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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 11, 2016 

v No. 326778 

Oakland Circuit Court 

DAVID KENNETH RENTSCH, LC No. 2014-249056-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, David Kenneth Rentsch, appeals by right his jury conviction of armed 

robbery. MCL 750.529. The trial court sentenced Rentsch as a fourth-offense habitual offender, 

see MCL 769.12, to serve 25 to 50 years in prison. For the reasons explained below, we affirm 

Rentsch’s conviction, but order a Crosby remand.1

I. BASIC FACTS 

 Testimony and evidence established that Rentsch participated in three robberies between 

the evening of March 15, 2013, and the morning of March 18, 2013. The first robbery occurred 

on March 15 at a 7-Eleven in Green Oaks Township. The second robbery occurred at night on 

March 17 at a Mobil gas station in Novi. The third robbery occurred the next morning at a BP 

gas station in Brighton. The trial at issue was for the robbery of the Mobil gas station. 

 The primary issue at trial involved Rentsch’s identity as the robber depicted in the video 

from the Mobil robbery. The still photographs from the video were not of high quality and the 

clerk working at the Mobil station, Brian Singer, was not able to identify Rentsch as the robber. 

However, the prosecution introduced evidence from the 7-Eleven and BP robberies. The victims 

from those robberies testified and the trial court allowed the admission of video evidence from 

those robberies. 

 

1

 See United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005). 
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 Tessandra Velentzas testified concerning the 7-Eleven robbery and stated that Rentsch 

could have been the robber involved there, but she was unsure. Lorin Olsztyn identified Rentsch 

as the robber involved in the BP robbery. Additionally, the prosecution offered evidence tending 

to establish Rentsch’s location from just before the 7-Eleven robbery until his arrest following 

the BP robbery. The prosecution relied on the victims’ testimony, testimony from Trina Sevelis, 

who was with Rentsch throughout the morning of March 18, testimony from investigating 

officers, and testimony from Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Special Agent 

Stan Brue, who analyzed when and where Rentsch’s cell phone was used. Finally, the 

prosecution presented evidence that police officers recovered clothing from Rentsch’s truck that 

matched clothing worn by the person involved in each robbery. 

II. OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE 

 Rentsch argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution to introduce 

evidence concerning the 7-Eleven and BP robberies. The trial court allowed the prosecution to 

introduce evidence concerning the 7-Eleven and BP robberies because the evidence was 

necessary to show scheme or intent, and to establish Rentsch’s identity as the robber. The trial 

court also concluded that the evidence would be more probative than prejudicial. We review a 

trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Sabin (After 

Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). 

 “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 

person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” MRE 404(b)(1). Evidence of other acts 

may properly be admitted, however, under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that 

the evidence might implicate character. See People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 60-64, 74; 508 

NW2d 114 (1993). First, the evidence must be offered for a permissible, non-propensity 

purpose. Id. at 74; People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 511; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). MRE 404(b) 

provides a non-exhaustive list of examples, two of which are relevant here: a scheme, plan, or 

system of doing an act, and identity. 

 The second consideration is that the evidence must be relevant, VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 

74; MRE 401, whereas the third consideration is whether the evidence should be excluded under 

MRE 403 as substantially more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 71-72, 74. “[M]ost evidence 

presented against a criminal defendant” is “damaging and prejudicial,” People v Railer, 288 

Mich App 213, 220-221; 792 NW2d 776 (2010), but is not necessarily substantially more 

prejudicial than probative. When weighing “probative value against prejudicial effect,” we 

“balanc[e] several factors, including” “whether the evidence is needlessly cumulative, how 

directly the evidence tends to prove [a] fact . . . , how essential the fact . . . is to the case, the 

potential for confusing or misleading the jury, and whether the fact can be proved in another 

manner without as many harmful collateral effects.” People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 

751 NW2d 408 (2008). Finally, “ ‘the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the 

similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 

admitted,’ ” VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 74, quoting Huddleston v United States, 485 US 681, 691-

692; 108 S Ct 1496; 99 L Ed 2d 771 (1988), which can “minimize[] the prejudicial effect of the 

bad-acts evidence,” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 612; 806 NW2d 371 (2011). 
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 When considering whether other act evidence was offered to prove a common scheme, 

plan, or system, we consider whether “ ‘the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are 

sufficiently similar.’ ” People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 479; 769 NW2d 256 (2009), quoting 

Sabin, 463 Mich at 63. “There must be such a concurrence of common features that the charged 

acts and the other acts are logically seen as part of a general plan, scheme, or design.” Id. 

(emphasis in original). But “a high degree of similarity is not required, nor are distinctive or 

unusual features required to be present in both the charged and the uncharged acts.” Id. at 480. 

When compared to the typical method of offering other acts evidence to prove identity, “the 

necessary degree of similarity is . . . less than that needed to prove identity.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 

65. 

 Other acts evidence can also be offered “ ‘to show identification through modus 

operandi.’ ” People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 671; 625 NW2d 46 (2000), quoting People v 

Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 186; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). The like act may not “simply [be] another 

crime of the same general category or even of the same specific character.” People v 

Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 311; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). Rather, the charged act and other acts 

offered must be “so nearly identical in method as to earmark the charged offense as the 

handiwork of the accused,” and “be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” Id. at 

310-311 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 

 The evidence from the 7-Eleven and BP robberies was offered for a proper, nonpropensity purpose. There was significant evidence that the person who committed the three 

robberies at issue used a common scheme, plan, or system in committing the robberies. The 

robberies occurred over a three day period at businesses that each sold gas. The robberies all 

occurred near I-96 and involved the robber placing a gun on the counter and requesting money. 

The robber was also quite calm during each robbery and wore jeans, gloves, and a head covering. 

In addition, there was evidence that, shortly after each robbery, Rentsch called Deshawn Hugle 

and drove toward Detroit. Accordingly, the three robberies were sufficiently similar to support 

an inference that they were part of a common plan, scheme, or system. Sabin, 463 Mich at 63. 

 We acknowledge that the robberies had differences. They did not all occur at the same 

time of day, occur in the same town, or involve the robber wearing the same exact clothing. The 

robber asked for a particular brand of cigarettes in some robberies, but not others. Additionally, 

what was presumably Rentsch’s red truck was only seen in the BP robbery. However, the acts 

contain many similarities as in Ho, 231 Mich App at 186-187, where the Court upheld the 

admission of other acts to prove identity. Moreover, to the extent this might be viewed as “a 

close evidentiary question,” a “trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary question . . . cannot be 

an abuse of discretion,” Sabin, 463 Mich at 67. Further, the evidence shows identity through 

other evidence. 

 First, Brue’s tracking of Rentsch’s cell phone over the three day time period is consistent 

with Rentsch being at the Mobil robbery. Additionally, this tracking shows a pattern of travel 

back and forth between Brighton and Detroit over the three days in which the robberies were 

committed. 
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 Second, while the robber was not wearing the same clothes in all three robberies, officers 

arrested Rentsch near a truck containing clothing that was consistent with that worn during the 

robberies. The clothing included: a hat, jeans, a North Face coat similar to the one worn by the 

robber of the 7-Eleven, gloves that were similar to those worn by the robber of the 7-Eleven, a 

white shirt, sweatshirt, ski mask, and gloves similar to that worn by the robber of the Mobil gas 

station, and “black cotton or knit gloves” and “[b]rown work boots” “similar to [those] worn by” 

the robber of the BP gas station. This specific collection of otherwise innocuous clothing 

suggests that one person committed each of the robberies and, because there was strong evidence 

that Rentsch committed the 7-Eleven and BP robberies, a reasonable jury could conclude that he 

was also the person who robbed the Mobil gas station. Accordingly, the evidence from the other 

robberies was probative to prove identity. MRE 401. 

 Evidence of the other robberies was no doubt “damaging and prejudicial.” Railer, 288 

Mich App at 220-221. But the evidence was highly probative of the disputed issue of identity. 

Blackston, 481 Mich at 462. Evidence of the other robberies was also not “needlessly 

cumulative” of evidence of identity associated with the robbery at the Mobil gas station. Id. 

And, as Singer could not identify the robber of the Mobil gas station and the photos of the 

robbery provided to us do not provide a clear picture of the robber, it does not appear that there 

was other evidence with less “harmful collateral effects” that could have been offered to 

establish identity. Id. Therefore, the evidence was not substantially more prejudicial than 

probative. Further, the trial court also properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence only 

for a proper purpose. Cameron, 291 Mich App at 612. 

III. SENTENCING ISSUES 

A. OV 19 

 Rentsch next argues that the trial court erred in scoring Offense Variable (OV) 19, which 

addresses a “threat to the security of a penal institution or court or interference with the 

administration of justice or the rendering of emergency services.” MCL 777.49. “ ‘[T]he plain 

and ordinary meaning of “interfere with the administration of justice” . . . is to oppose so as to 

hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering judgment of individuals or causes 

by judicial process.’ ” People v Sours, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016), slip op at 2, 

quoting People v Hershey, 303 Mich App 330, 343; 844 NW2d 127 (2013), quoting MCL 

777.49(c) (altered here). The variable “is generally scored for conduct that constitutes an attempt 

to avoid being caught and held accountable for the sentencing offense.” Id.

 A trial court must assign 25 points to OV 19 when the defendant “threatened the security 

of a penal institution or court.” MCL 777.49(a). When the defendant “used force or the threat of 

force against another person or the property of another to interfere with, attempt to interfere with, 

or that results in the interference with the administration of justice or the rendering of emergency 

services,” the trial court must assign 15 points. MCL 777.49(b). The trial court must assign 10 

points when the defendant “otherwise interfered with or attempted to interfere with the 

administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(c). “The phrase ‘interfered with or attempted to 

interfere with the administration of justice’ is broad.” Steele, 283 Mich App at 492, quoting 

People v Barbee, 470 Mich 283, 286; 681 NW2d 348 (2004). Ten points can be assigned when a 

victim is told not to speak to the police, id. at 492-493, when a victim or witness is threatened, 
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Hershey, 303 Mich App at 343-344, when a victim is impliedly threatened, People v McDonald, 

293 Mich App 292, 299-300; 811 NW2d 507 (2011), or when a defendant otherwise “attempt[s] 

to deceive the police during [an] investigation,” Hershey, 303 Mich App at 343-344. 

 In this case, the trial court assigned 10 points to OV 19 because Rentsch attempted “to 

interfere with . . . the administration of justice by encouraging his family members to 

contact . . .the . . . victims and or witnesses” without using “force or threats.” During phone calls 

that Rentsch had while incarcerated, he discussed not wanting Sevelis to disclose his conduct to 

the court, talked to his mother and friend about not wanting her to come to court, and explained 

how one could be prevented from coming to court. Additionally, he made at least implied threats 

against Sevelis, McDonald, 293 Mich App at 299-300, in agreeing with his friend that he wanted 

her to “disappear.”2

 In addition, Rentsch obtained the names of the victims, gave the names to 

his mother, and discussed wanting to contact them. This conduct was sufficient to support the 

trial court’s score. Consequently, the trial court did not err. 

B. CROSBY REMAND 

 Rentsch also argues that he is entitled to a Crosby remand because the trial court used 

judge-found facts to increase the floor of his guideline minimum sentencing range in violation of 

his Sixth Amendment rights. Rentsch did not preserve this issue for appeal. We review 

unpreserved challenges for plain error. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364; 870 NW2d 502 

(2015). 

 In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364, our Supreme Court held that Michigan’s sentencing 

guidelines are “constitutionally deficient” to “the extent [that they] require judicial fact-finding 

beyond the facts admitted by the defendant or found by the jury to score offense variables (OVs) 

that mandatorily increase the floor of the guidelines minimum sentence range . . . .” (Emphasis 

in original.) Such a scheme “violates the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 373. Instead, “[a]ny fact 

that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury 

and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v United States, 570 US ___; 133 S Ct 2151, 

2155; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013). If such a violation occurs, “the case should be remanded to the 

trial court to determine whether that court would have imposed a materially different sentence 

but for the constitutional error” using a procedure known as a Crosby remand. Lockridge, 498 

Mich at 397. 

 In this case, the facts necessary to score OVs 4 and 19 were not found by a jury. The trial 

court assigned 10 points to OV 4. OV 4 governs “psychological injury to a victim.” MCL 

777.34(1). Ten points are assigned when there was “[s]erious psychological injury requiring 

professional treatment occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a). This issue was not submitted 

to or determined by the jury and Rentsch did not concede that the victim suffered such an injury. 

 

2

 We note that this Court affirmed the same score for OV 19 involving Rentsch’s other 

convictions on the basis of similar conduct. See People v Rentsch, unpublished opinion per 

curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 22, 2015 (Docket No. 321934). 
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The same is true of the evidence that the trial court relied on in scoring OV 19. When the 20 

points assigned to OV 4 and OV 19 are subtracted from the total score, the applicable sentencing 

category goes from F-III to F-II. MCL 777.62. Accordingly, Rentsch’s guideline minimum 

sentencing range, as a fourth habitual offender, goes from 135 to 450 months to 126 to 420 

months. MCL 777.62. As such, he is entitled to a Crosby remand. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 There were no errors warranting a new trial. However, because the trial court sentenced 

Rentsch using facts not found by a jury, we order a Crosby remand. 

 Affirmed in part, but remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause