Plaintiff’s Complaint named as the De fenda nt the then-Commissioner of Social 1 Security , J o Anne B . Ba

rnhar t. As Ms. Bar

nhart wa s sued in her of

ficial c apac ity , the Court has substitut ed the c urre nt Comm issioner of Social Secur ity , Michae l J . Astrue, a s the Def endant pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 25(d)
. TANETAGUTHRI E, on beha lf of J EMAL POWE, Plaintiff,
v. MI CHAEL

J . ASTRUE, Commi ssioner of S o c i a l S e c ur i ty, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 05-029 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 31, 2009) Currently pendingbefor e the Court ar e Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reve rsal and Def endant’ s Motion for J udg ment of Aff irmance , respe ctively , of the de cision of an Ad min istrativ e L aw Jud g e (“ AL J”) de nyingSup ple me nta l Se c ur ity Inc ome B e ne fi ts ( “ SSI B ” ) t o Plaintiff J emal Powe, who ha s broug ht suit by and through his mother Tane ta Guthrie, pur suant to Title XVIof the Social Sec urity Act. Af ter re viewingthe par

ties’ brief s, the administrative
rec ord, and the rele vant ca se law a nd statutory

authority , the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s [7] Motion for J udg ment of Rever sal and GRANT Def endant’ s [9] Motion for J udg ment of Affir mance . 1 I. BACKG ROUND A. Le

ga l F ra me wor k an d Pro c e du ra l H

istor y On J anuar

y 9, 2002, Tane ta Guthrie f iled an application for SSI B on be half of he r son,Plaintiff’s application alleg ed that his disability commence d September 28, 2001, but 2 Pla int if f s ub se qu e ntl y

ame nd e d h is o ns e t da

te to Janu ary

9, 20 02 . Pl .’ s Mo t. at 1- 2 & n. 1; A .R. at 52. Al l c itatio ns to t

he C.F .R. , o r a

ny su bs e c tio n th e re of

, r e fe r t o th e 20 08 re gulatio ns un le ss 3 otherwise note d. 2 J emal Powe ( born in 1992), pursua nt to Titl e XVI

of the Social Sec urity

Act. Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2; Admin. Record ( “A.R.”) at 17. Plaintiff’s application for SSI B w as base d on alleg ed lea rning 2 disabiliti es constituting se vere functional limitations. P l.’s Mot. at 2; A.R. at 79. After Plaintiff’s claims wer e denie d initially and upon re consideration, he reque sted a hear ing be fore an AL J . A.R. at 16, 38. That hea ringoccur

red on A pril 1, 2003, and Plaintiff was repr esente d by

counsel. Id. at 16, 162. In a dec ision dated May 2, 2003, the AL J denied Plaintiff’s reque sted bene fits. Id. at 13-22. In order to place the AL J ’s opinion in context , the Co urtset s fo rt h b elo w t he l egal fra mew orkrel evan t t o P lai nt if f’s app li cat io n fo r S S I B. To be e ligible f

or SSI B, a

child must be disabled within the meaningof Title XVI of the Social Security

Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.901 (2008)
. The Social Sec urity Administration (“SSA”) 3 will consider a c hild disabled if he or she has “a medically

deter minable phy sical or menta l imp a ir me nt o r c omb inatio n o f i mpa ir me nts tha t c a us e s ma rk e d a nd se ve re fu nc tio na l li mit atio ns , and that . . . has la sted or ca n be expected to last for

a continuous per iod of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.906. A three -step seque ntial evaluation is used to deter mine whether a child is elig ible for SSI B on the basis of a disability . 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. This evaluation involves determining : (1) whe ther the c hild is enga g ed in substantial g ainful ac tivity ; (2) whe ther the child has a

n impairment or a c ombination of impairments that is severe ; and (3) whether the ch i l d h as an i mp ai rm en t (s ) t h atm ee t s , m ed i ca l l y equ al s , o r f

un ct i o n al l y

equ al s th e l i s t i n gs included in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. I f the c hild is enga g ed in substantial3

g ainful ac tivity

or does not have an impairment or c ombination of impairments that is severe , the child is considere d not disabled and the e valuation does not progress to the ne x t step. Id. In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a c hil d’ s im

pa ir me nt( s) fu

nc tio na lly e qu a ls a lis te d im pa ir me nt, the SSA considers six separ ate “ domains” or a rea s of func tioning, which inc lude: (1) Ac quiring
and us inginf or matio n; ( 2) Atte nd ingand c omp le tin gta sk s; ( 3) Inte ra c tin gand re latin gwi th others; (4) Movingabout and manipulatingobjects; (5) Car ing f or yourself; a

nd (6) He alth and phy sical we ll-being . 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b) (1)( i)-(vi). I n order to functionally

equal a listed i mp a i r m e n t , a c h i l d ’ s i mp a i r

m e n t“ mu s tb e o f

l i s t i n g - l e v e l s e v e r i ty; i.e. , it mus t r e su lt i n ‘marke d’ limitations i n two domains of func tioning or a n ‘extreme’ limitation in one domain.” Id. § 4 16 .9 26 a (a ). A “ mark e d” lim itatio n e xists wh e n a c hil d’ s im

pa ir me nt “ se ri ou sly

int e rf e re s” with his or her “ ability

to independently

initiate, sustain, or complete a ctivities.” Id. § 41 6. 92 6a (e )( 2) (i ). Th e SSAde sc ri be s a “ mark e d” lim itatio n a s “ mor e tha n mo de ra te ” but “ le ss than extreme,” a

nd will ge nera lly

find a “ marke d” limitation when a child has a “valid scor e that is two standard de viations or more be low the mean, but less than thr ee sta ndard de viations, on a compre hensive standa

rdized test desig ned to measur e ability or func tioning in that domain, and [t he child’s] day -to-day

functioningin domain-related ac tiviti es is consistent with that score.” Id. § 416.926a(e )(2) (i), (iii). An “ extreme” limitation is “more than marke d” but “doe s not
nece ssarily

mean a total lack or loss of a

bility to function.” Id. § 4 16 .0 26 a (e )( 3) (i ). Th e SSA will ge nera lly

find an “ extreme” limitation when a c hild has a “va lid score that is three standard deviations or more below the mea n on a compr ehensive standardized test desig ned to measur e ability or func tioning in that domain, and [the child’s] day -to-day functioningin domain-related activities is consistent with that score.” Id. § 416.926a(e )(3) (iii).4

In th e ins tant c a se , at Ste p O ne , th e AL J found tha t Pla int if f h a d n ot e ng a g e d in substantial ga inful activity since the a lleg ed onset of the disability . A.R. at 21. At Step Two, the AL J found that Plaintiff’s “spe ech a nd languag e dela

y ; and B I F [border line intellectual functioning ] are seve re, w ithin the meaningof the re gulations.” Id. at 17. At Step Three , the AL J found that Plaintiff did not meet or medica lly equal Sec tion 112.05 (“Mental Reta rdation”) of the SSA’ Childhood L istings for disa bility evaluation under Social Secur ity
. See id. at 17-18. Th e AL J the n c ontin

ue d to c on sid e r “ wh e the r [Pl a int if f] h a s a n im pa ir me nt t hat is functionally

equivalent in seve rity

to any listed impairment.” Id. at 18. The A L J discussed the rele vant standar ds and the e vidence contained in the A dminist rative Rec ord, includingtesting results, school re cords, a

nd testimony

duringthe administrative hea ring , and found that Plainti ff ha d “ mark e d li mit atio n” in t he do ma in o f A c qu ir ingand Us ingInf

or matio n. A. R. at 20 . A s to the re maining doma ins, the AL J found that Plaintiff had e ither “le ss than marke d limit ations” or “no limitation.” Id. at 20-21. The AL J conclude d that “[b] eca use [Pl aintiff] does not have ‘extreme’ limitation in one are a of f unctioning or

‘marke d’ limitation i n two are as/domains, he does not have an impairment that is func tionally equivalent in seve rity

to any listed impairment.” Id. at 21. Fina lly , havingdeter mined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment (or impairments) that mee ts, medically equals, or f

unctionally

equals a ny of the impairments listed,” the AL J con c lud e d th at Pla int if f d oe s n ot h ave “ a

‘d isa bil ity ’ a s d e fi ne d in

the Soc ia l Se c ur ity Act,” a nd there fore is “not elig ible for Supplemental Sec urity Income pa

y ments.” Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff appea led the AL J ’s dec ision, but t he Appe als Council determined the re w as no ba sis fo r gra

nti ngre vie w. A. R. a

t 3- 5. Ha vin gfu lly e xha us te d h is a dmi nis tr ativ e re me die s, Pla int if f t ime ly fi le d s uit in t his Court .5

B. Ev ide nc e Con tai ne d in theAd mi nis tra tiv e Re c or

d The AL J evaluated Plaintiff’s condition based on e vidence including te sting by the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Pub lic Sc ho ols (“ DC PS” ), DC PS st ud e nt r e c or ds , a

Chi ldh oo d D isa

bil ity Evaluation by

the Social Secur ity

Administration, information provided by Plaintiff’s mother, and the testimony

of Plaintiff and his mother duringthe administrative hea ring . No forma l medical e x amination is contained in the a dminist rative r ecor d, see A.R. at 1-2, and nothingin the
rec ord sug g ests such an e x amination was a dminist ere d, a fa ct Plaintiff cited in his reque st for an AL J hear ing a s evidenc e that the soc ial secur ity deter mination was flawe d, see id. at 38. The Court rec ounts below the most releva nt portions of the administrative re cord. 1. DCPS Testingand Rec ord of Ac ademic A chieve ment The Administrative Rec ord (“ A.R.”) c ontains Plainti ff’ s rec ords from the D CPS for the pe ri od June 6, 20 01 to F e br

ua ry 3, 20 03 . A .R. at 11 5- 12 8, 14 7- 16 2. Ac c or din gto t ho se re c or ds , Plaintiff was re fer

red f or eva luation “to deter

mine his need for

specia l education services” afte r twice r epeating the f

irst gr ade. Id. at 12 2. On June 7, 20 01 , a

DC PS Sc ho ol P syc ho log ist , An g e la Jef fe rs on , e va luate d Pl a int if f a nd de te rm ine d th at “ [h]is g e ne ra l c ognit ive a bil ity
. . . is border line,” and that his “verba l and per formanc e ability score s were also in the border line rang e.” Id. at 124-25. The School Psy cholog ist conducted a series of tests, specifica lly

the Wechsler Intellige nce Sca le for Children – T hird Edition (“WI SC-I I I ”), the Test of Nonve rbal Inte lli g e nc e – T hir d E dit ion (“ TO NI -3 " ), and

the Wec hs le r I

nd ivi du a l A c hie ve me nt T e st (“WIAT”) , and also c onsulted with Pl aintiff’s tea cher
. Id. at 122. The WI SC-I I Iestimated Plaintiff’s g ener al cognitive ability as “bor derline ( FSI Q = 71) ,” and his ve rbal a nd perf ormanc e ability “in the norma l rang e (V I Q [Verbal I Q] = 78, and PI Q [P erf ormanc e I Q] = 70).” Id . at6

124-25. On a

“languag e-f

ree measure of cognitive ability , TONI -3, [Pl aintiff] rece ived a quotient of 89 that place d him justbelow the avera g e ra ng e at the 24th pe rce ntile.” Id. at 124. Plaintiff also perf

ormed in the be low aver ag e ra ng e in mathematics, a lthough this is an ar ea of streng th in comparison to his weake r per formanc e ar eas. Id. at 122-24. The Psy cho-Educ ational Re po rt c re ate d f ro m th is e xami natio n c on c lud e d th at Pla int if f d id “ no t a

pp e ar t o me e t th e c ri te ri a of a student with a spe cific le arningdisability or mental re tardation. He appe ars to be mor e of a slow learne r.” Id. The re port rec ommended tutoring , aca demic enr ichment, and a dditional speec h and languag e eva luation. Id. On a Septembe r 24, 2001, a D CPS Speech/L anguag e Patholog ist L inda B rown e x amined Pla int if f, su bs e qu e ntl y

c re atin ga

“ Spe e c h/L angua g e Ev a luatio n Re po rt ,” ba se d u po n th e re su lts of this examination. Id. at 11 8. Th e Re c e pti ve On e -Wo rd Pic tur e Vo c a

bu lary Te st (“ROWPVT”) a dminist ere d duringthe exam indicated Plaintiff’s “r ece ptive vocabula ry (how well the child under stands)” w as “w ithin the normal rang e of de velopment.” Id. at 119. The Expr e ssi ve On e -Wo rd

Pic tur e Vo c a

bu lary Te st ( “ EO WPVT -R ” ), wh ic h me a sure s th e “ a bil ity to identify a sing le object or

g roup of objec ts on the basis of a sing le conc ept,” indicated Plaintiff’s “expressive voc abular

y skills were a

pproxi mately

2.8 y ear s delayed.” Id. The Clinical Ev a luatio n o f L angua g e F un dame nta ls ( “ CELF -3 " ), wh ic h is “ de signe d to ide nti fy ind ivi du a ls who lack the basic founda tion of content and f

orm that cha

rac terized mature la

nguag e use,” indicated Plaintiff’s “ ability to proce ss and under stand verba l communication” wa s in the “seve rely delayed ra

ng e of de velopment.” Id. at 119-20. Additionally , Plaintiff’s articulation skills were “ within the ‘mildly ’ dela y ed ra ng e.” Id. at 121. The r eport c oncluded that Plaintiff’s

“ re c e pti ve and

e xpre ssi ve langua g e sk ill s sh owse ve re de fi c its ,” wa rr anti ng“ the ra

pe uti c7

intervention.” Id. at 121. Pursuant to the rec ommendations in these re ports, a DCPS “multi disciplinary team,” comprised of

various educ ational profe ssionals and Plaintiff’s mother, met on September 28, 20 01 and de te rm ine d a

mixe d p ro g ra

m of “ g e ne ra l e du c atio n a

nd re so ur c e c la ssr oo m” tim e would provide the “ intensive/individualiz ed instruction” ne eded g iven that Plaintiff was “sig nificantly

below g rade level.” Id. at 115. An Individualiz ed Educ ation Prog ram (“ I EP”) wa s
cre ated pur suant to these re commendations, notingthat while Plaintiff’s “r ece ptive vocabula ry sk ill s are wi thi n n or

ma l r ang e of

de ve lop me nt, ” his c omm un ic atio n d isa

bil ity “ a ff e c ts a c a de mic perf ormanc e in all ar eas.” Id. at 67 . Und e r t he I EP Pl a int if

f w ou ld s pe nd

a pp ro ximate ly

ha lf his time outside of the “r egular e ducation setting ,” fifte en hours pe r we ek in spec ialized inst ruction and one hour

per w eek in spe ech a

nd languag e ther apy . Id. at 66. The I EP also called f or testing
acc ommodations, specifica lly “extended time,” wor

king in a “small g roup,” a

nd “re petition of direc tions, sim plified direc tions.” Id. at 73. On Fe bruar

y 3, 2003, a smaller ve rsion of this multi disciplinary team met and c reated an updated Individualiz ed Educ ation Prog ram a fter de terminingthat Plaintiff “continues to be elig ible for spe cial educ ation service s as a student who is spee ch and la nguag e impaire d.” Id. at 15 1. Pla int if

f’ s “ sp e c ia l e du c atio n te a c he r r e po rt e d th at [he ] co nti nu e s to sh owimp ro ve me nt” and a “ willingness to wor k,” howe ver his “r eadingskills continues [ sic] to be below g rade level but, [ sic] he has shown some improvement.” Id. at 16 0. Un de r t his ne w I EP Pl a int if

f w a s to
c ontin ue sp e nd inga

pp ro ximate ly

ha lf his tim e outsi de the “ re gula r e du c atio n s e tti ng ,” wi th fi ft ee nh o urs p er

we eki ns p ec i al i z edi n s tru ct i o nan d o n e h o ur p er

we eki ns p ee ch an d

l an gu age thera py . Id. at 148. Notes fr om the I EP review me etingalso stated that Plaintiff’s spec ial8

education teache r “f

eels that [Plainti ff] has made lot’s [sic] of prog ress a nd should continue [special education] service s.” Id. at 160. An additional Mar ch 31, 2002 letter written by

Sharon M. Be verly -Gomillion, the Special Education Coordinator, discussed Plaintiff’s af ter-sc hool tutoring. Id. at 161. The le tter noted that Plaintiff “ha s begun to show improvement but continues to function sig nigic antly [si c] below g rade level in both rea ding a nd mathematics,” and he “c ontinues to need a dditional support in order to re ach his potential.” Id. The DCPS recor ds and examinations repeatedly state that Plaintiff was c ooperative, communicative, a

nd attentive throug hout all testing. See, e .g., id. at 122. 2. Social Security

Administration Chi ldhood Disability Evaluation On Marc h 7, 2002, Gomma Nac hbahr, Ph.D., a Disability

Deter mination Service Consultant, conducted a disa bility evaluation of Plainti ff in conne ction with his application for SSI B. A .R. at 130-35; Def .’s Aff . Mot. at 3-4. Dr. N achba hr re lied upon prior psychoeducational testing, DCPS recor ds, and information provided by Plaintiff’s mother in forming conclusions about Plaintiff’s impairments. Id. Dr. Na chbahr noted the primar

y conce rn motivating this examination was an “a lleg ation of trouble lea rningin school.” Id. at 133. B ased upon the evidenc e, Dr . Nac hbahr c oncluded that Plaintiff suff ere d from a “ Rece ptive-Expressive L anguag e De lay

” and “ Bor derline Intellectual F unctioning.” Id. at 130. Dr . N a c hb a

hr ’s re po rt

e xami ne d th e e vid e nc e in r e latio n to e a c h o f t he six “ do ma ins ” rele vant to deter

mining the se verity

of an impairme nt. See id. at 132-35. Dr . Nac hbahr deter mined Plaintiff had a “ marke d” impairment in the a rea of “A cquiringand Using Inf or matio n, ” a s e vid e nc e d b y te st r e su lts and

the mot he r’ s d isc us sio n o f P la int if f’ s f un c tio na lity in this area. Id. at 132. Plaintiff had a “ less than marke d” impairment in “A ttending a nd9

Completing Tasks,” as evide nced by his requiringextra time on schoolwork, completion of homework “ (not nec essar ily on time),” c ompletion of household chore s, and attention span. Id. Pla int if f h a d a sim ila rl y “ le ss t ha n ma rk e d” imp a ir

me nt i n “ Inte ra c tin gand

Re latin gwi th Othe rs ,” a s e vid e nc e d b y

“ mil dly de lay e d” art ic ulatio n s kil ls a nd his g e ne ra lly

g e tti nga lon gwe ll with others. Id. Dr. Na chbahr found no limitations or im pairments in the ar eas of “Moving Ab out and

Manip ulatin gOb

je c ts, ” “ Cari ngF or

Yo ur se lf ,” and “ He a lthand

Phy sic a l We llBe ing.” Id. at 13 5. B e c a us e “ [a]n imp a ir me nt f un c tio na lly

e qu a ls t he lis tin g s if

it r e su lts in ‘m ark e d a nd se ve re fu nc tio na l li mit atio ns ,’ i.e ., the imp a ir me nt( s) c a

us e s ‘ mark e d’ lim itatio ns in two domains or an e x treme limitation in one domain,” Dr. N achba hr dete rmined that Plaintiff’s alleg ed impairment or c ombination of impairments did not “functionally equal the listing s.” Id
. at 134. On Marc h 19, 2002, Marg are t A. Fr iel, M.D., of the Of fice of Disability ’s Off

ice of Medica l Evaluation, deter mined this assessment of Plaintiff’s “Ac quiringand UsingInformation Domain” to be “ medically rea sonable.” Dr. F riel’s re view of the assessment agree d that “althoug h [P laintiff’s] lang uag e ability is more poorly

develope d than his intellectual functioning , a sepa

rate languag e impairment is not documented.” Id. at 12 9 ( e mph a sis in orig inal). On Apr il 17, 2002, Patricia Cott, P h.D., also re viewed the repor t and the evide nce a

nd aff irmed Dr. N achba

hr’s a ssessment “as written.” Id. at 130. 3. Tr ans c ri pt o f t

he Ad min ist rativ e He ari ngin T his Ca se B oth Pla int if f a nd his mot he r t e sti fi e d at th e Ap ri l 1, 20 03 a dmi nis tr ativ e he ari ngin t his
case . See id. at 162-81. Plaintiff testified that he was in the third g rade , his favorite subjec t was math, and music and r eadingwer e not his favor ite subjects. Id. at 166-67. Plaintiff also testified10

that he e njo y e d p layingba sk e tba ll, ha d f ri e nd s in and outsi de of

sc ho ol, and

ha d d isa g re e me nts with his sibl ings a

nd cousins. Id. at 167-69. He g ener ally completed his chor es on time, sometimes without any

reminder s. Plainti ff a lso testified that he had diff iculty rea ding a nd
rec eived a cade mic support in the form of tutoring
. Id . at 171-72. Plaintiff’s mother testified that Plaintiff puts forth ef fort in school and ha s a positive attitude, howeve r he w as appr oachingag e ele ven and “ he just can’ t rea d a [first] g rade book.” Id. at 176. She also testified that Plaintiff suffe red f rom rec urringheada ches which she be lieved could be r elated to his lea rningdifficulties, althoug h afte r seve ral visits to the doctor no condition ha d b e e n f

ound , a nd Pla int if f h a d n e ve r r e qu ir e d h os pit a lizatio n, surg e ri e s, or pe diatr ic involvement reg ardingthis iss ue. Id. at 17 7. Pla int if f’ s mo the r r e pe ate dly

e mph a size d h is difficulty rea ding. Id. at 175-80. II. LEGAL STANDARD

“ In a dis a bil ity pr oc e e din g , th e AL J ‘ha s th e po we r a nd the duty to i nv e sti g ate fu lly

a ll matters in issue, and to deve lop the compre hensive re cord r equire d for a fair de termination of disability .’” Simms v. Sullivan , 8 7 7 F. 2 d 1 0 4 7 , 1 0 5 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Diabo v. Sec ’y of HEW , 627 F.2d 278, 281 ( D.C. Cir. 1980)). A c ourt will not dist urb the de termination of the Commi ssioner if it is based on substantial evidenc e in the re cord a nd the cor rec t application of the re le va nt l e g a l st and ard s. 42 U. S.C. §§ 40 5( g ), 13 83 (c ); Bu tle r v . B ar nh ar t , 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence means “ such re levant evide nce a s a re asonable mind might ac cept a s adequate to support a conc lusion.” Richardson v. Pe rales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) ( citation omitted). Whi le a sc intill a of e videntiary support is insufficient, the test ca n be satisfied by

“somethingless than a pr eponder ance of the e vidence .” Fla. Mun. Power Agenc y v.Gene rally speaking , beca

use “the broad pur

poses of the Socia l Security Act re quire a 4 lib e ra l c on str

uc tio n in fa vo r o f d isa

bil ity , th e c ourt

mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t favor able to the c laimant.” Martin v. Apfel , 1 1 8 F. S u p p . 2 d 9 , 1 3 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Davis v. Sh ala la , 862 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D .C. 1994)). Ne verthe less, the Court notes that in the particula r c onte xt at iss ue he re , Co ng re ss a

me nd e d th e de fi nit ion

of “ dis a ble d” fo r c hil dr e n s e e kin gSSI B in 1996, and the that “ [t ]he thrust of [ that] l eg islation was most certainly to tighten e ligibility .” En c ar na c ion e xre l. G e or

gev . B ar nh ar t , 331 F.3d 78, 83 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (citingPersonal Responsibili ty

and Work Opportunity

Reconc iliation Act of 1996, Pub. L . No. 104-193 (1996) ).

11 FERC , 315 F.3d 362, 365- 66 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In revie wingan administrative de cision, a cour t may not determine the weig ht of the evide nce, nor substitut e its judgme nt for that of the Secre tary if his decision is based on substantial evide nce. Butler , 3 53 F .3 d at 99 9; Hays v

. Sullivan , 9 07 F .2 d 1 45 3, 14 56 (4 th C ir . 1 99 0) . Wh ile the re vie wi ngc ourt mus t c are fu lly scrutinize the entire r ecor d, Butler , 353 F.3d at 999, it is not to review the case “de novo” or
rew eig h the evidenc e, W

ar e v . B ar

nh ar t , 3 5 7 F. S u

p p . 2 d 1 3 4 , 1 3 8 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Davis v. Hec kler , 566 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D .C. 1983)). Instead, the Court de termines whe ther the AL J , actingfor the Sec reta ry , “has a naly zed all the evidenc e and ha s sufficiently explained the weig ht he has g iven to obviously probative material.” Simms , 877 F.3d at 1050. Se e als o 4 Rossello v. Astrue , 5 29 F .3 d 1 18 1, 11 85 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) (“ [s]ub sta nti a l- e vid e nc e re vie w i s highly defe rential to the a g ency fac t-finder

. . . [and] [r] ever sal of an a g ency decision under

that standard is ra

re” ). III . D ISC USS ION Plaintiff argues that the AL J ’s dec ision should be rever sed, or in the a lternative r emande d to the Social Security

Administration for a ne w hea ring , and make s three a

rguments in support of these re quests. First, he a rgues that the AL J failed to prope rly consider whether

his condition met or equa lled a listed impairment. Pl.’s Mot. at 3-6. Second, Plaintiff ar gues the e vidence of12

rec ord demonstrates that he satisfies L isting 112.05 of the Childhood L istings. Id. at 5-10. Th ir d, Pla int if

f a rgue s th at th e AL J er

ro ne ou sly de te rm ine d h is i mpa ir

me nt w a s n ot f

un c tio na lly equivalent to any

L isting. Id. at 10-11. De fenda nt disputes Pl aintiff’s c hara cter ization of the AL J ’s opinion, assertingthat the AL J ’s dec ision was supported by substantial evidence
. See ge ne ra lly De f. ’s Mo t. A. The ALJ Properly Considered theEvidenc e and Ex plained W

hether Plaintiff’s Conditi on Met or Equaled a Listed Impairme nt Plaintiff’s first argument is that the AL J did not properly consider whether

Plaintiff’s condition met or medica lly equale d a listed impairment bec ause the AL J “fa iled in his duty of explanation . . .fail[i ng ] i n any manner to discuss whether or

not the Plaintiff’s condition met or
e qu a le d th e re qu ir e me nts of any L ist e d Impa ir

me nt, ” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 3- 4, and a s r e su lt “ the [AL J’s] conclusory

statement make s it im possible for the Court to exercise its duty of re view,” id. at 5. Th is a pp e ars to b e a

pr oc e dura l, r athe r t

ha n s ub sta nti ve , a rgume nt. Th e AL J is no t r e qu ir e d to
s p e c if ic a ll y a d dr e s s e a c hc r it e r ia

o f a r e le v an t L is ti n g , b u t r ath e r mu s t p r o v id e “ a

s tate me n t o f

[] finding s and conc lusions, and the rea sons or basis there for, on a ll the material issues of f act, law , or discre tion presented on the rec ord.” Id. at 4 ( c iti ng5 U .S. C. § 55 7( c )) ; se e als o W ar e , 3 57 F. Sup p. 2d at 13 9 n .4 (“ Th e pla int if

f a rgue s sp e c if

ic a lly tha t th e AL J ina de qu ate ly

e xpla ine d h is decision by

failingto refe renc e the pa rticular e lements of L isting 112.04 . . . Howe ver, the pla int if f d oe s n ot c ite any

c a se re qu ir ingthi s le ve l of de ta il. ” ). Pla int if

f d oe s n ot c ite any

c a se law indicatinga diffe rent or he ighte ned standa rd of e x planation is require d. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Mot. Pl aintiff does c ite case s where courts found the AL J s’ consider ation of whe ther a plaintiff’s
c on dit ion me t or me dic a lly

e qu a le d a

lis te d im pa ir me nt t o b e ins uf

fi c ie nt. Ho we ve r, the AL Js’Although the AL J also rec og nizes L isting 112.02, “O rg anic Me ntal Disorder s,” the 5 op ini on ind ic ate s h e a

pp ro pr iate ly

re c ognize d th at e le me nts of thi s L ist ingare c on sid e re d w ith in cer tain prong s of L isting 112.05, e.g. 112.05(F ). See A.R. at 17. 13 opinions in t hose ca ses either failed to c onsider sig nificant proba tive evidenc e without explanation, see M

artin v. Apfel , 118 F. Supp. at 14 (D .D.C. 2000) (“ the AL J ' s failure to consider thi s unc ontr a dic te d, pr ob ativ e e vid e nc e tha t g oe s to the ve ry

he art of the c a se be fo re him

do oms his op ini on ” ); Taylor v. Hec kler , 5 95 F . Su pp . 4 89 , 4 92 (D .D .C. 19 84 ) ( “ [t]he AL J' s f a ilure to evaluate probative evidenc e submitted by plaintiff or to explain why he dee med [the claim] not
cre dible is ‘g ood cause ’ to reve rse” ), or of fer ed only

a g ener al conc lusion that the plaintiff’s
c on dit ion s d id n ot m e e t or me dic a lly

e qu a l any listed impairment without identify ing the rele vant L istings consider ed, see Da v is v . S ha lal a , 862 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (“ neither the AL J in his written decision, nor the A

ppeals Council, appe ar to have conside red L isting 1.12 . . . the AL J made a g ener al findingthat the evidenc e fa iled to establish that the Plaintiff’s impairments meet or e qual any L isting.”)
. Se e als o R os se llo , 529 F.3d at 1186 (reve rsingdecision of the a ppeals c ounsel wher e it “cited no e vidence to undermine the only conclusion that the re cord pe rmits”). In c ontr a st, the AL J in th is c a se sp e c if ic a lly ide nti fi e d th e re le va

nt L ist ing– 2 0 C. F .R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx . 1 § 112.05, “Menta l Retardation,” – and found “ the evidenc e of 5
re c or d f a ils to d oc ume nt a

lis tin gle ve l im

pa ir me nt. ” A. R. at 17 -1 8. Th e AL J note d th is conclusion is consistent with the testing r esults–“no treating or examining phy sician has medically supported the [claim] and none is found [in t he evide nce of rec ord],” A.R. at 18–and with the rec ommendations of Social Secur ity and DCPS psy cholog ical consultants, A.R. at 20. In makinghis determination re g ardingPlaintiff’s condition, the AL J acknow ledg ed “pe r clinica l testing by the [P laintiff]’s school psy cholog ist (Ex hibit 6F), [Pl aintiff] has BI F [Bor derline14

Intellectual F unctioning], with low I Q score s (70 Perfor mance ; 78 Verba l; 71 Full-scale ). [P laintiff] also has had an Individualiz ed Educ ation Plan developed f or spec ialized education with speec h and languag e ther apy (Exhibi t 7F).” A.R. at 17. The AL J further

supported his conc lusions by revie wingthe six “domains” se t forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a and the rele vant evidenc e in the re cord r elated to e ach. A .R. at 20-21. Reviewingevidenc e re levant to the domain of “ Acquiringand UsingInformation,” 20 C.F .R. § 416.926a(g ), the AL J ref

ere nced Plaintiff’ s I EP and the clinica l testing pe rfor med by the school psy cholog ist, specifica lly finding s that “[Pl aintiff] has BI F, with low I Q score s (70 Perfor mance ; 78 verba l; 71 Full-Scale) ,” fr om which the AL J conclude d that Plaintiff has a “ marke d limit ation in this dom ain.” A.R. at 20. In the domain of “ Attendingand Completing Ta sks,” 20 C.F.R. § 41 6. 92 6a (h ), the AL J re fe re nc e d s c ho ol r e po rt s in dic atin gPla int if f “ re qu ir e s a ssi sta

nc e and tim e to complete any

assig nment,” a r eport by

Plaintiff’s mother that he “ completes housew ork (but not nece ssarily

alway s on time), completes c hores most of the time, and ke eps busy on his own,”
as we ll as Plainti ff’ s “appr opriate attention span throug hout clinical testing ,” and his “ attention and conc entration at the hear ing;” from which the AL J conclude d Plaintiff “has less than ma rked limit ations in this area.” A.R. at 20. In the domain of “ Intera ctingand Relatingwith Others,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i), the AL J noted that Plaintiff’s ar ticulation skill s were “mildly delayed” a

nd “[his] mother has r eporte d [P laintiff] has friends his own ag e and is g ener ally able to g et along with others except school tea cher s and is not a disciplinary problem,” indicating “ less than marke d limit ations in this area.” A.R. at 20. In the domains of “Movingand Manipulating Ob je c ts, ” 20 C.F .R. § 4 16 .9 26 a (j ), “ Cari ngfo r O ne se lf ,” 20 C.F .R. § 4 16 .9 26 a (k), and “ He a lth and Well-being ,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a( l), the AL J found Plaintiff has “no limitations.” A.R. at15

20-21. These a

re not “ conclusory

statements,” c

f. R ic e v . M

as sa na ri , 2 0 0 2 U
. S
. D i s t . LE X IS 1 5 2 5 0 ( D
. D
. C
. A u g . 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 ) , a s a s s e rt e d b y P l a i n t i f f , b u tr ath e r

i s e v i d e n c e c i t e d

b y th e A LJ supporting his de cision and explaining his re asoning
. See Conway v . Astrue , 2 00 8 U .S. Di st. L EXI S 4109 at *22-*24 (D.D.C. May 23, 2008) (Kollar -Kotelly , J .) (holdingthe AL J ’s use of the plaintiff’s I Q score s, school rec ords, and e ducational pr og ram to have provided substantial evidenc e supportinga dete rmination that plaintiff did not meet or medica lly equal the r eleva

nt L isting). The AL J ’s opinion demonstrates that he appropr iately “we ighe d positive and neg ative fac ts included in [] differ ent re ports about [plainti ff’ s] conditi on ag ainst the criter ia that must be examined under e ach of

the six domains.” W

ar e v . B ar

nh ar t , 3 57 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 34 , 1 39 (D .D .C. 20 04 ); see A.R. at 16-22. “B y consideringthis arra

y of evide nce [includingtest score s and repor ts from phy sicians and a

school instructor] and listing it as support for his bene fits decision, the AL J adequately

revie wed the pla intiff' s claims.” W ar e , 357 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (c itations
o m i t t ed ). T h e C o urtth er ef o re re j ec t s P l ai n t i ff

’s ar gum en tth at“t h e A dm i n i s tra t i v e LawJ u d ge provided no e x planation for his de termination that the Plaintiff’s impairment did not meet or equal a n impairment listing.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4. B. TheALJ ’s Con c lus ion Tha t P lai nti ff’ s Co nd iti on Di d No t M

e e t or Me dic all y Equal a List ed Im

pairment Is Supported By Substantial

Evidenc e Plaintiff nextargues the AL J ’s opinion is subst antively err oneous bec ause “ the medica l evidenc e re veals that the Plaintiff satisfies the criter ia of L istings 112.05D, 112.05E, a nd 112.05F.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. L isting 112.05, “Me ntal Retardation,” states that the re quired leve l of
sever ity for a n impairment is met when the r equire ments in section A, B , C, D, E, or F of the16

L isting ar e satisfied. See20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx . 1, § 112.05. Plaintiff argues that he satis fi e s th e c ri te ri a

of L ist ing s 1 12 .0 5( D) , 1 12 .0 5( E) , a nd 11 2. 05 (F ). L ist ing11 2. 05 (D ) i s satisfied by

a “va lid verbal, pe rfor

mance , or full sca le I Q of 60 through 70 and a phy sical or other mental impairment imposing a n additional and sig nificant limitation of function.” Id. § 112.05(D). L isting 112.05(E) is satisfied by a “va lid verbal, pe rfor

mance or full sca le I Q of 60 throug h 70 and . . . [f]or children (a g e 3 to attainment of a g e 18), r esulting in at least one of para g raphs B 2b or B 2c or B 2d of 112.02.” Id. § 112.05(E). I n turn, para g raphs B 2b, B2c , and B2d of L isting 112.02 involve: b. Marke d impairment in ag e-a ppropriate social func tioning, docume nted by history and medica l findings . . . a nd including, if

nece ssary , the re sults of appropr iate standa

rdized tests; or c. Mar ked impairment in ag e-a

ppropriate persona l functioning , documented by history and medica l findings . . . a nd including, if

nece ssary , the re sults of appropr iate standa

rdized tests; or d. Marke d difficulties in maintaining conce ntration, persistenc e, or pa ce. Id. § 112.02B2. F inally , L isting 112.05(F ) is met by the satisfac tion of L isting 112.02B 2a, which involves “[m] arke d impairment in ag e appr opriate c og nitive/communicative func tion, documented by

history and medica l findings . . . a nd including, if

nece ssary , the re sults of appropr iate standa

rdized tests,” id. § 112.02B2a , and “a phy sical or other

mental impairment imposing an a dditional and signific ant limitation of function,” id. § 112.05F2. In revie wingthe AL J ’s dec ision, “as longas substantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s finding , the AL J ’s rulingmust be upheld.” W ar e , 357 F. Supp. 2d at 139. 1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Plaintiff Failed the Threshold Para g raph Requir ement of § 112.05 L ist ing11 2. 05 , whic h Pl a int if f c la ims his c on dit ion

satis fi e s, is g ov e rn e d b y

20 C.F .R.17

Part 40 4, Sub pa

rt P, App x. 1, § 1 12 .0 0( A) : “ L ist ing11 2. 05 (M e nta l Re tard atio n) c onta ins six sets of cr iteria [A-F ]. I f an impairme nt satisfies the diag nostic descr iption in t he introductory para g raph and any

on e of the six se ts o f c ri te ri a , w e wi ll f ind tha t th e c hil d’ s im

pa ir me nt m e e ts the listing.” Id. (empha sis added). L isting § 112.05 imposes a “ dual re quirement,” Blakes v

. Ba rn ha rt , 3 31 F .3 d 5 65 , 5 70 -7 1 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 3) , und e r whic h th e pla int if f m ay satis fy the c ri te ri a (A -F ) b u tb e f

o un d n o tm en t al l y

re t ar d edfo r f

ai l i n g t o d em o n s tra t e s i gn i fi ca n t l y s u b av er age g ener al intellectual f

unctioning “ in addition to the specific r equire ments of ea ch L isting,” Va zq ue z v . B ar nh ar t , 2005 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 22243, *22 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The fir st paragraph thus serves a s “the thre shold require ment for listing 112.05 ( signific antly subaver ag e g ener al intellectual func tioning with def icits in adaptive func tioning).” J e ffe rso n v . B ar

nh ar t , 64 Fe d. App’x. 136, 138 (10th Ci r. 2003). Plaintiff’s a rgument that he satisfies a ny L isting under

112.05 is the re fo re ina de qu ate if

the re c or d in dic ate s Pla int if f f a ile d to de mon str ate “ signif ic antl y subaver ag e g ener al intellectual f unctioning.” Sub sta nti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a fi nd ingtha

t Pla int if f f a ile d to me e t th is d ia g no sti c descr iption of mental retar dation. The AL J found that the I Q score s pointed to by Plaintiff, see Pl.’s Mot. at 6-8, and cited in the AL J opinion, see A.R. at 17, did not clear ly demonstrate tha

t Plaintiff was mentally

reta rded, but rather indicated “bor derline” intellectual func tioning. The school psy cholog ist’s report, ba sed upon the same testing c ited by the AL J , id. at 17, conc luded Plaintiff was not mentally reta rded, but rather “ appea

rs to be more of a slow lea rner ,” id. at 139. Plaintiff’s most rece nt I EP, A.R. at 146, also cited by the AL J , A.R. at 17, and a letter fr om the
sc ho ol s pe c ia l e du c atio n c oo rd inator , A .R. at 16 1, dis c us se d Pl a int if f’ s c ontin ue d a c a de mic imp ro ve me nt a

nd imp ro ve d c omm

un ic atio ns sk ill s. Us e of

su c h e vid e nc e by

the AL J is e nti re ly18

a pp ro pr iate a s “ school rec ords ar e an e x cellent sourc e of infor mation conce rningfunction and standardized testingand should alwa y s be soug ht for school-a g e childre n.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Sub pa rt P, App x. 1, § 1 12 .0 0( C) (3 ). Ac c or din g ly , th e Court fi nd s su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a deter mination that Pl aintiff fa iled to demonstrate menta l retar dation under L isting 112.05, eve n prior to consider ing Plaintiff’ s arguments conce rningSections (D), ( E), and ( F) of § 112.05.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Plaintiff Failed to Me et the Specific Requirements of §§ 112.05 D , 112.05 E, and 112.05 F Al th o u ghP l ai n t i ff

’s fa i l ure t o d em o n s tra t e t h ath e p o s s es s ed“s i gn i fi ca n t l y s u b av er age g e ne ra l inte lle c tua l f

un c tio nin g ” is d isp os iti ve of Pla int if f’ s a rgume nt, Pla int if

f’ s a rgume nt a lso fails bec ause the re is substantial evidenc e supportingthe AL J ’s dec ision that he did not satisfy the spec ific re quirements of §§ 112.05( D), (E ), and ( F) . Plaintiff does not point to evidence
c le arl y c ontr a dic tin gthe AL J’s d e c isi on , b ut r athe r a sse rt s h is c on dit ion satis fi e d th e sp e c if

ic require ments of L istings §§ 112.05(D) , (E), a nd (F ) and the ref

ore the AL J err ed. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Mot. at 5-9. Specifica lly , Plaintiff claims L istings §§ 112.05(D) , (E), a nd (F ) we re satisfied by his Performanc e I Q score of 70 in combination with claimed a dditional impairments. See Pl. ’s Mo t. at 6- 7. Whil e the AL J ac kn ow le dg e d th is s c or e and Pla int if f’ s “ mark e d li mit atio n in [ac qu ir ingand

us inginf or matio n],” A. R. at 20 , h e de te rm ine d th at Pla int if f’ s c on dit ion

fa ile d to meet the r equire ments of L istings §§ 112.05(D) , (E), a nd (F ). Fo r Lis t i n g 1 1 2
. 0 5 (D ), P l ai n t i ff cl ai m s h i s “s ev er e r ec ep t i v e a n d ex p re s s i v e l an gu age delay s,” Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7, constituted “a phy sical or other mental impairment imposing a n additional and sig nificant limitation of function.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpar t P, App’x 1, § 11 2. 05 (D ); se e als o id. § 1 1 2
. 0 0 ( A )
. T o d e t e r m i n e i f a c o n d i t i o ns at i s f

i e s th e Li s t i n g , anA LJ
e va luate s th e re le va

nt t e sti ngre su lts and

the imp a c t of

the c on dit ion

on the ind ivi du a l, 2 0 C. F .R.19

§ 416.924(a) , including the capa city to treat or a

meliorate the condition. See, e .g. , Peppe r v. Ba rn ha rt , 342 F.3d 853, 855 ( 8th Cir. 2003). Although the AL J rec og nized that Pl aintiff’s

“ sp e e c h a nd langua g e de lay [] an d B I F are se ve re ,” the re is s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to support the distinction that those impairments, while limi ting Plaintiff’s a cade mic perf ormanc e, did not constitut e a significant a nd additional limit ation under the L isting. In particula r, Pla int if f’ s mo st r e c e nt I EP, A. R. at 148-60, a nd the re commendations of the e x amining psy cholog ists, id. at1 2 2 -4 6 , s u p p o rt edth e A L J ’s d et erm i n at i o nth atP l ai n t i ff ’s s p ec i fi c l an gu age delay s, while sever e, “do not mee t or medica lly equal the c riteria of

any of the listed impairments,” id. at 17, 22. See, e .g., Briggs v. Callahan , 139 F.3d 606, 609 ( 8th Cir. 1998) (“a lthough [plaintiff] undoubtedly has additional impairments, there has bee n no showingthat the impairments impose a sig nificant limitation on [ plaintiff’s] activities”). Plaintiff’s improved pe rf or manc e in s c ho ol t

hr ou g h s pe c ia lize d in str

uc tio n a nd sp e e c h a nd langua g e the ra

py a lso evidenc es that his condition may not severe ly

limithis perfor

mance . Se e, e .g., Blak

e v . B ar nh ar t , 28 Fe d. Appx. 597, 600 (8th C ir. 2002). The AL J also found that Plaintiff’s “a ssertions
c on c e rn ingthe e xtent and lim iti ngde g re e of

his imp a ir

me nts [we re ] not

fo un d f ull y c re dib le a s to his meetingthe listing leve l or functional e quivalency for disability

purposes a

nd the same is not
corr oborate d by

the objective me dical evide nce.” A.R. 22. In Conway , this Court held that the AL J appropr iately found that a pla intiff had a se vere “lea rningdisability ” and “ obesity ,” but neve rtheless “ did not meet or me dic all ye qu al Section 112.05.” 2008 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 41091 at * 6 (emphasis adde d). The f oreg oing r ecor d evidenc e in this case similarly

ref lects substantial evidenc e supportingthe AL J ’s findingthat Plaintiff’s
c la ime d a dd iti on a l im

pa ir me nts did no t c on sti tut e a

dis a bil ity un de r t he L ist ing . T his Court

is20

not permitted to re- weig h the sig nificanc e of the evidenc e in the re cord, but rather to dete rmine whether the AL J ’s dec ision is s upported by substantial evidence . Ba sed on the for eg oing, the Court holds that subst antial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s findingthat Plaintiff’s claim fa ils under L isting 112.05(D)
. Withre sp e c t to L ist ing

11 2. 05 (E ), pla int if

f a rgue s th at hi s “ mark e d d if fi c ult ie s in
ma int a ini ng. . . p a c e ,” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 7- 8, e vid e nc e d b y his be ne fi tti ngfr om e xtra tim e in s c ho ol, A.R. at 105, 151, satisfy

the sec ond prongof the L isting. The A L J , howeve r, prope rly considere d this evidence in discussing “ the domain of attending a nd completingtasks,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h) , which addr esses “ how well you are able to foc us and maintain your attention, and how well you beg in, car

ry throug h, and finish your ac tiviti es, includingthe pac e at whic h y ou pe rf or m a c tiv iti e s . . . ,” and

de te rm ine d th at Pla int if

f h a d “ le ss t

ha n ma rk e d li mit atio ns in t

his
are a.” A .R. at 20. The AL J noted that in addition to school recor ds highlig hted by Plaintiff, “[his] mother has r eporte d that [he] completes housew ork (but not nec essar ily on time), completes his chor es most of the time, and ke eps busy on his own. [P laintiff] also has been found to have appropr iate attention span throughout clinical testing . He de monstrated g ood attention and conc entration at the hear ing.” A.R. at 20. Acc ording ly , substantial evidence supports a findingthat Plaintiff’s difficulties in maintainingpace did not satisfy §112.02(B )(2) (d) and ther efor e his claim fa ils under L isting 112.05(E)
. As to L ist ing11 2. 05 (F ), Pla int if f a rgue s h is Pe rf

or manc e I Q s c or e in c omb inatio n w ith his “sever e expressive a

nd rec eptive languag e dela y s” satisfy

112.02(B )(2) (a) and demonstrate an impairment imposing an a dditional and signific ant limitation of function. Pl.’s Mot . at 9. As an initial matter, unlike L istings 112.05(D) and 112.05(E) , the first prongof L isting 112.05(F ) is notPlaintiff also claims that the AL J failed to c onsider information in the Febr uary 3, 2003 6 I EP reg ardinghis “difficulty maintaining pa ce . . . w as not eva luated by the [AL J ].” Pl .’s Mot. at 8. To the contra

ry , the AL J specific ally

cites that I EP, A.R. at 17 (“Exhibit7F” ) and later dis c us se s “ sc ho ol r e po rt s” ind ic atin gthat Pla int if f r e qu ir e s a ssi sta

nc e and e xtra tim e to c omp le te a ssi g nme nts . 21 an I Q score require ment, but an instruction to consider r eleva nt evidence including “ historical and other information from pa

rents or othe r individuals who have know ledg e of the child.” 11 2. 02 (B )( 2) (a ); se e als o Ne al v . B ar nh ar t , 405 F.3d 685, 689 ( 8th Cir. 2005) (“while se vera l of the [112.05] subsections have a spec ific I Q re quirement . . . § 112.05F , does not”). A s discussed above, substantial e vidence besides the I Q score s supports the AL J ’s findingthat Plaintiff’s condition did “not medically equal the c riteria of

the listed impairments,” A.R. at 17, and the more limited importance pla ced on I Q score s under this L isting only further supports such
e vid e nc e . In a dd iti on , th e AL J’s c on c lus ion tha t Pla int if f’ s c on dit ion

do e s n ot m e e t or

me dic a lly
e qu a l a lis te d im pa ir me nt i s c on sis te nt w iththe c on c lus ion re a c he d in

a Chi ldh oo d D isa

bil ity Ev a luatio n F or

m c omp le te d b y

Go mma Na c hb ahr , Ph . D . o n M arc h 7 , 2 00 2, jud g e d me dic a lly
rea sonable by

Marg are t A. Fr iel, M.D. on Marc h 19, 2002, and af firmed by Patricia Cott, Ph. D. on April 17, 2002. See A.R. at 129-135. 6 In sum, the Court finds that substantial evidence in the rec ord supports the AL J ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition does not meet or medically

equal L isting 112.05. The Court there fore reje cts Plaintiff’s argument that the AL J substantively err ed in findingthat Plaintiff’s condition does not meet or medic ally equal L isting 112.05. C. TheALJ

Prop e rly Con sid e re d W he the r P lai nti

ff’ s Co nd iti on Fu nc tio na lly Equaled a Listed Impairment, and His Conclusion Is Supported by Substantial Evidenc e Plaintiff’s final ar gument is that the AL J err oneously deter mined that Plaintiff did not22

su ff e r a mark e d im

pa ir me nt i n a ny do ma in o f f

un c tio nin gand

that, a s a re su lt, his c on dit ion

did
no t f un c tio na lly

e qu a l a lis te d im pa ir me nt. Pl. ’s Mo t. at 9- 11 . F or a c on dit ion

to “ fu nc tio na lly equal” a listed impairment, 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a( a), a plaintiff “must fac e ‘e x treme’ limit ations in at least one a

rea , or ‘mar

ked’ limitations in two area s.” W ar e , 3 5 7 F. S u

p p . 2 d at1 4 1 (c i t i n g § 416.926a(a )). F unctional equivale ncy is determined f

rom the entire rec ord, includingtest score s
and pe rf or manc e in d a ily

a c tiv iti e s su c h a s sc ho ol. 20 C.F .R. § 4 16 .9 26 a (e )( 4) (i ii) (B ); see Sc ales
v . B ar nh ar t , 3 63 F .3 d 6 99 , 7 04 (8 th C ir . 2 00 4) . H e re , Pl a int if f c la ims a “ mark e d im

pa ir me nt i n the ac quiringand usinginformation domain,” a nd a “ma rked impairme nt in the domain of attendingand completingtasks,” which tog ether would satisfy

the cr iteria for

functional equivalenc e. A.R. at 10. The Court finds Plainti ff’ s claim of a “ marke d impairment in the do ma in o f atte nd ingand

c omp le tin gta sk s” un

pe rs ua siv e . T he AL J cor

re c tly de ta ile d th e six domains releva

nt to functional equivale nce, w eig hed the e vidence rele vant to eac h, and conclude d that Plaintiff only had one ma

rked limitation, in the acquiringand usinginformation domain. A.R. at 18-22. Reg ardingthe domain of attending a nd completingtasks, 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h) , su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the AL J’s f

ind ingtha

t Pla int if f “ ha s le ss t

ha n ma rk e d li mit atio ns in thi s are a .” A. R. at 20 . Wh ile Pla int if f a rgue s h is b e ne fi tti ngfr om “ e xtra a ssi sta nc e and tim e ” in school supports his claim, Pl.’s Mot. at 10, thi s is not the only information in the re cord r eleva nt to this determination. In contra st, the AL J ’s opinion review ed the e ntire re cord, c iting school repor ts, testimony

from Plaintiff’s mother, a nd Plaintiff’s attention span throug hout testing a nd duringthe hea

ring , A.R. at 20. The AL J “bala nced [these] fac ts,” W

ar e , 357 F. Supp. 2d at 142, to determine that Plainti ff’ s limi tation in this are a wa s not marked. Ac cording ly , the Court findsI t is therefor e unnec essar y to addre ss Plainti ff’ s err oneous ar gument that the AL J found 7
“ Pla int if f d id n ot s uf

fe r a mark e d im

pa ir me nt i n a ny do ma in o f f

un c tio n. ” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 9. Th is contention is plainly

contra ry to the rec ord as the A L J ’s opinion clear ly states “[Plainti ff] has marke d limit ation in this dom ain” in re fer ence to the domain of ac quiringand usinginformation. A.R. at 20. 23 su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a de te rm inatio n th at Pla int if f h a d “ le ss t

ha n ma rk e d li mit atio ns in this area .” A.R. at 20. Additionally , althoug h he disagree s with the AL J ’s conc lusion, P laintiff fails to identify

any specific proce dural e rror s in the AL J ’s eva luation of this domain. See Conway , 2008 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 41091 at *33-*34. Be cause Plaintiff claims a marke d limit ation in only one other domain, he fa ils to demonstrate the marke d limit ations in two domains required for f unctional equivale nce. There fore , the Court reje cts Plaintiff’s argument that the AL J err ed 7 in d e te rm ini ngthat Pla int if f’ s c on dit ion

wa s n ot f un c tio na lly

e qu a l to a

lis te d im pa ir me nt. IV . C ON CL USI ON Ba sed on the for eg oing r eview of the re levant law a

nd the administrative re cord, the Court finds that the Administrative L aw Judge applied the c orre ct leg al standar ds when he denied Plaintiff’s claim for Supplementa l Security Income B enef

its, and that his conclusions are supported by

substantial evidence . The Court shall DENYPlaintiff’s [7] Motion for J udg ment of Reversa l and GRANT De fenda nt’s [9] Motion for J udg ment of Aff irmance . This case shall be dismiss ed in its entirety . An appr opriate O rder acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: Marc h 31, 2009 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge