Chemical and Biological Defense 

Test and Evaluation (T&E) 

Future Challenges 

James J. Valdes and Ewelina Tunia 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

July 2012 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. All 

information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Ms. Ewelina Tunia is a Research Associate at the National Defense University’s Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy. She holds a master’s degree in security studies from 

Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a bachelor’s degree 

in political science from Hunter College, City University of New York. Ms. Tunia has 

coauthored several papers on biodefense issues. Previously, she held internships at Amnesty 

International and the United Nations and was an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Army National 

Guard. 

Dr. James J. Valdes is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy and the Army’s Scientific Advisor for 

Biotechnology. Dr. Valdes received a PhD in neuroscience from Texas Christian University and 

was a postdoctoral fellow at The Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions. He won a bronze medal for 

Best Paper at the 2002 Army Science Conference and Best Paper (Biotechnology) at the 2008 

Army Science Conference. Dr. Valdes is a co-founder of the International Society for 

Environmental Biotechnology and the International Society for Biological and Environmental 

Repositories. He has published more than 120 papers in scientific journals and was a 

Presidential Rank Award winner in 2003 and 2009. 

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CONTENTS 

Objectives....................................................................................................................................... 1

Basis of the Analysis...................................................................................................................... 1

Rationale for the Study................................................................................................................. 1

Changing Nature of the Threat ................................................................................................... 2

Emerging Technologies ................................................................................................................ 4

Future T&E Challenges ............................................................................................................... 5

A Few New Technologies.............................................................................................................. 7

General Themes ............................................................................................................................ 8

Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 8

The Roadmapping Process........................................................................................................... 8

Appendix A: Technology List.................................................................................................... 10

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. The Fluidigm Dynamic Array IFC.................................................................................. 1 

Figure 2. Synthetic Molecular Systems.......................................................................................... 3 

Figure 3. Mini Implantable Biosensor............................................................................................ 4 

Figure 4. Nanofluidic Laboratory on a Chip................................................................................... 5 

Figure 5. Battelle’s Ambient Breeze Tunnel ................................................................................. 6 

Figure 6. SQUID............................................................................................................................. 7 

Figure 7. Roadmap Planning in Four Steps.................................................................................... 9 
OBJECTIVES 

The objective of this study was to identify emerging technical, methodological, and 

infrastructure challenges for future Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Test and Evaluation 

(T&E) investment, and to serve as a prequel to the development of a full strategic T&E 

Roadmap. The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) of the National 

Defense University (NDU) led the study. 

BASIS OF THE ANALYSIS 

The CTNSP study group conducted a five-point analysis of the CBD program. The group 

reviewed requirements documents, the relevant science and technology (S&T) literature, existing 

CBD strategic plans, the current S&T investment portfolio, and current commodity programs. 

The Joint S&T Office (JSTO) Focused Innovative Thrusts and legacy S&T portfolio, the JSTO 

Strategic Science Roadmap, the Joint Requirements Office (JRO) requirements, and the Joint 

Program Executive Office (JPEO) programs represented the reviewed materials. 

RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 

Science and technology has been moving at an exponential pace, especially within disciplines 

critical to the CBD program. These primarily include the biological sciences, especially systems 

and synthetic biology and structural biology; information science, particularly bioinformatics; 

nanotechnology, specifically the ability to tailor nanomaterials from “the ground up,” and to 

design and fabricate devices on the nanoscale; and combinatorial chemistry. These rapid 

developments underpin both next generation threats and new countermeasure technologies that 

must be subjected to rigorous T&E before fielding. 

The T&E community has been confronted with numerous 

challenges when new technology is developed. The classic 

example is polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which permits 

the high fidelity amplification of DNA. The development of 

rapid PCR assays led to the ability to unambiguously detect 

and identify biological threat agents present at vanishingly 

small levels, but the vulnerabilities of the assays were not 

originally well understood by either the S&T or the T&E 

communities. 

Issues such as sample contaminants (e.g., chelating agents 

that reduce the availability of the PCR Mg+2 cofactor or exces

inhibitors found on test ranges or in operational environments) that do not affect the older, 

immunoassay-based detection technologies were serious interferents in the PCR formats. This 

led to erroneous false negative conclusions when samples contaminated with interferents failed 

to indicate the presence of DNA because the PCR reaction was inhibited. However, available 

PCR kits overcome inhibitory effects of test range soil components that become entrained in 

reaction mixtures as shown by recent work at Dugway Proving Ground (Soil Fluorescent 

s salts and other soil component 

Figure 1. The Fluidigm 

Dynamic Array IFC 

1 
Background Study, Phase I Report, Dugway proving Ground, 15 March 2011)1

. A more 

ubiquitous issue related to T&E of biological recognition elements (BRE) (i.e., the moiety that 

recognizes and permits the detection of the threat agent by binding to it) is quality control and 

quality assurance. The affinity and specificity of antibodies tend to vary from one lot to another; 

different laboratories make antibodies for a particular threat agent that binds to different epitopes 

on the agent; and the manufacturing processes for next generation BREs, such as molecular 

imprints, have not been standardized. This can lead to highly variable results and lack of data 

comparability between research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) organizations. 

Finally, the physico-chemical properties of new agents can be radically different than traditional 

agents, posing unforeseen problems when analyzed by existing procedures. This was the case for 

the unique properties of next generation chemical agents and is likely to be an even bigger issue 

with the advent of nanomaterials, which tend to have radically different properties at the nanoance of the total measured, resulting in a tricky signal-to-noise problem that must be 

ale of use, ranging from large areas in 

military attacks to smaller diss

ell as operational personnel. The analyses 

were performed in individual 2-day mini-workshops. 

                                                           

scale than they do at the meso- or macro-scales. 

Three additional issues for the T&E community are: (1) understanding likely operational 

conditions and replicating them under T&E scenarios; (2) presenting the challenge to the 

reference systems in the appropriate phase (e.g., vapor, droplet, particulates); and (3) overcoming 

problems of simulants accurately representing systems performance. Many T&E technologies 

work well under more or less pristine testing conditions, but are subject to interference from the 

background “noise” inherent in the real world. On the battlefield, smoke, dust, and other 

particulates can have deleterious effects on detectors, and under even the best of conditions, the 

background chemical contamination and biological flora and fauna will make up the 

preponder

resolved. 

It should be noted that changes in the nature of the threat, and indeed the technology and other 

issues discussed below, may actually surface at times outside their “expected” (near, mid, far) 

terms. Thus, something currently considered near term may emerge in the mid or far term due to 

both technical and/or operational considerations. For example, while chimeric organisms, which 

comprise genetic material, metabolic pathways, and capabilities of two or more organisms, may 

be available in the near term, appropriate methodologies for effectively disseminating them may 

not be available. Other issues may be connected to the sc

eminations in urban areas. 

CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT 

For the purposes of this study, the temporal dimension was divided into Near Term (1–5 years), 

Mid Term (5–10 years), and Far Term (10–15 years). This analysis was performed as part of a 

Strategic Science Roadmapping effort for JSTO and the subject matter experts (SME) included 

Service lab, academic, and commercial scientists, as w

In the Near Term, one can expect to see chimeric organisms; stealth pathogens; non-traditional 

chemical agents (NTA), which include both chemicals and biochemicals by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) definition; chemically impregnated particulates; and other novel 

chemical agents. Most of these are current realities, and the time frame refers primarily to when 

1

 Jeff Mohr, Bob McGhin, Jim Cornette. SAIC. “Dugway Proving Ground Soil Fluorescent Background Study,” 15 March 2011. 

2 
they would become a concern to T&E efforts. Chimeric organisms are those that have been 

genetically manipulated to include genes or entire metabolic pathways that confer novel 

capabilities on the original organism. The simplest example is inserting genes into expression 

systems, such as E coli, which then enable the production of a protein product, such as an 

enzyme. These are common technologies used in the biomanufacturing industry, but could be 

subverted to yield stealth pathogens, or organisms which appear to be harmless background biota 

but are, in fact, capable of causing illness. Even in the absence of intentional genetic engineering, 

on average, we see one new emerging disease per year just as a result of natural recombination or 

mutation, as well as the increasing frequency of antibiotic resistant microbes. Modifications to 

increase their transmissibility, ability to jump species, or to avoid detection or treatment are 

already possible. The NTAs and chemically impregnated particulates (e.g., dusty agents) 

currently exist, as do novel chemical agents defined here as industrial chemicals put to a new 

use or new synthetic molecules beyond the NTAs. These may be made either chemically or 

biologically, and may vary from relatively small molecules (e.g., nerve or mustard agents) to 

more complex substances (e.g., hormones, toxins). Taken together, these chemical agents have in 

common the fact that they often present novel physico-chemical properties that must be taken 

into consideration when designing T&E methodologies and facilities. 

ich mimic the functionality of living system but 

ef, Agricultural Negotiator, Office of the United States Trade Representative, on June 09, 

2011.2

                                                           

The Mid Term will be marked by the development in biology of synthetic molecular systems and 

the more ubiquitous use of nanomaterials with unique properties. Synthetic molecular systems 

refer to the construction of artificial structures wh

are themselves not alive. Such systems could 

be constructed of many different sorts of 

materials, including those designed from noncanonical amino acids, and would present 

enormous difficulties for detection and 

standardization of T&E procedures. 

Nanomaterials, commonly referred to as 

approximately 1–100 nanometers along at least 

one dimension, present critical safety 

considerations as we learn more about these 

materials. Their small size permits them to at 

once have toxic characteristics not evident at 

larger scales, while penetrating protective 

systems and exacerbating decontamination of 

test equipment. Materials with these 

dimensions are of sufficient concern that a 

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Policy Principles for the 

U.S. Decision-Making Concerning Regulation and Oversight of Applications of Nanotechnology 

and Nanomaterials was approved by the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy; 

Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget; 

and Chi

Figure 2. Synthetic Molecular Systems 

2

 John J. Young, Jr. Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Memorandum, “Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health 

(ESOH) Risks from Engineered Nanomaterials,” 13 May 2008. 

3 
The Far Term is speculative, but certainly includes the development of completely de novo

organisms with characteristics that cannot be predicted a priori. The ability to mix and match 

artificial components, a.k.a. “biobricks,” and the standardization of the parts and design rules 

will permit the design of almost any new organism with tailored characteristics, further 

challenging T&E methodologies. These advances will require complete rethinking of CBD T&E 

capabilities and methodologies as biological threats take a more leading role after a 90-year 

focus on chemicals. 

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 

Technology is accelerating at an exponential pace, and this is no truer than in the biological and 

information sciences. Also included is nanotechnology, which we consider to be chemistry at a 

very small scale. The key concept is that of “convergence,” that is, two or more disciplines 

converge at a point in time where they catalyze the emergence of an entirely new area of 

investigation. An older example is the development and fielding of a remote passive sensor, 

enabled by the advent of microprocessors coupled with infrared spectroscopy. A more recent 

example was the convergence of genomics and information technology (IT), which resulted in 

the relatively quick sequencing of the complete human genome. Since convergence is best seen 

retrospectively, it is difficult to predict new trends in science, but a few areas merit attention. 

Again, these analyses were conducted with SMEs from Service, academic, and commercial 

laboratories in a series of 2-day mini-workshops. 

In the Near Term, nanofluidic devices, next generation electronic sequencing, and adaptable 

algorithms will be significant issues for both biological and 

chemical detection. Nanofluidic devices, with channels an 

order of magnitude smaller than a human hair, have been 

developed and present significant challenges to sample 

acquisition, preparation, and handling; ease of handling of 

the devices themselves; and device standardization. These 

advantages may be partially offset by the technical 

challenges of maintaining clear channels when nanofluidic 

devices are used under operational conditions that involve 

dusts and other potential contaminants as described in 

Section 6a. Next generation sequencing on electronic chips 

raises the issue of data comparisons using different 

sequencing technologies. Adaptable algorithms, which will be integrated within the chip along 

with the sample acquisition and detector components, present the problem of independently 

testing the subcomponents when trouble shooting detector technologies. 

Figure 3. Mini Implantable 

Biosensor 

In the Mid Term, the enormous data sets generated by complete “panomics” will present 

problems for data analysis. Panomics refers to genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, 

metabolomics, and regulomics, that is, the complete set of biomarkers that will be accessible in 

the near future. Such biological complexity and large, mostly noisy data sets will present 

significant analytical problems such as signal-to-noise and the ability to compare results across 

different technologies which may be using different data or data analytical algorithms. In short, 

is what is purported to be measured actually what is being measured? However, based on the last 

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two decades of advancement in the “omics” realm, little 

doubt exists that the scientific and technical community 

will be up to the task of handling and manipulating 

massive data sets. 

The Far Term is, as with the threat assessment, very 

speculative, but it is likely that adaptive, selfprogramming materials will be designed and incorporated 

into detectors and protective equipment. These will 

present a moving target as they adapt to the T&E 

environments and will require innovative approaches to 

standardized testing. The recent publication of the National Strategy for CBRNE Standards by 

the National Science and Technology Council, Subcommittee on Standards, May 2011, will do 

much to establish an enduring framework for standardized CBD testing in the future.3

Figure 4. Nanofluidic Laboratory 

on a Chip 

FUTURE T&E CHALLENGES 

a) Equipment Challenges: 

The study group identified six significant challenges that can be classified as equipment 

or materiel related. These are decreased size scales of nanodevices, mimicking realistic 

operational conditions, testing systems rather than components, sensors for manikins, 

detection of NTA droplets, and aerosol sensors. As devices become smaller, sample 

handling and preparation become of paramount importance. Current nano-scale devices 

exist that are an order of magnitude smaller than a human hair, and such devices will 

require a great deal of sample clean-up in order to prevent fouling, maintain flow, and 

account for turbulence and mass action effects within the device. Integrating these tiny 

components seamlessly into a system, as in “lab on a chip” formats, will make it very 

difficult to test and troubleshoot individual components. In addition, simply handling 

such miniscule devices will present problems, such as aerosol presentation within test 

chambers, and the large numbers of devices that could be integrated into a system will 

result in challenges for data collection and analysis. 

One consistent theme within the interviewed T&E community was the need to develop 

realistic test conditions in the sense of mimicking operational conditions. Everything 

works well under pristine laboratory conditions, but real-world conditions often introduce 

uncontrolled variables that can skew results in favor of one technology over another. It 

will be necessary to identify the key variables and to develop test conditions that replicate 

operational environments likely to be encountered. This is also true of testing devices. 

Subsystems can (and usually do) function in an inter-dependent manner, and it is difficult 

to extrapolate test results of individual subsystems to the integrated whole. This is the 

opposite issue to that cited above, namely, being able to attribute performance issues to 

particular subcomponents when they are completely integrated into a unitary device. 

                                                           

3

 Executive Office of the President, “Policy Principles for the U.S. Decision-making Concerning Regulation and 

Oversight of Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials,” 9 June 2011. 

5 
A more specific set of issues was identified with respect to testing protective clothing on 

manikins. Sensors under the clothing are not ideal, and increasing sophistication and 

decreasing size of sensors, as with modern crash test dummies, for example, will lead to 

the integration of thousands of sensors into test manikins. Further, there is a need to 

develop sensors that are designed to work with aerosols, in addition to vapor sensors. 

b) Methodology Challenges: 

A large number of identified issues could be grouped under the rubric “methods 

development.” These can roughly be grouped into three categories: data analysis; 

agent/simulant preparation and systems performance correlations; and field measurement 

issues. Under the data analysis category, the enormous amount of data that will be 

available as a result of panomics measurements and the proliferation of micro- and nanoscale sensors will pose a serious challenge to data collection and analysis for both fielded 

and test reference equipment. This is due to both the sheer volume of data, much of 

which will be noise, and to the lack of standardization among very complex and often 

incomplete data sets. Algorithms will need to be developed, annotated, and standardized 

for peta computing (1 petabyte = 1,000 terabytes), and more robust algorithms for 

agent/simulant correlation will need to be developed. 

Agent and simulant sample preparation has been an ongoing issue and is likely to be 

exacerbated as new agents and, 

therefore, new simulants are 

developed. Organisms grown 

under slightly different conditions 

of nutrients, the number of 

“passes” before harvesting, and 

spray or freeze drying techniques 

can have radically different 

characteristics. Agents that have 

been prepared for weaponization 

are typically in a starved state and 

can be significantly different, 

physically and biochemically, than their healthy counterparts. As synthetic molecular 

systems and even artificial organisms are developed, the issue of standardization will 

either become critical, or will be replaced with a more generic set of detection parameters 

based on the particular detection technologies being developed. Considerable debate also 

exists on the need to be able to collect intact (i.e., viable) samples, suggesting a need for 

standard requirements regarding viability (i.e., does viable mean alive, able to reproduce, 

or in the case of a toxin, active, and to what extent?). 

Figure 5. Battelle’s Ambient Breeze Tunnel 

The T&E community universally recognized pragmatic issues related to field testing. The 

overall rubric could be summed up as obtaining “ground truth” within the testing 

environment. A major concern was reference measurements, and whether point 

measurements—even when they are numerous—accurately reflect conditions within the 

test volume of the chamber or ambient breeze tunnel. This issue was reflected in 

comments that current test chambers are “under instrumented,” and this is going to be a 

bigger problem in the future as the need to collect detailed molecular-level information 

6 
becomes integral to the detection technology being assessed. Finally, there is a need for 

improved field calibration of aerosols and standardization of wet slurry vs. dry powdered 

dissemination. 

c) Threat Agent Challenges: 

Next generation biological and chemical threats are going to pose major challenges for 

the development of adequate simulants and standards. The incredible potential of 

synthetic biology to create new structures and “organisms” not found in nature and the 

sheer number of possibilities will complicate both counter-measures and T&E of 

detection technologies. Beyond that, two critical T&E issues have considerable health 

and safety impact. First, containment and protection of personnel from next generation 

threats will be complicated by their physico-chemical characteristics such as the ability to 

penetrate protective materials, adhere to surfaces, and remain viable under harsh 

decontamination conditions. Second, verification of decontamination of toxins, next 

generation chemical agents, and proteinaceous toxins will require the development of 

new decontamination materials, new and more sensitive measurement techniques, and 

possibly new protective barrier materials. 

A FEW NEW TECHNOLOGIES 

A review of the literature identified five new technologies at TRL-7 or better readiness level and 

which could be quickly exploited for chemical and biological defense. Much as the emergence of 

PCR-based assays caused T&E problems that were not well understood until after conclusions 

had been drawn from the data, these and other new technologies may have similar impacts. (1) 

Super conducting quantum interference device (SQUID) is essentially a magnetometer used to 

measure very weak magnetic fields (see Figure 6). These are 

beginning to have research uses in biology, could be used to 

detect very small numbers of organisms, but are subject to 

interference from even very weak magnetic fields. In addition, 

a signal-to-noise issue must be accounted for during both the 

test and data analysis. SQUIDs also require cooling to very 

low temperatures, presenting a development challenge. (2) 

Bio micro-electro-mechanical systems (Bio-MEMS) of 

demonstrated utility for both biological and chemical 

detection and sometimes known as “lab on a chip” have been 

discussed previously and present handling, sample 

preparation, and troubleshooting issues that will concern T&E 

personnel. (3) Digital Array Integrated Fluidics Circuits (DAIFC) present many of the same 

applications and issues as Bio-MEMS as well as those of PCR, and their ability to process 

physiological fluids will present safety concerns. (4) Quantum cascade lasers (QCL) operate in 

the mid to far infrared red part of the spectrum, permitting laser operation in materials with poor 

optical properties. Devices constructed of such materials may have unique characteristics that 

will require methods development. (5) Giant MagnetoResistivity (GMR) is based on very large 

resistance changes in alternating metallic layers, and devices constructed of such materials will 

require special handling and test procedures. (See Appendix A) 

Figure 6. SQUID 

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GENERAL THEMES 

Overall, the study group concluded that five major themes capture the primary challenges the 

T&E community will face as new technologies are developed. These are as follows: 

1. Nano-scale operations that exploit the advances being made through the U.S. 

nanotechnology initiative as well as from international efforts 

2. Enhanced requirements for safe handling of 21st century threat agents that include 

chemicals, biochemicals, and natural as well as modified microorganisms 

3. Large, complex, possibly incomplete data sets that require rapid, real-time analysis 

4. Creation of operationally realistic test scenarios and conditions for testing unknowns and 

scenarios in which original attack location cannot be determined; includes modeling and 

simulation (M&S) for evolving threats and unknowns, and forensics-based analysis to 

post-identify attack 

5. Development of simulants and associated methodologies through which system 

performance-based agent-simulant correlations can be characterized 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

While it is recognized that the challenges are growing and far reaching for infrastructure 

viability and maintaining technological advantage in economic constraint, the scope of this 

study focused solely on technological challenges. 

1. Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, Test and Evaluation Office (DUSA-TE) and 

Program Managers (PM) engage SMEs for both existing and next generation programs 

for which (in the latter case) specific technologies have not yet been selected. These 

SMEs can be drawn largely from Service laboratory personnel who are familiar with 

operational requirements, are networked with industry and academia, and as a practical 

matter are generally less expensive to engage. They also provide a high degree of 

continuity not available from other SMEs whose length of engagement depends on 

specific project funding. A strong, dynamic technology watch is essential, however this 

can be achieved. 

2. Develop a formal strategic roadmap to identify and prioritize infrastructure, 

methodological, and threat agent challenges. The roadmap should recognize the shift 

toward biological and biosurveillance of emerging pathogens. The roadmap would be 

used to develop Program Office Management (POM) strategy, explain and defend 

programs, optimize investments, and ensure anticipation of future shock. 

THE ROADMAPPING PROCESS 

The roadmapping process is a formal procedure that follows a disciplined approach to mapping a 

desired end state. Various types of roadmaps exist, ranging from simple product roadmaps 

focused on a single commodity, to overarching strategic research roadmaps that cover a wide 

range of technology areas. In addition, roadmaps can be developed with unique characteristics 

suited for either sponsors or performers. Strategic roadmaps have a dual use: they lend clarity to 

8 
planning and investment; and they are able to map investments to products, hence defend 

programs. The Albright Strategy Group, LLC developed the graphic shown in Figure 7. 

Figure 7. Roadmap Planning in Four Steps 

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10 

APPENDIX A: TECHNOLOGY LIST 

1) Spectral

a) Wavelengths: Ultraviolet (UV); vis ; near infrared (NIR) (0.7–5 microns) ; short-wave 

infrared (SWIR) (2–5 microns); long-wave infrared (LWIR) (8–12 microns); far infrared 

(IR) (20–100 microns); TeraHertz (THz); and microwave. 

b) Methods: Miniaturized spectrometers; folded path length cells; photoacoustic 

spectrometers; Raman; surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS); coherent antiStokes Raman scattering (CARS); resonance Raman; breakdown spectroscopy (laserinduced breakdown spectroscopy [LIBS] and spark-induced breakdown spectroscopy 

[SIBS]); fluorescence; dynamic light scattering; fiber optics; femtosecond lasers; and 

hyperspectral imaging. 

2) Other Methods

a) Technologies: Photoionization; lab on a chip (microfluidics, electrokinetics); 

functionalized microcantilevers; quantum dots (gene and aptimer arrays); conducting 

polymers; miniaturized mass spectrometer (MS); nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and 

nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR); porous organic polymers and molecularly 

imprinted polymers (MIP); dendrimers; liquid crystals; flow cytometry; new enzymes; 

nanotechnology (nanomaterials, giant magnetoresistance [GMR], SQUIDs, gold 

nanoparticles/metal-oxide-semiconductor [MOS] junctions); ionic liquid electrolytes; 

solid phase microextraction (SPME/GC); ion mobility spectrometry (IMS)/mass 

spectrometry (MS); lipid diffraction gratings by dipping pen nanolithography; molecular 

computing; and molecular motors and machines. 

b) Data processing: Artificial intelligence (AI) and neural networks; game theory; swarm 

theory; massive parallel processing; role-based decisionmaking; and fuzzy logic.