learning from Experience

There has always been a Soviet/Russian desire to study lessons 

learned. For example, no one element of Russian history has received the

same attention as the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet Union’s 

participation in World War II). This war, which resulted in a Soviet and 

allied victory and saved the world from Hitler’s Nazism, has long served 

as the cornerstone rationale for military pride and for increased spending 

and patriotic values in Soviet and Russian times. Soviet suffering and 

losses were enormous. However, lessons learned, due to the Soviet 

penchant for secrecy, came into the open only sporadically through the 

years and covered “appropriate” topics. Such secrecy made the military 

pay a price, that being its inability to pay the appropriate respect to many 

heroic actions and further study the battles in which soldiers lost their 

lives.248

 

248 This lag in covering sensitive topics (such as Soviet losses) was best signified for 

Western audiences when a former editor of a respected Russian journal came to visit 

Fort Leavenworth’s Soviet Military Studies Office (now the Foreign Military Studies 

Office). The officer, a general, was discussing with then-Director David Glantz some of 

the lessons from World War II that the office was studying. Suddenly the officer began 

to wipe tears from his eyes. He stated that Americans were studying and paying 
110

In a similar fashion, there was hardly a transparent discussion of 

Russian actions from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan. It was not until the 

1990s that real lessons learned were discussed, when most everything in 

Russia became more open due to then Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 

democratic approach to the media. The former blockade on discussing 

Russian lessons learned did not apply to their impressions of foreign 

experiences, of course. The Russian military openly discussed numerous 

aspects of US and coalition actions during Desert Storm. Their dissection 

of that war allowed the Russian military to realize how far behind it was

in the application of military power. This point became painstakingly 

clear as they entered conflict in Chechnya in December 1994, where they 

were overwhelmed by Chechen regulars in the opening phases of the 

conflict. Russia did eventually recover its ability to control Chechnya, 

and toward the end of the century Russian lessons learned became more 

transparent. This trend continued until it all but disappeared with Russian 

support of surrogates (with both troops and weapons) in Eastern Ukraine. 

Not much more has appeared in regard to Russian actions in Syria. 

Internally, there is a keen discussion underway of all aspects of the 

operation. Several lessons appear to have been applied to the recent 

Kavkaz 2016 exercises, according to Russian sources.

Examining the Thoughts of Important Authors

There are specific individuals (officers in important official 

positions and well-respected theoretical authors) whose writings discuss 

the elements of Russian military thought, as well as lessons learned from 

past wars. Input from these officers differs based on experience, 

creativity, and authority, but all are worthy of close tracking for not only 

new or creative input, but also similarities and differences in emphasis. 

Authorship includes officers associated with the General Staff and 

influential analysts who write for Russian military journals. The main 

Russian sources utilized in the discussion below are Military Thought, 

the Military-Industrial Courier (VPK), Red Star, and the Journal of the 

Academy of Military Science.

 

homage to Soviet soldiers who had sacrificed their lives for the nation in battles that, at 

the time, Russians were still not allowed to discuss openly. 
111

Several of the articles in Military Thought were the first article in 

the edition, indicating their importance, and others were either close to 

the top or put alone in the middle of an edition so that they stood out. 

Thus, the importance of these concepts was obvious to all in Russia, but 

perhaps not to foreign analysts to whom table of contents were not 

available. Few Western analysts have focused to the extent the Russians 

have on nonmilitary, indirect and asymmetric operations over the past 

decade. This is understandable, since each nation has its own set of 

analysts and experts who see things from their own perspective and 

concepts. For example, in the West the focus has been on hybrid theory,

but lately this has shifted to “gray” area studies. 

The following summary provides substance to the elements of the 

Russian thought equation offered above. The categories were expanded 

just a little and now include: trends or the changing character of 

war/foreign trends to counter; forecasts/countering foreign forecasts; 

COFM; forms and methods; key concepts; and results/conclusions.249

Under each category are specific excerpts from Russian military 

documents that support the category, arranged chronologically.

Trends/Foreign Trends

Trends or the Changing Character of War

Speed, synchronization, and simultaneity are becoming 

war’s new decisive factors; the robots-cyborgs-androids 

chain reflects the general trajectory of contemporary 

development...biology is replacing physics and chemistry 

as a class associated with the means of armed struggle; 

they can be used to destroy a food base or serve as a virus 

 

249 For a more complete view, see “Thinking Like a Russian Officer” on the FMSO 

website. For further insights on this author’s thoughts on hybrid, new-generation, and 

new-type warfare, see The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2016, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 

554-575.
112

carrier in the case of animals; this may set off a 

biological arms race.250

Nations need to be prepared for local and regional wars and be 

ready to use or confront indirect actions often fostered by the 

information struggle; air and space theaters of war are points of concern; 

high-precision weapons change the nature of hostilities.251

The weakening of states is occurring through the use of 

information, psychological, moral, climatic (causing natural disasters, 

etc.), and organizational measures;252 psychotronic, biological, and 

genetic weapons are being developed that do not rely on explosive 

power.253

The “significance and weight of nonmilitary measures in 

confrontations between countries have grown considerably”;254

nonmilitary measures are “a combination of purposeful, specific moves 

in domestic and foreign policies exercised by the state in situations when 

efforts in actions related to military policy are to be supplemented or 

superseded”;

255 nonmilitary measures can be used to prepare and launch 

wars, erode military power, destroy military systems, and defeat victims 

of aggression; nonmilitary measures prepare the battlefield through the 

potential disorganization of the control aspect of an opponent’s military 

and political leadership. 

 

250 V. I. Lutovinov, “The Development and Use of Nonmilitary Measures to Reinforce 

the Military Security of the Russian Federation,” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), 

No. 5 2009, pp. 9-11. 251 M. A. Gareev, “On Several Characteristic Aspects of Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ 

(Military Thought), No. 6, June 2003, pp. 52-59. 252S. A. Bogdanov and V. N. Gorbunov, “On the Character of Armed Confrontation in 

the Twenty-First Century,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2009, p. 8. 253 Ibid., p. 7. 254 V. I. Lutovinov, “The Development and Use of Nonmilitary Measures to Reinforce 

the Military Security of the Russian Federation,” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), 

No. 5 2009, p. 3.

255 Ibid.
113

The risk of catastrophic consequences from the use of advanced

weaponry presupposes that more nonmilitary measures, to include 

political, economic, information and other means, should be used to 

resolve conflict; 256 at times it is not coercive potential that achieves 

success but the interaction of military and nonmilitary factors.

257

Nonmilitary means of confrontation are the sum of state and social 

institutions (organizations), political, legal, and economic standards, 

spiritual values, general-purpose information, and technological 

systems.258

Technosphere warfare is better “to achieve war goals by 

attacking the adversary’s automated control systems (ACS)”; this elicits 

the need for “a concept of an entirely new type of warfare—warfare in 

an artificial environment—to be added to the theory of military art.”259

Future rivalry among nations would be for “spaces” that include 

control over northern high latitudes, space militarization, and the seas 

and continental shelves, where the rivalry is being shaped by the 

development of international legal mechanisms that were jump-started 

by technological developments, enabling the large-scale development of 

these spaces.260

The reduction of a state’s military–economic potential by 

destroying vitally important objects of infrastructure; doing command 

and control in a uniform information domain; employing precision 

weapons, using special operations forces, robotic systems, UAVs, and 

weapons based on new physical principles on a large scale; using 

 

256 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions in Support of the 

Military Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, p. 15. 257 Ibid., p. 17. 258 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 

Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, p. 13.

259 Yu. I. Starodubtsev, V. V. Bukharin, and S. S. Semyonov, “Technosphere Warfare,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7 2012, pp. 22-31. 260 Andrei Baklanov, “A War of the Future,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4, 

October-December 2013, p. 131.
114

asymmetric and indirect operations and military operations by peacetime 

force groupings.261

Military actions now include developing mid- and long-range 

hypersonic air- and sea-based guided missiles; improving algorithms and 

the technical basis of reconnaissance-strike systems; and increasing the 

potential of intelligence, command and control, and destruction 

resources.262

The nature and substance of future wars will be changed radically 

by space-based attack weapons; orbiting battle space stations; new 

weapons of improved destructive power, range, accuracy, and rate of 

fire; greater capabilities of reconnaissance and robot-controlled assets; 

automated weapons control; communication; and information warfare 

systems.263

Foreign Trends to Counter

Foreign trends, such as hybrid ones, indicate that changes must 

be instituted in Russia’s organization of defense, to include a set of 

military and nonmilitary measures to counter hybrid methods of 

pressure. Such countermeasures include falsifying events and imposing 

restrictions on the activity of the mass media. They also include 

countering foreign private military companies, subversive groups, and 

terrorists.

264

 

261 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statute on the General Staff,” Journal 

of the Academy of Military Science, No. 1 2014, p. 15. 262 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development 

of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in 

Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of 

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, p. 34. 263 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 44. 264 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013.
115

The Russian perception of US trends includes the latter’s use of

direct and indirect actions according to a specific scenario, which 

proceeds as follows. Initially a victim state is chosen and irrefutable 

proof is provided of a threat in that state. An information campaign is 

developed that shows there is no alternative to the use of force, and later 

sanctions are introduced. Coalitions are formed, political pressure is 

exerted against countries obstructing US policies, and United Nations 

Security Council permission is sought to use military force.

265 To

maintain its world hegemony, the US has conducted “systemic” 

deterrence operations against Russia;

266 Russia calls such actions 

“indirect,” using a “third force” (described as blocs or countries, 

transnational companies, separate political forces, international extremist 

organizations, and so on for whom war is beneficial).267

Information confrontation campaigns developed by an adversary 

are designed to disorganize Russia’s national development, destroy its 

sovereignty, and help change a country’s rulers. Information effects are 

equivalent to the use of armed force in some cases. The “color 

revolution” information effect primarily uses the Internet to influence the 

consciousness of people.268

The trend for the US and its allies’ use of force is not the physical 

destruction of the enemy or state infrastructure, but the leadership’s 

subordination to their will. Increasingly its foundation is nonstandard or 

“hybrid actions,” to include both measures of a military nature and those 

without the use of military force.269

 

265 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development 

of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in 

Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of 

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, p. 26. 266 Ibid., p. 28. 267 Ibid., p. 29. 268 Ibid., p. 30.

269 Ibid., p. 29.
116

Forecasting/Foreign Forecasting

Forecasts of future wars require a skillful combination of 

military, nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures 

using a variety of forms and methods and a blend of 

political, economic, information, technological, and 

environmental measures, primarily by taking advantage 

of information superiority...Forecasting is viewed as an 

instrument that helps avoid errors in identifying the 

principal avenues for promoting military art, avoiding 

paths that lead nowhere, and cutting the costs of 

maintaining military security.270

Russian forecasting

Correct forecasts alone can help determine which armed forces 

and which troops will be required as well as identify the general trends in 

which the nature of armed struggle is developing.271

The characteristics of a future war are uncertain, since a new 

world order and security system model have not been completed and an 

ongoing fight for spheres of influence, regional domination, and natural 

resources continues. Moreover, the final impact of information 

technologies on warfare is unknown.

272 There appears to be a greater use 

of artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, robot-controlled and new 

physical principle weaponry, with some weapons comparable in

efficiency to nuclear weapons. The aerospace role will grow 

significantly, where even the planet may be a theater of operations.

Automated global network systems will control troops and weapons, and 

special forces will increasingly be used.

273

 

270 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44, 

49. 

271 M. A. Gareev, “On Several Characteristic Aspects of Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ 

(Military Thought), No. 6, June 2003, p. 54. 272 S. A. Bogdanov and V. N. Gorbunov, “On the Character of Armed Confrontation in 

the Twenty-First Century,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2009, pp. 2, 11. 273 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
117

Russia’s main effort will be directed at the destruction of an 

opponent’s unified information space, sources of intelligence, navigation 

and guidance systems, and communications and command and control 

systems.274

A new-generation war (NGW) will be fought with fire strikes, 

electronic strikes, robot-controlled warfare, aerospace and mobile aerial 

operations, air assaults, information reconnaissance strikes, antireconnaissance and similar operations, and combat and other actions.

275

States will try to resolve their interstate problems through every kind of 

deterrence—by force or peacefully, or by nonmilitary and indirect 

(asymmetrical) actions.

276 Deterring an aggressor by force includes 

direct threats of attack or powerful defensive deployments, ultimatums 

regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and information campaigns to

mislead adversaries about Russia’s readiness to counter aggression.

277

The initial period of war (IPW) of NGW may determine a war’s outcome 

if forces seize or destroy key control centers, disrupt an opponent’s 

governmental and armed forces operating procedures, and/or enable 

attackers to control operations that attempt to disorganize, demoralize, 

and paralyze opponents. Subversion and provocations will be used 

against a country’s leadership. The length of the IPW depends first and 

foremost on an attacker’s end goals, perhaps lasting between four and six 

weeks.

278

NGW is based on nonmilitary options, mobile joint forces, new 

information technologies, and the employment of military space-based 

systems, EW forces and weapons, electromagnetic, information, 

infrasound, and psychotronic effects, and corrosive chemical and 

 

274 M. A. Gareev, “Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

(Red Star), No. 183, 8 October 2008, p. 8, as downloaded from Eastview.com on 17 

March, 2010.

275 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a 

Country’s Preparations for a Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 

2012, p. 23.

276 Ibid., p. 26. 277 Ibid., p. 19. 278 Ibid., p. 25.
118

biological formulations along with nontraditional forms that cause 

earthquakes, typhoons, and heavy rainfall with the potential to damage 

the economy or aggravate the socio-psychological climate.

279 New forms 

and methods of employing joint forces in operations and engagements 

will evolve.280 

One should expect the development of a set of various forces and 

means capable of disrupting the normal functioning of the planet’s 

information domain and information assets and means of life support for 

Earth’s inhabitants. NGW may not be at the operational or strategic 

levels but planetary: planetary aggressors can provoke technogenic 

catastrophes in large economic regions and sections of the world with 

information networks and assets. After 2050 ecological weapons may 

also be developed for directed effects against countries’ mineral and 

biological resources, local areas of a biosphere (atmosphere, 

hydrosphere, lithosphere), and climate resources.281

The spectrum of tasks before the General Staff is conditioned by 

the fast-moving character and dynamic employment of military and 

nonmilitary means coordinated according to time, place, direction, 

forces, means, and resources.282 An important task is the forecasting and 

assessment of military threats.

283

Two types of forecasting are exploratory and normative 

prognoses. Exploratory prognoses, the best developed in the military 

sphere, define trends, directions, and regularities in military processes; 

 

279 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New–Generation 

War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2013, pp. 13-25. 280 Ibid., p. 17. 281 V. Slipchenko, “Information Resources and Information Confrontation: their 

Evolution, Role, and Place in Future War,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 10 

2013, p. 53.

282 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved 

by the President of the Russian Federation,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin 

of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22. 283 Ibid.
119

however, the precision of foresight is inversely proportional to the lapsed 

time period squared, and therefore is replete with miscalculation.

284

Normative prognosis includes mathematical modeling methods, systems 

analysis, operational research methods, objective trees, theoretical 

graphs, and network methods.

285

Indirect actions are reflected in improved methods of 

asymmetric, information, and unorthodox activities, using surprise and 

the time factor, for example, to advantage.

286 With regard to surprise, 

Chekinov and Bogdanov note that ruses in warfare “were seen as a

rational and necessary device, and acted as a coefficient of increasing the 

force and might of attacks. Refusing to employ cunning in war, 

conversely, undermined one’s own strength.”287 Twenty-first century 

military art will have different forms and methods of struggle, where 

nonmilitary and indirect actions will dominate with stratagems and 

surprise helping in their application.288

There has been a change in the essence and content of armed 

conflicts.

289 The opposing sides will inflict damage predominantly on 

enemy weapons and military equipment instead of enemy personnel, so 

that the course and outcome of armed struggle will rely on the ability of 

the opposing sides to regenerate weapons and military equipment created 

on the basis of the latest technologies. This requires the implementation 

of sets of nontraditional measures (timely creation of reserves of 

different information resources, etc.).

290 Troops will be equipped with 

 

284 S. G. Chekinov and S. A.Bogdanov, “Military Futurology: Its Origin, Development, 

Role, and Place within Military Science,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8 

2014, pp. 26-27. 285 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 286 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning of the 21st

Century: Problems and Opinions,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2015, p. 

42.

287 Ibid. 288 Ibid., p. 43.

289 P. A. Dul’nev and V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Principal Changes in the Nature of Armed 

Struggle in the First Third of the 21st Century,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2015, pp. 44-51.

290 Ibid.
120

directed energy weapons and resources to cause software failures and 

increase opportunities for surprise actions. New trends to forecast will 

include an increase in the intensity of armed struggle, a reduction of the 

duration of operations, and the conduct of armed struggles for more 

decisive goals.291

Nonstandard forms and methods are being developed. Russia’s 

new-type warfare includes “asymmetric” methods for confronting an 

enemy. Measures include the use of Special Forces, foreign agents, 

various forms of information effects, and other nonmilitary forms. For 

each conflict a different set of asymmetric operations will be created.292

Forecasts of future wars require a skillful combination of 

military, nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures using a variety of 

forms and methods and a blend of political, economic, information, 

technological, and environmental measures, primarily by taking 

advantage of information superiority.293 Forecasting is viewed as an 

instrument that helps avoid errors in identifying the principal avenues for 

promoting military art, avoiding paths that lead nowhere, and cutting the 

costs of maintaining military security.

294 Military science must use this 

methodology to validate the substance and nature of future wars and 

even to develop strategy. Russia must look for new forms and methods 

of using violent and nonviolent measures and indirect moves to protect 

its national interests. Renowned Soviet military theorist A. A. Svechin 

said one cannot restrict oneself to entrenched stereotypes if one want to 

conduct strategic forecasts of the nature and substance of future wars.295

 

291 Ibid. 292 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development 

of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in 

Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of 

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, pp. 35-36.

293 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 44. 

294 Ibid., p. 49. 

295 Ibid., p. 42.
121

Forecasting shows that future wars will have opening (about one

month) and closing (which must be as short as possible) periods. 

Forecasts of the geostrategic situation are made and linkages assessed 

between warfare that employs the use of arms and the use of nonviolent 

and nonmilitary measures.296

Countering Foreign Geopolitical Advances

There have been several recommendations suggested to counter 

Western geopolitical advances: get Cuba back as an ally; develop a 

friendship with another Latin American country, such as Nicaragua; 

establish a support port for the Russian Navy in Syria; continue to 

support Iran; reestablish Russia’s links with all nations of the Caucasus; 

and form up once again the Mediterranean Sea Operational Squadron.297

Countering Western civilizations cognitive advances have been 

equally troubling. The West devised a unique indirect approach, the socalled “organizational weapon,” that allowed it to win the “cold psychoinformation war.” This became known as the cognitive information 

phase of organizational weaponry, and was defined by S. Chernyshev as 

the employment of systems designed to eliminate a certain society, 

organization, company, or family (the mission does not have to be on a 

global scale).

298 They noted that metaprogramming involved “installing 

program filters that force the client to perceive the world in a way 

desired by the programmers.

299 [Note: this explanation is very close to 

the understanding of reflexive control theory]. 

As perceived by Russia, specific US threats are the global strike 

strategic-operational concept, the network-centric concept, weapons 

based on new physical principles, globally integrated operations, and the 

 

296 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 47.

297 Vladimir Kozhemyakin, “Caribbean, Iran, and the Caucasus—Three Painful 

Calluses for the US,” Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts), No. 38, 17 September 

2008, p. 9 as downloaded from Eastview.com on 18 March 2010.

298 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 

Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, p. 10.

299 Ibid., p. 11.
122

use of outer space and cyberspace.

300 Advanced combat action forms 

will include operations by mobile inter-service groupings active within 

the unified reconnaissance and information space that employ 

qualitatively new systems of command, control, and support, with threats 

neutered by advanced information technologies that reduce spatial, 

temporal, and information gaps between troops (forces) and facilities in 

operations and between bodies of command and control of unified 

groupings. Remote noncontact impact on the adversary will be the chief 

method of attaining the objectives of combat actions and operations, and 

obliterating differences among the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels and between offensive and defensive activities.301

Gerasimov noted that the emphasis on the methods of fighting

moves toward the complex application of political, economic, 

information, and other nonmilitary means, carried out with the support of 

military force, also known as the so-called hybrid methods. To counter 

hybrid techniques two deterrence-type approaches are required. 

Internally the country’s military and civilian assets must be mobilized to 

neutralize threats and counter or deter hybrid methods. Externally, 

Russia’s cooperation with foreign countries and organizations such as 

the CSTO, SCO, and BRICS help deter foreign aggression through a 

demonstration of solidarity. Russia must be prepared to protect state 

interests against an adversary’s employment of both traditional and 

hybrid methods of confrontation.302

Military Strategy/Correlation of Forces

In a late 2016 edition of Military Thought, the lead article was a

very long and thought provoking article on the topic of military 

 

300 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning of the 21st

Century: Problems and Opinions,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), Vol. 1 2015, p. 

38.

301 Ibid., p. 39. 302 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Syrian Experience. Hybrid Warfare Requires HighTech Weapons and Scientific Substantiation,” Military Industrial Courier 

Online, 9-15 March 2016.
123

strategy.303 The article was significant for two reasons: there has been 

only one or two articles in this journal on the topic over the past decade; 

and the purpose of the article was to discuss the drastic changes in the 

military strategic situation of the past few decades, since the forms of 

employing the Armed Forces has expanded and new methods of warfare 

have emerged.304 The old definition of strategy needs updating as a 

result, in the authors’ opinion.

Numerous issues of military strategy were discussed, to include 

its essence, tasks, elements, role, nature, principles, purpose, and content, 

among others. For this discussion, only the latter three will be examined.

The purpose of military strategy in the future, the authors 

contend, consists in guaranteeing the safety of Russia’s development, as 

well as the external and internal sovereignty of the country in complex 

geopolitical conditions of interstate relations.305 The principles of 

military strategy as a result will change as humanity progresses, 

especially in regard to new developments in science and technology. 

Peacetime principles of military strategy include the following:

• Strategic deterrence and the anticipation of the 

military, political, and strategic situation

• Identification of military threats and their trustworthy 

assessment

• Correspondence of strategic goals and tasks as to the 

political objectives of war

• Preparation of the state for defense well in advance

• Timely buildup of strategic reserves and stocks

• Prevention of war.306

 

303 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Military Strategy: a Look into the Future,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11, 2016, pp. 3-15. 304 Ibid., p. 4. 305 Ibid., p. 5. 306 Ibid., p. 7.
124

Wartime principles include the following:

• Unexpected, resolute, and continuous strategic actions

• Asymmetric actions

• Coordinated use of cross-service groupings of troops 

(forces)

• Firm and continuous leadership of the Armed Forces

• Seizure and maintenance of the strategic initiative

• Preventive actions.307

The principles of military strategy have become the initial theoretical 

provisions from which state and military leaders make decisions on 

defense and security issues.308

Due to the recent emphasis on non-military activities, the content 

of military strategy has changed. It now includes the Armed Forces 

employment in anti-crisis situations, peacekeeping operations, internal 

military cooperation, and disarmament issues, among others. Economic 

and political factors will now influence military strategy in a greater way 

than before. The essence of military strategy, defined as the military 

activity of the state to realize doctrinal precepts, will affect the factors 

and forms of military strategy’s content.309 The content of military 

strategy has thus changed as well and will include the following:

• Discovering and assessing the views and opportunities 

of leading states and coalitions to prepare, unleash, 

and conduct war and combat actions on a strategic 

scale

• Revealing the potential nature of future warfare, 

above all its strategic content and ways to prevent it 

beyond power measures, such as the use of nonviolent 

means (to include indirect and asymmetric actions)

 

307 Ibid. 308 Ibid.

309 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
125

• Defining the tasks of the Armed Forces (AF) in war 

and in strategic operations, as well as the means to 

this end

• Substantiating the methods, forms, and conditions for 

preparing and conducting war on the whole

• Strategic planning of the AF’s employment in 

prospective wars and strategic operations, and use of 

combined cross-service troop (force) groupings

• Command and control of the AF in peace-and wartime

• Providing strategic, moral and psychological, and 

logistical support of AF actions

• Working out military strategic requirements for 

military construction and buildup of the AF, and 

preparation of the state for defense.310

The authors note that military strategy’s content is not a constant 

due to changes in the military, sociopolitical, economic, and other 

spheres. However, the greatest influence will come from military threats 

and dangers and the results of science-and-technology progress, 

especially the latter’s impact on the forms and methods of their 

employment.311

Finally, the authors state that military strategy’s content, and its 

place in military art, will be “radically affected by new approaches to 

realizing the strategy of indirect moves” and the increasing importance 

of asymmetric and nonviolent measures. The form of strategic operations 

will include political isolation, economic sanctions, sea, air, and ground 

communication blockades, intimidation by force, and the introduction of 

peacekeepers under the pretext of human rights protection.312

One other item of interest in the article was the number of times 

that the elements of military thought (trends, forecasting, forms, and 

 

310 Ibid., p. 10. 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid., p. 12.
126

methods) were used. For one thing, their usage demonstrates the terms 

continued emphasis. For another, it offers new and updated ways of 

considering them. The term trend was used 25 times, forecasting was not 

used at all (but the word prognosticate was used twice), and forms and 

methods (together) were used 6 times. Separately, forms were used 10 

times and methods 13 times. Two other terms, indirect and asymmetric, 

often used to expand on how military art will be considered, were used 6 

times together. Indirect was used separately 4 times and asymmetric was 

used 3 times. 

Several other authors have also underscored the fact that as the 

methods of waging armed conflicts change, significant emphasis should 

be placed on the correlation of direct and indirect actions in strategy. 

Indirect actions are tied to political, economic, and psychological 

influences on the enemy and to methods of feeding him disinformation 

and destroying him from within.313 Another key factor is the impact of 

information systems as a vital component of not only communications 

and reconnaissance but also strike assets, to include the impact of 

artificial intelligence on robotics.

In the 21st century there will be a shift toward aerospace: longer 

range, greater power and accuracy, possibility of consecutive and 

simultaneous attacks across the entire theater of operations by piloted 

and pilotless aerial vehicles. This requires a four-to eight-fold superiority 

of the attacker’s air force over an adversary’s defense314 [note: a COF

assessment].

Gerasimov notes that 21st century wars are not even declared. 

Nonmilitary methods now surpass military actions by a 4:1 ratio; this 

takes place with the involvement of the population’s protest potential and 

 

313 M.A. Gareev, “Lessons and Conclusions Drawn From the Experience of the Great 

Patriotic War for Building Up and Training the Armed Forces,” Voennaya Mysl’

(Military Thought), No. 5 2010, p. 20. 314 S. V. Kuralenko, “Tendencies in the Changing Character of Armed 

Struggles in Military Conflicts in the First Half of the 21st Century,” Voennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 2012, pp. 41-42.
127

information warfare measures. Remote noncontact influence methods are 

achieving the goals of battles and operations, and new methods of 

carrying out military operations (no-fly zones, private military 

companies, etc.) are being used.315 The design of an efficient armed 

forces contingent in Russia depends, in large degree, on finding an 

optimal COFM of armed struggle.316

By the end of the 20th century prognostication was a branch of 

military science, with over 150 methods worked out, and RF MOD 

research organizations now use an improved version of the COF in 

various calculations.317 These calculations are consistent with Russia’s 

more applied math approach to predicting conflict, as opposed to the US 

approach, which relies heavily on historical analysis.

The development of weapons based on new physical and 

technological principles will change the percentage contribution [note: 

COFM] of various types of effects (fire, energy, software) used to 

destroy the enemy. This will cause a change in resource dependence for 

armed struggles.318

Forms (Organizations) and Methods (Weapons and Military Art)

Putin stated in 2006 that, “we should not chase after quantitative 

indicators...our responses will have to be based on intellectual 

superiority. They will be asymmetrical, less costly.”319 The asymmetric 

approach to ensuring military security is the sum total of the forms and 

 

315 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand 

Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 26 February 2013. 316 Ibid. 317 S. G. Chekinov and S. A.Bogdanov, “Military Futurology: Its Origin, Development, 

Role, and Place within Military Science,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8 

2014, p. 26.

318 P. A. Dul’nev and V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Principal Changes in the Nature of Armed 

Struggle in the First Third of the 21st Century,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2015, pp. 44-51.

319 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions in Support of the 

Military Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, pp. 20-

21.
128

methods of employing forces and assets based on the sides’ non-identical 

capabilities, making it possible to avoid (diminish the consequences of) a

confrontation or a direct armed clash with a potential adversary. This 

includes implementing measures to induce apprehension, demonstrating 

readiness and capabilities, and operating to deter via the guaranteed 

engagement of an opponent’s most vulnerable military assets and other 

strategically important facilities (command and control agencies, major 

industrial enterprises, hazards [dams, water, nuclear power stations], and 

critically important communications facilities). Deterrence can include 

threatening to use environmental and socio-political catastrophes as 

well.

320 

The strategy of indirect operations is characterized by the 

multiplicity of forms and methods of operations employed, including the 

conduct of information and remote (noncontact) confrontations, the 

segmented use of fires and strikes (land, air, sea), and, in the not too 

distant future, antisatellite operations. The US uses this strategy now to 

neutralize adversaries without weapons through information 

superiority.321 New technologies and concepts, such as network-centric 

operations, play a significant role in the forms and methods of future 

conflict.

322

Some so-called nonmilitary forms and means of warfare saw 

unprecedented technological development and acquired a very 

dangerous, practically violent character. For example, covert cyberattacks can cause serious complications in the energy, banking, and 

financial systems of opposing countries, so it will be unclear against 

whom to declare war.323 Forces can include the use of special operations 

 

320 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 321 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions in Support of the 

Military Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, pp. 19-

20.

322 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a 

Country’s Preparations for a Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 

2012, p. 19.

323 M. A. Gareev, “Anticipate Changes in the Nature of War: Every Era Has Its Own 

Kind of Military Conflict, and its Own Constraints, and its Own Special Biases,” 
129

forces and internal oppositions for the creation of a “continually 

operating front over the entire territory of the opposing state, and also 

information influence, the forms and methods of which are continually 

being improved.”324 Information conflict, in particular, opens up 

“extensive asymmetric capabilities for the reduction of an enemy’s 

combat potential.”325

Space reconnaissance assets are a principal source of information 

during the planning, organization, and conduct of combat operations, 

where radio-technical, radar, photo, TV, infrared, and radiation 

reconnaissance are continuously carried out, providing information in 

real time. Space assets support the guidance of precision cruise missiles 

to targets.

326 Each country preparing or already prepared for noncontact 

warfare will want to fully control near-Earth and interplanetary space. 

Command and control of all combat intelligence systems, forces, and 

assets will be implemented from command posts in space and in the air, 

or from protected command posts on the ground, radically changing the 

content and nature of warfare, where it is not masses of forces, but rather 

recce-strike and defensive combat systems that will clash in noncontact 

warfare characterized not by the quantitative and qualitative superiority 

of one of the sides, but rather by structural and organizational factors, 

effectiveness of command and control, and the quality of 

communications and guidance systems in support of military 

operations.327

Forms and methods are studied by the General Staff’s Center for 

Military and Strategic Studies. 27 central science and research 

institutions are looking at command, control, and communications 

systems; 46 such institutions are examining the development of weapon 

 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 5 June 

2013. 

324 Ibid. 325 Ibid. 326 V. Slipchenko, “Information Resources and Information Confrontation: their 

Evolution, Role, and Place in Future War,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 10 

2013, p. 56.

327 Ibid., p. 57.
130

systems; 18 such institutions, as well as the Center for the Study of the 

Military Potential of Foreign Countries, are examining intelligence 

issues; and 25 such institutions and the Main Science and 

Methodological Center are studying logistics.328

The types and methods of armed struggle imply a more “active 

employment of nonmilitary measures and indirect actions in interstate 

confrontation.”329 Supporting the development of these measures and 

actions are the forms and methods of preparing and conducting warfare, 

which Chekinov and Bogdanov believe are the most important tasks of 

military art.

330 Indirect actions display a great diversity of forms and 

methods of nonmilitary measures and nonviolent actions, especially in 

the information and remote (noncontact) confrontation.

331 Military art, 

the theory of preparing and conducting armed struggle on land, sea, and 

space, encompasses organizing, conducting, and supporting operations 

and actions. 332

Weapon volumes to control information objectives will increase, 

leading to “the development of forms and methods of operations aimed 

at the achievement of superiority in command and control and the 

destruction of the enemy’s precision weapons of various ranges.”333

Further, the development of space systems will cause a future 

redistribution of the percentages of traditional and new weapons to 

destroy the enemy during land (land-air, air-naval) operations. The 

percentage of rocket forces during the fire destruction of the enemy in 

 

328 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statue on the General Staff, Approved 

by the President of the Russian Federation,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin 

of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22.

329 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Art of War at the Beginning of the 21st

Century: Problems and Opinions,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2015, p. 

34.

330 Ibid., p. 36. 331 Ibid., p. 37. 332 Ibid., p. 33.

333 P. A. Dul’nev and V. I. Orlyanskiy, “Principal Changes in the Nature of Armed 

Struggle in the First Third of the 21st Century,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 

(Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2015, pp. 44-51.
131

operations may increase, and aviation employment may be reduced.

334

Developing directed energy weapons and the software means of 

destruction enables the reduction of explosives.

335

The West is using new forms of confrontation, combining 

military and nonmilitary resources, the latter including political, 

economic, and information effects are being employed as well. Russia 

will counter with the further development of strategic nuclear forces, 

Spetnaz, and an increase in the potential of its force groupings on 

threatened axes, where it will utilize reconnaissance, fire destruction 

assets, and the command and control of troops and weapons as priority 

improvements.336

Developing doctrine requires insights into the forms and methods 

of violent and nonmilitary actions, which are required before reforms, 

military economies, and infrastructures can be upgraded. Military 

science must be able to handle the transformation of views on the nature 

of threats, changes in the forms and methods of wars conducted by joint 

and cross-service task forces, the laws of warfare, and new areas of 

military art’s development.

337 Nuclear weapons will have reduced 

significance.

Gerasimov requested that the Academy of Military Science 

develop new forms and methods to counter hybrid threats. The scientific 

development of the forms and methods of applying joint institutional 

groups and sequences of military and nonmilitary actions must be 

considered for crisis situations. The Academy should focus on the new 

perspective vectors of military research, the evolution of new forms of 

strategic activities of the Armed Forces, space and information warfare, 

the development of prospective armaments [author: methods], the study 

 

334 Ibid. 335 Ibid. 336 V. V. Gerasimov, “New Forms of Confrontation Employed by Western Countries 

will be Considered when Developing Russia’s Defense Plan,” Armeiskiy Sbornik (Army 

Journal), No. 3 2015. 337 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 48.
132

of the nature of modern warfare, and the problems of strategic deterrence

(finding ways to deter hybrid pressures with nonnuclear means).

338 New 

models of weapons, such as robotic systems, a future 

telecommunications infrastructure, and an aerospace defense system

must be created, and strategic deterrence forces must be developed.

339 

Information resources must be viewed as potential effective weapons 

that can be used against Russia.340

A VPK report noted the development of direct-flow hypersonic 

jet engines and flight management systems; super-high-yield warheads; 

laser weapons; small, medium, and large robot-based platforms (the 

force must be increased by 20-30 percent with robotized models of 

arms); electrothermal chemical and electrodynamic guns with high-speed 

projectiles; super-high-yield electromagnetic pulse generators; 

multispectral optical target detection devices; ultra-broadband radars 

with phased-array antennas based on radio photon elements; zonal 

rapidly deployed active and passive hydro-acoustic systems for 

interpreting underwater situational awareness; and means of conducting 

information wars (particularly in cyberspace) and cognitive control.

341

The report went on to state that new models of nonlethal devices are 

being developed as well.

Operational Design

There is little written in the open press on operational design. In 

one of the few references to the topic, Lieutenant General Ivan 

Aleksandrovich Buvaltsev, chief of the RF AF Main Combat Training 

Directorate, stated the following to a question about an exercise scenario:

 

338 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Syrian Experience. Hybrid Warfare Requires HighTech Weapons and Scientific Substantiation,” Military Industrial Courier 

Online, 9-15 March 2016. 339 Ibid. 340 Ibid. 341 Konstantin Sivkov, “Information is the Best Defense. Scientists Call for Sixth 

Technological Generation to Be Adopted into the Armory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online (Military-Industrial Courier Online), 25 June 2014.
133

Here you cannot talk about a scenario as a whole, so to 

speak, because these are not planned exercises, shall we 

say, that are conducted according to a single operational 

design, as when we are trying to comprehend the 

development of an operational-strategic situation. The 

start was specified (the operational alert) and the 

performance of tasks according to combat assignments. 

That is to say, these plans are to stipulate that formations 

and combined formations should go to their designated 

areas and perform their intended tasks.342

Other than this reference, the term has not appeared in the Russian 

military’s open press. Another way to translate zamysel operatsii is 

operational content or operational intent. However, these terms were also 

seldom used. 

Major Concepts

IPW is the Key to Success

The main objectives of future wars will be achieved in the 

opening phase, which will become the turning point of the war.”343 It 

will include destroying military and government control centers,

disrupting the system for controlling a country, and targeting the 

military-industrial infrastructure. It will also include air, fire, and 

electronic attacks followed by paratroopers, Special Forces, and then 

land forces in the final stage. It was noted that the nuclear deterrent could 

be used against an opponent who has attacked using conventional 

weapons.

344

The IPW was defined as when warring states “conduct military 

operations involving groups of their armed forces that were deployed 

before the start of the war to achieve their short-range strategic 

 

342 Interview of Ivan Buvaltsev by Sergey Buntman and Anatoliy Yermolin, “Military 

Council: Surprise Inspection of Combat Readiness of Troops of the Eastern Military 

District,” Echo Moskvy Online, 27-29 July 2013. 343 Sivkov, p. 13. 344 S. A. Bogdanov and V. N. Gorbunov, “On the Character of Armed Confrontation in 

the Twenty-First Century,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2009, pp. 13-14.
134

objectives or to create favorable conditions for committing their main 

forces and continuing with more operations.”345 The IPW can come into 

play when a conflict is induced by natural resource depletion, the 

shrinkage of economies, rising demographic and ethno-political tensions 

in some countries, or widening gaps in economic development and living 

standards. It has new political, economic, and military conditions that 

change its parameters, which accords with history’s lessons that each 

war appears as a special case with different factors affecting the IPW.

346

The projected speed of future wars may not allow countries time to put 

their economies on a war footing, making it even more important to 

prevent potential adversaries from achieving military and technological 

superiority [note: there appear to be three phases to an IPW plan; 

committing forces in secret before war begins; creating conditions for the 

main force; and being aware that new conditions will continuously 

change initial parameters].347

The goals of IPW will be attained through the employment of 

military, economic, and information technology measures in 

combination with efficient psychological information.348 New

technologies include capabilities in outer space, information warfare, 

cyberspace, and weapons based on new physical principles (beam, 

geophysical, wave, genetic, and psychophysical).

349

Information Superiority is a Priority

Information superiority includes domination in space and 

reconnaissance systems, and in warning, navigation, meteorological, 

command and control, and communication assets; advantages in 

numbers of recce-strike systems and precision missiles; speed of 

 

345 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a 

Country’s Preparations for a Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 

2012, pp. 14-27. 346 Ibid., p. 17. 347 Ibid., p. 18. 348 Ibid.

349 Ibid.
135

introducing new programs, systems, and capabilities; and reliable 

information protection of assets.350

Information has been used to mislead, surprise, intimidate, or 

undermine leaders of an opposing force in the past, usually in tactical 

situations. Contemporary conditions show that information effects

(indirect operations) now are capable of strategic missions. Strategic 

information confrontation can disorganize military and state command 

and control measures, dupe the adversary, create public opinion, 

organize antigovernment demonstrations, and lower the opposing sides 

resolve to resist.351 Clearly the side with information superiority will be 

the first to utilize these advantages.

In 2011 it was noted that information’s impact can tackle 

strategic tasks and that strategic information confrontations are used to 

disorganize an opponent, deceive him, create a desired public opinion, 

organize antigovernment protests, etc.352 Information technologies can 

affect individuals and the mass consciousness of a nation or the systems 

of government and military control. Without information security a state 

can lose its political sovereignty, economic independence, and role as a 

world leader.353

Special information campaigns include broadcasts, the 

mobilization of reservists, the relocation of army units, and the 

deployment of reserves from the heartland to influence adversaries, 

backed up by false activities that are produced such that adversary 

 

350 V. Slipchenko, “Information Resources and Information Confrontation: their 

Evolution, Role, and Place in Future War,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 10 

2013, p. 52.

351 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions in Support of the 

Military Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, p. 20. 352 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 

Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, p. 6. 353 Ibid., p. 9.
136

reconnaissance units will capture them and think they are real.

354 Mass 

media can be used to stir up chaos and confusion in government and 

military management or command and control. The media can instill 

ideas of violence, treachery, and immorality in another nation to 

demoralize the public [note: which appeared to be a Russian action 

vector in Ukraine].

355 Chekinov and Bogdanov note that the danger 

associated with the mass media means that it must be kept under 

government control; national information sources must be kept from 

adversarial influence. A psychological information attack is directed 

against information exchanges in cyber space in a bid to achieve 

information superiority and cause damage to the adversary.356 Attaining 

information superiority is thus a priority if strategic objectives are to be 

achieved in NGW, and can be an IPW priority, to be followed by 

conventional weapons.357

Information struggles will sharply grow between command and 

control systems of strike and strategic defense forces at various levels; 

between strike and defensive assets of the countries; over the creation of 

a complex information and interference situation in the entire aerospace 

domain in the region of combat operations and the entire theater of war 

(military operations); over imposing on the enemy one’s own rules for 

conducting military operations; and over a reliance on information 

support for military-technological superiority. Information confrontation 

is becoming the factor that will substantially influence future warfare 

itself—its beginning, course, and outcome. Information confrontation in 

noncontact warfare should be understood as a new strategic form of 

struggle in which special methods and resources act on an enemy’s 

information environment while protecting one’s own to achieve strategic 

goals.

358 The possession of information assets in future warfare is 

becoming as indispensable an attribute as possession of forces and 

 

354 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a 

Country’s Preparations for a Future War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 

2012, p. 25.

355 Ibid., p. 27. 356 Ibid., p. 25. 357 Ibid., p. 24. 358 Ibid., p. 54.
137

means, arms, munitions, transport, and so on in past wars, and will result 

in the achievement of strategic and political goals.359

Information war is the start point of every action in a “new type 

of warfare (a hybrid war)” in which broad use is made of the mass media 

and computer networks (blogs, social sites, etc.). New information 

techniques, operating in the nanosecond format, are the decisive factor 

for military success, and are based on new technologies that are key 

components of information weapons, capable of paralyzing computer 

systems controlling troops and weapons and depriving the enemy of 

information transmission functions. Computers may become strategic 

weapons in future wars.

360 Information and psychological warfare come 

in all forms and methods. Future wars will be launched by EW forces, 

which protect friendly forces, block foreign propaganda disinformation, 

and strike at enemy EW forces and assets. They blend with strategic 

operations of the armed forces and with aerospace operations, augmented 

by cruise missiles, and reconnaissance “outfits (UAVs, robots)” 

delivering strikes and fires. Strategic goals in future wars require that 

information superiority is assured over the enemy. Russia should look

out for new-type wars (hybrid), including those actions to influence the 

behavior of the armed forces of Russia or to instigate internal tensions in 

society.361

Indirect and Asymmetric Operations

Military art is at a level where deeper views are needed on 

methods of conducting operations, engagements, and battles according to 

the principle of the dialectic continuity of experience that is accumulated 

from the past. The strategy of the indirect approach (SIA) is taking 

precedence over a strategy of force as a key to success. The SIA is 

characterized by a diversity in the forms and methods of military action; 

these include information warfare, stand-off warfare, segmented 

polycentric and EW strikes, and ground and naval, air and space, and 

 

359 Ibid., p. 55. 360 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “A Forecast of Future Wars: Meditation on 

What They Will Look Like,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, p. 44. 361 Ibid., p. 45.
138

anti-satellite operations. The US uses this type of asymmetric strategy 

today.

362

Information’s impact today can address strategic tasks. It was 

highlighted that “military command now has information-psychological 

weapons, i.e., special weapons based on the use of destructive 

information-psychological and information suppressing impact on the 

human psyche to direct or suppress human behavior and activity.”363

Included in such weaponry are the mass media, energy-informationpsychological weapons, psychotropic-information, bioenergeticsinformation, information-energy, virtual information-psychological 

weapons, somatropic-psychological-information weapons, and computer 

telecommunication networks. These weapons would be employed with 

other strike and EW assets (new weapon types), new tactical methods, 

and deception and stratagems.

364

Commanders have always tried to control an adversary’s conduct 

on the psychological (reflexive) level by using military stratagems 

(decoys, feints, etc.). Vorobyov and Kiselev note that in World War II, 

“reflexive control of the enemy’s conduct was achieved by implementing 

an array of measure and activities, interconnected by goal, place, and 

time and designed to foil the adversary’s plans...”365

The re-division of territory and markets is now being achieved 

through the indirect approach and the employment of nonmilitary means, 

such as political, economic, information, and climatic measures. 

Nonmilitary means show affinity for the concept of the indirect approach 

or indirect strategy366 [note: in their article on asymmetric operations, 

Chekinov and Bogdanov wrote that “asymmetric approaches and 

 

362 I. N. Vorobyov and V. A. Kiselev, “The New Strategy of the Indirect Approach,” 

Military Thought, Vol. 4 2006 of the Eastview publication Military Thought: A Russian 

Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, pp. 30-31 (in English). 363 Ibid., p. 31. 364 Ibid. 365 Ibid., p. 34. 366 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Strategy of the Indirect Approach: Its 

Impact on Modern Warfare,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2011, p. 4.
139

operations are close in terms of content to the strategy of indirect 

operations.”367 Thus, these authors would have you believe that the 

indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary approaches are actually quite close 

to one another in meaning]. “Given the current reality, it appears 

expedient for Russia to map out and eventually implement a strategy of 

indirect approach as its state strategy without an alternative.”368

Vorobyov and Kiselev write that a cyber-security plan must draw 

upon the strategy of asymmetric actions. Included in this approach are 

the following points: replacing monotony and stereotypes with multiple 

functions; combining centralization and decentralization instead of rigid 

hierarchy in command and control; using joint efforts rather than each 

unit for itself; using symmetry in place of asymmetry and asymmetry in 

place of symmetry; using alternatives instead of set-course actions; 

preempting against go-slow or wait-and-see attitudes; using modules 

instead of open-ended formations; using multipolarity in place of 

monopolarity; and using multiplicity instead of singularity.

369 They 

stated that fire strike maneuver in cyberspace is performed, based on 

mobility and surprise. New types of weapons include cyber weapons, 

ultrahigh-frequency weapons, directed energy weapons, and others, as 

present-day warfare is a competition in intelligence, information and 

reconnaissance gathering, and navigational abilities.370

Wars are now asymmetrical, that is, fought by adversaries with 

different technologies and different stages of development of their armed 

forces in terms of weapons, forms, and methods of fighting.371 An 

asymmetric operation is a weak adversary’s strategy that is designed to 

combat a strong adversary. Such operations involve the following: the 

unpredictability of the outcome of engagements even in the face of the 

 

367 “Asymmetric Actions...,” pp. 19-20. 368 “Indirect Approach...,” p. 13.

369 I. N. Vorobyov and V. A. Kiselev, “Indirect Warfare in Cyberspace,” Voennaya 

Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 12 2014, pp. 21-28. 370 Ibid. 371 P. A. Dulnev and E. A. Bryuzgin, “The Probable Character of Future Warfare,”

Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2,

2005, pp. 126-127.
140

clear incommensurability of the sides’ COF; probing for the strong side’s 

weaknesses; indirect military operations; and the inability of the strong 

side to defend positions or suppress a weak adversary.

372 Asymmetric 

operations are characterized by qualitative differences in employing new 

(nontraditional) means of armed struggle and forms and methods of 

waging it, yet are close in content to the strategy of indirect 

operations.373

Foreign experiences must not be copied. Each war requires an 

understanding of its own particular unique character.374 Asymmetric 

operations are inherent to a conflict situation in which, by means of an 

economic, diplomatic, information, and indirect military nature, a weaker 

enemy uses an asymmetric strategy (tactics) to conduct an armed 

struggle in accordance with his available limited resources to level the 

stronger side’s military-technological superiority. A very important 

condition for conducting asymmetric operations is the precise 

determination of the enemy’s most vulnerable and weakest areas, action 

against which will provide the maximum effect with minimal 

expenditure of one’s own forces and resources.

Asymmetric operational principles include maintaining 

covertness of preparations for the conduct of operations; persuading the 

weak side to use prohibited means to conduct military operations; 

concentrating efforts against the enemy’s most vulnerable locations 

(targets); searching for and exposing the enemy’s weak points; imposing 

on the enemy one’s own variant (one’s own will) for the course of the 

conflict; and expending low resources with respect to enemy actions. 

The goal is to achieve superiority or parity with results.

 

372 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Asymmetric Actions in Support of the 

Military Security of Russia,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 3 2010, p. 16. 373 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 374 V. V. Gerasimov, “Principal Tendencies in the Development of the Forms and 

Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding 

their Improvement,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, 2013, No. 1, pp. 24-

29.
141

To confront asymmetric opponents it is necessary to employ 

numerically small, specially trained contingents of troops; conduct 

preventive operations and make use of covert agent intelligence; explain 

work among the local population; switch to nonmilitary ways of exerting 

pressure on a weak adversary; and rely on indirect and nonmilitary 

operations.

375

Results of the Military Thought Process

It is important to state at the outset that exactly when in the 

thought process a new concept or template for the application of power is 

developed is not clear. It could, for example, come immediately after a 

forecast is developed, or it could be the result of the COFM and forms 

and methods process. 

Russia’s military thought template to date has resulted in two 

very different outcomes: the NGW and new-type warfare concepts. Both 

have only been discussed completely on one occasion each. NGW in an 

article in Military Thought by Chekinov and Bogdanov in 2013; newtype war in an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science

in 2015 by Kartapolov. Of interest is that now Chekinov and Bogdanov 

use the latter terminology rather than NGW. Gerasimov used new-type 

once in 2013 and has not used new-generation at all, according to 

available open sources. Hence, the current open-source focus clearly is 

on new-type warfare and not NGW.

With regard to the 2013 NGW discussion, Chekinov and 

Bogdanov stated that information superiority and anticipatory operations 

will be the main ingredients for success in NGWs, citing several 

characteristics.376 The characteristics are information, social media, 

nonlethal or bio or color revolution related; reconnaissance, aerospace,

and robot related; and the importance of the IPW. 

 

375 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “The Nature and Content of a New–Generation 

War,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 2013, p. 18. 376 Ibid.
142

Conflict or wars would play out in the following manner. First, 

the aggressive side would use nonmilitary actions such as a distributed 

attack, designed to strike at a country’s social system via a 

disinformation campaign to conceal the commencement date and scale of 

operations, which requires the attainment of information superiority.

377

Second, decisive information environment battles would include the 

remote manipulation of “intelligent machines” such as a quantum 

computer, which can operate in the nanosecond range, employing speed 

and synchronization to decide success or failure. Conflict would be set 

up by information, moral, psychological, ideological, and other measures 

months earlier,378 with heavy propaganda designed to spark discontent 

among the defender’s population, and armed forces personnel.

379

Third an aggressor may use nonlethal, new-generation, 

genetically engineered biological weapons that affect the human psyche 

and moods, or he may use undercover agents planted to encourage 

discontent and unlawful acts.

380 Fourth, the military phase will be 

preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions 

conducted under the guise of information operations used to target 

important objectives vital to the country’s sustainability.

381 Fifth, the 

attack begins with an aerospace operation lasting several days to damage 

an opponent’s key military and industrial capabilities, communication 

hubs, and military control centers, or to disorganize a defender’s air 

force and air defense system.

382 Sixth, the use of military robots and 

UAVs is anticipated, with each capable of engaging in combat 

independently and used to collect intelligence and reconnaissance data. 

Ground forces are deployed after political and military goals are 

achieved.

383 Finally, and most important, the opening period (IPW) of an

NGW will be pivotal, with targeted information operations, EW 

operations, aerospace operations, precision weaponry, long-range 

 

377 Ibid., p. 19. 378 Ibid., p. 20.

379 Ibid., p. 20. 380 Ibid., p. 21. 381 Ibid. 382 Ibid. 383 Ibid., p. 22.
143

artillery, and weapons based on new physical principles dominating the 

phasing of the operation.384

NGW was popularized in an excellent paper written by Latvian 

Army officer Janis Berzins. However, a recent search on open-source 

data indicated that NGW has almost completely disappeared from 

Russian military literature. There were zero hits on the topic over the 

past 1500 days, and Chekinov and Bogdanov now use new-type 

terminology, not NGW.

In 2015 General A. V. Kartapolov opened discussion on “newtype” warfare in an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military 

Science. The major difference between NGW and new-type warfare is 

that the former was developed by retired officers and the latter by active 

general staff departments, making the latter more relevant and likely. 

Kartapolov noted that nonstandard forms and methods are being 

developed. Russia’s new-type warfare includes “asymmetric” methods 

for confronting an enemy. Measures include the use of Special Forces, 

foreign agents, various forms of information effects, and other 

nonmilitary forms. For each conflict a different set of asymmetric 

operations will be created. 385

Asymmetric operations are inherent to a conflict situation in 

which, by means of actions of an economic, diplomatic, information, and 

indirect military nature, a weaker enemy uses an asymmetric strategy 

(tactics) to conduct an armed struggle in accordance with his available 

limited resources to level the stronger side’s military-technological 

superiority. A very important condition for conducting asymmetric 

operations is the precise determination of the enemy’s most vulnerable 

and weakest areas, action against which will provide the maximum effect 

with minimal expenditure of one’s own forces and resources.386

 

384 Ibid., p. 23. 385 A. V. Kartapolov, “Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development 

of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in 

Contemporary International Conflicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of 

the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, pp. 35-36. 386 Ibid., p. 35.
144

Principles of asymmetric operations include maintaining covertness of 

preparations for the conduct of operations; persuading the weak side to 

use prohibited means to conduct military operations; concentrating 

efforts against the enemy’s most vulnerable locations (targets); searching 

for and exposing the enemy’s weak points; imposing on the enemy one’s 

own variant (one’s own will) for the course of the conflict; and 

expending low resources with respect to enemy actions. The goal is to 

achieve superiority or parity with results.387 These principles of 

Kartapolov and the same as those of Chekinov and Bogdanov in regard 

to asymmetry.

Conclusions

For the Western audience, it is important to note the stress placed 

on the following items: the expanded role of information; the importance 

of the IPW; the role of noncontact and planetary operations; and. perhaps 

most important of all, the emphasis placed on the standard method of 

analyzing contemporary events, which has continued for decades, that is,

the more predictable aspects (elements and experience) of Russian 

thought. How and when to apply force is more subjective and dependent 

on the leadership’s overall appraisal of risk assessments, Western 

developments, and geopolitical conditions, that is, each strategy that is 

adopted is based on a study of several factors that result in a conflict with

a logic all its own. A good example of the result of such a process is the 

varied logic used in the Russian interventions in Estonia, Georgia, 

Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. These actions included both direct 

means and indirect or asymmetric ones, or, as Gareev notes, the 

correlation of both. 

The focus of the military thought template was to

demonstrate that there is continuity in Russian thought that the US

may be neglecting with its fixation on hybrid and gray area concepts;

the focus on prominent authors was to investigate what was important to

each group (official voices, research teams, and independent points of

view) and whether there was agreement among them on specific

concepts and ideas. Monitoring various viewpoints helps

 

387 Ibid.
145

researchers categorize concepts, as well as watch whether discussions on

topics continue or end (as has happened with NGW and is currently

progressing with new-type warfare).

The basis of Russian military thought—trends, forecasting, the

COFM, and the forms and methods of fighting—has been used

continuously for decades and thus must be kept in mind as we proceed.

For example, it will be most important to consider the impact of S&T

on the nature of future war. S&T advances will affect all areas of

forecasting: military-technical, military-economic, and even militarystrategic thought. Since the Russians are considering the fact that war can

now be conducted from the other side of the planet, a new area of

forecasting might be strategic-technical, although there has been no

official proclamation of this development to date. Maybe the US can 

utilize the idea and get ahead of the forecasting curve.

What should really concern Westerners is which ideas have been

accepted, put into use, and applied to the battlefield, especially in regard

to future warfare. One issue to consider would be the importance of the

IPW and the COFM and their mutual influence. That is, what strategic

advantages are uncovered in the COFM assessment and how might they 

indicate when to initiate the IPW. The COFM may offer inherent

recommendations as to the time, place, form, and method for the 

commencement of the IPW. According to military writers, this can

only be accomplished successfully under the umbrella of information

superiority. In Crimea, for example, Russia may have performed a risk

analysis and relied on the media to present the Russian force as a present 

but non-threatening and thereby gained a degree of information 

superiority. The risk assessment also surmised that the potential for US

involvement was minimal. A COFM military-economic, militarytechnical, and military-strategic assessment may have indicated

that the US force is tired, basically withdrawn and out of area, and not

able to gather much budgetary support. There was thus little to fear

from the US based on this COFM, and the intervention into Crimea

proceeded as predicted in light of the unfolding chaos in Kiev and Putin’s 

risk assessment.
146

Another advantage of examining so many different opinions on

future war is that one can ascertain specific definitions of terms. It is

always important to understand what is meant by a term, what it

includes, and how it could be used. The US should avoid mirror-imaging

its concepts onto Russian thought, but should rely instead on listening to

what the Russians are postulating, which can lead to new areas for

study.

With regard to new issues for study, Russian thinking on the

use of planetary warfare and space theaters of military operation 

definitely should remain as areas of consideration for US researchers.

Other interesting topics include trends in armed struggles, bioweapons,

new-type means and ways of conducting armed struggles (which

appears to be emerging), strategic deterrence, the concept of

geopolitical conditioning, et al.

Such indicators provide Western analysts with a glimpse of

where Russian planning and organizational input may be headed, as

well as what these writers consider to be future threats to Russia. With

a good grasp of this information Western analysts will possess an

advantage in their efforts to proceed with their own future

prognostications of the unfolding nature of war and how to contend with

it.
147

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTROL FEATURES OF ‘THE 

GERASIMOV LECTURES’388

Introduction

There are few military speeches of importance in Russia that can 

match or exceed those of Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valeriy 

Gerasimov. For the past five years, usually in February, he has spoken at 

the Academy of Military Science (AMS) on issues vital to strategy, 

operational art, and military science. Most of these speeches were carried 

in shortened form in VPK, the newspaper of the military-industrial 

complex. However, in his actual presentations, Gerasimov included 

tables and graphs (and sometimes more information) of importance, as 

discussed below, which were not provided in the newspaper articles. 

Each of his five speeches covered distinct yet important General Staff 

territory. Most touched on either the elements of military thought 

(discussed in the preceding chapter) or on control issues. 

In 2013 Gerasimov’s presentation focused on tendencies or 

trends in warfare and forms and methods of confronting them. 

Tendencies indicate changes in the character of war, along with the fact 

that new forms (organizations) and methods (weaponry and military art 

employment) are required of Russia’s military and its employment of 

force. Most analyses of his talk focused on his concept that nonmilitary 

events are being used over military responses by a ratio of 4:1. This is 

both an “emerging character of war” issue and potentially an element of 

military art. 

In 2014 Gerasimov covered the role of various organizations in 

the country’s defense, the new Statute on the General Staff, and the 

elements of military thought that dictate methodology. This speech, 

which elicited little discussion, included 11 tables and graphs of 

importance. The speech covered all five elements of Russian military 

 

388 The author is indebted to Dr. Harold Orenstein, who translated the entire 2013 and 

2016 speeches of Gerasimov, and selected portions of the 2014 and 2015 speeches. 

Without his support it would not have been possible to write this chapter. 
148

thought, as discussed in Chapter Four. In hindsight, this speech may be 

more insightful than the 2013 speech.

In 2015 the focus was leadership issues during the Great Patriotic 

War and the organization of command and control issues required for the 

country’s defense under contemporary conditions. In this speech an 

outline of the importance of the new National Defense Management 

Center (NDMC) was offered. In 2016, Gerasimov covered hybrid 

warfare issues and counters to them, which require high-tech weapons 

and a scientific basis, from his point of view. He was referring, of 

course, to the West’s use of hybrid issues, since Russia, according to its 

military press, does not use the theory but new-type warfare instead.

Finally, in 2017, he reiterated the need to continue to develop new forms 

and methods of warfare, and he stressed Russia’s continuing need to 

understand what “war” means under contemporary conditions.

The following chapter will detail the important messages 

contained in Gerasimov’s five speeches. The information provided to the 

AMS’s audience results in some surprising findings and conclusions.389

2013 Presentation

Gerasimov’s 2013 speech was about principal military trends in 

the world and the requirement to develop the proper forms and methods 

to confront them. 390 He stated that any scientific discovery in the sphere 

of military science is not worth two cents if the military does not forecast 

its image of future war.391 Changes in the nature of military conflicts 

 

389 It is a misnomer to label Gerasimov’s 2013 presentation as the “Gerasimov 

Doctrine.” This is a US construct which not only confuses the issue, but also misses the 

point of his presentation. In Russian, the term “doctrine” is equivalent to the US term 

“policy,” and the English term “doctrine” is equivalent to the Russian term “military 

art.” His speech was neither, but rather a discussion of tendencies and forms and 

methods.

390 V. V. Gerasimov, “Principal Tendencies in the Development of the Forms and 

Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding 

their Improvement,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, 2013, No. 1, pp. 24-

29.

391 Ibid., p. 29.
149

require new forms and methods of the armed forces employment. This, 

in turn, creates new demands for the multifaceted employment of all the 

state’s “power” structures. He called for the development of a scientific 

and methodological apparatus to support decision-making, one that takes 

into account the inter-service nature of force groupings and finds ways to 

combine their potential.392

New models and nonstandard approaches are needed. Russia 

should not copy foreign experiences but rather should work on being in a

leading position. This requires investment in military science. He notes 

that Soviet military scholar A. Svechin wrote: 

It is unusually difficult... to predict a war situation. For 

each war it is necessary to work out a special line of 

strategic behavior, each war represents a specific case that 

requires the establishment of its own logic and not the 

application of some stereotypical pattern.393

This approach remains valid today, as each conflict must be confronted 

with a special logic due to the unique nature of each, with its inherent 

characteristics.

Gerasimov noted that the differences between war and peace are 

being erased in the 21st century, with wars no longer declared nor 

following traditional stereotypical patterns (the Middle East wars 

confirm that “safe” states can quickly become violent). In an important 

linguistic statement, Gerasimov notes that these “new-type military 

conflicts” (which General Staff Main Directorate Chief A. V. 

Kartapolov expanded on dramatically in 2015) involve consequences 

similar to regular wars. Nonmilitary methods (political, economic, 

information, humanitarian, etc.) are a trend that has grown in use and 

even exceeded military measures in effectiveness. They are 

supplemented with the protest potential of a population and some 

military measures (information opposition, special operations forces, 

 

392 Ibid., p. 28.

393 Ibid., p. 29.
150

etc.), with the latter sometimes operating under the guise of 

peacekeeping and crisis management.394

The new contemporary environment requires the preparation of 

different forces and their armaments, which include new forms and 

methods for their long-term employment to confront both traditional and 

nonstandard procedures. The factor of speed ensures that the tactical and 

operational pauses to which we are accustomed are disappearing. New 

information technologies reduce the spatial, temporal, and informational 

gaps between troops and command and control organs.395 Gerasimov 

says that remote, noncontact effects against the enemy are becoming the 

main method for achieving the goals of battles and operations (the 

military art aspect of methods). The destruction of enemy targets is being 

accomplished to the entire depth of his territory. The differences between 

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and between offensive and 

defensive operations are being erased.396 The overall gist of the 

presentation, then, is his emphasis on the changing character of war and 

how Russia must adjust to it with new forms and methods.

Gerasimov added that presently a deep strike US threat is the 

concept of “Global Strike,” which envisions the destruction of enemy 

targets and forces at practically any location on Earth in a matter of a few 

hours. Such weaponry is part of Russia’s understanding of a method.397

Further, he mentioned the introduction into military affairs of precision 

weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, roboticized 

systems, asymmetric actions (the forms and methods of the latter in 

Russia are said to be superficial, requiring the AMS’s help to develop a 

holistic theory of asymmetric operations), and information effects, which 

are constantly being improved to reduce an opponent’s effectiveness.398

 

394 Ibid., p. 24.

395 Ibid.

396 Ibid., p. 26.

397 Ibid.

398 Ibid.
151

Not only did Gerasimov call for new forms and methods of 

asymmetric operations and information effects, but also he noted that 

military leaders, when discussing new forms and methods of armed 

struggle, should not “forget” Russia’s experience in the Great Patriotic 

War, in Afghanistan, and in the Chechen Republic. In Afghanistan, for 

example, specific forms and methods included surprise, a high tempo of 

advance, and the capable employment of tactical air assaults and bypass 

detachments.399 Thus, he includes the experience element from Russian 

military thought.

Today, Russia must ponder the development of operational forms 

and methods against a roboticized enemy; improvements in the forms 

and methods of employing force groupings; the forms of strategic 

operations (what kind and how many); and the development of forms 

and methods for the operation of aerospace forces.400 Outside the borders 

of the Russian Federation (RF), the particular way that the Armed Forces 

forms and methods will be used still needs to be determined. Gerasimov 

noted that support to operations beyond Russia’s borders included the 

introduction of simplified procedures for crossing the state border, the 

use of air-space and territorial waters of foreign countries, and the 

procedures for cooperating with the authorities of the host country.401

Another form of employing Armed Forces formations outside the 

borders of the RF is the peacekeeping operation. In addition to 

peacekeeping’s traditional methods, it is now possible to add special, 

humanitarian, rescue, evacuation, sanitary cordons, and other activities. 

Peacekeeping’s complexity is apparent, requiring the ability to keep the 

conflicting sides apart, protect and/or rescue the peaceful population, 

reduce the potential for hostility, and arrange a peaceful life, all of which 

requires scientific work. 402 [Perhaps a “special” activity was used in 

Crimea].

 

399 Ibid. 400 Ibid. 401 Ibid., p. 27. 402 Ibid., p. 28.
152

The publication of Gerasimov’s speech in the AMS journal 

included six tables or diagrams. The diagram depicting the “Role of 

Nonmilitary Methods in Resolving Interstate Conflicts” quickly became 

the most widely reproduced and quoted, and it was in this diagram that 

the ratio of a 4:1 use of nonmilitary over military measures was 

depicted.403 The diagram portrayed the phases of conflict from its covert 

origin to the reestablishment of peace on the horizontal x axis, and 

depicted the growth from a potential threat to a conflict on the vertical y 

axis. Below the axes was a chart listing some of the nonmilitary and 

military types of measures. These were the tendencies he was observing 

in the changing character of war.

Just below the diagram were two tables depicting both traditional 

forms and methods (commencement of military operations after strategic 

deployment; frontal clashes of large force groupings consisting basically 

of ground forces; defeat of personnel and destruction of fire resources, 

subsequent capture of lines and regions, with the aim of capturing 

territory; defeat of the enemy, destruction of economic potential, and 

capture of his territory; conduct of combat operations on land, in the air, 

and at sea; and command and control of force groupings within the 

framework of a strictly defined hierarchical structure of command and 

control organs); and new forms and methods (commencement of military 

operations by peacetime force groupings; high maneuver, noncontact 

combat operations of inter-service force groupings; reduction of militaryeconomic potential of a state by the destruction of critically important 

targets of his military and civil infrastructure in a short time; mass 

employment of precision weapons, extensive use of special operations 

forces, roboticized complexes, and weapons based on new physical 

principles; participation of the military-civilian component in combat 

operations; simultaneous effects on enemy troops and targets on the 

entire depth of his territory; armed struggle simultaneously in all 

physical environments and in the information domain; employment of 

asymmetric and indirect operations; and command and control of forces 

and means in a uniform information domain).404

 

403 Ibid., p. 25. 404 Ibid.
153

A third forms and methods table was on military operations in the 

Afghan War. The forms and methods used there were: air-land mobile 

nature of forms and methods of conducting military operations; threedimensional nature of the forms of employing forces; increase in 

dependence of operational success on the air fight; necessity of 

simultaneous effects on the enemy to the entire depth of his structure; 

increased roles of intelligence, radio-electronic warfare, and troop 

command and control; increased significance for maneuver to intensify 

efforts; encirclement of a large enemy grouping with its subsequent 

dismemberment and piecemeal destruction or compression of the ring of 

encirclement; combat operations of army formations and units by 

separate zones in the general area of operations; and air coverage, 

blocking of an enemy grouping in an isolated mountainous region, and 

his defeat with the approach of the main forces.405

The fourth table was on the “Development of Roboticized 

Resources in the US Armed Forces,” apparently designed to indicate US 

preferences in weapon developments that Russia must consider 

countering. There were photos of US UAVs, mobile land robots, naval 

robots, unoccupied underwater apparatuses, underwater remotely 

operated apparatuses (NPA), autonomous NPAs, and crewless surface 

ships (including semi-loaded NPAs).406 These are items that Russia 

would have to counter.

The fifth table was more interesting, as it focused on Russia’s 

“Operational Use of Armed Forces Formations Outside the Borders of 

the Territory of the Russian Federation.” Goals of operational use 

included the protection of RF interests and its citizens and support of 

international peace and security. Tasks to be resolved were the repulsion 

of armed attack on the formations of the Armed Forces of the RF and 

other forces or organs deployed outside the borders of the territory of the 

RF; repulsion or prevention of armed attack against another state that has 

turned to the RF with the appropriate request [think Syria!]; protection of 

RF citizens outside the borders of the territory of the RF against an 

 

405 Ibid., p. 26. 406 Ibid., p. 27.
154

armed attack against them [think the Baltics!]; and the fight against 

piracy and the provision of shipping security.407

Finally, the sixth table listed the “Principal Tasks of Military 

Science.” They included: the development of forms for employing the 

Armed Forces; the improvement of forms and methods of employing 

forces enlisted to resolve air and space defense missions; the 

organization and conduct of territorial defense under contemporary 

conditions; the development of the theoretical bases for peacekeeping 

operations, employment of the Armed Forces outside the borders of the 

territory of the RF and in post-conflict settlement; information 

opposition; improvement of means of armed struggle and methods of 

their employment; military operations modeling; functioning of systems 

for the all-round support of the Armed Forces; and the improvement of 

the conceptual apparatus of military science.408

2014 Presentation

Gerasimov’s 2014 presentation is an explicit description of 

Russia’s current activities and planning process. He focused on the role 

of the General Staff in organizing the country’s defense. He elaborated 

on the tasks being resolved by the military and the scientific complex 

under contemporary conditions, based on a 2013 statute on the General 

Staff that Putin approved.409 These changes were mandated due to the 

new nature of armed struggle, that is, its fast-moving character and 

dynamic employment of military and nonmilitary resources.410 This 

requires leaders to react quickly with decisions for creating, employing, 

and supporting the employment of forces, to include a significant shift to 

the information and space domains for operations.411

 

407 Ibid., p. 28. 408 Ibid. 

409 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the 

Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New Statute on the General Staff,” Journal 

of the Academy of Military Science, No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22. 410 Ibid., p. 15. 411 Ibid.
155

The General Staff’s main task remains strategic planning in the 

field of defense and the development of the foundations for the country’s 

military security, the ideology of the construction and development of 

the Armed Forces, and the military organization of Russia as a whole. 

The new statute provides for additional authority to coordinate the 

activities of organs of executive authority in the interests of ensuring the 

country’s defensive capabilities and security.412

Another main task of the General Staff consists of building and 

developing the Armed Forces as a whole and its troops’ services and 

branches. Scientific research results in recommendations for the efficient 

composition of the Armed Forces and the optimal correlation of forces 

and means for armed struggle (COFM), which is how much of the forms 

and means to develop and where to put them. A very important task is 

the forecasting and early assessment of military threats to the RF and, on 

the basis of this, the development of recommendations for the 

improvement of state policy in the area of defense.413

Leaders must make precise calculations when organizing defense, 

such as the General Staff’s legislatively defined requirement to produce a 

Plan of Defense for the nation, which includes planning documents for 

the state’s entire military organization.414 This plan was developed in 

January 2013. Tasks were coordinated with respect to place, time, 

directions, forces, means, and resources. A very important point was that 

these integrated and interdepartmental cooperative measures were aimed 

at creating a strategic deterrence posture to prevent military conflicts 

through convincing adversaries of the futility of using further forms of 

pressure on Russia.415

The new edition of the Statute on Military Planning in the 

Russian Federation specifies the defense plan’s developmental sequence. 

The agencies responsible for strategic deterrence (and the development 

 

412 Ibid. 413 Ibid., p. 19. 414 Ibid., p. 15. 415 Ibid., p. 16.
156

of the appropriate documents) include the FSB, the MVD, and the 

MChS. All operations must take into account changes in the nature of 

military conflicts. New documents set out fundamental principles of state 

policy in the area of military development and detail the goals, tasks, 

trends, and measures for building and developing the RF’s military 

organization.416

To resolve these tasks it is necessary to integrate the command 

and control/administrative systems of the Armed Forces and federal 

executive organs participating in defense into a single system of state 

administration and military command and control. The development of 

the RF’s NDMC is an important step. The opening of a national center 

enables a single system of command and control over the entire RF’s

military organization. This makes it possible in real time to obtain and 

analyze information and to prepare valid recommendations for decision 

making on the part of the state’s leadership with regard to reacting to 

crisis situations in the country and abroad. In effect this is a massive 

system of military control.417

The resolution of defense tasks requires appropriate military 

knowledge on the part of officials in federal executive organs. With this 

aim the Military Academy of the General Staff has resumed the joint 

training of representatives from the ministries and departments according 

to the National Defense Program. The training is conducted on a general 

operational-tactical background, according to uniform scenarios of the 

development of the military-political and strategic situation.418

Special attention must be placed on creating a comprehensive 

theory of indirect and asymmetric actions conducted by various federal 

executive organs. They should work in accordance with a uniform plan 

to neutralize threats, according to a uniform plan, in the interests of 

Russia’s military security.419

 

416 Ibid. 417 Ibid., p. 18. 418 Ibid.

419 Ibid., p. 19.
157

The development of forms for employing force groupings and 

methods of their operations is required, as is the determination of their 

optimal composition. In 2013 a theoretical assessment of possible threats 

was conducted, methods were analyzed, and the creation of interservice 

force groupings on strategic axes (theaters of military operations) were 

checked. On the whole, the results that were obtained supported the 

implementation of practical tasks.420

With the increase in the role of scientific research, requirements 

for the validation of scientific recommendations increase, the subjects of 

military-scientific developments broaden, and the forms and methods of 

research activity improve. This conditions the necessity of improving the 

military-scientific complex and using it in accordance with current and 

future tasks. Since 2013 the General Staff has been consistently doing 

such work.

Work is also being conducted on searching for and implementing 

new forms of cooperation between the MOD and establishments in the 

military-industrial complex. First and foremost is completing a five-year 

plan of development for scientific and research organizations in the 

MOD. This improves the structure and capabilities of the militaryscience complex. As an experiment, four science companies were 

formed and began to conduct research. This made it possible to attract 

talented graduates of institutions of higher learning to resolve scientific 

and practical tasks in the interests of the MOD.

421

A uniform system of organizing scientific research for defense 

will be developed, based on military-theoretical knowledge and the 

results of basic research from the Russian Academy of Sciences, the 

AMS, the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, and other 

scientific organizations, and will use the potential of the militaryindustrial complex’s enterprises. Special attention includes a focus on 

robotic systems with military applications, the creation of a future 

telecommunications infrastructure for the Armed Forces, and the 

 

420 Ibid. 421 Ibid., p. 21.
158

development of strategic deterrence forces and an aerospace defense 

system.422

A special focus will be on their creation at AMS, to include 

generating a methodology of military development and creating new 

forms and methods for conducting military operations. The scientific 

potential of the Academy should be effectively employed in the interests 

of developing military and nonmilitary measures under conditions of 

contemporary armed conflicts, and assessing their balance. 

This article contained eleven diagrams. The first covered the 

tasks of the General Staff that are specified in the Statute on the General 

Staff, approved in July 2013. The second described changes in the 

character of war. They involved the use of political, diplomatic, 

economic, and other nonmilitary measures in combination with the use 

of military force, to include:

• Reduction of the military-economic potential of a 

state by the destruction of vitally important objects of 

its military and civilian infrastructure;

• Simultaneous effects against enemy troops and 

objectives to the entire depth of his territory;

• Armed struggle simultaneously in all physical media 

and in the information domain;

• Command and control of forces and means in a 

uniform information domain;

• Mass employment of precision weapons, large-scale 

use of special operations forces, robotic systems, and 

weapons based on new physical principles;

• Employment of asymmetric and indirect operations;

• Commencement of military operations by peacetime 

force groupings; high-maneuver, noncontact combat 

operations by interservice force groupings;

 

422 Ibid.
159

• Participation of the civil-military component in 

military activities423

The third diagram listed changes that were introduced into the 

federal law “On Defense,” based on an April 2013 version. The goal of 

the changes was to coordinate the actions among the organs of state 

authority, command and control, and local self-government in the field 

of ensuring the country’s defensive capability. The fourth diagram was 

of the administrative system for the RF’s military organization. The fifth 

diagram was of forms of operational readiness in conjunction with the 

participation of federal organs of executive authority. 

The sixth diagram described the purpose and task of the RF’s 

military-scientific complex, which is a connecting link between the RF 

Armed Forces and the RF scientific complex. The military-scientific 

complex provides scientific validation regarding the trends in building 

and developing the RF’s Armed Forces and serves as the initial study for 

making military-political decisions. Its components include: 

• Validation of the basic trends in the building and 

development of the Armed Forces as a whole, services 

and branches of the Armed Forces of the RF, and 

forces that are not within the services and branches of 

the Armed Forces of the RF

• Determination of the optimal COFM of the Armed 

Forces of the RF, their qualitative and quantitative 

make-up, and the forms and methods of their combat 

employment

• Working out of tactical-technical and operationaltechnical requirements for future weapons and 

military equipment models (systems, complexes)

• Formation and study of new scientific trends that have 

an interservice and super-service nature, taking into 

account the results of basic forecasting and research in 

 

423 Ibid., p. 15.
160

the interests of building, developing, and employing 

the Armed Forces and of the security of the state

• Provision of military-scientific and scientific-technical 

accompaniment of weapons and military equipment at 

all stages of their life cycle.424

Gerasimov’s seventh diagram described the military-scientific 

complex’s development in 2013, which consisted of five science and 

research organizations created in the MOD. The eighth diagram was very 

important, as it extensively outlined the future structure of the Armed 

Forces military-scientific complex. The systemic science and research 

organizations of the RF’s MOD conduct interservice and super-service 

tasks in the interests of the Armed Forces of the RF. They decide on the 

forms and methods of armed struggle (at the General Staff’s Center for 

Military and Strategic Studies); command, control, and communications 

systems (in 27 central science and research institutions); and on the 

development of weapons systems (in 46 central science and research 

institutions). 

Science and research organizations of the RF MOD are present in 

all spheres of armed struggle. These include:

• Land, via research in the field of the development of 

forms and methods of employing conventional ground 

forces and development and creation of weapons and 

military equipment in the interests of the Ground 

Forces and Airborne Forces; and via three central 

science and research institutions; 

• Air, via research in the field of developing forms and 

methods of employing air and aerospace complexes 

and development and creation of weapons and 

military equipment in the interests of the Air Force; 

and via the Central Science and Research Institution 

of the Air Force; 

 

424 Ibid., p. 18.
161

• Sea, via research in the field of developing forms and 

methods of employing naval military systems and 

creating and developing weapons and military 

equipment in the interests of the Navy; and via the 

Military Training and Research Center of the Navy; 

• Strategic deterrence forces, via research in the field of 

creating and improving aerospace systems and 

development and creation of weapons and military 

equipment in the interests of Aerospace Defense 

Forces; via the Central Science and Research 

Institution of the Aerospace Forces; via research in the 

field of developing and improving strategic missile 

and space complexes and developing weapons and 

military equipment in the interests of the Strategic 

Rocket Forces; and via four central science and 

research institutions. 

Finally, there are the special science and research organizations 

of the RF MOD. These include an intelligence aspect (via 18 central 

science and research institutions and a Center for Studying the Military 

Potential of Foreign Countries); special types of support (with 33 central 

science and research institutions for engineers, 48 central science and 

research institutions, 12 central science and research institutions [there 

was no indication as to whom the institutions belonged, so the 48 and 12 

institute numbers probably support different branches], and 27 national 

centers); and engineer and camouflage support (via a Central Science 

and Research Institution [Engineer Forces]), among other elements.

425

The ninth diagram examined priority trends in developing and 

creating weapon systems, including forecasting threats to the security of 

the RF and working out forms and methods to effectively prevent them. 

The development of future weapons systems examines complexes, 

elements equipping them, and supporting systems, with the employment 

of the latest (breakthrough) technologies; the creation of a future 

telecommunications infrastructure for the Armed Forces and resources 

 

425 Ibid., p. 20.
162

for information confrontation; the development of strategic deterrence 

forces and resources for countering an instantaneous strike; the 

development and creation of robotic complexes with military application 

UAVs; and the development of contemporary teaching and training 

systems for qualified specialists of various profiles in the interests of the 

Armed Forces of the RF.

426

The tenth diagram listed the elements that would compose a 

uniform base of scientific knowledge. These include the formation of 

archives of the results of dissertation research and scientific research and 

experimental and design work on the basis of the Military-Science 

Library of the Armed Forces (special collection of controlled copies 

located in House 3 of the MOD); the development of an automated 

system to support decision-making, with the organization of scientific 

work in the Armed Forces of the RF; the creation of an electronic library 

of scientific work and an automated system for registering, storing, and 

analyzing the results of completed scientific-research, experimentaldesign and technological work and dissertation research (on the basis of 

27 MOD central science and research institutions); and the integration of 

the information base with similar bases of other federal executive organs 

(Russian Ministry of Education and Science, Russian Ministry of 

Industrial Trade).427

A final diagram described trends and directions in the joint work 

of Russia’s MOD and the AMS. They include joint research into the 

nature of military threats to the security of the RF and ways to prevent 

war and military conflicts; the development of recommendations on 

providing more efficient and effective solutions of defensive tasks, 

including consideration of interdepartmental cooperation on issues of the 

organization of defense; participation in the development of scientific 

foundations of military doctrine and the organization of principles of the 

collective defense of friendly and allied states; the strengthening of 

foreign military-scientific ties and cooperation in training qualified 

specialists for the Armed Forces and military-industrial complex 

 

426 Ibid. 427 Ibid., p. 21.
163

enterprises; the scientific and research work “Preface-30” (to include the 

formation of a system of opinions on the development of the military 

organization of the RF and the creation of a system of long-term analysis 

and strategic planning in the field of countering threats to national 

security); and the scientific and research work, “Defense” (bringing to 

light the essence of contemporary warfare, determining the criteria for 

employing nonmilitary resources in international confrontation, and 

forming a system of knowledge about war and defense of the state, 

taking into account the employment of both military and nonmilitary 

resources).428

2015 Presentation

Gerasimov’s 2015 presentation initially covered the leadership 

experiences of World War II, and from those lessons, there was an 

extrapolation of ways to conduct and organize the command and control 

of Russia’s defense under contemporary conditions. The first lesson 

concerned the organized restructuring of the organs of state 

administration and military command and control. Gerasimov’s 2014 

speech seemed to cover all these points and how Russia had reorganized 

its administration for defense,

429 so there was not much new here.

The second lesson was that the experience of war convincingly 

demonstrates that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and organs of 

strategic and operational-tactical command levels should train as a 

uniform system of command and control beforehand, in peacetime. A

system of strategic leadership should be created on uniform principles: 

centralized control of the strategic nuclear forces and strategic force 

groupings. Here it is necessary to provide the military district and army 

commanders and, in a number of cases, formation commanders with the 

ability to make decisions independently under conditions of the 

 

428 Ibid., p. 22.

429 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Experience of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic 

War and the Organization of Uniform Command and Control of the Country’s Defense 

under Contemporary Conditions,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, No.2 

2015, pp. 5-15.
164

commencement of enemy aggression, first and foremost, in case of his 

surprise attack.430

The third lesson was that the effectiveness of the resolution of 

assigned tasks by force groupings depends, to a considerable degree, on 

the organization of cooperation among large formations, formations, and 

units of the services and branches of the Armed Forces. Interservice 

force groupings in theaters of military operations (on strategic axes) 

under a unified command should be created in peacetime.431

The fourth lesson was that the technical outfitting of the system 

of strategic leadership (above all, communications and administrative 

resources) and the protection of command posts must be observed. Their 

operational readiness determines to what degree the combat capabilities 

of the Armed Forces will be realized. This is particularly urgent today, 

Gerasimov added, under conditions where the United States has 

implemented the “Prompt Global Strike” concept, within whose 

framework so-called “decapitation strikes” are envisioned to be delivered 

against the Armed Forces and state command posts of other nations.

The overall leadership of the defense of the country and the 

Armed Forces lies with the President of the RF, the Commander-inChief of the Russian Armed Forces. The organs of state authority of the 

RF, together with the organs of local self-government, carry complete 

responsibility for the provision of military security, the state of defense 

readiness, and the mobilization readiness and combat capability of the 

Armed Forces within the bounds of their powers, as determined by the 

Constitution.432

An important step in the construction of a uniform system of state 

control of the military sphere of the Russian state was the creation of the 

NDMC. It is an organ of military organization of the state, under the 

leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 

 

430 Ibid., p. 12. 431 Ibid. 432 Ibid.
165

the RF. It continually operates, with an unchanging peacetime and 

wartime structure.433

The principal duty of the NDMC is to monitor, analyze, and 

forecast the development of the situation on strategic axes and in

problem regions, provide information support for decisions made by the 

leadership of the country and the Armed Forces, and coordinate the 

activities of federal executive authorities with respect to issues of 

safeguarding the country’s defense. The functioning of the NDMC

makes it possible to collect, analyze, and provide varied information in 

real time and to prepare well-founded recommendations for decision 

making by the state leadership with respect to operational reactions to 

crisis situations, both in the country and abroad.434 In wartime one of the 

most important tasks of the NDMC is information support to the Stavka

(a term which originates from the Armed Forces High Command of the 

Russian Empire and Soviet Union and probably refers to members of the 

High Command today) of the Supreme High Command about the 

situation in theaters of military operations, the transmission of Stavka

instructions to the troops, and control over their execution.435

Taking into account the given situation on the territory of Russia, 

and in accordance with the Presidential Decree “On the MilitaryAdministrative Division of the Country,” the Western, Southern, Central, 

and Eastern Military Districts were formed in December 2010. The 

status of joint strategic commands was given to these military districts. 

In December 2014 the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command was 

established.436

Each joint strategic command bears the responsibility for the 

combat readiness of its subordinate forces and for the safeguarding of the 

Security of the RF on a strategic axis. In peacetime the fleets and air 

force and air defense formations are subordinate to the commanders of 

 

433 Ibid., p. 13. 434 Ibid. 435 Ibid. 436 Ibid., p. 16.
166

the military districts. In wartime the joint strategic command directs 

combat operations by interservice and interdepartmental groupings on 

land, at sea, and in the air.437

The experience of the past war [Great Patriotic War or WW II] 

will never lose its importance. Command personnel of the Russian Army 

and Navy can and should extract from this experience everything that 

has not lost its significance, and, relying on the development of military 

art in the postwar period, creatively resolve contemporary tasks with 

regard to increasing combat preparedness and developing the Armed 

Forces.438

There were two diagrams worthy of note. The first analyzed the 

way to forecast the development of the situation. It noted that the 

president, the minister of defense, and the General Staff work out 

decisions. The NDMC collects, generalizes, and analyses information, 

such as important events in the world and in the RF, to include terrorist 

acts, the world’s military-strategic and military-political situation, and 

the socio-political situation in the RF and Commonwealth of 

Independent States. The analysis includes information on the status and 

nature of troop operations; the manning of the Armed Forces; measures 

for operational readiness; emergency situations; the status of the combat 

readiness of the Armed Forces; the status of the combat readiness of the 

strategic offensive force groupings of foreign countries; and information 

from the data processing center.439

Finally, there was a diagram that discussed the organs of strategic 

command and control of the military organization of the RF. These 

included, of course, the president, with links to the Security Council and 

the government of the RF (here one finds the federal organs of executive 

authority, the economic bloc; and the federation organs of executive 

authority, or power block, which includes the Special Formations [in 

wartime] and the Internal Forces of the MVD, military formations and 

 

437 Ibid. 438 Ibid.

439 Ibid., p. 14.
167

organs); directly under the president is the Stavka of the Supreme High 

Command (in wartime), the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and 

the NDMC. Subordinate to it are the Center for the Control of Nuclear 

Forces, the Combat Control Center (multi-departmental force groupings 

and the large formations, formations, and military units in the Armed 

Forces of the RF), and the Center for the Command and Control of 

Everyday Activities.440

2016 Presentation

Gerasimov’s 2016 presentation began, as in 2013 and 2014, with 

a brief mention of the evolving nature of armed struggle. He stated that 

the rapid development of science and technologies had resulted in the 

employment of high-tech and long-range means of striking capabilities. 

This has become the main method of achieving the goals of military 

operations, he noted,441 which is a departure from his 2013 focus on 

nonmilitary methods.

After this initial focus, he moved on to discuss the changing 

forms of resolving conflicts, which had given impulse to new methods of 

military operations. Thus Gerasimov again, as he has done in the past, 

mentions the forms and methods of military operations. Further, he notes 

that “the scientific development of forms and methods of employing 

various departmental groupings and procedures for actions by the 

military and nonmilitary components of territorial defense is required 

now.” Methods included the employment of political, economic, 

information, and other nonmilitary measures, the so-called “hybrid 

methods.”442 He described the latter in the following way:

Their content includes the achievement of political goals 

with minimal armed effects against the enemy, mainly by 

undermining his economic and military potential, 

 

440 Ibid., p. 13. 441 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Organization of the Defense of the Russian Federation 

Under Conditions of the Enemy’s Employment of ‘Traditional’ and ‘Hybrid ‘ Methods 

of Conducting War,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, No.2 2016, pp.19-24. 442 Ibid., p. 20.
168

information and psychological effects, active support of 

internal opposition, and partisan and sabotage methods of 

conducting armed struggle.443

It is unclear whether the use of hybrid methods refers to just a foreign 

powers use of this methodology (as the title of his article implies) or if he 

includes Russia among those using these methods.

Gerasimov states that the basis of hybrid actions is information 

technologies, which “envision the manipulation of the protest potential 

of the population.”444 Information resources are an effective type of 

weapon. Military force is used only in extreme cases under the guise of 

peacekeeping activities or crisis management issues. Hybrid war is not 

officially declared and includes the use of indirect and asymmetric 

activities. States that fall under hybrid aggression slide into chaos. He 

adds that “there can no longer be ‘classical’ combat operations without 

‘hybrid’ operations.”445 Again, it is unclear if this implies that Russia is 

also considering or using hybrid actions.

Developments in traditional warfare and the “features of hybrid 

warfare” have caused changes in Russia’s organization of defensive 

activities. They include:

• The consolidation of efforts of practically all organs 

of state power.

• The development of a new Defense Plan of the RF.

• Coordination of all of Russia’s capabilities on a 

systemic basis.446

Russia must do several things to confront hybrid threats. The 

effectiveness of its deterrence policy, its territorial defense posture, and 

the prevention of military conflicts are the most important points to 

 

443 Ibid. 444 Ibid. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid., p. 21.
169

consider and improve upon. Coordinated measures to neutralize military 

dangers such as hybrid methods of pressure must be considered,447 and 

collective security based on work with foreign countries is more 

important than before, to include advancing the system of regional and 

global security in the international legal field. Finally the main 

component of hybrid methods operations in the information domain must 

be emphasized. The most efficient asymmetric method of waging war 

has become the falsification of events and the restriction of the activities 

of the mass media.448 This appears to be what Russia has been doing in 

contemporary times.

Command and control issues must be adjusted due to their 

importance. Two years ago Russia developed its National Center for 

Command and Control of the Defense of the RF. A primary function of 

the Center is to ensure that the country continues to operate during a 

crisis situation.449 The Armed Forces of the RF must be ready to protect 

state interests “in a military conflict of any scale, with the enemy’s 

extensive use of both ‘traditional’ and ‘hybrid’ methods of 

confrontation.” Russia’s Armed Forces must be able to operate under 

“nontraditional” conditions of conducting military operations.450

Gerasimov ended his presentation by emphasizing where Russia 

must concentrate its future research trends. They include developing 

forms of strategic operations; improving strategic offensive and 

defensive forces in both the space and information domains; and 

developing operational-strategic requirements for weapons and 

command and control systems. New ideas are required, and the AMS 

must play a key role in studying the evolving nature of contemporary 

warfare and the problems of strategic deterrence.451 Of interest is that his 

speech did not include graphs and charts, as did the other three speeches.

 

447 Ibid. 448 Ibid., p. 22.

449 Ibid. 450 Ibid., p. 23. 451 Ibid.
170

2017 Presentation

In March 2017 the Russian Academy of Military Science held its 

yearly conference. At the speaker’s podium were Chief of the Russian 

General Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov, and other military notables. This was 

Gerasimov’s fifth consecutive appearance at the gathering of scientists 

and current and retired military officers. 

Gerasimov’s speech, titled “Modern Wars and Current Issues of 

the Country’s Defense,” began with a general discussion of the concept 

of war.452 He noted that the Russian Federation’s Military Doctrine 

defined war as “a form of the resolution of interstate or intra-state 

contradictions with the employment of military force.” Debates have 

continued on the war topic, however, with some sources noting that 

armed conflict now can include information, economic, and other 

variants. There remains, he noted, the need for an “analysis of the 

characteristic features and singularities of modern armed conflicts and 

for the ascertainment of the trends of their emergence and development.” 

For the US, Gerasimov notes, war appears to be classified as 

either traditional or nontraditional. In the 21st century this classification 

was supplemented with hybrid war, which cannot be classified as war or 

peace. Hybrid war has replaced, in his opinion, what the US earlier 

referred to as non-contact or remote-control war, such as NATO 

operations in Yugoslavia, where the non-contact issue first began.

Now conflicts can be described as involving a different 

composition of participants, weapons, and forms and methods of troop 

operations. Other changes include the correlation of the contribution of 

these types of conflict to the overall political success of a war. 

Information superiority must be established through the use of news 

 

452 Valeriy Gerasimov, “The World on the Brink of War. It is Not Enough to Take 

Account of Today’s Challenges. Future Challenges Need to be Forecasted,” VPK 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 15 March-21 March 2017. This summary was 

developed on the basis of what was reported in the VPK. It is possible that the actual 

speech, when published in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, may differ 

from this version. All references and quotes in the text are based on the VPK source.
171

media and social networks, where information-psychological and 

information-technical factors are employed simultaneously. Still, it is too 

early, in Gerasimov’s opinion, to use hybrid war as an overall term for 

such methods.

He adds that a blurring of the lines between war and peace is now 

a trend, where national security and sovereignty are threatened without 

the use of force. The use of new factors, such as the defense of 

democracy or inculcation of democratic values, is expanding. Methods 

include nonmilitary measures, along with the protest potential of a 

country’s citizenry. They have acquired unprecedented technological 

development and could even lead to the collapse of the energy, banking, 

or other spheres of state activities.

Gerasimov then underscored that military coercion remains a 

trend that is inherent to most conflicts and that, based on the conflicts in 

Iraq and Yugoslavia, armed conflict will remain the main content of 

wars. However, analysts must continue to study and analyze war’s 

essence. Further, the role and significance of the forecasting of dangers 

and threats is growing, to include assessing economic, information, and 

other challenges. This requires the balanced development of all services 

and combat arms and the mastery of precision weaponry and 

communications, intelligence-gathering, automated control, and 

electronic warfare. The Strategic Missile Troops, Navy, Air and Space 

Forces, and Ground Troops will all be modernized, with the strike 

potential of precision weapons increased fourfold. Robotic systems will 

enhance combat potential. New weapons are being tested in Syria and 

new lessons learned. The military-political leadership is also trying to 

restore the people’s trust in the army.

Gerasimov concluded his talk with a statement of tasks for the 

Academy of Military Science to undertake, which included the study of 

new forms of interstate confrontation and the development of effective 

methods of countering them (he made a similar declaration at the end of 

his 2016 speech). Building scenarios and forecasts of the militarypolitical and strategic environment are urgent tasks as well. Organizing 

and accomplishing the regrouping of troops in remote theaters requires 

separate study (this appears to be a correlation of forces factor). 
172

Thus, Gerasimov’s speech did not reveal anything startlingly 

new. He once again covered the basic parameters of Russian military 

thought, discussing trends, forecasting, correlation of contributions 

(instead of forces), and the forms and methods required to confront the 

emerging character of war. Of interest is that there also appears to be a 

serious discussion underway as to how to understand the essence of war 

under contemporary conditions. This debate should be followed closely 

in the coming months, especially since the title of the newspaper article 

publishing the speech was “The World on the Brink of War.”

Conclusions

These five speeches are different in content and focus. The first 

(2013) speech was clearly the most discussed of the five. It is about the 

changing character of war, what Gerasimov termed “tendencies,” which 

have resulted in nonmilitary approaches to solving geopolitical problems 

being preferred to military ones by a ratio of 4:1. Similarly, as the title of 

his presentation indicates, there are forms and methods that must be 

developed to contend with these tendencies. He mentioned forms and 

methods 11 times in his presentation. 

The second (2014) speech referenced the new General Staff 

Statute that Putin had approved and focused on how the General Staff 

would organize the country’s defense as a result. A shift to the 

information and space domains for operations was stressed, as well as 

the development of the appropriate military knowledge on the part of 

most federal executive organs. Such training is accomplished for various 

ministries and departments at the Academy of the General Staff. This 

presentation, while seldom mentioned by analysts, is at least equal in 

importance to Gerasimov’s 2013 speech for its focus on a host of issues.

The 2015 presentation first conducted an extrapolation of 

command and control lessons learned from World War II and how to 

apply them to Russia’s defense under contemporary conditions. That is, 

the speech discussed strategic leadership in some detail. The principal 

duties of the NDMC were said to be to monitor, analyze, and forecast the 

development of the situation on strategic axes and in problem regions, 

provide information support for decisions made by the leadership, and 
173

coordinate the activities of federal executive authorities. A diagram 

discussing the organization of strategic command and control of military 

organizations was included.

In his 2016 speech Gerasimov very specifically stated, “The 

scientific development of forms and methods of employing various 

department groupings and procedures for actions by the military and 

nonmilitary components of territorial defense is required now.”453 These 

forms and methods would help organize the defense of Russia against, as 

the title of the article noted, an enemy’s employment of traditional and 

hybrid methods of conducting war. Changes conducted so far include 

consolidating the efforts of most organs of state power, the development 

of a new defense plan, and the coordination of Russia’s capabilities on a 

systemic basis. He added that the most effective asymmetric method of 

war is now the falsification of events and the restriction of mass media 

activities. Finally, in his 2017 speech, Gerasimov was not as specific as 

before and focusing on military thought, describing new weapons, and 

finding new definitions for war.

 

453 Gerasimov, 2016 presentation, p. 22.
174
175

CHAPTER EIGHT: REFLEXIVE CONTROL

Introduction

One of the prime goals for a Russian commander in warfare is to 

interfere with the decision-making process of an enemy commander. 

This is often accomplished by the use of disinformation, camouflage, or 

some other stratagem or application of military cunning. For Russia, one 

of the primary methods is through the use of the theory of reflexive 

control (RC). This principle can be used against either human-mental or 

computer-based decision-making processors. The theory is similar to the 

US concept of perception management, except that it attempts to control 

more than manage a subject, and it is used much more extensively. 

The concept of RC was employed for many years by the Soviet 

Union, and now it is finding use in Putin’s Russia. Its end goal is to 

influence decision-making, control behavior, or make an enemy act in a 

certain way. It manipulates the thought process of an opponent for the 

benefit of Russia through numerous means, to include the mass media, 

trolls, analogies, or even violence. It can be applied at the tactical, 

operational, strategic, and geopolitical levels through the application of 

various resources and measures.

The term is being discussed internationally as well, but always 

with a Russian context. Explanations of RC have appeared in Polish, 

Georgian, German, Indian, and Serbian papers just in the past year. The 

site InSerbia News (in English), for example, noted that Russia uses RC 

tactically, strategically, and geopolitically; and that it aims to convey 

selected information to the enemy forcing him to make self-defeating 

decisions (a computer virus influencing or controlling an opponent’s 

decision-making process is one use, the article notes, adding that “young 

Vladimir Putin learned all there is to know about RC at the 401st KGB 

School.”).454 The German press noted that RC uses information to 

deliberately distort the perception of reality in its audience and generate 

 

454 InSerbia News (in English), 3 October 2016.
176

the desired reaction on the part of the recipient of the false 

information.455

RC is defined in general terms as a means of conveying to a 

partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to 

voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of 

the action. The theory continues to undergo further refinement today. For 

example, in the past five years there have been Russian military articles 

about the use of RC in network-centric warfare, in information weapons, 

in deterrence theory, and in 21st century tactics, all of which will be 

noted below. 

This chapter will aim to provide an updated summary on RC 

thinking in Russia. This author has written before on the concept and 

some of that material is included as well.456 While it is not known 

exactly how frequently the concept is used by Russian political or 

military leaders, it certainly has a history, appears imbedded in theory, 

and is often revisited for its contemporary relevancy to evolving 

concepts. This inspires a much required closer look.

Definitions

Two fairly recent definitions of RC appeared in Russian 

publications in 2011. A dictionary-questionnaire-type book, Operations 

in Information-Psychological War, stated that RC was “one of the 

technologies for effects against the social consciousness.” 457 It involves 

psychological technology based on the cyclical repetition of the chain: 

effect (stimulus)-reaction. According to K. G. Jung, who was cited in the 

definition, information-psychological effects (IPE) are implemented 

 

455 Ingo Mannteufel, “Putin: Right Message for Everyone,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 

(Electronic Edition), 1 March 2016. 456 See, for example, Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the 

Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2004, pp. 237-256; Timothy Thomas, 

Recasting the Red Star, 2011, pp. 118-130; and Timothy Thomas Military Strategy, 

2015, pp. 117-123. 457 V.B. Veprentsev, A.V. Manoylo, A.I. Petrenko, and D. B. Frolov, Operations in 

Information-Psychological War: Short Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Hotline –

Telecom, 2011, pp. 446-448.
177

through “the relativity of everything human,” where RC is the 

information effect on an object (people, associations of people such as 

groups, or even civilizations).458 Further,

RC is first of all the art of manipulating people and 

groups of people; and secondly a specific method of 

social control. The technology is mainly aimed against a 

narrow group of people in a specific state who are 

invested with the greatest authority, or against separate 

individuals in this group. It is assumed that IPE against 

the leadership and executive structures of a country result 

at least in a temporary slowdown of the tempo of 

operational decision-making, and even in a blocking of 

the centers of administrative control of a state; at best, 

they can result in the ‘authority’ elites making decisions 

that are favorable with respect to the goals and intentions 

of the initiator of the IPE.459

RC as a technology (method) depends on a special model of the 

subject being controlled instead of relying on human intuition. The 

model must reflect the object’s ability to perceive itself and other 

objects, including those that are attempting to establish control, i.e., it 

must be reflexive. This requires that reliable channels for delivering 

information are determined, the objects susceptibility to types of external 

effects (such as the mass media) tabulated, and special scenarios created. 

With regard to technology, the authors note that 

A computer model of the psychology of the behavior of 

the model, its reflexive apparatus, is created; according to 

a special program, scenarios of IPE and their 

consequences are played. After the employment of an IPE 

‘impulse,’ an assessment is made in real time of the 

closeness of the reaction of the object to the target setting 

and, if necessary, additional optimal effects are 

 

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid.
178

selected...The repetition of the cycles of IPE are 

limitless.460

An important aspect of the methodology is the opening of the possibility 

of refining the national structure for making operational and strategic 

decisions. RC is the information effect on an object, for the description 

of which it is necessary to use concepts such as “consciousness” and 

“will.”461 A model of RC was included, and it is reproduced below.

The RC references above note that the concept could be used 

operationally to control decision-making or (as in the InSerbia example) 

used tactically, strategically, or geopolitically. All such uses appear to be 

relevant.462

 

460 Ibid. 461 Ibid. The diagram above is on page 447 of the Veprentsev, Manoylo, Petrenko, and 

Frolov work.

462 In a discussion in Moscow with a Security Council administrator at some time in the 

late 1990s or early 2000s, this author asked whether the Council employed RC. The 

response was that the Security Council has a group of people who establish long-term 

goals and then formulate the type of RC actions required to reach that goal. This 

required influencing the decisions of other countries with RC’s methodology, especially 

in regard to geopolitics. When asked who these people were, this author was told that 

such information would never be made public.
179

The technology link to RC was made clear as long ago as 1995 in 

a military article by Sergey Leonenko. However, this was a military and 

not a civilian reference. Leonenko noted that under present conditions a 

need arises to act not only on people, but also on technical 

reconnaissance assets, especially weapon guidance systems. The 

transparent use of mockups, for example, can reflexively control the 

other side into thinking this is not where the main attack will appear.463

Another example of the use of technology was offered in 2015, 

indicating the concept continues to be exploited. In a discussion of why 

intelligent electronic warfare (EW) decision support systems in tactical 

formations are so important versus automated systems, it was noted that 

an automated system can operate like a robot using specific opportunities 

provided by complex RC mechanisms. However, the more 

comprehensive the system’s automation, the greater the risk that robots 

might be controlled by both the adversary and friendly forces. Only a 

decision support system can facilitate the exercise of complex RC over 

an adversary, while protecting friendly systems from similar control by 

an enemy force.464

Another early RC reference and definition was the 1975 book, 

Concept, Algorithm, Decision. Here RC was defined as follows:

Any disinformation is RC. Concealment, provocation, 

formulation of the opponents’ doctrine, a diversionary 

strike, and conveyance to the enemy of a false impression 

about the level of our knowledge concerning him and of 

our notions relative to his ideas about our concept of him, 

etc., are all varieties of reflexive controls of different 

degrees.465

 

463 S. Leonenko, “On Reflexive Control of the Enemy,” Armeyskiy sbornik (Army 

Digest), No. 8 1995, p. 28. 464 Yu. Ye. Donskov, O. G. Nikitin, and P. N. Besedin, “Intelligent Electronic Warfare 

Decision Support Systems in Tactical Combined Arms Formations,” Military Thought, 

No. 10 2015, pp. 33-40. 465 V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Concept, Algorithm, Decision, Moscow 1975, 

p. 220, as translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force.
180

Arms control negotiations also included references to RC. In 

1996, one Russian article in the journal, Independent Military Review,

stated that when holding negotiations the techniques associated with 

creating a conducive atmosphere need to be studied. Conventional 

marketing techniques and specialized methods of psychological support 

warranted study, especially “techniques based on RC.” Psychological 

support for negotiations fit quite well into the overall tasks of supporting 

arms export negotiations.466

One of the more startling RC references in the early years was 

developed in 1997, for it implies that much written in Russia is merely 

RC-related material. In an article devoted to theoretical problems 

regarding the formation of Russia’s military doctrine, Major-General A. 

F. Klimenko, an expert commentator on Russian military thought, stated 

that military doctrine contains recommendations on how military force 

may be employed. He noted that “the property of RC of the other, 

competing, side is set forth in it.” Reflexive functions intended for both 

internal and external consumers are “programmed” into the doctrine, 

where these functions can “most effectively accomplish its role with the 

open publication of its main provisions.”467 Thus, Western analysts of 

Russia’s military doctrines and other documents should take pause, since 

Klimenko’s assessment indicates that at least some open-source material 

may intentionally contain RC material. This could even include official 

documents such as Russia’s military doctrine, as Klimenko stated. 

A somewhat hidden military reference and definition of RC (one 

had to know what one was looking for) was also offered in 2011. In an 

official MOD document (“Conceptual Views on the Activities of the 

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space”) 

“information war” was said to involve:

 

466 Petr Shlayev, “The Human Aspect of the Problem: Arms Exports and Ergonomics,” 

Independent Military Review (supplement to Independent News), 24 February 1996. 467 A. F. Klimenko, “Theoretical-Methodological Problems of the Formation of 

Russia’s Military Doctrine. The Techniques for their Resolution,” Military Thought (in 

English), No. 3 1997, pp. 6-9.
181

Conflict between two or more States in information space 

with the goal of inflicting damage to information systems, 

processes, and resources, as well as to critically important 

structures and other structures; undermining political, 

economic, and social systems; carrying out mass 

psychological campaigns against the population of a State 

in order to destabilize society and the government; as well 

as forcing a State to make decisions in the interests of 

their opponents.468

The last line is key, “forcing a State to make decisions in the 

interests of their opponents.” There is no difference between this 

statement and those from the definitions offered by many theorists over 

time, such as K. V. Tarakonov’s 1974 thought that “RC is understood as 

the process of one of the sides giving reasons to the enemy from which 

he can logically infer his own decision, predetermined by the first 

side.”469

A Closer Look at the 1990s: Leonenko and Chausov

Leonenko

Writing in 1995 from a military perspective, Colonel S. 

Leonenko defined reflexive control as follows:

RC [reflexive control] consists of transmitting motives 

and grounds from the controlling entity to the controlled 

system that stimulate the desired decision. The goal of 

RC is to prompt the enemy to make a decision 

unfavorable to him. Naturally, one must have an idea 

 

468 “Conceptual Views on the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 

in Information Space,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2011, at 

ens.mil.ru.

469 Clifford Reid, “Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning,” in Brian D. Dailey 

and Patrick J. Parker, editors, Soviet Strategic Deception, Lexington Books, 1987, 

Chapter 14, p. 294.
182

about how he thinks.470

A “reflex” involves the specific process of imitating the enemy’s 

reasoning or imitating the enemy’s possible behavior to cause him to 

make a decision unfavorable to himself. The decision itself must be 

made independently. 

In fact, the enemy comes up with a decision based on the 

idea of the situation which he has formed, to include the 

disposition of our troops and installations and the 

command element’s intentions known to him. Such an 

idea is shaped above all by intelligence and other factors, 

which rest on a stable set of concepts, knowledge, ideas 

and, finally, experience. This set usually is called the 

‘filter,’ which helps a commander separate necessary 

from useless information, true data from false, and so 

on.471 

The chief task of RC is to locate the weak link of the filter and exploit it. 

According to the RC concept, during a serious conflict, the two 

opposing actors (countries) analyze their own and perceived enemy ideas 

and then attempt to influence one another by means of RC. A “reflex” 

refers to the creation of certain model behavior in the system it seeks to 

control (the objective system). It takes into account the fact that the 

objective system has a model of the situation and assumes that it will 

also attempt to influence the controlling organ or system. RC exploits 

moral, psychological, and other factors, as well as the personal 

characteristics of commanders. In the latter case, biographical data, 

habits, and psychological deficiencies could be used in deception 

operations.472 In a war in which RC is being employed, the side with the 

highest degree of reflex (the side best able to imitate the other side’s 

 

470 Leonenko, p. 28. This is akin to how British and American perception management 

theorists view the purpose of deception. 471 Ibid. 472 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
183

thoughts or predict its behavior) will have the best chance of winning. 

The degree of reflex depends on many factors, the most important of 

which are analytical capability, general erudition and experience, and 

one’s knowledge about the enemy. Leonenko added that, in the past, 

stratagems were the principal tool of RC, but today camouflage and 

deception [maskirovka] have replaced stratagems, a conclusion disputed 

by many. For example, the Chinese have demonstrated that electrons 

can be used as stratagems and operate as effectively as camouflage and 

deception in the traditional sense.

Leonenko’s theories about varying degrees of RC can be 

explained as follows. If two sides in a serious conflict – “A” and “B” –

have opposing goals, one will seek to destroy the other’s goals. 

Accordingly, if side A acts independently of the behavior of side B, then 

his degree of reflex relative to side B is equal to zero (0). On the other 

hand, if side A makes assumptions about side B’s behavior (that is, he 

models side B) based on the thesis that side B is not taking side A’s 

behavior into account, then side A’s degree of reflex is one (1). If side B 

also has a first degree reflex, and side A takes this fact into account, then 

side A’s reflex is two (2), and so on.

If successfully achieved, RC over the enemy makes it possible to 

influence his combat plans, his view of the situation, and how he fights. 

In other words, one side can impose its will on the enemy and cause him 

to make a decision inappropriate to a given situation. RC methods are 

varied and include camouflage (at all levels), disinformation, 

encouragement, blackmail by force, and the compromising of various 

officials and officers. Achieving successful RC requires in-depth study 

of the enemy’s inner nature, his ideas and concepts, which Leonenko 

referred to as the “filter,” through which passes all data about the 

external world. So defined, a filter is a collective image (termed “set”) of 

the enemy’s favorite combat techniques and methods for organizing 

combat actions, plus a psychological portrait of the enemy. Thus, reflex 

requires study of someone else’s filter and the exploitation of it for one’s 

own ends.473

 

473 Discussion with a Russian military officer in Moscow, September 1998.
184

Leonenko integrated information technologies and RC theory in 

his writings. He noted that the use of computers could hinder the use of 

RC by making it easier to process data and calculate options. This is so 

since an opponent can more easily “see through” an RC measure by an 

opposing force by simply using a computer. The computer’s speed and 

accuracy in processing information can detect the RC measure. On the 

other hand, in some cases, this may actually improve the chances for 

successful RC, since a computer lacks the intuitive reasoning of a human 

being.474

Computer technology increases the effectiveness of RC by 

offering new methods adaptable to the modern era that can serve the 

same ends. Leonenko then assessed these new opportunities that the use 

of computer technology afforded to RC, stating:

In present conditions, there is a need to act not only 

against people but also against technical reconnaissance 

assets and especially weapons guidance systems, which 

are impassive in assessing what is occurring and do not 

perceive to what a person reacts.475

If an information warfare or information operation system cannot 

perceive what a person reacts to and is unable to assess what is 

occurring, does this mean that it provides only insignificant data? Or 

does it mean that there are two layers to reflexively control? The first 

layer consists of the “eyes, nose, and ears” of sensors, satellites, and 

radars. The second layer is the “brain software” of humans, which 

gathers, processes, and produces knowledge from the information or 

makes decisions based on it. What happens, however, if the “eyes, ears, 

and nose” are manipulated? How does that affect the input into decisions 

and knowledge? For example, the use of such military activity by 

Yugoslav forces in the Balkans fooled NATO sensors over Kosovo and 

 

474 Leonenko, p. 29. Who can say, however, what powers computers might assume in 

the future?

475 Ibid.
185

resulted in NATO shooting at targets that were fakes. 

Yet, in the end, we do leave some decisions to computers. This 

indicates to Leonenko that we live in a much more frightening 

environment than we care to believe if, in fact, decisions are in the hands 

of machines that are “incapable of assessing what is occurring and do not 

perceive what a person reacts to.”

Chausov

Finally, in 1999 F. Chausov noted that “RC is the process of the 

intentional conveying to an opposing side of a certain aggregate of 

information which will cause that side to make a decision appropriate to 

that information.”476 Thus, information war techniques can be expected 

to contain RC methods. More important, Chausov discussed the risk 

involved with using RC, a topic seldom covered:

To justify the methods of using force while taking risk 

into account, the numerical measure R0 is introduced as 

the difference between the assessments of guaranteed 

effectiveness, or Eg, and the projected (situational) 

effectiveness, Es. The estimate of the guaranteed 

effectiveness represents the lower limit of the 

effectiveness indicator, given any type of enemy action 

and fixed actions by our own forces. Situational 

effectiveness refers to the effectiveness of a force’s action 

which is achieved through a certain type of action based 

on a commander’s decision. Ordering or establishing 

preference among the values of the risk looks like this: 

R0,1 > R0,1+1.

477

Chausov listed the principles of RC as a goal-oriented process 

 

476 F. Chausov, “Osnovi refleksivnogo upravleniya protivnikom (The Basics of 

Reflexively Controlling an Enemy),” Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest]), No. 9, 1999, p. 

12. The author would like to thank Mr. Robert Love of the Foreign Military Studies 

Office for his help in translating this and other segments of Chausov’s article. 477 Ibid., p. 14.
186

requiring a complete picture of all RC measures needed; an 

“actualization” of plans, that is providing a sufficiently complete picture 

of the intellectual potential of commanders and staff officers (based on 

their reality), especially when conditions are determined by global 

information space; the conformity of goals, missions, place, time and 

methods for RC’s conduct; the modeling or forecasting of the condition 

of a side at the time actions are being implemented; and the anticipation 

of events.

21st Century Tactics, Analogies, and Ukraine: A Theoretical 

Discussion 

Vorobyev and Kiselev

Major General Ivan Vorobyev and Colonel Valeriy Kiselev, 

regular contributors to several Russian military journals, have mentioned 

the topic of RC on several occasions through the years. For example, in a 

2006 article on the indirect approach they noted that RC of the enemy 

included implanting measures and activities, interconnected by goal, 

place, and time, designed to impose ones will on the enemy “through 

concealment, masking, deception, feints, decoy actions, and diversionary 

actions.”478

In 2008 they stated that commanders and staffs must master the 

“art of reflexive control” of enemy actions using robotized equipment, 

precision-guided munitions, and weapons based on new physical 

principles. This must be accomplished due to the intensification of 

information-psychological operations and the potential wider use of 

deception operations. Key elements of deception include “double 

deception (make opponents believe that true intentions are false),” 

“protection of key information,” “embedded concepts (generate an 

opponent’s misbelief in data that contains the deception plan),” and 

“false luck (create a situation for successful enemy actions that actually 

lead them to a trap).”479 In 2011, while discussing network-centric 

 

478 I. N. Vorobyev and V. A. Kiselev, “The New Strategy of the Indirect 

Approach,” Military Thought, No. 9 2006, pp. 2-5. 479 Ivan Vorobyev and Valeriy Kiselev, “Perspectives on Tactics in the 21st Century,” 

Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest), No. 2 2008, p. 22.
187

actions, the authors noted that fighting today is “primarily intellectual, 

information-reconnaissance-navigational,” where troop control assumes 

a form of battle control, meaning the RC of enemy actions. Decisions are 

an “amalgam of calculation and risk”480 and, thus, a goal of RC is to 

affect them. Finally, in a 2013 article devoted to the principles of 

military art, Vorobyev and Kiselev noted that information-psychological 

support is now an integral part of information war and includes the RC 

of the behavior of the enemy through the spread of false information 

programs and other forms of deceiving the enemy.481

Khorunzhyy

In 2013, in a VPK article, Nikolay Khorunzhyy asked whether 

Russia really needed a cyber command. The article noted that important 

features of cyber wars indicate the extensive use of information 

resources by potential enemies. It was noted that “influencing his 

information system on the basis of the principles of reflexive control, one 

can achieve desirable actions,” which some refer to as a provocation. 

However, the author notes, this is simply normal and an effective way of 

conducting war.482

Makhnin

Also in 2013 two interesting articles on RC appeared in the 

journal, Military Thought. The first, by V. L. Makhnin, has the most 

potential application to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, especially as it 

applies to the media. He noted that going from the reflection of 

cooperation to that of conflict can break the will of the adversary’s 

military and political leaders. This is known as strangling the enemy in a 

“friendly” embrace.483 One is reminded of the Putin-Poroshenko meeting 

 

480 I. N. Vorobyev and V. A. Kiselev, “From Modern Tactics to the Tactics of NetworkCentric Actions,” Military Thought, No. 8 2011, pp. 19-27; and “Trends in the 

Development of Network-Centric Actions,” Military Thought, No. 5 2014, pp. 10-17. 481 I. N. Vorobyev and V. A. Kiselev, “Evolution of the Principles of Military Art,” 

Military Thought (in English), Eastview Press, No. 3 2008, pp. 84-91. 482 Nikolay Khorunzhyy, “Does Russia Need a Cyber Command?” Kovrov VPK.name, 

23 August 2013.

483 V. L. Makhnin, “Reflexive Processes in Military Art: The Historico-Gnoseological 

Aspect,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 1 2013, p. 40.
188

for a truce that was immediately followed by a Russian military invasion 

of Ukraine. Was Poroshenko strangled in the “friendly” embrace? One 

should closely observe recent cease-fires to see if the same “friendly” 

embrace repeats itself.

Makhnin stated that the organization of the reflexive process 

between opposing combat systems is related to the development and 

implementation of a series of measures to supply the reflexed combat 

system with interests, motivations, and reasons. These measures combine 

to create a desired operational-tactical situation and provide an incentive 

for making desired inferences and conclusions that benefit the friendly 

decision-maker.484 The use of the reflexive process leads to the 

following:

An analysis of the past experience in preparing and 

conducting operations, combat actions, engagements, and 

other tactical actions with the purpose of misleading the 

adversary in plans conceived by commanders shows that 

reflexive influence on the adversary was confined to 

forming a simulacrum, that is, false-real, information, and 

psychological images of objects, processes, and 

phenomena. Reflexive influence using simulacra 

paralyzes the adversary’s (decision-maker’s) intelligent 

(creative) activity.485

Simulacrums (images or representations of reality), naturally, are closely 

associated with the formation of a “new reality.”

Yet another way to induce reflection, according to Makhnin, may 

be the most interesting and it involves the use of analogies. The latter’s 

RC use enables one to draw inferences and discuss subjects that cannot 

be observed. In military art analogy is a cognitive approach that helps 

one develop concepts and a new way to achieve the purpose of specific 

actions. One is reminded of the use of the fascist and Nazi analogy in 

 

484 Ibid., p. 34. 485 Ibid., p. 37.
189

reference to people fighting in Maidan Square against Ukrainian 

President Viktor Yanukovych, an analogy drawn to acquire support from 

the Russian population. Russians well remember the Nazi onslaught 

against Stalingrad and Leningrad in World War II, and so this analogy 

touches a raw nerve in them. Was the population a recipient of a form of 

internal RC through analogy? Most likely it was. Analogies can 

reflexively serve as a strong unifying force for a population with a strong 

historical predilection, as is the case for Russians and their memories of 

World War II. 

Another Makhnin comment is that the reflexive approach allows 

a commander to uncover an idea unknown to himself or his opponent “at 

the moment.”486 Interests, motivations, and reasons that shape the 

operational-tactical situation are conveyed to an adversary and stimulate 

his reasoning and conclusions, which can produce more reflexive input 

by Russian commanders. He notes that it could cause an opponent to 

slow down his operations, abandon plans, and make irrational decisions, 

which could be exactly what is happening in Ukraine. 

Makhnin describes what he terms as creative and destructive 

reflexive functions. The former develops “in a situation when the 

struggle goes on at a slow pace and, accordingly, the operational-tactical 

situation changes slowly as well, when the opponents’ objectives are 

clear, and the way to reach them has been figured out.”487 Clearly the 

slow pace of the conflict in Ukraine has offered Russia the opportunity to 

thwart opinions that have developed against Russian support for the 

separatists and to keep Ukrainian forces from taking control of proRussian-controlled territory. Destructive reflexive functions refer to a 

commander’s concept that is based on a tested way of action or an old 

idea.488 Makhnin did not offer an example of destructive RC.

Kazakov and Kiryushin

 

486 Ibid., p. 46. 487 Ibid., p. 44. 488 Ibid.
190

The second article on RC control (which could also apply to 

actions in the Ukraine conflict at the combat or even diplomatic level) 

was written by V. G. Kazakov and A.N. Kiryushin. The authors asked 

“is it possible, apart from ordering about subordinates, to control people 

or groups that are not directly subordinated to one’s own control body or 

decision-maker?” Since the time of Sun Tzu this has been done through 

deception or premediated actions, they note, which make the enemy 

believe in things that are not true. 489

Kazakov and Kiryushin discussed the concept of complex or 

double-track control over combat actions:

By dividing the control concept into command control 

(legitimizing manipulation of subordinate forces in an 

effort to accomplish a mission) and reflexive control 

(seeking to stealthily control enemy forces to create 

hindrances or frustrate their combat missions), we put a 

somewhat different sense into this classification that 

expands the scope of research into the control factor in 

general and control over combat actions in particular, and 

put it forward in a new, other than a pedagogical 

format.490

They add that such control over combat actions needs to result in 

drawing up superior plans to employ RC and maneuver the enemy into a 

managed position, resulting in what they term as “reflexive superiority.” 

The reflexive environment or reality of combat are the shared realm of 

two opponents, and there they “clash for priority and superiority of their 

strategies of reflections, ideas, and decisions,” which translates into 

warfare. The authors add that RC expert V. A. Lefebvre, who developed 

the RC theory, believes that it is defined as “influencing the enemy in a 

 

489 V. G. Kazakov and A. N. Kiryushin, “Complex Management of Military Actions,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7, 2013, pp. 61-67.

490 Ibid., p. 63.
191

way that sways him into making a decision expected of him by the 

transmitting side.”491

Interestingly the authors also quote Makhnin, who stated that 

“applying compelling influence is central to reflexive control as a way to 

constrain the generation and absorption of new knowledge, paralyze 

creativity by the opposing combat system’s commanders and staffs, and 

constrict the scale on which the opposing combat systems’ operational 

(combat) potentialities can be exploited.”492 This requires the 

development of an “information package,” which is an RC message, put 

together for the enemy to make a decision. It thus is important to 

understand what an opposing commander “sees” and how he might 

subjectively respond. Again, like Makhnin, the authors think it is 

important to rely on the use of simulacrums, this time in the form of an 

information package, to influence enemy decision-making.493

In 2015 Kazakov and Kirishin wrote an article on RC for the 

Journal of the Academy of Military Science. It appeared to be an 

expanded version of their 2013 article, containing some of the same 

information, while also offering new material. The authors noted that 

while control of the enemy is important, so is control of one’s own 

troops. That is, the synchronic control of the enemy should be 

coordinated with control over subordinate friendly forces. Combat 

operations need the creation of “favorable conditions to execute combat 

tasks with the help of deception and covert control of the enemy.”494 The 

“command control” of friendly forces is defined in the following way:

The purposeful, systemic, centralized, and subordinated 

action of a commander, through designated officers, on 

the military collectives of units, subunits, and each soldier 

in particular to ensure a high level of mobilization and 

 

491 Ibid., p. 64.

492 Ibid.

493 Ibid.

494 V. G. Kazakov and A. N. Kiriushin, “All-Inclusive Command and Control of 

Combat Operations,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, No. 4 2015, p. 36.
192

combat readiness of forces, and to ensure that level of 

their professional and moral-psychological preparedness 

that, under combat conditions will make it possible for 

them to execute their assigned tasks fully and with 

minimal losses.495

The actual problem is controlling those forces outside the 

subordinate relationship, which is the enemy force. The usual method is 

to deceive the enemy. Deception is a “premeditated action aimed so as to 

create in another an impression of facts that do not correspond to 

reality.”496 This has been a part of military art for a long time. 

It appears that the theory of reflexive control (RC) will also be 

valuable in such research. RC is 

Generally understood as the process of transmitting to the 

enemy the ‘bases/foundations’ for making a decision. At 

the same time, Lefebvre believes that RC is a special 

action against the enemy, with the aim of ‘persuading’ 

him to make a decision that has been predetermined by 

the controlling side.497

There is great interest at the tactical level for this type of 

research. If an enemy force can be preempted in the sphere of thinking 

and plans, then the result can be the placement of an enemy force in the 

position of a controlled system, or a victim of what is known as 

“reflexive superiority.” It is also necessary to consider how an opponent 

makes decisions and develops information packets, which can result in a 

reflexive controlling action.498

Representing information packets is the term simulacra, which is 

a basis for determining the content of the functioning of an information 

 

495 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

496 Ibid., p. 37.

497 Ibid.

498 Ibid.
193

packet as a means of deception. Simulacrum is from the Latin simularc 

“to pretend.” There are representational (copy of a copy, pretending to be 

an original or the real thing, where false information exists but is not 

prevalent over real information) and nonrepresentational (simulacra can 

go to work outside the framework of a real copy and does not presuppose 

a correlation with any existing referents). The latter usually manifests in 

the form of a simulation composed of false information about the state of 

an object. Simulation and concealment are the two aspects of deception 

that form the foundation of reflexive interaction.499

The most probable areas where command control and RC can be 

combined are in the process of decision-making in general and in the 

planning of combat operations in particular. RC orients on the creation of 

conditions that increase the effectiveness of command control (here it 

seems that command control executes missions that support the 

information packets which the enemy is receiving). In order to RC the 

enemy, a specially designated force and means should be developed, that 

is a specific TO&E500 with information-psychological confrontation 

qualifications. These forces would develop and transmit 

recommendations to the commander on how to use RC measures 

together with command control actions.501 These forces would be 

expected to accomplish the following:

Here the implementation of the RC method at stages of 

immediate preparation for and execution of the combat 

mission is carried out by means of sending the appropriate 

information packets to the enemy. It should be recalled 

that an information packet within the framework of a RC 

method is implemented through the totality of simulacra, 

which are embodied in both a nonrepresentational form 

(simulation) and a representational form (concealment).502

 

499 Ibid., p. 38. 500 Ibid., p. 39. 501 Ibid., p. 41. 502 Ibid., p. 40.
194

The method of RC of the enemy is understood by the authors as 

“the ordered aggregate of information packets sent to the enemy with the 

goal of creating favorable conditions for executing a combat mission.”503

The information packets are sets of simulacra of a non-existing combat 

situation, or simulacra that conceal existing combat situations.504 The 

situation is subject to two sets of reflexion. Information reflexion is how 

the enemy views friendly forces and their condition based on their 

system of intelligence and the enemy’s assessment of an opponent’s 

potential. Operational reflexion is the principles and features of an 

enemy’s decision-making within the information he has about the 

condition of his opponent’s force and combat operations plans. Combat 

experience also counts when such decision-making is conducted.505

Meanwhile, friendly forces try to determine the type of 

information packets that present to the enemy’s mind an advantageous 

model of friendly forces and means. RC goals are determined in the 

order of those before the commencement of combat operations and those 

that commence while the combat mission is being carried out. This 

creates a spatial-temporal RC framework. The synchronization of the 

methods of command control and RC of the enemy is the basis of the 

plan for resolving the execution of combat missions. 

They noted that the commander needs a special group (outside 

the TO&E) with information-psychological qualifications to develop and 

transmit RC measures together with command control (“readiness to 

execute assigned tasks”) actions, which they mentioned in the 2013 

article. Commanders should move from secrecy of the combat plan to the 

development of all-inclusive command and control (synchronizing 

command control and RC) of the enemy that implements the concrete 

sequence of information packets to influence conditions. Thus, this 

article appears to be an updated version of their 2013 article, with the 

following two diagrams used to in the article to explain how command 

 

503 Ibid. 504 Ibid. 505 Ibid.
195

control and RC fit together to manipulate an enemy’s decision-making 

process.506

In the diagram below, an IP is an information packet, CM is a 

combat mission, RC is reflexive control, and TP is the ordered totality of 

procedures.

 

506 V. G. Kazakov and A. N. Kiriushin, “All-Inclusive Command and Control of 

Combat Operations,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, No. 4 2015, p. 39. 

The diagram above was on page 39 and the diagram on the next page was on page 40.
196

Russian RC in Modern Operations

Meanwhile the Russian military is exercising other types of RC. 

For example, it is conditioning the West to Russian exercises along 

Ukraine’s border. After a period of time these exercises appear less 

important to observers on the other side of the border. Simultaneously, 

Russia’s military looks for a pretext to act. Pretext and conditioning are 

two sides of the same coin when it comes to RC. They assist one another, 

with the pretext usually the result of a mistake in an opposing side’s 

understanding of a Russian conditioning exercise.

One Ukrainian officer noted that on occasion Russia summons 

OSCE observers to their location and then Russia starts a bombardment 

of a Ukrainian area, knowing that Ukraine will retaliate to stop it. When 

the OSCE arrives at the Russian location, they record only the response 

from the Ukrainian side. That is, the Russians reflexively coordinated the 

OSCE observation. In another case of RC, some Russians have been 
197

known to make phone calls to the UN saying they are locals and that 

Ukraine is shelling them.507 Tis is akin to the cyber trolls spreading 

misinformation, but in this case cell phone trolls. Since all Russian 

media outlets report the same information, there is no choice other than 

to believe what is said in the Russian press, which is a form of RC over 

Russia’s domestic front. 

On May 13, 2016, Ukraine’s Strategic Communications Center in 

Kiev briefly explained how Russia uses its longstanding and growing 

connections into Ukraine’s journalism and business sectors to develop 

anti-government sentiment in Kiev. The Center stated that Russianbacked journalists are contacted by Russia’s GRU and told to go to a 

designated site before an unexpected, controversial event begins there. 

Once the incident is underway, these journalists are therefore the first to 

report – in local, national and international media – that the Kiev 

government is to blame (for this calamity, tragedy or whatever the 

“event” was).508

In 2016 the book, Future War, was published in Russia (it was 

not available to this author before this study went to the publisher). 

However, the Russian journal, Independent Military Observer, reviewed 

it under the headline, “The Main Thing—to Force Your Enemy to Fulfill 

Your Will,”509 so it would not be surprising to find references to RC in 

the text, as the title implies the use of RC. 

Conclusions

The discussion has included some of the old examples of RC, as 

well as some of the new ones. It is clear that the concept “has legs” and 

keeps adjusting to modern times, as witnessed through its inclusion in 

the military’s 2011 definition of information war. It has been used at the 

 

507 Interview with Anatoliy Kravchuk by Pavlo Vuyets, “General Staff Spokesman 

Anatoliy Kravchuk on Exacerbation in Donets Basin: Russia Must Keep its Cutthroats 

in Good Shape,” Kyiv Glavkom, 25 July 2016. 508 Discussion between the author and Mr. Rob Kurz, FMSO, who was present at the 

Strategic Communication Center in Kiev.

509 Oleg Vladykin, “The Main Thing—To Force Your Enemy to Fulfill Your Will,” 

Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), 30 September 2016.
198

strategic and tactical levels.

Several of the actual types of RC operations from the Russian 

side include attacks on physical structures that are blamed on others; the 

use of pretexts and conditioning; cyber issues (trolls, etc.); decisionmaking and RC on the part of the National Security Council of Russia; 

use of media (apparently foreign letters critical of Ukraine or the US 

were actually written by Russians); the use of analogies; and the use of 

information packets and simulacrums. Naturally, this list could be 

extended. 

It seems that RC appears everywhere in Russia. It has a role to 

play as part of negotiations, long- and short-term strategies, analogies, 

doctrines, tactics, and high-tech systems, among other areas. One should 

expect that the RC concept will be around long after the disappearance of 

not only President Putin but more likely than not his successor too. RC 

remains a successful part of Russian philosophy and will not go away 

easily.
199

CHAPTER NINE: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

CENTER AND KAVKAZ-2016

Introduction

One of the shortcomings in Russia’s defensive posture that 

President Putin and the military recognized over the past several years 

was the inability of the MOD to manage or control in a timely manner 

not only its many assets but also its coordination with other federal 

bodies. The creation of the National Defense Management Center 

(NDMC) seems to have resolved both problems, as the center’s 

successes over the past two years indicate. It has integrated advanced 

information technologies such that it is capable of providing information 

that enables decision-making proposals that correspond to the situation 

on a 24/7 basis.

This chapter will describe not only the creation and functions of 

the NDMC but also how it was applied to the autumn exercise, Kavkaz2016.

National Defense Management Center 

On 1 December 2014 the NDMC officially opened on alert duty 

in Moscow on the Frunzenskaya Embankment. The facility manages the 

state’s military organization and reacts to crisis situations in Russia and 

across the globe. One article on the opening stated that the computer 

capacity of the NDMC was more than three times that of the Pentagon, 

and that the information is processed at a speed equal to reading “50 

Lenin Libraries” per second. It reportedly has three management 

structures: the center for managing strategic nuclear forces, the center for 

combat command and control, and the center for managing everyday 

activities. A colonel explained that the center can constantly monitor 114 

training areas, and that alert duty is organized around 48 combat posts. 

Further, the center’s duty forces “constantly exchange up-to-the-minute 

information with more than 50 federal executive bodies,” indicating the 

reach of the center’s activities to control situations and the defense 

posture of Russia. In order to prepare officers for duty at the center, a 
200

National Defense Management Institute has been established at the 

General Staff Military Academy. The comprehensive study of defense 

management problems is covered at the institute.510

A year later the Deputy Chief of the NDMC, Major General Igor 

Solokhov, was interviewed on the center’s accomplishments over the 

past 365 days. He noted that Putin approved the center on 8 May 2013 in 

order to improve the system of centralized management of the state’s 

military organization. NDMC centralization included how the militaryindustrial complex and regional economic centers would fit into an 

overall mobilization plan in case of conflict. With regard to the three 

management centers of the NDMC, the strategic nuclear force center is 

designed to manage the use of the strategic nuclear forces based on 

decisions of the nation’s top military-political leadership. The center for 

combat management monitors the military-political situation in the world 

and forecasts the development of threats to the RF. The center for 

managing day-to-day activity monitors all areas of activity of the Armed 

Forces; and coordinates the activities of federal organs to meet the 

requirements of the troops not belonging to the MOD.511

Solokhov noted that the NDMC hopes to improve 

interdepartmental information collaboration and the equipping of 

regional and territorial management centers with technical information 

exchange facilities. They would be united with a single hardware and 

software system. The basis for information collaboration is Presidential 

Edict No 601, dated 1 September 2014, which defined the aims and 

procedures for collecting information relating to questions of Russia’s 

defense. Collaboration is based on bilateral agreements between the 

MOD and federal executive bodies and on the integration of information 

systems of federal bodies into the NDMC’s hardware and software 

system.512

 

510 Aleksandr Khokhlov, “The Whole World in the Palm of Your Hand...” 

Komsomolskaya Pravda Krasnoyarsk Online, 12 February 2015. 511 Oleg Falichev, interview with Igor Solokhov, “Duty Officer for the Country. 

National Defense Management Center Sums Up Results of First Year’s Work,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 25 November 2015. 512 Ibid.
201

Lieutenant-General Mikhail Mizintsev, the Chief of the NDMC, 

reported at a Public Council session that as of October 2015 some 54 

federal executive institutions and executive institutions of 29 

components of the RF participated in the Tsentr-2015 strategic 

command-staff exercise.513 Thus collaboration appears to be improving. 

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu supported this improvement a month 

later, noting that “one important direction of its [NDMC] work is 

coordinating power agencies’ work in the defense sphere...much has 

been done over the past year, but even more still remains to be done.”514

A normative-law base has been established and a procedure for 

collecting and exchanging information developed. 

Shoygu’s comments came at the “First Interdepartmental 

Conference on Information Interaction,” whose presumed goal was to 

study the experience of collaboration and the search for new forms and 

methods of its improvement. One report noted that “the holding of the 

conference will shape new views in the sphere of information 

technologies and various organizational solutions aimed at the further 

improvement of the system of interdepartmental information 

collaboration.”515 Shoygu supported this plan with his statement that two 

science companies [which are composed of young talented servicemen] 

of programmers would be created for the NDMC, adding that the volume 

of software to be created is fairly large. Fortunately, the science 

companies can be supplemented with other organizations, since “fairly 

strong programmer-training schools existed in Tomsk, Irkutsk, and 

Novosibirsk.”516 

 

513 Unattributed report, “General of the Army Sergey Shoygu Took Part in a Plenary 

Session of the Defense Department’s Public Council,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 19 October 2015. 514 Unattributed report, “Defense Minister Army General Sergey Shoygu Participated in 

the Work of the First Interdepartmental Conference on Information Interaction,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 19 November 2015. 515 Unattributed report, “Interdepartmental Conference on Information Collaboration to 

be Held at the National Center for Management of the Russian Federation’s Defense,” 

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 3 November 2015. 516 “Defense Minister Army General Sergey Shoygu Participated...”
202

In a lecture at the Academy of Military Science in 2015, Chief of 

the General Staff V. V. Gerasimov discussed the importance of the 

NDMC.517 He made it clear that the organization has a key role to play in 

military decision-making. In particular, he made his points via the use of 

two diagrams in his speech, both of which were published in the Journal 

of the Academy of Military Science. 

The first diagram [neither are visually reproduced here] analyzed 

the way to forecast the development of the situation, which, as stated 

earlier, is a function of the NDMC. It noted that the president, the 

minister of defense, and the General Staff work out decisions. The 

NDMC collects, generalizes, and analyzes the following eleven types of 

information, according to the diagram:

• Important events in the world and in the RF; 

• Terrorist acts;

• The world’s military-strategic and military-political 

situation;

• The socio-political situation in the RF and CIS

• Information on the status and nature of troop 

operations; 

• The manning of the Armed Forces; 

• Measures for operational readiness; 

• Emergency situations; 

• The status of combat readiness of the Armed Forces; 

• The status of combat readiness of the strategic 

offensive force groupings of foreign countries; 

• Information from the data processing center.518

The second diagram offered a view of the organs of strategic 

command and control of the RF’s military organization. These include

 

517 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Experience of Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic 

War and the Organization of Uniform Command and Control of the Country’s Defense 

under Contemporary Conditions,” Journal of the Academy of Military Science, No.2 

2015, pp. 5-15. 518 Ibid., p. 14.
203

the president, with links to the Security Council and the government of 

the RF (here one finds the federal organs of executive authority, the 

economic bloc; and the federation organs of executive authority, or 

power block, which includes the Special Formations [in wartime] and the 

MVD’s Internal Forces [now part of Putin’s National Guard and not the 

MVD], military formations and organs); and directly under the president 

is the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (in wartime), the MOD, the 

General Staff, and the NDMC. 

In 2016 an article in Military Thought noted that the NDMC is 

involved in mathematical modeling of situations via simulations to 

increase an officer’s ability to respond realistically to threats and 

crises.519 Computer forms of operational training (CFOT) at NDMC 

include command and staff exercises and computer war games. Combat 

actions are carried out via specific software and modern methods of 

mathematical modeling of operations, often conducted in different forms. 

The operational basis for CFOT remains the nature of armed struggles 

and the various forms and method of combat actions to confront them. 

Also considered are threats, trends in the development of an adversary’s 

armed forces, and the probable nature of future war.520

A late 2016 TV report added more information about the NDMC. 

It noted that counterpart branches exist all over Russia. There is a navy 

command center in St. Petersburg and mini-centers for each service arm 

and each military district, with the latter reaching down to brigade level. 

Duty is handled by four shifts, and a banner in the hall describes which 

shift is on duty by a letter and number on the back of the banner. There 

are two helicopter pads on the roof and a hovercraft dock on the river 

opposite the building. The NDMC has 15 separate halls. There is a daily 

heads-of-department conference. There are 8 institutions that provide up 

to 500 recruits yearly for the Center.521

 

519 A. B. Mikhaylovsky and H. I. Sayfetdinov, “Computer Learning Forms of Officials 

of the National Defense Management Center of the Russian Federation,” Military 

Thought, No. 5 2016, pp. 57-63. 520 Ibid. 521 Rossiya 24 Television, 30 December 2016.
204

A super-computer center was shown during the TV program, 

which can monitor situations and make assessments of situations, 

translate 6 languages at a time, and has a total storage capacity of 236 

petabytes and a processing power of 16 petaflops. According to the 

report, this makes it the most powerful computer of its kind in the world. 

The computer has several layers of protection from hacking, and the 

building’s physical security includes gates, video surveillance, and 

special detector systems for toxic or radioactive agents, to include a 

“Rodion” system that can detect any foreign SIM card on the premises; 

and “white noise” generators that prevent anyone outside from hearing 

what is going on within. Finally, everyday a heads-of-department 

conference takes place; and there are eight institutions that provide up to 

500 recruits yearly for the Center. Another report noted that the Center 

can integrate 73 federal executive bodies, the governments of all 85 

constituent entities, and 1320 state corporations and defense industry 

facilities.522

Kavkaz-2016

In September 2016 the Russian military began its Kavkaz-2016 

exercise. This strategic command staff exercise involved warships, 

aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles throughout the Southern Military 

District, and included not only the North Caucasus and Southern Russia, 

but all of the Black and Caspian Seas as well. A rehearsal of 

mobilization readiness and territorial defense took place.523

A few days earlier the Bank of Russia, the Ministry of Finance, 

the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and other federal executive bodies 

were inspected for their ability to work under wartime conditions. The 

idea was to ensure that communications worked and that no one would 

be deprived of resources. The NDMC was in control of the operation, 

and a software system was being constructed to link information 

resources and all ministries and departments. The NDMC also monitors 

 

522 President of Russia Website (in English), 22 December 2016. 523 Nikolay Grishchenko, “Kavkaz-2016 Exercises Testing New Types of Weapons,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 5 September 2016.
205

defense plants and construction facilities. The evacuation of organs of 

power to bunkers was also rehearsed.524

During the exercise it was reported that a “directorate of a 

military district (for wartime) was formed for the first time in many years 

during the Kavkaz-2016 strategic command-post exercise.”525 This 

means the exercise was designed to test the integration of assets in time 

of war. The military district, created on the basis of a joint strategic 

command, ensures a martial law regime, mobilization resource 

preparations, and logistical support. State reserve enterprises, industrial 

and repair enterprises, and plants and factories were involved, 

“regardless of the forms of ownership.”526 Special attention was devoted 

to logistic tasks of civilian administrations. To prevent conflicts of 

interest, Putin signed an edict that apparently allows the MOD to 

“confiscate the entire rolling stock of joint-stock companies or the 

Russian Railroad in the event of military operations.”527

The military district thus conducts territorial defense with the 

help of other ministries and departments, such as the National Guard or 

MChS. Provisions are implemented to repulse or prevent aggression 

against Russia. Reservists were called up as well, altogether nearly 

4,000. Not only did they guard important facilities but sought to destroy 

illegal armed formations. Most important, however, was that the 

leadership over various components was rehearsed for the first time.528

In a 14 September wrap-up, Gerasimov stated that, while taking 

into account the Syrian experience, the exercise “rehearsed a massive air 

 

524 Yekaterina Zgirovskaya and Yelena Malysheva, “Wartime Central Bank. Ministries 

and Central Bank Become Involved in Surprise Inspection of Russian Army,” 

Gazeta.ru, 29 August 2016. 525 Interview with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Romanchuk, “Experiment Deemed 

Successful,” Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 7 October 2016. 526 Ibid. 527 Oleg Falichev, “The Long Arm of the Bastion: Why the Strategic Command Staff 

Exercise Kavkaz-2016 Elicited Heightened Activity of Foreign Intelligence Services,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 21-27 September 2016. 528 Ibid.
206

strike, defense from cruise missiles, coordination with territorial defense 

subunits, and the [involvement of] information operations troops.”529

While noting that troop skills were honed based on actual military 

conflicts, including those in Syria, the emphasis was on weaponry, with 

Gerasimov stating that “Russia has been testing all state-of-the-art 

weapons in Syria. We have tested all models of weapons, literally all, in 

Syria.”530 The exercise involved 120,000 servicemen, 400 pieces of 

combat equipment, 90 tanks, 15 combat ships and vessels, 500 tons of 

munitions, and 35,000 tons of fuel. He added that there are now 66 

battalion tactical groups (BTG) in the Russian army, with 125 planned 

by 2018. Presently there are two BTGs in a brigade, with each battalion 

composed of 400-500 soldiers with reinforcements, that is, tanks, 

mortars, and other types of equipment. Coordination with other Russian 

agencies was refined as well.531

Of interest was that nonstandard (atypical) decisions were 

emphasized, as there were no scripted solutions. Gerasimov added that as 

military art develops, defensive operations must be active, since the 

boundary between defense and the offense is becoming increasingly 

blurred. Commanders must be able to foresee how to incorporate 

preventive offensive operations in certain sectors.532 Finally, with regard 

to missiles and mobility, it was noted that S-400, Kalibr, and Bastion 

systems were fired, and the Strelets reconnaissance and target attack 

system was exercised along with air, rail, river, and sea operations.533

 

529 Maksim Solopov, “Kavkaz with a Syrian Bias: The General Staff has Summed Up 

the Results of the Kavkaz-2016 Exercises,” Gazeta.ru, 14 September 2016. 530 Ibid. 531 Ibid. An RIA Novosti report on the same day quoted Gerasimov as noting that a 

battalion tactical team (BTG) is a reinforced battalion with from 700-900 servicemen. 

See “The Armed Forces Will Increase by Twofold the Number of Reinforced Battalions 

with Contract Servicemen,” RIA Novosti, 14 September 2016. 532 See for example, Aleksandr Tikhonov, “In the Southwest Sector,” Krasnaya Zvezda 

Online, 16 September 2016; and Oleg Falichev, “The Long Arm of the Bastion: Why 

the Strategic Command Staff Exercise Kavkaz-2016 Elicited Heightened Activity of 

Foreign Intelligence Services,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 21-27 

September 2016.

533 Ibid.
207

Gerasimov stated that territorial defense had been a center of 

attention for two years. The exercise solved many of the questions 

associated with that focus. Arms, munitions, missiles and so forth were 

stockpiled, other agencies participated in organizing territorial defense, 

and important areas or facilities secured, which is the mission of 

territorial defense elements. A reservist system for mobilization training 

was approved. The repulsion of massed airstrikes, methods of combating 

cruise missiles, and a focus for the first time on enemy information 

warfare capabilities also marked the exercise. In regard to the latter, 

Gerasimov noted that information warfare at some stage could even 

prevail over traditional military engagements. Kavkaz-2016, he 

concluded, “was the latest step in the development of the system of 

territorial defense.”534

Defense Minister Shoygu stated that “The exercise demonstrated 

the high readiness of the federal ministries, Russian regions, and 

enterprises to fulfill their tasks.”535 In this way representatives of bodies 

of state authority and local self-government bodies received the 

necessary practice. Such “bodies” included the Bank of Russia, the 

Industry and Trade Ministry, and Rosrezerv536 (which ensures 

mobilization needs and supports the economy).

Conclusions

In his year-end speech to the Defense Collegium, Shoygu noted 

that the command and staff exercise was the most ambitious training 

initiative of the year. He stated that it featured an effort to relocate 

divisions from 4 armies at a distance of 2500 kilometers and to deploy 

command units at new theaters of operations. To Shoygu, this confirmed 

that the military command structures could manage the situation if a 

national security threat emerged in the south of Russia.537

 

534 Aleksandr Tikhonov, “In the Southwest Sector,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 16 

September 2016.

535 Interfax (in English), 12 October 2016. 536 Ibid. 537 Website of the President of Russia (in English), 22 December 2016.
208

In 2017 the exercise will be staged in the Western Military 

District, opposite the Baltics and Ukraine. This operation will increase 

the heartbeat of those on the Baltic side of the border, as the constituents 

will wonder just what plans Russia has in store.
209

CHAPTER TEN: RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN SYRIA

Introduction

On 30 September 2015 Russian air operations began in Syria. 

Earlier, a military equipment buildup had taken place, lasting over 

several weeks, at an airfield near Latakia and at the naval base at Tartus, 

the latter designed to serve Russia’s air, naval, and ground (naval 

infantry) components. 

Why did Russia take these preparatory steps and then intervene in 

this particular conflict at a time when Kremlin leaders were heavily 

focused on Eastern Ukraine and potential problems in the Baltics? The 

rationale appeared simple: first and foremost, to support the Bashar AlAssad regime, which, according to some Russian accounts, had lost 

control of up to 70 percent of Syrian territory to the Islamic State (ISIS) 

in September 2015.538 Second, Russia noted with alarm that its southern 

belly was again exposed to the return of extremists who had fought on 

the side of ISIS against the Syrian government and were now bringing 

back to Russia both their ideology and lessons learned from fighting 

there. After quieting the near decade-long struggle inside Russia in 

Chechnya, which is very near the region of conflict, Russia’s leaders did 

not want a new threat recreated there or spread to other parts of the 

country. Both points appeared to have spearheaded the Kremlin’s 

decision-making and influenced its resolve to intervene.

Upon further examination after several months of fighting, 

however, other more general reasons beyond this initial rationale began 

to appear. They can be categorized as geopolitical, national, and military:

• Geopolitical: restore Russian influence in the Middle 

East as its main arbiter; provide support to its best 

friend in the region, Syrian President Bashar Al-

 

538 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Syria: Russian Thunder. The Commander of the Russian 

Federation’s Troop Grouping in Syria Has Given His First Interview to Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 24 March 2016.
210

Assad; keep the US from exerting too much influence 

over the region; place the US in a conundrum—does it 

overextend its influence in Syria at the expense of 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and a tired force?; deflect attention 

from Russian activities in Crimea, Ukraine, and 

elsewhere on its periphery; conduct integrated 

operations with Iranian, Hezbollah, and Syrian forces; 

and exert pressure on the European Union.

• National: use cooperation with the US in Syria as 

leverage to perhaps curtail sanctions and, as a result,

energize Russia’s failing domestic economy; divert 

attention from an increasingly unpopular conflict 

against brother Slavs in Ukraine; and reassure the 

population that the Kremlin is directing its attention 

toward the emerging threat to the south of the nation. 

• Military: test new weaponry and transport capabilities

and demonstrate new military deterrence means (with 

new weapons) as the military continues to implement 

reforms and reequip the force after years of neglect; 

demonstrate to the international community 

professional competency that was lacking in Georgia; 

learn to work with other nations/groups 

(Iran/Hezbollah, etc.) and establish new alliances; 

learn to identify the forms and methods that 

insurgents/terrorists use in combat; demonstrate the 

command and control capabilities of the new National 

Defense Management Center (NDMC) in Moscow 

and its ability to integrate combat assets; and destroy 

the financial (oil facilities, etc.) means supporting 

ISIS’s operations.

The emphasis in Syria is on military operations and not 

nonmilitary measures, which is of note, since Chief of the General Staff 

Valery Gerasimov stated in 2013 that nonmilitary activities were used 

over military ones by a 4:1 ratio in today’s context. Instead, the testing of 
211

new weaponry and the heavy use of the military’s Aerospace Force 

(space, air force, and air defense assets) was emphasized. The primary 

use of aerospace operations also confirmed Defense Minister Sergey 

Shoygu’s assertion that they represent the center of gravity of modern 

conflicts. There appeared to be little cyber or propaganda input other 

than efforts to persuade Russia’s domestic population of the validity of 

the military’s deployment. There was some attention provided later in 

the campaign to humanitarian operations, but overall the 4:1 ratio seems 

to have been reversed. 

The focus on testing new equipment was prioritized not only 

under Syria’s battlefield conditions, but also in exercises. For example, 

the early September 2016 Kavkaz exercise (almost one year after the 

start of operations in Syria), worked on many of the lessons learned from 

the Syrian experience. In regard to Syrian lessons learned, it was stated 

that

The troops also obtained the experience of the 

disorganization of the illegal armed formations’ command 

and control systems, gaining and maintaining information 

supremacy, the coverage of the troops from possible air 

strikes, the security and defense of basing airfields, the

restoration of constitutional law and order, and the 

transfer of liberated territory to the local authorities.539

This chapter will only discuss the military aspect of the Russian 

intervention. It will analyze the equipment that Russia has used in the 

region from both Russian and Western sources; the forms and methods 

of fighting used by ISIS as detailed in Russian articles; and the thinking 

behind the partial pullout of forces in March 2016, among other 

issues.

540

 

539 Maksim Solopov, “Kavkaz with a Syrian Bias: The General Staff has Summed Up 

the Results of the Kavkaz-2016 Exercises,” Gazeta.ru, 14 September 2016. 540 The thinking of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate about actions on the 

ground and in the air is located at Appendix One.
212

Russian Equipment Used in Syria: Russian and Western Sources

The lack of ISIS air defense weaponry has made Syria’s airspace 

an ideal testing ground for air operations. Some have noted that after the 

withdrawal of some fighter jets in March, helicopters replaced them, and 

perhaps this is yet another way to ensure rotary as well as fixed-wing 

aircraft get tested. Another important aspect of Russian involvement in 

Syria is that it has allowed it to test new force models and new weapons. 

Force groups appear to have included covert private military 

companies. For example, Islamists have posted video images of those 

killed and, while Russia denies these soldiers are part of their security 

services, reporters note that they probably are aligned with private 

military companies in Russia. A BBC report stated that they belong to a 

company known as Vagner, an organization consisting of a battalion 

with infantry weapons, armored vehicles, heavy weapons, 

communications, man-portable air defense and security companies, and 

several hundred men.541 Several other equipment types used in Syria are 

described below, divided into those the Russians report and those 

reported on in the West.

Russian reporting: Gerasimov noted that while the use of 

military force and being proactive are essential, victory also depends on 

a combination of political, financial, ideological, and information 

resources of the state, since ideology can infect people’s minds.542 Thus 

an all-round approach to security must be maintained. 

The actual main military systems discussed were EW means, 

precision-guided weaponry, and air operations. There was also a mention 

of Orlan and Forpost UAVs being used in Syria for aerial reconnaissance 

and targeting for aviation and artillery units. They make it possible to 

detect up to two groups of targets from altitudes of 1500-2000 m, with an 

airspeed of up to 100 kmh, a flight range of up to 250 km, and a TNT 

warhead of up to 15kg.543

 

541 BBC Monitoring (in English), 29 March 2016. 542 Interfax (in English), 27 April 2016. 543 Interfax-AVN Online, 9 September 2016.
213

EW: Russia considers its EW missions as follows: to defend 

against possible air and ground attacks; to protect personnel and 

equipment against radio-controlled demolition charges and improved 

explosive proponents; to protect friendly electronic equipment; and to 

constantly monitor electronic equipment. EW is viewed as an 

asymmetric weapon for new-generation wars. It is reportedly capable of 

shutting down high-tech arms and equipment. Assets in Syria include the 

Krasukha-4 ground-mobile complex, which can suppress frequencies 

emitting reconnaissance and data transmission from 150-300 km. It 

works against Lacrosse and Onyx satellites, AWACS, Sentinel, and 

UAVs. The Khibiny airborne multifunctional EW complex works 

against reconnaissance and command and control assets. The Il-20 

ELINT and EW aircraft have sensors, antennas, and other equipment to 

support missions. The Borisoglebsk-2 has also been reported to be in 

Syria. The Rychag, Moskva, Rtut, and Porubshchik complexes suppress 

radars and disrupt guidance, command and control, and communications 

systems. The latter is based on the Il-22. The Infauna EW complex and 

small Lesochek jammers can combat radio-controlled demolition 

charges, improvised explosive devices, and precision-guided munitions, 

and disrupt cellular communications. The Vitebsk active jammer is also 

in use.544

Aerospace and Precision weapons: Putin has personally praised 

the performance of Russian precision weaponry and aircraft systems in 

Syria. In particular, he pointed out the performances of the Su-30SM, 

Su-34, and Su-35 planes, and the Mi-28 and Ka-52 helicopters. He added 

that “air-launched and sea-launched long-range precision weapons were 

used in combat conditions” for the first time.545 Journalists were more 

skeptical. One report noted that only at the end of 2016 would external 

targeting pods be placed on aircraft, first for the Su-30SM and Su-35 

 

544 Anatoliy Sokolov, “On the Front Line: Umbrella over Syria: Russian EW Assets 

Confirmed High Effectiveness and Can Be Considered an Asymmetric Weapon for 

New-Generation Wars,” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 25 May-31 May 

2016.

545 Interfax (in English), 11 May 2016.
214

fighters and the modernized MiG-29.546 Another report, also noting that 

work on suspended containers have dragged on and are not in the 

inventory of strike aircraft, did state that the precision “weapon of 

choice” of Aerospace Forces was the KAB-500S. The main precisionguided munition carrier was the Su-34. Another report noted that the Su34 may replace not just the Su-24, but also the Su-25 ground attack 

aircraft.547 Perhaps for this reason, all of the Su-25s appeared to be 

pulled from Syria. The Russians would then test the Su-34 in the role of 

a ground-attack aircraft. Also highlighted were the use of sea-launched 

Kalibr-NK cruise missiles (46 in all, according to the authors) and the 

successes with Su-25 bombers and Mi-24P helicopters in direct fire 

support roles to assist Syrian ground forces. 

Reported shortcomings included the absence of JDAM kits, the 

lack of airborne refueling tankers, the difficulty of targeting mobile 

objects, and the use of strike UAVs equipped with guided missiles548

(this, the authors noted, is the weakest aspect of the Aerospace Forces,

although this assertion is questionable due to the number and 

characteristics of UAVs in Russia’s inventory, listed elsewhere).549

Another source stated that there were problems with helicopters in Syria 

and that these issues would be corrected immediately. Meanwhile work 

will continue on the new generation helicopter, codenamed Minoga, 

which will be smaller than the Ka-27 but will have the Kamov 

configuration.550

 

546 Aleksey Mikhaylov, “’The Army’” The Russian Aerospace Forces are Testing 

Aircraft Sniper Sights: The Cooperation of Rostekh and Roskosmos Enterprises 

Permitted the Development of the New Complex for Precision Bombing,” Izvestiya 

Online, 6 May 2016. 547 Unattributed report, “Russia’s Aerospace Forces and Industry Will Transition to the 

Full Cycle of Su-34 Servicing,” RIA Novosti, 25 June 2016. 548 Aleksey Ramm and Anton Lavrov, “Retribution without Refueling: Operation in 

Syria Reveals Weak Points in Aerospace Forces,” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 

Kuryer Online, 6-12 April 2016.

549 For example, see Russia: Military Strategy Impacting 21st Century Reform and 

Geopolitics, Timothy Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015, pp. 130-146. 550 Moscow TASS, 12 May 2016.
215

Western Reporting: Western reporting focused primarily on 

equipment and on the proclamations of Putin and important members of 

the MOD. 

Ground Support: Russian arms supplies to Syria appear to have 

included the T-90 main battle tank with its Shtora countermeasure 

system, the Iveco LMV-M65 light armored vehicle, BMP-2 infantry 

fighting vehicles, body armor, and up-armored T-72 main battle tanks.551

Another report stated that Russia’s 24 Television Network showed a 

TOS-1A and two BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers firing, 

purportedly in support of a Syrian advance on Tadmur.552 The TOS-1A 

is used to support advancing armor. These 220mm rockets utilize both 

incendiary and thermobaric rounds. The system is composed of 24 tubes, 

with warheads close to 45 kg in weight and a range of a 0.5-6 km. Putin 

confirmed on 17 March 2016 that Russian Special Forces, artillery, and 

UAV units had been operating in Syria. He awarded medals to several 

people from these units in a Kremlin ceremony. The same report noted 

that some Russian servicemen killed in Syria may have belonged to the 

Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU).553

Aerospace Support: A March 2016 report on the withdrawal of 

Russia’s air force from Syria indicated that not only did many of the 

aircraft (with the exception of the Su-25 strike aircraft) still remain, but 

also several seem to simply have been rotated back to Russia and 

replaced by the same aircraft types. In addition, more helicopters (Mi35Ms) seem to have been added to the base at Humaymim in order to 

offset the loss of the Su-25s.554

 

551 Tim Ripley, “Tilting the Balance: Russian Syrian Ops Six Months On,” Janes 

Defense Weekly, 16 March 2016, p. 21. 552 Tim Ripley, “Syrian Forces Close in on Palmyra,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 March 

2016, p. 4.

553 Jeremy Binnie, “Putin Announces Mission in Syria is ‘Generally Complete’...and 

Reveals Units Deployed There,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 23 March 2016, p. 5. 554 Jeremy Binnie and Sean O’Connor, “Analysis: Russian Air Group in Syria Remains 

a Powerful Force,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 March 2016, p. 6.
216

Another report stated that Russia’s air force had helped the 

Syrian Armed Forces in two ways: through airstrikes and through the 

collection of aerial intelligence. The Ilyushin Il-20, an offshoot of the 

US’s P-3 Orion, was used along with the Tu-214R SIGINT targeting and 

collection aircraft.555 Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel 

General Viktor Bondarev noted that “not a single target had been missed 

since the campaign was launched on 30 September 2015.” Since Russia 

did not reply on precision-guided munitions, and used “dumb” bombs 

often, this statement is questionable. As the journalist writing the article 

noted of the claim, it can be given credence if “by ‘target’ he is referring 

to Syria itself,” then perhaps Bondarev’s assertion is true.556

Air defense systems have been deployed at the Humaymim Air 

Base and on ships in the Mediterranean. The former include the S-400 

long range and the Pantsir-S short-range systems.557 A 23 March report 

stated that Mi-38N and Ka-52 helicopters were seen for the first time at 

the air base in TV footage. They usually operate in pairs.558 On 27 March 

Russia’s Zvezda TV’s footage showed an Iskander missile system 

deployed at Humaymim. It is thought that this is the Iskander-K, which 

is identical to other versions but carries two cruise missiles instead of 

ballistic ones. Its range is 500 km, and it may have been deployed to 

offset the withdrawal of some Russian strike aircraft. This also may be a 

way to operationally test the system under real wartime conditions.559

Finally, an April report noted that the Su-34’s performance in 

Syria has generated interest among export customers. It is the only 

platform to have delivered precision-guided munitions in Syria. It is 

 

555 Ripley, “Tilting...” 556 Gareth Jennings, “Russia Claims ‘Total Accuracy’ in Syrian Campaign,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, 23 March 2016, p. 8. 557 Jeremy Binnie, “Putin Announces Mission in Syria is ‘Generally Complete’...,” 

Jane’s Defense Weekly, 23 March 2016, p. 5. 558 Ibid., p. 4.

559 Jeremy Binnie, “Iskander TEL Spotted in Syria,” Janes Defense Weekly, 6 April 

2016, p. 4.
217

equipped with NIIP NO12 radars and Khibiny L-175V EW suites, and 

the designers claim it can jam Aegis combat control systems.560

A 29 September 2016 London Mail report was direct, talking 

about Russia’s “obscene array of weapons.” These included barrel, 

napalm, thermobaric, cluster, and phosphorus bombs, which have turned 

Aleppo, a World Heritage Site, into a “place of extreme violence and 

death, a hell in which explosives, chemicals, and fire rain from the sky, 

killing and burying alive its inhabitants in their hundreds, with many 

more maimed or made homeless.”561 Then-US Secretary of State John 

Kerry warned Russia that if it did not stop the bombing the US would 

suspend talks.562

Forms and Methods of Terrorists: Two Russian Reports

In February 2016, in an article in the Russian military journal,

Armeiskii Sbornik (Army Journal), a general outline of the character of 

the emerging fight in Syria was offered from the aspect of terrorist forms 

and methods of fighting. It was noted that the actions of ISIS, like many 

other operations over the past two decades, were aimed at seizing 

territory, destroying a government, and/or reducing a country’s economic 

potential. Irregular terrorist military formations were often outfitted with 

weapons purchased on the black market or stolen from a nation’s 

resources through insider connections. Specific trends were identified for 

confronting terrorist forces: 

• ISIS and other terrorist groups appear well outfitted, 

often no worse than Syrian forces, so battles will take 

place; 

 

560 Reuben F. Johnson, “Syrian Campaign Drums Up Interest n Su-34,” Janes Defense 

Weekly, 6 April, 2016, p. 5. 561 Unattributed report, “Apocalypse Aleppo: How an Obscene Array of Weapons That 

Destroy Internal Organs, Stick to Skin, and Burn at 2200F and Suffocate Victims with 

Smoke Is Turning Syria’s Second Largest City into a Slaughter House,” London Mail 

Online (in English), 29 September 2016. 562 Ibid.
218

• Professional men from defeated armies around the 

world help plan ISIS’s operations and their 

implementation, so defeating them will not be easy; 

• The emergence of religious fanaticism requires strong 

moral and psychological preparation by forces 

opposing them; 

• Attacks on terrorists need to be sudden to prevent 

them from scattering or seeking underground shelter; 

• Mobile operations on an extensive front will 

predominate for both sides in offensive and defensive 

operations, using preemptive fires and radio-electronic 

strikes; 

• Terrorists tend to shift to ground-underground 

operations when confronted with an opponent with 

superior technical capabilities,563 so counterunderground operations must be studied. 

The makeup of fighters on both sides is a conglomerate of allies. 

In Syria, for example, Al-Assad’s army is composed of national militias, 

armed Syrian Kurd formations, Hezbollah detachments from Lebanon, 

Iranian military units, and the Syrian and Russian military 

establishments. Lines of contact are unpredictable and concentration of 

forces on a main axis of approach is difficult. Russia’s aerospace 

operations played a key role in the fight against irregular armed 

formations, along with UAVs and reconnaissance satellites.564 The 

terrorist grouping is similarly composed of fighters from a variety of 

nations.

Initially the Russian aerospace forces targeted terrorist 

infrastructures, such as field camps, warehouses, and so on in order to 

help prevent the sale of goods such as oil. A second focus was roads, 

 

563 V. Kiselev, G. Pis’menskii, and V. Popov, “Tendencies and Possibilities: Some 

Forms and Methods of Conducting Combat Operations in Syria,” Armeiskii Sbornik, 

February 2016, pp. 3-7. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his 

translation of this material.

564 Ibid.
219

since they are the main avenues of advance or movement of precious 

cargo. In Syria, 26,299 km of road are hard surface and 10,078 are not. 

There are also 2700 km of railroad. These arteries dictate potential areas 

of concentration of an enemy force. Tactics to control roads were 

thoroughly developed in the past during the Soviet Union’s war in 

Afghanistan’s mountainous areas. Now there is a Russian study 

underway for controlling roads in desert terrain, where brute force seems 

to prevail over employing methods the enemy does not expect. 

The authors note that one “method” to study from a Russian 

perspective is how to conduct a cleaving strike against an irregular force, 

that is, how to penetrate into the depth of its reserves in order to break its

operational and potentially its strategic defensive stability. This requires 

new operational and strategic approaches. However, at the present time, 

Syrian forces can only conduct offensive operations at the tactical level 

and cannot have operational success, which requires strong operational 

reserves. The maximum tactical unit capable of organizing and 

conducting an operation is the brigade, which does not always have 

sufficient forces and means to completely defeat an enemy. Precision 

weaponry is not as useful against an enemy using only automatic rifles 

and antitank weapons and relying on maneuver warfare, so force-onforce battles occur often. Irregular forces have learned to dissipate after 

spotting a UAV overhead. In closing, it was noted that an enemy without 

regular formations or even tactical cooperation among its force 

groupings, but ideologically motivated, can conduct successful combat 

operations for a long time against a regular army under conditions of 

hybrid war.565

In July 2016 Armeiskii Sbornik carried an article on the first 150 

days of combat operations in Syria, discussing the general situation 

confronting its armed forces and some of the peculiarities of ISIS

operations. 566 Under consideration were ways that ISIS operated as well 

as Russia’s perceived view of shortcomings of the Syrian Armed Forces.

 

565 Ibid. 566 V. Kiselev, “Some Results of Combat Operations in Syria,” Armeiskii sbornik (Army 

Journal), No. 7, 2016, pp. 8-18. The author again would like to thank Dr. Harold 
220

First, there was mention of the fact that Syria’s troops could not 

conduct large-scale operations on an operational scale against the 

terrorists due to the limited number of the Syrian Army’s military 

formations (similar to the observation above). Large-scale mobilization

was not feasible, since most of the male population wants to fight for the 

regions where they live. Also, under contemporary conditions, the forms 

for employing the armed forces (such as the operation) require the use of 

inter-service force groupings. These are not present in Syria, where, due 

to a lack of combined-arms formations, the Syrian command uses special 

operations forces as infantry units and formations. This requires Russia 

to adapt to the shortcomings of the force with which it is partnering in 

the fight.

Second, there are not only many different countries, but also 

different religious denominations taking part in combat operations on 

both sides. Iranian units, Lebanese Hezbollah, and representatives from 

Afghanistan (Khazars, of whom, according to various data, there are 

3000-10,000) are fighting with the Syrian Armed Forces; Syrian Kurds 

are fighting on their own territories; and the terrorists are employing 

combatants from several European countries, Asia, and even Africa. This 

requires that Russian commanders prepare their troops for operations 

against various types of international terrorist organizations.

Third, there are countries who, in pursuit of their own interests, 

desire to destabilize the international situation and support the terrorists. 

These countries supply terrorist organizations with financial support 

through nongovernmental organizations and with combat equipment and 

arms, including the most contemporary. Here the authors are accusing 

the West without naming it.

Fourth, the strong ideological and psychological base of the 

terrorist elements was highlighted, noting that this base is developed in 

 

Orenstein for his translation of this material, all of which is located on pages 16-18 of 

the article.
221

peacetime, supported by centers of nontraditional Islam. Here Saudi 

Arabia and Qatar were singled out as centers of such support.

Fifth, it is clear that terrorist organizations are fully capable of 

performing both defensive and offensive operations, even without air 

support and an adequate amount of artillery and armored vehicles. 

Specifically, it was noted that on 15 February 2016 “terrorist 

detachments undertook a number of offensive operations in the Homs 

region, although their other detachments in other provinces were 

generally in a very difficult situation.”567

Sixth, terrorist groups appear to remain in specific regions and 

only coordinate the most important missions with other formations. This 

changes, however, when a charismatic leader is killed. Then fighters 

scatter or lose their positions. This is important to consider when 

planning and conducting combat operations against terrorist 

detachments.

Seventh, terrorists have organized a strong system of 

counterintelligence on captured territories. Not only the armed 

formations of terrorists but also the local population becomes involved. 

The latter has even been reported to have been responsible for reporting 

scouts from government forces in the area. 

Eighth, Russian fighters must remember that terrorists do not 

observe human rights and that civilians in combat regions are often used 

as human shields. In eastern Guta (a suburb of Damascus), the eastern 

part of Aleppo, and other places where fighters were surrounded, 

civilians remained in their homes. Using such people as shields, the 

terrorists continued their bombardment, raids against government troops, 

and exchanges of fire.

Ninth, the Syrian Army appeared unable to conduct an offensive 

method such as the penetration (“maneuver” in the armies of the NATO 

countries). Combat operations were more focused on “squeezing out” 

 

567 Ibid., p. 17.
222

fighters with fires. Maneuvers such as envelopments or flanking actions 

have a purely psychological effect and are used at the lowest tactical 

levels.

Finally, during this period, air and air-mobile assaults were not

attempted. This reluctance has to do with the lack of decisive 

penetrations and defeat of the enemy even to the depth of the tactical 

defense. The line of contact consisted of individual positions and 

checkpoints instead of trenches. In urban conditions, the defense of 

individual buildings or blocks are developed by terrorists in combination 

with powerful surface and underground lines of communication. These 

structures are difficult to penetrate, since multiple actions are required to 

capture buildings and structures, and to sweep underground lines of 

communication and engineer structures.

The war verified the continued importance of Syria’s main strike 

force, its tank subunits and units. Tank superiority enables decisive 

victories, but it is difficult to create strong tank groupings. In conclusion, 

tactics and operational art continue to be relevant and important for 

modern armed conflicts. Their careful study is required if new tactical 

procedures are to be developed, even against a technically inadequately 

equipped enemy. 

First the Pullout, then the Declaration to Stay Indefinitely

On 14 March 2016 the Kremlin announced that the main part of 

Russia’s forces in Syria would return to Russia. However, what the 

announcement really did was to scare Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad 

into more reliance on Russia instead of taking its presence for granted. 

As The Economist reported

The bombing campaign has been massive, but Russia has 

also done much else. Palmyra, recently recaptured from 

Islamic State, now hosts a small Russian base, ostensibly 

for sappers clearing the area of mines. Russian Special 

Forces are involved in intelligence and targeting. 

Instructors train Syrian counterparts. Russian officers

have waded into local politics, brokering ceasefires. The 
223

Russians are here for the long haul: when the defense 

ministry ordered medals for the Syria campaign, it asked 

for over 10,000.568

Without Russia’s presence Al-Assad’s forces are not capable of 

thwarting the terrorist offensive.

Only a week or so after the limited pullout, disagreements arose 

between Russia and the US, at least from the Russian perspective. The 

US appeared unable or not ready to have a substantive discussion on 

joint unilateral actions, according to Sergey Rudskoy, Chief of the Main 

Operations Directorate of the General Staff. He noted that the US delay 

in discussing a joint mechanism to handle cease-fire violations would 

result in Moscow beginning a unilateral application of the rules of the 

agreement, since the US (according to the Russians) appears unprepared

to have a substantive discussion. Sergey Zhigarev, First Deputy Head of 

the Duma Defense Committee, stated that the US does not control the 

situation, implying that Russia’s appeal is a type of deadline meant to be 

a negotiating tactic to speed up the deliberative process used by the 

US.569

In August the Russian deployment took on a new look. First, it 

was announced that Putin, through Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay 

Pankov, submitted to the State Duma for ratification an agreement for 

the long-term deployment of the Russian Armed Forces’ air group in 

Syria. Syria will provide the infrastructure and grounds free of charge. 

Personnel, transport facilities, and aircraft of Russia’s air group will not 

be subject to inspection by Syria’s border and customs authorities, and 

they and their families will be accorded immunity and privileges similar 

to diplomatic representatives. No claims will be allowed against the air 

group in connection with their activities. Perhaps most important, the 

agreement is for “an indefinite period and shall terminate on the 

 

568 Unattributed report, “The Withdrawal that Wasn’t,” The Economist, May 14 2016, p. 

43.

569 Yuriy Gavrilov, “General Staff Authorized to State,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 March 

2016.
224

expiration of one year from the date of receipt of one party’s notice of its 

intention to terminate this document.”570 In other words, Russia is here 

for the long haul.

Second, Russian strikes against targets in Syria had been 

delivered from Iranian airfields. The Russian use of these assets was 

designed to save expenses and not exceed the MOD’s budget limits, 

while improving cooperation between Russia and Iran. Use of Iranian 

airfields saves fuel and allows the Russian air force to enlarge its bomb 

load.571

Third, requests were sent to Iraq and Iran to use their airspace for 

the overflight of cruise missiles during an exercise that the Russian 

MOD was conducting in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean with 

warships armed with Kalibr cruise missile.572 Thus, overall, the pullout 

has not happened as many expected. Instead, an increase in long-term 

deployments via negotiated agreements has taken place.

September 2016 to January 2017: A Few Notes

In this five-month period there were only a few items to report. 

Two were tactical innovations, some had to do with weapon 

developments, and then there were a few miscellaneous but interesting 

items.

With regard to tactics, Russia’s press celebrated what is known as 

a “tank carousel,” described as follows: 

A tank platoon engages targets by volley first, then pulls 

back to reload, and at this time the next platoon moves up 

to firing positions and continues volley fire; then the next 

 

570 Ivan Yegorov, “They Will Be There for as Long as Necessary. Russia is Preparing to 

Ratify the Agreement on the Air Base in Syria,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 9 August 

2016.

571 Interfax (in English), 16 August 2016. 572 Interfax, 15 August 2016.
225

platoon joins battle. That way tank subunits support high 

intensity of fire engagement.573

In October another tactic was introduced in the press. It appears 

that Russia is developing what it terms to be super-light motorized rifle 

brigades, based on lessons learned from the Syrian Armed Forces. 

Soldiers will use Patriot jeep-pickup trucks to conduct high-speed raids. 

They can move hundreds of kilometers quickly, the jeep platforms being

more maneuverable and mobile. They will only be used in desert, steppe, 

and semi-arid conditions. Seven soldiers can travel in each pick-up truck. 

The latter will be equipped with 12.7-mm Kord machineguns, AGS-30-

mm grenade launchers, and Kornet or Konkurs antitank missile 

complexes. The jeep can also transport Podnos 82-mm mortars and a 

basic load of rounds.574

With regard to weaponry, in October 2016 it was reported that 

ten Pantsir air defense systems would be supplied to the Syrian Army.575

A Ka-31SV radar reconnaissance craft was spotted at Latakia.576 In 

November it was reported that the Tu-95 bomber had been outfitted with 

the new Kh-101 cruise missile for the first time and used in Syria. In the 

past only the Tu-160 had been outfitted with the missile there.577

From December through January there were several new 

weapons reportedly present in Syria. Footage of the Ka-52 Katran, a 

naval modification of the Ka-52 Alligator, was shown firing missiles.578

Rossiya 1 TV showed footage of tracked robots armed with antitank 

 

573 Natalya Koroleva and Yuriy Borodin, “Syrian Rampart’ in the Volgograd Steppe,” 

Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 23 September 2016. 574 Aleksey Ramm, “The Ministry of Defense is Forming Super-Light Brigades: 

Motorized Riflemen in UAZ Patriot Pickups will Avoid the Enemy’s Strength, Slip 

through his Combat Formations, and Inflict Lightning Strikes,” Izvestiya Online, 21 

October 2016.

575 Nikolay Surkov, “Russian Air Defense Systems will Strengthen Syrian Army,” 

Izvestiya Online, 11 October 2016. 576 No author provided, “New Russian Ka-31SV Radar Reconnaissance Helicopter 

Noted in Syria,” Lenta.ru, 27 October 2016. 577 No author or title provided, Izvestiya Online, 18 November 2016. 578 Rossiya 24 TV, 5 December 2016.
226

guided missile systems being used in combat (Syria was not specified),

and there were reports about the use of Special Operations Forces in 

Syria.579 There was a report stating that in November the Navy for the 

first time used carrier-based aviation to strike ground targets. Kalibr 

missiles launched from the frigate Admiral Grigorovich, and Bastion 

coastal systems also struck terrorist positions. Experts noted that the 

Mediterranean group gives Russia an extra trump card “both on the 

battlefield and in negotiations.”580 Defense Minister Shoygu noted at the 

end of December that 162 modern weapons were tested in Syria to dat. 

They include the Su-30 SM and Su-34 aircraft, the Mi-28N and Ka-52 

helicopters, and seaborne cruise missiles.581 In January 2017 it was noted 

that Russia’s Aerospace Forces had deployed 12 Su-25 ground-attack 

aircraft to Syria, which came just two weeks after Russia announced a 

drawdown of its forces there.582 Finally, it was noted that the S-400 

missile systems protecting the Humaymim Air Base would remain in 

place to protect it against airstrikes.583

There were also a few miscellaneous notes worthy of mention, 

the most important being the problems that Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov 

aircraft carrier experienced. In mid-November a pilot had crashed in the 

sea after it had run out of fuel “waiting for the ship’s broken arrester 

wires to be fixed.” The same report noted that on 20 November, most of 

the carrier’s air group has been rebased to the Humaymim Air Base.

584

This may be due to the carrier’s decks being unavailable for use. Perhaps 

for this reason it had been rerouted out of the area. On 26 November the 

Iranians noted that Tehran could “allow Russia to use Hamadan for 

Moscow’s aerial operations against ‘terrorists’ in Syria.”585

 

579 Nikolay Grishchenko, “Video of Russian Special Operations Forces in Action in 

Syria Published,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 December 2016. 580 Aleksandr Stepanov, “Russian Carrier Aviation and Bastion Systems Enter Fray in 

Syria. Terrorists Being Bombed with All Weapons,” MK Online, 15 November 2016. 581 Interfax (in English), 22 December 2016. 582 LiveJournal, 10 January 2017. 583 Interfax (in English), 15 January 2017. 584 Rossiya 24 TV, 5 December. 585 RIA Novosti, 26 November 2016.
227

Another commentary expressed concern over the ability of the 

Syrian Armed Forces to continue to hold territory. There is worry, since 

the Syrians took and then lost Palmyra, the thinking being that this could 

also happen in Aleppo. There was also concern that organized uprisings

in major cities might now turn into a guerilla war in rural localities.586

Another worry is that cease-fires are arranged and abandoned, and there 

is concern regarding the continuous reports of Russian war crimes 

(alleged attacks on hospitals, schools, humanitarian aid convoys, etc.). 

Meanwhile Russia continues to try to get out of the conflict and save 

face. One analyst, Nikolai Zlobin, noted that Russia faces three tasks in 

Syria: to destroy terrorists, to beat the US in a big game, and to preserve 

influence in Syria when the fighting ends.587

Conclusions

As Russia’s military confidence grows, its aggressive activities 

will need the constant attention of those in areas near or bordering on the 

country, particularly the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Arctic

region. Snap inspections could eventually turn into the initial period of 

war that some writers stress. In 2008 an exercise commenced next to 

South Ossetia that was structured on the basis of a possible war with

Georgia; such a war began soon after. The Tsenter exercises in 2015 

were followed by the operation in Syria. Thus, the Kavkaz exercise is 

troubling, especially as it was developed in conjunction with an exercise 

in Crimea, which borders on Ukraine in the south, implying the potential 

of a dual front. 

From a military perspective, it appears that the Russian MOD has 

achieved many of the goals it set for itself before entering the conflict. It 

has validated or is in the process of validating weapon capabilities and 

employment methods. This is especially true for the Aerospace and 

Naval Forces, less so for the Ground Forces. The Air Force appears to 

have learned how to work with the Syrian Ground Forces and Russian 

Special Forces in the area. Strategic bomber flights from Russia to the 

 

586 Vladimir Frolov, “Aleppo Taken, Palmyra Surrendered. What Next? What Russia 

Has Achieved in Syria and What it Should Do Next,” Republic, 13 December 2016. 587 Rossiya 1 TV, 15 November 2016.
228

area have not stopped either. Along with this demonstration of 

professional capabilities comes an implicit aura of deterrence capabilities 

that must be considered by potential adversaries. It is now understood 

that any confrontation with Russia will be met with a host of new 

weapons. Technological advances are playing a key role in the reform of 

the Armed Forces.

Beyond the employment of weaponry, there are many lessons 

learned regarding the planning and implementation of strategic transport 

capabilities. There has been a continuous logistics flow of material from 

Russia to Syria. These flights are most likely controlled via the 

integrated command and control apparatus of the NDMC. 

Communication and EW capabilities appear strongly tested and 

developed as well.

Russian military analysts, writing in professional journals, are 

stressing the manner in which terrorist groups are deploying their forces. 

This discussion is ongoing and will be worth following. Interestingly, 

there are fewer lessons learned in journals about Russian troop 

experiences. Instead the focus is on the tactics and operations of 

terrorists. Gerasimov, however, has stressed several times that Syrian 

lessons learned discussions must continue in Russia’s academies.

There are problems, of course, and most (from a Russian 

perspective) lie with the Syrian Armed Forces. Rebels still control much 

territory in Syria, even though Syria has been receiving Russian 

assistance for over a year now. Russia’s Aerospace Force, in conjunction 

with Syrian artillery attacks, helped stabilize the situation for the first six 

months of their deployment. Recently, however, things have stalled. 

Much of the blame for this turn of events is placed on Syria. One writer 

noted that the Syrian military has not centralized its supply system; its 

soldiers are not motived to succeed in combat; its military leadership has 

no clear strategic vision; and there is no strategic reserve. Perhaps of 

equal importance is that special service corruption in Syria “is on a 

simply incredible scale. To one degree or another they extract tributes 
229

not just from the entire civilian population but also from the army as 

well.”588 

Overall, however, Russia appears well on its way to achieving its 

geopolitical and national goals of attaining influence in the region and at 

home. If Russia’s military successfully stays the course, it will exit the 

conflict far better prepared than it entered it, both militarily and 

diplomatically/politically. The Kremlin’s inhabitants, who envision 

enemies everywhere and see conspiracies around every corner, will have 

become a most dangerous group, who will require the West’s constant 

attention.

 

588 Mikhail Khodarenok, “’Russians Carry Out Strikes, but Al-Assad’s Soldiers Are Not 

Going Into Battle’—Why Russia Has Not Managed to Achieve Decisive Victory in 

Syria in One Year,” Gazeta.ru, 23 September 2016.
230
231

CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 

Introduction

Autocratic systems and kleptocracies are expected to exert 

control from above. Russia is no exception to the rule. During 2016 the 

country underwent several significant changes, and many had to do with 

control measures in the civilian and military sectors. In the former, the 

best example is Putin’s development of a personal Palace Guard in the 

form of a National Guard (on 16 January 2017 he even signed a decree 

establishing 27 March as the Day of the Russian Federation National 

Guard Troops).

589 He also strengthened the security service’s control 

over the regions, perhaps fearing a backlash where money and supplies 

are in demand. Russia’s media attempted to exert control over the 

thinking of other nations with their reliance on perspective (local 

interpretations of objective reality, outright half-truths or even lies) over 

truth (such as attempts to deflect responsibility over the downing of the 

Malaysian airliner or to cover up charges of doping by Russian athletes). 

Russian hackers exerted control over files of the Democratic National 

Committee leading up to the US elections, and evidence of Russian 

hacking has been found in the files of numerous other nations, to include 

Denmark, Germany, France, and Sweden. Putin signed a decree on a 

new Information Security Doctrine, which established further control 

over the Internet in Russia, and other strategies and concepts were signed 

into law as well. 

With regard to the military sector, the Armed Forces continued to 

rely on a five-step template to discover changes in the external threat 

environment and offer prescriptions for confronting them, enabling 

control over future war scenarios. Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov 

added to this thought pattern, describing how new trends in the character 

of warfare result in new forms and methods of confronting them. The 

National Defense Management Center (NDMC) demonstrated that it has 

achieved total control over military and civilian institutions in time of 

war or conflict, as was demonstrated during Kavkaz-2016. New 

achievements in reflexive control (RC) indicate that Russia is ready even 

 

589 Interfax (in English), 16 January 2017.
232

at the geopolitical level to make others think they are doing something 

for themselves when they are actually doing it for Russia. Finally, 

Russia’s use of its Aerospace Force demonstrated a method of 

controlling conflict in Syria in support of Syrian ground operations, 

while testing a host of new weapons. 

It is thus clear that 2016 witnessed several advances in Russia’s 

methods of control over its environment and conflict. This is apparently 

a predictable trend for a nation obsessed with conspiracy theories and 

insecurities. What does it all mean?

Control Accomplishments 

Civilian Issues

Domestically, Putin decided to shake up his political entourage 

while keeping a few key leaders (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, 

Defense Minister Shoygu) in place. As mentioned in Chapter One, it is 

most intriguing to speculate “how” Putin might make changes to his 

retinue, with speculation being the key word here. A theoretical five-step 

template was proposed for understanding his considerations when 

making cadre changes. This template is different from the only 

authoritative voice on the topic, that of Gleb Pavlovsky, whose 

discussion of the concept known as sistema was covered extensively. 

In late December 2016, in an interview on Politkom.ru, 

Pavlovsky offered his year-end assessment of the cadre changes and the 

problems within the country. He noted the following:

• This cadre change is not the first. This change is 

simply meant to try to develop a stable administrative 

apparatus. Low-level voter turnout shows this change 

is needed.

• The elite is now a collective concept, that is, groups 

with very different interests.

• Regions have different levels of development and 

different rates of economic decline. The center has 

been unable to balance them. Regions subsidized from 
233

the budget provide votes for money. Governors must 

fulfill edicts for which they have no money. 

• The mass media are paralyzed with artificial agendas 

of threats and geopolitics, anything except the real 

conflicts within the country.

• The authorities put too much trust in ratings and 

election results.590

The shake-up spread to the MVD, where the Internal Troops 

were moved to spots within the newly created Russian National Guard. 

The Guard eventually numbered 340,000 soldiers, and it seemed that 

many of the missions involved protecting Putin, deterring domestic 

violence and demonstrations, controlling domestic security issues, and 

fighting domestic terrorism. Interesting weapons developed for the 

Guard included sniper flamethrowers and acoustic non-lethal weapons 

for use in public order situations. The latter system reportedly will 

produce a “controlled behavioral reaction in rioters,” with a range of not 

less than 60 meters and an operational capability of 4 hours. Pavlovsky, 

in his December interview, noted that the Guard is designed to “build a 

strong vertical structure of power, effective at least in one area, a 

structure ascending directly to the president—an internal political 

vertical structure of power.”591

Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two authors with high-level 

contacts in Russia, noted that Putin turned more often to the security 

services in 2016 than in the past, as his regime increased the fight against 

“spies” and conducted targeted attacks under the guise of an 

anticorruption campaign. This focus even included the arrest of 

Economic Development Minister Aleksey Ulyukayev and high-ranking 

police officials. The authors note that it appears that Putin has returned to 

 

590 Aleksandr Ivakhnik, interview with Gleb Pavlovsky, “Next Year We Will Witness a 

‘Velvet Uprising’ of Cultural and Scientific Groups against the ‘Dictatorship of the 

Village,’” Politkom.ru, 26 December 2016.

591 Ibid.
234

the Soviet experience, where control is maintained through spy mania 

and repressions to keep the elite in check.592

Putin continues to visualize an existential threat to the regime, 

and seeks at every opportunity to search out foreign agents or identify 

extremist tendencies in groups, to include nongovernmental 

organizations, or individuals. His continual push appears to be to 

establish strategic stability while maintaining territorial integrity and 

national sovereignty. His motives appear to be based on a strong belief in 

Russian nationalism. He has ordered that Russian history books be 

rewritten. Further he appears to simply distrust the West and clearly did 

not get along well with President Obama.

Putin uses the media extensively to support his causes among the 

population. Russia’s media continued to describe the nation’s objective 

reality in terms only Russians or its former citizens abroad could 

comprehend. The focus of the media was to create a reality in which 

everything Russian was good, while everything Western was simply 

manipulative and out to take advantage of Russia. As a result, Russia 

placed some harsh restrictions on its media and Internet users, requesting 

them to think hard before posting or writing anything that might harm 

Russian interests. Repressive laws included blocking websites, moving 

servers to Russia, and obligatorily installing the security services’ 

improved “system of operational intelligence measures” (SORM) on 

servers at a company’s expense. The goal was to force social networking 

websites to block “content and divulge a user’s personal data” when

requested. When total control over information flows was not achieved, 

Russia turned to China, inviting Fang Binxing, its creator of the Great 

Firewall of China, to Russia for advice.593

To thwart media accusations against Russia, various scenarios 

(perspectives) on events were offered and half-truths (even lies) began to 

replace truth. The Dutch released their 2016 findings/conclusions for 

 

592 Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Special Services: 2016 Achievements,” 

Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 5 January 2017.

593 Ibid.
235

responsibility about the Malaysian airliner that was shot down over 

Ukraine in 2014. Russia has offered various spins over the past two years 

as to how the aircraft was actually destroyed (including one immediately 

before the Dutch report was released, to lessen the latter’s impact) in 

order to control the narrative, but in each case the international 

community had solid contradictory evidence supporting Russian or 

Russian-backed surrogate responsibility. Such options on reality have 

become standard fare for Russia’s media, who fail to handle the truth, 

except for a very small share of journalists who see through this charade.

Of course, others could see through the half-truths but are not 

courageous enough to expose them.

Accusations of Russian cyber-attacks against several nations 

(Sweden, Germany, France, etc.) culminated in Russian cyber espionage 

in the US at a crucial time, targeting the Democratic National Party and 

state boards of election in the run-up to the US presidential elections. 

The attacks were designed to demonstrate Russian control over Internet 

resources. In response President Barack Obama expelled Russian 

diplomats and ordered the conduct of several covert operations against 

Russia. Russia, of course, denied the allegations. 

Russia has also noted several organizations (the FSB, the Federal 

Protection Service, the MOD, the Department of Presidential Affairs, 

and the Rosatom state corporation) as “essential for ensuring the rights 

and legitimate interests of Russian Federation citizens, national defense, 

and state security.”594 Interestingly, also added to this list are media 

outlets Russia Today, the All-Russian State Television and Radio 

Broadcasting Company, the Ostankino Television Center, the ITARTASS Agency, and the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting 

Network, all of which were granted an exemption from the tighter and 

more transparent rules of contract system law.595

 

594 Yekaterina Grobman, “Rossiya Segodnya, TASS, and VGTRK Get Defense 

Concessions for State Procurements,” Kommersant Online, 11 January 2017.

595 Ibid.
236

Several new policies were developed and accepted during 2016. 

The National Security Strategy was adopted on the last day of 2015, 

while December 2016 witnessed the adoption of an Information Security 

Doctrine, a Science and Technology Development Strategy, and a new 

Foreign Policy statement. Each is designed to exert greater control over 

Russian interests and the activities of its citizens and foreign 

guests/organizations residing in Russia.

Military Issues

Russia’s military continued its intellectual tradition of turning to 

military science to report on trends in warfare’s changing nature. These 

changes were reflected most of all in the speeches that Gerasimov gave 

at the Academy of Military Science. He requested that the Academy 

provide new forms and methods of fighting to meet the new international 

situation. Other organizations seem to have followed Gerasimov’s 

recommendations as well. The Russian General Staff Academy and the 

Advanced Research Foundation (much like the US’s DARPA) organized 

a competition, which resulted in 351 submissions. Some of the winning 

essay entries are listed here, and many reflect topics of concern to 

Gerasimov over the past three years:

• “Wars of the Future: Forms and Methods”

• “Suspension Point for Vertical Take-off UAVs 

(Quadcopters) for Delivering Munitions (hand 

grenades, under-barrel grenade launcher rounds) in 

Hard-to-Reach Sites (in Urban Conditions) for the 

Stand-off Destruction of the Enemy and Methods for 

their Use”

• “Resources for Future Armed Conflict: Humane FuelAir Mines”

• “Pocket Reconnaissance—Nano-UAV Development”

• “Prospects for the Realization of Autonomous 

Grouped Employment of Military-Use Robotic 

Complexes”
237

• “Establishing the Foreign Language Communication 

Competency of Peacekeeping Forces in an Armed 

Conflict Zone”596

Other reports referenced elements of Russian military thought. 

One report noted a potential focus change from nuclear to nonnuclear 

weapons. This is the result of precision weaponry, according to Reserve 

Major General Vladimir Bogatyryov. The report stated that the fighting 

capabilities of the “strategic non-nuclear forces are to increase almost 

fivefold by the start of 2021” and that new weapon systems in the 

Aerospace Forces “will increase their firepower to destroy cruise missile 

by 50 percent.”597 He ended noting that weapons based on new physical 

principles are under development, along with many more “which are too 

early to talk about, though I would like to.”598 Thus, his report touches 

on the methods of warfare, as did a report by Defense Minister Shoygu, 

who noted that the deterrence factor will shift from the nuclear to the 

non-nuclear field by a factor of four.599 Another report, from Foreign 

Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, noted that the US deployment 

of forces in Europe brings in a “substantial imbalance in the 

configuration of forces on the continent,”600 which implies a change in 

the correlation of forces. A meeting of the Scientific Council of the 

Russian Federation’s Security Council noted that “issues involving the 

comprehensive use of non-military assets for asserting Russia’s national 

interests and for countering new forms of warfare in the international 

arena require additional study.”601

A more detailed description of the use of RC measures was 

provided and older methods were reexamined. There are several RC 

methods, both mental and physical, for manipulating conflict. In the 

 

596 No author provided, “Authors of Best Military Research Determined,” Advanced 

Research Foundation Website, 3 November 2016.

597 Interfax (in English), 0706 GMT, 16 January 2017.

598 Ibid.

599 Interfax (in English), 0859 GMT, 12 January 2017. 600 Interfax (in English), 1603 GMT, 16 January 2017. 601 No author provided, “Scientific Approaches to the Concept of War in the Modern 

World Discussed in the RF Security Council,” RIA Novosti, 12 January 2017.
238

Ukraine conflict, analogies were offered as one example of a way to 

control the perceptions of audiences at home and abroad. Russian 

theorists see a weakness in the Western ability to consider all angles of a 

problem. They tend to offer their perception of events and thereby shape 

objective reality to their liking. They then move on to the next problem, 

as things tend to change at a dramatic speed in the age of the Internet, 

where there is precious little time to examine charges in depth. As a 

result, on occasion Russia’s version of events tend to find friction where 

there actually is none. 

Of continued concern are Russia’s “snap inspections.” On 16 

December Gerasimov briefed military attaches on his inspection policy, 

noting that they do not violate obligations relating to the control of 

conventional armaments.602 The worry is that these snap inspections, 

which involve the movement of equipment over great distances and the 

rehearsal of military administrative agencies working with federal and 

regional executive bodies, could be used to condition border nations into 

thinking an inspection is an exercise when, in fact, it could be a 

mobilization for a real intervention scenario.

The establishment of the NDMC was another key development, 

most notably in the way it was used during Kavkaz-2016 to mobilize an 

entire region, from the governor all the way down to the lowest private. 

The NDMC appears designed to function like a Stavka in wartime.

Russia’s military press positively assessed the development of 

new weapons as Russia continued its arms sales to China and India 

during the year, making key inroads in the arms markets of both nations. 

For both China and India, the arms they acquired have greatly increased 

their strike capabilities. 

Russia’s Syrian campaign offered the military the opportunity to 

move out of the training area and actually conduct operations, which 

offered a chance to test weaponry under actual combat conditions. 

 

602 No author provided, “Russian Will Continue to Conduct Snap Readiness 

Inspections,” RIA Novosti, 16 December 2016.
239

Control measures were focused on simply using the Aerospace Forces 

and Special Forces to confront ISIS. Russia’s military met with both 

success and setbacks, to include accusations from the US of the 

commitment of war crimes. The latter charges included accusations of 

atrocities and indiscriminate bombings. Aleppo was taken after months 

of fighting while Palmyra, which was liberated earlier, was recaptured by 

rebels. Relations with Turkey turned from bad to good and back to 

problematic. The bad began with the Turkish shoot down of a Russian 

fighter plane. Eventually Turkish President Erdogan and President Putin 

talked. Turkish ground troop support eventually backed Russia’s 

aerospace efforts in Syria. However, in December relations turned 

suddenly a sour again with the assassination by an off-duty Turkish 

policeman of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey. 

Putin and Shoygu Summarize 2016: Where is Russia Heading?

In their year-end speeches, Putin, Shoygu, and Gerasimov 

exulted in the improvements (speed, integration of commands, etc.) in 

the decision-making system of Russia and in the collection of hundreds 

of pieces of new equipment produced by the military-industrial complex. 

In a November 2016 summary Putin discussed the technical 

outfitting of the Army and Navy, adding that over 5,500 arms and pieces 

of equipment were sent to the troops. He underscored the point that the 

Armed Forces development should not conflict with economic and social 

tasks. Rather, the force must be guided by the principle of reasonable 

sufficiency,603 a term used often during the Gorbachev era. Putin stated 

that combat effectiveness must be continually increased, shortcomings 

identified, and lessons learned in Syria tabulated. 

He also focused on developments in the space sector, to include 

new launch-vehicle designs, lunar programs, and deep space research. 

The first phase of building a cosmodrome was to be completed by the 

 

603 No author provided, “What Kind of Missions Putin Assigned to the Russian Military 

and Defense Establishment Representatives,” TASS, 18 November 2016.
240

end of 2016, an unmanned launch program ready by the end of 2021, and 

the infrastructure for a manned launch ready by 2023.604

Putin then noted the following in regard to what must be 

produced:

One of the main conditions for ensuring state security is 

the capability of industry and enterprises to immediately 

adjust or increase the output of required products if 

necessary and ensure deliveries of arms, equipment, parts, 

and other material in requisite amounts.605

He ended his discussion with a few statements on the importance of 

neutralizing military threats to Russia and the design and creation of 

advanced weapon systems that will ensure the strategic balance of 

forces.606

Shoygu’s speech was more specific. In a year end speech to the 

MOD Collegium, he discussed a number of elements. First, he discussed 

threats to the nation, which he listed as NATO battalions, reconnaissance 

flights, and military exercises, and the US missile defense system in 

Europe, along with its program to upgrade nuclear bombs and storage 

facilities. Second, he highlighted the numerous improvements to all 

facets of Russia’s Armed Forces, from the services to medical and 

housing issues. Third, he covered budgetary issues, Russian successes in 

Syria, and Russian military exercises.607

Shoygu offered a host of successes to indicate that Russia’s 

objectives in Syria had been achieved. He noted that 12,360 square 

kilometers of territory and 499 populated areas were liberated; 18,800 

missions flown, which delivered 71,000 strikes on terrorist 

infrastructure; and 725 terrorist training camps, 405 munitions’ plants, 

 

604 Ibid. 605 Ibid. 606 Ibid. 607 Website of the President of Russia (in English), 22 December 2016.
241

and 35,000 terrorists liquidated. Since estimates were that there were 

between 40-50,000 terrorists when the operation began, there should 

only be some 15,000 left. Of course, this does not include replacements, 

which most likely numbered in the thousands, if his calculations are 

correct. Terrorist equipment has been seized, 26,000 explosive devices 

disarmed, tons of humanitarian relief delivered.608 However, no mention 

was made of the countless mistakes Russian forces have made over the 

past year and a half.

Shoygu’s report also noted the percentages of increase in the 

combat capabilities of the Armed Forces in 2016. These included a 14 

percent increase in the country’s combat capability and a 5 percent 

increase in arms deliveries; modern weapons now occupied 58.3 percent 

of permanent-readiness units, and the reliability of arms and equipment 

rose from 89 to 94 percent.609 This again indicates the Russian penchant 

for mathematical analysis.

Finally, Shoygu listed priority issues for the nation to resolve in 

2017. They included, among other priorities:

• Continue to build up the combat capabilities of the 

Armed Forces and to take measures to reinforce the 

force groupings in the western, southwestern and 

Arctic strategic areas. Ensure timely placement and 

strict compliance with the state defense order in 2017, 

and achieve the level of 60 percent or more of the 

Armed Forces’ equipment consisting of modern 

weapons and materiel in permanent-readiness units.

• With regard to strategic nuclear forces, put three 

missile regiments equipped with modern missile 

systems on combat duty, as well as enter five 

modernized strategic aviation complexes into service.

• With regard to the general purpose forces, deploy two 

brigade sets of Iskander-M missile systems in the 

 

608 Ibid.

609 Ibid.
242

Ground Forces and rearm three divisions of the army 

air defense with Tor-M2 air defense missile systems. 

Also, ensure the supply of 905 of the latest tanks and 

armored combat vehicles.

• Deploy 170 new and modernized aircraft in the 

Aerospace Forces and Navy; rearm 4 SAM regiments 

with the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system; deploy 8

surface ships and 9 combat boats in the effective Navy 

forces; supply 4 Bal and Bastion rocket complexes to 

the coastal troops; ensure the acceptance into service 

and placement on alert of 3 radars with high 

operational readiness in Yeniseisk, Orsk, and Barnaul; 

launch the second unified space system spacecraft; 

and continue to improve the Armed Forces basing 

system.

610

What Does it all Mean?

While it may be too early to make a dramatic prediction, there

should be some Russian and US worries as to where the Kremlin is 

headed. In Russia, the worry should be that they may be headed in the 

same direction as the USSR in the days of Brezhnev and even 

Gorbachev, which is to some sort of collapse. In spite of all the efforts to 

exert control over their system as described above, which has succeeded 

to a large degree in the opinion of many observers, there is another factor 

to consider. While not referring directly to Russia, Steven Pinker, writing 

in the Wall Street Journal in December 2016, referenced a scientific law 

that has some applicability to Russia’s current situation. Pinker noted the 

following:

The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that in an 

isolated system (one that is not taking in energy), entropy

[disorganization, chaos, randomness, etc.] always 

increases over time. Closed systems inexorably become 

less structured, less organized, less able to accomplish 

 

610 Ibid.
243

interesting and useful outcomes, until they slide into an 

equilibrium of gray, tepid monotony and stay there.611

While Russia continues to take in energy, it is energy derived from a 

rather jaundiced view of the world, one which sees threats and 

conspiracies everywhere. The monotony of this input is that its view of 

reality is stilted through these two lenses, even when threats do not in 

actuality exist or when the Russians do not admit that their own actions 

caused a threatening response from others. The regions are becoming 

increasingly chaotic, as governors search for money and citizens search 

for stability. Threats, either real or imagined, enable expenditures on 

military weaponry and draw needed funding away from the regions.

The scenario that should worry the US is that Russia is so 

insecure that it will react inappropriately to conditions and events when 

viewed through its slanted perspective on just what makes up objective 

reality. Russia needs to stop creating its own reality and attempting to 

convince other nations of its perspective (such as the MH17 incident). 

Russia, as a result, fails to take into consideration the effect of its own 

actions (and half-truths) and their consequences. This can bring the 

world to the brink of a nuclear or nonnuclear disaster. 

Discussions with Russians should proceed on the basis of US 

recognition of the former’s desire for equal security, strategic stability, 

and territorial integrity and sovereignty. Discussions with the US should 

proceed on the basis of Russia’s recognition that it is responsible for the 

violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and that 

working off its own view of objective reality will never work out. If such 

talks are not forthcoming-and they probably are not-then the US will 

have to be keenly aware of Russian attempts to control discussions, 

negotiations, and outcomes. The Kremlin will continue to expand its 

geopolitical quests. NATO nations and nations bordering on Russia will 

have to keep a sharp lookout for mental or physical traps that are set for 

them. It means that, in all likelihood, we are in for a time of troubles.

 

611 Steven Pinker, “Why Things Fall Apart,” The Wall Street Journal, Review Section, 

31 December 2016-1 January 2017, p. C1.
244
245

APPENDIX ONE: RUSSIA’S GENERAL STAFF/COMMANDERS 

ON THE WAR IN SYRIA

Russia’s General Staff/Commanders on the War in Syria

When analyzing Russian military activity in Syria, two of the 

most important sources of information are the comments made by the 

Russian Chief of the General Staff V. V. Gerasimov and by ColonelGeneral Andrey Kartapolov, the Chief of the Main Operations 

Directorate, the latter of whom is often referred to as the “brain” of the 

General Staff.612 It is they who plan and run operations. 

Kartapolov guided the Main Operations Directorate during the 

initial intervention into Syria. In November he was reassigned as the 

commander of the Western Military District, and Lieutenant-General 

Sergey Rudskoy, his deputy in the Directorate, replaced him. This 

section will examine the comments of these three men on Russian 

military actions in Syria. Their conversations offer a perspective over 

time, as Kartapolov was in charge when the operation began, Rudskoy 

replaced him in November, and Gerasimov has been there the entire 

time. Their comments center on a few specific issues, to include the 

number of sorties flown and targets hit, the negotiating process between 

Russia and the US and results obtained, and Russia’s military pullout. 

Another important source of information is comments from the 

actual field commanders in Syria. Two are discussed below. The first is 

Lieutenant General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was called the main 

executor of the plan that was first laid out by Colonel-General Vladimir 

Zarudnitskiy (who was in charge of training government troops in Syria). 

Dvornikov was eventually replaced in the summer of 2016 by Lieutenant 

General Aleksandr Zhuravlev.

Colonel-General Andrey Kartapolov

 

612 Viktor Baranets, “Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov: Russian Military Base May 

Appear in Syria. It Will Have Naval, Air, and Ground Components,” Komsomolskaya 

Pravda Online, 16 October 2015.
246

Kartapolov, known as a competent commander who possesses 

broad tactical thinking, was assigned to the Main Operations Directorate 

in June 2014. This means that he was intensely involved in two 

important Russian military buildups, first in Eastern Ukraine and then in 

Syria. The latter is the first acknowledged deployment of Russian forces 

outside of Russia (Putin continues to deny that Russian forces are in 

Ukraine, even though everyone knows they are there), since the 1979 

invasion of Afghanistan. From these deployments Kartapolov has gained 

practical experience.613

In a 3 October 2015 briefing Kartapolov stated that since 30 

September Russian aviation forces had made over 60 sorties into Syria. 

Attack targets were command and control posts, munitions and 

explosives dumps, communications hubs, mini-plants that were 

producing suicide bomber material, and training camps. He made a point 

of reminding the media that Russia had provided other nations with an 

advance warning of impending Russian airstrikes against ISIS targets. 

These warnings were issued through the Coordination Committee’s 

International Information Center, which was established in Baghdad. As 

of 3 October only Iran, Iraq, and Syria had provided information to the 

center. 

Kartapolov very optimistically stated that Russia had “succeeded 

in undermining the terrorists’ material-technical base and substantially 

reduced their combat potential.”614 Colonel-General Viktor Bondarev, 

Commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, added to this optimism, 

stating that all bombs and missiles hit their targets “with no mistakes.”615

Targets are chosen after compiling data from space and radio-electronic 

intelligence, and images from UAVs, and impending strikes are 

 

613 Defense Ministry press report, “Russian Defense Minister Presents new Commander 

of the Western Military District Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 23 November 2015. 614 Unattributed report, “Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov, Chief of the Russian 

Federation’s Armed Forces’ General Staff Main Operations Directorate, Speaks about 

Results of Activity of Russian Air Grouping in Syria,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 3 October 2015. 615 Interfax (in English), 7 October 2015.
247

computer-modeled. Aviation and maritime launch sources use the same 

algorithms. Kartapolov noted that deviation from the targets bombed did 

not exceed 5 meters.616 Several of those targets were destroyed due to the 

launch of Kalibr (3M14T variant, with a 900-1500-mile range) cruise 

missiles from the Southwest Caspian Sea, with the involvement of four 

guided–missile ships. Finally, he noted that attempts to contact Russia’s 

partners in the fight against ISIS (here he implies the US) and coordinate 

ISIS locations have gone unanswered. He offered two reasons: Russia’s 

partners do not have such coordinates and/or they do not want Russia to 

attack ISIS targets.617 However, since the deployment of Russian forces 

has continued deep into the summer of 2016, these initial successes 

outlined by Kartapolov appear to have not been sustained at such a high 

rate.

On 16 October retired Colonel Viktor Baranets, an MOD press

secretary and ten-year veteran of MOD’s Central Apparatus and General 

Staff, interviewed Kartapolov. The latter would not say when the 

decision was made to start sending military equipment to Syria, but his 

Directorate initially assessed the situation and prepared the leadership 

with proposals for achieving objectives. The main task was to use all 

capabilities to transfer equipment, arms, and material supplies to Syria as 

quickly as possible. A first step then involved setting up the coordinating 

committee in Baghdad. A set of reconnaissance assets gathered 

information on ISIS, whose presence was estimated at 40,000-50,000 

fighters. Before attacking any ISIS targets, Kartapolov noted, a triple 

check on the accuracy of a target’s location was made, using space, 

drones, radio, and other types of reconnaissance systems.618

Russia’s presence in country appeared to have inspired the Syrian 

Army, as more than ten populated localities were liberated in the first 

few days of direct support from Russian assets. When asked if Russian 

 

616 Interfax (in English), 7 October 2015. 617 Unattributed report, “Andrey Kartapolov, Chief of the Russian Federation’s General 

Staff Main Operations Directorate, Has Spoken about the Results of the Employment of 

Cruise Missiles against Rebels in Syria,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 8 October 2015. 618 Baranets.
248

forces could be used in Iraq, Kartapolov noted that if a request comes 

from the Iraqi leadership to President Putin, as it did from Syria’s 

president, then it will be considered. Kartapolov reiterated that no 

Russian ground troops would be employed in Syria. Coordination with a 

small Syrian task force regarding air operations and the location of the 

forward line of troops would continue.619

Kartapolov appeared suspicious and even hostile when 

examining US intentions and capabilities. He noted that the US’s failure 

to admit it is unable to achieve its objectives in Syria without Russia is 

due to the fact that it would be humiliating; that the US could not 

understand what Russia was doing in Syria; that the US “possibly” had 

supplied Stingers to forces opposed to President Al-Assad opposition 

forces; and that US bombings to date had been aimed at making it more 

difficult for Syrian troops to conduct operations. He stated that 

“everything the US-led coalition is doing is a sham...It is an imitation of 

strikes...”620 With regard to a US statement that Russia will suffer heavy 

losses in Syria, he noted that such a statement indicated an “utter lack of 

professionalism.” He then went on to add that the US’s sarcastic 

response to the Russian launch of Kalibr cruise missiles was due to the 

fact that US intelligence sources missed this. He called US capabilities 

weak, noting in regard to equipment “which they tout as boundless, are a 

children’s tale.”621 He criticized the Western media, stating that daily 

false reports are published about the indiscriminate nature of Russian air 

strikes. This “newspaper canard” is carried out with photo collages and 

video stills without any proof as to the time or site of the event.622

In a 16 October report, Kartapolov stated that Russia and Turkey 

had agreed to establish a hotline between them to prevent incidents in the 

 

619 Ibid. 620 Ibid. 621 Ibid. 622 Unattributed report, “Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main 

Operations Directorate Chief Andrey Kartapolov Sums Up Results of Russian Aviation 

Group’s Operations in Syria over Past Month,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 30 October 2015.
249

air.623 This was required due to the increased number of sorties flown by 

the Russian Air Force. He noted on 30 October that, after a month, 1391 

sorties had destroyed 1623 terrorist sites. His totals included the 

following: 249 command and communication centers; 51 training camps; 

35 plants and workshops where explosive devices where assembled; 131 

ammunition and fuel depots; 371 strongholds; and 786 field camps and 

bases.624 He added that ISIS propaganda included the public execution of 

prisoners and hostages, which took place after rounding up the local 

population and forcing them to watch the executions for intimidation 

purposes.625

On 3 November, during a briefing at the MOD, Kartapolov 

softened his criticism, stating that significant cooperation had occurred 

among Russia, the US, and patriotic forces in Syria. Not only was a 

memorandum signed between the US and Russia’s MOD the previous 

week, but air crews flew to within three nautical miles of one another 

and made contact on a predetermined frequency, exchanging messages in 

Russian and English. A hot line was established between Russian forces 

at their airbase in Syria and the US Air Force in Qatar. Further, contact 

has been established with Syrian opposition leaders. This enabled 

Russian aviation on 3 November to drop KAB-500 precision aerial 

bombs due to opposition information.626 Such cooperation will enable 

the sides to unite the efforts of both “government troops and other 

patriotic forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, which were previously in 

opposition, and act as a united front against the common enemy—

international terrorism.”627

 

Kartapolov’s final press appearance as Head of the Main 

Operations Directorate appears to have been a 19 November briefing on 

two massed air strikes against ISIS targets. He noted that on 18 

 

623 Interfax (in English), 16 October 2016. 624 Interfax (in English), 30 October 2015. 625 “Russian Federation Armed Forces...,” 30 October 2015. 626 Kartapolov briefing, “Colonel-General Andrey Kartapolov Has Spoken about the 

Results of the Activity of the Russian Aviation Group in Syria,” Ministry of Defense of 

the Russian Federation, 3 November 2015. 627 Interfax (in English), 3 November 2015.
250

November Russian Tu-160 and Tu-22MZ aircraft, in a 24-hour period, 

conducted 126 combat sorties from the territory of the RF while 

operational-tactical aircraft worked from the Humaymim Air Base in 

Syria. These strikes were assisted by drone and aircraft reconnaissance 

data, as well as data from space. On 19 November he stated that Tu95MS strategic missile carriers launched 12 cruise missiles from Russian 

territory against ISIS targets, while Tu-22MZ long-range bombers 

carried out strikes against 6 targets in Syria.628 Days earlier (reports state 

that Putin signed the decree on 10 November) Kartapolov had been 

reassigned to be the commanding officer of Russia’s Western Military 

District.629 He was replaced as Head of the Main Operations Directorate 

of the General Staff by his deputy, Lieutenant General Sergey 

Rudskoy.630

Lieutenant General Sergey Rudskoy

Little is known about Rudskoy’s background other than that he 

was Kartapolov’s deputy in the Main Operations Directorate before 

taking charge. However, from the beginning of his time in this position, 

he focused on specific things the Armed Forces were doing or needed to 

do. On 24 November he stated that to ensure security at the Russian air 

base in Syria, strike aircraft would need jet fighter cover; air defense had 

to be strengthened (he advocated the use of the Fort system on the 

Moskva cruiser, which is similar to the S-300); and contact with Turkey 

should be discontinued.631 A day later, he stated that a Russian Su-24M 

front-line bomber was shot down by a Turkish F-16 fighter with a 

“close-radius missile with an infrared homing head,”632 saying that the 

incident occurred over Syrian territory, four kilometers from the 

 

628 Unattributed report, “Colonel General Andrey Kartapolov, Head of the Russian 

Federation’s Armed Forces General Staff Main Operational Directorate, Summarizes 

results of Second and Third Massed Air Strikes against ISIL Targets in Syria,” Ministry 

of Defense of the Russian Federation, 19 November 2015.

629 Interfax-AVN Online, 23 November 2015. 630 Unattributed report, “Defense Ministry Source: Deputy Chief of the General Staff 

Kartapolov to Head Western Military District,” TASS, 16 November 2016. 631 Rossiya 24 TV, 24 November 2015. 632 Statement by Lieutenant General Rudskoy, Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, 25 November 2015.
251

border.633 Turkey stated the opposite, that the attack took place after the 

bomber violated Turkish territorial sovereignty, for which Russia had 

been warned earlier due to prior incursions. Diplomats then took over the 

negotiation process regarding the downing of the aircraft.

Next, Rudskoy advocated shutting down ISIS funding. This 

would require Aerospace Forces delivering airstrikes on “oil extraction, 

storage, refinery, and transportation facilities in ISIS-controlled 

areas.”634 Certain nations, he added, to include Turkey at the forefront, 

were aiding this ISIS-led business project, and Russia had irrefutable 

evidence, through both aerial and space reconnaissance assets, that 

implicated Turkey’s use of three main routes to get oil.635

On a more positive note Rudskoy stated that unspecified Syrian 

opposition forces were helping the Russian military and the Syrian 

government’s forces to attack ISIS positions. He estimated that more 

than 150 opposition groups are operating on Syrian territory636

(naturally, not all are cooperating with Russia). He added that since 30 

September aircraft had conducted 4,201 combat missions, to include 145 

by strategic missile and long-range bomber aviation.637 Targets included 

1200 tankers hauling crude and petroleum products, and 6 oil facilities, 

which were destroyed in the past 3 days.638 In a 2015 year-end report, he

noted that 5,240 sorties were flown, meaning that since 15 December 

(when 4,201 sorties were noted) 1,000 more were flown in just 2 weeks. 

The creation of a “multi-level reconnaissance system ensuring the 

reliable exposure of the gunmen’s targets” has greatly facilitated 

Russia’s air effort and enabled government troops and even detachments 

of the patriotically–minded opposition to conduct offensive operations 

against bandit groups. The goal is to prevent ISIS’s further smuggling of 

 

633 Ibid. 634 Speech by Lieutenant General Rudskoy, Ministry of Defense of the Russian 

Federation (in English), 2 December 2015. 635 Ibid. 636 Interfax, 15 December 2015. 637 Ibid. 638 Unattributed report, “The Russian Federation Has Destroyed in Syria More Than 

1,000 Oil Tankers since 30 September,” RIA Novosti, 15 December 2015.
252

Syria’s assets out of the country.639 He also made it a point to once again 

remind readers that “Russian aviation is operating on Syrian territory 

legitimately at the invitation of this country’s leadership with the 

observation of all the norms of international law.”640

In an early 2016 statement, Rudskoy announced that more than 

1,000 targets were hit in the first 10 days of the year. One military expert 

saw a real problem with the pronouncement that Russia was providing 

air support to the Syrian opposition and Al-Assad’s forces 

simultaneously. This expert believes what is really happening is Russian 

support for the Kurdish opposition, who have been fighting for 

autonomy from Turkey, and not support for opposition forces in 

general.641 Two days after this report Rudskoy announced that a decision 

had been made to begin “a new direction in the activity of the Russian 

Armed Forces in Syria.” This was the introduction of a humanitarian 

operation, supplying foodstuffs, medication, and other essentials. Some 

of the aid is being delivered by Il-76 transport aircraft of the Syrian Air 

Force using Russian parachute platforms.642

In February Rudskoy stated that a Russian and US Syrian 

ceasefire coordination center with hotlines had been established between 

Russian forces in Syria and the US force in Amman. An exchange of 

maps was made, depicting regions where work is under way on 

reconciling the sides in the conflict. Russia provided a list of armed 

formations with some 6,111 people who joined the ceasefire and a list of 

74 exact geographical coordinates where strikes must be excluded. 

According to the report, fighting has ceased at 34 locations.643

 

639 Unattributed report, “Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff 

Main Operational Directorate Sums Up Results of Activity of Military Space Forces in 

Syria in 2015,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 25 December 2015. 640 Ibid. 641 Maksim Solopov, “Whom is Russia Helping?”RosBiznesKonsalting (RBK) Online, 

13 January 2016. 642 Rossiya 24 TV, 15 January 2016. 643 Rossiya 24 TV, 27 February 2016.
253

In March Rudskoy stated that an echelon of Su-24, Su-25, and 

Su-34 aircraft had returned to Russia, as part of the pull-out from Syria. 

Other equipment would be redeployed via aircraft or sea transport.644

Almost simultaneously he noted that the US did not support all of the 

Russian initiatives offered in the 25 February framework of the Joint 

Russian-US Statement, in some cases formulating its own views. A 

compromise draft was sent to the US on 5 March, but an 18 March 

meeting in Amman showed to Russia that the US is not ready for a 

substantive discussion of the agreement’s text. He noted that any delay is 

unacceptable, since the situation is dangerous. As a result of such 

inaction, he noted that “in the absence of a US reaction to these 

proposals, the RF will begin the unilateral application of the rules 

envisaged by the Agreement as of 22 March.”645 Author Yuriy Gavrilov 

added that this apparently means that Russia is ready to strike persistent 

violators of the ceasefire in Syria without further coordination. Further, 

Gavrilov states that the US is providing only a minimum amount of 

information on the oppositions’ formations, and such a one-sided 

approach is not making Russian negotiators happy.646

Rudskoy noted that conditions for a blockade and control over 

dominating grounds and main roads have cut off ISIS from its logistical 

communications. This will ultimately result in the defeat of the terrorists 

around Palmyra.647 In addition, 43 deals were signed with moderate 

opposition leaders, who “pledged that units under their command would 

stop fighting,” according to Rudskoy.648 In support of this effort, 

between 7-27 March some 500 combat sorties were flown delivering 

more than 2,000 strikes in support of Syrian Army ground operations.649

With regard to the accuracy of the air strikes, Naval Admiral Vladimir 

Komoyedov, who chairs the State Duma Defense Committee, stated that 

Russia uses unguided bombs on bombers fitted with guidance and drop 

 

644 Rossiya 24 TV, 18 March 2016. 645 Yuriy Gavrilov, “General Staff Authorized to State,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 22 

March 2016.

646 Ibid. 647 Interfax (in English), 18 March 2016. 648 Interfax (in English), 21 March 2016.

649 Interfax (in English), 31 March 2016.
254

systems. Western analysts are not clear on just how much, if at all, this 

improves accuracy.

In April Rudskoy announced that there were no immediate plans 

to free Aleppo.650However, a 28 July Interfax report noted that leaflets 

were used to distribute exit plans from the city, so that personal 

documentation and other humanitarian issues could be handled 

expeditiously. The leaflet warned city occupants that when approaching 

checkpoints they should wait for a signal from government troops and 

slowly turn their back and demonstrate to authorities that there are no 

explosive devices on their bodies.

651 In addition, Rudskoy announced 

that Russia’s NDMC has opened a 24-hour hotline, to which Russian and 

foreign citizens can call with offers of humanitarian aid for Aleppo 

residents.652

To assist with long-range bombing activities, the airfield at 

Mozdok in Russia is being renovated so that larger aircraft in greater 

numbers can use the field as an exit and entrance point to and from 

Syria.653 Russia is also assisting the Syrian Air Force, having provided 

two of ten modernized Su-24M2 frontal aviation bombers to them. It is a 

modernized version of the Su-24M frontal aviation bomber. For the 

international community, this could cause minor headaches, as analysts 

try to figure out if the aircraft is Russian or Syrian that is doing the 

bombing. Currently some 30 sorties a day are being flown by the Syrian 

force.654 Syrian support is important, as Rudskoy pointed out on 11 

August that the main aim of the Aerospace Forces was to prevent 

 

650 Interfax (in English), 21 July 2016. 651 Interfax (in English), 28 July 2016. 652 Interfax (in English), 1 August 2016. 653 No author provided, “The Army and the Defense Industrial Complex: The Airfield 

at Mozdok will Begin to Accept All Types of Combat and Transport Aircraft Beginning 

in 2017,” TASS, 22 July 2016. 654 Anton Mardasov, “Armies and Wars: The War in Syria: Su-24s Fly Right Past 

Kerry; Russia’s Transfer of Bombers to the Syrian Air Force Could Have a Hidden 

Meaning,” Svobodnaya Pressa, 27 July 2016.
255

terrorist reserves from redeploying to the southwestern edge of 

Aleppo.655

In August Rudskoy faced his toughest moment to date in regard 

to casualties, having to deal with the downing of a Mi-8AMTSH 

helicopter by ISIS that killed five soldiers. This was the fourth helicopter 

lost, according to official reports. The helicopters are used for 

humanitarian freight and for search and rescue operations or transport of 

special operation troops.656

Chief of the General Staff V. V. Gerasimov

Nearly a month and a half after combat operations began in Syria, 

Gerasimov delivered one of his first public reports to Putin on the 

progress of fighting there. He stated that in 48 days, 2,289 combat sorties 

had been flown and 4,111 missile and bombing strikes had been

conducted. This assault destroyed 562 command posts, 64 terrorist 

training camps, and 54 weapon and ammunition production plants, 

among other sites. This support has allowed the Syrian Armed Forces to 

go on the offensive along the entire front line of several provinces. In 

order to step up strikes against ISIS, a new plan has been constructed that 

includes 25 long-range aviation aircraft, 8 Su-34 advanced bombers, and 

4 Su-27SM fighters, apparently operating from the territory of the RF. 

Additional reconnaissance was to be conducted by 10 image and radar 

reconnaissance satellites, some of which are civilian owned. Control 

over the missions was still maintained from the NDMC in Moscow via 

long-range aviation command posts and the air group in Syria.657

The same day the President of Russia’s website detailed a report 

from Defense Minister Shoygu, who said that long-range aviation assets 

involved in Syria included Tu-160, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M3 strategic 

bombers. These attacks from Russian territory involve flights 5 to 9 

hours in length. Some Tu-22M3 flights are departing from Mozdok in 

 

655 Interfax (in English), 11 August 2016. 656 Ivan Safronov, “Mi-8 Flies into Fiery Opposition; Five Russian Officers Die in 

Syria,” Kommersant Online, 1 August 2016. 657 Rossiya 24 TV, 17 November 2015.
256

North Ossetiya.658 When asked how much all of the sorties were costing, 

Mozdok’s commander, Major General Anatoliy Konovalov, replied 

“You can’t put a price on the country’s security.”659

The following day it was reported that Gerasimov had been 

awarded the Order of St. George, the nation’s highest military honor, 

apparently for running the operation in Syria.660 If true, this would seem 

to be somewhat strange, as most military awards are given after an 

operation/conflict ends or is near ending, neither of which fit Russian 

actions in Syria. In November the situation was still ambiguous, and it 

has now stretched out to the winter of 2017-2018 (as this work goes to 

press), with no end date in sight.

On 19 November 2015 Gerasimov discussed French participation 

in the Syrian operation with French representatives. Earlier an ISIS

attack had destroyed a Russian A321 airliner in flight and heading out of 

Egypt, while the French had just experienced the terrorist attack on 

innocent civilians at a rock concert and a restaurant in Paris. The sides 

discussed issues of collaboration between the Russian naval grouping 

and the French aircraft carrier group.661 In late December Gerasimov and 

General Pierre de Villiers, Chief of the French Defense Staff, agreed to 

establish a working group to better coordinate the fight against terrorism. 

They agreed that Syria should remain “a united, secular, and multi-faith 

state.”662 A few days earlier Gerasimov had discussed the fighting with 

US General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They 

discussed joint cooperation between Russian and US air operations.663 

In December it was reported that Russia’s air group had 

expanded its airbases in Syria. In addition to the main Humaymim Air 

 

658 President of Russia website (in English), 17 November 2015.

659 Andrey Kolesnikov, “The War Was Yesterday: Kommersant Special Correspondent 

Watched it Together with the Supreme Commander in Chief,” Kommersant Online, 18 

November 2015.

660 Russian News Website RBK, 18 November 2015. 661 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation website, 19 November 2015. 662 Interfax (in English), 24 December 2015. 663 RIA Novosti, 15 December 2015.
257

Base in Latakia, there were reports that it was also using the Al-Shayrat 

Base in Hims and the Tiyas Base in Palmyra as “forward-staging” 

airfields for supporting the government offensive. The latter two seem 

particularly important as refueling and ammunition resupply points for 

Mi-24P attack helicopters and Mi-8 helicopter transports. At the time 

there was also a report on the number of aircraft supporting operations in 

Syria. It was reported that at Humaymim there were 12 Su-25SM attack 

aircraft, 11 Su-24M and 4 Su-34 frontline bombers, 4 Su-30SM fighters, 

12 Mi-24 attack helicopters, and 4 multipurpose Mi-8 helicopters. Based 

on Russian territory are 4 Su-27SM fighters, 5 Tu-160 strategic missile 

carriers, 6 Tu-95MS, 8 Su-34, and 14 Tu-22M3 aircraft. All bomber and 

attack aircraft were covered by Su-30SM fighters.664

Gerasimov noted that the threat of terrorist activity spreading into 

Russia was growing, which was one of the main reasons that an 

Aerospace Force operation against ISIS was initiated.665 Russia is 

carrying out 30-40 strikes per day in support of the Free Syrian Army, 

whose total strength exceeds 5,000 troops according to Gerasimov.666

There appeared to be progress in the fight to seize the strategic initiative. 

Gerasimov stated in January 2016 that of the 15 directions where combat 

operations were under way in Syria, 10 were offensive, 3 involved 

preparations for offensive operations, and 2 were defensive.667

On 28 March, Gerasimov announced that all operational-tactical 

aircraft of the Aerospace Forces that had planned to leave Syria had 

returned to Russia.668 It is not known how many additional aircraft were 

not in the plan and are staying on. That same day he noted that 

Aerospace Forces, Special Operations Forces, and Russian military 

advisors had helped liberate the important Syrian cultural center of 

 

664 Ivan Safronov and Pavel Tarasenko, “Bases with Room for Growth; Russian Airmen 

Bring New Infrastructure into Play in Syrian Operation,” Kommersant Online, 7 

December 2015.

665 Interfax (in English), 14 December 2015. 666 Interfax (in English), 14 December 2015. 667 Rossiya 24 TV, 22 January 2016. 668 Interfax (in English), 28 March 2016.
258

Palmyra.669 It is the first time that Gerasimov mentioned Special 

Operations Forces in Syria beyond the function of providing 

reconnaissance and targeting support. Many outside observers were 

asking about the extent of the drawdown, which forces had remained, 

and, in fact, was a transformation of the force to a new stage of 

operations actually underway instead of a drawdown. No answers were 

forthcoming from the Russian MOD. Meanwhile, Gerasimov continued 

to note that Russia was meeting in full its obligations in ensuring the 

ceasefire and national reconciliation in Syria.670

In June the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta stated that Russia 

was preparing to begin a “decisive struggle against all groupings that are 

violating the armistice in the Syrian Arab Republic,” according to a 

statement from Gerasimov. Some believe that the Russian offensive will 

be aimed at retaking oil and gas fields in the east and southeast of Syria. 

Since the Russian Aerospace Forces are refraining from bombing the 

actual sites, their focus is on motor vehicle convoys moving in the 

direction of Turkey, while military advisers are helping the Syrian forces 

organize an active offensive armed struggle against terrorists and AlAssad’s enemies.671 In short, there are still many Russian forces in Syria,

and operations there are continuing in spite of what many felt was a 

Russian pull-out from Syria.

Russian Commanders in Syria: The Work of Dvornikov and now 

Zhuravlev

In February 2016 a Russian media report noted that Colonelgeneral Vladimir Zarudnitskiy, Head of Russia’s Central Military 

District, was in charge of training government troops in Syria, and that 

Lieutenant General Aleksandr Dvornikov, his Chief of Staff, was the 

“main executor of Zarudnitskiy’s plans in Syria.”672 In an interview 

Dvornikov stated that Russian advisors had helped plan Syrian Armed 

 

669 Interfax (in English), 28 March 2016. 670 Interfax, 20 June 2016. 671 Vladimir Mukhin, “General Staff Announces Hunt for Shape-Shifter Terrorists in 

Syria. Moscow Helps Damascus to Take Control of Main Oil and Gas Fields,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 June 2016. 672 Urals News Website (Ura.ru), 23 February 2016.
259

Forces combat operations, and that modern weapons, to include artillery 

systems, communication systems, and so on, had been provided to 

them.673

In March 2016 Dvornikov returned to Moscow and gave a 

lengthier interview to the Russian press. He noted that Syrian troops, 

tired after 4 years of fighting, had been facing 60,000 terrorists, who 

controlled about 70 percent of Syria when the Russian operation began 

in September 2015. A military advisor system was established to train 

government troops and other patriotic elements. This helped enable a 

switch to offensive operations, supported by Russia’s Air Force, and 

offered the opportunity to recapture three major oil and gas fields.674

Russia’s snap readiness inspections helped prepare its force for 

deployments to Syria. State-of-the-art modular structures helped Russia 

quickly establish an adequate infrastructure for its forces. Dvornikov 

added that Russian Special Operations Forces were operating on Syrian 

territory, conducting reconnaissance, guiding aircraft to targets, and 

performing other special missions. He noted that military advisors were 

working at all levels, including the tactical level, but he did not state that 

Russian Ground Forces had participated in operations. He ended his 

interview by stating that “the requisite number of forces intended to 

ensure monitoring of compliance with the cessation of hostilities regime 

will remain in Syria.”675 For his service in Syria, Dvornikov received a 

medal and the title of Hero of Russia from Putin for his service as 

commander of the RF’s troop grouping in Syria from October until the 

March pullout of some Russian forces. He has since been appointed 

Commander of the Russian Southern Military District.676

On 22 July it was reported that Southern Military District First 

Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Aleksandr Zhuravlev had taken 

 

673 Interfax (in English), 23 March 2016. 674 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Syria: Russian Thunder. The Commander of the Russian 

Federation’s Troop Grouping in Syria Has Given His First Interview to Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 24 March 2016. 675 Ibid. 676 Interfax, 20 September 2016.
260

command of the grouping of RF troops in Syria. This duty change took 

place at a time when ISIS was conducting continuous offensive 

operations in the area of Palmyra. Since September 2015 he had served 

as the Chief of Staff in Syria and temporarily carried out Dvornikov’s 

duties when the latter returned to Moscow in March.677 Very little has 

been heard about Zhuravlev since.

 

677 Ivan Safronov, “Regrouping of Generals: Aleksandr Zhuravlev Becomes 

Commander of Russian Contingent in Syria,” Kommersant Online, 22 July 2016.
261

APPENDIX TWO: KRUGLOV ON FORECASTING

In the last issue of Military Thought in 2016, author V. V. 

Kruglov discussed the status and opportunities presented by military 

forecasting.678 As an element of Russian military thought, forecasting is 

a topic to be followed closely, for it influences the further development 

of military strategy.

There is a need in Russia to correctly forecast the nature of 

threats and changing character of war for the next 30-50 years, according 

to President Vladimir Putin. He stated that this requires a new “smart” 

system of military analysis, although he did not expand on what this 

might mean.679

The tasks of forecasting include predicting the development of 

the military, political, and strategic situation; and the appearance of 

advanced types of weapons, the nature of warfare, and military actions. 

Author V. V. Kruglov noted that one should not expect too much of a 

forecast, as it is among the most difficult in any science. Forecasting is 

dependent on not only predicting or foreseeing dangers and threats at the 

present time but also other issues. He notes that the content of the armed 

struggle matrix (weapons, forms and methods of both combat actions 

and employing formations, theater of operations characteristics, and so 

on) makes forecasting so difficult. This indicates that there is not just 

one answer to war’s potential nature, but several possibilities.680 The 

focus will be where threats to Russia or its national interests occur.

The conclusions one reaches are about the RF Armed Forces 

composition and makeup, organization, command and control, support 

system and so one should be in a specific region or on strategic sectors, 

and what role strategic reserves and mobilization reserves should have. 

 

678 V. V. Kruglov, “Military Forecasting: conditions, possibilities, and the Realization 

of Results,” Military Thought, No. 12 2016, pp. 33-38. 679 Ibid., p. 33. 680 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
262

The forecasts should also note that contemporary wars are clearly 

different from those of even the recent past. There is a strong technical 

and intellectual aspect of modern war that must be noted.681

By identifying trends in the changing character of war, forecasts 

can be more relevant and precise in their ability to piece together a 

picture of future war. Kruglov recommended eight trends that appear to 

have manifested in the past few years:

• The expanding spatial continuum of military activity;

• The creation and increased use of the information 

continuum (to include the use of reflexive control);

• The changing logical-temporal construction of armed 

struggle;

• The strengthening of deductive and weakening of 

inductive ties in relation to armed struggles;

• The organization and conduct of armed struggles in 

real time;

• The increase in the gap between the scope of 

destruction and destruction capabilities; 

• The switch to the practical use of robot-driven 

weapons systems;

• The active use of nonmilitary forms and methods of 

struggle.682

The identification of trends allows planners to forecast preparations for 

them.

There are a few problems with using trends in forecasts. First, 

trends usually don’t link together, and particular circumstances can 

determine the dominance of one trend over another. Second, trends are 

not rigid categories. To overcome such shortcomings, planners and 

 

681 Ibid., p. 35. 682 Ibid., p. 36.
263

commanders use their subjectivity to affect combat actions and 

forecasting.683

To make sure that combat activities go according to plan, it is 

necessary to do one of two things: either forestall an adversary or strike 

first in order to gain the initiative. Kruglov notes that David used the 

latter tactic in his fight with Goliath. One should deal a preemptive strike 

via a long-range high-precision weapon to attain the strategic initiative. 

When aggression starts, it is imperative to have two or three action 

options in each theater of operations, adjusted according to the path that 

the political, military, and strategic situations dictate. Under such 

circumstances, the roles of reconnaissance and intelligence activities 

become paramount.684

Kruglov offered three conclusions: forecasts of potential theaters 

of operations need to be updated every three-six months or more often; it 

is necessary to forecast forms for the employment force grouping; and it 

is necessary to conduct training sessions of various types and forms 

involving, as a priority, centers of defense control and national, regional, 

and territorial ones.685

 

683 Ibid., p. 37. 684 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 685 Ibid., p. 38.
264
265

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Timothy L. Thomas (BS, Engineering Science, USMA; MA, 

International Relations, University of Southern California) is a senior 

analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. Mr. Thomas conducts extensive research and publishing in the 

areas of peacekeeping, information war, psychological operations, low 

intensity conflict, and political-military affairs. Mr. Thomas was a US 

Army foreign area officer who specialized in Soviet/Russian studies. His 

military assignments included serving as the Director of Soviet Studies at 

the United States Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany; as an 

inspector of Soviet tactical operations under the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe; and as a brigade S-2 and company 

commander in the 82nd Airborne Division. Mr. Thomas has written two 

studies on Russia’s military, Recasting the Red Star and Military 

Strategy. He and his wife Christine currently live in Leavenworth, KS.