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i 

82–461 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–46] 

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 

IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES: 

PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 28, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, June 28, 2013, Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges: Private Sector Perspectives .................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, June 28, 2013 .............................................................................................. 25 

FRIDAY, JUNE 28, 2013 

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES: 

PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities ...................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Atallah, Rudolph, Chief Executive Officer, White Mountain Research LLC ...... 2 

Cohn, Mark, Vice President, Engineering and Chief Technology Officer, 

Unisys Federal Systems ...................................................................................... 4 

Costa, Barry, Director, Technology Transfer, The MITRE Corporation ............. 5 

Jacobs, Scott E., President, New Century US ....................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Atallah, Rudolph ............................................................................................... 29 

Cohn, Mark ....................................................................................................... 41 

Costa, Barry ...................................................................................................... 50 

Jacobs, Scott E. ................................................................................................. 62 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 79 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 99 

(1) 

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE 

CHALLENGES: PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Friday, June 28, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. We are 

going to be interrupted by votes here shortly, so we are trying to 

make the best of a difficult situation. 

I will just say that it has been a continuing interest of this subcommittee on the lessons learned from irregular warfare and how 

we go forward. And so today’s hearing is an attempt to get a crosssection of private-sector opinion about that subject, and we very 

much appreciate the witnesses being here and, in advance, your 

patience in a rather constrained day. 

With that I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Langevin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here; thank the chairman for holding this hearing. In interest of time and brevity, in light of the fact that we will 

be pulling votes, I will submit my opening statement for the record, 

but again thank our witnesses for being here. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Let me turn it over to our witnesses: Mr. Rudy Atallah, Chief Executive Officer of White Mountain Research; Mr. Mark Cohn, Vice President, Engineering and 

Chief Technology Officer for Unisys Federal Systems; Barry Costa, 

Director, Technology Transfer, The MITRE Corporation; and Scott 

Jacobs, President of New Century US. Again thank you all for 

being here. 

We will turn it over to you, and, without objection, your entire 

written statement will be made part of the record, and we will turn 

it to you to summarize your statement, if you will. Mr. Atallah. 
2 

STATEMENT OF RUDOLPH ATALLAH, CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, WHITE MOUNTAIN RESEARCH LLC 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation. Let me just dive right in 

and outline a few of my thoughts. 

I’m going to start by discussing a few points on the challenges 

to irregular warfare as we see it from our side, from my company. 

The first challenge is understanding non-Western friends and foes. 

Perhaps the greatest challenge to IW [irregular warfare] observed 

since 9/11 attacks is our inability to accurately understand and 

therefore project how and why nonstate allies and adversaries, including those inspired by militant strands of political Islam, think, 

organize, and operate. 

Part of this problem set arises from our institutional tendencies 

towards mirror imaging; that is, thinking like professional soldiers, 

analysts, and policymakers rather than non-Western activists, bureaucrats, or militants, motivated as much by identity belief or cultural imperatives as they are by traditional notions and strategy. 

Challenge number two is our overreliance on technology. Despite 

recognition since 9/11 of the importance of sociocultural understanding, the reality of our approach to IW remains focused on zeroes and ones. We continue to rely increasingly on intelligence derived from technical sources and less on humans. Context derived 

from understanding and thinking like others takes a back seat to 

information. 

Beyond the monetary burden associated with overreliance on 

warfighting technologies, our ability to grasp and contend with 

complex sociocultural issues is gradually eroded. Our soldiers have 

grown accustomed to possessing enormous amounts of intelligence 

data at their fingertips that provide answers to almost every question arising within the operating environments. But whether the financial resources required to sustain this technology will be there 

in the coming lean years is unknown. 

SOF [special operations forces] units will have to return to more 

traditional modes of working as small units conducting operations 

by, with and through local military liaison forces and other local 

surrogates. Although advanced technologies will certainly play a 

role in these cases, these small units will succeed or fail based on 

their ability to analyze, fight, and navigate within the local 

environment. 

The third challenge is defining the political outcomes of IW. It 

is a well-known maxim that war is politics by other means. A clear 

understanding of our objectives and strategies in waging IW is essential, essentially given the primacy of influence and winning at 

war’s moral level. Further, the clear articulations of these objectives, basically our desired end state, to the American public is also 

key, given this necessity to generate support for the long-term operations and patience that characterize effective irregular warfare. 

Fourth, our fourth challenge is limited to SME [subject matter 

expertise] immersions. Another apparent challenge in combating irregular warfare is basically having a lack of reliable subject matter 

expertise in some regions of the world. Generating a meaningful 

understanding of a country or a region’s sociocultural issues requires years of immersion. 
3 

It has been our observation that when DOD [Department of Defense] reacts to a new issue, it often reaches out to academia for 

answers. However, it is often the case that academic advisors have 

limited understanding of ground-truth sociocultural context because their expertise is gleaned from desktop research or coupled 

with trips to a distant capital. Instead of turning to individuals 

who have spent meaningful time on the ground conducting field 

work and developing objective, qualitative perspectives on the challenges at hand, DOD too often invests in shallow and often biased 

expert opinions. The result is poor, often skewed understanding of 

both the problem set and the environment that is nevertheless 

translated into IW planning. 

Recommendations. First, we need to expand our human capabilities. As American warfighters, we will always have the ability to 

do something, but having good intelligence coupled with solid context allows to us do the right thing. 

Second, we need to couple an expanded HUMINT [human intelligence] capability with new methods of sociocultural training and 

alternative analysis programs that promote viewing the environment through the eyes of non-Westerners. 

Third, continued private-sector partnerships as well as—are essential for DOD. Businesses like White Mountain Research that 

work overseas have a great deal to offer as the market forces us 

to stay in tune with foreign political and sociocultural issues in 

order to compete. As we conduct our peer-to-peer research and keep 

pace with local politics in foreign countries, DOD can gain richly 

from our experience. 

Fourth, we must bear in mind everything has an economic limitation. Based on this, at the political level we should determine 

what we want our objectives to look like and define and calibrate 

appropriate IW resources to meet it. 

Fifth, the lack of continuity in DOD must be addressed. Most soldiers never exceed more than 2 to 3 years in an overseas assignment. This does not allow for sustained familiarity with the host 

country that is so crucial in IW. This is why programs like AFPAK 

[Afghanistan-Pakistan] Hands must be continued and expanded to 

other regions of the world. These programs can dovetail well with 

regional centers of excellence, like the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies or the George C. Marshall Center. 

Finally, I will conclude with that more effective and systemic 

screening procedures should be instituted for academic advisors. 

These should be vetted for not only their subject matter and knowledge, but also their objectivity. When advising on a far-flung place 

like Mali, Nigeria, extensive on-the-ground experience should also 

be a prerequisite before there are any people put in position to educate the warfighters. We have witnessed too many times the unfortunate consequences of unprepared or biased advisors hired to provide direction to crucial DOD initiatives. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Atallah can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohn. 
4 

STATEMENT OF MARK COHN, VICE PRESIDENT, ENGINEERING 

AND CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, UNISYS FEDERAL SYSTEMS 

Mr. COHN. Good morning. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Hit the button and get closer. 

Mr. COHN. Thank you very much. 

Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Langevin and other distinguished members of subcommittee. I am 

Mark Cohn, Chief Technology Officer for Unisys in our Federal 

Systems division. We thank you for inviting Unisys to participate 

in this hearing about lessons learned in irregular warfare challenges in today’s operating environments and how industry can 

contribute to enhancing our security. 

Around the world and here at home, Unisys is a leading provider 

of integrated security solutions, many of which incorporate advanced biometric and identity management technologies. For example, we delivered a national identity system for Angola with multiple biometrics that required mobile enrollment in the villages 

under austere conditions. It provides counterfeit-resistant proof of 

identity to a widely dispersed population, representing a cornerstone of citizenship in this emerging democracy as proof of their 

right to vote and for access to government services. 

Recently we delivered a system for Mexico that provides for storage of 110 million identity records, comprising fingerprints, iris 

scans, and facial images, with a capacity to accept 250,000 enrollments daily. 

To defend the Nation and defeat our adversaries engaged in irregular warfare, the Defense Department requires capabilities in 

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and 

stability operations. Success depends on separating enemy combatants from the civilian population or the innocent members of the 

civilian population. 

Biometrics can be used to record the identity of enemy combatants, to link individuals to events such as IED [improvised explosive device] explosions. So in irregular warfare, a primary U.S. objective is also to create a safe and secure environment for friendly 

populations and friendly military forces to mitigate disruptions to 

their daily lives. Providing that safe environment is complex as the 

enemy is generally well concealed within the population. 

Another challenge in irregular warfare is being able to distinguish loyal indigenous security forces from disloyal foes who can 

procure uniforms and equipment that allow them to blend with 

regular forces and conduct surprise attacks in installations or within government buildings. 

It is important to recognize there are limitations to the biometric 

systems and methods available to U.S. military forces in theater. 

Data capture generally requires close physical proximity to a subject who is usually uncooperative, and relies on equipment and a 

system architecture that reportedly fails at times to meet vital 

needs. 

Today’s tactical collection equipment employs custom-built integrated mobile kits that can be bulky and cumbersome, and there 

are problems with data synchronization. Industry can help by taking advantage of new mobile processing platforms derived from 
5 

consumer mobile devices extended with ruggedized biometric sensors, and by implementing interfaces in a unified architecture that 

streamlines uploads to the authoritative database so it can return 

match/no-match results to the operators quickly. 

It is essential that transmitted and stored identity information 

and biometrics stay coupled, because separation of the data undermines the system’s speed, accuracy, and ability to detect enemy 

combatants. 

The relative cost and performance of biometric systems has improved dramatically in the last 12 years. There is greater reliance 

on multiple biometrics that can interoperate between vendors. 

There are multiple examples of large-scale systems implemented 

rapidly at predictable cost because we used a framework of proven 

components. That enables us to deliver systems that are flexible, 

scalable, secure; to utilize multiple workflows and biometric modalities without complex custom software coding; and to be extensible 

through standards-compliant open interfaces. 

There has also been a great expansion in the diversity of use 

cases for biometrics. For example, in Canada we implemented a 

system for the Port of Halifax that uses vascular, that is vein pattern recognition, for access to the port’s 5,000 workers. We did the 

restricted area identity card that uses fingerprints and iris scans 

to secure Canada’s 28 major airports. 

In all regions of the world we see widespread consumer acceptance of biometrics. There is significant commercial interest in 

banking and other regulated industries because biometrics can simplify the user experience while increasing security when compared 

with passwords and PINs [personal identification number]. 

The Department of Defense today employs a user authentication 

approach that relies on a common access card and a PIN. This is 

highly secure, but can be impractical. A commercially available biometrics-driven alternative used today in the banking industry is 

more convenient, less expensive and time-consuming to administer, 

eliminates the problem of transport and lockout during PIN reset, 

and can address risks that the current CAC [common access card] 

and PIN model cannot, such as the impostor threat. 

So in conclusion, we believe the Department of Defense can expect these international and industry developments are in many 

cases applicable to the challenges confronted in irregular warfare, 

and we think they can help improve internal security and stability 

through U.S. and partner-country initiatives. Unisys looks forward 

to supporting that progress both here and overseas. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohn can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Costa, I think we have time to get your opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF BARRY COSTA, DIRECTOR, TECHNOLOGY 

TRANSFER, THE MITRE CORPORATION 

Mr. COSTA. Chairman, Mr. Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to speak about irregular warfare challenges, specifically in my case the value of 

sociocultural situational awareness and the technologies and data 
6 

that enable such awareness and support rapid and effective 

decisionmaking. 

What I will describe is 21st-century radar, technology that can 

provide us with rapid and effective insight into the changing 

human terrain for irregular warfare as well as other missions. Just 

like an airborne camera allows us a view of the physical terrain, 

and infrared lets us see into the night, there are now technologies 

that allow us a view of the human terrain to include populations, 

networks, groups, and behaviors. 

The Nation must adapt its methods and create tools that reflect 

the realities of national security in a new age of real-time global 

information flow, and we must understand and engage in the public dialogue created by these new communication media. As demonstrated by the swift changes brought about by the Arab Spring, 

we must rapidly sense, understand, and, if necessary, engage with 

words and deeds to positively shape the environment. 

While technology can’t replace deep human insight, we believe 

that empirically derived, scientifically grounded technologies can 

help us understand the human terrain. The defense community has 

built a science and technology foundation necessary for studying 

and understanding sociocultural behavior. Given that this technology foundation allows us insight into the human terrain, we are 

now better positioned to pursue effective courses of action in the 

full range of military operations. 

These new technologies are enablers for irregular warfare, allowing us to identify extremist networks, groups, and key influencers. 

Additionally, these technologies support our analysts and decisionmakers as they work to mitigate irregular warfare threats. 

Much remains to be done to evolve and adapt these sense-making capabilities to play a vital role in current and future missions. 

Recent rapid and profound shifts in the geopolitical context have 

brought renewed attention to challenges such as hostile nonstate 

actors who may be pursuing weapons of mass destruction, nationstate instability driven by drug economies and transnational criminal issues, humanitarian and disaster relief, and cyber threats. 

These technologies can give us some more nuanced insight into 

global challenges, but this is just the beginning, and continued research is likely to make significant additional progress. 

However, we must conduct such research with a keen eye toward 

quick and effective transitions to those warfighters, programs and 

organizations that need them. While there are many difficult challenges in this area, some of which will take years to solve, there 

are technologies and methods available today that can help us find 

key information within this deluge of data and understand the effectiveness of our words and actions upon those with whom we 

engage. 

Experience to date suggests an exciting future in which global information, applied research and analytics are fully and dynamically 

integrated; however, DOD and the Nation are not yet at that desired end state. To get closer, DOD should maintain the momentum created over the past several years by supporting promising 

research that will enable the capabilities most relevant to future 

national security demands. 
7 

Let me leave you with this thought: If DOD had ended its research investment in traditional radar technologies after just 5 

years, the program would have ended around 1939, leaving us with 

a rudimentary and tantalizing potential for long-range sensing. Social radar is at that tantalizing stage, and we can see the promise. 

Drones and satellites alone can’t detect violent speech or determine 

how our adversaries’ narrative is spreading. We need a global and 

persistent indications and warning capability. We call that social 

radar. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costa can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Jacobs, if you don’t mind, I think we will go ahead and take 

your opening statement. Now, there are still 356 Members who 

haven’t voted yet, so I think we will have time to do that, and then 

we will come back for questions. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT E. JACOBS, PRESIDENT, NEW CENTURY 

US 

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Langevin, members of the subcommittee. I thank you for your opportunity to appear before this panel today. And as a retired NCIS 

[Naval Criminal Investigative Service] special agent and a graduate of the Congressional Fellowship Program, I am acutely familiar with the leadership that this committee does every day, and it 

is that leadership that is vital to our Nation’s security. 

New Century US is a privately held firm that is the American 

subsidiary of the London-based New Century International. Currently our firm is executing a contract with the U.S. Government 

to provide training that supports the professionalization of the Afghan National Army, while New Century International continues 

to provide training and mentoring to the Afghan National Police 

and the Afghan National Army in support of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission in Afghanistan. In short, our 

programs and the collective experience of New Century personnel 

has positioned our firm as both the keen observer of irregular challenges worldwide and as a knowledgeable proponent of irregular 

solutions. 

At New Century we believe a focus on improving the capacity of 

the Afghan military and security forces and other host nation security forces is a wise, cost-effective and intelligent investment for 

supporting American foreign policy objectives because it offers a potential to build an effective leave-behind and self-sustaining indigenous security force after a large-scale U.S. military presence is reduced or becomes unavailable. 

With that in mind, our firm’s flagship program is called Legacy 

and was first implemented in western Iraq province of al Anbar in 

2008, and is currently being executed in Afghanistan. Aimed at improving the capability and capacity of the ANP [Afghan National 

Police] and ANA [Afghan National Army] forces, the current 

iteration of Legacy employs a specific doctrine and teaching methodology that is based on the experience of the British constabulary 

force, or Special Branch, in Northern Ireland during the conflict in 

the 1970s and 1980s. 
8 

The value added of New Century approach lies in the methodology, but also of the deep experience found within the ranks of the 

personnel that work for New Century. These are former Royal Ulster Constabulary police officers that have worked tirelessly in 

Northern Ireland to defeat and disrupt the networks that perpetrated the violence in Northern Ireland. 

Since irregular threats abroad and Federal budget pressures at 

home are almost certain to continue, we believe the indirect and irregular approach will become increasingly important in the days 

ahead. That is why our firm embraces and supports the all-important ‘‘by, with, and through’’ creed of the Special Operation Force 

community as it applies to achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

We view this indirect approach as practical and essential for 

working with foreign allies as well as for identifying and confronting irregular challenges around the globe, especially in environments requiring a limited counterinsurgency response or, as Admiral McRaven would say, a small footprint. Therefore, establishing carefully targeted assisted programs to develop and empower the local authorities of American allies would be wise. 

Just imagine America’s strategic position if we were able to establish indigenous-led counterterrorism COIN [counterinsurgency] 

programs in states that struggle to defeat irregular networks. 

Imagine, too, the improved security posture and greater moral authority of America if both the State Department and the Department of Defense would combine efforts and jointly offer assessments to potential partners and allies. 

Three lessons learned that I would like to talk today that we 

have learned in Afghanistan. One, Special Branch-like activities to 

ultimately succeed need the U.S. military. The U.S. military must 

provide daily support to overall COIN doctrine and strategy. They 

must train for it, they must develop doctrine for it, and this must 

be embedded in the very mindset of how we wage war. 

Effective COIN efforts take time. We learned in Northern Ireland 

that it took over 20 years to penetrate the criminal networks that 

promoted the violence in Northern Ireland. It takes time. 

And final observation is actually a concern and pertains to the 

point just made about doctrine, training, and budgeting. Despite 

significant gains in the field, notwithstanding the 2008 issuance of 

the DOD Directive 3000.07, the Department and each of the military services have remained somewhat listless with respect to this 

important subject. The 2008 directive assigned additional duties to 

SOLIC, the Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, for organizing lead roles defining, 

and guiding, and coordinating irregular warfare-related activities 

across DOD. Yet 5 years later we still do not see any tangible leadership on these issues anywhere in the Department. The 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance only lightly referenced the concept, and no true champion, no 

true champion has emerged for institutionalizing such lessons or 

for providing a sustainable budget. 

And I must point out—I know I am just about out of time, but 

this is a very critical point. General Stan McChrystal recently 

talked about it takes a network to defeat a network, going back to 

earlier comments of Mr. Atallah as well. And ironically this com-
9 

mittee echoed his comments back in the 2011 and 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Acts, an important point, where you praise 

the approach of the Legacy program in the committee report. And 

also the report noted special interest in the ‘‘attack of the network’’ 

approach. And you made two recommendations. Actually you directed the Secretary to provide you with two things: the applicability of Legacy program in other operations and regions where network-based threats are present, or where conditions are conducive 

to supporting these threats; and number two, very important point, 

options for an appropriate management structure within the Department to institutionalize and sustain the capabilities that Legacy and, I must emphasize, similar programs provide to the 

warfighter. 

And finally, in conclusion, we agree with both General 

McChrystal’s assessment and your wise words after toiling years in 

the field doing this kind of capacity building, but we need a more 

visionary and effective leadership in the United States Government, just as more international partners and allies are required. 

Our Nation cannot do it alone. It simply cannot. ‘‘By, with, and 

through’’ is an effective guiding principle for the United States in 

the years ahead. Our recommendation is for us to follow it. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacobs can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you all. Lots of interesting topics to follow up on. We will stand in recess while we vote, and they are estimating it will be about 45 minutes, so Pete will buy you all a cup 

of coffee in the back. 

Thanks, Pete. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. Thank 

you all again for your patience. I think Mr. Langevin had another 

meeting he was going to try to grab, and then will try to be back 

with us. 

Let me go back to, as I say, each of you made a number of interesting points. Mr. Atallah, you said in your testimony—or one of 

the points you made is there is an overreliance on technology, and 

yet we talk about human terrain radar, which I am not exactly 

sure what that is, but I presume there is a technological component 

of that. The kinds of things we hear about are monitoring social 

media, for example, and detecting trends and that sort of thing. 

So I guess I would appreciate thoughts from each of you about 

this, I guess, question: Are we too dependent on technology, and 

are we looking to technology to solve what may be nontechnological 

problems? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

question. I had to think long and hard about this, and, yes, we do 

rely heavily on technology, and I find it more with our younger 

generation that is actually entering the forces, they can’t function 

without their devices. 

I am an Africanist. I spend a lot of time on the continent. And 

although cell phone technology, for example, on the continent is 

growing pretty quickly, there are remote areas in Mali, Niger, different places where various ethnic groups are not relying—don’t 
10 

use technology. So how do we metric those individuals? How do we 

figure out what those individuals are doing? So we come back to 

we are looking for solutions on Facebook or Twitter just to see 

what these individuals are doing, and we miss the important part. 

I think what we need to do is focus more on the basics. 

HUMINT, I pushed for that. Sociocultural training is important. 

We do a little bit of it, but we don’t get into the depth that is required in order to understand. I was born and raised in Lebanon. 

When I understand a culture from its roots, and I speak the language, the last thing I want to do is go to technology to look for 

an answer. The first thing I want to do is to go to a human being 

that I know down the street that may have the answer. And that 

is where we are starting to miss the boat. We find ourselves today 

just sitting 7-, 8,000 miles away looking for an answer that is in 

front of us on a screen instead of having that granular HUMINT 

side that is important. 

Mr. COSTA. Sir, I agree that deep human insight is required, and 

I agree that people like Mr. Atallah can’t be replaced, but on the 

other hand, there are technologies that allow insight to him, to people like him, and to others, decisionmakers included, that can allow 

us to understand trends. Four billion, eight hundred million people 

have a cell phone right now, and most of the world will have a cell 

phone and be wired, wired so to speak, within the next decade. It 

is a lot of information that people are generating, that they are discussing on social media and in other forums, and that dialogue becomes increasingly important. 

It is not the only source. There are lots of other great data 

sources. There are lots of other great technologies and methods. 

But I would suggest that understanding this emerging dialogue 

and using these technologies to help foster understanding is critical. And there have been some great examples of successes doing 

that, but, again, it doesn’t supplant just deep human understanding that people like Mr. Atallah can provide. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. When you talk about human terrain radar, 

what sorts of things are you talking about? 

Mr. COSTA. A variety of technologies, sentiment analysis is one 

of them, emotion analysis is another one; technologies that model 

decisionmaking, others—technologies that even forecast instability. 

There is a system in use in the Department of Defense right now 

that forecasts long-term instability. So, as an example, will government X or will country X experience instability events in the next 

6 months? There is a system that does that right now. It is not perfect; however, it provides deep insight to analysts studying that 

country and allows them to dig deeper into issues of interest. So 

those are the sorts of technologies that I am referring to. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Cohn, if you all are putting in these ID 

[identification] cards in a variety of countries that don’t have 

maybe as much technology as we do, what are some of the challenges that you have run into in implementing those technologies? 

Mr. COHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an interesting subject 

that fascinates us in the industry. I could probably spend an hour 

talking about that, but I would like to keep it brief, though. 

There are a number of sociocultural issues that we encounter 

that are quite striking. In Malaysia, where we happen to do the na-
11 

tional ID, in that country they have religion that appears on the 

face of their ID card, which seemed like a pretty oddball concept 

to those of us. They happen to also have a default state religion 

that goes on there if you don’t claim one. It is a different world. 

In the Middle East, where we do a lot of work, and Malaysia is 

one of the countries where this arises also, there are cultural concerns regarding how we enroll biometrics because of personal privacy. If you have a fingerprint sensor, and you use both hands, 

there is a tremendous aversion regarding hygiene. Therefore iris is 

used, say, for the expellee database [National Expellees Tracking 

and Border Control System] from the United Arab Emirates because you can still take a sample with a veil. 

So we see a lot of variation, and in candor, without getting down 

in the weeds regarding this sort of cottage industry of biometrics, 

the way we see it, it has to be tuned to the country and its culture. 

But the Prime Minister of Malaysia said in 1995, this will be a way 

that we catapult our country into the 21st century. They saw it as 

a big part of modernizing their economy, that they could have more 

participation because biometric verification would then be an inexpensive, widespread social good. 

When Pay By Touch, a U.S. company, went into bankruptcy, 

Singapore banks could no longer use fingerprint verification for 

banking. Malaysian banks that used to thumbprint under MyKad, 

their national ID card, could continue to do banking security with 

biometrics. The banks there have a key to unlock the card, and you 

can put your equivalent of an ATM [automated teller machine] 

card onto the same card the government issues, and they have a 

local e-Purse application so you don’t have to carry cash when you 

go to their equivalent of a 7-Eleven. So in other words, this allows 

people to participate in a modern economy in a way that we don’t 

even think of in this country. And I could go on about some of the 

Latin American differences as well whenever you would like. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Jacobs, can you reflect on technology and 

how it has applied, and the challenges, I guess. You talked about 

training the Afghan National Army. I would presume in Afghanistan you run into some of those as well. 

Mr. JACOBS. Absolutely. 

I would first like to go back to the question you asked Mr. 

Atallah here. The purpose of the Legacy program is to penetrate 

a network, the criminal network, drug network, terrorist network. 

And then through that penetration how you do that is by developing sources, informants, and tasking informants to get information. And then based upon that information, you do something with 

it; you take action against that network to disrupt it. And a person 

can do that. 

You can ask a person for information. You can task him to do 

something. It is hard to task a technical device. And even though 

technical devices are added benefits, and can certainly help us in 

our endeavors, it is the human piece that, in my years of experience, have really been deemphasized in terms of our, you know, national strategy. It is more of a reliance on the technical piece, and 

the very human piece, the human interaction, the relationship development piece is what I believe has been shortchanged in the 

most recent history. But it is that human piece that allows us to 
12 

penetrate the networks that do these bad things that harm our 

country. So the challenge, and it is a challenge, is how do you take 

the good technology and apply it to the human piece, and that is 

a challenge. 

In terms of Afghanistan, I had just recently come back from Afghanistan, and I was talking to an Afghan Army general about 

GEOINT capability—geospatial intelligence—and what were their 

requirements for this capability. And he was a very practical general, he had he fought the Russians during the Russian incursion 

into their country, and he said, Scott, what I need is a good map. 

You know, I don’t need the GEOINT capability. You know, I need 

a good map, and then I need your help in training the map readers. 

And again, he focuses on the human piece, you know, an individual 

utilizing a map, and from that map you do your targeting, you do 

your operational planning. 

And I thought that was very insightful from an Afghan general 

that has the ability to get GEOINT, but he says, no, I can’t sustain 

it. There is not a legacy here. My people don’t understand how to 

work GEOINT because of my lack of education here. 

So you have to build systems at a level in which the host country 

can apply it. And that is the lesson that we have learned through 

Legacy and through other experiences that I have had in my 

career. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Switching topics, in your written and in your 

oral testimony, you talked about the importance of DOD, and 

State, Intelligence Community working together, that interagency 

cooperation. Can you offer your thoughts on where we are and if 

you have a suggestion on how that—what can be done to improve 

that moving ahead. And actually for any of you who would offer 

your insights based on your experience about how well the Federal 

Government works with itself, and how well the Federal Government takes advantage of the opportunities the private sector offers. 

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

The State Department and the Department of Defense have 

enormous resources, personal resources, training capabilities, but 

oftentimes there is—because of the lack of coordination between 

the different parts of the Government, and oftentimes the same 

purpose, we see an ability not to fully leverage those resources that 

both State and both DOD have. 

In many countries that I have been in, you don’t have an effective police force, and your military force is that police force, and so 

you have to use irregular techniques to train a military component. 

But the problem with the military is that the U.S. military is not 

a police capability; that resides in the State Department. And so 

that is where this cross-pollination could really be an effective tool 

to more accurately and appropriately teach police skill sets to the 

military component on the ground. 

So that is really what I mean about blending in certain environments that we find ourselves in today where that leverage would 

be a powerful U.S., you know, strategy to work together to get 

more done on the ground. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. 

Mr. COSTA. Chairman, within my domain we have found that 

technology itself can be a point of agreement. And we have used 
13 

one of the systems that was developed by the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Research and Engineering called the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System as a rallying mechanism to bring both 

the IC [Intelligence Community] and the State Department together, in a limited sense at least, around some technology that actually does help them forecast and understand data. That in itself 

has created a dialogue which is very, very productive. And in addition, using this allows them to more fully leverage private industry 

since some of this technology is commercialized, and they are 

bringing this to bear. 

So MITRE, as a nonprofit FFRDC [federally funded research and 

development center], is helping support this and bringing the world 

to bear in support of these problems. And technology is one way 

that we believe we can bring it together, and we are. 

Mr. COHN. Sir, we have seen actually what I would characterize 

as excellent cooperation in the areas that we get to observe. And 

perhaps I should explain that. Coming at this from the perspective 

of this identity management challenge, our biggest concern is how 

do we collect information about the largest group of the population 

in a cooperative way, because it is a lot cheaper and easier to get 

them to cooperate. So we want a national government or equivalent 

to create some kind of a use case where the citizens voluntarily 

benefit from participating, that allows us to kind of deal with the 

‘‘needles in haystack’’ problem. Those that comply, it is cheaper for 

us to have that data collected by a friendly government, so if whatever sensitivity they need to the local culture, the State Department, the community, and Defense Department all see the benefit 

of this, and the programs that we have, I believe, are cooperative 

in this space. 

Ultimately there is a shared interest with the ally abroad to 

share information that can be useful, denying movement to adversaries, be able to some degree even target the enemy. And it benefits us if we don’t have to do the work ourselves, using a Western 

perspective with our local footprint, but rather have them, in a 

sense, helping us, but by dealing with a lot of the data collection 

and even the analysis in many cases. 

But if I can return just to the general issue, you know, in terms 

of technology versus HUMINT, I don’t think that is really a choice 

we must make. We will all be living in a world where technology 

continues to flourish around us. If we fail to take advantage of mobile computing, of analytics that are available to both our adversaries and us, to cloud-based repositories that assemble more and 

more information together, then shame on us for failing to do that. 

On the other hand, that is not a substitute for people on the 

ground, and I don’t think it is really a choice that we make 

directly. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Very well. 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, with respect to everybody, I am not 

denying that technology doesn’t have its uses obviously, and I think 

everybody has said that. 

And in terms of your question on interagency cooperation, I think 

from my experience interagency cooperation is very good whenever 

we are focusing on something kinetic. We tend to come together 

and make solid decisions. 
14 

I think where the interagency still lacks is when it is nonkinetic. 

Decisions are often mired in disagreements, and the approach between the various organizations sometimes slows to a halt, and 

therefore it takes a long time to come up with a decision on a particular problem set. 

And I think if we can take best practices from how we come together in coordinating on a kinetic strike and apply them to nonkinetic issues, I think that is where we can see ourselves moving 

forward. 

I find this, again from an African perspective across the continent, I have seen this time and time again from my days in OSD 

[Office of the Secretary of Defense], and now as an outsider working on the corporate side trying to support certain agencies and 

looking at some of the key issues focused on CT [counterterrorism]. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to thank 

our panel of witnesses for being here today and for your testimony. 

Before I give my questions, I don’t know if he had been acknowledged already, but I know the subcommittee has had its jurisdiction expanded, adjusted over the last several years, but in another 

incarnation the former chairman of this subcommittee Mr. Saxton 

is in the audience, Jim Saxton. I just wanted to welcome you, Mr. 

Chairman. It is great to have you here. 

With that, if I could just turn to our witnesses. I am going to 

start with Mr. Cohn, but if others to like to chime in as well. You 

touched upon this in your testimony, but again, if you could speak 

more broadly about the capabilities that biometrics and defense 

forensics bring to an irregular warfare environment, and how useful are those capabilities in a more conventional fight? 

Mr. COHN. Thank you. I appreciate the question. 

We focus a lot of attention on identification technology with respect to live samples that we get from people that we encounter in 

real life. That tends to be the economic engine that drives us forward. DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] indexing happens to be one of 

the biometrics that isn’t normally used that way because you don’t 

get a rapid response. Today it is not available in real time. 

But DNA is a biometric. We have, in my company, done the algorithm development work and rehosting for CODIS [Combined DNA 

Index System] for the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and 

so we have some experience with that. We have designed some of 

the kinship analysis protocols, and that can play a big role when 

trying to sort out friend from foe even when you don’t have a sample from an individual. If tribal affiliation is a factor in someone’s 

loyalty, that is one of the things you can, in fact, tell from DNA. 

You also can do disaster victim identification, identifying remains 

based upon relatives, using kinship analysis. 

So biometrics has a broader set of use cases than just verification 

of identity for willing subjects. But ultimately most of the use cases 

that we think about commercially involve witting subjects who are 

cooperative. In warfare we are going to be in the opposite scenario 

for the most part. And there have been emerging technologies like 

three-dimensional face verification, which we can use at a distance 

exceeding 20 meters now to be able to identify with great accuracy 

and biometric precision almost at the level of iris recognition, 
15 

which means that we are dealing with accuracy at the level of tens 

of millions in terms of our discrimination ability. So we could have 

standoff distances, protect facilities that way. 

We also have something called two-and-a-half dimensional face, 

which may seem a little bit odd, where they can use a 2D [two-dimensional] facial gallery, compare it to unposed, uncontrolled poses 

in the crowd. We do it for soccer hooligan detection in Europe. We 

might as well do it at IED scenes, where we could capture passively images of people around, associate them with the images 

captured at other scenes to be able to build a model of whoever you 

encounter on a frequent basis. But those might be examples of biometrics, not civilian use, but where they might be used in—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The last, the facial recognition technology, the 

two-dimensional images, how quickly does that happen? How rapidly can you find a cross-check? 

Mr. COHN. Oh, the matching algorithms are fast enough so that 

you could determine if somebody is on a known, say watch list of 

a magnitude equivalent to our national watch list, in real time. In 

candor, it is not so much the elapsed time, it is the number of processors you have behind the scenes to be doing those checks in parallel against the known repository. So it may be that if we are talking about a tactical scene, that processing may be done by server 

cluster, if you will, not on board, say, the mobile vehicle where the 

cameras and sensors reside, if that makes sense. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Anybody else care to comment on biometrics? 

Mr. JACOBS. I would like to comment very briefly. I think when 

you use biometrics, you have to have really a good domain awareness, what is the technical capability on the ground of that population. And the reason for that is so you know what to use in terms 

of technology to get the kind of information that you need. I think 

that is an important point here. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

So for the panel, what partner-nation training capabilities are 

particularly suited in your views to be resident in DOD or in industry, particularly with regard to cybersecurity? 

Mr. COHN. Sir, I am probably the closest person to a cybersecurity person here on the panel, so I will thank you for the question 

because it is so important to our society and to our partner nations. 

DOD, through NSA [National Security Agency] and through the 

military network defense organizations that are companions with 

NSA, is unrivaled in their ability to perform a mission under adverse and hostile network conditions. Having said that, we are 

challenged in theater because of the networks and the diversity of 

circumstances. And I think that we are facing a generational challenge to overcome this. 

I appreciate the suggestion we should have DOD training our allies. The truth is that we have too many cases that we know of of 

foreign intelligence services likely having penetrated systems that 

we depend upon for security because they are owned and operated 

by our friendly host governments, and they may have been designed or built in a way that didn’t have first-rate security safeguards. We have seen cases where a national identity system or 

border control system was having backup tapes of the encounter 

data sent unencrypted overseas to another country. So it could eas-
16 

ily be penetrated and known, but if known, the tapes, in fact, could 

be altered. 

I don’t know if that is typical. That was some time ago. But there 

are a number of situations like that where basic cyber hygiene and 

practices that we think of as kind of midlevel protection, not esoteric against high-level threats, just the basics, will not be found 

overseas, and it is very important that we share that knowledge. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It is disappointing, but a good point to make. 

Anyone on that point? 

If I could then, just my final question to Mr. Costa, what do you 

see as the future of the Department’s human social, cultural and 

behavioral, or HSCB, monitoring capability after the drawdown of 

forces in Afghanistan? 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you for that question. 

I see them as broadly applicable to all the challenges that are 

facing the Department of Defense, you know, the Intelligence Community and perhaps even State Department. How do we have any 

sense of short-term instability? How do we predict the next Arab 

Spring? That is a great goal. We can’t predict the next Arab 

Spring, but how could we predict it? How could we get a sense of 

awareness of how opinion and behavior and sentiment around the 

world is changing so that leaders like you and decisionmakers can 

get a sense a priori of what might be changing? How can we understand how our U.S. messages, whether those are words or deeds, 

are being received around the world? How can we understand 

whether our stability actions in country X are having any effect or 

having our desired effect? 

I believe that the technologies associated with what we call this 

human sociocultural behavior domain have extremely broad applicability, and I have seen them applied to a variety of missions already—countering WMD, countering proliferation, in addition to irregular warfare. So I see the condition quite bright for the applicability of these technologies. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

With that I have no further questions. I will yield back and again 

thank the chairman for holding the hearing, but also to our witnesses for your testimony. Thank you for the work you are doing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Costa, is that sort of modeling more challenging in a tribal 

society or—— 

Mr. COSTA. Well, sir, it is always challenging. The modeling is 

always challenging. And frankly, the more granular you become, 

the smaller the group you try to model becomes, in some senses it 

gets more challenging to do it that way. Strategic modeling, while 

challenging, may be just modeling nation-state interaction. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yes, yes. 

Mr. COSTA. Incredibly complex. But now when we want to go 

subnationally and model competing groups, we have to have far 

more data and model to more precision. And in some cases it can 

be done, but yet the reusability of that model becomes a question. 

So nations don’t change quite that rapidly, but groups can. And so 

that sort of modeling gets quite complex. 
17 

So I think while this technology is very applicable to regular 

warfare, when we start to move toward subnational and national 

levels, it gets even more possible and even perhaps more effective. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Interesting. 

Let me, if I could, kind of broaden back out to the general topic 

that we are thinking about today, irregular warfare. My view is 

that we are going to have a lot more of this in various places all 

around the world. I think that is inevitable. And I take the point 

that at least some elements of DOD and other agencies kind of 

want to turn the page and go back to regular warfare. There is resistance to that. 

But I guess I would be interested from each of you as to what 

sort of capabilities should we look for DOD to retain in thinking 

about irregular warfare; what sorts of capabilities does it make 

more sense for DOD to engage the private sector to obtain; and 

talk about, at least based on your experience, that interaction of 

DOD choosing to engage the private sector and how well or how 

poorly that works. So kind of a broader question. Thinking about 

irregular warfare, what does DOD need to be able to do itself; what 

can it hire out; and that interaction between the two, oversight, if 

you will, procurement, where the two come together, how is that 

going, and how can it be made better? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

question. 

I guess I would start by saying in order to employ proper IW 

technologies, I think it is important to define where we want to go, 

what we want to do. And at times that is not very clear, and therefore it becomes difficult to figure out what type of technologies to 

use. 

So if we take issues like Libya, or Syria today, or Mali, or whatever is going on, first and foremost we have to define what we want 

the warfighter to achieve at the end, and that is a political process, 

I think, that would just—at that in terms—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I don’t want to interrupt. So you have got to 

know what your goal is before you can decide what the capability 

is that you need to have or to procure? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Or to procure or invest in. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. That has got to be country or case-by-case 

basis? 

Mr. ATALLAH. And so it just depends on what the long-term 

goals, where our focus is going to be for the up—for the near future. I guess it just boils down to having an end goal in order to— 

because as I view it, if we are talking about a resource-constrained 

environment, and we have a shrinking budget, we have to use our 

resources in an effective way, and therefore we have to pick what 

we actually invest in. 

Technology is great, but I am a former aviator by trade, so we 

invest in large-ticket items that cost billions of dollars when we can 

employ less amount of money in technologies that can give us more 

bang for the buck depending upon where we are going. So that 

would be one. 

I think I mentioned in my testimony when I talk about AFPAK 

Hands, that is a great program that can be employed, for example, 

with our regional centers in making our warfighters smarter on 
18 

particular regional areas of the world with longevity; meaning that, 

you know, when we cycle our soldiers out on the battlefield, typically they will have 2 or 3 years in country, and they push out, and 

then a new person has to relearn the new. But when we have longevity in a particular environment, we become smarter, and therefore we know what technologies to employ based on that environment that we have been living in or operating in for long periods 

of time. I think that would be the case that I would make. 

And so there is no silver bullet for this question, but, you know, 

the key is defining truly where we want to go in the future. And 

I would leave it at that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I will just comment. I think you are right. 

Resource-constrained environment, and yet we need to invest 

ahead of time in the people to have the cultural-social, language capabilities for those places, and that is going to be hard in a resource environment. But your point about the importance of that, 

the irreplaceability of that when you get into a situation strikes a 

cord with me, but I think there is going to be that tension. I think 

you are right about that. 

Mr. ATALLAH. Yes, sir. I mean, obviously, again, there is no perfect answer. The enemy is evolving all the time, our issues are 

evolving all the time. So I think when we go back to basics, and 

this is probably the point that I am trying to drive home in what 

I am saying today, is the sociocultural aspect, I think, in everything is extremely important in order to drive where we resource 

our technologies to be effective in particular problem sets around 

the world. When I understand the environment, say, for instance, 

in Lebanon and Syria, and I have spent enough time studying it, 

I will know what technologies to employ in that particular environment to achieve the end results of what our political process is asking me to do. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. COHN. Mr. Chairman, I want to be careful how I respond to 

that. I would like to start, if you don’t mind, just by talking for a 

moment about what it is that I do for a living. My job is to look 

at commercial technologies and try to figure out where they are 

cost-effective and applicable to our Government’s missions; and 

likewise, to look at the Government’s developed technologies that 

we are familiar with to see whether they are cost-effective and of 

value in the private sector. Because my company, three-quarters of 

our customers are outside the U.S. Federal Government, and that 

is how we bring value. So we spend a lot of time trying to look at 

technologies like what I mentioned in my statement earlier regarding personal authentication. 

But I would suggest that perfect is the enemy of good, in austere 

budgets we can’t afford to have ambitious, unrealistic stretch objectives driving the way that we build systems and we specify them. 

I don’t think we can afford to have shortfalls and capability where 

they are vital, but I think it is a very difficult trade-off. And I think 

we can learn a bit from our commercial programs where there are 

capabilities that might be good enough and have defense-grade security capabilities built in even if they don’t necessarily meet the 

full list of desired functionality. That may be the best we can afford 
19 

in some cases, because the alternative may be providing no capability whatsoever. 

And with respect to our current Defense Department and how it 

handles information technology, I think there is a lot of progress 

to look at commercial platforms to see how they can apply. The latest Army NIE [Network Integration Evaluation], the integration 

evaluation, used a commercial smartphone from Samsung as the 

display unit for maps tied to the Rifleman Radio. That, I think, is 

an example of what we have no choice of what to do because we 

can’t afford to build ruggedized, military-grade devices that cost 10 

times or 100 times as much. 

I think the same thing is going to be applied more and more 

across the spectrum. And my guess is that we will end up with bigger bang for our buck, if you will, but we may also find cases where 

we have to still deal with specialized development of a custom solution because the military does have unique needs, and balancing 

that will become the issue. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So you see the trend, because of tight budgets, 

among other reasons, to using more commercially available technology and making it fit, I guess the ‘‘good enough,’’ particularly 

when we are trying to build partnership capacity. 

Mr. COHN. Sir, it is not just because of tight budgets; it is also 

because of the accelerated pace of change. If you stuck with custom 

platforms like we used to build to put down the hatches of the nuclear submarines, you would have computers like on the Apollo 

capsule. If you use commodity IT servers that are coming out that 

can be configured with virtualization of the cloud, they are so much 

cheaper, but they are less reliable. If we cluster them together, 

they work fine. 

I think it is also the fact that we want to harness that innovation 

in the private sector, but we can’t do it unless we accept the commercial platforms are modified. 

Mr. COSTA. Sir, I would actually start by addressing a point that 

my colleague to the right just made. I believe that absolutely there 

is much commercial technology that the Department of Defense 

and the Federal Government can leverage in the domain that I am 

speaking to you, in this human terrain domain. There is much 

technology that can be leveraged, and that is being done. However, 

there are certainly things that aren’t be done by commercial industry, and that has to be done by DOD research. But yet that DOD 

research needs to transition to the warfighter to programs of record 

and perhaps back to commercial industry, because that way we 

both stimulate the economy, and we get that technology into commercial solutions that are then available for the broader Government to bear under challenges. 

So I believe that it is both; that we have to leverage commercial 

technology, but yet the results of DOD research can, in fact, go 

back into that and stimulate the economy and bring value to the 

warfighter. But I believe there are low-cost technologies that allow 

us to understand violent extremists, their networks, their groups, 

and the spread of their messages, and that is key to irregular warfare. And people on this panel that conduct such analysis can use 

tools like this to achieve that understanding, at least at some level, 

while they conduct their deeper understanding. 
20 

We also have some technologies that allow us to understand the 

effects of our messages, and they are still in their infancy. I am not 

overpromising that any of these technologies are a magic or silver 

bullet, but they allow us to understand some of the effects. And we 

are pushing beyond just correlation; we are pushing towards causation: We said the following, and, based on that, this happened, and 

that was because of our actions. We are pushing toward that. That 

is a promise, but not yet here. 

In addition, we have technologies that allow us to do course-ofaction analysis. So if we do X, then Y, we expect the best result 

to happen. So that also has pertinence to irregular warfare. 

So I think with that there are clear things that DOD and the private sector can do. DOD has a clear mission to conduct this irregular warfare. Contractors, companies can help with that in engaging. However, in my domain we can help deeply in helping technology and bringing that to bear on this mission. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And how effective is DOD at figuring out what 

it needs to invest in itself versus let the private sector do? 

Mr. COSTA. Well, personally I have spent a lot of time with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering staff 

on the human sociocultural behavior program, and we monitor the 

commercial environment and work closely with them, so we never 

willingly, knowingly build something that we could buy. We keep 

close track of where commercial industry is. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So you think at least in that area it is working 

pretty well. Keep track of what the commercial sector is doing so 

you don’t duplicate, and then at the same time figure out the key 

areas where DOD dollars need to be invested. 

Mr. COSTA. Absolutely. I believe that we have done a good job in 

this area. In fact, in this area we are transitioning some of these 

technologies to commercial companies to, again, close that loop and 

make those more broadly available. So I do think this is a success 

story. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I am not sure that is the case in all areas, but 

I am glad to hear success stories when I can find them. 

Mr. Jacobs. 

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you again. 

Contractors should not collect information. Contractors should 

not be tasking individuals to collect information. That is an 

inherently governmental function to collect human intelligence 

information. 

Contractors, on the other hand, can mentor, train, and advise 

very effectively, and, through observations on the ground, one of 

the key capabilities of the contractor community is sustainment. 

The military has an unbelievable rotation cycle, the OPTEMPO 

[operational tempo] is just an incredible, difficult thing for our military commanders to manage. They come to Afghanistan for a year 

and leave. Contractors, on the other hand, have been—I mean from 

my experience have been on the ground for years in Afghanistan 

doing the mentoring and training, and developing those key relationships that are required to do this kind of work. 

So that is a differentiator between a contractor sustainment over 

a period of time versus the military. 
21 

The other item that I would like to point out to is that the Congress has invested heavily in the past 10 years, since 9/11, in a lot 

of technologies. Lots and lots of good things have come from that 

investment. But what my observations have been over time is that 

we don’t institutionalize the success stories, the things that really 

work, the technologies that really work. And we need to have some 

resource, some font where that is captured and not lost, and the 

investment that has been made, hundreds and millions of dollars, 

will not be lost to the future battles that we will find ourselves in. 

We all agree that there are many unsettled states out there, and 

the technologies that we talk about here will be required. And we 

know from industry, really through independent assessments and 

some other tools that we have employed based upon Congress’ 

tasking of those things, we know they work. So we need to capture 

those things. I don’t want that to be lost here today. And—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Capture how? 

Mr. JACOBS. We need to capture it in doctrine, in strategy. We 

need to capture it in schoolhouses by which we teach our leaders; 

in which we teach, train, and equip our soldiers; we train and 

equip our State Department foreign specialists, our police advisors. 

We need to capture these lessons learned, we really do, and it 

needs to be written down, or it will be lost. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here. I know you all contribute in many different ways, many 

times in your own specific esoteric way, to strengthen the national 

security of this Nation, and I truly appreciate it. 

I am going go ahead and just do a shout-out here. Former Congressman Saxton is in the room here, too. He was here when I 

came into Congress 11 years ago. And that doesn’t mean he is old; 

that just means he was here. But always grateful to see him. 

Mr. Jacobs, if I could, I would like to direct my question to you, 

sir. Can you share some of the metrics that highlight the successful 

implementation of these human intel-based programs? You know, 

I just think that obviously all of us knows the real, best intelligence is boots-on-the-ground, human intelligence, and I would like 

to get sort of these metrics or the results of some of your human 

intelligence programs. I mean, how many lives do you think you 

and your team have been able to actually save, and has that been 

as a direct result of their sort of unique role in the human terrain? 

I will follow up if I need to, but it gives you sort of a flavor. 

Mr. JACOBS. Sure. Thank you for the question. 

There have been great capacity built in the last 4 years on the 

part of the security forces in Afghanistan both on the police side 

and on the army side. The results of that mentoring and training 

has resulted in hundreds of insurgents being captured or killed. I 

think, you know, probably my last count, over 600 insurgents have 

been captured or killed. The weapons of insurgency have been 

taken out of production, in terms of kilograms of the chemicals that 

are used to hurt and harm and kill our soldiers and marines. 

But the more tangential, the more direct is to see the incredible 

capacity that has been started years ago from a zero now probably 

to, out of 10, a level five, a level six in terms of their ability to col-
22 

lect information, analyze that information, target and take down 

the bad guy. 

I was in Afghanistan again several weeks ago. There was an attack at the airport. Three years ago that SWAT [Special Weapons 

and Tactics] capability by the police would have taken days to resolve. This was done in about 4 to 5 hours. They came, they identified, they secured the perimeter to protect the public, and killed 

the bad guys. Pretty impressive. Pretty impressive. That is 

progress. That really is tangential progress on the ground. 

And so I don’t want to get into a lot of specifics, but one of the 

beauties that I think every successful program needs to have an 

independent analysis by a third party to look at it and to kick the 

tires. It is very important. And the RAND Corporation has done 

that on our Legacy program, funded by the United States Congress, to look at whether or not this truly is a unique capability 

that we should have. And the studies have begun in 2008, and they 

go on to this day. Legacy is probably one of the most unique programs that have been countless studied by RAND, and without a 

doubt they show clearly that these kinds of programs work, and 

that we should have this capability in our arsenal, in our toolbox 

of irregular warfare. 

The other thing that the RAND Corporation has talked about is 

the measures of effectiveness that we go into, and we measure— 

we have 500 data points, and I am not going to get into all the details of that, but those data points measure—are quantifiable and 

measurable to the outcomes of the program. And it ensures that 

the taxpayers are getting their money’s worth, that this program 

actually works. And that is why we do what we do. 

So I know I have been rambling a little bit and covered a lot of 

things, but—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, if you would afford me just one last 

followup here, because I have been listening very carefully to what 

you are saying, and I am wondering if you might have—because I 

know it is impossible to get into some of the minutiae, but if you 

might have some sort of compilation of some of the things that we 

are talking about here today, and, as you know, especially that you 

could give us to that would have an impact not only to the members of this committee, but to the larger membership of the Armed 

Services Committee. 

And as we move forward, it seems especially important with this 

transition period in Afghanistan where combat operations will soon 

draw to a close, would you say programs like this will increase or 

decrease in importance? And what are some of the hardware tools 

that best suit operators who are trying to build intelligence capacity in this environment? You know, it especially seems like a relevant question given that some of the majority of our Afghan partners are still using technology like flip cell phones. 

Mr. JACOBS. That is right. That is right. 

Mr. FRANKS. I would love to get some sort of written overview 

of this, because if this is saving lives, and you are saying—your testimony is that this is saving lives—— 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. JACOBS. It is saving lives. 
23 

Mr. FRANKS [continuing]. Of American and coalition lives. 

Mr. JACOBS. Yes, yes. 

One thing I would caution. A lot of things get caught up in 

drawdowns, you know, and we need to be very careful not to cut 

the ability to build capacity by our allies. And my concern is that 

in the rush we don’t leave a true capacity on the part of our Afghan 

partners to penetrate networks. And that needs to be sustained, 

mentored, and continued to be nurtured on the part of the United 

States of America. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Atallah, we have got security challenges 

all across Africa. Would you foresee that it would make sense for 

the Government to hire companies to help build capacity, improve 

security forces in some of the various countries you are familiar 

with? 

Mr. ATALLAH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

question. 

Certainly companies can provide capabilities, absolutely. I think 

these companies need to be carefully selected. I think we need to 

also carefully select what we employ, because as we make certain 

countries more capable, we also—at the same time the enemy becomes more capable in time, adjusting to, you know, what the realities are on the ground. And so we got to define that and figure out 

what we are trying to achieve; again going back to my earlier statement is what is our end game? Once we define that, we can obviously employ—there are places across the Sahel; of course, in Somalia now, we are looking at tensions between, you know, the two 

Sudans, and Egypt and Ethiopia. These are going to continue to 

fester. And there are certainly places with our small companies like 

we see here, or mine, where we can bring in some of that; we can 

bridge the gap between usage of proper, well-fitted technologies 

into specific cultures to achieve the end means that we are aiming 

for. 

And I always go back to the problem is not what we are capable; 

we can do a lot of stuff. The thing is, are we doing the right things? 

That is the question is what does right look like at the end? And 

I think that is important to actually answer. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Great. 

Well, thank you all. I appreciate it. I think this is going to be 

a topic that occupies us a lot in the years to come, and each of you 

have helped enlighten me at least on how to move forward. So 

again, thank you for being here, thank you for your testimony, and 

thank you for your patience on our interruption. With that the 

hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 28, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 28, 2013 

(29) 

white mountain research 

Prepared Statement of 

Rudolph Atallah (Lt Col USAF, ret.) 

Chief Executive Officer 

White Mountain Research 

and 

Senior Fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, 

Atlantic Council 

And 

Jeffrey B. Cozzens 

President 

White Mountain Research 

and 

Fellow, Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, 

George Mason University 

Before the 

(!;ludell ~tates j!)onse of !\rprrseutatiurs 

QI:ommitter 011 ;ctrmeb $i&rrbirrs 

~ulJtOmmittH on 1II1tl'lficrr!lCI', ICUH'l"gllll.\ cr::l)rriits ilnl:r Q.:ilpillJthtirs 

On 

"Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges: 

Introduction 

Private Sector Perspectives" 

Friday, 28 June 2013 

10:00 a.m. 

Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2118 

Washington, D.C. 

Mr. Chairman and Honorable Members of the Subcommittee: 
30 

Rudolph Atallah & jeffrey Cozzens Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Past, Present, and Future Irreg\.Jlar Warfare Challenges:' 

28 June 2013 

www.wmrgrp.com 

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today on the irregular warfare 

challenges that my colleague, Jeffrey Cozzens, and I have observed since 2001. My 

testimony focuses on framing some ofprincipallW challenges that have crystallized 

since 200l-problems that will continue to demand persistence, unconventional 

thinking and the full commitment of our defense and intelligence communities to 

address. I will close with some thoughts concerning the maintenance and 

improvement of our national IW proficiencies as we seek to meet future challenges. 

Our written response to the Committee's queries and my testimony today is rooted 

in my experience as an Africanist and former special operations and OSD policy 

professional, and Mr. Cozzens' background as a terrorism researcher and alternative 

assessments specialist. We have both been involved with the conceptualization and 

planning of IW activities in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, and continue to 

advise the US Government on matters of cultural intelligence, counter-terrorism and 

other activities germane to IW through our small business, White Mountain 

Research. 

About White Mountain Research LLC 

White Mountain Research (WMR) is a Virginia-based small business providing 

tailored international security solutions to U.S. Government and commercial clients. 

Jeffrey Cozzens and I lead WMR, supported by an international contingent of former 

special operations professionals, terrorism subject matter experts and some of the 

world's foremost Africa analysts. We deliver maximum value to our clients by 

fusing practical operational know-how, creative approaches to cultural and human 

intelligence and global interdisciplinary academic expertise. 

Before I begin, let me say that we recognize that technology plays an important role 

in IW; however, we believe it is subordinate in importance to IW's human ways and 

means. My testimony therefore highlights the imperative of understanding the 

humanity, thought and behavior of our non-Western allies and adversaries while 

emphasizing the centrality of human intelligence (HUMINT) in IW. Eroding 

irregular adversaries' ideological and social centers of gravity and wielding the 

influence required to win at war's moral level-critical in an age where social media 

turns tactical missteps into strategic conundrums-can only be achieved through 

the access, dexterity and context afforded by properly equipped warriors and 

analysts. Technology, while it can assist in this process, cannot take their place. 

Definitions 

For our purposes, irregular warfare (IW) can be defined as warfare that involves 

one or more irregular forces-especially non-state actors-and favors asymmetric 

and indirect approaches designed to win legitimacy and influence while eroding an 

adversary's. Some of the more common contemporary manifestations of IW include 

terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT), forms of transnational criminality, 

insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN), foreign internal defense (FID) and so 

forth. 

2 
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Rudolph Atallah & Jeffrey Cozzens Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Past, Present, and Future Irregular 'Warfare Challenges," 

28 June 2013 

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IW challenges and lessons-learned since 2001 

Allow me to outline some of the challenges and lessons-learned of the past 12 years 

that we find most striking: 

Challenge 1; Understanding non-Western friends and foes 

Perhaps the greatest challenge to IW observed since the 9/11 attacks is our inability 

to accurately understand and therefore project how and why non-state allies and 

adversaries-including those inspired by militant strands of political Islam-think, 

organize and operate. Part of this problem set arises from of our institutional 

tendency towards mirror-imaging-that is, thinking like professional soldiers, 

analysts and policy-makers rather than non-Western activists, bureaucrats or 

militants, motivated as much by identity, belief or cultural imperatives as they are 

by traditional notions of strategy. Our struggles in this respect are related to or 

have birthed a subset of challenges, each of which deserves more attention than this 

paper can afford. These include: 

• The obvious but monumental complexities associated with combatting 

virulent ideologies that are associated with a major monotheistic religion or 

are an offshoot of a legitimate social movement.! Challenging extremist 

ideologies across changing national boundaries, socio-cultural contexts and 

legal environments naturally adds to the density and scope of the problem. 

• Consistently and accurately understanding adversaries'-or for that matter, 

partner states' or tribes'-victory metrics 2, negotiating strategies and 

decision-making. 

• Turning allies into enemies because our planning has, in some instances, not 

thoroughly and accurately accounted for the strategic impact of tactical 

errors that have offended codes of faith, honor and dignity. Globalized 

technologies like social media instantaneously amplity these errors and feed 

the recruitment narratives of irregular foes, which thrive like parasites on 

perceived victimization and perceptions of American hypocrisy. 

Challenge 2: Overreliance on technology 

Despite recognition since 9/11 of the importance of socio-cultural 

understanding, the reality of our approach to IW remains focused on 'zeroes' 

and 'ones'; we continue to rely increasingly on intelligence derived from technical 

sources and less on HUMINT. Context derived from understanding and thinking like 

'others' takes a backseat to information. Beyond the monetary burden associated 

with overreliance on war-fighting technologies, our ability to grasp and contend 

with complex socio-cultural issues is gradually eroded. The cost beyond billions of 

dollars is misunderstanding (or missing altogether) important underlying factors of 

conflict, potential alliances and opportunities to pursue long-term, effective direct 

1 See Jeffrey B. Cozzens, "The Culture of Global Jihad: Character, Future Challenges and 

Recommendations," Future Actions Series, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, King's 

College London (April 2009). 

2 Jeffrey B. Cozzens, "Victory-From the Prism ofJihadi Culture," Joint Force Quarterly (January 

2009). 

3 
32 

Rudolph Atallah & Jeffrey Cozzens Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Past, Present, and future Irregular Warfare Challenges." 

28 June 2013 

www.wmrgrp.com 

and indirect solutions to irregular challenges. The role of the MNLA in Mali is, in our 

view, a case in point} 

Further, since the first Gulf War, we have developed high-tech solutions that lend 

warfighters the ability to quickly tlnd, fix and finish enemy targets. Our soldiers 

have grown accustomed to possessing enormous amounts of intelligence data at 

their fingertips that provide answers to almost every question arising within the 

operating environment. But whether the financial resources required to sustain this 

technology will be there in the coming lean years is unknown. If the economists are 

correct, SOF units will have to return to more traditional modes of working as small 

units conducting operations "by, with and through" local military liaison forces and 

other local surrogates and, in extremis, as independent units working from 

commander's intent with little support from either US or friendly local forces. 

Although advanced technologies will certainly playa role in these cases, these small 

units will succeed or fail based on their ability to analyze, fight and navigate within 

the local environment. Their ability to understand cultural context is essential to 

finding victory in such limited operations. The question is whether we are doing 

enough institutionally to prepare them. 

Challenge 3: Defining the political outcomes ofIW 

It is a well-known maxim that war is 'politics by other means'. Agreeing here with 

Clausewitz, a clear understanding of our objectives and strategies in waging IW is 

essential, especially given the primacy of influence and winning at war's moral level. 

Further, the clear articulation of these objectives-basically, our desired 'endstate'-to the American public is also key, given the necessity to generate 

Americans' support for the long-term operations and patience that characterize 

effective irregular warfare. Without a clear articulation of our desired ends, how 

can we measure effective means? We do not believe that this question has been 

asked enough in the halls of the Pentagon since 2001. Irregular warfare has often 

appeared as an end in itself. 

Challenge 4: Limited SME immersion 

Another apparent challenge in combatting irregular and geographically dispersed 

threats is a lack of reliable subject matter expertise. Generating a meaningful 

understanding of a country or region's socio-cultural issues requires years of 

immersion. It has been our obsenration that, when DoD reacts to a new issue, it 

often reaches out to academia for answers. However, it is often the case that 

academic advisors have limited understanding of ground-truth socio-cultural 

context because their 'expertise' is gleaned from desktop research or a couple trips 

to a distant capital. Instead of turning to individuals who have spent meaningful 

time on the ground conducting fieldwork and developing objective qualitative 

3 Rudolph Atallah, testimony on security in the Sahel and West Africa before the US House of 

Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs (21 May 2013), at: 

http://does.house.gov Imeetings IFA/FA 16/20130521/10Q886!1l11RG·113-FA16· Wstate·AtalJahR· 

2013052Lpdf 

4 
33 

Rudolph Atallah & Jeffrey COlzens- Prepared Statement at HearIng on "Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges," 

28 June 2013 

www.wmrgr2.com 

perspectives on the challenges at hand, DoD too often invests in shallow and often 

biased 'expert' opinions. The result is a poor, often skewed understanding of both 

the problem-set and the environment that is nevertheless translated into IW 

planning. 

Of course, another principal secondary challenge within the problem of expertise is 

one of scope and timeliness-scope because IW problem-sets evolve and disperse 

so quickly, and time because the bureaucratic and vetting mechanisms required to 

find and place credentialed experts (or develop them from within DoD) produce 

huge opportunity costs. Again we turn to the crisis in Mali for an example. 

Challenge 5: Negating the advantages of suicide operations 

Suicide tactics-whether through an improvised explosives device, a small unit like 

the Mumbai attackers, or an individual gunmen-and the innovation and 

commitment that drives their effectiveness are some of the primary operational 

challenges of our age. In crafting effective IW, negating the operational, cultural, and 

even spiritual advantages of suicide bombing must remain a consideration, as this 

method will continue to remain a preferred weapon of mass effect for irregular 

combatants. 

Many of the advantages of suicide bombing operations are well know, but merit 

listing here to showcase the human element: 

• The function of the suicide bomber as a 'smart bomb', who operates fleXibly 

at both a strategic and tactical level to hit targets of mass effect 

commensurate with the 'intent' of his movement or commander. 

• The demonstrative element of suicide bombing, enflamed by the prominent 

media (and social media) coverage it receives, aiding not only in publicizing a 

terrorist's cause but also in 'striking fear'-a primary objective. 

• The ability of suicide operatives to dismiss the traditional pillars of Western 

Cold War strategiC theory: deterrence, pre-emption and early warning. 

• The attractiveness of martyrdom as a reward for the operative and his/her 

cause, whether politically, social and/or religious in nature, which compels 

the operative( s) to complete their mission; 

• The attractiveness of the act as an end in itself for some militants. 

• The fact that suicide operatives waste little time deliberating about how to 

evade authorities after an attack or face interrogators; and 

• The low cost and technical simplicity of most suicide IEDs and operations. 

Challenge 6: Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 

Finally-and related to the above point on suicide tactics-is the challenge posed by 

lEDs and their continued use and improvement. From Afghanistan, to Iraq, to 

Boston, the lED remains a weapon of choice for the weak owing to its simplicity to 

construct, its globalized and highly replicable nature and its potential to generate 

surprise, mass casualties and strategic impact. Terrorists and insurgents are 

continually upgrading or even simplifying their designs in a bid to overcome our 

5 
34 

Rudolph Atallah & Jeffrey Cozzens Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges," 

28 June 2013 

www.wmrerp (om 

sophisticated and costly defenses. They still too often succeed. While a host of 000 

entities have made tremendous progress in lED detection, defeat and various other 

counter-measures, the threat persists and will continue into the foreseeable future. 

Recommendations 

The last 12 years have been defined by an evolving spectrum of irregular threats 

and asymmetric methods. Much of our global contest with movements like al-Qaeda 

and its transnational contemporaries have been waged in unfamiliar and highcontext areas that test not only our financial wherewithal but also our human 

capital. In agreement with most on this panel, we believe this pattern will continue. 

On this point, we offer several parting thoughts for improvement as we look to the 

next 12 years of IW: 

First, we need to expand our HUMINT capabilities. As American war-fighters, 

we will always have the ability to do 'something', but having good intelligence 

coupled with solid context allows us to do the right thing. 

Second, we need to couple an expanded HUMINT capability with new methods of 

socio-cultural training and alternative analysis programs that promote viewing the 

environment through the eyes of non-Westerners. Years ago, the Air Force began a 

new career path for its officers in which they were required to focus on a region 

with an aim to learn the culture and an associated language. The goal was to groom 

officers with socio-cultural skills and knowledge so they can become more effective 

diplomat-warriors in the future. This program exemplified the forward thinking 

that needs to be encouraged as we prepare for future [W. The Marine Corps and 

Army have offered many similar programs, although some like the Army Directed 

Studies Office have, unfortunately, fallen by the wayside just when they are needed 

most. 

Third, continued private sector partnerships are essential for 000. Businesses 

like White Mountain Research that work overseas have a great deal to offer, as 

the market forces us to stay in-tune with foreign political and socio-cultural 

issues in order to compete. As we conduct our peer-to-peer research and keep 

pace with local polities in foreign countries, DoD can gain richly from our 

experiences. 

Fourth, interagency best practices for planning kinetic operations should also be 

used in non-kinetic planning. We know how to work together to identify and pursue 

targets. However, we do not typically follow the same principles and patterns when 

dealing with non-kinetic challenges. 

Fifth, we must bear in mind that everything has an economic limitation. Based on 

this, at the political level, we should determine what we want our objectives to look 

like and define and calibrate appropriate IW resources to meet it At the grand 

6 
35 

Rudolph Atallah & Jeffrey Cozzens Prepared Statement at Hearing on "Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges:' 

28 June 2013 

www.wmrgrp.com 

strategic level, we must also recall that national culture is a powerful instrument 

that could be leveraged more effectively than it has, 

Sixth, IEDs have been around from the inception of gunpowder. We should keep 

organizations like jEIDDO open because this problem will never go away, The 

Boston bombing is a case in point Our ability to minimize, defeat, prevent lED 

attacks is an important part of our IW capability. 

Seventh, the lack of continuity in 000 must be addressed. Most soldiers never 

exceed more than two or three years in an overseas country assignment. 

Unfortunately, with each rotation, their replacement has to learn local issues from 

the start, even when the institutional knowledge is there. This does not allow for 

the sustained familiarity with the host country that is so crucial in IW. To be more 

effective, 000 should allow a soldier to focus on a region (a group of countries 

sharing a common border) for a minimum of five years and include a yearlong 

overlap with the inbound soldier. This will provide the opportunity to develop 

meaningful local networks more quickly and transition critical knowledge. This is 

why programs like AFPAK Hands4 must be continued and expanded to other regions 

of the world. These programs can dovetail well with regional centers of excellence 

like the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) or the George C. Marshall Center. 

Eighth, in combat zones, soldiers are too often restricted to secure locations, 

negating important opportunities for cultural immersion. This has the potential to 

taint soldiers' perspectives and can create an "us versus them" mentality with 

strategic consequences. We know that effectiveness typically increases for Special 

Operators who dismount vehicles and engage with the local populations. Most will 

tell you that they garner important cultural signals this way, making them vastly 

more efficient and empowered war-fighters. Their lessons-learned should be 

applied in a wide swathe across 000. 

Finally. more effective and systematic screening procedures should be instituted for 

academic advisors. These should be vetted for not only their subject matter 

knowledge, but also their objectivity. When advising on far-flung places like Mali or 

Nigeria. extensive on the ground experience should also be a prerequisite before 

they are put in a position to educate our warfighters. We have witnessed too many 

times the unfortunate consequences of unprepared and/or biased advisors hired to 

provide direction to crucial 000 initiatives. 

4 See http·lIwwv".jcs.mil(pa~e,aspx?id~52 

7 
36 

RUDOLPH ATALLAH 

COUNTERTERRORISM & POLITICAL/MILITARY SPECIALIST 

Air Force Lt Colonel Retired' Foreign Area Officer - Africa/Middle East/Europe' Linguist (French/Arabic) 

Counterterrorism strategist specializing in political & military negotiations at the highest levels ofleadership. 

Designed approaches for East, North & Sahel regions of Africa. Accredited Air Force Defense Attache to 6 African 

countries; possess extensive on-the-ground experience across the continent. Requested by name to speak at 

numerous government, military, academic, & civilian conferences / symposiums. Able to represent policy to 

Congress & Senate. A l7-year Middle East resident who has traveled to 1 00+ countries & met w/5 heads of state. 

EXPERIENCE 

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 12/2009 to Present 

White Mountain Research LLC (WMR), Herndon. Virginia 

WMR is a service disabled veteran owned small business that is dedicated to understanding and mitigating complex 

threats to human security. Built the company from the bottom up, from 2009-2011, WMR grew by 400% taking on 

contracts with US government agencies and corporate clients. 

Led & negotiated 5 successful hostage releases from Somali pirates. 

Planned/developed emergency evacuation plans from Egypt for DOD!, a Houston based Oil Company. 

Worked w/senior executives on crisis planning to protect 3 oil rigs. Saved $3 million/day. 

Led event security for 3 of ICANN's (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers) 1200 person 

conferences in Kenya, Columbia & Senegal - 100% success. 

Taught risk management class to 430+ oil workers in Norway, Egypt & UAE. Reduced mishaps by 50%. 

Africa Counterterrorism (CT) Director 1 Morocco-Tunisia Country Director 4/2007 to 9/2009 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Pentagon. Washington. DC 

Only Foreign Area Officer in the Air Force concurrently holding three regional specialization designationsAfrica, Middle East, and Europe. Informed and advised the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on CT policy & strategy 

in Africa and related engagement with Morocco and Tunisia. Orchestrated conferences with Ministry of Defense 

(MOD) officials of Morocco and Tunisia. Developed strategic CT initiatives, programs & activities to enhance U.S. 

national security interests through evaluation of regional political & military developments. Supervised security 

cooperation, military training & humanitarian assistance programming. Advocated CT policy wlUnited Nations. 

Briefed Congress and Senate on counterterrorism activities/operations against violent extremists in Somalia. 

Worked in the office of the Secretary over the last 6 years on complex political/military issues ranging from 

CT operations to complex border disputes (Ethiopia/Eritrea) and mil to mil engagements. 

Led first ever OSD Policy U.S.lEuropean Africa CT conference, resulting in new policy changes designed to 

reduce terrorist threats from Africa. Also increased terrorist captures through new strategy development. 

OSD's point-man for Morocco's $2.1 billion purchase ofF-16 and T-6 aircraft from U.S. manufacturers. 

Instrumental in steering Morocco~s choice of aircraft over French jet fighter by using effective negotiation. 

Advised DoD Senior official during visit to Djibouti, Ethiopia & France to discuss the establishment of 

Africa Command (AFRICOM). 

Worked w/SOCOM on the rescue of Cap I Philips (MAERSK ALABAMA) from pirates off the Somali 

coast. Provided key information/strategy, which led to his rescue. 

Africa Counterterrorism Director / East Africa Director 6/2003 to 4/2007 

Office of the Secretary Of Defense. Pentagon. Washington. DC 

Informed & advised SecDef on CT policy and strategy in Alfica and related engagement with nations in the Horn 

of Africa (HOA). Supervised security cooperation, military training & humanitarian assistance programming. 

Advocated CT policy among foreign governments, the UN, Congress and interagency intelligence organizations. 

Developed strategic CT initiatives, programs, activities & intelligence policies to enhance U.S. national security 

interests through evaluation of regional political & military developments. Handpicked to be key advisor for the Air 

Force on Defense Attache panels. 

Led/negotiated w/Government of Djibouti the expansion of 1st forward-operating base in Africa. (IO-year, 

$1.5 billion deal) 

Lead strategist in crafting Somali policy to eliminate Al Qaeda activity & protect U.S. interest in the HOA. 

Outlined innovative approach to counter piracy off the Somali coast, lessening food crisis affecting more 

than 14 million people in the horn of Africa. 
37 

Led 000 team to advance counterterrorism plans with Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. 

Invited by SOCOM & UAE's crowned Prince as guest speaker to the CT Symposium in Abu Dhabi. 

Spearheaded initiative leading to the capture of 10 pirates and rescue of an Indian vessel with 16 hostages 

off Somali coast through development and implementation of a counter-piracy policy. 

Air Force Defense Attache 6/2000 to 6/2003 

Defense Intelligence Agency, United States Embassy - Abidjan, Cote d'/voire 

Represented the Secl Air Force & Commander of U.S. Air Force Europe. Advised U.s. Ambassadors in 6 West 

African nations, their respective national air forces and MODs on Air Force matters. Reported on military & 

political matters leading to forraulation of U.S. policy supporting regional national security interests, crisis 

contingency planning & response. Directed air operations for C-12 aircraft supporting U.S. diplomatic missions & 

defense attaches in 24 African countries. 

Led most active C-12 aircraft program in the Defense Attache system. 

Judged most effective Air Force liaison to military leaders in 6 nations due to knowledge of the region 

and fluency in both French and Arabic. 

Authored 1/3 of intelligence reports in the Defense Attache's Office. 

Assisted evacuation of 1,700+ American Citizens from Ivory Coast following 2002 coup. 

Spent extensive time on the ground in West I Central Africa seeking out extremist in response to 9·11. 

Sought by key embassy officials for insight on local Arabic-speaking communities. 

Director I Instructor - Sub-Saharan Orientation Course 6/1997 to 6/2000 

Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, FL 

Directedlmanaged the Sub·Saharan Africa Orientation Course, instructing military & government civilian 

personnel on political, military, economic, and cultural aspects of Sub-Saharan region. Taught officer courses to CT 

& Special Operations Forces staff. Developed new coursework utilized in Middle East & CT programs. 

Handpicked by OSD to instruct in first-ever senior African civil-military course in Senegal, West Africa. 

Extraordinary instructor teaching 5 separate courses relevant to regional terrorism and security issues. 

Only AF pilot to advise 3'd Special Forces Group on integration of airlift into Africa peacekeeping program. 

Senior Fellow at ANSARI African Center 

Wing Flight Safety Officer I C-141 Aircraft Commander 

United States Air Force - 60"' Air Mobility Wing, Travis Air Force Base, CA 

Directed and supervised 35 base safety programs ensuring flight and aircraft safety. 

Over 4,000 flight hOllrs to include combat flight time. 

Masters of Science, International Relations, Troy University, AL 

Bachelor of Science, Electrical & Biomedical Engineering, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 

Squadron Officer School & Air Command and Staff College 

Joint Military Attache School 

Multiple C-141 I C-12 Qualification, Instructor Pilot and Aircraft Commander Schools 

Air Force Flight Safety School, Top Graduate 

Dynamics ofInternational Terrorism; African Studies 

CERTIFICATIONS 

Fixed Wing Multi-engine Instructor Pilot I Multi-engine and Instrument Rated Pilot I Air Refueling Pilot 

PADI Advanced Open Water Diver 

A W ARDSI ACHIEVEMENTS 

Over 25 military honors including: Defense Meritorious Service Medal for direct involvement in the rescue of 

Capt Philips and 6 years of OSD Policy achievements. 
38 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

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39 

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40 

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3 
41 

Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare 

Challenges: Private Sector Perspectives 

Statement of Mr. Mark L. Cohn 

Vice President, Engineering and Chief Technology Officer 

Unisys Federal Systems, Unisys Corporation 

Before the 

House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

June 28, 2013 
42 

Good morning Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and other distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. I am Mark Cohn, Vice President Engineering and Chief 

Technology Officer for Federal Systems at Unisys Corporation. We thank you for inviting 

Unisys to participate in this hearing focusing on lessons learned in irregular warfare, challenges 

that remain in today's operating environments, and how industry can contribute to enhancing our 

security. 

Unisys is a global corporation, headquartered in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania with 22,000 employees 

in over 100 countries providing information systems solutions and services to a wide range of 

private and public sector customers. Unisys has a long and proud history of serving our federal 

government. We provide solutions for 1500 government entities around the world. 

Around the world and here at home, Unisys is a leading provider of integrated security solutions 

- many of which incorporate advanced biometric and identity management technologies. For 

example, we delivered a national identification card for Malaysia that employs fingerprint 

identification and supports real-time biometric verification of identity at traffic stops and 

biometrically-protected automated border control. We delivered a national identification system 

for Angola with multiple biometrics that required mobile enrollment in the villages under austere 

conditions. It provides counterfeit-resistant proof of identity to a large and widely dispersed 

population, as a cornerstone of citizenship in an emerging democracy to support proof of the 

right to vote and for future access to mUltiple government services. Recently, we delivered a 

system for Mexico that provides for storage of 110 million identification records comprising 

fingerprints, facial images, and iris scans with the capacity to process 250,000 new enrollments 

daily. Enrollments are underway starting with youth and extending to Mexico's entire adult 

population. Mexico's Secretary of Government (SEGOB) stated that the use of iris recognition, 

along with other biometric data, serves to combat crime such as human trafficking and to 

streamline registration and enrollment procedures in schools and health care programs. These 

systems, along with those we furnish to national security and law enforcement organizations, 

provide reliable technology to verify the identities of known individuals and the means to 

identify unknown individuals. 
43 

To defend the nation and defeat our adversaries engaged in irregular warfare, the Department of 

Defense requires capabilities in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, 

and stability operations. Our military operates with other U.S. governmental agencies, 

multinational partners, and the partner nation to develop plans for coordinated action and to 

minimize the reliance on U.S. military and security presence. In the long run, it is ultimately a 

political contest for legitimacy and influence over a relevant portion of the population that 

depends on a capable local partner to address the conflict's causes and provide security, good 

governance, and economic development. However, counterinsurgency operations depend on 

separating enemy combatants from innocent civilians in the general population. 

Generally state and/or non-state actors resort to irregular warfare when traditional methods of 

warfare are not ideally suited to reach their objectives or they do not have the resources to fight 

against a stronger adversary. In irregular warfare, a primary U.S. objective is to create a safe, 

secure environment for friendly populations and friendly military forces and to mitigate 

disruptions to their daily lives. This can help to grow or maintain popular support for the 

government or entity the U.S. is supporting. Providing a safe environment is complex during 

irregular warfare as the "enemy" generally is well concealed within the population. The 

"enemy" can involve a number of non-state actors, such as terrorists, criminal enterprises and 

warlord militias, that are difficult to identify among the general population, and this enhances 

their ability to carry out surprise attacks on the population. Another challenge in irregular 

warfare is being able to distinguish loyal indigenous security forces from disloyal foes who can 

procure uniforms and equipment that allow them to blend with regular forces and conduct 

surprise attacks on installations or within government buildings that could have strategic policy 

implications. 

Biometrics, the application of technology and science to measure physical characteristics to 

determine the identity of individuals, can playa valuable role in irregular warfare by helping to 

prevent and disrupt irregular threats by identifying targets of interest, deny movement to 

adversaries, and protect civilians and military forces. It is important to recognize there are 

limitations to biometric systems and methods as data captured for these purposes by U.S. 

personnel generally requires close physical proximity to the subject, usually is episodic and 

selective because cooperative participation by subjects cannot be expected, and relies upon 
44 

equipment and a system architecture that reportedly fails at times to fully address operational 

needs. Today's tactical collection equipment employs custom-built integrated mobile kits that 

can be bulky and cumbersome and reportedly there are issues with data synchronization and 

other factors limiting effective tactical use (referring to GAO report GAO-12-442, pages 16-24). 

Industry can help by taking advantage of new mobile processing platforms derived from 

consumer mobile devices configured for rugged conditions and extended with biometric sensors 

and by implementing interfaces in a unified architecture that streamlines information interchange 

from tactical collection to an authoritative database so that submissions are received and 

match/no-match results are provided to operators consistently and quickly. It is essential that 

transmitted and stored identity information and biometrics stay coupled because separation of the 

data undermines the system's speed, accuracy and ability to detect enemy combatants. With 

respect to facility security and force protection, more advanced biometric techniques than are in 

use today are possible to improve verification of identity for U.S. and coalition military 

personnel and civilian partners and without requiring the person undergoing verification close 

proximity to friendly forces. One example is three-dimensional facial recognition which does 

not depend on the use of visible light so it can operate at night without calling attention to itself. 

At facilities and checkpoints, this would allow greater stand-off distances reducing the threats 

posed by suicide bombers. Another example is improved 2-dimensional and what is called "2.5 

dimensional" facial recognition algorithm performance, intelligent camera systems, and face 

detection analytics that could enable capture of unobtrusive non-cooperative biometric data to 

identify and associate individuals observed at improvised explosive device detection sites. 

Unisys longstanding experience providing integrated biometric credentialing solutions in 

countries such as Malaysia, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Chile, Costa Rica and Spain 

indicates that other countries are using wide-scale identity management and biometrics to protect 

borders, secure transportation facilities, and to improve the efficiency of the administration for 

public services. Some focus on electoral participation or on delivery of social services. The 

relative cost and performance of such systems has improved dramatically in the last twelve to 

fifteen years with greater reliance today on multiple biometrics simultaneously captured for 

enrollment (not just two fingerprints for example but capturing all ten and adding facial and/or 

iris), proven large scale adoption of commercial frameworks that reduce development time and 
45 

risk, and emergence of standards and services based architectures that enable vendor 

independence in selecting algorithms and building systems that can evolve. The biometric 

systems that Unisys deployed in Angola and Mexico can be seen as examples where these trends 

have come together. Both were implemented rapidly at predictable cost because we used a 

framework of proven components to enable the various delivered systems to be flexible, 

scalable, secure, and to utilize multiple workflows and biometric modalities independent of the 

algorithm vendors, and to rely on standards-compliant open interfaces. 

There has been a great expansion in the number of economically viable use cases for biometrics 

to support access control such as neighborhood policing (badging systems for use at checkpoints 

to achieve local area security), protecting access to government buildings and military 

installations, humanitarian assistance identification systems to reduce fraud in distribution of aid, 

and international border control systems to improve security. For instance, we implemented a 

system that the Port of Halifax that uses vascular biometrics for access to the port by 5,000 

workers and the Restricted Area Identity Card with fingerprint and iris for access to Canada's 28 

major airports. DNA matching is now more widely used in forensic identification systems to 

combat crime and also increasingly for purposes such as kinship analysis for disaster victim 

identification. In all regions of the world, we see widespread user acceptance of biometrics for 

secure access to sensitive facilities including international borders and for consumer convenience 

such as protecting electronic banking records and securing air travel. Consumer mobile 

applications will increasingly rely on biometrics captured with inexpensive sensors (for voice, 

face, and touch). There is significant commercial interest in banking and other regulated 

industries because anti-spoofing techniques can easily be employed and biometrics can simplify 

the user experience while increasing security when compared with password or personal 

identification number (PIN). This could provide advantages for some purposes over today's 

Department of Defense personnel authentication approach that relies on Common Access Card 

(CAC) and PIN. A commercially available biometrics-driven alternative used today in the 

banking sector would be more convenient, less expensive and time consuming to administer, 

would eliminate the problem of transport and lockout during PIN reset, and could address risks 

such as the impostor threat that the current CAC and PIN model cannot. Low cost and 

deployment "footprint" mean this could be used to secure access by non-government 
46 

organizations and partner country personnel to electronic systems for sharing situational 

awareness information. 

We believe the Department of Defense can expect that these international and industry 

developments are in many cases applicable to the challenges we face when confronting 

adversaries in irregular warfare and in improving the internal security and stability of the 

societies that we are working to stabilize both through U.S. and partner country initiatives. 

Unisys looks forward to supporting that progress both here and overseas. 
47 

Mark L. Cohn 

Vice President Engineering 

Chief Technology Officer, Federal Systems 

Unisys Corporation 

Mark Cohn is vice president engineering and chief technology officer for Unisys 

Federal Systems. He directs portfolio strategy and solution development for major 

Federal Systems programs to bring innovation to the marketplace and expand the 

mission impact of IT. He is organizing Unisys capabilities that enable mobility, 

analytics, and cloud-driven enterprise transformation and acts as technology 

emissary for Unisys with industry partners and enterprise customers. 

Prior to his current assignment, Mark served as partner and vice president, 

Enterprise Security for Unisys with responsibility for the vision and management of 

security solutions and services programs across the company while managing the 

Federal Systems Enterprise Security practice. He was a principal spokesperson and leader of the Unisys 

global team of experts in the application of information technology to physical security and surveillance 

systems, transportation, and international border security and was the Unisys representative for 

government-industry liaison on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection. 

Since joining Unisys in 1985, Mark has served successfully in a broad range of engineering and management 

pOSitions. For several years, Mark was vice president and chief architect for Unisys Global Public Sector, 

where he provided technical leadership for public sector engagements in defense and domestic security. As 

chief engineer and technical services director for border security and critical infrastructure, he managed 

mission system engineering and product development for the first phase Common Operational Picture 

system. He was technical advisor and executive of interest for Unisys with the DoD Counterintelligence Field 

Activity, program manager for the Transportation Security Administration Registered Traveler pilot program 

and principal architect for the Department of Homeland Security US-VISIT Exit system. Prior to that, he 

managed the transition to Unisys of IT Production Support at the Executive Office of the President and 

architected the technical solution for the TSA Information Technology Managed Services contract, as well as 

several interagency law enforcement information sharing systems. 

In 2001, Mark was chief architect for modernizing Unisys health care solutions to move from mainframe to 

Wintel servers and comply with HIPAA regulations. From 1997 through 2000, he was general manager of 

the architecture and software development practice of Federal Systems, where he directed Unisys egovernment initiatives and managed a $25 million per year portfolio of programs from sales through service 

delivery at the Departments of Education, HHS, HUD, and Transportation and at the FAA, Military Health 

Service, National Guard Bureau and GSA Public Buildings Service. 

Mark is an expert in the design and implementation of trustworthy, highly available distributed systems. He 

began his career at Unisys as a senior systems programmer on fault-tolerant systems used for aviation 

infrastructure management and was the prinCipal designer and chief engineer for nationwide critical 

command and control capabilities essential to air traffic control that have proven to be among the most 

reliable systems ever put into operation. 

Mark was educated at MIT and the University of Maryland with a bachelor's degree in behavioral and social 

sciences. He has a graduate certificate in management information systems and a master's degree in 

management of technology from American University. He was a Certified Computer Programmer and is 

currently a Certified Information Security Manager and Project Management Professional. He reSides in 

Washington DC. 
48 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

Instruction to Witnesses: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 1 13th Congress 

requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) 

received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. 

This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the 

House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy 

(including home address and phone number will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the 

witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: Mr. Mark L. Cohn 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

Individual 

X Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of company, association or other entity being represented: Unisys 

Corporation 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant(s)/contracts federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or grant 

IVILIOthcr US Government/Intelligence 97,715,851.80 In/ormation Technology Services 

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NASA 455,861.47 Information 'I'echnology Services 

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NASA 49,924,335.63 Information Technology Services 
49 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts 

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Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: (Note: Unisys response is Awards received in the 

FISCAL YEAR) 

Current fiscal year (2013): 

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96 

281 

256 

Federal Agencies with which federal contracts are held: (Note Unisys response is the Agencies for Awards received in the subject 

FISCAL Year) 

Current fiscal year (2013): 

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See above chart 

See above chart 

See above chart 

List of subjects of federal contracts(s) (for example. ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure 

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IT Services 

iT Services 

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the Fisca! Year Awarded.) 

Current fiscal year (2013): 

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111,201,523.80 

981,328,677. I 5 

442,622,624.07 

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NlA 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

NlA 
50 

House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

June 28, 2013 

Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges: Private 

Sector Perspectives 

Barry Costa 

Director, Office of Technology Transfer 

The MITRE Corporation 

Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

inviting me to speak today about irregular warfare challenges, 

specifically the value of sociocultural situational awareness and the 

technologies and data that enable this awareness and support rapid 

and effective decision making. 

What I will describe is 21 st century "radar" ... i.e., technology that 

can provide us with rapid and effective insight into the changing 

scenarios for irregular warfare, as well as other missions. Just as 

airborne cameras give us a view of the physical terrain, there are 

now technologies that give us a view of the human terrain, 

including populations, networks, groups, and behaviors. 

The ability to rapidly understand the human environment around 

the world is becoming increasingly important, as we have all seen 

in the past few years. It is critical to the security of the United 

States to understand the sentiments and actions of people 

throughout the world, and to be able to appropriately engage with 

words and deeds to positively shape the environment. 
51 

While technology can't replace deep human insight, MITRE firmly 

believes that understanding this human domain is possible and is 

best supported by technologies that are both empirically derived 

and scientifically grounded. What we have discovered, achieved, 

and transitioned in the past 10 years has shown great promise and 

applicability, despite just modest investments. There is a case to be 

made for continued, and perhaps larger, investments in this area so 

that additional progress can be made more quickly. 

The not-for-profit MITRE Corporation operates a number of 

federal agencies' Federally Funded Research and Development 

Centers and manages an independent research and development 

program, which leads research in this area. In addition to 

conducting research, we help our government sponsors apply this 

new technology to their missions, including irregular warfare, 

counter-proliferation, counter-WMD, and even public interest 

healthcare issues. MITRE's "Social Radar" vision helped drive the 

Department of Defense's thoughts and investments in this area 

and, for that, we are proud. 

To understand the global human environment, we need to look 

beyond the places in which the United States has forces, including 

Afghanistan, and consider all potential places for conflict, which 

could form very quickly. The technologies that MITRE and others 

have been developing and transitioning for the past several years 

are the principal tools of phase 0 military operations, when we 

must positively engage with allies and adversaries. The tools are 

also enablers for irregular warfare since they allow us to determine 

the networks, groups, key influencers, and audiences with whom 

we should engage. 

We are also convinced that by working together with academia, 

industry, and government, we can more quickly bring the right 

combination of expertise together to solve these tough challenges 

and get capabilities into the hands of the warfighter. Collaborating 
52 

with this broad community also improves MITRE's ability to 

transition our intellectual property directly to sponsors and 

industry, when appropriate. By transferring our technology to 

customers, other U.S. government agencies, commercial entities, 

and academia, these tools can be of broad value to our sponsors 

and the U.S. government. 

As we continue to research and transition social radar tools and 

technologies, we look to increase affordability and effectiveness by 

finding new ways to use these technologies to support multiple 

mission domains. 

It was more than 10 years ago, when working on a U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) program, that we began to 

envision and build tools to provide insights into the human 

domain. Six years ago we helped the Department of Defense 

(DoD) begin and execute the Human Social Culture Behavior 

Modeling Program. This led to the creation of indications and 

warning capabilities that can alert us to significant changes in the 

human environment, such as long-term worldwide instability or the 

kind of changes we saw during the Arab Spring. Over these 10 

years, the DoD has made great progress with a modest investment, 

but there is much more to be done. 

The need for these capabilities was publicly recognized around 

2006, after years of experience with non-conventional conflicts 

spanning multiple operational phases in culturally complex and 

unfamiliar terrain in Iraq and Afghanistan. These years gave the 

U.S. military a deep appreciation for the importance of 

sociocultural understanding. Success in these conflicts depended 

on close, effective interaction with an array of actors, including 

local populations, governments and military forces, allies, and nongovernmental groups. 

This experience led an increasing number of military leaders to 
53 

articulate the need for enhanced capabilities rooted in social and 

cultural factors to understand behaviors. For example, when 

Lieutenant General Benjamin Freakley was in Afghanistan as 

Commanding General Combined Joint Task Force-76, he said, 

"We must develop the ability to understand the complex human 

factors and must incorporate them into all facets of operations." 

Overall in the last six years, the defense community has built a 

science and technology foundation for understanding this human 

domain and has improved capabilities for understanding behaviors 

driven by social and cultural variables. We are now better 

positioned to pursue effective courses of action in the full range of 

military operations. In fact, the research community has already 

delivered some of these tools to organizations including: 

USSOCOM, as well as the U.S. Southern, Strategic, and Pacific 

Commands, International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. 

Army Training & Doctrine Command Analysis Center. The 

adoption of these technologies is not limited to the Department of 

Defense; the Intelligence Community and Department of State are 

also adopting technologies in this domain. 

Much remains to be done, however, to evolve and adapt 

sociocultural behavior sense-making capabilities to playa vital role 

in current and future missions. Recent, rapid, and profound shifts 

in the geo-political context have brought renewed attention to 

challenges such as hostile non-state actors who may be pursuing 

weapons of mass destruction, nation-state instability driven by 

drug economies and transnational criminals, humanitarian and 

disaster relief, and cyber threats. Continued sociocultural behavior 

research can make significant contributions to all of these 

mISSIOns. 

The nation must adapt its methods and create new tools that reflect 

the realities of national security in the new age of real-time global 

information flow, and we must understand and engage in the 

public dialogue created by these new communication media. 
54 

While social media is only one of many different data sources 

necessary to achieve this human domain awareness, and is best 

used in conjunction with traditional data and methods, its 

importance is growing rapidly. It is a wired world in which 2 

billion people have mobile broadband and 4.8 billion people have 

cellphones. We expect most of the world's population to be 

connected to the internet in some way within the decade. As this 

happens, more and more people will use social media and similar 

mechanisms to describe their locations, themselves, and their 

environments. 

The challenge is to find the valuable signals amidst an enormous 

amount of data. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, Director of the 

Defense Intelligence Agency, has argued that we "must develop a 

sensory capability to better detect the precursors to political 

change, a social radar that enables policy leaders to make informed 

decisions that maximize national influence left of bang." 

There are many very difficult challenges in this area, some of 

which will take decades to solve, but there are things we can do 

now to detect meaningful signals amidst the data deluge, support 

more timely alerting of change, and better understand the 

effectiveness of our words and actions upon various audiences. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense Research & Engineering's 

Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling Program drove many of 

today's successes, including the Worldwide Integrated Crisis of 

Early Warning System (W-ICEWS), which forecasts long-range 

nation state instability, and the Identifying and Countering 

Terrorist Narratives project, which allows us to go beyond what is 

explicitly stated and understand the deeper underlying narrative. In 

addition, the program developed network-based metrics for 

discovering change in dynamic networks and identification of 

emergent leaders, issues, and trends; and it developed a simulationbased workbench combining computational models that allows 
55 

users to experiment with the effectiveness of alternative actions to 

influence audiences. 

In addition, MITRE has developed proof-of-concept Social Radar 

tools that support understanding of rapidly changing sentiment and 

emotion across the globe. 

Innovative ideas for research, science, and technology are essential 

to long-term success in building DoD sociocultural behavior 

capabilities. Experience to date suggests an exciting future in 

which global information, applied research, and analytics are fully 

and dynamically integrated. However, DoD and the nation are not 

at that desired end-state. To get closer, DoD should maintain the 

momentum created over the past several years by supporting 

promising research thrusts that will result in the capabilities most 

relevant to future national security demands. 

The recommendations that follow reflect the experience of the last 

six years in the Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling project, 

including our understanding of current commercial technology and 

research efforts under way in this domain. 

1. DoD needs a robustly funded research and engineering 

program to address the range of capabilities users need. The 

area of applied sociocultural behavior research and 

engineering is still relatively young. Specified requirements 

remain relatively limited, despite widespread 

acknowledgment of needs. While the Services are conducting 

research in this domain, funding cuts have blunted the 

creation of the scale of programs needed. 

2. The Services should prioritize Science & Technology for the 

development of sociocultural behavior capabilities, building 

on some of the innovative work already under way. This 

needs to be supported by specification of current 
56 

sociocultural behavior-related capabilities and the 

requirements of Service communities. To maximize the 

success of the first two recommended actions, DoD needs to 

intensify coordination across the sociocultural behavior 

research space. Using mechanisms such as the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense Human Systems Social, Cultural and 

Behavioral Understanding sub-area group, DoD should 

increase coordination both horizontally (across the Services 

and at any given level of research) and vertically (from Basic 

through Applied research and on to Advanced Technology 

Development and Prototyping programs). 

3. DoD should identify a center of excellence for sociocultural 

modeling, integration and analysis, focused on application of 

technology to user needs, rapid transition to users and 

Programs of Record, metrics, data interoperability, model 

validation, and model reuse and generalizability. This center 

should emphasize moving sociocultural behavior tools into 

operations as quickly as possible. 

Let me leave you with this thought: If the DoD had ended its 

research investment in pulsed radar technologies after just five 

years, the program would have ended in 1939, at the start of World 

War II, leaving us with a rudimentary capability for long-range 

sensing, as well as a glimmer of its tantalizing potential. 

The research in human domain situational awareness may prove 

just as important. We must continue to support this research, as 

well as the quick transition of capabilities to the organizations that 

need them. 

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 

Case Number 13-2605 

©2013 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. 
57 

Barry Costa 

Director, Technology Transfer Office 

Barry Costa leads MITRE's program to transfer MITRE-developed technology 

directly to the government or to industry, which then makes these technologies 

available to the government and the public as affordable products. The Technology 

Transfer Office works closely with MITRE's engineers and scientists to guide them 

through the transfer process, as well as \vith organizations who arc interested in 

licensing Ollr technology or in collaborating on its development for the government's 

benefit. 

Mr. Costa also serves as the director ofMfTRE's Corporate Initiative on Smart Power 

and as the systems engineer for the Assistant Secretary of Defense Research & 

Engineering's Human Socia! Culture Behavior modeling program. In addition, he 

leads a MITRE research portfolio of projects in the Human Geography and Smart 

Power domains. His cun-ent technical focus is on the research and transition of natural 

language processing and sociocultural understanding and modeling capabilities, with 

an emphasis on the development and transition of such systems for operational 

suppOli. 

Since joining MITRE in 1984, Mr. Costa has led critical, fast-paced projects for the 

Air Force, Joint Staff, U.S. Central, Atlantic. and Special Operations Commands, as 

well as other organizations. He has had a broadly diverse career in pioneering 

technologies for: digital imaging and immersive visualization systems, human social 

culture behavior analysis and modeling, operationally focused technical analyses, and 

radar modeling. 

Mr. Costa has worked in a wide of technologies over his career at MITRE, 

continually looking for ways to his experiences to find innovative solutions 

for our sponsors. His projects have included doing systems engineering for programs 

such as the Aegis Combat System and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System; 

computer networks and communications architectures; helping U.S. Centra! 

prepare communications systems for Desert Storm; integrating and 

managing multimedia data collections; designing tactical video systems and imaging 

systems; and developing software prototypes for data extraction and analysis. 

8cforcjoining MITRE, Mr. Costa served on active duty with the U.S. Navy. He is a 

graduate of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 

JUNE2013 
58 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the 1 13th Congress requires nongoverrunental witnesses 

appearing before House corrunittees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: Barry A. Costa 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

_Individual 

-X..Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: The MITRE Corporation 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of 

contracts contract or grant 

2 DOD 941,174,299 R&D 

1 DHS 78,202,089 R&D 

1 FAA 149,396,674 R&D 

1 Department of Treasury 155,132,098 R&D 

3 VA 71,237,801 R&D 

2 Department of State 1,192,121 R&D 

1 NOAA 1,087,254 R&D 

1 NASA 192,518 R&D 

1 NSF 16,986 R&D 

1 Department of Agriculture 2,964 R&D 

1 Department of Energy 95,810 R&D 

1 Administrative Office of the 5,308,534 R&D 

United States Courts 

1 Undersecretary of Defense 5,801,646 R&D 

-JASONS 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 
59 

federal grant(s)j federal agency dollar value subject(s) of 

contracts contract or grant 

2 DOD 934,335,591 R&D 

1 DHS 86,330,219 R&D 

1 FAA 154,642,179 R&D 

1 Department of Treasury 126,639,144 R&D 

3 VA 60,571,158 R&D 

2 Department of State 2,189,406 R&D 

1 NOAA 1,432,558 R&D 

1 NASA 136,543 R&D 

1 NSF 14,481 R&D 

1 Department of Agriculture 1,945 R&D 

1 Administrative Office of the 4,650,480 R&D 

United States Courts 

1 Undersecretary of Defense 4,940,629 R&D 

- JASONS 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 

Federal grant(s) federal agency dollar value subject(s) of 

j contracts contract or grant 

2 DOD 916,969,182 R&D 

1 DHS 59,803,132 R&D 

1 FAA 141,978,500 R&D 

1 Department of Treasury 142,905,285 R&D 

2 VA 27,036,785 R&D 

2 Department of State 1,942,284 R&D 

1 NOAA 2,350,237 R&D 

1 NASA 383,748 R&D 

1 NSF 119,143 R&D 

1 Department of Agriculture 1,328 R&D 

1 Undersecretary of Defense 5,698,003 R&D 

- JASONS 

2 
60 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2012): 17 

Fiscal year 2011: 16 

Fiscal year 2010: 14 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (2012): See above 

Fiscal year 2011: See above 

Fiscal year 20 I 0: See above 

List of subjects offederal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2012): R&D 

Fiscal year 2011: R&D 

Fiscal year 2010: R&D 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

Current fiscal year (2012): $1,408,840,794 

Fiscal year 2011: $1,375,884,333 

Fiscal year 201 0: $1,299,187,735 

3 
61 

Federal Grant Infonnation: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Nwnber of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2012): 

Fiscal year 2011: 1 

Fiscal year 20 I 0: I 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: 

Current fiscal year (2012): NSF 

Fiscal year 20 II: NSF 

Fiscal year 20 I 0: NSF 

List of subjects offederal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2012): Collaborative R&D 

Fiscal year 2011: Collaborative R&D 

Fiscal year 2010: Collaborative R&D 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 

Current fiscal year (2012): $16,986 

Fiscal year 2011: $14,481 

Fiscal year 2010: $119,143 

4 
62 

STATEMENT BY 

SCOTT E. JACOBS PRESIDENT, NEW CENTURY US 

BUILDING INTELLIGENT CAPACITY 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

112TH CONGRESS 

ON 

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES: PRIVATE 

SECTOR PERSPECTIVES 

JUNE 28, 2013 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
63 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before this panel today. As a retired Federal special agent and as a graduate of 

the congressional fellowship program, I am acutely familiar with the leadership provided by this 

committee. As the current President of New Century US (NCUS), I would like to personally thank each 

and everyone of you for your steadfast dedication to public service. 

Introduction 

New Century US is a privately-held firm currently on contract with the U.S. government to 

provide, among other things, training and education support to the Afghan National Army(ANA). NCUS is 

the American subsidiary of the London-based New Century International and has been founded in a 

manner consistent with all laws, regulations, and protocols established by the U.S. government. The firm 

is proud of the variety of services it provides in support of the U.S. government and its allies. In support 

of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, New Century International currently provides training and 

mentoring support to the Afghan National Police (ANP). NCUS has also provided a similar service to 

authorities in a vis-a-vis a "train-the-trainer" program, an initiative authorized and funded through the 

DoD Counter Terrorism Technical Support Office for the U.S. military. Furthermore, NCUS continues to 

provide high-quality operations' analysis and intelligence-related support to a variety of other federallyfunded initiatives. In sum, the firm's programs and the nature of the collective experience of New 

Century personnel, positions the firm as both an observer of irregular challenges worldwide and as a 

knowledgeable proponent of irregular solutions. 

Current Activities 

The flagship program of our firm is called "Legacy," a program first implemented in the western 

Iraq province of al Anbar and currently in place in Afghanistan. Aimed at improving both the capability 

and capacity of the ANP and ANA forces, the current iteration of Legacy employs a specific doctrine and 

1 
64 

teaching methodology, one based on the experience of the British constabulary force - or Special 

Branch - in Northern Ireland during the conflict of the late 1970s and '80s. 

The value-added of the New Century approach lies not only in its well-developed Legacy 

methodology but also - and most importantly - depends on its deep well of experience found within the 

ranks of qualified personnel. As I previously mentioned, the success of the firm rests with "doers" 

several veterans of Special Branch and the Northern Ireland conflict, as well as others more recently 

seasoned after years of serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the doctrine and methodology of the 

Legacy program is designed to leverage and reflect the richness of this experience. The curricula of the 

respective programs thus includes both in-class discussion and the all-important, in-the-field "hands on" 

training. 

New Century provided training has produced a number of quantifiable results in support of the 

NATO mission in Afghanistan. By adapting traditional Special Branch tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TIPs) to accommodate and befit the unique circumstances of the local culture, the Legacy methodology 

has developed and nurtured an ever-diligent, wiser, and more coordinated Afghan police force. Since 

inception, the Afghan Legacy program has directly facilitated the capture of numerous improvised 

explosive devices, detonators, suicide vests, munitions, and other weapons. Furthermore, the resulting 

police force developed and tutored by our small, hybrid teams of cultural advisers and former special 

police personnel has been responsible for the arrest, capture, or death of more than six hundred 

insurgents. We remain honored and humbled by the following praise offered by a former 3-star 

American General at the beginning of the effort: "New Century's program is immediately effective." 

But the greatest achievement of Legacy, we believe, lies in the much-improved reporting and 

increased coordination apparent throughout the larger ANP community, and in the effective fusion of 

military, intelligence, and law enforcement TIPs in support of a larger counter-insurgency (COIN) and 

2 
65 

counter-terrorism mission. We believe our hybrid approach is notably consistent with David Kilcullen's 

views about the prerequisites of an effective COIN strategy when he writes in his book, Accidental 

Guerilla: 

"[Pjolice intelligence analysts are a good first step, and the police intelligence capability should 

grow naturally to include informant networks, undercover police officers, and joint policemilitary intelligence centers.'" 

We also agree with the counsel of National Defense University professor Bard E. O'Neill when he argues 

in favor of creating such a force before the onset of an insurgency: 

"[WJise governments turn to specially trained police and intelligence agencies for a 

solution ... Keeping the military out of the day-to-day business of countering terrorists in favor of 

special police forces can be done even when the latter are part of the military establishment.'" 

And so, at New Century we believe a focus on improving the capacity of the Afghan - and other hostnation - security forces is a wise and an intelligent investment for supporting American foreign policy 

objectives, as it also offers the potential to build an effective residual or "leave-behind" security force 

when a U.S. military presence is reduced or simply unavailable. As U.S. taxpayers, we also view this 

approach as a wise and cost-effective investment strategy for leveraging limited public resources. 

The Strategic Landscape 

The firm believes in, embraces, and supports the all-important "by, with, and through" creed of 

the Special Operations Forces community as it applies to meeting U.s. foreign policy objectives. We view 

this indirect approach as practical and essential for working with foreign allies, as well as for identifying 

and confronting irregular challenges around the globe - especially in environments requiring a limited 

1 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2009, p. 61. 

1 Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1990, p. 

129. 

3 
66 

counter-insurgency response. And because both irregular threats abroad and federal budget pressures 

at home are almost certain to continue, we believe the indirect and irregular approach will become even 

more important in the days ahead. 

Terrorism, insurgency, crime, and the illicit trafficking of drugs and humans - these are the 

activities that promise to litter the global strategic landscape in the years ahead. They already exist 

today in too many regions of the world - in Africa, South America, and across Asia - where weak nationstates are incapable of mounting an effective response. If ignored or unassisted, some of these states 

may falter and fail and follow the path of Afghanistan in the 1990s or of Somalia today - enlarging 

evermore that part of the world in which American ideals and interests are threatened or under siege. A 

carefully-targeted assistance program, therefore, would be wise, one designed to develop and empower 

the local authorities of American allies. Just imagine the strength of America's strategic position if the 

local authorities in the following nations simultaneously mounted with US. assistance a more effective 

and sustainable counter-terrorism and COIN program: Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, the Central African 

Republic, Chad, Peru, Thailand, and the Philippines. Imagine, too, the improved security posture and 

greater moral authority of America if both the U.s. State Department and the Department of Defense 

(000) combined efforts and jointly offered security reform assessments to potential partners and allies 

around the globe. 

lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future 

The Afghan Legacy program adopted the same goals as those of the original program in Iraq: 

first, develop a locally-based human collection and analysis capability; and second, establish an 

information-gathering and investigative infrastructure within the police to support COIN strategic 

objectives. We believe we achieved both of these objectives and have learned a number of important 

lessons about COIN and Irregular Warfare (iW) along the way. 

4 
67 

First, a thorough understanding of both the local- and national-level strategic environments is 

essential and enhances the performance of the small, hybrid teams of mentors and advisers. This 

requires keeping an eye on both the larger picture and strategic aim while examining and researching 

the local networks and possible biases of families, tribes, and local leaders. A thorough understanding of 

the environment also allows a training team to keep a focus on the proper objectives throughout the full 

spectrum of the program's performance, or from the early stages of planning through actual training, 

implementation, and review. This level of understanding can be produced by an initial assessment 

conducted by a small advance team of researchers. 

Second, designing and tailoring a flexible doctrine and training regime increases local 

acceptance of the program. In Iraq, we noticed that trainees were experiential learners and responded 

best to role-playing scenarios and also responded well to stories about veteran experiences in the 

Northern Ireland campaign. In Afghanistan, we discovered and thus designed and implemented a 

simpler and streamlined reporting methodology, one more suitable to a culture with such a low literacy 

rate. 

Third, in COIN campaigns the timely reporting of information is necessary for it to be useful or 

actionable, placing a premium on adequate communication habits and requiring a close relationship 

between the trainers and the trainees. 

Fourth, future field surveys and training efforts should also assess the natural respect for the 

rule of law in a specific country and lend attention to the workings and integrity of the judicial branch of 

government. 

Fifth - and this is important - for a Special Branch-like activity to ultimately succeed the U.S. 

military must embrace it as part of an overall COIN doctrine and strategy, budget and train for it, and 

S 
68 

provide daily support for it in the field. Failure to provide adequate transportation and security support, 

for instance, might derail the entire effort. 

Sixth, effective COIN efforts may take time and require patience. The British success in Northern 

Ireland, for example, took over two decades to secure. Therefore, U.S. policymakers should also 

consider preventive programs along the lines of Professor's O'Neill's counsel and remain mindful of the 

following phrase: "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." 

A final observation is actually a concern and pertains to the point just made about doctrine, 

training, and budgeting for such a capability. Despite significant gains in the field and notwithstanding 

the 2008 issuance of a DoD Directive on IW (i.e., 3000.07), the department and each of the military 

services have remained somewhat listless with respect to this important subject. The 2008 Directive 

assigned additional duties to both Special Operations Command and the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/low-Intensity Conflict, granting these organizations lead 

roles for defining, guiding, and coordinating IW-related activities across DoD. And yet five years later, we 

still do not see any tangible leadership on these issues anywhere in the department. The 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance only lightly referenced the 

concept, and no true champion has emerged for institutionalizing such lessons or for providing a 

sustainable budget. 

Final Thoughts 

The complex nature of the world requires innovative solutions. At New Century we strongly 

believe a large part of the solution lies in the fusion of the conventional and the unconventional, in both 

the regular and the irregular, and in a greater collaboration between the communities of law 

enforcement, intelligence, and military professionals. We also believe in the use of small, highly6 
69 

experienced training teams for building the capacity of our allies, and for constructing a defensive 

network of collaborators in various hotspots - or potential hotspots - around the world. 

In a recent on-line article retired General Stan McChrystal noted that it takes a network to 

defeat a network, and this is precisely the situation we find ourselves in today.' Ironically, his comment 

echoes language authored by this subcommittee and included in the House reports accompanying 

passage of both the 2011 and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Acts: 

"The committee remains concerned that the Secretary of Defense has not taken full advantage 

of a novel approach that takes into account an understanding of the tribal landscape and invests 

in developing host nation security forces, particularly local police organizations that maintain 

close ties with and function to protect the local population. The committee praised this 

approach, the Legacy program, in the committee report (H.Rept. 111-491) accompanying the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. In the report, the committee noted 

special interest in the "Attack of the Network" approach used in the Republic of Iraq and 

Afghanistan under the Legacy program. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of 

Defense to conduct an assessment of the following: 

1) The applicability of the legacy program in other operations and regions where 

networked based threats are present or where conditions are conducive to 

supporting these threats; and 

2) Options for an appropriate management structure within the Department to 

institutionalize and sustain the capabilities that Legacy and similar programs 

provide.,,4 

At New Century we agree with both this assessment and General McChrystal's assertion and 

have come to this conclusion after years spent toiling in the field. We feel that the combination of our 

unique methodology and depth of experience offers the perfect recipe for disrupting the forces of 

terrorism, crime, and subversion. But more visionary and effective leadership is needed in the U.S. 

government, just as more international partners and allies are required. Our nation cannot do it alone. 

'Stanley McChrystal, Lesson from Iraq: It Tokes a Network to Defeat a Network, 

http://www.linkedin.com{today!post{article{20130621110027-86145090-lesson-from-irag-it-takes-a-network-todefeat-a-network?trk=eml-mktg-celeb-sc-prehed (June 2013). 

4 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, http://www.gpo.gov{fdsys{pkg{CRPTll1hrpt491{pdf{CRPT-ll1hrpt491.pdf: The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

http:{{www.gpo.gov{fdsys!pkg!CRPT-112hrpt78!pdf!CRPT-l12hrpt78.pdf. 

7 
70 

"By, with, and through," is an effective guiding principle for the United States in the years ahead. We 

recommend that we follow it. 

8 
71 

Scott E. Jacobs 

Professional Profile 

Results drin'tl exccutl,Tc \-vith a history of achicYC1uent in driving inn()\~ation and 

partnerships. Proven capacity to en\rlsion and direct national security projects and tirst of 

their kind business dcvelopme11l initiatives. Experienced leader managing operations for 

small businesses to include launching new products and successfully managing client 

relationships. Core competencies include: 

_Strateg.ic planning and execntion • Intlucntial change leader • Decish-c business leadership 

Experience and Achievements 

NEW CENTURY US, Arlington, V,\ 2011- current 

;\ focused on sector reform initiatives that trains and 111('ntors lawenforccrnent 

in world countries to rule of la\\' peoccsscs and improved la\-v enforcement capacities. 

President 

Report to Board of Directors with re,"',t"sihiii,y business, costs, building a corporate 

team and execution on contracts 

Increased net profits by 18 percent, 

tIaintained safety and security of personnel in semi permissive enVir0t1111ents. 

Exceeded performance me tries in deyeIoping la"v enforcement capacity \vith host nation authorities. 

INTELLICHECK MOBILISA, ,\lexandria, VA 

An identity Im,,,,,,,"fl,,,1l 

Department and cornm(,1'c1al el,,[e1l1W;CS. 

Senior Vice President, Defense ID Group 

2010 - 2011 

access control solutions lo the 

11lanufactufer/ rescller /200+ customers) 

Recnlited CI-::O to orchestrate a turnaround and revitalization of the I)efense ID 

of plan to increase re\TnUeS the gcwcrnment market. Realigned positions, staffed 

development redefined performance pe;ric)rmanc:e 

excellence. a team of software sales professionals, 

support staff in the sales and il1;;.tallatton throughout the DoD and the cb'f'icmrneCH 

products based upon chnnging cnstomC't rCClutrem.ents. 

J\chicved 1 ~t year re\'enue growth of 5 percent within B months) exceeding coq)orate expectations. 

Launched Fugiti\'e hnder ne\v Defense ID product successfully. 

Partnered \vith key prime contractors on go\'ernment contract proposals valued at S32 million dollars. 

21ST CENTURY SYSTEMS INCORPORATED (21CSI), [\r1ington, V:\ 2009 - 2010 

A decision support soft\vare product and geospatial services managing $20 million in revenue 

having 9 offices and 150 employees delivering products to the 

Senior Vice President, Federal Systems Group (FSG) 

Reported directly to CEO in the capacity of a Chief Operations Officer 

Presidents with responsibility 2.+ software and geospatial development projects to day company 

operations. 

Led the FSG hy increasing productivity by 7 percent, delivering quality products on time and on budget. 
72 

Scott E. Jacobs.Page 2 

Drove initiatives that reinvested $3 million in internal research and development funds to maintain 

competitive edge on product line. 

• Collaborative business partner with track record for fostering relationships with prime contractors, 

vendors and employees to deliver sustainable ROI and gain new market share. 

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NCIS) 1981-2008 

NelS is a worldwide law enforccment~ counterterrorism and counterintelligence organization Vlith a presence 

in 41 countries and 160 locations. 

Director, (Acting), DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), i\rlington, VA 2008 

Director, CIFA reports direcdy to the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and is the program manager 

for the DoD counterintelligence (CI) enterprise, leading approximately 900 CI specialists in the management 

and execution of the national CI strategy. 

Served as principle advisor to the Undersecretary of Defense on all CI matters. 

Responsible for the integration of CI activities, execution of CI priorities, management and advocacy of 

CI funding programs and resources. 

Directed the day to day operations of all CIFA personnel, resources, programs and activities. 

Executive Assistant Director, Senior Executive Service, Combating Terrorism Directorate 2005-2008 

Led the agency's Combating Terrorism Directorate consisting of 450 government and contractor personnel 

in the investigation of all terrorism incidents and operations impacting the Navy/Marine Corps personnel. 

Directed all high level investigations/ operations and communicate findings to senior government leaders. 

Responsible for DON policy on critical infrastrnctnre protection, force protection, protective service, 

biometric, identity management and vulnerability assessment programs. 

• Launched an innovative enterprise solution for DoD suspicious incident reporting with the FBI. 

Special Agent in Charge, Northwest Field Office, Silverdale, WA 2001-2005 

Leader of an office consisting of 100 criminal investigators, counterintelligence, counterterrorism and force 

protection professionals that serviced 75 Navy commands in a five state region. 

Formed the first law enforcement information sharing consortium in the country-Northwest Law 

Enforcement Information Exchange (LlnX)-consisting of approximately 150 federal, state and local 

law enforcement agencies. Currendy deployed to 9 regions throughout the United States. 

Identified and launched a $5 million effort to develop access control technologies to protect Navy bases. 

Deputy Assistant Director, Economic Crimes Department, Washington, D.C 

Legis Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C 

Education and Mfiliations 

MA, Washington State University, School of Criminal Justice, 1980 

BA, Criminal Justice with honors, Phi Beta Kappa, Washington State University, 1978 

1996-2000 

1995-1996 

Certificate, DoD National Security Management Course, Maxwell Schoo~ Syracuse University, 1995 

Certificate, DoN Flag Officer Training Course, Shepardstown, WV, 2004 

Certificate, DoN Executive Business Course, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2007 

Member, International Association of Chiefs of Police 
73 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the 113th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: Scott E. Jacobs 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

_Individual 

lRepresentative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: New Century U.S. 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

Combined Security U.S. Army $6.5 million Mentoring and advising the 

Transition Afghanistan National Army 

CommandAfghanistan 

(CSTC-A) 

Advanced Security Department of $139,334 Training and menta ring 

Force Assistance Defense Special framework for U.S. Forces 

Capability Operations and while working in 

Development Low-Intensity conjunction with host 

(ASFACD) Conflict, nation security forces. 

Combating 

Terrorism Technical 

Support Office 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

Combined Security U.S. Army $6,086,589 Mentoring and advising the 

Transition Afghanistan National Army 
74 

CommandAfghanistan 

(CSTC-A) 

Advanced Security Department of $300,666 Training and mentoring 

Force Assistance Defense Special framework for U.S. Forces 

Capability Operations and while working in 

Development Low-Intensity conjunction with host 

(ASFACD) Conflict, nation security forces. 

Combating 

Terrorism Technical 

Support Office 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

Combined Security U.S. Army $5,913,544 Mentoring and advising the 

Transition Afghanistan National Army 

CommandAfghanistan 

(CSTC-A) 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ;L; 

Fiscal year 2012:_2_: 

Fiscal year 20 II :_1_. 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): U.S. Army; Department of Defense Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Combating Terrorism Technical 

Support Office ; 

Fiscal year 2012: U.S. Army; Department of Defense Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office 

Fiscalyear2011: U.S. Army. 

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013): training and mentoring; 

Fiscal year 2012: training and mentoring; 

Fiscal year 2011: training and mentoring. 

2 
75 

Aggregate do 11ar value of federal contracts held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): $6.639.334; 

Fiscal year 2012: $6.387.255 

Fiscal year 2011: $5.913,544. 

3 
76 

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: _________________ _ 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: _________________ _ 

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013):. _______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : ___________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 

Current fiscal year (2013):, ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012:. __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011:, __________________ _ 

4 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 28, 2013 

(79) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. JACOBS. See attached. [See page 22.] 
80 

INTRODUCTION 

At the June 28, 2013 hearing On Past, Present, and Future Irregular Warfare Challenges: Private Sector 

Perspectives, Congressman Trent Franks requested New Century's representative, Mr Scott Jacobs, to 

provide statistical information evidencing the claimed successes of the Legacy program in Afghanistan. 

In this document we provide a selection of such statistics and related narrative reporting on intelligenceled operations mounted by the Afghan National Security Forces (AN SF) stemming from the mentoring 

and training delivered by the Legacy program. New Century is not privy to ISAF's tracking and analysis of 

the program's performance, therefore, what is presented here is only a partial picture of the operational 

activities, being one assembled from our own internal reporting. 

STATISTICS 

In accordance with our program performance obligations, each mentor routinely submits highlights 

report. The following three tables set out a selection of performance achievements gleaned from these 

reports, covering a three year period to June 2013. The actual numbers will be higher but the 

information provided is the cumulative values of what we are able to track from the content of the 

mentor reports. 

We do not have access to data on the number of sources recruited or the number of intelligence reports 

filed (albeit the latter is understood to be significant). 

Only 
81 

The above recoveries and removal of Taliban operatives has undoubtedly led to the protection of 

numerous lives, both those of Coalition / Afghan Forces and civilians alike. Taking just the lED statistic in 

isolation and applying a subjective factor of one death avoided for each lED recovered would suggest 

that at least 1,000 lives have been saved from this factor alone. 

The Legacy program comprises the two principal components of: (1) mentoring in the field (with a 24/7 

availability); with (2) classroom training in the designated schoolhouses. Below is a table of the courses 

run between April 2010 and June 2013 under the classroom component. Key statistics to note are that 

323 courses were delivered, spanning 25 course titles, provided to more than 3,000 students, and in 

excess of 61,000 student training days completed. 
82 

The Legacy program presently (July 2013) deploys 125 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in Afghanistan, of 

which a little over one-quarter are trainers delivering the above courses, with the vast majority of the 

remainder being mentors who work in the field alongside their AN SF counterparts, applying the Tactics, 

Techniques and Procedures enshrined in the written doctrine and supplemented by the provision of a 

catalog of hip-pocket lessons. The number of SMEs is expected to reduce in the coming months as the 

availability of force protection and life support diminishes as a consequence of the drawdown of 

Coalition Forces. 

NATIONAL TARGETING AND EXPLOITATION CENTER (NTEC) 

A central component of the transition of the Legacy program's intelligence capability to the ANP 

Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI) has been the development of the Network Targeting Exploitation 

Center (NTEC) in Kabul. New Century has contributed to the technical expertise underpinning the 

establishment of this intelligence fusion and operations center through the mentoring of operational 

commanders and personnel, supported by guidance on the drafting of protocols for the management of 

the internal operational and administrative processes. 

The New Century mentors working in the NTEC have capitalized upon the experience gained from 

operating within an equivalent, highly successful framework in the UK, particularly in Northern Ireland, 

to provide the ANSF with the capability to receive, analyze, plan and execute intelligence-led operations, 

each underpinned by legal warrants, and to do so in a coordinated and controlled manner, with the 

proper oversights mechanisms in place. 
83 

The process is based upon the original UK-based Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) model to 

harmonize intelligence received within NTEC from a range of organizations / sources and enable the 

conduct of de-conflicted covert and overt policing operations. The Legacy program has assisted the DPI 

develop effective internal mechanisms for the flow of intelligence from ANSF source handlers, through 

intelligence analysts within the NTEC, to operational decision-makers. These processes have enabled 

decisions to be taken by ANSF commanders to risk assess, plan missions and then deploy specialist 

personnel, including surveillance teams, to proactively exploit intelligence opportunities. 

Amongst the impressive statistics for the NTEC since it became operational two years ago is that, as of 

late June 2013 a total of 175 operations have been planned or are in plan, of which 107 have so far been 

completed. All operations are warrant-based, so have full legal standing. They have led to the arrest of 

88 insurgents, with 21 more KIA. At least 35 IEDs have been recovered, along with suicide vests and 

numerous weapons, ammunition of various types, grenades, mines and warheads, plus 3,000kg of drugs 

and chemicals. Of course, these statistics present only part of the story as the effective disruption of 

terrorist acts will be causing disorientation and a number of such intended acts will simply not be 

undertaken for fear of interdiction or arrest. 

SUCCESSES 

The internal highlights reports filed by mentors includes narrative information on selected operations 

arising from intelligence collected by their mentees. These reports are assimilated by the program's 

technical support team and in the text below we have provided examples from two recent months 

(chosen at random) of these typically 10 page long documents. 

December 2012 ExamJJl~ 

December 1: A HUMINT platoon member of forward deployed 207th Corps, Mica 1, Multi-Function 

Team (MFT) received intelligence from a source that Taliban had emplaced an lED next to the home of a 

well-known and wealthy individual in XXX in order to target ANSF/ANP personnel. This information was 

immediately passed to local ANA Operations center and to the ANP. The lED was discovered by local 

ANP and subsequently destroyed in situ. 

December 6: Source intelligence was received that Taliban had emplaced 4x PPIEDs on a 50 meter 

stretch of road in XXX village, XXX district, XXX province. As a result of this intelligence a search was 

commenced. The search team located all four of the PPIEDs with pressure plates attached. All four IEDs 

were destroyed in situ. 
84 

December 6: XXX DPI received source intelligence that Taliban had emplaced 3x RCiEDs at XXX bridge, 

XXX village, XXX district. As a result of this intelligence a search was commenced. The search team 

located all three devices, consisting of 2x lOltr and Ix 20ltr jugs. All three IEDs were destroyed in situ. 

December 6: Source information indicated that Taliban were fabricating PPIEDs in a deserted compound 

in a named location in XXX district, XXX province. The compound belonged to XXX ALP Commander XXX, 

an ex-Taliban Commander who joined the reintegration process last year. As a direct result of this 

intelligence, AUP supported by ANA, ALP and NDS commenced a search of the grid location. The search 

team located 12x complete PPIEDs and 2x RPG rounds. The RPG rounds were detonated in situ and the 

12x PPIEDs were transported to XXX AUP DHQ for disposal by US Military EOD Assets. 

December 7: DPI received source intelligence that the Taliban had placed 8x PPIEDs on a 50 meter 

stretch of road in XXX village, XXX district, XXX province, approximately SOm south of XXX. The devices 

were emplaced under the cover of darkness on December 6 and were of the jug type, with victimoperated pressure plates attached. As a result of this intelligence a search operation was commenced. 

The search team located all eight of the PPIEDs which were detonated in situ. 

December 9: Following the kidnapping of a doctor in XXX on December 5, intelligence originating 

directly from the DPI allowed CF to mount an operation which led to his rescue and a number of 

insurgents killed during the operation. 

December 9: XXX DPI received information detailing a planned Taliban attack on a joint US ISAF/ALP CP, 

located within the XXX area of XXX district. The DPI officer immediately reported the details to the 

relevant US ISAF 52 cell, which was immediately fed into the ISAF/ANSF commanders at the CPo As 

anticipated, ISAF/ALP CP came under small arms fire and underslung grenade launcher rocket attack 

from multiple firing points. It is assessed by the ISAF 52 cell that due to receiving the threat warning in a 

timely and accurate manner the joint forces were able to prepare and take up defensive positions within 

the CP to enable them to react to the attack affectively. As a result there were no casualties. 

December 11: XXX DPI received information detailing the location of a recently heavily lEO seeded 

compound within the village of XXX, XXX district, which is located close to a Joint US ISAF/ALP CP and is 

an area frequently patrolled and visited by the US ISAF/ALP units. Minutes after the information had 

been passed, another report was received adding that a Joint ISAF/ALP patrol was patrolling towards the 

compound. XXX DPI immediately reported this to US ISAF 52 cell. As a result of the information relayed 

to the US ISAF 52 cell, a message was passed to the Joint ISAF/ALP on-ground patrol commanders who 

conducted a search around the reported compound; as a result there were no casualties and lOx JEDs 

were located and dealt with. 

December 11: Col XXX, the OCC-P commander requested assistance from Legacy as he had no 

interpreter and was developing a situation with one of his AN SF counterparts. Legacy ACA XXX was 

briefed by the mentor and the Col and subsequently made contact with an NDS officer who, in turn, 
85 

supplied a detailed location of an lED planted near the main highway. An operation was subsequently 

mounted by the NOS who arrested a suspected Insurgent INS. The INS admitted that he had intended to 

launch an attack on a large number of ANSF/GIRoA officers as they withdrew their wages. The INS also 

intended to detonate himself as further ANSF responded to the initial attack. Two mortar rounds to be 

used as IEDs and a suicide vest were recovered. 

December 15: DPI intelligence led to an operation and arrest of a top Insurgent in the XXX district. 

Further arrests are expected as a result of this intelligence. 

December 22: DPI received time sensitive source information that named insurgents had left XXX village 

to travel to XXX village with intent to ambush ANSF. The ANSF were alerted and were able to 

successfully engage the insurgents. 

December 15: DPI received intelligence from a known source indicating that an lED had been placed on 

the main road in the village of XXX. An operation resulted in the recovery of a fully primed lED. 

December 19: A DPI source stated that Taliban in XXX had placed a red motorcycle VBIED on the main 

road close to PHQ. An intelligence led search operation by ANP officers discovered and made safe said 

motorcycle VBIED close to XXX PHQ. 

December 20: DPI received source intelligence that insurgents had placed a remote controlled mine on 

the main road in the village of XXX. An ANP intelligence-led operation successfully discovered and made 

safe a remote controlled lED constructed from a mine in the village of XXX. 

December 23: DPI intelligence indicated that a leading Taliban commander and lED expert was resident 

in XXX village in XXX district. It was believed this commander had a munitions hide in XXX village 

containing two remote controls and five detonators. An ANP intelligence-led search operation located 

and discovered the hide containing the reported two remote controls and a quantity of detonators. 

December 23: A DPI team member conducted an emergency telephone debriefing which resulted in the 

production of a threat warning passed to AN SF and CF; this was followed up with an AIR. The 

information identified the location of a number of IEDs that had been emplaced during the previous 

evening in order to target ISAF and ANSF. ANSF deployed to the reported area of the IEDs accompanied 

by ISAF EGO where they located and detonated lx RCIED. 

December 25: As a result of DPI intelligence that a consignment of drugs was being moved along 

Highway XXX a joint DPI/ANP operation was mounted at the XXX checkpoint. As a result of the 

operation a lorry was stopped which was transporting a white minibus on the back. A search of the 

minibus resulted in 36kg of heroin being discovered. The drugs and the vehicles were taken to PHQ and 

the driver, who was arrested, handed over to the Counter Narcotics Unit (CNUl. 
86 

December 25: As a result of DPI intelligence regarding the movement of drugs from Kandahar to Kabul 

in a specific vehicle the DPI mounted an operation using the XXX checkpoint. A Toyota minibus was 

stopped and searched and found to contain 7kg of pure opium. Three persons were arrested and taken 

to PHQ along with the vehicle and the drugs and handed over to the CNU. 

April 27: As a result of DPI intelligence a joint operation was mounted in XXX village, XXX district. The 

operation, which was planned by the DPI, resulted in the following successes; Insurgent Commander 

31/C XXX province and four other insurgents were killed during a gun battle; three injured insurgents 

escaped the scene, one of whom was later reported dead from injuries sustained. Insurgent weapons 

were lost as the fleeing insurgents tried to cross the XXX river while in flood. Four motorcycles, one 

radio and one RPG rocket were seized during the operation. 

May 1: As a result of Intelligence received, an operation was mounted by the DPI in the XXX area of XXX, 

which culminated in the recovery of 10 missiles. 

May 2: As a result of intelligence gleaned from XXX the DPI became aware of planned attacks on HWY1 

between two villages in XXX district. These actions would involve large numbers of insurgents later the 

same day. The intelligence was passed to the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) with the result that ANP 

forces were tasked to the area where they subsequently engaged Taliban insurgents at XXX. During the 

battle one Taliban insurgent was killed and three others injured. There were no ANP casualties. 1x RPG, 

960x AK-47 rounds, one rocket and 1x Pakistan ID card were recovered. 

May 2: DPI intelligence indicated that a group of Taliban intended to carry out a number of attacks in 

the area of XXX. The ANP were informed and later that same evening approximately seven Taliban 

insurgents on motorcycles were engaged in a short gun battle. As a result they were chased from the 

area - no ANSF causalities were reported on this operation. It is not known if there were any Taliban 

causalities. 

May 3: As a result of MICa 2 intelligence reporting an ANSF cordon and search operation was launched 

in the vicinity of XXX village in XXX district. The MFT from MICa 2, supporting the 3rd Kandak, reported 

that the Taliban shadow governor for XXX province, "XXX", along with 20 Taliban fighters from the XXX 

district, were using the wooded area around XXX village. A joint cordon and search operation was 

launched into the wooded area of the village and a fire fight ensued. Consequently, four Taliban were 

killed and three were detained. One RPG rocket launcher, one AKM assault rifle and associated 

ammunition were recovered. 

May 5: Over the last 10 week period the DPI in XXX province has regularly submitted intelligence in 

relation to the location of approximately 1,SOOlbs of highly volatile explosive material. During the early 
87 

hours of Sunday May 5 Romanian Special Forces from FOB Airborne, supported by American SF, 

mounted a planned operation in the XXX area to deal with this cache. The explosives were located and 

neutralized in situ. 

May 5: As a result of DPI intelligence received a planned operation took place at XXX village, XXX district, 

XXX province involving DPI, ALP, ANP and NOS. After firing at Afghan security forces an arrest was made 

and the suspect was found to be wearing a sophisticated suicide vest. Weapons I explosives seized 

included the suicide vest and an AK-47 assault rifle. 

May 6: Intelligence from XXX district DPI indicated where an lED had been emplaced in the roadway 

close to XXX village, in XXX district. The ANP authorities were informed and an operation was carried 

out which successfully located the device. The ANP destroyed the device in situ. There were no arrests 

in connection with this operation. 

May 8: Information supplied by MICa 2 led to several compounds being identified as suspicious in XXX 

village, XXX district. The Information was passed to 2 Company, 6 Kandak, 2nd Brigade. The Kandak 

subsequently launched a search operation into the compounds identified by the MICa. In one 

compound a quantity of explosives and a suicide vest were found. 

May 10: Intelligence from XXX DPI indicated that an lED had been emplaced under a drainage bank at 

the bottom of XXX Hill in the area of XXX, XXX district. The device was located and destroyed following a 

search operation. 

May 15: DPI in XXX received intelligence relating to the location of an lED. The intelligence was 

disseminated to the DCOP who initiated a follow up search. ANSF conducted the search and located the 

lED which was destroyed in situ. 

May 16: XXX DPI received information indicating the location of two IEOs. This intelligence was 

disseminated to the DCOP who initiated a follow up search. ANSF conducted the search and located the 

two lEOs, which were destroyed in situ. 

May 16: The DPI and other AN SF conducted an intelligence led operation to intercept a cargo of 

weapons hidden inside a container and believed to be on route to Kabul via Jalalabad. The container 

lorry was stopped at the XXX and the driver and passenger found to be dressed in NOS uniforms. On 

searching the container they discovered equipment and weapons purporting to be from a recently 

closed FOB in XXX district in XXX province, namely 47x AK-47 assault rifles, 7x PEKA machine guns and 

military clothing. The persons dressed in NOS uniform were arrested at the scene. 

May 18: Information supplied by an MFT from MICa 2 identified the time and location of a possible 

planned Taliban ambush in the vicinity of XXX village, XXX district, XXX province. 5th Commando Kandak 
88 

were tasked to the area and as a result a 10 minute firefight ensued which resulted in one Taliban 

insurgent killed. The surviving Taliban fled the area. 

May 20: Following information received by deployed personnel of 203rd Corps, MICO (3) MFT, one 

insurgent was detained by the ANA in possession of a primed lED. 

May 20: An intelligence-led operation involving XXX DPI resulted in the arrest of a deputy Taliban 

commander and the identification and safe disposal of four IEDs. 

May 21: Intelligence from XXX district DPI indicated the location of a RCIED which had been emplaced in 

a wall alongside the road one kilometer north of XXX district center. The intelligence indicated that the 

device was to be used to attack an AUP ranger vehicle which regularly used this route. The ANP 

authorities were informed and an operation was carried out which successfully located the device. The 

device was subsequently destroyed in situ. 

May 22: The XXX team received information from a source identifying the location of an lED; the team 

passed the information to the Kandak. The MHT subsequently deployed to the area with an element of 

the Kandak and recovered the lED. During the search operation the team received further information 

by telephone from the source; this led the MHT to a compound where they detained an individual 

suspected of em placing the lED. 

May 23: Intelligence from XXX district DPI indicated the location of an anti-vehicle lED which had been 

dug into the center of the non-asphalt road in XXX village, XXX district, XXX province. The device was 

subsequently located and defused by the AUP. 

May 23: As a result of DPI source intelligence AUP and ALP officers commenced a search of a given grid 

location. The search team located a PPIED emplaced at the side of the road. The device was recovered 

and transported to a local AUP CP for forensic exploitation and destruction by ISAF. 

May 24: DPI intelligence led to the discovery of two remote controllEDs which had been placed under a 

bridge in the vicinity of XXX Road, XXX district, XXX province. The IEDs were made safe by the EOD 

engineering team from XXX provincial PHQ. 

May 27: As a direct result of intelligence received by the DPI an lED was recovered and made safe in the 

XXX area of XXX district. 

May 27: Source intelligence received indicated that approximately 250 Taliban insurgents armed with 

AK-47s, PKMs, RPG-7s and mortars planned to attack and overrun a series of named ALP, ANP and ANA 

checkpoints between XXX and XXX, along the XXX valley, effectively cutting off XXX district. As a result, a 

total of four infantry rifle companies were deployed to the area. The operation disrupted the attack as it 
89 

began, with an estimated 100 Insurgents being dispersed. Following an intermittent firefight, lasting 

almost 12 hours, four insurgents were detained with the only injuries incurred by ANSF being an ANA 

soldier with GSW to his right hand. Insurgent casualties/fatalities are unknown at this time. 

OBSERVATIONS 

Over the course of Legacy's delivery we have received feedback from beneficiaries or monitors of the 

program. A selection of these is provided below. 

n. and their actions may have prevented an 

attack against my Marines. True professionals and team players, [your 

have been a real pleasure to work with . 

Lt Gen Nicholas Carter, Deputy 

Commander, ISAF 

Cpt Kemp, SFAT 52 Commanding 

Officer, FOB Tarin Kat, RC-S 

US Government, Combating 

Terrorism Technical Support Office, 

2012 Review 

Cpt Clements, Commanding 

Officer, operational element, US 

9th Marine Regt, RC-SW 

. ~ .. ~~ .. -----~-~.~~~~-~--.. ~~~~~-~.~~-~-~-------.--~---~ 

23 February 2012 

! am proud to have overseen the Legacy program on my watch. There 

has been a tangible increase of exploitable intelligence directly as a 

product of the Legacy training. This has resulted in the recovery of; 

weapons, ammunition, explosives and the arrests of insurgents,.. ! am 

leaving Fiaz next week and returning to the USA to brief the new SFA 

commanders. My recommendation to them is that they continue in the 

same direction. 

9 February 2012 

Colonel Connor, Commanding 

Officer, FOB Fiaz, RC-E 

The Legacy program has produced substantial results in RC-S .0> under the Brigadier General Schweitzer, DCG, 

Legacy training and mentoring programs, the quality and reliability of the Operations 

[ANSF 
90 

At cnso they are looked at as the 

The Legacy program possesses an unequalled ability to enable the AN SF 

police and military intelligence forces to penetrate insurgent and 

criminal networks ... the Legacy program provides an unmatchable 

means to provide full-time, in-depth HUMINT training to the ANSF 

forces. 

6 May 2010 

Legacy has demonstrated a ground-breaking approach for rapidly 

establishing host-nation security force intelligence capacity and 

capability, first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. 

The effects of the Legacy approach are potentially game-changing in 

Afghanistan. 

January 2010 

Th[isJ is a superb program which delivers a critical capability to partner 

nation counterinsurgency forces and valuable collateral benefits to US 

forces. Legacy is an exceptional program that clearly benefits the overall 

US COIJme"nSIJreen'cv 

27 August 2009 

I never realized just how good the training was. The students are totally 

absorbed it. 

Bryan Taylor, Program Analyst 

SETA Contract Support Staff, cnso 

Colonel Hayatullah, CommandantANITC 

Colonel Chester, Divisional Chief 

Mal CSTC-A 

Major General Mallory, DCG 

NTM-A j CSTC-A 

Counterinsurgency 

and Assistance teams (CAAT) RC-S 

report 

Major General Toolan, Commander 

-II MEF (FWD) j RC-SW 

General McChrystal, CommanderISAF 

US Government - Commissioned 

Independent Assessment, LUKaS 

Lieutenant General Helmick, 

Commander - MNSTC-Ij NTM-A 
91 

TRANSITION 

General John Allen, Deputy 

Commander - US CENTCOM 

General John Allen, Deputy 

It's making a difference. It's Commander - US CENTCOM 

The proof of a successful program is the eventual autonomous application of the underlying skills, 

doctrine and processes without the presence of mentors and trainers, coupled with an indigenous ability 

for host nation personnel to teach the know-how to future generations of intelligence officers I source 

handlers. Therefore, the desired end state of the Legacy program is to have transitioned ANP DPI and 

ANA G2 units at the national, provincial, district and local level to this independent, self-sufficient state, 

To evaluate progress towards this end state, an empirical performance and compliance measurement 

system, entitled the Professional Standards Transition Model (PSTM), has been designed and introduced 

by program personnel. This dynamically assesses the competency in the HUMINT capability of units and 

mentees, 

Specifically assigned Performance Compliance Officers (PCOs) inspect every mentoring location on a 

regular basis in order to evaluate and score the progress of six categories of technical activity in the 

context of supporting the ANSF HIMINT capability, These are: 

Doctrine as developed by NC's Technical Department and delivered by the mentors 

Operational command and control and operational deployment 

Materiel- the equipment, apparatus, supplies and security of sites to support the capability 

Personnel- recruitment, retention, training, motivation and personal development 

Training to facilitate the transfer of the HUMINT skills to mentees to enable operational 

performance to be enhanced and institutionalized 

Relationships, such as those between commanders and their subordinates, and amongst the 

mentees within their own organizations and with other ANSF bodies, 

The PSTM adopts an Aspect Rating Scheme (ARS) which establishes a scoring mechanism for each of the 

four key attributes of the PSTM measurables, namely: 

People ability 

Doctrine - proficiency 

Administration - efficiency 

Institutiona lization, 
92 

Through the application of the ARS to each of the measurables linked to a capability, PCOs collect data 

that provides an indication on the performance of individual members of the AN SF and the degree of 

institutionalization within the organization. Aggregate scores are applied across the measurables for 

each individual capability and a performance score (0 to 5) is attained for that capability. The aggregate 

scores across all capabilities within each category provide a score for that category. 

The model intelligently discriminates between those aspects of the measurables which the Legacy 

program can control, those which can be influenced, and those over which the program has no control. 

Each aspect has been tagged using these discriminators within the supporting bespoke software. 

In summary, PSTM provides the basis for a multi-dimensional and multi-tiered management tool 

designed to capture a wide range of data through inspections by PCOs. The model enables an objective 

determination to be reached as to the readiness of the assessed component of the AN SF organization to 

transition to independent operation. It does this through analyzing collected data to measure the 

performance of mentees and AN SF sites, along with the transfer of HUMINT skills and doctrine 

application. It also facilitates an assessment of the institutionalization of the program through the 

application of the ARS to the measurable linked to each capability. 

Customized software generates a number of valuable reports illustrating, primarily graphically, the state 

of each assessed ANSF HUMINT component, and its quantifiable compliance with the performance 

metrics which track its readiness to transition. Process adjustments can be made to the mentoring and 

training provided, and I or recommended to the relevant ANSF leadership in order to minimize the 

timeframe to achieve the requisite level of autonomous capability to achieve transition. 

We believe that the PSTM is an unique tool and that Legacy is the only capacity-building program which 

incorporates an integrated, empirical measurement tool to: (1) monitor progress towards the desired 

end state of a fully transitioned capability; (2) provide empirical feedback to the US Government 

program managers on performance and progress; and (3) assist project personnel deliver their capacitybuilding mission and expediently achieve transition. 

An example of a location transition status report is provided below. 

USt~ 
93 

Professional Standards Transition Model: Transition Report (LEI 

Executive Summary 

011 
94 

ILLUSTRATIONS 

One technique by which we capture a record of the achievements and success of the Legacy program 

has been the compilation and maintenance of an extensive picture gallery. The photo montage below is 

an illustration of this. 

Procedures and relationships that exist have 

resulted in quantitative and qualitative examples 

of key organizational advances with mentee 

organizations. 

Regional Manager of RC-S awarding 'Best DPI 

8SMC Student' at FOB Walton 

Transition of training to the Afghans 

developed with excellent cultural awareness 

of training teams and exemplified by ANSF 

control of some HUMINT training. 

Legacy training delivery and materials has been 

greatly appreciated by the Afghans and regularly 

recognized for its quality by CF. 

NC and Afghan co-delivery of police training at PITC, 

Kabul 
95 

Infrastructure, equipment and supplies 

procured and set up during Legacy have proven 

to be absolutely fit-for-purpose. Lessons 

Learned have produced a flexible and enduring 

approach to the building and transition of 

HUMINT capability for the ANSF. 

Weapons cache recovered at Kandahar 

The doctrine has been grounded in the field as 

a result of Qur high level of expertise in COIN 

police and military operations. This expertise is 

both relevant to Legacy and has endowed our 

customers - the US Government and ANSF 

with a sense of value and confidence. 

Legacy infrastructure at the BAF Compoundincludes closs rooms, offices, and accommodation 

Legacy is developing an intelligence capability in 

the ANSF that is effective and increasingly 

institutionalized in the country. Countless 

operational successes are greatly indicative of 

this. 

HUMINT mentor debriefing mentee at FOB Geronimo 

17 
96 

FURTHER INFORMATION 

A full set of the Operational Successes monthly reports of which examples are set out in the "Successes" 

section above, and other statistics can be furnished by the Irregular Warfare Support Program at CTTSO, 

The POC is: 

Bryan Taylor 

Email 

Telephone 

Subject Matter Expert, IWSP 

brya n ,taylor.ctr@cttso,gov 

(571) 372-7226 

For any further information required of New Century please contact: 

Michael Grunberg Chief Operating Officer 

Email 

Telephone 

michael,grunberg@newcenlcorp,com 

+44 1481 700 001 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 28, 2013 

(99) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In Unisys’ experience of integrating biometrics solutions for international customers, what lessons have you seen that might be applied to our own 

biometrics challenges? 

Mr. COHN. See attached. 
100 

The second broad area of applications for biometric technology is access control systems typically used to 

protect facilities, borders, or computer networks. These systems generally focus on the ability to perform 

fully automated verification of authorized access for known cooperative subjects and to refuse entry to 

others. Significant trends for such systems include greater scalability (spanning dozens of locations under 

a single control system), enterprise integration with centralized identity and human resource management 

systems, and dramatic grown in the adoption of biometrics to lower operating costs and increase security. 

Fast reliable response often depends on rapid exchange and dense storage of compact preprocessed 

biometric templates that are almost always vendor-specific instead of the larger image files used for 

collection by identification systems and selection of biometric technologies suitable for verification in a 

specific use case scenario such as hand vein geometry, voice, or keystroke recognition. Applications 

range from relatively small systems to secure an individual manufacturing or critical infrastructure facility 

with a biometric to fully integrated architectures protecting overseas nuclear reactors and secure supply 

chain operations with a multiple overlapping security technologies. Biometrics can scale across large 

enterprises, prevent fraud, and eliminate impostor threats when compared with traditional credential based 

systems that rely on controlled distribution of physical badges. For example, a restricted area whose 

access is controlled by badge and PIN can easily be compromised if an individual's credential is "loaned" 

to another person; this is prevented· when a biometric is used instead. Globally, receptivity to these 

applications is paralleled by growing consumer acceptance of biometrics for personal convenience in one 

to one verification scenarios for retail banking, cell phone access, and expedited movement through 

security access points. 

The third broad area of expanded biometrics use is behavior monitoring and intelligence applications 

emerging from passive collection systems such as public space surveillance. Popular for soccer hooligan 

detection and urban area street crime prevention, this is increasingly commonplace for customer and 

adversary identification in commercial settings and we believe will be a growing element in physical 

security information management systems. These are generally uncontrolled collections reliant on 

different sensor technologies than the first two functional areas and often include unwitting subjects. 

Industry developments here obviously have tremendous value in force protection. 

Although biometrics as a general topic clearly encompasses all of these functional areas - plus issues 

associated with system integrity and other security controls, privacy protection, and countermeasures --

there is substantial heterogeneity in the use cases involved, the technologies used, and the general 

architectural approaches that must be employed. The Department of Defense has requirements that span 

this full range and is almost uniquely challenged to exploit the potential for biometrics in additional future 
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areas. Therefore, it may be useful to know that international developments have led to an industry 

response where we now can speak of a common platform, architecture, and proven toolset to assist in 

addressing this wide range of challenges coherently and that some leading international organizations are 

already utilizing. 

Let us now return to consider specific lessons learned from experience implementing large scale storematch-share identification systems. Foremost among these is the value of software reuse. Unisys was 

one of the first companies to realize the potential benefits of software reusability as a means of reducing 

cost and managing risk, while accelerating the associated time-to-capability delivery. To that end, we 

embraced Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and developed our early biometrics projects in the context 

of a standards-based framework. This framework serves as a foundation in which reusable software 

components can be easily and rapidly integrated with other third-party software and hardware 

technologies. With many subsequent successful customer solution deployments, we are now 

implementing projects with our third-generation reusable framework, that we call the Library of 

Electronic Identity Artifacts (LElDA). LElDA is a framework of reusable identity artifacts that can be 

readily integrated with a variety of other technologies, (e.g., matching algorithms, hardware platforms, 

commercial "middleware") to quickly and economically develop and deploy new biometrics solutions 

that are flexible, secure, and highly scalable. 

A second key observation from our experience is that cost-effective scalable biometric identification 

solutions depend less and less over time on the unique characteristics of a particular biometric matching 

algorithm and data collection technology such as an individual vendor's fingerprint, facial recognition, or 

iris matcher and will generally depend more on other technical and architectural characteristics. The 

reduced criticality of vendor-specific features implemented for individual biometric technologies is 

because we have been successfully implementing industry-wide cross-vendor interoperability standards 

for fingerprint in the late 1980's and into the 1990's and face and iris in the last decade, have seen 

significant improvements in sensor and match processor cost and perfonnance over the same period, and 

have proven the business case advantages of multi-modal matching and cross-vendor integrations. 

Biometric identification systems must still focus much attention on data collection and image capture 

quality control because input of useable biometric and biographical information is central for both live 

samples and batch imports; both of which are becoming more routine and standardized as software and 

hardware vendor dependency declines. The ability to perform matches across modalities (e.g., fingerprint 

and face or iris) with a multi-modal fusion service is in our view the key to growing system scale with 

fewer biometric examiners rather than incremental improvement in performance for anyone modality. 
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Beyond tuning the system to perfonn the appropriate scale biometric identity matching, we often find the 

elevated program implementation risk, complexity, and implementation challenges generally come from 

other functional areas such as the need to provide additional services to support identity management 

workflows and client business rules, the effort and time to customize systems for specific 

implementations occasionally discovered during or even after system integration, and to generate and 

manage reports such as watchlists and handle exceptions. The most important feature of the system to 

reduce risk and save time and money can now be the ability to plug in new logic, configure new 

interfaces, and to flexibly adjust workflow and system behavior without time-consuming cycles of custom 

software development and testing. 

Accordingly, experience has led the industry to concentrate on delivering mature capabilities so that our 

clients receive the following benefits (with examples to illustrate how we make that happen): 

Full Life-Cycle Support: With a library that includes more than 600 reusable artifacts, 

we can more quickly automate the entire identity management life cycle, from biometric 

collection, enrollment, identification, storage, expert examination, and results through 

credential production and document authentication 

Vendor Independence: Our framework supports plug-and-play of different vendors' 

technologies, while minimizing or eliminating the need for code changes. This enables 

quick and easy integration of preferred COTS hardware or software from mUltiple 

vendors.l LEIDA is also a proven means of implementing mUltiple vendors' algorithms 

within a single modality. Some of this is due to strong promotion of relevant standards.2 

Multi-Modal Functionality: LEIDA provides a repeatable foundation for integrating 

any combination of fingerprint, face, iris, voice, palm, latent, and signature collection, 

and fused or single modality matching for identification (I :many), verification (1 : I), and 

watch lists. 

Scalability and Flexibility: LEIDA uses a flexible and repeatable SOA-based open 

architecture designed never to limit scalability or perfonnance. Although LEIDA can be 

deployed to support much larger implementations, current deployments support galleries 

up to 110 million. These have been fully tested in field deployments and designed to 

scale to more than 250,000 biometric enrollments per day. It can be deployed centrally 

as an authoritative source or as a standalone or fully integrated distributed system. It is 

also flexible enough to be support smaller scale systems and has been used to implement 

mobile enrollment and matching capabilities on Windows and iOS platfonns. 

Speed to Capability: Although SOA techniques offer comparatively little value when 

1 Examples of vendors whose technologies are integrated within LEIDA include Safran MorphoTrust (formerly L-l 

Identity Solutions), Safran MorphoTrak, NEC, Iris 10, Cognitec, Daon, 3M, Hoyos, Oracle, Cross Match, AOptix, 

Aware, IBM, wee Group, and ImageWare Systems 

2 LEIDA is compliant with many domain-specific standards, including international standards such as ISO/lEe, 

BioAPl, CBEFF, and u.s. Government standards such as ANSI/INCITS, EBTS, EFTS, NFIQ, and FBI-certified WSQ. 
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they are used to develop one-off custom solutions, they are extremely powerful when the 

resulting technology is reused across multiple projects or deployments. Many of our 600 

reusable artifacts represent individual use cases that support rapid repackaging and 

deployment with minimal need for development and testing. The reuse of so many 

already proven artifacts with a repeatable service delivery methodology enables the 

delivery of complex solutions in a fraction of the time required by traditional custom 

development. For example, the large Mexico National ID program leveraged the LEIDA 

artifact library with the system ready for production within 12 months of contract award. 

In our international marketplace, the reality is that acquisition cost can trump other factors with customers 

some times forced to choose to trade cost against del ivery speed or risk avoidance, an important or 

desired element of functionality, andlor targeted run-time performance which may be important to the 

mission. Therefore, our goal has been to increase affordability during initial standup and reduce long 

term cost of ownership without compromising schedule, functionality, or performance. We have adopted 

several strategies. First, we avoid development effort which reduces both cost and time by re-use. 

Second, our programmatic structured approach for re-use reduces each customer's maintenance costs by 

integrating mature components already fully tested from earlier engagements to minimize re-work and 

longer run by sharing costs of improvements over time. As new capabilities are developed and refined, 

they are added to the framework and are made available for each subsequent client implementation and 

also are readily available to enhance or extend previous LEIDA deployments. Third, our customers can 

benefit from algorithm vendor independence through reduced license fees for matchers in each modality 

through competition and competitive analysis. Last and perhaps most important, when changes are 

required LEIDA facilitates easy configuration and adapting workflows, business rules, and transaction 

management, with minimal code change to keep pace with evolving requirements reducing labor support 

cost and time to respond to new or emerging needs while minimizing the risk of disruptions to integration 

progress or even worse to ongoing operations by destabilizing the system if already in production. 

Beyond these lessons leamed about large scale identification systems and integration practices 

embodied in the Unisys LEIDA framework, our industry and international experience also has 

brought to us information relevant to the biometrics challenges facing the United States today 

regarding mobile collection, force protection including capture at a distance, and emerging 

commercial and consumer uses that can be applied to DoD missions. I discussed each of these in 

my earlier testimony and would be happy to provide supplementary material on those topics in 

an appropriate setting if that would be useful. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with the subcommittee on these important topics.