NASA 

Assessments of Major 

Projects 

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2018

GAO-18-280SP

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-280SP, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2018 

NASA

Assessments of Major Projects

What GAO Found

The cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the 

extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown. NASA expects cost growth 

for the Orion crew capsule—one of the largest projects in the portfolio—but does 

not have a current cost estimate. In addition, the average launch delay for the 

portfolio was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 10 years of 

assessing major NASA projects (see figure below). 

NASA’s Major Project Portfolio Cost and Schedule Performance Deteriorated in 2018 

The deterioration in portfolio performance was the result of 9 of the 17 projects in 

development experiencing cost or schedule growth. 

• Four projects encountered technical issues that were compounded by risky

program management decisions. For example, the Space Launch System and

Exploration Ground Systems programs are large-scale, technically complex

human spaceflight programs, and NASA managed them to aggressive

schedules and with insufficient levels of cost and schedule reserves. This

made it more difficult for the programs to operate within their committed

baseline cost and schedule estimates.

• Two projects ran into technical challenges that resulted in delays in the

integration and test phase. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that

the James Webb Space Telescope project encountered delays primarily due

to the integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than

expected, as well as resolving technical issues during testing. GAO has

previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk

of incurring cost and schedule growth.

• Three projects experienced cost growth or schedule delays due to factors

outside of the projects’ control, such as delays related to their launch vehicles.

NASA continues to face increased risk of cost and schedule growth in future 

years due to new, large and complex projects that will enter the portfolio and 

expensive projects remaining in the portfolio longer than expected. 

View GAO-18-280SP. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. 

Why GAO Did This Study

This report provides GAO’s annual 

snapshot for 2018 of how well NASA is 

planning and executing its major 

acquisition projects. In May 2017, GAO 

found that projects were continuing a 

generally positive trend of limiting cost 

and schedule growth, maturing 

technologies, and stabilizing designs. 

But, at the same time, GAO noted that 

many of these projects, including some 

of the most expensive ones, were 

approaching the phase in their life 

cycles when cost and schedule growth 

is most likely. 

The explanatory statement of the 

House Committee on Appropriations 

accompanying the Omnibus 

Appropriations Act, 2009 included a 

provision for GAO to prepare status 

reports on selected large-scale NASA 

programs, projects, and activities. This 

is GAO’s 10th annual assessment. 

This report describes the cost and 

schedule performance of NASA’s 

portfolio of major projects, among other 

issues. This report also includes 

assessments of NASA’s 26 major 

projects, each with a life-cycle cost of 

over $250 million. To conduct its 

review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, 

technology maturity, design stability, 

and other data; reviewed monthly 

project status reports; and interviewed 

NASA officials.

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made related 

recommendations that NASA generally 

agreed with, but has not yet fully 

addressed. GAO continues to believe 

they should be fully addressed. NASA 

generally agreed with GAO’s findings.
Page i GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Letter 1

Background 3

Portfolio Cost and Schedule Deteriorated but Extent of Cost 

Growth Is Unknown 12

NASA Generally Maintained Technology Maturity of Its Projects 

but Performance in Design Stability Measures Is Mixed 26

Too Early to Determine Outcome of NASA’s Efforts to Address 

Workforce Challenges 35

Project Assessments 43

Commercial Crew Program 45

Double Asteroid Redirection Test 47

Europa Clipper 49

Exploration Ground Systems 51

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On 53

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 55

Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, 

 Geodesy, and Heat Transport 57

Ionospheric Connection Explorer 59

James Webb Space Telescope 61

Landsat 9 63

Laser Communications Relay Demonstration 65

Low Boom Flight Demonstrator 67

Lucy 69

Mars 2020 71

NASA ISRO – Synthetic Aperture Radar 73

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 75

Parker Solar Probe 77

Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem 79

Psyche 81

Radiation Budget Instrument 83

Restore-L 85

Space Launch System 87

Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment 89

Surface Water and Ocean Topography 91

Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 93

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope 95

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 97

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 100

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Appendix II Major NASA Projects Assessed in GAO’s 2018 Report 107

Appendix III Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s Annual Assessments 109

Appendix IV Technology Readiness Levels 111

Appendix V Elements of a Sound Business Case 113

Appendix VI Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 115

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 118

Tables

Table 1: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 

Assessment by Phase 8

Table 2: Development Cost and Schedule Performance of 

Selected Major NASA Projects Currently in Development 15

Table 3: Examples of Risky Programmatic Decisions Made by 

NASA’s Human Spaceflight Programs 18

Table 4: Characteristics of Technology Readiness Levels 111

Figures

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Space Flight Projects 3

Figure 2: Notional Distribution of Cost Reserves for a Project 

Budgeted at the 70 Percent Confidence Level 5

Figure 3: NASA’s Workforce Distribution at NASA Headquarters 

and Centers as of January 2018 11

Figure 4: Development Cost Performance and Average Launch 

Delay for Major NASA Projects from 2009 to 2018 14

Figure 5: Number of NASA’s Major Projects Attaining Technology 

Maturity by Preliminary Design Review from 2010 to 2018 28
Page iii GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 6: Average Number of Critical Technologies Reported by 

NASA’s Major Projects in Development from 2009 to 

2018 30

Figure 7: Number of NASA Major Projects That Released at least 

90 Percent of Drawings by Critical Design Review and 

Average Percentage of Released Drawings from 2010 to 

2018 32

Figure 8: Average Percentage of Engineering Drawing Growth 

after Critical Design Review for NASA Major Projects 

from 2010 to 2018 34

Figure 9: NASA’s Workforce Average Age, Retirement Eligibility, 

and Average Number of Years Worked Past Retirement 

Eligibility as of January 2018 40

Figure 10: Illustration of a Sample Project Assessment 44

Figure 11: Cost and Schedule of Major NASA Projects Assessed 

in GAO’s 2018 Report by Phase 107

Figure 12: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s Annual 

Assessments from 2009-2017 109

Figure 13: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 

Assessment 110
Page iv GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Abbreviations 

AIM Asteroid Impact Monitor 

ATLAS Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System

CCP Commercial Crew Program 

CNES Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales 

DART Double Asteroid Redirection Test

DCI data collection instrument 

DSOC Deep Space Optical Communications 

EGS Exploration Ground Systems 

EM-1 Exploration Mission 1

EM-2 Exploration Mission 2

ESM European Service Module

ESA European Space Agency

GFAS Ground Flight Application Software

GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences 

GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control

GRACE-FO Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On 

GSLV Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle

HP3 Heat Flow and Physical Properties Probe

HVPS high voltage power supply

ICESat-2 Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 

ICON Ionospheric Connection Explorer

InSight Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, 

and Heat Transport

ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation

ISS International Space Station

JCL joint cost and schedule confidence level 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JPSS-2 Joint Polar Satellite System 2

JWST James Webb Space Telescope

KaRIn Ka-band Radar Interferometer 

KDP key decision point 

LBFD Low Boom Flight Demonstrator

LCRD Laser Communications Relay Demonstration

LRI Laser Ranging Interferometer

MAVEN Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NEXT-C NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster-Commercial

NISAR NASA ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Page v GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 

OCI Ocean Color Instrument

Orion Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

OSIRIS-REx Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification

 Security-Regolith Explorer

PSP Parker Solar Probe

PACE Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem

QueSST Quiet Supersonic Technology

RBI Radiation Budget Instrument 

SCaN Space Communication and Navigation

SCCS Spaceport Command and Control System

SCS Sampling and Caching System

SDO Solar Dynamics Observatory

SEIS Seismic Experiment for Interior Structure 

SGSS Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment

SLS Space Launch System

SPC Solar Probe Cup

SWOT Surface Water and Ocean Topography 

TESS Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 

VBB Very Broad Band 

WFIRST Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope

WICN Workforce Information Cubes for NASA
Page vi GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects

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United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

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Page 1 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 1, 2018

Congressional Committees

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is planning 

to invest about $61 billion over the life cycle of its current portfolio of 26 

major projects—those projects that have a life-cycle cost over $250 

million. These projects aim to continue exploring Earth and the solar 

system and extend human presence beyond low Earth orbit, among other 

things. This report provides an overview of NASA’s planning and 

execution of these major acquisitions—an area that has been on GAO’s 

high risk list since 1990.1 It includes assessments of NASA’s key projects 

across mission areas, such as the Space Launch System for human 

exploration, Mars 2020 for planetary science, and Ice, Cloud, and Land 

Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2) for Earth science.

The explanatory statement of the House Committee on Appropriations 

accompanying the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 includes a provision 

for us to prepare project status reports on selected large-scale NASA 

programs, projects, and activities.2 This is our 10th annual report 

responding to that mandate. This report assesses (1) the cost and 

schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio of major projects, (2) the 

maturity of critical technologies and stability of project designs at key 

points in the development process, and (3) the extent to which NASA is 

assessing future workforce capacity challenges that may affect its ability 

to manage its portfolio of projects. This report also includes individual 

assessments of 26 major NASA projects. When NASA determines that a 

project has an estimated life-cycle cost of over $250 million, we include 

that project in our annual review up through launch or completion.

To assess the cost and schedule performance, technology maturity, and 

design stability of NASA’s major projects, we collected information on 

these areas from projects using a data collection instrument, analyzed 

projects’ monthly status reports, interviewed NASA project and 

 

1

GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts 

Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017).

2

See Explanatory Statement, 155 Cong. Rec. H1653, 1824-25 (daily ed., Feb. 23, 2009), 

on H.R. 1105, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, which became Pub. L. No. 111-8. In 

this report, we refer to these projects as major projects rather than large-scale projects as 

this is the term used by NASA.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

headquarters officials, and reviewed project documentation. There are 26 

major projects in total, but the information available depends on where a 

project is in its life cycle.3 For the 17 projects in the implementation 

phase, we compared cost and schedule estimates as of February 2018 to 

their original cost and schedule baselines, identified the number of 

technologies being developed, and assessed their technology maturity 

against GAO-identified acquisition best practices and NASA policy. We 

also compared the number of releasable design drawings at the critical 

design review against GAO-identified acquisition best practices and 

analyzed subsequent design drawings changes. We reviewed historical 

data on cost and schedule performance, technology maturity, and design 

stability for major projects from our prior reports and compared it to the 

performance of NASA’s current portfolio of major projects.

To assess the extent to which NASA is assessing future workforce 

capacity, we reviewed NASA assessments of technical capabilities and 

business services, interviewed officials responsible for the assessments 

and implementing recommendations from the assessments, including 

officials within the Office of Human Capital Management, and analyzed 

workforce data found in a NASA database. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purpose by reviewing responses to data 

reliability questions from knowledgeable agency officials and the data for 

obvious errors.

Finally, to conduct our 26 project assessments, we analyzed monthly 

status reports and interviewed project officials to identify major sources of 

risk and the strategies that projects are using to mitigate them. Appendix I 

contains detailed information on our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to May 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

 

3

Eight projects were in an early stage of development, called formulation, when there are 

still unknowns about requirements, technology, and design. For those projects, we 

reported preliminary cost ranges and schedule estimates. The Commercial Crew Program 

has a tailored project life cycle and project management requirements. As a result, it was 

excluded from our cost and schedule performance, technology maturity, and design 

stability analyses.
Page 3 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The life cycle for NASA space flight projects consists of two phases—

formulation, which takes a project from concept to preliminary design, and 

implementation, which includes building, launching, and operating the 

system, among other activities. NASA further divides formulation and 

implementation into phase A through phase F. Major projects must get 

approval from senior NASA officials at key decision points before they 

can enter each new phase. Figure 1 depicts NASA’s life cycle for space 

flight projects.

Figure 1: NASA’s Life Cycle for Space Flight Projects

Project formulation consists of phases A and B, during which the projects 

develop and define requirements, cost and schedule estimates, and the 

system’s design for implementation. NASA Procedural Requirements 

7120.5E, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements, specifies that during formulation, the project must 

complete a formulation agreement to establish the technical and 

acquisition work that needs to be conducted during this phase and define 

the schedule and funding requirements for that work. The formulation 

Background
Page 4 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

agreement should identify new technologies and their planned 

development, the use of heritage technologies, risk mitigation plans, and 

testing plans to ensure that technologies will work as intended in a 

relevant environment. Prior to entering phase B, projects develop a range 

of the project’s expected cost and schedule which is used to inform the 

budget planning for that project. During phase B, the project also 

develops programmatic measures and technical leading indicators, which 

track various project metrics such as requirement changes, staffing 

demands, and mass and power utilization. Near the end of formulation, 

leading up to the preliminary design review, the project team completes 

technology development and its preliminary design.

Formulation culminates in a review at key decision point C, known as 

project confirmation, where cost and schedule baselines are established 

and documented in a decision memorandum. The decision memorandum 

outlines the management agreement and the agency baseline 

commitment. The management agreement can be viewed as a contract 

between the agency and the project manager. The project manager has 

the authority to manage the project within the parameters outlined in the 

agreement. The agency baseline commitment includes the cost and 

schedule baselines against which the agency’s performance on a project 

may be measured.

To inform the management agreement and the agency baseline 

commitment, each project with a life-cycle cost estimated to be greater 

than $250 million must also develop a joint cost and schedule confidence 

level (JCL). The JCL initiative, adopted in January 2009, produces a 

point-in-time estimate that includes, among other things, all cost and 

schedule elements in phases A through D, incorporates and quantifies 

known risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to date, and 

addresses available annual resources. NASA policy requires that projects 

be baselined and budgeted at the 70 percent confidence level and funded 

at a level equivalent to at least the 50 percent confidence level.4

The management agreement and agency baseline commitment include 

cost and schedule reserves held at the project and NASA headquarters-

 

4

NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E, NASA Space Flight Program and 

Project Management Requirements paras 2.4.4 and 2.4.4.2 (Aug. 14, 2012) (hereinafter 

cited as NPR 7120.5E (Aug. 14, 2012)). The decision authority for a project can approve it 

to move forward at less than the 70 percent confidence level. That decision must be 

justified and documented. 
Page 5 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

level, respectively.5 Cost reserves are for costs that are expected to be 

incurred—for instance, to address project risks—but are not yet allocated 

to a specific part of the project. Schedule reserves are extra time in 

project schedules that can be allocated to specific activities, elements, 

and major subsystems to mitigate delays or address unforeseen risks. 

Project-held cost and schedule reserves are within the project manager’s 

control. If the project requires additional time or money beyond the 

management agreement—for example, if a project needs additional funds 

for an issue outside of the project’s control—NASA headquarters may 

allocate headquarters-held reserves. Figure 2 notionally depicts how 

NASA would distribute cost reserves for a project that was baselined in 

accordance with its JCL policy.

Figure 2: Notional Distribution of Cost Reserves for a Project Budgeted at the 70 

Percent Confidence Level

The total amount of cost and schedule reserves held at the project level 

varies based on where the project is in its life cycle. Seven NASA centers 

or laboratories are responsible for managing 25 NASA major projects. Of 

these, four centers or laboratories manage 20 of the 25 major projects 

 

5

NASA refers to cost reserves as unallocated future expenses. 
Page 6 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

and require or recommend that projects hold a certain level of cost and 

schedule reserves at key project milestones.6 For example, at the 

Goddard Space Flight Center, projects are required to hold cost reserves 

equal to at least 25 percent of the estimated cost remaining at the project 

confirmation review, and 10 percent at the time of delivery to the launch 

site. Projects track their reserves between phases to help ensure they 

hold reserves consistent with these requirements. The 26th major project 

included in our review, the Low Boom Flight Demonstrator (LBFD), does 

not have a lead center because it is using a virtual project office model. 

Project officials said they have not yet determined which center cost and 

schedule guidelines the project will follow.

After a project is confirmed, it begins implementation, consisting of 

phases C, D, E, and F. In this report, we refer to projects in phase C and 

D as being in development. A critical design review is held during the 

latter half of phase C in order to determine if the design is mature enough 

to support proceeding with the final design and fabrication. After the 

critical design review and just prior to beginning phase D, the project 

completes a system integration review to evaluate the readiness of the 

project and associated supporting infrastructure to begin system 

assembly, integration and test. In phase D, the project performs system 

assembly, integration, test, and launch activities. Phases E and F consist 

of operations and sustainment and project closeout.

NASA’s portfolio of major projects ranges from satellites equipped with 

advanced sensors to study the Earth to a rover that plans to collect soil or 

rock samples on Mars to telescopes intended to explore the universe to 

spacecraft to transport humans and cargo beyond low-Earth orbit. When 

NASA determines that a project will have an estimated life-cycle cost of 

more than $250 million, we include that project in our annual review. After 

 

6

Goddard Procedural Requirements 7120.7A, Schedule and Budget Margins for Flight 

Projects (Feb. 28, 2017); Marshall Procedural Requirements 7120.1, Marshall Space 

Flight Center Engineering and Program/Project Management Requirements (Aug. 26, 

2014); Langley Research Center, Space Flight Project Practices Handbook, LPR 7120.5 

B-1 (Mar. 17, 2014); and Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Flight Project Practices, Rev. 8 (Oct. 

6, 2010). The Kennedy Space Center and Johnson Space Center do not have centerspecific guidance for reserves. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 

manages the Parker Solar Probe (PSP) and Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) 

projects and has guidelines for schedule reserves, but not for cost reserves. The Johns 

Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory SD-QP-012, Rev. b, Space Exploration 

Sector (SES) Quality Procedure: Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Project 

Management Control System (PMCS) (Apr. 4, 2017). 

NASA Projects Reviewed 

in GAO’s Annual 

Assessment
Page 7 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

a project launches or reaches full operational capability, we no longer 

include an assessment of it in our annual report.

This report includes assessments of 26 major NASA projects (see table 

1). Six projects are being assessed for the first time this year: Double 

Asteroid Redirection Test (DART), Laser Communications Relay 

Demonstration (LCRD), LBFD, Lucy, Psyche, and Restore-L. Prior to 

establishing its cost baseline, the LCRD project had an estimated lifecycle cost estimate of less than $250 million and therefore was not 

included in our previous reviews when the project was in formulation. For 

a list of the 26 projects and their current cost and schedule estimates, see 

appendix II. We did not complete an assessment for the Asteroid Redirect 

Robotic Mission project this year because, as of June 2017, the project 

closed out most project development activities at the direction of NASA 

headquarters. Appendix III includes a list of all the projects that we have 

reviewed from 2009 to 2017.
Page 8 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Table 1: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 Assessment by Phase

Projects in formulation Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART)

Europa Clipper

Low Boom Flight Demonstrator (LBFD)

Lucy

Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE)

Psyche 

Restore-L 

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST)

Projects in implementation Commercial Crew Program (CCP)

Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On 

(GRACE-FO)

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2)

Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, 

Geodesy, and Heat Transport (InSight)

Ionospheric Connection Explorer (ICON)

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST)

Landsat 9 (L9)

Laser Communications Relay Demonstration (LCRD)

Mars 2020

NASA ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR)

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion)

Parker Solar Probe (PSP) (formerly Solar Probe Plus)

Radiation Budget Instrument (RBI)

Space Launch System (SLS)

Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS)

Surface Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT)

Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS)

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. | GAO-18-280SP
Page 9 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Over the past 6 years, we have issued several reports assessing NASA’s 

progress acquiring its largest projects and programs in more depth.7 We 

found in July 2016 that all three human spaceflight programs—the Orion 

Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), the Space Launch System (SLS), 

and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—were making progress in 

resolving technical issues and maturing designs, but that pressure on the 

limited cost and schedule reserves put the schedule for their first 

combined mission, the uncrewed Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1), at risk.8

Subsequently, in April 2017, we found that given the combined effects of 

ongoing technical challenges in conjunction with limited cost and 

schedule reserves, it was unlikely that these programs would achieve the 

planned November 2018 launch readiness date.9 We recommended that 

NASA confirm whether this launch readiness date was achievable and, if 

warranted, propose a new, more realistic EM-1 date and report to 

Congress on the results of its schedule analysis. NASA agreed with both 

recommendations and stated that it was no longer in its best interest to 

pursue the November 2018 launch readiness date. In December 2017, 

 

7

GAO, James Webb Space Telescope: Actions Needed to Improve Cost Estimate and 

Oversight of Test and Integration, GAO-13-4 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2012); Space 

Launch System: Resources Need to be Matched to Requirements to Decrease Risk and 

Support Long Term Affordability, GAO-14-631 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2014); James 

Webb Space Telescope: Project Meeting Commitments but Current Technical, Cost, and 

Schedule Challenges Could Affect Continued Progress, GAO-14-72 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 8, 2014); James Webb Space Telescope: Project Facing Increased Schedule Risk 

with Significant Work Remaining, GAO-15-100 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2014); Space 

Launch System: Management Tools Should Better Track to Cost and Schedule 

Commitments to Adequately Monitor Increasing Risk, GAO-15-596 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 16, 2015); James Webb Space Telescope: Project on Track but May Benefit from 

Improved Contractor Data to Better Understand Costs, GAO-16-112 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 17, 2015);NASA Human Space Exploration: Opportunity Nears to Reassess Launch 

Vehicle and Ground Systems Cost and Schedule, GAO-16-612 (Washington, D.C.: July 

27, 2016); Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: Action Needed to Improve Visibility into 

Cost, Schedule, and Capacity to Resolve Technical Challenges, GAO-16-620 

(Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2016); NASA Commercial Crew Program: Schedule Pressure 

Increases as Contractors Delay Key Events, GAO-17-137 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 

2017); NASA Human Space Exploration: Delay Likely for First Exploration Mission, 

GAO-17-414 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2017); NASA Human Space Exploration: 

Integration Approach Presents Challenges to Oversight and Independence, GAO-18-28 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct 19, 2017); NASA Commercial Crew Program: Continued Delays 

Pose Risks for Uninterrupted Access to the International Space Station, GAO-18-317T 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2018); and James Webb Space Telescope: Integration and 

Test Challenges Have Delayed Launch and Threated to Push Costs Over Cap,

GAO-18-273 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2018).

8

GAO-16-620 and GAO-16-612. 

9

GAO-17-414. 
Page 10 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

NASA approved a new EM-1 schedule of December 2019, with six 

months of schedule reserve available to extend the date to June 2020. In 

April 2018, NASA provided us with the letter the agency sent to Congress 

on its assessment of the EM-1 schedule. We are in the process of 

reviewing the letter to determine if it addresses our recommendation.

We have also reported for several years on the James Webb Space 

Telescope (JWST) project, which has experienced significant cost 

increases and schedule delays. Prior to being approved for development, 

cost estimates for JWST ranged from $1 billion to $3.5 billion, with 

expected launch dates ranging from 2007 to 2011. Before 2011, early 

technical and management challenges, contractor performance issues, 

low levels of cost reserves, and poorly phased funding levels caused 

JWST to delay work after confirmation, which contributed to significant 

cost and schedule overruns, including launch delays. Following an 

independent review that found JWST was executing well from a technical 

standpoint, but that the baseline cost estimate did not reflect the most 

probable cost with adequate reserves in each year of project execution, 

Congress placed an $8 billion cap on the formulation and development 

costs for the project in November 2011. NASA rebaselined JWST with a 

life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion that included additional money for 

operations and a planned launch in October 2018.10 In December 2017, 

we found that the JWST project continues to make progress towards 

launch, but the program is encountering technical challenges that require 

both time and money to fix and may lead to additional delays.11

In January 2018, NASA had a civil servant workforce of approximately 

17,100 employees distributed among NASA Headquarters in Washington, 

D.C., and nine centers located around the country. Figure 3 shows the 

distribution of this workforce across NASA headquarters and the centers.

 

10A rebaseline is a process initiated if development costs increase by 30 percent or more 

and requires the NASA Administrator to transmit a report to the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

11GAO, NASA: Preliminary Observations on the Management of Space Telescopes, 

GAO-18-277T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2017).

NASA’s Workforce
Page 11 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 3: NASA’s Workforce Distribution at NASA Headquarters and Centers as of January 2018

Note: Civil servant staff within NASA’s Shared Services Center are included in the total for the 

Stennis Space Center because the center is located there. 

NASA also relies on a contractor workforce to accomplish its mission. 

NASA estimated that approximately 33,100 contractors would support 

NASA in 2018. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is a federally funded 

research and development center under contract with NASA and is 

managed by the California Institute of Technology. It has about 5,500 

employees, who primarily conduct NASA-related work. The Applied 

Physics Laboratory is a research center affiliated with Johns Hopkins 
Page 12 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

University and has about 6,300 employees, some of whom manage and 

support NASA projects.

The cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio of major projects 

has deteriorated since last year, but the extent of cost performance 

deterioration is unknown. NASA lacks a current cost estimate for its Orion 

crew capsule—one of the largest programs in the portfolio—but expects 

the program will exceed its cost baseline when NASA updates the 

program’s life-cycle cost estimate. Because the Orion program accounts 

for about 22 percent of all development costs, even a small percentage of 

cost growth for the Orion program could significantly affect cost 

performance. The known negative cost and schedule performance is 

largely driven by the cost and schedule growth of four projects—SLS, 

EGS, Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) and Mars 

2020—that experienced technical problems compounded by 

programmatic challenges. Together, these projects experienced $638 

million in cost growth and 59 months in aggregate schedule delays. Two 

projects—JWST and ICESat-2—experienced schedule delays due to 

technical challenges identified during integration and test. Another 3 

projects—NASA ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR), Ionospheric 

Connection Explorer (ICON), and Gravity Recovery and Climate 

Experiment Follow-On (GRACE-FO)—experienced cost growth or delays 

largely due to factors outside of the projects’ control, such as launch 

vehicle delays.

NASA is at risk of continued cost increases and schedule delays as 

newer, complex projects begin development and expensive projects 

linger in the portfolio longer than expected due to delays. Several projects 

that experienced schedule delays or cost increases will face further 

challenges completing integration and test—the phase of development 

that often reveals unforeseen challenges that can lead to cost and 

schedule growth—that could result in additional cost and schedule 

growth.

Portfolio Cost and 

Schedule 

Deteriorated but 

Extent of Cost Growth 

Is Unknown
Page 13 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Since we last reported in May 2017, the average launch delay increased 

to 12 months, up from 7 months in 2017—the highest schedule delay we 

have reported to date.12 We are not able to determine the extent of 

portfolio cost growth this year because NASA does not have a current 

cost estimate for the Orion program—one of the largest programs in its 

portfolio—and officials expect the cost to increase. As of June 2017, the 

Orion program’s development cost was about $6.6 billion and based on 

that estimate it accounts for 22 percent of the portfolio’s estimated $30.1 

billion of development costs. As a result, a small percentage of cost 

growth for the Orion program could significantly affect cost performance. 

Even without including Orion cost growth, the overall development cost 

growth for the portfolio of 17 development projects increased to 18.8 

percent, up from 15.6 percent in 2017 (see figure 4).13

 

12GAO, NASA: Assessments of Major Projects, GAO-17-303SP (Washington, D.C: May 

16, 2017). 

13We have historically presented cost and schedule performance including and excluding 

the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) because, prior to 2015, it had a development 

cost baseline significantly larger than other projects and the magnitude of its cost growth 

masked the performance of the remainder of the portfolio. Now that other projects in the 

portfolio, such as Orion and the Space Launch System, have large development cost 

baselines, we no longer present cost performance trends excluding JWST.

Portfolio Average Launch 

Delays Increased, but 

NASA Lacks a Current 

Orion Program Cost 

Estimate to Determine 

Extent of Cost Growth
Page 14 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 4: Development Cost Performance and Average Launch Delay for Major 

NASA Projects from 2009 to 2018

Note: The years in the figure are the year we issued our report. Cost and schedule performance is 

compared across each report period. 

Senior-level NASA officials told us that they expect that the Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate and the Orion program 

will complete an updated life-cycle cost estimate in June 2018. This would 

be approximately 10 months after the program raised to senior-level 

officials’ attention that the program expects cost growth over its cost 

baseline to the second combined mission, Exploration Mission 2 (EM-2), 

during an August 2017 briefing concerning potential cost increases 

related to the EM-1 launch delay.

Seven of 17 NASA major projects stayed within cost and schedule 

estimates since we last reported in May 2017, but 9 projects experienced 

cost growth or schedule delays and cost growth is expected for the Orion 

program. Table 2 provides data on the cost and schedule performance for 
Page 15 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

the 17 major projects in development that have cost and schedule 

baselines since we last reported on the portfolio’s performance in May 

2017.14

Table 2: Development Cost and Schedule Performance of Selected Major NASA Projects Currently in Development 

Overall performance Project Confirmation 

date

Changes since

May 2017

Cumulative 

performance

Year

Cost

(millions)

Schedule

(months)

Cost

(millions)

Schedule

(months)

Lower than expected cost PSP 2014 $0.0 0 -$5.4 0

GRACE-FO 2014 -$1.6 3 -$2.2 3

TESS 2014 -$13.1 -2 -$39.9 -2

Within baseline ICON 2014 $0.0 8 $0.0 8

SWOT 2016 $0.0 0 $0.0 0

LCRD 2017 $0.0 0 $0.0 0

Landsat 9 2017 $0.0 0 $0.0 0

Higher than expected cost Mars 2020a 2016 $12.9 0 $10.7 0

NISAR 2016 $22.0 0 $22.0 0

Replanc InSight 2014 $0.0 0 $131.7 26

EGS (EM-1) 2014 $417.8 19 $421.4 19

SLS (EM-1) 2014 $147.8 19 $147.8 19

Rebaselinec JWST 2008 $0.0 19 $3,607.7 71

ICESat-2 2012 $1.4 4 $206.3 17

SGSSb 2013 $59.5 21 $421.6 48

Canceled RBI 2016 $0.0 0 $0.0 0

Under revision Orion (EM-2)d 2015 $0.0 0 -$151.7 0

Total: $646.7 91 $4,770.0 209

Legend: PSP: Parker Solar Probe; GRACE-FO: Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On; TESS: Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite; 

ICON: Ionospheric Connection Explorer; SWOT: Surface Water and Ocean Topography; NISAR: NASA Indian Space Research Organisation – 

Synthetic Aperture Radar; LCRD: Laser Communications Relay Demonstration; InSight: Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and 

Heat Transport; EGS: Exploration Ground Systems; SLS: Space Launch System; EM-1: Exploration Mission 1; JWST: James Webb Space Telescope; 

ICESat-2: Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2; SGSS: Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment; RBI: Radiation Budget Instrument; Orion: 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle; EM-2: Exploration Mission 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. | GAO-18-280SP

Note: Positive values indicate cost growth or launch delays. Negative values indicate cost decreases 

or earlier than planned launch dates. 

a

The Mars 2020 project used $2.2 million in funds originally budgeted for development for formulation 

activities. This partially offsets an increase of $12.9 million in development cost growth primarily due 

 

14GAO-17-303SP. 
Page 16 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

to increased costs associated with a technology demonstration instrument and entry, descent, and 

landing instrument. 

b

The SGSS project reported cost growth up through its first operational readiness review, which is 

currently planned for the end of fiscal year 2019. However, the project expects that there could be 

additional cost and schedule growth beyond what is reported here. 

c

A replan is a process initiated if development costs increase by 15 percent or more. NASA replanned 

the SLS program even though development costs did not increase by 15 percent or more. A replan 

does not require a new project baseline to be established. A rebaseline is a process initiated if 

development costs increase by 30 percent or more. Both processes require NASA to submit a report 

to relevant congressional committees. In addition, if a project or program milestone is likely to be 

delayed by 6 months or more, this report is also required. 

d

NASA officials said they are revising the Orion program’s life-cycle cost estimate and expect to 

complete a new estimate in June 2018. The new cost is expected to exceed the program’s 

development cost baseline. The current costs in the table reflect the estimate provided in June 2017. 

The cumulative cost change reflects the program shifting $151.7 million of funding previously 

budgeted for the development phase to the formulation phase. 

The deteriorating cost and schedule performance of the portfolio in 2018 

is the result of

• four projects—SLS, EGS, SGSS, and Mars 2020—addressing 

technical challenges that were compounded by risky programmatic 

decisions;

• two projects—JWST and ICESat-2—experiencing delays due to 

technical challenges identified during integration and test; and

• three projects—NISAR, ICON, and GRACE-FO—experiencing cost 

growth or delays largely due to factors outside of the projects’ control.

We elaborate on these three scenarios below.

Technical challenges compounded by risky programmatic 

decisions. Together, SLS, EGS, SGSS, and Mars 2020 experienced 

$638 million in cost growth and 59 months in aggregate schedule delays 

due to technical problems that were compounded by programmatic 

challenges since our May 2017 report.15 The SLS and EGS programs 

experienced cost growth and schedule delays associated with EM-1, their 

first combined mission along with the Orion program. We have found for 

several years that the human spaceflight programs—Orion, SLS, and 

EGS—are making progress maturing designs and building hardware, but 

also are experiencing some significant engineering and manufacturing 

challenges. For example, the SLS program ran into numerous challenges 

 

15GAO-17-303SP. 
Page 17 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

completing the welding of its core stage element in 2017. The program 

stopped welding on the core stage for months to identify and resolve low 

weld strength in the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks due to low 

weld strength measurements found in the liquid oxygen tanks caused by 

a program and contractor decision to change the weld tool configuration 

during fabrication. The EGS program also experienced technical 

challenges, including with the design and installation of the ground 

support equipment and the 10 umbilicals that connect SLS and Orion to 

the Mobile Launcher—which supports the assembly, testing, and 

servicing of SLS and provides the platform on which SLS and Orion will 

launch.

Finally, although the Orion program has not yet reported cost growth, it 

also experienced technical challenges. These challenges included 

software delays and hardware delays, and at least 14 months of delays 

with the European Service Module—which provides air, water, power, 

and propulsion to Orion during in-space flight—since the element’s critical 

design review in June 2016. In April 2017, we found that, according to 

program officials, the delays with the service module were largely due to 

NASA, the European Space Agency, and the European Space Agency 

contractor underestimating the time and effort necessary to address 

design issues for the first production service module and the availability of 

parts from suppliers and subcontractors. NASA expects the Orion 

program to experience cost growth over its cost baseline to the second 

combined mission, EM-2. However, the extent of the growth is unknown 

because, as noted above, NASA is currently revising its life-cycle cost 

estimate.

Technical challenges such as these are not unusual for large-scale 

programs, especially human exploration programs that are inherently 

complex and difficult. However, we have found that NASA has made 

programmatic decisions—including establishing low cost and schedule 

reserves, managing to aggressive schedules, and not following best 

practices for earned value management or creating reliable cost and 

schedule baselines—that have compounded the technical challenges 

(see table 3). As a result, the three human spaceflight programs have 

been at risk of cost and schedule growth since NASA approved their 

baselines.
Page 18 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Table 3: Examples of Risky Programmatic Decisions Made by NASA’s Human Spaceflight Programs

Programmatic decision Example(s) Negative effect GAO report(s)

NASA baselined the 

Exploration Ground Systems 

(EGS), Orion Multi-Purpose 

Crew Vehicle (Orion), and 

Space Launch System (SLS) 

programs with low cost and 

schedule reserves.

In July 2016, we found that NASA baselined 

the SLS program with cost reserves of less 

than 2 percent, even though guidance for 

Marshall Space Flight Center—the NASA

center with responsibility for the SLS 

program—established standard cost reserve 

for launch vehicle programs of 20 percent 

when the baseline is approved. 

Operating with low cost and 

schedule reserves limits a 

program’s ability to address 

risks and unforeseen technical 

challenges.

GAO-17-414 and 

GAO-16-612

NASA managed the EGS, 

Orion, and SLS programs to 

an internal schedule for 

completing development 

production that was 

aggressive and could 

exacerbate delays and lead to 

cost overruns. 

In July 2016, we found that the EGS program 

planned to conduct the mobile launcher’s 

verification and validation concurrent with 

ground support equipment systems and 

umbilicals installation to support the 

program’s internal schedule goal. We found 

this to be a risky practice because of 

uncertainties regarding how systems not yet 

installed may affect the systems already 

installed.

Working towards a more 

aggressive internal goal is not 

a bad practice; however, 

increasing cost and schedule 

risk to the program in order to 

pursue such a goal is not 

beneficial to programs in the 

long term. 

GAO-16-620 and 

GAO-16-612

The SLS program did not 

follow best practices for using 

earned value management, 

which integrates the project 

scope of work with cost, 

schedule, and performance 

elements for optimum project 

planning and control. 

In July 2016, we found that the SLS program 

had not positioned itself well to provide 

accurate assessments of progress with the 

core stage because it operated for several 

years without a performance measurement 

baseline that is necessary to support full 

earned value management reporting. The use 

of earned value management is advocated by 

both GAO’s best practices for cost estimating 

and NASA’s own guidance.

Programs that do not use 

earned value data are limited 

in their ability to have accurate 

assessments of project 

progress, produce early 

warning signs of impending 

schedule delays and cost 

overruns, and provide 

unbiased estimates of 

anticipated costs at 

completion. 

GAO-16-612

The Orion and SLS programs 

established baselines that 

were not fully reliable.a

In July 2016, we found that the Orion program 

did not generally follow best practices in 

preparing its cost and schedule estimates, 

which were key inputs into the program’s joint 

cost and schedule confidence level processes 

and baseline. In July 2015, we found that cost 

and schedule estimates for the SLS program 

substantially met five of six characteristics 

that GAO considers best practices for 

preparing reliable estimates, but could not be 

deemed fully reliable because they only 

partially met the sixth characteristic—

credibility.

Without sound cost and 

schedule estimates, decision 

makers do not have a clear 

understanding of the cost and 

schedule risk inherent in the 

program or important 

information needed to make 

programmatic decisions.

GAO-16-620 and 

GAO-15-596

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports. | GAO-18-280SP

a

We did not assess EGS’s cost and schedule estimates compared to best practices. 
Page 19 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

In December 2017, NASA announced the new internal launch readiness 

date for EM-1 is now December 2019, and has allocated 6 months of 

schedule reserve available to extend the date to June 2020 for possible 

manufacturing and production schedule risks. This represents a delay of 

13-19 months for EM-1. It is too soon to know if NASA has addressed the 

programmatic challenges identified above but we will continue to follow 

up through future reviews.

Similarly, the SGSS project experienced new cost growth of $59.5 million 

and delayed its completion by 21 months. Project officials attributed the 

cost growth and delays to the contractor’s incomplete understanding of its 

requirements, which led to poor contractor plans and late design 

changes. But project management has been a challenge as well.16 The 

project has historically struggled to manage contractor performance and 

has faced both contractor and project staffing shortfalls, as we found in 

our prior reports starting in 2013.17 For example, NASA managers noted 

concerns with contractor plans and staffing estimates in 2013 during 

project confirmation. In March 2015, we found that the project was being 

rebaselined due to the contractor’s poor cost and schedule performance 

and limitations that NASA placed on the funding available to the 

contractor in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The contractor was also 

operating with a limited number of staff at that time. In May 2017, we 

found that the project continued to experience contractor performance 

problems and had experienced cost growth and schedule delays over the 

2015 rebaseline even as the project decreased its scope. In addition, the 

project experienced staff shortfalls in key areas, such as systems 

engineering and business management.

The Mars 2020 project experienced $12.9 million in development cost 

growth, but no schedule delays. The cost growth was primarily due to 

technical challenges on a technology demonstration instrument and 

 

16In 2016, NASA announced it was reclassifying SGSS as a hybrid sustainment project for 

the Space Network. A hybrid sustainment effort is a sustainment effort that still includes 

development work. The SGSS project expects to experience additional cost growth and 

schedule delays, but the exact magnitude is unknown. The project was reevaluating its 

cost and schedules through its final acceptance review at the time of our review. 

17GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, GAO-13-276SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013); NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 

GAO-14-338SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2014); NASA: Assessments of Selected 

Large-Scale Projects, GAO-15-320SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2015); NASA: 

Assessments of Major Projects, GAO-16-309SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2016); and 

GAO-17-303SP. 
Page 20 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

higher than anticipated integration costs for an entry, descent, and 

landing instrument. Both instruments are funded by the Human 

Exploration and Operations and Space Technology Mission Directorates. 

NASA officials attributed the cost growth of the technology demonstration 

instrument—which is designed to convert carbon dioxide to oxygen—to 

the complexity of the technology development for the effort. At the 

project’s preliminary design review in February 2016, a critical technology 

for the technology demonstration instrument did not meet the 

recommended level of maturity, which we have found can increase risk 

for systems entering product development. The project had matured the 

technology to this recommended level by its critical design review in 

February 2017. However, as a result of the focus on maturing this 

particular technology, other components of the instrument fell behind the 

planned schedule. Project costs for Mars 2020 also increased for an 

entry, descent, and landing instrument, due, in part, to cost increases for 

integration and to add additional staff to the instrument team to maintain 

schedule.

Finally, the RBI project would have likely exceeded its cost baseline if 

NASA had not decided to cancel the project in January 2018. According 

to NASA’s cancellation memorandum, the project was canceled because 

of continued cost growth, technical issues, and poor contractor 

performance. In 2017, we found that the project was working to an 

aggressive schedule, and the prime contractor continued to experience 

cost overruns even after NASA added a deputy project manager and 

increased site visits and meetings with the contractor.18 Subsequently, the 

project—which was developing an instrument to be hosted on a National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellite—determined that it 

would not be able to meet its delivery date for integration with the satellite 

without requiring additional funding in excess of the project’s cost 

baseline if other technical issues arose. In its cancellation memorandum, 

NASA stated continuing to fund RBI from within the Earth Science

Division budget would slow other important activities.

Technical challenges identified during integration and test. The 

JWST and ICESat-2 projects experienced technical challenges during 

integration and test that delayed their schedules. Both projects were 

previously rebaselined before entering system-level integration and 

testing, and the current schedule delays are beyond the new schedules 

 

18GAO-17-303SP. 
Page 21 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

that NASA set for the projects in 2011 for JWST and in 2014 for ICESat2.

• The JWST project delayed its launch readiness date by at least 19 

months from October 2018 to May 2020. NASA announced two 

delays for the project since our last portfolio-wide review in May 

2017.19 First, as we found in February 2018, the project delayed its 

launch readiness date by up to 8 months primarily due to the 

integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than 

expected.20 Specifically, execution of spacecraft integration and test 

tasks, due to complexity of work and cautious handling given the 

sensitivity of flight hardware, was slower than planned. In addition, 

before the delay, the project used all of its schedule reserves to its 

prior launch readiness date. This was the result of various contractor 

workmanship errors, particularly with respect to the spacecraft 

propulsion systems, as well as the resolution of various technical 

issues, including a test anomaly on the telescope and sunshield 

hardware challenges. Second, in March 2018, NASA announced that 

it had delayed the project’s launch readiness date by an additional 11 

months to approximately May 2020 and planned to establish an 

external independent review board to analyze the project’s 

organizational and technical issues to inform a more specific launch 

time frame.

The announcement also stated that after a new launch date is 

established, NASA would provide a new cost estimate that may 

exceed the $8 billion congressional cost cap that was established in 

2011. NASA plans to finalize the project’s cost and schedule in June 

2018. Because the additional delays were announced while a draft of 

this report was with NASA for comment, we plan to follow up on the 

reasons for the additional delays and the results of the analysis in a 

future review.

• The ICESat-2 project delayed its launch readiness date by 4 months 

from June to October 2018 due to technical issues with its only 

instrument, the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System. A key 

part in the instrument’s lasers failed during instrument environmental 

testing, which delayed the project’s system integration review—the 

start of system-level integration and test. The manufacturer 

determined the primary cause of the anomaly was a flaw in the design 

 

19GAO-17-303SP. 

20GAO-18-273. 
Page 22 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

of the mount that ensures a component of the optical module remains 

in a specific, precise position. The spare flight laser encountered the 

same problem during earlier testing, which indicated a systemic 

problem. The project redesigned and repaired the lasers and is 

proceeding through integration and test.

External factors. External factors—including responding to requests for 

additional data collection and delays due to launch-vehicle related 

issues—contributed to cost increases or schedule delays for the NISAR, 

ICON, and GRACE-FO projects.

• The NISAR project experienced cost growth as the result of an 

increase in the scope of data collection in response to additional data 

needs being identified by an interagency working group. The 

additional data includes soil moisture and natural hazard data that 

would be of value for other federal agencies and the science 

community. NASA officials said the additional funding for development 

would be used to upgrade the ground stations so that they can 

receive the additional data at a higher downlink data rate and volume.

• The ICON project missed its committed launch readiness date 

because of an accident involving its launch vehicle. In January 2017, 

two of the Pegasus launch vehicle’s three stages were involved in a 

transport accident. The stages were subsequently returned to the 

launch vehicle contractor facility for inspection and testing, and no 

damage was found. The project had been on track to launch early. 

Subsequently, in September 2017, an anomaly found in testing of the 

launch vehicle bolt cutter assemblies resulted in additional delays, but 

the magnitude of these delays is not yet known; an investigation is 

underway.

• The GRACE-FO project delayed its launch readiness date from 

February to May 2018 due to issues with its planned launch vehicle 

and launch site. The launch vehicle is the responsibility of NASA’s 

partner on the project—German Research Centre for Geosciences 

(GFZ). GRACE-FO had planned to launch at a Russian launch site. In 

February 2016, GFZ reported that it was notified by the Russian 

Federal Space Agency that the Dnepr launch vehicle was no longer 

available for GRACE-FO. GFZ, in June 2016, arranged to launch the 

two GRACE-FO spacecraft, along with commercial satellites, on a 

SpaceX Falcon 9.

In addition, the Commercial Crew Program also experienced delays, 

which are not included above because the program does not have a 

schedule baseline. Since the award of the current Commercial Crew 
Page 23 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

contracts in September 2014, the program, Boeing, SpaceX, and multiple 

independent review bodies have all identified the contractors’ delivery 

schedules as aggressive. In February 2017, we found that Boeing and 

SpaceX had determined that neither could meet their original 2017 dates 

for NASA to certify their systems for human spaceflight.21 In January 

2018, we found that both contractors had notified NASA that final 

certification dates have slipped again and are now in the first quarter of 

calendar year 2019.22 The Commercial Crew Program’s schedule 

analysis indicates that certification may be further delayed to December 

2019 for SpaceX and February 2020 for Boeing.

In 2016 and 2017, we found that projects appear most likely to rebaseline 

between their critical design review and system integration review—the 

riskiest point in the development cycle.23 Of the 14 projects in NASA’s 

current portfolio of major projects that have held a critical design review, 3 

had to rebaseline before holding a system integration review. An 

additional 4 projects experienced cost growth after critical design review, 

but the cost growth did not require a rebaseline. Further, most of the 

projects that have experienced cost growth during this risky point in the 

development cycle are not small projects. All but one has a current lifecycle cost estimate of over $1 billion and include NASA’s flagship 

missions, like JWST and Mars 2020. The total development cost growth 

for these 7 projects is about $4.9 billion to date, but additional cost growth 

could occur as the projects are not yet complete.

The composition of the portfolio in the coming years is expected to 

include similarly large and complex projects, putting NASA at risk of 

continued cost increases and schedule delays. Specifically, NASA plans 

to have complex projects enter the development portfolio in the next few 

years as they hold confirmation reviews and set cost and schedule 

baselines. This includes the Europa Clipper project and potentially the 

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST) project. In February 

2018, the President’s 2019 Budget Request proposed canceling the 

WFIRST project due to the project’s significant costs and higher priorities 

in the agency. However, the project may continue if funding is received. 

 

21GAO-17-137. 

22GAO-18-317T. 

23GAO-16-309SP and GAO-17-303SP. 

NASA Is at Risk of 

Continued Cost Increases 

and Schedule Delays as 

Newer, Complex Projects 

Begin Development and 

Expensive Projects Linger
Page 24 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Together, preliminary estimates indicate that these two projects could 

cost as much as $7.8 billion. In addition, NASA expects to begin other 

large, complex projects like the Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway—

currently being discussed as a space station or outpost in lunar orbit—

and a Europa Lander project in the coming years. A December 2017 

space policy directive also instructed NASA to return astronauts to the 

moon for long-term exploration and to pursue human exploration of Mars 

and the broader solar system.

To its credit, NASA recently took steps to put a process in place to control 

the costs of two projects while in formulation, which may prove useful if 

properly executed.

• The Europa Clipper project implemented a process whereby cost 

growth threats would be offset by descoping instruments in whole or 

in part. For example, if an instrument exceeds its development cost by 

20 percent, the project would propose a descope option to NASA that 

brings instrument cost below that threshold. NASA has not descoped 

any instruments to date.

• The WFIRST project is responding to findings from an independent 

review that was conducted to ensure the mission’s scope and 

required resources are well understood and executable. The review 

found that the mission scope is understood, but not aligned with the 

resources provided and concluded that the mission is not executable 

without adjustments and/or additional resources. For example, the 

study team found that NASA’s current forecasted funding profile for 

the WFIRST project would require the project to slow down activities 

starting in fiscal year 2020, which would result in an increase in 

development cost and schedule. NASA agreed with the study team’s 

results and directed the project to reduce the cost and complexity of 

the design in order to maintain costs within the $3.2 billion preliminary 

cost target.

But even with these efforts, NASA’s cost and schedule performance may 

be further tested in upcoming years as some expensive, complex projects 

linger in the portfolio longer than expected.

• As previously discussed, the Orion program expects cost growth and 

faces other schedule and technical risks as it moves through the 

integration and test phase for EM-1 into at least 2019 and then 

through 2023 for EM-2. As of August 2017, NASA officials expected 

that new hardware and addressing development challenges would be 

the factors contributing to increased cost for the program. For 
Page 25 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

example, there was a cost impact when the program moved from a 

single-piece, or monolithic, heatshield design to one that employs 

blocks in order to improve its structural strength. Program officials 

said they are also assessing schedule delays for EM-2, and noted that 

the EM-2 launch date depends on the outcome of the EM-1 launch 

date.

• The SLS and EGS programs continue to face cost, schedule, and 

technical risks as they move through the integration and test phase 

into at least 2019. For example, SLS will have to complete a “green 

run” test which requires multiple first-time efforts. Specifically, the test 

is the culmination of the development effort and includes the core 

stage integration with its four main engines, fully fueling with 

cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen, and then firing all four engines for 

about 500 seconds. NASA currently has no schedule reserve to its 

target December 2019 launch readiness date for two key areas in the 

core stage schedule. First, there is no reserve between the end of 

core stage production and the delivery of the core stage to the test 

facility. Second, there is no reserve between the end of the testing 

and delivery to Kennedy Space Center for final integration and testing 

prior to launch.

• As previously discussed, the JWST project is at risk of exceeding its 

congressional cost cap, and faces schedule risks as it completes its 

remaining integration and test work. These activities have taken 

considerably longer than planned due to a variety of challenges, 

including reach and access limitations on the flight hardware. 

Additionally, the project faces significant work ahead. For example, 

the project must complete integration of spacecraft element hardware 

and conduct deployment and environmental tests of the integrated 

sunshield and spacecraft. Further, it must integrate the telescope 

element with the spacecraft element to form the JWST observatory, 

and complete another set of challenging environmental tests on the 

full integrated observatory. At the same time, the project will need to 

mitigate dozens of remaining hardware and software risks to 

acceptable levels and address the project’s many potential single 

point failures to the extent possible.

• The SGSS project expects to experience additional cost growth 

through the final acceptance review because the full scope of the 

effort has not been included in the cost. NASA only approved its new 

cost estimate through the initial operational readiness review, 

currently planned for September 2019. A project official said NASA 

headquarters asked the project to determine if there are ways to 

reduce the cost between the operational readiness review and the 
Page 26 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

final acceptance review. NASA plans to conduct an independent 

review of the project in mid-2018 to inform a decision on whether to 

continue the project past the operational readiness review. If NASA 

decides to continue the project past this review, additional cost growth

is expected for SGSS when NASA revisits project costs through future 

budget cycles.

NASA has generally maintained the technology maturity and number of 

critical technologies of its major projects, but had mixed performance in 

design stability measures. Most of NASA’s major projects in development 

matured their technologies to the level recommended by best practices by 

their preliminary design review—continuing a trend since 2015. Our best 

practices work has shown that reaching this level of maturity can 

minimize risks for projects entering development, which lowers the risk of 

subsequent cost growth and schedule delays. Of the three projects that 

held preliminary design review in 2017, one matured its technologies to 

the level recommended by GAO best practices. The average number of 

critical technologies decreased in 2018 because new projects in the 

portfolio reported one or no critical technologies. NASA has maintained 

the level of design stability at critical design review, but projects continued 

to experienced late design changes. Of the three projects that had held 

critical design review in 2017, one met the best practice of releasing 90 

percent of engineering drawings by this review. In addition, the average 

percentage of released drawings for the portfolio—meaning the average 

of the percentage of drawings released for each project in the portfolio for 

each reporting period—has remained generally consistent with the past 5 

years. We have previously found that releasing at least 90 percent of 

engineering drawings lowers the risk of projects experiencing design 

changes and manufacturing problems that can lead to cost and schedule 

growth.

NASA Generally 

Maintained 

Technology Maturity 

of Its Projects but 

Performance in 

Design Stability 

Measures Is Mixed
Page 27 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Most of NASA’s major projects in development—12 of 17 projects—met 

the best practice of maturing all technologies to a technology readiness 

level 6 by their preliminary design review, which is a generally consistent 

trend since 2015 (see figure 5).24 Our best practices work has shown that 

reaching a technology readiness level 6—which includes demonstrating a 

representative prototype of the technology in a relevant environment that 

simulates the harsh conditions of space—by preliminary design review 

can minimize risks for the systems entering product development.25

Projects falling short of this standard may experience subsequent 

technical problems, which can result in cost growth and schedule delays. 

Appendix IV provides a description of technology readiness levels, which 

are the metrics used to assess technology maturity.

 

24NASA distinguishes critical, or new, technologies from heritage technologies. Our 

product development best practices do not make this distinction. We describe critical 

technologies as those that are required for the project to successfully meet customer 

requirements, which can include both existing or heritage technology or new technology. 

Therefore, to assess overall technology maturity, we analyzed the maturity of heritage and 

critical technologies that NASA reported for projects in our data collection instrument. In 

other analyses, which focus on the number of new technologies being used by programs, 

we maintain NASA’s distinction between critical and heritage technologies. 

25Appendix V contains information about GAO’s product development best practices and 

the project attributes and knowledge-based metrics that we assess projects against at 

each stage of a system’s development.

NASA Generally 

Maintained the Technology 

Maturity of Its Projects
Page 28 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 5: Number of NASA’s Major Projects Attaining Technology Maturity by 

Preliminary Design Review from 2010 to 2018

Note: Includes projects that completed preliminary design review and identified critical or heritage 

technologies. For example, for 2018, 17 of 26 NASA major projects had held this review and 

identified critical or heritage technologies. 

This year, we removed one project—Origins-Spectral InterpretationResource Identification-Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx)—from 

our analysis of technology maturity because it launched in September 

2016. We added three projects—Landsat 9, LCRD, and Restore-L—

which held their preliminary design review before February 2018. Of the 

three projects that were added, only one—Landsat 9—matured its 

technologies to a technology readiness level 6. The other two projects—

Restore-L and LCRD—did not meet our technology maturity best 

practice.

The LCRD and Restore-L projects are technology demonstrations 

managed by the Goddard Space Flight Center, and the center’s policy 

does not require technology demonstrations to mature all of their 

technologies to technology readiness level 6 by preliminary design 
Page 29 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

review.26 NASA officials explained that this is because the purpose of 

some technology demonstration projects is to mature new technologies to 

technology readiness level 6 or higher by the end of the demonstration, 

making it not feasible for these projects to achieve this level by the 

preliminary design review. However, we included LCRD and Restore-L in 

our analysis because both planned to mature their technologies prior to 

launching. Therefore, the same risks of subsequent technical problems 

that can result in cost growth and schedule delays identified in our best 

practices work applies to these projects. The LCRD project matured its 

technologies to technology readiness level 5 by its preliminary design 

review and to a technology readiness level 6 by its critical design review. 

The Restore-L project matured all but one of its technologies. The project 

changed its vision navigation system shortly before its preliminary design 

review because its prior vision navigation system did not meet 

requirements and the contractor was unable to resolve the issue. 

Restore-L project officials stated that they have a plan in place to mature 

the new system to a technology readiness level 6 by summer 2018, prior 

to the project’s planned critical design review in January 2019.

NASA’s major projects continue to report low numbers of critical 

technologies.27 The average number of critical technologies for the 

projects in development declined to 2.5 compared to last year’s average 

of 3 critical technologies; however, the average is consistent with the last 

several years (see figure 6). The decrease in critical technologies was 

driven by the addition of three projects—Landsat 9, LCRD, and RestoreL—that reported one or no critical technologies and the exclusion of 

OSIRIS-REx, which had 3 critical technologies.

 

26NASA’s technology demonstration missions program, which began in 2010, aims to 

mature new technologies from a technology readiness level 5 to technology readiness 

level 7 or greater. After the technologies are matured, they are to be transferred or infused 

into other NASA, partner, or commercial projects.

27Projects self-report the number of their critical technologies.
Page 30 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 6: Average Number of Critical Technologies Reported by NASA’s Major 

Projects in Development from 2009 to 2018

NASA’s most recent Discovery project selections—Lucy and Psyche—

continue its trend of low reported critical technologies, but are not yet 

included in our analysis because they have not held preliminary design 

review. These projects reported no critical technologies and plan to use a 

design that is based heavily on heritage technologies with modifications. 

Both projects reported that their heritage technologies are mature, but 

plan to modify some technologies. We have previously found that mature 

technologies must be demonstrated in a relevant environment and should 

be very close to form, fit, and function. Therefore, these two projects will 

likely have developmental work despite using high-heritage, mature 

technologies in their designs.

GAO’s best practices criteria do not focus on the number of new 

technologies, but rather their maturity, when considering their effect on 

cost and schedule risk. Therefore, the issue is not whether to push 

innovation through technology development, but rather the steps projects 

take to increase the likelihood of mission success by maturing these 

technologies to a high level prior to entering the implementation phase.
Page 31 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

NASA has maintained the number of projects with stable designs at 

critical design review. The critical design review is the time in the project’s 

life cycle when the integrity of the project design and its ability to meet 

mission requirements is assessed. Our work on product development 

best practices shows that at least 90 percent of engineering drawings 

should be releasable by this review to lower the risk of subsequent cost 

and schedule growth. Engineering drawings are considered to be a good 

measure of the demonstrated stability of a product’s design because the 

drawings represent the language used by engineers to communicate to 

the manufacturers the details of a new product design—what it looks like, 

how its components interface, how it functions, how to build it, and what 

critical materials and processes are required to fabricate and test it. Once 

the design of a product is finalized, the drawing is “releasable.” 

Of the 12 projects that have held a critical design review, four released at 

least 90 percent of their current projected engineering drawings (see 

figure 7).28 In addition, the average percentage of released drawings for 

the portfolio has remained generally consistent with the past 5 years.

 

28We used the number of drawings released at the critical design review as a fraction of 

the total number of drawings currently projected. Therefore, the denominator in the 

calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the critical design review. 

We believe this calculation more accurately reflects the design stability of the project. 

NASA Has Maintained the 

Level of Design Stability at 

Key Design Review, but 

Late Design Changes Still 

Occurred
Page 32 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 7: Number of NASA Major Projects That Released at least 90 Percent of 

Drawings by Critical Design Review and Average Percentage of Released Drawings 

from 2010 to 2018

Note: Includes projects that completed critical design review and had engineering drawings. For 

example, for 2018, 12 of 26 NASA major projects had held this review and had engineering drawings. 

This year, in analyzing the number of projects that met the best practice, 

we added 3 projects and removed 1 project. One of the 3 projects that 

were added to the analysis this year—RBI—met the best practice. The 

other two projects, LCRD and Mars 2020, did not meet the best practice. 

The LCRD project released over 90 percent of its design drawings in 

December 2016 at its critical design review, but reported design drawing 

growth in January 2018. As a result of the drawing growth, the metric of 

drawings released at this review decreased to 78 percent, which is below 

the best practice. The Mars 2020 project held its critical design review 

before it had a stable design, at which point it had released about 72 

percent of its expected design drawings. Project officials stated that they 

held the design review earlier than normal to avoid delaying the 

development of heritage technologies, which make up a large percentage 

of the Mars 2020 rover. As a result of holding the review early, new and 
Page 33 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

highly complex developments were not stable at the time of the design 

review.

Our analysis of design drawings dropped one project—OSIRIS-REx—in 

2018 and removed the EGS program from prior years’ analyses. We 

excluded EGS from prior years because program officials told us that the 

prior data submissions were not inclusive of all subsystems and they did 

not have a way to replicate previous data submissions to include all of the 

subsystems. Further, EGS program officials stated they do not use design 

drawings as a management tool. EGS program officials said that the 

program used a different approach for tracking design maturity because 

the program contains several major construction and facilities efforts. This 

approach included tracking requirements stability, internal and crossprogram technical assessments, interface control document maturation, 

and closure of open work. However, because some of these efforts 

required new development work, tracking the release of and changes to 

engineering design drawings at the program level would have been a 

valuable metric for the program to monitor. We will follow up on this issue 

in a future review.

Despite an increase in the number of projects meeting GAO’s best 

practice, some of the 8 projects that did not meet the best practice 

released a low percentage of their drawings by the critical design review. 

Five of the 8 projects that did not meet the best practice released fewer 

than 60 percent of their projected engineering drawings. For example, in 

2016 we found that the Parker Solar Probe project held its critical design 

review with only 34 percent of its design drawings released, significantly 

lower than the best practice of 90 percent.29 The project demonstrated it 

had a stable design at its system integration review in May 2016—over 

one year after its critical design review, the point at which product 

development best practices recommend having a stable design.

In addition to maintaining the level of design stability at critical design 

review, NASA major projects also experienced design changes at a 

similar level as last year. The average percentage of drawing growth for 

the entire portfolio slightly increased from 18 percent to 19 percent (see 

figure 8). Of the 12 projects included in this year’s analysis, 11 

experienced drawing growth after their critical design review, ranging from 

2 to 52 percent. If a project experiences a large amount of engineering 

 

29GAO-16-309SP. 
Page 34 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

drawing growth after this review, it may be an indicator of instability in the 

project design late in the development cycle. Design changes at this point 

can be costly to the project in terms of time and funding because 

hardware may need to be reengineered or reworked as a result. This 

analysis dropped OSIRIS-REx in 2018 and the EGS program in prior 

years for reasons discussed above.

Figure 8: Average Percentage of Engineering Drawing Growth after Critical Design 

Review for NASA Major Projects from 2010 to 2018

Note: Drawing growth in 2010 was primarily attributed to the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) 

because it did not have a stable design at its critical design review and drawings for SDO’s 

instruments were not included in this review. The project launched in 2010 and exited the portfolio. 

NASA projects have continued to perform well against other design 

stability measures, such as maintaining center-specified mass and power 

margins, and completing a validation and verification plan.30 Most projects 

for which mass and power requirements were applicable met these 

 

30Validation is defined as the continuous process of ensuring that requirements are wellformed (clear and unambiguous), complete (agrees with customer and stakeholder needs 

and expectations), consistent (conflict free), and individually verifiable and traceable to a 

higher level requirement or goal. Verification is defined as proof of compliance with 

requirements and specifications.
Page 35 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

requirements at their critical design reviews and have continued to 

maintain the required levels of margin.31 Further, all projects that were 

required to complete a validation and verification plan by their critical 

design review met the requirement. NASA requires that projects complete 

a validation and verification plan by this review to ensure that projects 

have a plan in place to track the completion of verification and validation 

events and activities.

Several projects covered in our review were experiencing workforce 

challenges, such as not having enough staff or staff with the right skills. 

While it is difficult to tie these workforce challenges to increases in cost, 

there have been instances where projects have reported schedule delays 

or late design changes as a result of workforce shortages. Our work has 

generally found that the shortage of trained acquisition personnel hinders 

agencies from managing and overseeing acquisition programs and 

contracts that have become more expensive and increasingly complex.32

Moreover, NASA’s own assessments indicate that there are broader 

workforce-related challenges that can have a negative impact on 

programs over the long run, if not addressed in a strategic manner. NASA 

is taking steps to address its findings, but it is too early to determine the 

outcomes. One is focused on developing a strategic workforce plan, 

including determining what mix of skills and capabilities are needed in the 

future, and the other is focused on leveraging skills across NASA’s 

centers. We will be tracking NASA’s progress in this area in future 

reviews as capacity—having the right people and resources to resolve 

risk—is one of two criteria that NASA has not yet met for removal from 

our high-risk list.33

 

31Mass is a measurement of how much matter is in an object. It is related to an object’s 

weight, which is mathematically equal to mass multiplied by acceleration due to gravity. 

Margin is the spare amount of mass or power allowed or given for contingencies or special 

situations. Some centers provide guidance on the percentage of mass margin required at 

various points in project development, with required margins ranging from 30 to 0 percent, 

depending on where a project is in the development cycle. 

32GAO, Acquisition Workforce: Federal Agencies Obtain Training to Meet Requirements, 

but Have Limited Insight into Costs and Benefits of Training Investment, GAO-13-231 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013).

33GAO-17-317. 

Too Early to 

Determine Outcome 

of NASA’s Efforts to 

Address Workforce 

Challenges
Page 36 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

During the course of our review, we found that several major projects 

identified workforce challenges, including not having enough staff or staff 

with the right skills. To accomplish its scientific and space exploration 

missions, NASA relies on having a skilled civil servant and contractor 

workforce. While it is difficult to tie these workforce challenges to 

increases in cost, there have been instances where projects have 

reported schedule delays or late design changes as a result of workforce 

shortages. Further, our work has generally found that the shortage of 

trained acquisition personnel hinders agencies from managing and 

overseeing acquisition programs and contracts that have become more 

expensive and increasingly complex.34 Examples of workforce challenges 

identified by projects include:

• The Mars 2020 project, which is managed by the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, experienced workforce shortages in several key areas 

such as flight software and for the development of a sampling and 

caching system that will collect and cache Martian soil and rock 

samples. Project officials said not having staff with the right level of 

experience within its sampling and caching system development 

contributed to the project being behind in releasing its engineering 

drawings. As of June 2017, project officials said the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory has been able to address these workforce challenges 

largely because laboratory management prioritized staffing for the 

project over other projects.

• The Europa Clipper project, which is managed by the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, experienced workforce shortages in several key areas, 

including avionics, since October 2016. The project has revised 

staffing plans several times, but continues to face workforce 

shortages even with NASA headquarters involvement. Project officials 

said these shortages have delayed development in some areas and 

have led the project to outsource some work to contractors. As of 

January 2018, project officials reported that they have seen 

improvements in addressing workforce shortages.

• The SGSS project, managed by the Goddard Space Flight Center, 

faced staffing shortfalls in key areas, such as systems engineering 

and business management, which contributed to late design changes. 

For example, a project official said the systems engineering was not 

done correctly before, which led to the software not being coded to 

 

34GAO-13-231. 

NASA Has Experienced 

Workforce Challenges on 

Major Projects
Page 37 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

the right requirements. As of January 2018, NASA officials stated that 

these workforce issues had largely been resolved because some 

positions were filled by reassigning staff to these areas and others are 

no longer needed. 

• The EGS program, which is managed by Kennedy Space Center, is 

working with its contractors to increase its software development staff 

retention rate, which has been a challenge. Program officials said the 

current retention rate is about 70 percent, but the program would like 

that to be higher in order to avoid additional delays in its software 

development efforts due to losing staff. The officials attributed the 

contractor workforce challenges to competition in the space industry 

near the center in Florida.

Further, in January 2018, the NASA Office of Inspector General found 

that the SWOT project, which is managed by the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory, experienced workforce shortages in key fields to design and 

develop its instruments.35 The report stated that the staffing problems 

were driven by conflicting priorities among several other Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory projects, including Mars 2020, that also needed those skills. 

The Office of Inspector General recommended that the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory director evaluate current and future critical technical staffing 

requirements and make adjustments as necessary to ensure that the 

laboratory has the technical support needed for their missions. The 

director plans to address the recommendation through its existing 

processes and forums for assessing and addressing staffing resources at 

the laboratory.

NASA’s own assessments indicate that there are broader workforce 

challenges in disciplines that are necessary to effectively manage its 

major projects. Since 2012, NASA has been conducting capability 

assessments of its technical disciplines and business services to assist in 

establishing a more efficient operating model that maintains critical 

capabilities and meets current and future mission needs. Through these 

efforts, NASA identified capacity gaps in the following areas:

• Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) disciplines. An 

assessment of technical capabilities conducted in 2016 identified 

 

35NASA Office of Inspector General, NASA’s Surface Water and Ocean Topography 

Mission, IG-18-011 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2018).

NASA’s Assessments 

Indicate Broader 

Workforce Challenges
Page 38 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

GN&C research and technology development as a discipline area that 

was inadequately positioned to meet mission requirements. In a 

follow-up assessment in 2017, NASA determined there have been no 

significant changes to the GN&C workforce since 2015. The 

assessment found, though, that the risk is stabilizing due, in part, to 

adding more early career hires. These assessments determined the 

GN&C workforce needs to be reshaped over the next decade to build 

future workforce skills.

• Scheduling, earned value management, and cost estimating. A 

budget business services assessment conducted in 2016 

recommended that the agency work with centers to regionalize 

access to these specialty capabilities and to leverage access to these 

skills across centers. Officials from the Office of the Chief Financial 

Officer said they have made some progress in filling gaps in cost 

estimating and earned value management capabilities, but scheduling 

expertise remains a major challenge. As a result, officials said they 

have a scheduling effort underway to build the capability in-house by 

improving training and tools.

• Cost and pricing analyst workforce. A procurement business 

services assessment conducted in 2015 identified capability gaps in 

the cost and pricing analyst workforce. As part of assessing options to 

strengthen expertise associated with source evaluation boards for 

contract awards, NASA found that the agency had an inadequate 

supply of cost and pricing analysts across centers. In response to this 

finding, NASA plans to form a centralized team of cost and pricing 

professionals to support acquisition efforts across centers. In addition, 

NASA established a pricing community of practice to develop and 

share best practices in this area, developed training courses, and, in 

some instances, centers are hiring cost and pricing analysts as a part 

of efforts to rebuild this skill set across the agency.

We have also found that other agencies have experienced challenges 

related to their earned value management, cost estimating, and cost and 

pricing analysis workforces.36 For example, in June 2008, we found that 

the Coast Guard faced challenges in recruiting and retaining a sufficient 

 

36For example, GAO, Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management 

and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain, GAO-08-745 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 

2008); Defense Contract Management Agency: Amid Ongoing Efforts to Rebuild Capacity, 

Several Factors Present Challenges in Meeting Its Missions, GAO-12-83 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 3, 2011); and Defense Acquisition Workforce: Actions Needed to Guide 

Planning Efforts and Improve Workforce Capability, GAO-16-80 (Washington, D.C: Dec. 

14, 2015).
Page 39 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

number of government employees in acquisition positions such as 

contract specialists and cost estimators, among other areas.37 In addition, 

in December 2015, we found that the Department of Defense did not 

meet its workforce growth goals in 3 priority career growth areas—

contracting, business, which includes cost estimating and analysis, and 

engineering.38

Another trend, the aging of NASA’s workforce, has both negative and 

positive effects. About 56 percent of NASA’s workforce is 50 years old 

and over, an increase of about 7 percentage points over the past 5 years. 

Officials said that NASA’s workforce is aging because NASA has a low 

attrition rate—about 4 percent annually—and high numbers of staff stay 

several years past retirement. We also found that, as of the beginning of 

2018, 21 percent of the workforce is retirement eligible, about another 23 

percent will become eligible in less than 5 years, and the average number 

of years staff that stay past initial retirement eligibility varied by 

occupation (see figure 9). On average, individuals remain at NASA 

between 4-7 years past their initial retirement eligibility date, but staff in 

the engineering and science occupations stay on longer than other 

occupations, such as professional and administrative.

 

37GAO-08-745. 

38GAO-16-80. 
Page 40 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 9: NASA’s Workforce Average Age, Retirement Eligibility, and Average 

Number of Years Worked Past Retirement Eligibility as of January 2018

Note: The other category includes clerical, technicians, medical and other miscellaneous occupations. 

Officials said there are both advantages and disadvantages to having an 

aging workforce. For example, human capital officials noted that having 

an aging workforce is good for maintaining institutional knowledge due to 

experienced staff staying longer, but that having a low attrition rate makes 

it more difficult for the agency to make changes to its workforce skill mix 

as needed. Officials within the Office of the Chief Engineer and Mission 

Support Directorate said that they were looking at ways to be more 

strategic in hiring or using existing capabilities to meet their skills needs.
Page 41 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

In our review of selected agency-wide assessments and through 

discussions with knowledgeable NASA officials, we found that NASA has 

two efforts underway that may help to address some workforce 

challenges: strategic workforce planning and cross-center collaboration. 

We will be tracking the progress of these efforts in future reviews, as it is 

too early to determine the outcomes.

Strategic Workforce Planning: In 2016, NASA completed a human 

capital assessment that identified a lack of agency-wide strategic 

workforce planning as a high-risk area under the agency’s current 

operating model. It stated that the lack of agency-wide strategic workforce 

planning was at the root of many of the other findings in the assessment, 

such as the need for better coordination and collaboration across the 

centers, created uncertainty and was driving centers to think locally 

instead of agency-wide. To address this concern, the Office of Human 

Capital Management has an effort underway to begin to develop NASA’s 

first agency-level strategic workforce plan in 2018. NASA defines 

strategic workforce planning as the discipline of determining the size and 

composition of a future workforce that is able to perform the 

organization’s most important functions, maintain capabilities, and fulfill 

key business goals while maintaining agility in a dynamic environment. 

Human capital officials said they plan to update NASA’s policy on 

strategic workforce planning after they have established their framework 

for strategic workforce planning.39 As part of the new process, human 

capital officials said their office will provide guidance to the centers to 

develop center master plans, which are to have a 10- to15-year outlook 

on capabilities. Human capital officials said they will ask the centers to 

develop their first master plans by October 2018, and the Office of Human 

Capital Management is to use them to create NASA’s first agency-level 

strategic workforce plan.

Cross-Center Collaboration: The 2016 human capital assessment also 

identified the need to increase cross-center collaboration to improve 

workforce utilization. NASA plans to develop a process to better 

understand where skills are needed across the centers and then use 

employees with those skills at any center to meet those needs. According 

to human capital officials, the Office of Human Capital Management was 

not the right organization to address this concern because they felt that it 

 

39NASA Policy Directive 3010.1A, Strategic Workforce Planning (Jan. 15, 2009).

Outcome of NASA’s 

Strategic Workforce and 

Cross-Center Planning 

Efforts Not Yet Known
Page 42 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

would require leadership at a higher level than their office to implement it. 

They noted that an effort such as this would require the agency to 

overcome the cultural barrier of NASA being a decentralized agency, with 

most of its work completed at the center level. This barrier has proven 

difficult for the agency in the past and has resulted in NASA having 

different approaches to implementing policies and guidance at the 

centers. For example, in April 2014, we found that when NASA policy 

gave centers wide latitude in implementing export control procedures, 

implementation across centers was inconsistent.40

NASA has taken other steps to improve cross-center collaboration by 

sharing mission support capabilities across the centers. For example, 

NASA plans to coordinate the center-level human capital and financial 

staff and activities through the headquarters offices, rather than at each 

center. NASA plans to complete this transition by the end of September 

2019.41 Other business services areas, such as procurement, also plan to 

move to this operational model, but have not yet started the transition. 

Officials within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer said the purpose of 

this change is for the mission support areas to become more effective 

and efficient, and deliver a consistent set of services across the agency.

As NASA develops its first strategic workforce plan and considers taking 

additional steps towards a new operating model with more cross-center 

collaboration, it will be vital to have senior leadership’s commitment to 

these efforts. Capacity—having the right people and resources to resolve 

risk—is one of two criteria that NASA has not yet met for removal from 

our high-risk list; the other being demonstrating progress. We first 

designated acquisition management at NASA as a high-risk area in 1990 

in view of NASA’s history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage 

in the majority of its major systems. Capacity is central to managing the 

complex and difficult work that NASA takes on. We have found that an 

effective organization includes a senior leadership team committed to 

 

40GAO, Export Controls: NASA Management Action and Improved Oversight Needed to 

Reduce the Risk of Unauthorized Access to Its Technologies, GAO-14-315 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 15, 2014).

41The Office of the Chief Financial Officer capabilities that are not realigned under the new 

model before October 2019 will be handled as part of a separate effort.
Page 43 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

developing more effective ways of doing business, accomplishing results, 

and investing in human capital.42

The individual assessments of the 26 projects we reviewed provide a twopage profile of each project. Each assessment includes a description of 

the project’s objectives, information about the NASA centers and 

international partners involved in the project, the project’s cost and 

schedule performance, a timeline identifying key project dates, budget 

information, and a brief narrative describing the current status of the 

project.43 The budget information is based on NASA’s fiscal year 2019 

budget request. On the first page, the project profile presents the 

standard information listed above. On the second page of the 

assessment, we provide an analysis of the project challenges, and outline 

the extent to which each project faces cost, schedule, or performance 

risks because of these challenges, if applicable. NASA project offices 

were provided an opportunity to review drafts of the assessments prior to 

their inclusion in the final product, and the projects provided both 

technical corrections and more general comments. We integrated the 

technical corrections as appropriate and summarized the general

comments at the end of each project assessment.

See figure 10 for an illustration of a sample assessment layout.

 

42GAO, Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

43The manifested launch date is the launch date which the project is working toward, and 

when a launch vehicle is available to launch the project. This date is only a goal launch 

date for the project, not a commitment that they will launch on this date. The committed 

launch readiness date is determined through a launch readiness review that verifies that 

the launch system and spacecraft/payloads are ready for launch.

Project Assessments
Page 44 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Figure 10: Illustration of a Sample Project Assessment 
45

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

01/18

GAO

review

12/18

SpaceX

crewed

test flight

08/18

Boeing

uncrewed

test flight

11/18

Boeing

crewed

test flight

02/19

SpaceX final

certification

01/19

Boeing final

certification

2019 – 2024

Post-certification

missions

08/18

SpaceX

uncrewed

test flight

09/14

Transportation

Capabilities phase

contract awards

$4,229.6

$2,599.0

BOEING SPACEX

Current 

maximum

contract value

(as of Feb 

2018)

Original 

maximum 

contract value

(as of fiscal

year 2014)

$4,321.9

$2,646.5

2.2%

1.8%

$4,526.0

$6,968.4

95.6%

4.4%

CCP

Other

major 

projects

17 MONTHS

01/19

08/17

09/14

02/19

04/17

09/14

BOEING SPACEX

Current 

proposed 

certification 

review date

as of 

Feb. 2018

Original 

certification 

review date

22 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Both of the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors have made progress 

developing their crew transportation systems, but continue to have aggressive 

development schedules. All test flights have slipped to 2018 and the final 

certification reviews have slipped to early 2019. Both contractors continue to 

work through design issues for their crew transportation systems. SpaceX is 

finalizing the design for its launch vehicle, Falcon 9, which will be needed to 

support crewed flights. Boeing is analyzing the design of the forward heat shield 

to determine if its expected performance may damage the spacecraft during reentry. The Commercial Crew Program is the first NASA program that the agency 

will evaluate against a loss of crew requirement, a key safety metric. Program 

officials said that if the contractors cannot meet the loss of crew requirement 

specified in the contracts, NASA could still certify their systems by employing 

operational mitigations. 

NASA Lead Center: Kennedy Space Center

Commercial Partners: Boeing, SpaceX, 

Blue Origin,a

 Sierra Nevada Corporationa

Launch Location: Boeing-Cape Canaveral 

Air Force Station, FL; SpaceX-Kennedy 

Space Center, FL

Launch Vehicle: Boeing-Atlas V; SpaceXFalcon 9

Requirement Derived from: NASA Strategic 

Plan

Budget Portfolio: Space Operations, Space 

Transportation 

a

Blue Origin and Sierra Nevada Corporation do not have contracts 

for the current phase and therefore were not included in this 

assessment. 

Commercial Crew Program 

The Commercial Crew Program facilitates and oversees the development of 

safe, reliable, and cost-effective crew transportation systems by commercial 

companies to carry NASA astronauts to and from the International Space 

Station (ISS). The program is a multi-phase effort that started in 2010. During 

the current phase, the program is working with two contractors—Boeing and 

SpaceX—that will design, develop, test, and operate the crew transportation 

systems. Once NASA determines the systems meet its standards for human 

spaceflight—a process called certification—the companies will fly up to six crewed 

missions to ISS.

common name: CCP

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP

b

c

b

Includes costs to fund the contracts. 

c

Includes contract costs for development, operations, and 

special studies. 
46 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

Both of the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors 

have made progress developing their crew transportation 

systems, but delays persist as the contractors have had 

difficulty executing aggressive schedules. The contractors 

were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it 

needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 

2017. In January 2018, we found the contractors’ test flights 

have slipped to 2018 and the final certification reviews 

have slipped to early 2019.d This represents a delay of 17 

months for Boeing and 22 months for SpaceX from initial 

schedules. The Commercial Crew Program is tracking 

risks that both contractors could experience additional 

schedule delays and its schedule risk analysis indicates 

that certification is likely to slip until late 2019 for SpaceX 

and early 2020 for Boeing.

Design 

SpaceX must close several of the program’s top risks 

related to its upgraded launch vehicle design, the Falcon 

9 Block 5, before it can be certified for human spaceflight. 

This includes SpaceX’s redesign of the composite 

overwrap pressure vessel. SpaceX officials stated the new 

design aims to eliminate risks identified in the older design, 

which was involved in an anomaly that caused a mishap 

in September 2016. Separately, SpaceX officials told us 

that the Block 5 design also includes design changes 

to address cracks in the turbine of its engine identified 

during development testing. NASA program officials told 

us that they had informed SpaceX that the cracks were an 

unacceptable risk for human spaceflight. SpaceX officials 

told us that they have made design changes, captured in 

this Block 5 upgrade, that did not result in any cracking 

during initial life testing. However, this risk will not be closed 

until SpaceX successfully completes qualification testing 

in accordance with NASA’s standards without any cracks. 

SpaceX officials stated they expect this testing to be 

completed in first quarter calendar year 2018. 

Boeing is also mitigating several risks in order to certify its 

system including challenges related to the performance of 

its abort system and a component of its parachute system. 

Boeing is addressing a risk that its abort system may not 

meet the program’s requirement to have sufficient control 

of the vehicle through an abort. In some abort scenarios, 

Boeing has found that the spacecraft may tumble, which 

could pose a threat to the crew’s safety. To validate the 

effectiveness of its abort system, Boeing has conducted 

extensive wind tunnel testing and plans to complete a pad 

abort test in April 2018. Boeing is also addressing a risk 

that during re-entry to the Earth’s atmosphere, a portion 

of the spacecraft’s forward heat shield, which protects the 

parachutes during re-entry, may reconnect and damage the 

parachute system. NASA’s independent analysis indicates 

that this may occur if both parachutes that pull the forward 

heat shield away from the spacecraft deploy as expected. 

Boeing’s analysis indicates the risk exists only if one of two 

parachutes does not deploy as expected. If the program 

determines this risk is unacceptable, Boeing would need 

to redesign the parachute system, which the program 

estimates could result in at least a 6-month delay.

Other Issues to Be Monitored 

The ability to meet one of the crew safety requirements, 

which stems from agency policy, is one of the program’s 

top risks. NASA established the “loss of crew” requirement 

as one way to measure the safety of a crew transportation 

system, with the intent to minimize the probability of death 

or permanent disability to one or more crew members. 

Under the current contracts, the loss of crew requirement 

is 1 in 270, meaning that the contractors’ systems must 

carry no more than a 1 in 270 probability of incurring loss 

of crew. Program officials told us that Commercial Crew 

is the first NASA program that the agency will evaluate 

against a loss of crew requirement. They said that if the 

contractors cannot meet the loss of crew requirement, there 

are several actions the Commercial Crew Program could 

take to help meet it. Program officials stated, however, 

these actions may not be enough to completely close the 

gap. The program has reported it is exploring options, 

such as on-orbit inspections of the spacecraft. Additionally, 

program officials told us that one of their greatest upcoming 

challenges will be to complete two oversight activities—

conducting phased safety reviews and verifying that 

contractors meet requirements—concurrently. For example, 

the program originally planned to complete phase two of 

the safety review process in early 2016, but as of October 

2017, neither contractor had completed this phase—the 

program had approved 90 percent of Boeing’s phase two 

reports and 70 percent of SpaceX’s.

common name: CCP

COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM

 dGAO-18-317T.

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 

program officials stated that NASA’s Commercial 

Crew Program and private industry partners, Boeing 

and SpaceX, continue to develop the systems 

that will return human spaceflight to the United 

States. Both commercial partners are undertaking 

considerable amounts of testing in 2018 to prove 

space system designs and the ability to meet NASA’s 

safety and mission requirements for crew flights to 

the ISS.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

47

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

05/18

Project

confirmation

03/19

Critical

design

review

04/18

Preliminary

design

review

09/16

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

11/19

System

integration

review

02/16

Formulation

start

12/20

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$22.5

97.7%

2.3%

DART

Other

major 

projects

$247.7 – $290.7

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

DEC 2020 – 

MAY 2021 PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

02/16

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

The DART project is working toward preliminary design review and project 

confirmation, but funding uncertainty and technology maturity of its propulsion 

system may change the project’s schedule. This uncertainty could trigger a reevaluation of life-cycle costs and overall schedule heading to preliminary design 

review and project confirmation. Further, DART’s planned electric propulsion 

thruster is facing development delays, particularly in its propulsion power 

systems. The project is looking at possible schedule delays should thruster 

issues persist. DART was also intended to be one of two spacecraft to be sent 

to the Didymos binary asteroid system—along with a spacecraft produced and 

launched by the European Space Agency. The European spacecraft did not 

receive necessary funding for 2017 and may be canceled. The DART project is 

assessing the effect on collected science data of losing proximate observation 

and is in the early stages of considering various alternatives.

NASA Lead Center: Marshall Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: European Space 

Agency

Launch Location: TBD 

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 22 months

Requirement Derived from: NASA 

Authorization Act of 2008 and 

implementing guidance

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary 

Science

Double Asteroid Redirection Test 

The DART project plans to travel to the near-Earth asteroid Didymos, a 

binary system, and impact the smaller of the two bodies. NASA will assess 

the deflection result of the impact for potential future use on other potentially 

hazardous near-Earth objects. The project responds to near-Earth object 

guidance by the Office of Science and Technology Policy to better understand 

our impact mitigation posture, and to recommendations by the National 

Research Council Committee to conduct a test of a kinetic impactor. The DART 

mission is part of the Asteroid Impact and Deflection Assessment, which is an 

international collaboration with the European Space Agency.

common name: DART

Source: Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab. | GAO-18-280SP
48 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The DART project entered the preliminary design and 

technology completion phase in June 2017 with the agency 

acknowledging that uncertain funding may affect the 

project’s schedule. This could trigger a re-evaluation of 

life-cycle costs and overall schedule heading to preliminary 

design review and project confirmation—which the project 

has delayed by 2 months and 1 month, respectively. 

DART’s planned launch readiness date range is December 

2020 – May 2021, with impact of the asteroid occurring 

in 2022. Project officials told us that if they receive less 

funding than planned, there is another launch opportunity 

2 years later and they are currently studying the effects on 

the mission if it is delayed to this date. Officials also noted a 

delayed launch window would likely increase total costs in 

exchange for lower annual costs. 

Technology 

DART’s propulsion system includes technologies that 

remain immature and may delay the mission preliminary 

design review and potentially the project’s launch date. The 

DART project is working with NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon 

Thruster-Commercial (NEXT-C)—a project managed at 

Glenn Research Center under the Discovery Program—to 

provide in-space electric propulsion for the mission. The 

DART mission will be the first time this technology will fly 

operationally and, if successful, will serve as qualification 

for future deep space missions. However, first-time 

production of this system—DART’s critical path and top 

risk—is proving challenging. The NEXT-C thruster’s power 

processing unit, which provides necessary voltages to 

the thruster, is the technical risk keeping the thruster from 

maturing. The project has delayed the mission preliminary 

design review by 2 months in part to allow more time to 

mature the NEXT-C technology. In addition, the program is 

carrying a risk to its launch readiness date dependent upon 

the NEXT-C meeting delivery and design targets.

Developmental Partner

The DART project’s science collection may be less than 

originally planned due to the European Space Agency not 

funding DART’s sister project, the Asteroid Impact Monitor 

(AIM) project. DART was designed to work with AIM as 

part of the collaborative Asteroid Impact & Deflection 

Assessment. Per the mission plan, as the DART spacecraft 

impacts the smaller of the Didymos binary asteroids, 

the AIM spacecraft would collect impact data along with 

Earth-based observatories. However, the AIM project did 

not receive necessary funding at the European Space 

Agency’s ministerial meeting in December 2016. Losing 

AIM will reduce the amount of science data collected on 

the impact and the asteroids themselves. While the project 

believes that it can still meet its objectives of characterizing 

the results of the DART impact on the Didymos system, 

the project is performing planning and analysis leading up 

to preliminary design review to determine how effective 

the Earth-based observatories will be at determining the 

results of the impact event. As a result of the potential loss 

of science data, NASA is considering possible alternatives 

that could provide imagery and data related to the impact. 

common name: DART

DOUBLE ASTEROID REDIRECTION TEST

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

DART project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

49

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

10/18

Project

confirmation

11/19

Critical

design

review

08/18

Preliminary

design

review

01/17

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

09/20

System

integration

review

06/15

Formulation

start

07/23

Agency

launch

readiness

date

06/22

Project

launch

readiness

date

$498.3

93.2%

6.8%

Europa

Clipper

Other

major 

projects

$3,100 – $4,000

(including launch

vehicle)

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

07/23

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

06/15

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

The Europa Clipper project plans to hold its preliminary design review in August 

2018 and its confirmation review in October 2018 on schedule, at which point the 

project will establish its cost and schedule baselines. The project implemented 

a process to manage instrument costs with options to descope an instrument 

entirely or in part but has not descoped any instruments to date. The project 

continues to work toward a June 2022 launch but the availability of a qualified 

and well-understood launch vehicle could affect that schedule. The project 

is maintaining compatibility with multiple launch vehicles as it awaits NASA’s 

selection. The project is evaluating design options that may affect the mass and 

power needed to operate the spacecraft and its 10 instruments. The project 

has experienced workforce shortages since October 2016, but has seen recent 

improvements. The project is currently holding cost reserves consistent with Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) policy, but is not meeting JPL’s schedule reserve 

requirement due to technical issues with solar array development.

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, 

FL

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 3 year science mission

Requirement Derived from: 2011 Planetary 

Science Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary 

Science

Europa Clipper 

The Europa Clipper mission aims to investigate whether the Jupiter 

moon could harbor conditions suitable for life. The project plans to launch 

a spacecraft in the 2020s, place it in orbit around Jupiter, and conduct a 

series of investigatory flybys of Europa. The mission’s planned objectives 

include characterizing Europa’s ice shell and any subsurface water, analyzing 

the composition and chemistry of its surface and ionosphere, understanding 

the formation of its surface features, and surveying sites for a potential landed 

mission. We did not assess the proposed Europa lander mission, which NASA is 

managing as a separate project in pre-formulation. 

common name: CLIPPER

Source: Europa Project Personnel, California Institute of Technology, Jet Propulsion Laboratory. | GAO-18-280SP
50 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

In February 2017, NASA approved the Europa Clipper 

project to proceed with preliminary design and technology 

completion, but the project’s independent review board 

highlighted that the complexity and scope of the current 

10 instruments may cause cost and schedule growth. 

In response, the project proposed and NASA approved 

a process to manage instrument costs with options to 

descope an instrument entirely or in part to prevent 

cost growth. For example, if an instrument exceeds 

its development cost by 20 percent, the project would 

propose a descope option to NASA that brings instrument 

cost below that threshold. NASA has not descoped any 

instruments to date. 

The project is currently holding cost reserves consistent 

with JPL policy, but is not meeting JPL’s schedule reserve 

requirement due to technical issues with solar array 

development. In March 2017, the project discovered that 

the materials it planned to use on its solar arrays did not 

meet requirements under low temperatures. As a result, 

the project changed the materials it plans to use and is 

exploring using a different vendor for the solar arrays. 

Project officials said the technical issues and the project’s 

actions to mitigate them delayed delivery of the solar 

arrays 3 months beyond the project’s baseline need date. 

However, project officials said the baseline need date was 

earlier than the actual need date for solar array integration. 

As a result, the project is reassessing the integration 

and test flow and may be able to recover some schedule 

reserves. 

The project plans to hold its preliminary design review in 

August 2018 and its confirmation review in October 2018 

on schedule, at which point the project will establish its cost 

and schedule baseline. 

Launch

The Europa Clipper project continues to work toward a 

June 2022 launch, but the availability of a qualified and 

well-understood launch vehicle could affect that schedule. 

Project officials stated that the project needs to select 

a launch vehicle by the end of 2018 to maintain a 2022 

launch date. The project is maintaining compatibility with 

multiple launch vehicles such as the Delta IV Heavy, 

Falcon Heavy, and NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS); 

however, each of the launch vehicles under consideration 

has trade-offs that affect development. The Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016 requires the project to use SLS; 

however, recent SLS schedule delays could result in a 

delay to Europa Clipper’s planned June 2022 launch 

readiness date unless NASA adjusts its current plans 

for SLS and the associated ground systems. Project 

officials support using SLS as the launch vehicle, even if 

it delays the planned launch, because SLS allows a direct 

flight to Jupiter. This path could reduce the travel time by 

approximately 4.5 years compared to other launch vehicle 

options. 

Technology and Design

The project is currently meeting JPL mass and power 

margin requirements, but is evaluating design options 

that may affect the mass and power needed to operate 

the spacecraft and its 10 instruments. For example, 

accommodation of the ice-penetrating radar has been 

difficult because it requires a higher-than-expected amount 

of power that could lead to design trades. To mitigate 

this risk, the project is conducting additional testing of 

the instrument to evaluate compatibility at lower levels of 

power. The project is also evaluating design options for 

its solar arrays, which project officials said will increase 

available power but may also increase mass. 

Other Issues to Be Monitored

The project experienced workforce shortages at JPL 

in several key areas since October 2016. The project 

has revised staffing plans several times, but the project 

continues to face workforce shortages even with NASA 

headquarters involvement. As of January 2018, project 

officials reported that improvements have been seen 

in addressing workforce shortages. Other JPL projects 

have experienced workforce issues as well, which NASA 

attributes to the amount of work the laboratory is managing. 

common name: CLIPPER

EUROPA CLIPPER 

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

Europa Clipper project officials provided technical 

comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
51

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

05/14

Project

confirmation

12/15

Critical

design

review

03/14

Preliminary

design

review

08/12

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

04/18

System

integration

review

02/12

Formulation

start

11/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

12/19-06/20

Replanned

launch

readiness

date

$969.4

$1,843.5

$965.8

$2,264.9a

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

14.9%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$2,812.9 $3,230.7a

$880.1

$3,230.7

92.5%

7.5%

EGS

Other

major 

projects

11/18

LAUNCH

DATE

02/12

06/20

LAUNCH

DATE

02/12

19

MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

In December 2017, NASA announced a new schedule and cost estimate for the 

EGS program, after determining that the November 2018 launch readiness date 

for Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) was no longer feasible. NASA is now planning 

to a launch readiness date of December 2019, with 6 months of schedule reserve 

to a June 2020 date. The life-cycle cost estimate for EGS is approximately $3.1 

billion to the December 2019 date and $3.2 billion to June 2020. The program’s 

schedule is currently driven by its two major software development efforts, both 

of which are undergoing technical challenges. For example, the ground control 

system is in the process of transitioning to a new contractor and is undergoing 

organizational changes. In addition, while the program has made progress with 

major projects such as the Vehicle Assembly Building and Launch Pad 39B, the 

Mobile Launcher is continuing to have technical challenges. Fifteen percent of 

the Mobile Launcher’s accessories and umbilicals still have to complete testing, 

and there are emerging concerns about the structural integrity of the Mobile 

Launcher’s base.

NASA Lead Center: Kennedy Space Center

International Partner: None

Requirement Derived from: NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010

Budget Portfolio: Exploration, Exploration 

Systems Development 

Exploration Ground Systems 

The Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program is modernizing and 

upgrading infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center and developing 

software needed to integrate, process, and launch the Space Launch System 

(SLS) and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion). The EGS program 

consists of several major construction and facilities projects including the 

Mobile Launcher (pictured to the left), Crawler Transporter, Vehicle Assembly 

Building, and launch pad, all of which need to be complete before the first 

uncrewed exploration mission using the SLS and Orion vehicles.

common name: EGS

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP

a

Assumes June 2020 launch date.
52 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

In December 2017, NASA announced a new schedule and 

cost estimate for the EGS program, after determining that 

the November 2018 launch readiness date for Exploration 

Mission-1 (EM-1) was no longer feasible. In April 2017, we 

found that the date was likely unachievable for all three 

human spaceflight programs—EGS, the Space Launch 

System, and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle—due to 

technical challenges continuing to cause schedule delays and 

the programs having little to no schedule reserve to the EM-1 

date, meaning they would have to complete all remaining 

work with little margin for error for unexpected challenges 

that could arise.b The new launch readiness date for EM-1 is 

now December 2019, but NASA has allocated 6 months of 

schedule reserve to June 2020 for possible manufacturing 

and production schedule risks. This represents a delay of 

13-19 months for EM-1. The life-cycle cost estimate for EGS 

is approximately $3.1 billion to the December 2019 date and 

$3.2 billion to June 2020, or 11.8 to 14.9 percent above the 

project’s committed baseline. 

Technology 

EGS’s two major software development efforts—Spaceport 

Command and Control System (SCCS), which will operate 

and monitor ground equipment, and Ground Flight Application 

Software (GFAS), which will interface with flight systems 

and ground crews—are the program’s primary schedule 

drivers, and the program has recently restructured the 

organization of the SCCS in order to address gaps in systems 

engineering processes, among other concerns. EGS’s 

other major software development effort, GFAS, continues 

to face challenges due to late deliveries from the SLS and 

Orion programs and delays in SCCS; however, program 

officials stated they have been heavily focused on resolving 

SCCS challenges. According to program officials, increased 

processing needs combined with unplanned rework led to 

higher complexity in the SCCS system. This complexity in turn 

led to a program review of SCCS, which found gaps in the 

system development process and in SCCS’s organizational 

structures. As a result of these issues, EGS is restructuring 

the Systems Engineering and Integration organization, 

augmenting hardware, and hiring more staff. Program 

officials noted that a challenge in this restructuring is hiring 

because NASA is competing for software developers with 

the local aerospace economy. The program is also executing 

a pre-planned transition that moves SCCS under the same 

contractor as GFAS and will shift the SCCS development 

structure to smaller deliverables that can be released more 

often. A senior NASA official said that EGS’s software 

development is a top issue leading up to EM-1, and that as a 

result, the EGS Associate Program Manager was temporarily 

reassigned to exclusively manage enhancements to the 

EGS software development effort. 

Design

The EGS program has made progress on several projects, 

including the Vehicle Assembly Building and Launch Pad 

39B, but technical challenges continue with the Mobile 

Launcher. The Mobile Launcher supports the assembly, 

testing, and servicing of the SLS rocket and provides 

the platform on which SLS and Orion will launch. The 

program has started verification and validation activities 

for the Mobile Launcher, while ground support equipment 

and umbilical installation projects are still underway. For 

example, 15 percent of the Mobile Launcher’s umbilicals 

and launch accessories still have to complete testing. 

Program officials previously said this concurrency 

increases risk because of uncertainties regarding how 

systems not yet installed may affect the systems already 

installed. In November 2017, EGS reported that loads 

models have indicated low stress margins in critical 

locations in the Mobile Launcher base. The program 

attributed this issue to an error in their model. The program 

is currently designing structural reinforcements for the base 

of the Mobile Launcher and hydraulics pedestals for the 

launch pad. Program officials stated this approach could be 

completed within the program’s existing schedule. 

common name: EGS

EXPLORATION GROUND SYSTEMS

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, EGS 

program officials said the vast majority of EGS 

development and production content is on track for 

EM-1 and work is proceeding for the first flight of 

crew on Exploration Mission-2. In addition, officials 

said EGS has strengthened its ground software 

development plans to reflect expected deliveries 

from other programs. Program officials also provided 

technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. bGAO-17-414.
53

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

02/14

Project

confirmation

02/15

Critical

design

review

01/14

Preliminary

design

review

07/12

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

07/15

System

integration

review

01/12

Formulation

start

05/18

Manifested

launch

readiness

date

02/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$107.4

$264.0

$60.5

$107.4

$261.8

$62.7

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$431.9 $431.9

$70.6

$431.9

99.7%

0.3%

GRACE-FO

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

02/18

LAUNCH

DATE

01/12

05/18

LAUNCH

DATE

01/12

3

MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The GRACE-FO project plans to launch in May 2018, 3 months later than its 

committed launch readiness date of February 2018, but within its committed cost 

baseline. Delays to the project’s launch readiness date, which over time have 

accumulated to 9 months of delays, are related to the project’s launch vehicle 

arrangement. First, GFZ—NASA’s partner on the project, which is responsible for 

the launch vehicle—reported that it was notified by the Russian Federal Space 

Agency that the Dnepr launch vehicle was no longer available. Subsequently, 

GFZ arranged to launch the two GRACE-FO spacecraft, along with commercial 

satellites, on a SpaceX Falcon 9. But the project experienced subsequent 

delays after SpaceX experienced an anomaly on a launch pad that resulted in 

delays to the launch schedule. The project used the extra time created by the 

launch delays to conduct additional risk reduction activities during system-level 

integration and test. 

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partner: German Research 

Centre for Geosciences (GFZ)

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: Falcon 9

Mission Duration: 5 years

Requirement Derived from: NASA 2010 

Climate Plan

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On

The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On (GRACE-FO) 

will continue and expand upon the 2002 GRACE mission, which ended 

science operations in October 2017. The system, which consists of two 

spacecraft working together to obtain scientific measurements, will provide 

high-resolution models of Earth’s gravity field and insight into water movement 

on and beneath the Earth’s surface for up to 5 years. These models will provide 

rates of ground water depletion and polar ice melt and enable improved planning 

for droughts and floods. GRACE-FO is a collaborative effort with the German 

Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ). 

common name: GRACE-FO

Source: Airbus Defense and Space. | GAO-18-280SP
54 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The GRACE-FO project plans to launch in May 2018, 3 

months later than its committed launch readiness date of 

February 2018, due to delays related to its launch vehicle 

arrangement. The project expects to launch within its 

cost baseline and plans to use its remaining project-held 

reserves to cover costs through May 2018. The project 

completed system-level testing on both spacecraft in 

November 2017 and shipped GRACE-FO to Vandenberg 

Air Force Base in California for pre-launch activities in 

December 2017.

Launch and Development Partner

The GRACE-FO project previously planned to launch early 

in August 2017, but delays related to its launch vehicle 

arrangement resulted in a 9-month delay to its launch 

readiness date. The launch vehicle is the responsibility 

of NASA’s partner on the project—GFZ. An initial delay 

of 4 months occurred when the project changed its 

launch vehicle after GFZ reported that it was notified 

by the Russian Federal Space Agency that the Dnepr 

launch vehicle was no longer available. GFZ, in June 

2016, arranged to launch the two GRACE-FO spacecraft, 

along with commercial satellites, on a SpaceX Falcon 9. 

SpaceX then experienced an anomaly on a launch pad 

in September 2016 that resulted in delays to the launch 

schedule as SpaceX investigated the source of the 

anomaly. In July 2017, a new 30-day launch readiness 

window from March to April 2018 was negotiated, resulting 

in an additional 4 months of delays for the project. In March 

2018, the launch was delayed an additional month to May 

2018 due to launch range availability.

Integration and Test

The project used the extra time in the schedule due to 

launch delays to conduct additional risk reduction activities 

during system-level integration and test. For example, the 

project identified a design issue with its global positioning 

system antenna during testing. With the extra time, it 

replaced the antennas on both spacecraft to resolve the 

issue. In addition, the project identified a manufacturing 

issue with one of the two cavities that stabilizes the 

laser of its Laser Ranging Interferometer (LRI), which is 

contributed by GFZ. LRI is a technology demonstration 

that performs the same ranging measurements of GRACEFO’s microwave instrument but with greater precision and 

is not needed to meet the mission’s science requirements. 

With the extra time, the project was able to replace and 

reintegrate the cavity with the spacecraft. 

In addition, the project is investigating the shifting of an 

optical system component of LRI during system-level 

environmental testing in August 2017. The project is 

investigating the cause, but anticipates the shift is likely due 

to the expansion of adhesive bonds between the optical 

components when exposed to temperature and humidity. 

The project conducted additional tests using spare flight 

hardware in a vacuum, which removes humidity, to 

understand future alignment performance in a space-like 

environment. The project expects that it will be able to 

use the component as-is because tests indicate there is 

sufficient performance margin even with the shifting, that 

exposure to the vacuum of space will reduce the shifting, 

and it can make operational adjustments to further improve 

performance, if needed. 

common name: GRACE-FO

GRAVITY RECOVERY AND CLIMATE EXPERIMENT FOLLOW-ON

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

GRACE-FO project officials provided technical 

comments on a draft of this assessment, which 

were incorporated as appropriate.
55

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

12/12

Project

confirmation

02/14

Critical

design

review

10/12

Preliminary

design

review

05/11

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

05/14

Project

rebaseline

12/09

Formulation

start

06/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

08/17

System

integration

review

 09/18-10/18

Manifested

launch

readiness

date

$248.8

$558.8

$249.1

$765.1 $52.6

$49.3

BASELINE

FY 2013

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

23.6%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$860.2 $1,063.6

$130.1

$1,063.6

99.4%

0.6%

ICESat-2

Other

major 

projects

05/17

LAUNCH

DATE

12/09

10/18

LAUNCH

DATE

12/09

17

MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2013

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The project will miss its rebaselined committed launch date but does not expect 

the cost to exceed the rebaseline because it has sufficient cost reserves to cover 

the delay. The project will miss its committed launch readiness date of June 2018 

due to issues with its sole instrument—the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter 

System (ATLAS). In July 2016, the ICESat-2 project encountered problems with 

the flight lasers developed for ATLAS that caused NASA to delay the launch 

date to October 2018, which is 17 months beyond the original baseline and 4 

months beyond the rebaselined date set in 2014. The project held its system 

integration review and began system-level integration and test in August 2017. 

The two repaired lasers that will fly on the ATLAS instrument were shipped back 

to Goddard Space Flight Center, completed flight acceptance testing, and are 

integrated onto the instrument. The project entered the system assembly and 

testing phase in October 2017.

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: Delta II

Mission Duration: 3 years

Requirement Derived from: 2007 Earth 

Science Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 

The Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2) is a follow-on 

mission to ICESat that will measure changes in polar ice-sheet mass and 

elevation. The measurements will provide researchers a better understanding 

of the mechanisms that drive polar ice changes and their effect on global sea 

level. ICESat-2’s upgraded laser instrument will allow the satellite to make more 

frequent measurements and provide better elevation estimates over certain 

types of terrain than ICESat.

common name: ICESAT-2

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
56 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The project will miss its rebaselined committed launch 

date but does not expect the cost to exceed the rebaseline 

because it has sufficient cost reserves to cover the delay. 

The ICESat-2 project is proceeding to integration and test 

after problems with lasers within the primary instrument—the 

Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS)—

caused NASA to delay the launch readiness date from June 

2018 to October 2018. This represents a 17-month delay 

beyond the original baseline and a 4-month delay beyond 

the rebaselined date set in 2014. However, the project is 

working to an earlier, September 2018 launch readiness 

date. The project completed a cost and schedule replan in 

October 2017, which required a large portion of remaining 

headquarters-held cost reserves, but did not take the project 

over its baseline commitment of $1,063.5 million.a The project 

is holding cost and schedule reserves at the level required 

by NASA center policy, but the project will need to realign 

funding planned for system integration and testing to address 

a shortfall in cost reserves for the operations phase. The 

project held its system integration review in August 2017 and 

received approval to enter the system assembly and testing 

phase in October 2017.

Technology and Design 

Over numerous years, the ICESat-2 project has addressed 

issues with its flight lasers, and continues to mitigate the 

risk that they might fail again in the future. During ATLAS 

environmental testing in 2016, the project determined two 

of its three lasers needed repairs due to cracked crystal. 

The remaining laser did not require rework and continued 

to operate—completing over 2,300 hours of runtime. 

Subsequently, the project found that components on a test 

model—similar to the laser that did not need repairs—cracked 

while in storage. Project officials were unable to identify a 

single root cause of the cracking but determined this was an 

indication that the unrepaired laser could fail. ICESat-2 only 

needs one laser for mission success, but will carry a second 

for redundancy. In July 2017, following the completion of a 

trade study to determine which two of its three flight lasers 

should fly on ATLAS, NASA decided to use the two lasers 

that were repaired for flight. Officials said this decision was 

due to uncertainty in the reliability of the unrepaired laser 

and that the repaired lasers fully address the factors that 

contributed to the fractures. Since being repaired, together 

these lasers have completed a total of over 1,200 hours of 

runtime and have performed to requirements. Flying the two 

repaired lasers does not affect the project’s plans to launch 

in September 2018. However, the project is carrying multiple 

risks to account for the potential that the repaired lasers could 

still fail at various points in time. For example, the project is 

carrying two risks that weigh the effect of the lasers failing on 

the ground during integration and test or failing while on 

orbit. If a laser fails during integration and test, it would 

take 5 weeks to replace it with a spare.

Integration and Test 

The ICESat-2 project is proceeding through integration 

and test now that the ATLAS flight lasers are integrated 

onto the instrument and undergoing performance testing. 

The project held its system integration review and began 

system-level integration and test in August 2017. The 

two repaired lasers that will fly on the ATLAS instrument 

were shipped back to Goddard Space Flight Center 

and completed flight acceptance testing. On one of 

the repaired lasers, which was fully integrated onto the 

optical bench, the project observed an unusual pattern in 

its optical components during initial performance testing, 

and ATLAS officials have convened a review board to 

investigate the cause of this issue. The other repaired 

laser, which performed as expected during acceptance 

testing, began integration in September 2017 and is now 

undergoing performance testing.

common name: ICESAT-2

ICE, CLOUD, AND LAND ELEVATION SATELLITE-2

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 

ICESat-2 officials stated that during initial ATLAS 

testing, flight laser two exhibited an anomalous 

laser behavior. Project officials stated the laser 

was transported back to the contractor for cleaning 

and testing, which revealed comparable results to 

previous tests. The laser was returned to NASA and 

is performing normally. Project officials also provided 

technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. a

This total baseline cost differs from the total cost outlined in the table above due to an increase in 

project labor during the formulation phase. This increase is not related to the ATLAS instrument. 
57

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

03/14

Project

confirmation

05/14

Critical

design

review

10/13

Preliminary

design

review

02/15

System

integration

review

06/17

System

integration

review #2

07/11

Formulation

start

05/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$98.9

$541.8

$34.4

$98.9

$673.5

$56.6

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

22.8%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$675.1 $828.9

$143.5

$828.9

99.4%

0.6%

InSight

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

03/16

LAUNCH

DATE

07/11

05/18

LAUNCH

DATE

07/11

26

MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The InSight project is on track to meet its revised cost and schedule agreement 

after technical issues with its primary instrument—the Seismic Experiment for 

Interior Structure (SEIS)—caused it to miss the previously planned launch date 

of March 2016. The project is holding cost and schedule reserves consistent with 

the level required by Jet Propulsion Laboratory policy. NASA redesigned the SEIS 

container and integrated it on the lander in August 2017. The project continues 

to track a risk that sensors within the SEIS will not function as intended, which 

would affect the project’s ability to meet science requirements. To increase 

confidence that the sensors will perform, the project is completing tests to confirm 

the sensors’ ability to survive for the mission’s duration. The project also used the 

additional time from the launch delay to redesign the wiring within the HP3—a 

German-contributed instrument that drills into the Martian surface to collect 

temperature data—to address an anomaly found in testing. 

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partners: Centre National 

d’Etudes Spatiales (France) and German 

Aerospace Center (Germany)

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 29 months

Requirement Derived from: 2011 Planetary 

Science Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary 

Science

Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, 

Geodesy, and Heat Transport

The Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat 

Transport (InSight) is a Mars lander with two primary objectives. It is intended 

to further understanding of the formation and evolution of terrestrial planets 

by determining Mars’s size, its composition, and the physical state of the core; 

the thickness of the crust; and the composition and structure of the mantle, as 

well as the thermal state of the interior. It will also determine the present level of 

tectonic activity and the meteorite impact rate on Mars. InSight is based on the 

Phoenix lander design. Phoenix successfully landed on Mars in 2008. 

common name: INSIGHT

Source: © California Institute of Technology. | GAO-18-280SP
58 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The InSight project is on track to meet its revised cost and 

schedule agreement approved by NASA in August 2016 

after the project missed its previously planned launch 

date. The InSight project missed its original launch date 

due to technical issues with the Seismic Experiment for 

Interior Structure (SEIS) instrument—the project’s primary 

instrument and a contribution from the Centre National 

d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES)—which increased costs by 

almost $154 million and delayed the launch by 26 months. 

The project delivered the InSight spacecraft to the launch 

site in February 2018 before its planned launch in May 

2018. The project is holding cost and schedule reserves 

consistent with the level required by Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory policy.

Integration and Test and Development Partner 

The InSight project has resolved technical issues that 

necessitated a SEIS redesign, but is working to mitigate 

a risk on a key SEIS component that could affect SEIS’s 

performance in operations. After discovering vacuum seal 

leaks that prevented the SEIS container from sealing 

properly and ultimately caused the launch delay, the project 

restructured SEIS responsibilities with NASA redesigning 

the SEIS container and CNES conducting integration and 

test. In March 2017, CNES confirmed that the redesign of 

the SEIS container was successful after completing a leak 

test, and integrated the SEIS with the lander in August 

2017. The project is tracking a risk related to a potential 

failure of a Very Broad Band (VBB) sensor—a key SEIS 

component that will be used to measure seismic activity—

in operations. The project has requested and received 

a significant number of VBB waivers. For example, the 

project requested and received approval to proceed with 

an oxidized part on several VBBs. The waivers individually 

have a low risk of causing a VBB failure, but together 

present a more moderate risk of a failure. More than one 

VBB failure would prevent the project from meeting its 

science requirements, according to officials. The project is 

completing tests to confirm the sensors’ ability to survive 

for the mission’s duration, which should provide increased 

confidence in the VBBs.

Because the project had additional time in its schedule 

due to the launch delay, it redesigned the Heat Flow and 

Physical Properties Probe (HP3)—a contributed instrument 

that will drill into the Martian surface to take temperature 

measurements—to resolve anomalies that occurred late 

in testing and to improve performance. These anomalies 

included damaged internal wiring caused by shocks 

generated by the hammering mechanism. The project 

completed a HP3 trade study, which evaluated whether or 

not to fly the redesigned HP3 or proceed with the original 

design, and determined the redesigned HP3 represented 

the lower risk option for the mission. The project integrated 

the redesigned HP3 in October 2017 prior to system-level 

testing. The HP3 is not needed for the project to meet its 

level 1 science requirements.

Design

The InSight project was tracking a risk related to its 

parachute that could have consumed approximately 27 

percent of its cost reserves, but in October 2017 the project 

made the decision to use the existing parachute design that 

removed that risk. According to officials, the InSight project 

uses the same manufacturer for nylon in its parachute as 

the Mars 2020 project—another project that will land on 

Mars—originally planned to use. Mars 2020 discovered 

a potential problem with the strength of its parachute 

fabric as the fabric was degrading upon exposure to high 

heat during a planetary protection activity. As a result, the 

InSight project was concurrently building a parachute with 

new nylon material as well as a parachute using existing 

material. However, the project decided to abandon building 

a parachute using new material when it was determined 

that the new nylon material did not meet specifications, 

the vendor could not meet the required schedule in order 

to make the risk reduction option viable, and, according 

to officials, expert reviews rated the existing parachute as 

acceptable to fly. The Advanced Supersonic Parachute 

Inflation Research Experiment successfully completed 

a test in October 2017 that provided the project with 

additional support for their decision to use the parachute 

using original material. 

common name: INSIGHT

INTERIOR EXPLORATION USING SEISMIC INVESTIGATIONS, GEODESY, AND HEAT TRANSPORT

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

InSight project officials provided technical 

comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate 
59

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

10/14

Project

confirmation

04/15

Critical

design

review

07/14

Preliminary

design

review

01/14

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

08/16

System

integration

review

09/11

Formulation

start

No earlier

than 06/18

Manifested

launch

readiness date

10/17

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$42.4

$196.0

$14.3

$38.8

$196.0

$17.9

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$252.7 $252.7

$24.8

$252.7

99.9%

0.1%

ICON

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

10/17

LAUNCH

DATE

09/11

NO

EARLIER

THAN

06/18

LAUNCH

DATE

09/11

AT LEAST

8 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The ICON project has missed its committed launch readiness date of October 

2017 and both the project’s schedule and costs are under review. Delays to 

the project’s launch readiness date are related to problems with ICON’s launch 

vehicle. The project experienced a 6-month delay due to a transport incident 

with a launch vehicle segment and launch range conflicts. In September 2017, 

an anomaly found in testing of the launch vehicle bolt cutter assemblies resulted 

in additional delays, but the magnitude of these delays is unknown while an 

investigation of the anomaly is underway. In February 2018, NASA determined 

the project will launch no earlier than June 2018, but this date is still under review. 

The ICON project completed its system-level integration and test activities in April 

2017 as planned, but has not shipped the spacecraft to the launch site due to the 

launch delay.

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: Centre Spatial de 

Liege Université de Liège (Belgium)

Launch Location: Kwajalein (Marshall 

Islands)

Launch Vehicle: Pegasus

Mission Duration: 2 years

Requirement Derived from: 2010 Science 

Mission Directorate Science Plan and 

2009 Heliophysics Roadmap Team Report 

to the NASA Advisory Council 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Heliophysics

Ionospheric Connection Explorer 

The Ionospheric Connection Explorer (ICON) observatory will orbit Earth 

to explore its ionosphere—the boundary region between Earth and space 

where ionized plasma and neutral gas collide and react. Its four instruments 

will make direct measurements and use remote sensing to further researchers’ 

understanding of Earth’s upper atmosphere, the Earth-Sun connection, and the 

ways in which Earth weather drives space weather.

common name: ICON

Source: University of California, Berkeley. | GAO-18-280SP
60

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The ICON project has missed its committed launch 

readiness date of October 2017 and both the project’s 

schedule and costs are under review. The project 

completed its system-level integration and test activities in 

April 2017 as planned, but has not shipped the spacecraft 

to the launch site due to ongoing delays related to the 

launch vehicle. According to officials, the project received 

$7.8 million of headquarters-held reserves to cover initial 

delays, but it cannot determine whether it will exceed its 

cost baseline until NASA and the launch vehicle provider 

set a new launch date. Project officials said they need 

about $1 million a month for ICON to remain in storage.

Launch

The ICON project had planned to launch early, in June 

2017, but the project has experienced delays associated 

with its launch vehicle. In January 2017, two of the Pegasus 

launch vehicle’s three stages were involved in a transport 

accident. The stages were subsequently returned to the 

launch vehicle contractor facility for inspection and testing, 

and no damage was found. The launch vehicle contractor 

then delivered the stages to Vandenberg Air Force Base 

for integration and testing activities. Due to conflicts at the 

launch vehicle range, the earliest available launch date was 

December 2017, which resulted in a 6-month launch delay 

from the planned June 2017 launch date. 

In September 2017, however, an anomaly identified in 

bolt cutter assembly confidence testing—testing to show 

that the bolts that hold the launch vehicle and payload 

together will separate as planned during launch—resulted 

in additional delays, but the magnitude of the delay is 

unknown. One of nine bolt cutter assemblies failed to 

fracture a bolt during testing. As a result, NASA and the 

contractor halted testing and began an investigation of 

the anomaly, which is ongoing. NASA’s Launch Services 

Program is working with the launch vehicle provider to 

identify the root cause of the anomaly, evaluate options to 

resolve the issue, and determine a new launch readiness 

date. In February 2018, NASA determined the project will 

launch no earlier than June 2018, but this date is still under 

review.

common name: ICON

IONOSPHERIC CONNECTION EXPLORER

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, ICON 

project officials stated that the project completed all 

observatory integration and test activities last year. 

As of January 2018, the observatory remains in 

the Orbital-ATK cleanroom in Gilbert, Arizona in a 

safe state—under continuous purge and performing 

periodic monitoring of the battery voltage—awaiting 

determination of a new launch date and shipment 

for launch vehicle integration. Project officials 

also provided technical comments, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
61

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

07/08

Project

confirmation

03/10

Critical

design

review

03/08

Preliminary

design

review

01/06

Mission/

system

definition

review

06/18

System

integration

review

05/20

Target

launch

readiness

date

03/99

Formulation

start

10/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$1,800.1

$2,581.1

$582.4

$1,800.1

$6,188.8

$836.6

BASELINE

FY 2009

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

77.8%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$4,963.6 $8,825.4

$1,645.3

$8,825.4

92.2%

7.8%

JWST

Other

major 

projects

06/14

LAUNCH

DATE

03/99

05/20

LAUNCH

DATE

03/99

71

MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2009

LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The JWST project delayed its planned launch readiness date by a total of at least 

19 months from October 2018 to May 2020. In March 2018, NASA announced 

the most recent delay to approximately May 2020 based on a schedule 

analysis by its standing review board. This analysis showed that more time will 

be needed to integrate and test the telescope and spacecraft elements and 

conduct environmental testing. For several years, the observatory contractor 

has overestimated workforce reductions at the beginning of each fiscal year, 

but technical challenges have prevented the planned reductions and hindered 

JWST’s ability to control costs. As a result, the observatory contractor has 

maintained higher workforce levels than expected, and may continue to do so in 

the coming months. Along with the latest launch delay, this puts the project at risk 

of exceeding its $8 billion congressional cost cap. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partners: European Space 

Agency, Canadian Space Agency

Launch Location: Kourou, French Guiana

Launch Vehicle: Ariane 5 

Mission Duration: 5 years (10-year goal)

Requirement Derived from: 2001 

Astrophysics Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Astrophysics

James Webb Space Telescope 

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large, infrared-optimized 

space telescope designed to help understand the origin and destiny of the 

universe, the creation and evolution of the first stars and galaxies, and the 

formation of stars and planetary systems. It will also help further the search 

for Earth-like planets. JWST will have a large primary mirror composed of 18 

smaller mirrors and a sunshield the size of a tennis court. Both the mirror and 

sunshield are folded for launch and open once JWST is in space. JWST will 

reside in an orbit about 1 million miles from the Earth. 

common name: JWST

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
62 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The JWST project has delayed its planned launch readiness 

date by at least 19 months, from the committed October 

2018 launch readiness date to approximately May 2020. 

NASA announced two delays for the project since we last 

reported in May 2017.a First, in September 2017, the 

project announced a delay of up to 8 months based on the 

results of a schedule risk assessment that showed various 

components of spacecraft element integration were taking 

longer to complete than expected. Prior to establishing the 

new launch window, the project used all remaining schedule 

reserves to address various technical issues, including a 

test anomaly on the telescope and sunshield hardware 

challenges. The new launch date included up to 4 months 

of new schedule reserves. However, by February 2018, 

the project had consumed the 4 months of reserves due to 

continuing challenges with spacecraft integration and test. 

Then, in March 2018, the JWST project announced an 11- 

month launch readiness delay to approximately May 2020 

based on the results of a standing review board schedule 

analysis. According to the analysis, the previous launch date 

was not possible due to lessons learned during spacecraft 

element integration and test and propulsion system rework. 

The analysis further indicated that more time will be needed 

to integrate and test the telescope and spacecraft elements 

and conduct environmental testing. 

Due to these challenges, the observatory contractor has 

maintained higher levels of workforce than expected, and 

may continue to do so in the coming months. As a result, the 

project is at risk of exceeding the $8 billion congressional 

cap for formulation and development costs established in 

2011. An external independent review board will conduct a 

schedule analysis, with the results expected in May 2018, to 

be followed by the agency’s final decision on JWST’s launch 

date in June 2018 and a report to Congress in summer 

2018. After the launch date is determined, NASA will update 

the project’s cost estimate. 

Integration and Test 

The project and observatory contractor significantly 

underestimated the time required to complete integration 

and test work on the spacecraft element. Execution of 

spacecraft integration and test tasks was much slower 

than planned due to a variety of challenges including 

complexity of work and reach and access limitations on 

flight hardware. In addition, the observatory contractor 

has consumed several weeks of schedule reserves due 

to various workmanship errors, particularly with respect 

to the spacecraft propulsion systems. For example, an 

observatory contractor technician applied too much voltage 

and damaged components of the propulsion system, and 

reattaching the replacement components consumed 5 

weeks of reserves. Also in May 2017, the observatory 

contractor discovered that valves in the thruster modules—

which help control spacecraft on-orbit positioning—had 

been damaged by a cleaning solution and had to be 

refurbished. Reattaching the refurbished modules was 

expected to be complete by February 2018, but was 

delayed by one month when a technician applied too much 

voltage to one of the components in a recently refurbished 

thruster module. 

Contractor 

The observatory contractor continued to maintain higher 

than planned workforce levels in the past year, and may 

continue to do so in the coming months. For several 

years, the observatory contractor has overestimated 

workforce reductions at the beginning of each fiscal year, 

but technical challenges have prevented the planned 

reductions and hindered JWST’s ability to control costs. 

After completing negotiations on a cost overrun proposal in 

September 2017, driven by higher-than-planned workforce 

levels, the project is expected to issue a request for 

proposal from the observatory contractor in early 2018 for 

the costs for the remaining work through the new launch 

window. A cost overrun proposal seeks to increase the 

value of a cost-reimbursement contract when the total 

estimated cost is less than the contract’s estimated cost to 

complete the performance of the contract. 

common name: JWST

JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

JWST project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. 

 aGAO-17-303SP.
63

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

12/17

Project

confirmation

04/18

Critical

design

review

09/17

Preliminary

design

review

06/16

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

08/19

System

integration

review

03/15

Formulation

start

11/21

Committed

launch

readiness

date

12/20

Target

launch

readiness

date

95.8%

4.2%

Landsat 9

Other

major 

projects

$569.9

$885.0

$16.1

$634.2

$234.8

$16.1

$634.2

$234.8

BASELINE

FY 2018

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$885.0 $885.0

BASELINE

FY 2018

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

11/21 LAUNCH

DATE

03/15

11/21 LAUNCH

DATE

03/15

0 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The Landsat 9 project entered the implementation phase in December 2017 and 

formally established its cost and schedule baselines. The project is working to a 

launch readiness date of December 2020, 11 months earlier than its baselined 

launch date, in part to help meet a goal of the scientific community to maintain 

two Landsat satellites on-orbit simultaneously. As a result, the project is not 

holding schedule reserves at the level required by NASA center policy to address 

known and unknown risks. The project considers this schedule challenging, but 

achievable because of the high use of heritage technologies, mature instrument 

designs, and extensive use of hardware from the prior Landsat mission, Landsat 

8. The project entered implementation with mature technologies and stable

instrument designs. The project plans to hold its critical design review in April 

2018. Our work on product development best practices shows that at least 90 

percent of design drawings should be released by critical design review to lower 

the risk of subsequent cost and schedule growth. As of January 2018, the project 

had released about 64 percent of its design drawings. Prior to this review, the 

project will need to mature the design of its spacecraft. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 5 years

Requirement Derived from: National Plan 

for Civil Earth Observations 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

Landsat 9 

Landsat 9 is the next satellite in the Landsat series Program, which provides 

a continuous space-based record of land surface observations to study, 

predict, and understand the consequences of land surface dynamics, such as 

deforestation. The program is a collaborative, joint mission between NASA and 

the U.S. Geological Survey. The Landsat data archive constitutes the longest 

continuous moderate-resolution record of the global land surface as viewed 

from space and is used by many fields, such as agriculture, mapping, forestry, 

and geology.

common name: L9

Source: Orbital ATK (artist rendering). | GAO-18-280SP
64 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

The Landsat 9 project entered the implementation phase 

in December 2017 and formally established its cost and 

schedule baselines. The project set a baseline life-cycle 

cost of $885 million and a launch date of November 2021. 

However, the project is working toward a launch readiness 

date of December 2020 due to direction in the Explanatory 

Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2016. According to officials, this earlier launch date will 

help ensure that the Landsat program is able to maintain 

two Landsat satellites on-orbit simultaneously, which is a 

goal of the scientific community, but not a requirement for 

the program. NASA calculated the project’s joint cost and 

schedule confidence level, the likelihood a project will meet 

its cost and schedule estimate, at 47 percent for the earlier 

December 2020 launch date. This is slightly lower than 

the 50 percent required by NASA policy. However, for the 

baselined launch date of November 2021, the joint cost and 

schedule confidence level is greater than 70 percent, which 

meets the requirement in NASA policy. 

As a result of working to this earlier launch date, the project 

is holding schedule reserves below the level required by 

NASA center policy. This means the project would have 

less time to address known and unknown risks without 

affecting its December 2020 launch date. The project 

considers this schedule challenging, but achievable 

because of the high use of heritage technologies, mature 

instrument designs, and extensive use of hardware from 

the prior Landsat mission, Landsat 8. In addition, project 

officials said they have confidence that the project can 

meet this date because they have been executing to 

this aggressive schedule without needing any schedule 

reserves. The project is holding cost reserves at the level 

required by NASA center policy.

Technology and Design 

The Landsat 9 project proceeded into implementation 

with mature technologies. The project held its preliminary 

design review in September 2017 with mature technologies 

and stable instrument designs due to high use of heritage 

technologies and designs from Landsat 8. Utilizing heritage 

technologies and designs on projects can help to reduce 

risk and control costs when they are used for similar 

purposes in similar environments. Specifically, Landsat 9’s 

instruments—Thermal Infrared Sensor-2 and Operational 

Land Imager-2—are at a technology readiness level 9 

and all components in the flight segments are above a 

technology readiness level 6. Maturing technologies to a 

technology readiness level 6 by preliminary design review 

is a best practice and helps minimize risks for space 

systems entering product development. 

The project also proceeded into implementation with the 

designs of its two instruments stable. The project plans 

to hold its critical design review in April 2018. Our work 

on product development best practices shows that at 

least 90 percent of design drawings should be released 

by critical design review to lower the risk of subsequent 

cost and schedule growth. As of January 2018, the project 

had released about 64 percent of its design drawings. 

The project completed critical design reviews for its two 

instruments prior to mission preliminary design review 

due to the high level of heritage designs from Landsat 8, 

and has released over 90 percent of drawings for both. 

Most of the drawings that have not been released are for 

the spacecraft. The project’s spacecraft also has a design 

similar to that of Landsat 8 and uses heritage components 

from other Earth-orbiting satellites. The project plans to 

hold its spacecraft critical design review in February 2018. 

common name: L9

LANDSAT 9

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Landsat 

9 project officials stated that all project elements are 

successfully making progress and on track to support 

a December 2020 launch readiness date. Officials 

also provided technical comments on a draft of this 

assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 
65

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

04/17

Project

confirmation

12/16

Critical

design

review

10/13

Preliminary

design

review

03/13

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

07/18

System

integration

review

12/12

Formulation

start

11/19

Committed

launch

readiness

date

06/19

Target

launch

readiness

date

$169.5

$91.8

$1.5

$169.5

$91.8

$1.5

BASELINE

FY 2017

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$262.7 $262.7

$53.4

$262.7

99.4%

0.6%

LCRD

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2017

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

11/19 LAUNCH

DATE

12/12

11/19 LAUNCH

DATE

12/12

0 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The LCRD project established its cost and schedule baselines in April 2017 

at a higher cost and later schedule than preliminary estimates due to funding, 

programmatic, and design changes made after preliminary design review in 

October 2013. The LCRD project has had to delay its schedule, change its 

host spacecraft, and adjust its design to accommodate scope changes as 

well as funding shortfalls in prior years. LCRD has also added a redundant 

communication capability that adds longevity but also cost and complexity to the 

spacecraft. In addition, multiple hardware components have been delivered late 

and are consuming project schedule reserves heading into integration and test.

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partners: N/A

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station, FL

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V 551

Mission Duration: 2+ years

Requirement Derived from: NASA Strategic 

Plan 

Budget Portfolio: Space Technology, 

Research and Development

Laser Communications Relay Demonstration

LCRD is a technology demonstration mission with the goal of advancing 

optical communication technology for use in deep space and near-Earth 

systems. LCRD will demonstrate bidirectional laser communications between a 

satellite and ground stations, develop operational procedures, and transfer the 

technology to industry for future use on commercial and government satellites. 

NASA anticipates using the technology as a next generation Earth relay as well 

as to support near-Earth and deep space science, such as the International Space 

Station and human spaceflight missions. The project is a mission partner and will 

be a payload on a U.S. Air Force Space Test Program satellite.

common name: LCRD

Source: Universities Space Research Association (USRA). | GAO-18-280SP
66 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The LCRD project’s cost and schedule baselines 

increased compared to its preliminary estimates due to 

funding, programmatic, and design changes made after 

preliminary design review in October 2013. LCRD entered 

the implementation phase in April 2017 and formally 

established its cost and schedule baselines of $262.7 

million to launch by November 2019, which is $23.4 

million higher and 23 months later than the preliminary 

cost estimate. The cost and schedule increases over the 

preliminary estimate are due in part to externally driven 

design changes that the project has had to address. The 

new launch date also reflects the project delaying its 

confirmation review from late 2013 until April 2017 due 

to funding and programmatic challenges. For example, 

funding for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 was less than 

planned, which led the project to halt development of the 

ground segment for 2 years. The project has also changed 

management and undertaken numerous replans and 

descopes since 2013. As of October 2017, the project 

was holding cost reserves below levels required by NASA 

center policy. 

Technology 

LCRD’s technologies were not mature by preliminary 

design review. As a technology demonstration, Goddard 

Space Flight Center does not require technologies to be 

at technology readiness level 6 at that review. However, 

the same risks of subsequent technical problems apply to 

technology demonstrations, which can result in cost growth 

and schedule delays. Further, because technologies are 

being demonstrated to support future missions, the project 

added a high-bandwidth radio transceiver as a backup 

to the optical modules to increase reliability, redundancy, 

and longevity. A drawback of the laser communication 

system is that it requires an unobstructed line of sight in 

order to transmit and receive data. The radio transceiver 

allows LCRD to transmit data with less interruption as the 

radio transceiver increases redundancy should the lineof-sight be obstructed, and longevity should an optical 

unit fail during the mission. In 2017, the proposal for the 

high-bandwidth radio transceiver came in at a higher than 

expected cost but LCRD received funding from sources 

outside the project office. In addition, LCRD is working with 

its host spacecraft to solve potential on-orbit vibration that 

could impact data transmission, but the project will have to 

fund additional damping. 

Design

The project held its critical design review in December 2016 

with a stable design and then held project confirmation in 

April 2017, which allowed the project to enter final design 

and fabrication. The project held its confirmation after 

its critical design review in part due to adding encryption 

to the project following its preliminary design review. 

Adding encryption to the project required a change in 

host spacecraft to one with proper facility clearances, 

changes to the interface designs between LCRD and the 

new host, and changes to the onboard LCRD hardware to 

accommodate encryption. 

Integration and Test

Late component deliveries have delayed integration and 

testing and further delays could begin to affect LCRD 

integration as well as spacecraft integration prior to 

launch. For example, payload integration and testing 

has been delayed by about 6 weeks due to a number 

of late component deliveries. In one instance, delivery 

of the flight support assembly—which interfaces the 

LCRD payload to the host spacecraft and maintains the 

thermal environment—was behind schedule due to late 

procurement of heaters and temperature sensors. In 

another, delivery of one of the two flight modems was late 

due to rework and component replacement.

common name: LCRD

LASER COMMUNICATIONS RELAY DEMONSTRATION

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

LCRD project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

67

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

09/18

Project

confirmation

07/19

Critical

design

review

07/18

Preliminary

design

review

09/16

LBFD

formulation

start

03/14

Mission

definition

review

06/21

Projected

first flight

date

03/13

Start of

concept

formulation

studies

03/22

System

acceptance

review

$75.7

97.7%

2.3%

LBFD

Other

major 

projects

$390.0+

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

MARCH

2022

SYSTEM

ACCEPTANCE

REVIEW

03/13

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

The LBFD project entered the preliminary design and technology development 

phase and established preliminary cost and schedule targets in September 

2016. The project expects that its preliminary cost estimate of at least $390 

million will increase when it establishes its cost and schedule baseline at project 

confirmation planned for September 2018, due in part to the estimate not 

including cost and schedule reserves. The project began under a concept study 

effort known as the Quiet Supersonic Technology (QueSST) project and was 

conducted under an existing research contract. NASA selected a post-preliminary 

design and build contractor in March 2018. Under the QueSST effort, the project 

matured three of LBFD’s six technologies and will need to mature its remaining 

three technologies before the project’s preliminary design review. These include 

one critical technology: the design tools needed to create the aircraft’s outer 

shape, which is necessary to meet the project’s mission. 

NASA Lead Center: None

International Partner: None

Requirement Derived from: Aeronautics 

Research Mission Directorate Strategic 

Implementation Plan 

Budget Portfolio: Aeronautics, Integrated 

Aviation Systems Program

Low Boom Flight Demonstrator 

LBFD is a flight demonstration project planned to demonstrate that noise 

from supersonic flight—sonic boom—can be reduced to acceptable levels, 

allowing for eventual commercial use of overland supersonic flight paths. 

Plans include multiple flights beyond fiscal year 2022 to gather community 

responses to the flights and to create a database to support development of 

international noise rules for supersonic flight. 

common name: LBFD

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
68 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

The LBFD project entered the preliminary design and 

technology development phase and established preliminary 

cost and schedule targets in September 2016. The project’s 

preliminary cost estimate is $390 million but the project 

expects the estimate to increase when it establishes a cost 

and schedule baseline at its confirmation review planned 

for September 2018. For example, the preliminary cost 

estimate does not include cost reserves. 

Further, according to project officials, the cost estimate 

will also include an additional $39 million associated with 

requirements and concept study efforts—that included 

developing a preliminary design—conducted from 2014 

to 2016. Known as the Quiet Supersonic Technology 

(QueSST) project, the effort was conducted under an 

existing research contract with Lockheed Martin. Project 

officials explained that QueSST used funding available 

each year for concept studies, but that the LBFD project is 

slated for dedicated funding following its preliminary design 

review. However, project officials do not plan to include 

some of the costs associated with the flights to gather 

community responses because a separate NASA project—

the Commercial Supersonic Technology project—will lead 

this effort. 

Additionally, the project’s preliminary schedule is in flux. 

Since the release of the fiscal year 2019 Presidential 

Budget Request in February 2018, project officials 

indicated that dates for some key events have changed, 

and the system acceptance review is now scheduled 5 

months later than previously planned.

Design and Technology

In March 2018, NASA selected Lockheed Martin for the 

post-preliminary design contract for LBFD development. 

Officials reported that the solicitation did not require 

that proposals use the preliminary design developed by 

Lockheed Martin under QueSST. But officials said that part 

of the evaluation criteria was whether the proposed concept 

was at a preliminary design review-level of maturity. 

Based on the work completed under QueSST, the LBFD 

project is continuing to mature its one critical technology—

the design tools used to create the aircraft’s outer shape, 

which is necessary to achieve low-boom supersonic 

flight. Project officials said developing these tools and 

the shape, which directly impacts the sound produced by 

the aircraft during supersonic flight, will be the majority 

of the development work necessary to fly and test the 

LBFD aircraft. The project has assessed the design tools 

to be at a technology readiness level 5, which means the 

basic components have been integrated and tested in a 

simulated environment. 

Three of LBFD’s five heritage technologies were matured 

as part of the QueSST effort. The project will need to 

mature the remaining technologies as well as the design 

tools prior to its preliminary design review in July 2018. 

Maturing technologies during preliminary design helps 

reduce risks for systems entering product development. 

The fiber optic sensing system, which will measure bend 

and twist of the wings and stabilizer, and the external vision 

system, which includes cameras and monitors to provide 

forward visibility for the pilot—are not yet mature and will 

require additional development work. The project noted that 

these two technologies have flown before but not as part of 

a research aircraft. 

Other Issues to Be Monitored

The LBFD project is using a virtual project office and is 

in the process of making decisions on how to execute 

the project using this model. The project team includes 

personnel from many NASA centers, allowing specialized 

staff in different centers to collaborate more than they 

would normally. The virtual project office model may 

highlight an organizational structure that could be beneficial 

for future projects, but it is too soon to tell. In addition, 

officials stated that the project has not decided which NASA 

center’s policies it will follow, which include the cost and 

schedule reserve requirements the project will need to 

meet, among other guidelines. 

common name: LBFD

LOW BOOM FLIGHT DEMONSTRATOR

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, LBFD 

project officials stated that the project is continuing 

with its formulation activities in fiscal year 2018. 

These activities will lead to authorization to proceed, 

with implementation following the confirmation 

review planned for September 2018, at which time 

the project will be baselined. Project officials also 

stated that the information contained in this project 

assessment reflects the most currently available 

projections. Project officials also provided technical 

comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

69

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

12/18

Project

confirmation

10/19

Critical

design

review

09/18

Preliminary

design

review

02/18

Spacecraft system

requirements/

systems

definition review

07/20

System

integration

review

12/16

Project

selection

10/21

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$57.4

96.1%

3.9%

Lucy

Other

major 

projects

$914 – $984

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

12/16

OCT – NOV

2021

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

In December 2016, Lucy was one of two projects selected by the Discovery 

program—a series of competed missions that have focused investigations and 

short development periods—to proceed to preliminary design and technology 

completion phase. Lucy is expected to have its rehearsal flyby of a main belt 

asteroid in 2025, and then fly by Trojan asteroids over the course of the next 

8 years. Project officials stated that the design is based heavily on heritage 

hardware and does not require development of any critical technologies. The 

project is evaluating the extent to which risks are posed by existing hardware. For 

example, the project is tracking a risk related to the size of the solar array, which 

is larger than what the contractor typically builds. The project also implemented 

a trade on its spacecraft to address the risk of on-orbit failure from a heritage 

engine. Additionally, the project and NASA Launch Services have identified two 

launch vehicle options, but the project does not expect NASA to select a vehicle 

before its preliminary design review in September 2018. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, 

FL

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 11.6 years

Requirement Derived from: Discovery 

Program Announcement of Opportunity 

2014 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary 

Science

Lucy 

Lucy will be the first mission to investigate the Trojans, which are a 

population of never-explored asteroids orbiting in tandem with Jupiter. The 

project aims to understand the formation and evolution of planetary systems 

by conducting flybys of these remnants of giant planet formation. The Lucy 

spacecraft will first encounter a main belt asteroid—located between the orbits 

of Mars and Jupiter—and then will travel to the outer solar system where the 

spacecraft will encounter six Trojans over an 11-year mission. The mission’s 

planned measurements include asteroid surface color and composition, interior 

composition, and surface geology. 

common name: LUCY

Source: Southwest Research Institute (SwRI). | GAO-18-280SP
70 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

In December 2016, Lucy was one of two projects selected 

by the Discovery program—a series of competed missions 

that have focused scientific investigations and short 

development periods—to proceed to the preliminary 

design and technology completion phase. At that same 

time, the project established preliminary cost and schedule 

estimates. The project’s planned launch window is OctoberNovember 2021. Under that planned launch date, Lucy is 

expected to have its rehearsal flyby–a main belt asteroid 

encounter that will allow the project to test instruments—in 

2025 and then fly by Trojan asteroids over the course of 

the next 8 years. If the project misses that launch date, 

another launch window opens in 2022. The project’s 

preliminary cost range is $914 million to $984 million, and 

the project is currently holding cost and schedule reserves 

consistent with the level required by NASA center policy. 

The project plans to hold its preliminary design review in 

September 2018 and its confirmation review in December 

2018, at which point it will establish its cost and schedule 

baseline. 

Technology and Design

Project officials characterize the Lucy design as low risk 

because it does not require development of any critical 

technologies and has a high heritage design. For example, 

these officials stated that Lucy’s design has the same 

architecture as prior NASA projects such as Juno and the 

Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution Mission (MAVEN). 

The project plans to fly three instruments—a thermal 

spectrometer, a reconnaissance imager, and an imaging 

spectrometer—that are not exact replicas of previously 

flown versions but leverage heritage hardware. The 

Lucy project reports that its one heritage technology—an 

ultraflex solar array—is mature, but the project plans to use 

the technology in a different environment than previously 

demonstrated as well as make modifications that affect 

form, fit, and function. We have previously asserted that 

mature, heritage technologies must be demonstrated in a 

relevant environment and should be very close to form, fit, 

and function. The project is tracking a risk related to the 

size of the solar array since, at approximately 6 meters, it is 

larger than what the contractor typically builds. Because the 

contractor has not flown an array of this size, officials said 

they anticipate being more involved in this procurement, but 

there are no technical issues at this point. 

According to officials, the Lucy spacecraft’s proposed 

main engine was the same model used on a series of 

environmental satellites that have had engine performance 

problems. The engine has failed in flight more than once 

and was a single point failure for the Lucy project. As a 

result, the project completed an engine trade study in July 

2017 and decided to select a different engine. 

Launch 

In coordination with NASA Launch Services at Kennedy 

Space Center, project officials identified the Atlas V and 

Falcon Heavy as vehicles that meet mission requirements. 

However, as of January 2018, the Falcon Heavy had not 

flown, so launch environment data was not yet available to 

the project. Project officials are tracking a risk that it could 

be necessary to rework hardware due to the Falcon Heavy 

launch environment. However, the project has assessed 

the cost impact of this scenario should the Falcon Heavy be 

selected. Officials said they do not expect NASA to select 

a launch vehicle prior to the project’s planned September 

2018 preliminary design review, the point at which projects 

prefer to select a launch vehicle. Until then, the project 

is designing to a mix of the two potential launch vehicles’ 

requirements.

common name: LUCY

LUCY

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

Lucy project officials provided technical comments on 

a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate.
71

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

06/16

Project

confirmation

02/17

Critical

design

review

02/16

Preliminary

design

review

10/14

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

02/18

System

integration

review

11/13

Formulation

start

07/20

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$376.0

$1,676.9 $1,687.6

$393.1

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

0.6%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$2,443.5 $2,458.2

$390.7

$377.5

$1,412.7

$2,458.2

90.9%

9.1%

Mars 2020

Other

major 

projects

07/20

LAUNCH

DATE

11/13

07/20

LAUNCH

DATE

11/13

0 MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The Mars 2020 project has encountered cost growth and schedule delays due 

to technical and design challenges for some components and subsystems—

including a new and highly complex development—but these delays have 

not affected the project’s overall schedule. The project did not mature all of 

its technologies until after the project’s critical design review, which is later 

than recommended by best practices. Further, the project’s new and complex 

developments continue to face technical challenges that could affect cost and 

schedule. Additionally, the project had an unstable design at its critical design 

review, with 72 percent of its drawings released. This is lower than recommended 

by best practices and new and highly complex developments were not stable at 

the time of the design review. The project is working toward system integration 

review in February 2018, but the project is tracking several risks that may affect 

schedule. For example, the new Sampling and Caching System (SCS) that will 

collect and cache Martian soil and rock samples is facing technical and schedule 

challenges. 

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partners: Centre National 

d’Etudes Spatiales (France), Centro 

de Astrobiología and Center for the 

Development of Industrial Technology 

(Spain), Norwegian Defence Research 

Establishment (Norway)

Launch Location: Eastern Range, FL

Launch Vehicle: Atlas V

Mission Duration: 2 years

Requirement Derived from: 2011 Planetary 

Science Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary Science

Mars 2020 

Mars 2020 is part of the Mars Exploration Program, which seeks to further 

understand whether Mars was, is, or can be a habitable planet. Its rover and 

science instruments will explore Mars and conduct geological assessments, 

search for signs of ancient life, determine potential environmental habitability, 

and prepare soil and rock samples for potential future return to Earth. The rover 

will include a technology demonstration instrument designed to convert carbon 

dioxide into oxygen. Mars 2020 is based heavily on the Mars Science Laboratory, 

or Curiosity, which landed on Mars in 2012 and remains in operation. 

common name: MARS 2020

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech. | GAO-18-280SP
72

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The Mars 2020 project continues to meet its schedule 

baseline, but is not meeting the cost baseline established 

at its confirmation review in June 2016. The project 

experienced $14.7 million in cost growth due to technical 

challenges with a technology demonstration instrument 

and higher than expected integration costs for an entry, 

descent, and landing instrument. In addition, the project 

has also experienced schedule delays for some of its 

new developments, but these delays have not affected 

the project’s overall schedule. For example, the project 

delayed its system integration review by about 3 months 

to February 2018 to allow for more time to build new 

development hardware, which were behind schedule due 

to technical and design challenges. Even with this delay, 

project officials said they are confident in the schedule 

established at the confirmation review because the project 

is holding schedule reserves at about two times the level 

required by Jet Propulsion Laboratory policy. In addition, 

the project allocated a significant portion of cost reserves to 

the new development items. The project is not holding cost 

reserves at the level required by Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

policy, but expects to be meeting the policy once the project 

receives additional funds in February 2018. 

Technology 

The Mars 2020 project matured its technologies later than 

recommended by best practices and several new and 

highly complex developments continue to face significant 

technical challenges that could affect cost and schedule. 

Best practices recommend maturing technologies to a 

technology readiness level 6 by the project’s preliminary 

design review to help minimize risks for space systems 

entering product development. However, all of the 

technologies for the Mars 2020 project were not mature 

until after the program’s critical design review. Further, 

the project is concerned late hardware deliveries and 

unfavorable sample contamination test results might cause 

the Sampling and Caching System (SCS)—the project’s 

most challenging development that will collect and cache 

Martian soil and rock samples—to be delivered late to 

integration and test. Additionally, the project experienced 

technical issues with multiple components within an 

instrument that will search for organics and minerals 

that have been altered by water, which have negatively 

affected the instrument’s cost and schedule. To mitigate 

these challenges, the project allocated additional reserves 

and brought on additional expertise. Further, the project is 

utilizing existing SCS development models rather than build 

new ones to reduce cost and schedule risk. 

Design 

The Mars 2020 project held its critical design review before 

it had a stable design, which increases the project’s risk 

of cost growth and schedule delays during the integration 

and test phase. At this review, the project released about 

72 percent of design drawings, which is less than the best 

practice of releasing 90 percent of design drawings at this 

review. Project officials stated that they held the design 

review earlier than normal to avoid delaying progress on 

the development of heritage technologies, which make 

up a large percentage of the rover. As a result of holding 

the review early, new and highly complex developments, 

such as the SCS, were not stable at the time of the design 

review. The unstable design contributed to delays in 

fabricating parts for the SCS engineering unit. As a result, 

the project reduced the number of engineering models it 

will build to help meet schedule. 

The project has a series of parachute tests underway to 

determine whether it can fly with its heritage parachute or 

needs to use a strengthened parachute. These tests are 

to help mitigate risks related, in part, to supersonic test 

failures observed on an unrelated project. Officials said the 

project successfully tested its heritage design at supersonic 

speeds in October 2017, which reduces the risk that a new 

parachute design will be necessary. However, if future tests 

do not successfully demonstrate that either the heritage 

or redesigned parachute inflate as intended, the project 

may have to conduct additional development and tests, 

which could consume all of Mars 2020’s available schedule 

reserve. 

Other Issues to Be Monitored

The Mars 2020 project has experienced workforce 

shortages in several key areas, but, according to officials, 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has largely been able to 

meet the project’s needs because it prioritized staffing for 

the Mars 2020 project. Other Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

projects have experienced workforce issues as well, which 

NASA attributes to the amount of work the laboratory is 

managing.

common name: MARS 2020

MARS 2020

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Mars 

2020 project officials stated the project matured all its 

new technologies to the appropriate level by critical 

design review. Further, officials stated the project 

had backup technologies but none were required. 

Officials also stated the project has accommodated 

schedule delays within available schedule reserves 

and continues to maintain robust schedule reserve 

along the critical path. Project officials also provided 

technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate.
73

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

08/16

Project

confirmation

10/18

Critical

design

review

06/16

Preliminary

design

review

12/14

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

12/19

System

integration

review

03/14

Formulation

start

09/22

Committed

launch

readiness

date

12/21

Manifested

launch

readiness

date

$117.0

$661.0

$88.9

$117.0

$683.0

$96.9

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

3.5%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$866.9 $896.9

$568.0

$896.9

96.6%

3.4%

NISAR

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

09/22

LAUNCH

DATE

03/14

09/22

LAUNCH

DATE

03/14

0 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The NISAR project continues to operate within its schedule baseline, but is not 

meeting its cost baseline established at its confirmation review in August 2016. 

The project experienced $30 million in cost growth as the result of an increase in 

the scope of data collection. Also, about 2 months after confirmation, the project 

learned that its radar reflector contractor entered into two commercial contracts, 

which could put a strain on the contractor’s workforce and increased cost and 

schedule risk to the project. NASA increased near-term funding of the project in 

May 2017, which allowed the project to accelerate radar reflector development. 

In addition, the project made design changes to the radar reflector boom 

assembly—used to deploy the reflector when the spacecraft reaches orbit—to 

address risks that could prevent the boom from latching in place. The NISAR 

project continues to track cost and schedule risks related to its partnership with 

ISRO. NISAR is progressing toward its critical design review in October 2018. 

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partner: Indian Space 

Research Organisation (India)

Launch Location: Satish Dhawan Space 

Centre, India

Launch Vehicle: Geosynchronous Satellite 

Launch Vehicle Mark II

Mission Duration: 3 years

Requirement Derived from: 2007 Earth 

Science Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

 NASA ISRO – Synthetic Aperture Radar 

The NASA Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) – Synthetic 

Aperture Radar (NISAR) is a joint project between NASA and ISRO that 

will study the solid Earth, ice masses, and ecosystems. It aims to address 

questions related to global environmental change, Earth’s carbon cycle, 

and natural hazards, such as earthquakes and volcanoes. The project will 

include the first dual frequency synthetic aperture radar instrument, which will 

use advanced radar imaging to construct large-scale data sets of the Earth’s 

movements. NISAR represents the first major aerospace science partnership 

between NASA and ISRO.

common name: NISAR

Source: © California Institute of Technology/Jet Propulsion Laboratory. | GAO-18-280SP
74 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The NISAR project continues to operate within its schedule 

baseline, but is not meeting the cost baseline established 

at its confirmation review in August 2016. The project 

experienced $30 million in cost growth as the result of an 

increase in the scope of data collection in response to 

additional data needs being identified by an interagency 

working group. The additional data include soil moisture 

and natural hazard data that would be of value for other 

federal agencies and the science community. Also, about 2 

months after confirmation, the project learned that its radar 

reflector contractor entered into two commercial contracts, 

which could put a strain on the contractor’s workforce and 

increased cost and schedule risk to the project. To avoid 

schedule conflicts with the contractor’s new contracts, 

NASA increased the project’s near-term funding in May 

2017 so that the project could accelerate development of 

the radar reflector. NISAR is progressing toward its critical 

design review in October 2018 and is currently holding cost 

and schedule reserves consistent with the level required by 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory policy.

Design

The NISAR project made design changes to the radar 

reflector boom assembly—used to deploy the radar 

reflector when the spacecraft reaches orbit—to address 

risks that could prevent the boom from latching in place. 

Specifically, the project modified how the boom is deployed, 

including using spring dampers to deploy the boom 

instead of a cable-driven system and non-explosive launch 

restraints to reduce shock levels. Project officials said the 

boom redesign has single point failures, but the probability 

of failure is lower compared to the previous design. 

The NISAR project continues to track the system’s mass 

as a significant risk. Maintaining adequate mass margins 

is a key indicator of design stability. Project officials stated 

that they continue to improve their knowledge of mass 

through the use of engineering models and more matured 

design, and sometimes this has led to an increase in mass. 

For example, the project used computer aided design to 

determine the length of cabling needed and found this 

increased its mass estimate over prior estimates. In July 

2017, the project instituted a mass control plan, which 

project officials said would require all increases in mass 

to be reported and determinations be made regarding the 

necessity of the change. 

Developmental Partner

The NISAR project continues to track a risk that process 

differences between NASA and its development partner, 

the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), could 

negatively affect cost and schedule, but a recent project 

assessment concluded that collaboration between the 

two organizations has been effective. For example, in 

July 2017, the project signed an updated cooperative 

project plan that outlines how the two organizations should 

interface on topics such as requirements and technical 

information. 

The project is also tracking a risk related to the ISROprovided launch vehicle—the Geosynchronous Satellite 

Launch Vehicle (GSLV) Mark II—which must meet all 

NASA-ISRO agreed-upon criteria before it can be used. 

For example, the GSLV Mark II must have three successful 

launches and one successful 4-meter fairing launch prior 

to NISAR’s planned launch date in 2021. As of January 

2018, ISRO had four consecutive successful GSLV Mark II 

launches, but had not yet planned a 4-meter fairing launch.

common name: NISAR

NASA ISRO – SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

NISAR project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. 
75

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

09/15

Project

confirmation

10/15

Critical

design

review

08/14

Preliminary

design

review

12/14

Exploration

flight

test

02/10

Orion

canceled under

Constellation

program

07/06

Formulation

start under

Constellation

program

02/12

Formulation

start

04/23

First crewed

 flight committed

launch readiness

date

12/19-06/20

First uncrewed 

flight replanned

launch readiness

date

$4,515.1

$6,768.4

$4,666.8

$6,616.7

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

JUNE 2017

Operations

Development

Formulation

$11,283.5

Under revision

$3,757.7

$11,283.5

70.2%

29.8%

Orion

Other

major 

projects

04/23

EM-2

LAUNCH

DATE

04/23

EM-2

LAUNCH

DATE

02/12 02/12

0 MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The Orion program continues to operate within its schedule baseline but NASA

expects the program to exceed its cost baseline through Exploration Mission-2 

(EM-2) due to new hardware and the program addressing development 

challenges. The extent of cost growth is unknown, but NASA plans to complete 

a new cost estimate by June 2018. For example, according to NASA, the cost 

increases have been driven in part by moving from a single-piece, or monolithic, 

heatshield design to one that employs blocks in order to improve its structural 

strength. The program’s service module—contributed by the European Space 

Agency—is currently driving the program schedule as well as the launch 

schedule for the first mission. The module has proven more difficult to produce 

than expected and has been delayed numerous times. The service module is at 

risk of further delays that may affect NASA’s planned launch date for EM-1, which 

would begin to consume schedule reserve for EM-2. In addition, the program is 

addressing some parts material failures. Specifically, the spacecraft’s avionics 

cards did not withstand vibration testing and required a materials change.

NASA Lead Center: Johnson Space Center

International Partner: European Space 

Agency

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, 

FL

Launch Vehicle: Space Launch System

Mission Duration: Up to 21 day active 

mission duration capability with four 

crew

Requirement Derived from: NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010

Budget Portfolio: Exploration, Exploration 

Systems Development

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle 

The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) is being developed to 

transport and support astronauts beyond low-Earth orbit, including traveling 

to Mars or an asteroid. The Orion program is continuing to advance 

development of the human safety features, designs, and systems started 

under the Constellation program, which was canceled in 2010. Orion is planned 

to launch atop NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS). The current design of 

Orion consists of a crew module, service module, and launch abort system.

common name: ORION

Source: © 2017 Lockheed Martin Corporation. | GAO-18-280SP

 aIncludes funding through Exploration Mission-2.

a
76 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The Orion program continues to operate within its schedule 

baseline but NASA expects the program to exceed its cost 

baseline through EM-2, and is at risk for future schedule 

delays. The project’s life-cycle cost estimate is expected 

to increase beyond its $11.28 billion baseline—due in part 

to the EM-1 schedule delay—when a planned, new cost 

estimate for the program is complete in June 2018. According 

to preliminary analysis, major drivers of the potential 

cost increase also include new hardware and addressing 

development challenges. For example, there was a cost 

impact when the program moved from a single-piece, or 

monolithic, heatshield design to one that employs blocks in 

order to improve its structural strength. 

In December 2017, NASA announced December 2019 as 

the new internal launch readiness date for EM-1 and that the 

agency also allocated 6 months of schedule reserve to June 

2020 for possible manufacturing and production schedule 

risks. While the Orion program did not have a committed 

launch date for EM-1, the recent delay has reduced the 

amount of time available to the program between EM-1 and 

its committed EM-2 launch date of April 2023. In addition, 

the delay means that the program will continue to consume 

resources for EM-1 that would have otherwise been available 

for development on EM-2, thus increasing pressure on the 

EM-2 cost and schedule. If NASA delays EM-1 beyond 

December 2019—which is likely given both Orion and the 

Space Launch System have no schedule margin to meet 

their deliveries for this date—the schedule reserve for Orion’s 

committed EM-2 launch date of April 2023 would continue to 

erode and put the program at risk for future schedule delays. 

Developmental Partner 

The late completion and delivery of the European Service 

Module (ESM)—a European Space Agency contribution via 

agreement with NASA—is driving the program’s schedule 

and may further delay EM-1. The European Space Agency 

has delayed delivery of the service module 14 months since 

the element’s critical design review in June 2016. The ESM 

currently has no schedule reserve to support the December 

2019 launch schedule, meaning that any additional delays 

will compress or delay integration activities prior to launch. 

Further, NASA is tracking a risk that the ESM could be 

delayed beyond the current estimated delivery date of June 

2018. Such a delay would likely delay the EM-1 launch date 

beyond December 2019.

Program officials stated that recent ESM delays are due 

in part to late component deliveries from subcontractors, 

especially valves. However, they also noted at least one of 

those valves is currently not meeting specifications, indicating 

that the design was not sufficiently mature prior to production. 

The valve, a heritage design from the Space Shuttle 

program that maintains pressure in the propulsion system, 

is not sealing properly due to the increased pressures 

necessary on the ESM. The program has previously stated 

that all sides believed that the development of the ESM 

would be easier than it has proven to be, being based on 

a prior European Space Agency spacecraft. However, the 

changes have been more substantial than expected and 

the production of the first flight unit has faced setbacks. The 

program stated that they expect the production of the flight 

unit for the second flight to be quicker, though it will require 

some additional elements to support crew. 

Technology and Design

Avionics design has recently become an issue for the Orion 

program and is currently 2 months behind the ESM in terms 

of driving the program’s schedule. The avionics cards, 

along with many other onboard systems, have to withstand 

the vibration and radiation environment on Orion. The 

program found that the circuits on the avionics cards were 

cracking under operating conditions due to a poor design. 

As a result, officials stated that the program determined the 

root cause of the failure and redesigned the cards’ base 

material to better withstand the environment. The program 

worked to reorganize the integration and test schedule to 

allow for the replacement of the cards. 

common name: ORION

ORION MULTI-PURPOSE CREW VEHICLE

PROGRAM OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Orion 

program officials stated that they believe the riskinformed approach that they use to address and 

resolve issues has proven to be successful. Also, 

program officials stated the program remains on track 

to meet its April 2023 baseline for EM-2. Program 

officials also provided technical comments, which 

were incorporated as appropriate.
77

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

03/14

Project

confirmation

03/15

Critical

design

review

01/14

Preliminary

design

review

11/11

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

05/16

System

integration

review

12/09

Formulation

start

08/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$247.1

$1,055.7

$247.1

$1,050.3

$250.6 $250.8

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

-0.3%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$1,553.4 $1,548.2

$523.4

$1,548.2

97.2%

2.8%

PSP

Other

major 

projects

08/18

LAUNCH

DATE

12/09

08/18

LAUNCH

DATE

12/09

0 MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The PSP project continues to target an August 2018 planetary launch, but the 

project is encountering a number of technical issues that may lead to a schedule 

delay or result in the project launching with fewer capabilities than originally 

planned. The project will need to resolve the following three issues by spring 

2018 to maintain the launch window. First, the Solar Probe Cup, which is one 

component of an instrument package necessary to meet top-level mission 

requirements, has encountered several technical issues during development. 

Some of these issues may require the project to descope this instrument. 

Second, the project is completing qualification testing of the separation system 

after several separation bolts in the launch vehicle interface failed during a test. 

Lastly, the project has identified contamination stemming from an alloy used 

in three locations on two instruments. In one of the locations, the project must 

determine if it can limit the contamination. If it cannot, the project will need to 

delay its launch in order to replace the affected part. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station, FL

Launch Vehicle: Delta IV-heavy class with 

NASA-provided upper stage

Mission Duration: 7 years

Requirement Derived from: 2012 

Heliophysics Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Heliophysics

Parker Solar Probe 

PSP will be the first NASA mission to visit a star. Using the gravity of Venus, 

the spacecraft will orbit the Sun 24 times and gather information to increase 

knowledge about the solar wind, including its origin, acceleration, and how 

it is heated. PSP instruments will observe the generation and flow of solar 

winds from very close range and sample and take measurements of the Sun’s 

outer atmosphere, where solar particles are energized. To achieve its mission, 

parts of the spacecraft must be able to withstand temperatures exceeding 2,500 

degrees Fahrenheit and endure blasts of extreme radiation. The project was 

formerly named Solar Probe Plus, or SPP, and was renamed in May 2017. 

common name: PSP

Source: Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Lab. | GAO-18-280SP
78 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The PSP project continues to target an August 2018 

planetary launch, but the project is encountering a 

number of technical issues that may lead to a schedule 

delay. Maintaining the project’s 2018 launch window is 

important because a potential window only opens every 

10 months. The 2019 launch window would result in a 

longer mission duration and require more fuel, and after 

that, the next window that meets requirements is 2023. 

The project continues to hold schedule reserves at Applied 

Physics Laboratory-recommended levels, but the project 

is tracking a risk that there may not be adequate reserves 

to address any future issues that may arise. The project is 

also tracking a risk that it may exhaust its cost reserves in 

fiscal year 2018 addressing instrument issues and retaining 

project staff, which could lead to the need for additional 

headquarters-held cost reserves. 

Launch

In September 2017, while testing the interface between 

the launch vehicle and the spacecraft, three of the six 

separation nuts failed to release their bolts. If this occurred 

during launch, it would result in a total mission failure. 

NASA’s Launch Services Program, which obtained launch 

services for PSP, initiated an anomaly investigation. This 

investigation determined that the bolts were improperly 

installed. The investigation board identified corrective 

actions, which have passed initial tests. The separation 

system plan includes completing qualification testing by 

April 2018 and includes schedule margin. However, if 

additional issues are identified, the project could potentially 

miss the 2018 launch window. 

Integration and Test 

The Solar Probe Cup (SPC), which is part of an instrument 

package necessary to meet top-level mission requirements 

to gather information about particles in the solar wind, has 

encountered several technical issues during integration 

and testing. For example, recent testing has identified 

scenarios where the spacecraft’s different operating 

temperature environments could result in twisting between 

the SPC and spacecraft, which could lead to cracks over 

time. To mitigate this risk, the project is conducting testing 

to determine the scope of this issue. If twisting could occur 

repeatedly throughout the mission, the project will consider 

de-scoping the SPC, which would require approval from 

NASA. The project plans to make a decision in March 2018 

about whether to fly the SPC. 

Other Issues to Be Monitored

The project is tracking a risk that an alloy used in several 

locations on the spacecraft will release gases when 

exposed to the high temperatures found where the 

spacecraft is intended to operate. The released gases can 

later re-solidify and contaminate the spacecraft. The alloy is 

found in three locations, supporting two instrument suites, 

on the spacecraft—the four FIELDS whip antennas, their 

respective thermal shields, and the SPC thermal shield—

which are required to meet top-level mission requirements. 

Testing to understand the alloy’s performance revealed 

that the alloy released gases even at temperatures much 

cooler than where the spacecraft will operate. The project 

is pursuing two mitigations. First, it is conducting tests to 

develop a contamination model, which should indicate 

the effects, if any, the re-solidified gases have on the 

spacecraft and help project officials determine if it is safe 

to fly the spacecraft with the existing alloy. Second, officials 

told us that they have ordered new material which could 

be used to replace the four FIELDS whip antennas and the 

SPC thermal shield. The project plans to make a decision 

if they will replace existing parts with the new material by 

February 2018. The project cannot replace the FIELDS 

thermal shields, so they have designed and implemented 

an additional shield, which will undergo testing in March 

2018.

common name: PSP

PARKER SOLAR PROBE

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

PSP project officials provided technical comments on 

a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated 

as appropriate.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

79

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

06/19

Project

confirmation

01/20

Critical

design

review

03/19

Preliminary

design

review

01/17

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

05/21

System

integration

review

06/16

Formulation

start

08/22

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$98.1

100%

0.0%

PACE

Other

major 

projects

$805 – $850

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

AUGUST 2022 – 

APRIL 2023

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

06/16

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

The PACE project entered the preliminary design and technology completion 

phase in July 2017, but is facing funding uncertainty. The fiscal year 2018 

President’s Budget Request did not include funding for PACE. In order to meet 

scientific requirements and stay within NASA’s established $805 million cost cap, 

the PACE project modified capabilities and made system trades. The project used 

a design-to-cost process, which requires the project to determine what baseline 

capabilities are achievable within cost limitations. The PACE mission cost cap 

continues to create risk around the project’s launch vehicle selection, but officials 

are mitigating this risk by exploring alternative launch options, such as a ride 

share agreement with the Air Force. Project officials said they expect NASA to 

select a launch vehicle before project confirmation, currently planned for June 

2019.

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: TBD

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 3 years

Requirement Derived from: 2007 Earth 

Science Decadal Survey 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem 

The Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) is a polar-orbiting 

mission that will use advanced global remote sensing instruments to 

improve scientists’ understanding of ocean biology, biogeochemistry, ecology, 

aerosols, and cloud properties. PACE will extend climate-related observations 

begun under earlier NASA missions, which will enable researchers to study 

long-term trends on Earth’s oceans and atmosphere, and ocean-atmosphere 

interactions. PACE will also enable assessments of air and coastal water quality, 

such as the locations of harmful algae blooms.

common name: PACE

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP (Note: Ocean Color Instrument pictured above.)
80 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

In July 2017, NASA approved the PACE project to enter 

the preliminary design and technology completion phase, 

but with funding uncertainty. NASA did not request 

funding for PACE in its fiscal year 2018 budget request—

an action attributed to budget constraints and higher 

science mission priorities. NASA also did not request 

funding for PACE in its fiscal year 2019 budget request. 

Despite proposed cancellation, the project is working 

toward preliminary design review scheduled for March 

2019 and is continuing to use the design-to-cost process 

that requires the project to determine a baseline set of 

capabilities that are achievable within the project’s $805 

million mission cost cap at the 65 percent confidence level. 

This includes the $705 million allocated to the project and 

$100 million allocated to NASA headquarters for sciencerelated activities, such as the calibration and validation 

of instrument data and processing of science data. The 

project is holding cost and schedule reserves consistent 

with NASA center policy.

Technology and Design

The PACE project modified capabilities and made system 

trades to meet scientific requirements within NASA’s 

established $805 million cost cap. As part of the designto-cost process, the project added capability to its primary 

instrument—the Ocean Color Instrument (OCI)—including 

extending performance to a new ultraviolet range and 

adding components for daily calibration. Additionally, the 

project originally sought an agreement with the Indian 

Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for a contributed 

polarimeter because the cost of procuring the instrument 

was higher than the amount allocated under the project’s 

cost cap. However, according to officials, ISRO’s inability 

to meet schedule needs and the uncertainty surrounding 

the future of the project led ISRO to withdraw its concept of 

a contributed polarimeter. The project is now pursuing two 

smaller contributed instruments that have mature designs 

from the University of Maryland-Baltimore County and 

the Netherlands Space Office—the Dutch space agency. 

According to officials, the project would use these smaller 

instruments in place of the larger ISRO polarimeter. While 

the ISRO polarimeter was a more capable instrument, 

the two polarimeters are expected to provide substantive 

scientific information for the cloud and atmospheric science 

community. The project will continue to make capability 

trades as part of the design-to-cost approach until project 

confirmation.

The PACE project made a design decision to tilt the OCI 

on a platform as opposed to tilting the entire spacecraft in 

order to meet a requirement that the OCI must tilt during 

some points of operation to avoid sun glint, or reflection 

of the sun off the ocean that causes a loss in data. The 

project came to this decision through a trade study, which, 

according to officials, demonstrated that tilting the entire 

spacecraft would take longer than tilting just the platform, 

lessening the amount of time the project has to collect 

data. However, the project is now tracking a risk that the 

inertia created by the OCI platform could interfere with data 

collection, which the project plans to mitigate by optimizing 

the placement and alignment of the OCI on its platform. 

Launch 

The PACE project is pursuing a shared ride agreement 

with the Air Force, which could help to mitigate a launch 

vehicle risk that the project is tracking. The launch vehicle 

cost remains the project’s top risk, which could cause the 

project to exceed the $705 million allocated to the project 

or have to reduce its science capabilities. According to 

officials, a shared ride option would allow PACE to be the 

primary mission with a secondary Air Force payload at 

launch, which would reduce the project’s launch vehicle 

costs and free up funding for other areas. The project has a 

launch vehicle budget of $105 million, and under a potential 

shared ride agreement, the project would be required 

to cover only a portion of the total vehicle costs. Project 

officials said they expect NASA to select a launch vehicle 

before project confirmation, currently planned for June 

2019.

common name: PACE

PLANKTON, AEROSOL, CLOUD, OCEAN ECOSYSTEM 

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

PACE project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. 
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

81

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

05/19

Project

confirmation

04/20

Critical

design

review

03/19

Preliminary

design

review

04/18

Project

mission

system

review 

12/20

System

integration

review

12/16

Project

selection

08/22

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$50.3

95.6%

4.4%

Psyche

Other

major 

projects

$907.3 – $957.3

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

12/16

AUGUST

2022

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

In December 2016, Psyche was one of two projects selected by the Discovery 

program—a series of competed missions that have focused scientific 

investigations and short development periods—to proceed to the preliminary 

design and technology completion phase. NASA selected the project’s 2023 

launch proposal, but later directed the project to work to an accelerated launch 

readiness date of August 2022. The accelerated launch date will allow Psyche 

to arrive at the asteroid over 4 years earlier than the original timeline due to a 

quicker flight. According to project officials, the Psyche project’s current design 

utilizes mature, heritage technologies with some modifications. The project plans 

to fly three instruments that have flown on prior planetary missions and buy a 

commercially available spacecraft design. The project also plans to fly the Deep 

Space Optical Communications technology demonstration (DSOC), which is a 

laser-based communication device that could be beneficial to future deep space 

missions requiring high data rates, but it is not needed to meet Psyche’s science 

requirements. As a result, Psyche could launch without DSOC if it experiences 

delays.

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station, FL

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 21 months science 

operation

Requirement Derived from: Discovery 

Program Announcement of Opportunity 

2014 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Planetary 

Science

Psyche 

Psyche will be the first mission to visit a metal asteroid and aims to 

understand a previously unexplored component of the early building blocks 

of planets: iron cores. The project plans to orbit the Psyche asteroid to 

determine if it is a planetary core, characterize its topography, assess the 

elemental composition and determine the relative ages of its surface regions. 

common name: PSYCHE

Source: NASA/JPL-Caltech/Arizona State Univ./Space Systems Loral/Peter Rubin. | GAO-18-280SP
82

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

In December 2016, Psyche was one of two projects 

selected by the Discovery program—a series of competed 

missions that have focused scientific investigations and 

short development periods—to proceed to the preliminary 

design and technology completion phase. NASA selected 

the project’s 2023 launch proposal, but later directed 

the project to work to an accelerated launch readiness 

date of August 2022. The accelerated launch will allow 

Psyche to arrive at the asteroid over 4 years earlier than 

the original timeline due to a quicker flight path. At the 

most recent decision point, the project set a preliminary 

cost range of $907.3 million to $957.3 million. The project 

plans to hold its preliminary design review in March 2019 

and its confirmation review in May 2019, at which point it 

will formally establish its cost and schedule baseline. The 

project is currently holding cost and schedule reserves 

consistent with the level required by Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory policy.

Technology and Design 

The Psyche project reported that its current design 

does not use any critical technologies and is based 

heavily on heritage technologies with modifications, 

which project officials assess as all being matured to at 

least technology readiness level 6. We have previously 

asserted that mature technologies must be demonstrated 

in a relevant environment and should be very close to 

form, fit, and function. The Psyche project reports that its 

heritage technologies are mature, but the project plans 

to modify some technologies. For example, the project 

plans to modify the Gamma Ray Neutron Spectrometer 

instrument—previously used on a mission to Mercury 

and will be used to determine Psyche’s elemental 

composition—by adding a new cooling system, which the 

project is tracking as a risk because of possible problems 

accommodating the new cooling system. Project officials 

stated the spacecraft bus design—reported mature by the 

project—is based on a commercially available design that 

is used for Earth-orbiting communication satellites. The 

project plans to make minor modifications to some of the 

spacecraft bus to enable it to operate more robustly in deep 

space. 

The project also plans to fly the Deep Space Optical 

Communications technology demonstration (DSOC), 

which is a laser-based communication device that could 

be beneficial to future deep space missions requiring 

high data rates. NASA is developing and funding DSOC 

as a separate project in the Space Technology Mission 

Directorate. As a result, the Psyche project does not control 

the cost or schedule for DSOC. The Psyche and DSOC 

projects have been working closely together to align their 

schedules, such as by establishing regular team meetings 

and developing a memorandum of understanding to ensure 

consistent expectations between both projects. If DSOC 

experiences delays, project officials stated that there is an 

option that Psyche could launch without it because DSOC 

is not needed to meet Psyche’s science requirements. 

Other Issues to be Monitored

In September 2017, the project reported a risk that it may 

have to conduct integration and testing off-site because 

it is planning to share a clean room with the Europa 

Clipper project, which has stricter planetary protection 

and contamination control requirements. These stricter 

requirements have a cost impact and the project is 

researching options to partition the clean room without 

jeopardizing the Europa Clipper project’s requirements. The 

project is also researching options to conduct integration 

and testing off-site, such as using the contractor’s facilities.

common name: PSYCHE

PSYCHE

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

Psyche project officals provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. 
83

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

07/16

Project

confirmation

09/17

Critical

design

review

05/16

Preliminary

design

review

12/14

System

requirements

review

07/14

Formulation

start

01/18

Project

cancellation

$102.8

$202.0

$102.8

$202.0

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

JAN. 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$304.8 $304.8

$109.5

$304.8

100%

0.0%

RBI

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

JAN. 2018

12/19

LAUNCH

DATE

07/14

12/19

LAUNCH

DATE

07/14

0 MONTHS

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

According to NASA’s cancellation memorandum, NASA canceled the RBI 

project because of continued cost growth, technical issues, and poor contractor 

performance. The RBI project continued to experience contract cost growth, 

and as of November 2017, contract costs for design, fabrication, and delivery 

of RBI had grown by about 110 percent from the original value for this work, or 

an increase of $115 million. This increase depleted all remaining project-held 

cost reserves as the project entered the riskiest point of the development cycle. 

Ultimately, NASA determined that continuing to fund RBI from within the Earth 

Science Division budget would slow other important activities.

NASA Lead Center: Langley Research 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Not applicable

Launch Vehicle: Not applicable; instrument 

hosted on JPSS-2 spacecraft

Mission Duration: 7 years

Requirement Derived from: NASA Strategic 

Plan

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

 Radiation Budget Instrument 

The Radiation Budget Instrument (RBI) is a scanning radiometer that NASA

planned to launch on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 

(NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System 2 (JPSS-2). RBI’s planned mission 

was to support global climate monitoring by continuing measurements of the 

Earth’s reflected sunlight and emitted thermal radiation made by NASA and 

NOAA satellites over the past 30 years. This data was intended to represent 

one of two key sets of measurements needed to determine whether the Earth is 

warming or cooling.

common name: RBI

Source: Harris Corporation. | GAO-18-280SP
84

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Project Status

According to NASA’s cancellation memorandum, the RBI 

project was canceled because of continued cost growth, 

technical issues, and poor contractor performance. 

The project identified the following specific issues that 

contributed to poor project cost and schedule performance: 

schedule planning that did not realistically account for 

contractor past performance, insufficient oversight of the 

contractor and its subcontractors, and poor integration of 

government and contractor teams with limited transparency 

concerning risks and issues. In 2017, both the government 

and the contractor took steps to respond to poor project 

performance, including changes to both the government 

and contractor program management teams, but ultimately 

NASA determined that continuing to fund RBI from within 

the Earth Science Division budget would slow other 

important activities. Based on the historical performance of 

other instruments and assessments of the likely remaining 

lifetime of on-orbit satellites, NASA believes the risk of 

a data gap is low if the next radiation budget-measuring 

instrument launches in 2027.

Cost and Schedule Status

The RBI project continued to experience contract cost 

growth, and was likely to exceed its cost baseline. As of 

November 2017, contract costs for design, fabrication, and 

delivery of RBI had grown by about 110 percent from the 

original value for this work, or an increase of $115 million. 

This cost increase depleted all remaining project-held 

cost reserves as the project entered the riskiest point of 

the development cycle—the integration and test phase. In 

2016 and 2017, we found that projects appear most likely 

to rebaseline during this period.a

 In November 2017, the 

project requested additional reserves to cover increased 

contractor costs. If NASA would have approved the 

increase, it would have brought the project’s costs to within 

approximately $2 million of its established cost baseline, 

which officials said was likely to be exceeded.

To support the decision of whether or not to continue the 

project, the project updated its joint cost and schedule 

confidence level, which is the likelihood that a project will 

meet its cost and schedule baseline. The update indicated 

that the project had a 30 percent chance of meeting the 

original delivery date of April 2019. As a result, the project 

updated the delivery date with NOAA to July 2019. The 

confidence level update showed that RBI had a 70 percent 

chance of meeting the later delivery date, but it would likely 

require additional funding in excess of the project’s cost 

baseline if other technical issues arose. 

Technology and Design 

The RBI project held its critical design review in September 

2017 with 100 percent of its design drawings released. 

Best practices show that releasing 90 percent of design 

drawings by critical design review lowers the risk of 

subsequent cost and schedule growth. The review, 

previously scheduled for June 2017, was delayed to 

provide more time to resolve technical issues and to 

have additional test results available to inform the review 

board on the project’s readiness to proceed. More 

specifically, the project conducted testing on an engineering 

development unit as a risk reduction measure and identified 

technical issues with the telescope and various electronic 

components that needed to be addressed prior to the 

review. 

common name: RBI

RADIATION BUDGET INSTRUMENT

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, RBI 

project officials stated that RBI was not included 

in the President’s fiscal year 2018 budget request 

and continuing to fund RBI from within the Earth 

Science Division budget would slow other important 

activities. Project officials stated that multiple efforts 

by the RBI government and contractor team to 

improve performance were yielding positive results, 

including the resolution of technical issues leading 

to a successful critical design review. Officials also 

said improved cost and schedule controls were also 

proving to be effective. Project officials also provided 

technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. aGAO-16-309SP and GAO-17-303SP.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

85

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

04/18

Project

confirmation

01/19

Critical

design

review

11/17

Preliminary

design

review

10/16

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

04/20

System

integration

review

05/16

Formulation

start

12/21

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$260.0

100%

0.0%

Restore-L

Other

major 

projects

$626.0 – $753.0

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes.

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

05/16

JUNE 2020 –

DEC 2020

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

The Restore-L project is no longer working to the preliminary cost and schedule 

estimates that NASA approved when it entered the preliminary design phase 

because the Space Technology Mission Directorate’s proposed budget does not 

allow the project to execute to that plan. The mission directorate asked the project 

to evaluate two scenarios based on future funding possibilities. The project is to 

present a plan based on these scenarios to the mission directorate prior to the 

project establishing its cost and schedule baselines at its confirmation review in 

April 2018. The project reported that it does not use any new, critical technologies 

and that all six heritage technologies are modified from prior projects to fit the 

Restore-L design. The project matured five of these six technologies to the level 

recommended by best practices at its November 2017 preliminary design review. 

The technology that was not mature was a replacement for the prior vision 

navigation system, which did not meet requirements and the vendor was unable 

to resolve the issue. Project officials stated that they have a plan in place to 

mature the new system by December 2018. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 12 months

Requirement Derived from: Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016 

Budget Portfolio: Space Technology, 

Research and Development

Restore-L 

The Restore-L project will demonstrate the capability to refuel on-orbit 

satellites for eventual use by commercial entities. Specifically, Restore-L 

plans to autonomously rendezvous with, inspect, capture, refuel, adjust the 

orbit of, safely release, and depart from the U.S. Geological Survey’s Landsat 

7 satellite. Landsat 7 can extend operations if successfully refueled, but it is 

planned for retirement if the technology demonstration is unsuccessful.

common name: RESTORE-L 

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
86 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

The Restore-L project is no longer working to the 

preliminary cost and schedule estimates that NASA 

approved when it entered the preliminary design phase 

because the Space Technology Mission Directorate’s 

proposed budget does not allow the project to execute 

to that plan. In April 2017, NASA set a preliminary cost 

estimate range of $626 million to $753 million with a 

projected launch readiness date between June and 

December 2020. However, the funding profile the Space 

Technology Mission Directorate proposed for future years 

will not allow the project to maintain a launch in 2020. As a 

result, the mission directorate asked the project to evaluate 

two scenarios based on future funding possibilities. 

According to NASA officials, one scenario assumes 

$130 million in project funding per fiscal year through the 

updated preliminary launch date for on-orbit demonstration. 

The other assumes $130 million for fiscal year 2018 

followed by about $45 million for each of the fiscal years 

2019 through 2024—focusing on technology development 

for industry use. The project is to present a plan based on 

these scenarios to the mission directorate prior to project 

confirmation review—the point at which the project will 

formally establish its cost and schedule baselines. The 

project has delayed its confirmation review from September 

2017 to April 2018, in part to allow for more time to evaluate 

the scenarios. As of December 2017, the project’s notional 

schedule is for a launch readiness date in December 2021, 

1 year later than planned when the project entered the 

preliminary design phase. This notional schedule is based 

on various funding scenarios the project could face, and 

provides additional schedule reserve. 

Technology and Design 

The Restore-L project matured five of its six technologies to 

the level recommended by best practices at its preliminary 

design review in November 2017. Best practices 

recommend maturing technologies to a technology 

readiness level 6 by the project’s preliminary design review 

to help minimize risks for space systems entering product 

development. The technology that was not mature at the 

review was a replacement vision navigation system that 

is new to the project. The prior vision navigation system 

did not meet requirements and the vendor was unable 

to resolve the issue. The project’s independent review 

board stated that Restore-L needed a comprehensive 

plan to mature the technology at the review and project 

officials said they have a plan in place to mature the new 

system to a technology readiness level 6 by December 

2018. The project reported that it does not use any new, 

critical technologies and that all 6 heritage technologies 

are modified from prior projects to fit the Restore-L 

design. Project officials said that although Restore-L 

uses all heritage technologies, the technologies will be 

used together in a new way to complete the mission’s 

requirements. 

The robot system is driving the project’s schedule and 

the project has had to redesign system components, 

which consumed schedule reserve and put pressure on 

the project’s preliminary launch schedule of December 

2020. The robot system, which includes the spacecraft’s 

robotic arm and associated components, will be used to 

capture the Landsat 7 spacecraft and will then employ 

tools to access the Landsat 7’s propellant system, transfer 

propellant, and seal the system prior to releasing the 

spacecraft. The resolver pre-amp assembly—a component 

used to amplify signals to the robotic arm—is undergoing 

redesign to address signal distortion concerns. Another 

element, the robotic electronics units used to control the 

arm, is being redesigned to simplify and reduce the number 

of components in order to reduce schedule risk during 

integration and test. This redesign consumed schedule 

reserve before the project began working to a December 

2021 notional schedule. 

Other Issues to be Monitored

The project’s current notional schedule would delay 

Restore-L’s launch outside the servicing window for 

Landsat 7. Specifically, the agreed upon servicing window 

is January through September 2021, which the notional 

project launch schedule in December 2021 does not 

meet. However, that window may be extended if NASA 

reimburses the U.S. Geological Survey for additional costs 

to continue Landsat 7 operations.

common name: RESTORE-L 

RESTORE-L

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

Restore-L project officials provided technical 

comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
87

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

08/14

Project

confirmation

07/15

Critical

design

review

07/13

Preliminary

design

review

05/12

Mission/

system design 

review

11/11

Formulation

start

12/19-06/20

Replanned

launch

readiness

date

11/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

$2,674.0

$7,021.4

$2,674.0

$7,169.2a

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

1.5%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$9,695.4 $9,843.2a

$1,272.1

$9,843.2

95.3%

4.7%

SLS

Other

major 

projects

11/18

LAUNCH

DATE

11/11

06/20

LAUNCH

DATE

11/11

19

MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2014

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

In December 2017, NASA announced a new schedule and cost estimate for 

the SLS program, after determining that the November 2018 launch readiness 

date for Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) was no longer feasible. NASA is now 

planning to an internal launch readiness date of December 2019, with 6 months 

of schedule reserve to a June 2020 date. The life-cycle cost estimate for SLS 

is approximately $9.7 billion to the December 2019 date and $9.8 billion to the 

June 2020 date. The delivery schedule for the program’s core stage—which 

functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural backbone—has continued 

to slip as the program addresses a series of technical challenges, including 

the completion of welding its large, first stage. The program currently has no 

schedule reserve to ship the core stage for testing, as well as from the test 

site to the launch site, in order to meet the December 2019 launch readiness 

date. Should problems or issues arise during testing, they will likely affect the 

enterprise integration and test schedule.

NASA Lead Center: Marshall Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Kennedy Space Center, 

FL

Launch Vehicle: N/A

Mission Duration: Varied based on 

destination

Requirement Derived from: NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010

Budget Portfolio: Exploration, Exploration 

Systems Development

Space Launch System 

The Space Launch System (SLS) is intended to be NASA’s first humanrated heavy-lift launch vehicle since the Saturn V was developed for the 

Apollo program. SLS is planned to launch NASA’s Orion spacecraft and 

other systems on missions between the Earth and Moon and to enable deepspace missions, including Mars. NASA is designing SLS to provide an initial 

lift capacity of 70 metric tons to low-Earth orbit, and be evolvable to 130 metric 

tons, enabling deep space missions. The 70-metric-ton capability will include a 

core stage, powered by four RS-25 engines, and two five-segment boosters. The 

130-metric-ton capability will use a new upper stage and evolved boosters.

common name: SLS

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP

a

Assumes June 2020 launch date.
88 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

In December 2017, NASA announced a new schedule and 

cost estimate for the SLS program, after determining that 

the November 2018 launch readiness date for Exploration 

Mission-1 (EM-1) was no longer feasible. In April 2017, we 

found that the date was likely unachievable for all three human 

spaceflight programs—Exploration Ground Systems, SLS, 

and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle—due to technical 

challenges continuing to cause schedule delays and the 

programs having little to no schedule reserve to the EM-1 date, 

meaning they would have to complete all remaining work with 

little margin for error for unexpected challenges that could 

arise.b The new internal launch readiness date for EM-1 is now 

December 2019, but NASA has also allocated 6 months of 

schedule reserve to June 2020 for possible manufacturing and 

production schedule risks. This represents a delay of 13-19 

months for EM-1. The life-cycle cost estimate for SLS is about 

$9.7 billion to the December 2019 date and $9.8 billion to 

the June 2020 date, or 0.4 to 1.5 percent above the project’s 

committed baseline. 

Technology, Design, and Manufacturing 

The delivery schedule for the program’s core stage—which 

functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural backbone—has 

slipped 14 months in the last year to May 2019, due in large 

part to production issues that have delayed completion of the 

core stage element. According to program officials, the liquid 

hydrogen tank has proven difficult to weld to specifications 

because it is thicker than metals that have been used by 

industry in the past. Without a history of similar efforts to 

compare to, officials explained that they have to check and 

test every potential anomaly with increased scrutiny than if 

they were producing something already used throughout the 

aerospace industry. In addition, according to officials, because 

this is the first flight article, the contractors are performing 

extensive testing to ensure that their production processes 

and methods are resulting in end items that meet or exceed 

specifications so that the next unit can be produced more 

quickly. 

In addition to these issues, the program has faced work 

slowdowns and stoppages due to severe weather. In February 

2017, a tornado hit parts of the Michoud Assembly Facility in 

Louisiana, where the core stage is being produced. While work 

resumed shortly after the storm, according to program officials, 

it did so at less than full capacity and delayed the program by 

a total of about 2 months. According to officials, repair work is 

complete in SLS manufacturing areas and should not further 

impact production work at the facility.

Integration and Test 

The program has no schedule reserve through delivery of 

the core stage to Kennedy Space Center for the December 

2019 launch date. In addition to completing production of 

flight and test articles, the program has to integrate the 

engines to the core stage and ship them to Stennis Space 

Center for a green run test. During this test, the core stage 

is fueled and the four main engines fired for about 500 

seconds for the first time. This test will stress the flight 

components as well as the ground equipment used for the 

test. For example, according to program officials, 7 of the 

12 cryogenic fluid pumps at Stennis Space Center must 

work together in order to fuel the vehicle. Should issues 

arise, the program will likely need additional time to assess 

and mitigate difficulties or glitches, which would likely affect 

delivery to Kennedy Space Center and could delay the 

enterprise integration and test schedule.

common name: SLS

SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, SLS 

program officials stated that a vast majority of SLS 

development and production work is on track for 

EM-1 and that work is also proceeding for the first 

crewed flight—EM-2. In addition, officials state that 

the program is successfully working through first-time 

production issues that are not unprecedented for a 

program of this scope and ambition. Program officials 

also provided technical comments, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. bGAO-17-414.
89

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

04/13

Project

confirmation

06/13

Critical

design

review

06/15

Project

rebaseline

09/19

First 

operational 

readiness review

05/18

System

integration

review

09/12

Preliminary

design

review

11/11

Mission/system

definition

review

09/10

Formulation

start

11/20 06/21

Final acceptance

review planning

dates

$125.8

$368.1

$165.4

$789.7

BASELINE

FY 2013

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

93.4%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$493.9 $955.1

$247.3

$955.1

99.2%

0.8%

SGSS

Other

major 

projects

06/17

COMPLETION

DATE

09/10

06/21

COMPLETION

DATE

09/10

48

MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2013

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

In 2017, the SGSS project experienced additional cost growth and schedule 

delays beyond the rebaselined cost and schedule estimate NASA set in 2015. 

Since the 2015 rebaseline, the project’s total costs increased by at least $112.9 

million, from $1,207.9 million to $1,320.8 million even as the scope decreased 

from nine terminals at three Space Network sites to six terminals at one site. 

According to the fiscal year 2019 budget request, NASA plans to conduct an 

independent review in 2018 to inform a decision on whether to continue the 

project. If the project continues, additional cost growth is expected as the latest 

cost estimate covers only through the initial operational readiness review, 

currently planned for September 2019. Project officials attributed the cost growth 

and delays to an incomplete understanding of requirements by the contractor, 

which led to poor contractor plans and late design changes. Contractor 

performance has been a concern for the project, but project officials stated that 

contractor performance improved in fiscal year 2017. The project delivered the 

final software increment in May 2017 and the software is now in integration and 

testing. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: N/A

Launch Vehicle: N/A

Mission Duration: 25 years with periodic, 

required upgrades to hardware and 

software

Requirement Derived from: March 2008 

Space Network modernization concept 

study

Budget Portfolio: Space Operations, Space 

and Flight Support

Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment

The Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) project plans to 

develop and deliver a new ground system for one Space Network site. The 

Space Network provides essential communications and tracking services to 

NASA and non-NASA missions. Existing systems, based on 1980s technology, 

are increasingly obsolete and unsustainable. The new ground system will 

include updated systems, software, and equipment that will allow the Space 

Network to continue to provide critical communications services for the next 

several decades. The Space Network is managed by the Space Communication 

and Navigation (SCaN) program.

common name: SGSS

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP

Note: The SGSS project has received an additional $365.7 million 

from Space Network users outside of NASA.
90 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

In 2017, the SGSS project experienced additional cost 

growth and schedule delays beyond the cost and schedule 

rebaseline NASA set for it in 2015. In 2016, SGSS was 

reclassified as a hybrid sustainment project instead of a major 

project, which means that NASA is no longer measuring the 

project against its cost and schedule baseline, among other 

oversight implications. However, according to officials, the 

project is still required to provide quarterly and annual status 

reports to NASA on their cost and schedule. Since the 2015 

rebaseline, however, the project’s total costs increased by at 

least $112.9 million, from $1,207.9 million to $1,320.8 million, 

even as the scope decreased from upgrading nine terminals 

at three Space Network sites to six terminals at one site. The 

SGSS project presented its new cost and schedule estimate 

to NASA headquarters in August 2017, which NASA approved 

up through the initial operational readiness review, currently 

planned for September 2019.

Additional cost growth is expected for SGSS when NASA 

revisits project costs through future budget cycles. According 

to the fiscal year 2019 budget request, an independent review 

of the project is underway to determine whether the project 

will continue and was initiated due to budget challenges. In 

the event the project continues, officials stated the project 

plans to evaluate various funding scenarios, including 

continuing but receiving less funding than requested. Project 

officials attributed the cost growth and delays to an incomplete 

understanding of requirements by the contractor, which led 

to poor contractor plans and late design changes, but project 

management has been a challenge as well. For example, 

the project has historically struggled to manage contractor 

performance and has faced staffing shortfalls in key areas, 

such as systems engineering and business management. 

However, as of January 2018, NASA officials stated that these 

workforce issues had largely been resolved because some 

positions were filled by reassigning staff to these areas and 

others are no longer needed. The project delivered the final 

software increment in May 2017 and the software is now in 

integration and testing. The project is working toward the 

systems integration review in May 2018. 

Contractor 

Contractor performance has been an ongoing concern for the 

project, but project officials stated that performance improved 

in fiscal year 2017. The SGSS project attributes most of its 

cost and schedule growth to the contractor underestimating 

the scope of the development effort. The contractor moved 

a large portion of the software’s required functionality into 

the last software development increment after experiencing 

problems with earlier increments. Project officials stated the 

contractor did not fully understand the requirements, technical 

planning was inadequate, and the contractor’s planning did 

not account for resolving software defects. In response 

to the issues the project has faced, the SGSS project 

has taken action to try to address contractor performance 

problems. For example, the project worked with the 

contractor to develop new, more reliable cost and schedule 

estimates both for 2017 and beyond. The new schedule 

focuses on discrete tasks, which enables better tracking 

and measurability. In addition, the project managers for the 

project and the contractor were replaced. Project officials 

stated that contractor performance improved in fiscal year 

2017 as the project successfully completed most of the 

plan it created for fiscal year 2017, which included delivery 

of the final software increment to integration and testing in 

May 2017. 

Integration and Test 

The project is tracking several risks to completing 

integration and testing—a period where problems are 

commonly found and schedules tend to slip—on schedule. 

For example, the project is tracking a risk that Space 

Network and mission partner users may be unavailable 

for testing, which could slow progress. The project is also 

tracking the number of software defects as a risk. While 

the project and the contractor’s models generally agree 

on defect resolution timeframes, officials said there is a 

risk that defects could arise that would take longer than 

planned to fix. Additionally, the project is continuing work 

to demonstrate end-to-end performance and stability of 

the SGSS system. As part of the fiscal year 2017 plan, the 

project established five operational scenarios as measures 

of performance and stability. The project completed four of 

the operational scenarios, but was unable to complete the 

fifth due to a problem with third-party software. The project 

is working with the software vendor to resolve the issue. 

common name: SGSS

SPACE NETWORK GROUND SEGMENT SUSTAINMENT

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, project 

officials noted the contractor performed on plan for 

fiscal year 2017 and completed all the milestones 

within the critical path. The project also provided 

technical comments, which were incorporated as 

appropriate. 
91

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

05/16

Project

confirmation

02/18

Critical

design

review

04/16

Preliminary

design

review

05/14

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

07/19

System

integration

review

11/12

Formulation

start

04/22

Committed

launch

readiness

date

04/21

Manifested

launch

readiness

date

$136.8

$571.5

$46.7

$136.8

$571.5

$46.7

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$754.9 $754.9

$418.8

$754.9

97.1%

2.9%

SWOT

Other

major 

projects

04/22

LAUNCH

DATE

11/12

04/22

LAUNCH

DATE

11/12

0 MONTHS

BASELINE

FY 2016

LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The SWOT project continues to operate within its cost baseline and plans 

to launch in April 2021, a year earlier than its committed schedule baseline, 

despite encountering technical issues with its main instrument—the Ka-Band 

Radar Interferometer (KaRIn). An engineering model of the KaRIn high voltage 

power supply was damaged during testing due to three electrical arcing events 

that were caused by manufacturing and handling of parts, and weaknesses in 

the packaging design. In addition, the project augmented the main beams that 

connect the instrument antennas to the spacecraft, which resulted in delays to 

releasing design drawings. The project discovered signal interference off the 

main beams that could distort KaRIn’s science measurements. Project officials 

said they planned to release about 90 percent of design drawings at the planned 

February 2018 critical design review, which is a best practice.

NASA Lead Center: Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory

International Partners: Centre National 

d’Etudes Spatiales (France), Canadian 

Space Agency (Canada), United Kingdom 

Space Agency (United Kingdom)

Launch Location: Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA

Launch Vehicle: Falcon 9

Mission Duration: 3 years

Requirement Derived from: 2007 Earth 

Science Decadal survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Earth Science

Surface Water and Ocean Topography 

The Surface Water and Ocean Topography (SWOT) mission will use its 

wide-swath radar altimetry technology to take repeated high-resolution 

measurements of the world’s oceans and freshwater bodies to develop a 

global survey. This survey will make it possible to estimate water discharge 

into rivers more accurately, and help improve flood prediction. It will also 

provide global measurements of ocean surface topography and variations in 

ocean currents, which will help improve weather and climate predictions. SWOT 

is a joint project between NASA and the French Space Agency—the Centre 

National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES).

common name: SWOT

Source: California Institute of Technology/Jet Propulsion Laboratory (artist depiction). | GAO-18-280SP
92 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The SWOT project continues to operate within its cost baseline 

and plans to launch in April 2021, a year earlier than its 

committed schedule baseline. The project is holding schedule 

reserves consistent with the level required by Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory policy, but did not meet cost reserve requirements 

in fiscal year 2017 due to costs associated with risk reduction 

activities and to stay on schedule. For example, project officials 

said they used cost reserves to build higher-fidelity engineering 

models and to secure a higher than planned workforce to 

execute fiscal year 2017 tasks. However, the project was 

able to reconstitute some of its cost reserves due to lowerthan-expected launch vehicle costs and is meeting cost 

reserve requirements for fiscal year 2018 as of January 2018. 

The project is progressing toward its critical design review 

scheduled for February 2018.

Technology and Design

The project’s primary instrument—the Ka-Band Radar 

Interferometer (KaRIn)—continues to be the most complicated 

development effort and has experienced technical issues that 

have had cost and schedule implications. During testing, an 

engineering model of the KaRIn high voltage power supply 

(HVPS) was damaged due to three electrical arcing events that 

were caused by manufacturing and handling of parts as well as 

weaknesses in the packaging design. To mitigate these events, 

the project repaired the electrical board within the engineering 

model with temporary fixes to support upcoming testing 

and built a second electrical board with enhanced handling 

procedures for a key thermal vacuum test in February 2018. As 

a result, HVPS development is driving the project’s schedule. 

To maintain its current schedule, the project is building the 

HVPS flight model in parallel to its ongoing testing of the 

engineering model. The project determined this approach 

was less risky than delaying flight model development until 

engineering model testing is complete. The project is tracking a 

risk, however, that development of the flight model concurrently 

may cause late rework. 

In addition, the project augmented the main beams that 

connect the instrument antennas to the spacecraft, which 

resulted in delays to releasing design drawings. The project 

discovered signal interference off the main beams that could 

distort KaRIn’s science measurements. To mitigate this risk, the 

project added a reflective plate to the main beam to minimize 

signal distortion and successfully held a mechanical critical 

design review with the modified main beam design. As a result, 

however, the project is 3 months behind schedule in releasing 

drawings for the modified design and is working with the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory to secure additional staff to accelerate 

drawing production. 

As of January 2018, SWOT released 87 percent of its 

expected drawings and project officials said they plan to 

release about 90 percent of design drawings at critical 

design review. Best practices show that releasing at least 

90 percent of design drawings by this review can decrease 

a project’s risk of cost growth and schedule delays. 

Other Issues to Be Monitored 

After the project experienced challenges with one of the 

tools—AirSWOT—that it plans to use to help understand 

the data returned from the KaRIn instrument once SWOT 

is in orbit, the project selected two additional methods to 

augment ocean measurements. The project determined 

that the performance of AirSWOT, which is an airborne 

sensor, was likely to be insufficient and that heavy wave 

activity when collecting ocean data was the root cause 

of measurement abnormalities. The project selected an 

airborne laser-based remote sensor along with a network 

of underwater gliders to augment the measurements from 

in-orbit satellites that were planned with AirSWOT. This 

approach successfully passed a technical peer review 

in December 2017 and the project plans to complete 

additional experiments using the selected approach to 

inform its calibration and validation plan.

common name: SWOT

SURFACE WATER AND OCEAN TOPOGRAPHY

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, project 

officials stated that SWOT is a challenging mission 

making a first of a kind measurement of global 

surface water. Officials also stated the project has 

been advancing the heritage systems development 

allowing the project to focus on the challenging 

KaRIn development. The project is completing 

thorough testing of engineering models along with 

a series of technical reviews in preparation for 

the flight model development. The project’s focus 

remains on systematically rectifying technical issues 

while devising workarounds to maintain the overall 

milestones. SWOT officials also provided technical 

comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 
93

PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

COST PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

estimated funding needed

then-year dollars in millions FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTATION

01/18

GAO

review

10/14

Project

confirmation

08/15

Critical

design

review

09/14

Preliminary

design

review

02/14

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

07/17

System

integration

review

04/13

Formulation

start

06/18

Committed

launch

readiness

date

04/18

Manifested

launch

readiness

date

$27.1

$323.2 $283.3

$26.3

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

-11.0%

CHANGE

Operations

Development

Formulation

$378.4 $336.7

$28.1

$27.1

$48.5

$336.7

99.3%

0.7%

TESS

Other

major 

projects

BASELINE

FY 2015

LATEST ESTIMATE

MARCH 2018

06/18

LAUNCH

DATE

04/13

04/18

LAUNCH

DATE

04/13

2

MONTHS

EARLY

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

The TESS project launched on April 18, 2018, before its committed launch date 

and within its cost baseline. The project expected to launch in March 2018 but did 

not meet this date due to certification delays with the SpaceX Falcon 9 upgrade 

known as Block 4. To cover the 1-month delay, NASA shifted funding previously 

budgeted for the operations phase to the development phase. The project 

did not have headquarters-held reserves to cover a launch past March 2018 

because NASA reallocated $15 million of TESS’s headquarters-held reserves to 

another astrophysics project. The TESS project completed environmental testing 

and conducted additional testing on its spare camera at temperatures seen 

in space to better understand expected camera performance on orbit. During 

thermal testing, the project found that the substance attaching the lenses to the 

camera barrel places pressure on the lenses and causes the cameras’ focus 

to shift slightly. However, in June 2017, NASA directed the project to integrate 

the cameras because they are still expected to meet TESS’s top-level science 

requirements even with the anomaly.

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: None

Launch Location: Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station, FL

Launch Vehicle: Falcon 9

Mission Duration: 2 years

Requirement Derived from: 2010 

Astrophysics Decadal Survey

Budget Portfolio: Science, Astrophysics

 Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 

The Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS) will use four identical, 

wide field-of-view cameras to conduct the first extensive survey of the sky 

from space for transiting exoplanets—or planets in other solar systems. The 

mission’s goal is to discover these exoplanets during transit, the time when 

the planet’s orbit carries it in front of its star as viewed from Earth. The project 

plans to discover rocky and potentially habitable Earth-sized and super-Earth 

planets orbiting nearby bright stars for further evaluation through ground- and 

space-based observations by other missions, such as the James Webb Space 

Telescope.

common name: TESS

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
94 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status 

The TESS project launched on April 18, 2018—2 months 

early and within its cost baseline. The project had planned 

to launch in March 2018, but the launch date was moved 

by a month due to delays related to its launch vehicle. At 

the key decision review prior to the project entering the 

operations and sustainment phase, NASA approved shifting 

$1.9 million prevously budgeted for the operations phase 

to the development phase to cover the 1-month delay. The 

project did not have any headquarters-held cost reserves 

available to cover a launch past March 2018 because 

NASA reallocated $15 million of TESS’s headquarters-held 

reserves to another astrophysics project, the Wide-Field 

Infrared Survey Telescope project. The project is holding 

cost and schedule reserves at the level required by NASA 

center policy. 

Integration and Test 

The project completed observatory environmental testing 

after overcoming spacecraft and instrument challenges 

to its cost and schedule. The project entered system 

assembly, integration and test—the phase where 

problems are most commonly found and schedules tend 

to slip—in August 2017. The project mitigated two risks 

related to its spacecraft. First, the project integrated its 

flight Ka-band transmitter in October 2017 after a 2-year 

delivery delay. The transmitter, essential for TESS as it 

transmits the mission data back to Earth, experienced 

continued contractor performance and manufacturing 

issues such as incorrectly placed parts. The project used 

schedule reserves to accommodate delays, installed an 

on-site representative to oversee the contractor’s work, 

and developed a contingency plan to fly TESS with 

the transmitter’s engineering development unit, which 

performed well in testing. Second, the project closed a risk 

that its slip rings—components within the solar array drive 

assembly necessary for power transmission—could be 

unsafe for flight. In May 2017, the project found damage to 

a small number of its slip rings, but later determined the slip 

rings were acceptable for flight after testing showed that 

they performed as expected. 

The project conducted additional testing on its spare 

camera at temperatures experienced in space to better 

understand expected camera performance on orbit after 

finding that the focus of each camera shifts slightly at 

the temperatures in which TESS will operate. In thermal 

testing, the project found that the substance attaching 

the lenses to the camera barrel places pressure on the 

lenses and causes the cameras’ focus to shift slightly at 

on-orbit temperatures. Prior to system integration review, 

NASA deemed the four cameras acceptable as they are 

expected to meet top-level science requirements even 

with the anomaly and in June 2017 directed the project to 

integrate the cameras. In July 2017, the project integrated 

the cameras with an alternative data handling unit, which 

powers the cameras and serves as the instrument data 

storage and processing computer. The project decided 

to use the alternative data handling unit because the unit 

originally designed for the project was behind schedule due 

to technical issues and contractor performance. 

Launch

The project did not meet its expected March 2018 launch 

date due to certification delays for its launch vehicle, the 

SpaceX Falcon 9 upgrade known as Block 4. Certification 

is necessary because it will be the first time that a NASA 

instrument will launch on the Block 4 version of the vehicle. 

The TESS project expected that NASA’s Launch Services 

Program would certify the Block 4 in September 2017, 7 

months before TESS is scheduled to launch. However, 

NASA needed additional time to investigate the Falcon 9 

second stage pressure vessel, which was involved in an 

anomaly that caused an explosion in September 2016. 

SpaceX also required extra time to meet NASA’s Launch 

Services Program requirements.

common name: TESS

TRANSITING EXOPLANET SURVEY SATELLITE

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

TESS project officials provided technical comments 

on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate.
PROJECT INFORMATION PROJECT SUMMARY

PRELIMINARY COST PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

then-year dollars in millions

PROJECT BUDGET INFORMATION

percent of current portfolio for fiscal year 2019

total funded to date

then-year dollars in millions

95

FORMULATION

IMPLEMENTA

01/18

TION

GAO

review

01/20

Project

confirmation

06/21

Critical

design

review

12/19

Preliminary

design

review

03/18

System

requirements/

mission

definition review

06/23

System

integration

review

02/16

Formulation

start

09/25

Projected

launch

readiness

date

$195

100%

0.0%

WFIRST

Other

major 

projects

$3,200 – $3,800

a

This estimate is preliminary, as the project is in formulation and there 

is uncertainty regarding the costs associated with the design options

being explored. NASA uses these estimates for planning purposes. LATEST ESTIMATE

FEB. 2018

2024 – 2026

PROJECTED

LAUNCH

READINESS

DATE

02/16

Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

a

NASA’s preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the WFIRST project are 

currently under review as the project responds to findings from an independent 

review. The review found that the mission is not aligned with the resources 

provided and concluded that the mission is not executable without adjustments 

and/or additional resources. NASA agreed with the study team’s results and 

directed the project to reduce the cost and complexity of the design in order to 

maintain costs within the project’s $3.2 billion preliminary cost target. As a result 

of the review, design trade-offs are being made. The project plans to make a final 

decision on the design features and international partners as it prepares for its 

system requirements and mission definition review in March 2018. The WFIRST 

project also matured its two critical technologies, but is tracking a risk concerning 

the production of Wide Field Instrument detectors. Project officials stated large 

array detectors always pose fabrication challenges. The President’s 2019 Budget 

Request proposed canceling the WFIRST project. 

NASA Lead Center: Goddard Space Flight 

Center

International Partner: TBD

Launch Location: TBD

Launch Vehicle: TBD

Mission Duration: 51⁄4 years (Including onorbit commissioning)

Requirement Derived from: 2010 

Astrophysics Decadal Survey 

Budget Portfolio: Science, Astrophysics

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope 

The Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST) is an observatory 

designed to perform wide-field imaging and survey of the near-infrared 

sky to answer questions about the structure and evolution of the universe, 

and expand our knowledge of planets beyond our solar system. The project 

will use a telescope that was originally built and qualified by another federal 

agency. The project plans to launch WFIRST in the mid-2020s to an orbit about 

1 million miles from the Earth. The project is also planning a guest observer 

program, in which the project may provide observation time to academic and 

other institutions.

common name: WFIRST

Source: NASA. | GAO-18-280SP
96 Assessments of Major NASA Projects GAO-18-280SP

Cost and Schedule Status

The WFIRST project’s preliminary cost and schedule 

estimates are currently under review as the project 

responds to findings from an October 2017 independent 

review conducted to ensure the mission’s scope and 

required resources are well understood and executable. 

The review found that the project is not executable unless 

its mission scope is redesigned or its preliminary cost target 

is increased. NASA agreed with the study team’s results 

and directed the project to reduce the cost and complexity 

of the design in order to maintain costs within the project’s 

$3.2 billion preliminary cost target. In February 2018, the 

President’s 2019 Budget Request proposed canceling the 

WFIRST project. 

Design and Technology 

In response to the independent review, the project 

developed a system design proposal that will be presented 

at its system requirements and mission definition review in 

March 2018 to reduce WFIRST cost and complexity. As of 

January 2018, the project was planning to reach the $3.2 

billion cost target by treating the coronagraph—designed to 

perform high contrast imaging and spectroscopy of nearby 

exoplanets—as a technology demonstration as opposed 

to a science instrument. This, according to officials, allows 

the project to make a trade between performance and risk, 

and thereby avoid potential impacts to the project’s cost 

and schedule. In addition, the project plans to review the 

capabilities of the Wide Field Instrument, which is intended 

to measure light from a billion galaxies and perform a 

survey of the inner Milky Way, as part of the review. NASA 

is also considering whether or not to maintain capability for 

WFIRST to be “starshade ready.” A starshade is a device 

that is launched with or separately from an observatory 

and positioned between it and the star being observed 

to block out the starlight while allowing the light emitted 

by the planet through. NASA planned to review and 

formally approve the changes at the project’s next key 

decision review, planned for April 2018, prior to entering 

the preliminary design and technology completion phase. 

Finally, in response to the independent review, NASA 

upgraded the risk classification of the project, which could 

increase project costs due to more system reliability and 

mission assurance requirements. 

The WFIRST project has matured its two critical 

technologies to a technology readiness level 6, which 

helps to minimize risks for space systems when entering 

production, but is tracking a risk concerning the production 

of Wide Field Instrument detectors. Project officials stated 

large array detectors always pose fabrication challenges. 

To date, detector production has exceeded historical 

trends, but the project is completing ongoing tests to 

validate detector quality. 

Developmental Partner

NASA is considering several potential contributions with 

various international partners, including the Canadian 

Space Agency, European Space Agency, France, Germany, 

and Japan, for elements of the Wide Field Instrument, 

coronagraph, and ground system. These contributions 

could potentially reduce the project’s cost. NASA also 

expects to determine its international partners before 

the project enters the preliminary design and technology 

completion phase.

common name: WFIRST

WIDE-FIELD INFRARED SURVEY TELESCOPE 

PROJECT OFFICE COMMENTS

WFIRST project officials provided technical 

comments on a draft of this assessment, which were 

incorporated as appropriate. 
Page 97 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

We provided a draft of this report to NASA for its review and comment. In 

its written response, NASA generally agreed with our findings and stated 

that the report provides NASA with a valued independent perspective on 

its major acquisitions. NASA also noted that we incorporated technology 

demonstration projects into the audit this year, and that it is important to 

remember that the purpose of these activities is to mature specific new 

technologies to a technology readiness level 6 or higher by the end of 

their demonstration phase in a relevant environment. As a result, it is 

NASA’s view that our best practice to mature technologies to a 

technology readiness level 6 by the preliminary design review is not 

applicable to technology demonstration projects. 

As discussed in the report, we included two technology demonstration 

projects—LCRD and Restore-L—in our assessment this year because 

these two projects each had a life-cycle cost estimate of over $250 

million. In addition, we included these two projects in our analysis of 

NASA major projects attaining technology maturity at preliminary design 

review because both projects planned to mature their technologies prior 

to launch, not at the end of their demonstration phase in a relevant 

environment as NASA described in its letter. Therefore, these two 

projects are still susceptible to the same risks projects might experience if 

they fall short of the best practice of meeting a technical readiness level 6 

by preliminary design review. These risks include subsequent technical 

problems that could result in cost growth and schedule delays. In the 

future, if other technology demonstration projects have a life-cycle cost 

estimate over $250 million and enter the portfolio of projects that we 

assess, we will continue to discuss project technology maturity goals for 

those specific projects with NASA. These discussions will inform our 

determination of whether we will compare those projects against our best 

practices on technology maturity.

NASA’s written comments are reprinted in appendix VI. NASA also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of the report to the NASA Administrator and 

interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 98 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report at listed in appendix VII.

Cristina T. Chaplain

Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions
Page 99 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

List of Committees

The Honorable Jerry Moran

Chairman

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Cruz

Chairman

The Honorable Edward J. Markey

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable John Culberson

Chairman

The Honorable José Serrano

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Brian Babin

Chairman

The Honorable Ami Bera

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Space

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 100 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the cost and schedule 

performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 

(NASA) portfolio of major projects, (2) the maturity of technologies and 

stability of project designs at key points in the development process, and 

(3) the extent to which NASA is assessing future workforce capacity 

challenges that may affect its ability to manage its portfolio of projects. 

We also described the status and assessed the risks and challenges 

faced by NASA’s 26 major projects, each with life-cycle costs more than 

$250 million. When NASA determines that a project has an estimated lifecycle cost of over $250 million, we include that project in our annual 

review up through launch or completion. We did not develop an 

assessment for the Asteroid Redirect Robotic Mission project because, as 

of June 2017, the project closed out most project development activities 

at the direction of NASA headquarters.

To respond to these objectives, we developed several standard data 

collection instruments (DCI). We developed multiple DCIs, which were 

completed by NASA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer, to gather data 

on each project’s cost, schedule, funding, and notional 5-year budget. We 

used another DCI, which was completed by each project office, to gather 

data on project’s technology and design maturity and development 

partners. The information available on individual projects depends on 

where a project is in its life cycle. For example, for projects in an early 

stage of development called formulation there are still unknowns about 

requirements, technology, and design. We also analyzed DCI data from 

prior reviews.

To assess the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s major projects, 

we compared cost and schedule data as of February 2018 provided on 

DCIs by NASA for the 17 projects in the implementation phase during our 

review to previously established cost and schedule baselines.1 The 

Commercial Crew Program has a tailored project life cycle and project 

management requirements, so it was excluded from this analysis. In 

addition, we assessed development cost and schedule performance for 

NASA’s portfolios of major projects for each reporting period between 

2009 and 2018 to examine longer-term trends. To determine cost 

performance, we compared the projects’ baseline development costs and 

development costs as of February 2018. For the Orion program, we used 

 

1

For the purpose of this review, cost performance is defined as the percentage of total 

development cost growth over the development cost baseline.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 101 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

a June 2017 cost estimate because NASA was revising the program’s 

life-cycle cost estimate at the time of our review. For two projects—

Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On (GRACE-FO) and 

Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS)—the cost performance is 

current as of March 2018 because NASA updated cost information after 

we received the cost DCI in February 2018. All cost information in this 

report is presented in nominal then-year dollars for consistency with 

budget data. Current baseline costs for all projects are adjusted to reflect 

the cost accounting structure in NASA’s fiscal year 2009 budget 

estimates. For the fiscal year 2009 budget request, NASA changed its 

accounting practices from full-cost accounting to reporting only direct 

costs at the project level. To determine schedule performance, we 

compared the project’s baseline launch readiness or completion date and 

launch readiness or completion date as of February 2018. For three

projects—GRACE-FO, James Webb Space Telescope, and TESS—the 

schedule performance is current as of March 2018 because NASA 

provided an updated schedule after we received the schedule DCI in 

February 2018. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked project officials to complete a 

DCI that provided the technology readiness levels of each of the project’s 

critical and heritage technologies at various stages of project 

development including the preliminary design review. We did not verify or 

validate project office supplied data on the technology readiness level of 

technologies, or the classification of technologies as critical or heritage. 

For the 17 projects that had held a preliminary design review and 

identified critical or heritage technologies, we compared those levels 

against our technology maturity best practice and NASA policy on 

technology maturity to determine the extent to which the portfolio was 

meeting the criteria. Our work has shown that reaching a technology 

readiness level 6—which indicates that the representative prototype of 

the technology has been demonstrated in a relevant environment that 

simulates the harsh conditions of space—by the preliminary design 

review is the level of maturity needed to minimize risks for space systems 

entering product development. Originally developed by NASA, technology 

readiness levels are measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with 

paper studies of a technology’s feasibility and culminating with a 

technology fully integrated into a completed product. See appendix IV for 

the definitions of technology readiness levels. We compared this year’s 

results against those in prior years to assess whether NASA was 

improving in this area. We did not assess technology maturity for those 

projects that had not yet reached the preliminary design review at the 

time of this assessment or for projects that reported no critical or heritage 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 102 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

technologies. We also excluded 2009 from our analysis since the data 

were only for critical technologies and did not include heritage 

technologies. We compared the number of critical technologies being 

developed per project with those in prior years to determine how the 

number of critical technologies developed per project had changed. We 

also collected information on the use of heritage technologies in the 

projects; including what heritage technologies were being used; what 

effort was needed to modify the form, fit, and function of the technology 

for use in the new system; and whether the project considered the 

heritage technology as a risk to the project.

To assess design stability, we asked project officials to complete a DCI 

that provided the number of engineering drawings completed or projected 

for release by the preliminary and critical design reviews and as of our 

current assessment.2 We did not verify or validate project office supplied 

data on the number of released and expected engineering drawings. 

However, we collected the project offices’ rationale for cases where it 

appeared that only a small percentage of the expected drawings were 

completed by the time of the design reviews or where the project office 

reported significant growth in the number of drawings released after the 

critical design review. In accordance with best practices, projects were 

assessed as having achieved design stability if at least 90 percent of 

projected drawings were released by the critical design review. We 

omitted the Exploration Ground Systems program in this year’s analysis 

and retroactively excluded the program from prior year analyses in 2016 

and 2017 because program officials said they do not track design 

drawings as a management tool and we found that the prior data 

submissions were not inclusive all subsystems. We compared this year’s 

results against those in prior years to assess whether NASA was 

improving in this area. For this year’s assessment, 12 projects had held a 

critical design review and reported data on design drawings. We did not 

assess the design stability for those projects that had not yet reached the 

critical design review at the time of this assessment. To assess project 

technical margins, we gathered project mass and power information using 

a DCI and compared it against NASA requirements. We omitted the 

 

2

In our calculation for the percentage of total number of drawings projected for release, we 

used the number of drawings released at the critical design review as a fraction of the total 

number of drawings projected, including where a growth in drawings occurred. Therefore, 

the denominator in the calculation may have been larger than what was projected at the 

critical design review. We believe that this more accurately reflected the design stability of 

the project.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 103 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Exploration Ground Systems, Space Network Ground Segment 

Sustainment, and Space Launch System as those projects do not contain 

spacecraft. We excluded the Orion program because it does not have 

applicable metrics. To assess completion of project validation and 

verification plans, we asked project officials to complete a DCI that 

provided data on whether a plan was completed by the critical design 

review.

To assess the extent to which NASA is assessing future workforce 

capacity challenges that may affect its ability to manage its portfolio of 

projects, we did the following:

• Analyzed NASA major project documents, such as monthly status 

reports, and interviewed project officials to determine if the projects 

were experiencing any workforce challenges. We also discussed the 

process of staffing Jet Propulsion Laboratory projects with officials 

within the NASA Management Office at the laboratory.

• Interviewed Mission Support Directorate and Office of the Chief 

Engineer officials responsible for agency-wide capability assessments 

to identify if workforce challenges were raised as a concern in these 

assessments. Through an initial review of documents and discussions 

with officials, we identified select technical areas that workforce 

capability gaps were identified in the assessments for additional 

review, including the technical capability areas of sensors and 

instruments, and guidance, navigation and control. We also selected 

the human capital, budget, and procurement business assessments 

because of the relation to the acquisitions process and acquisition 

workforce functions that could affect NASA’s ability to manage its 

major projects. We reviewed the recommendations in each 

assessment and identified those specifically related to aspects of 

workforce capacity and human capital management. We interviewed 

relevant officials on the status of implementation plans for these 

recommendations—including NASA’s efforts to improve strategic 

workforce planning and cross-center collaboration—and discussed 

the role these efforts would play in the broader implementation of 

NASA’s operating model.

• Analyzed publicly available workforce data from NASA’s Workforce 

Information Cubes for NASA (WICN) to identify workforce 

characteristics that could affect NASA’s workforce capacity. WICN 

contains snapshots of workforce composition as of certain dates and 

are updated every two weeks by NASA’s Shared Services Center. We 

obtained and analyzed data from WICN as of January 2018. 

Specifically, we examined (1) total employee staffing levels for the 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 104 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

past 5 years, (2) age, (3) retirement eligibility, and (4) the average 

number of years staff stay past initial retirement eligibility by 

occupational category. To assess the reliability of the workforce data 

used in the review, we reviewed NASA’s responses to questions on 

the database, which included information on the source of the data, 

how NASA uses the data, and the reliability of the data; interviewed 

officials with knowledge of how the database is used at the agency 

and how the information is compiled; and reviewed the data for errors, 

such as by confirming correct sums and checking the consistency of 

workforce totals across the data. We concluded the workforce data 

were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.

Our work was performed primarily at NASA headquarters in Washington, 

D.C. In addition, we and related GAO engagement teams visited Goddard 

Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland; the Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory in Pasadena, California; Kennedy Space Center in Merritt 

Island, Florida; Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas; and Marshall 

Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.

This year, we developed project assessments for the 26 projects in the 

portfolio with an estimated life-cycle cost greater than $250 million. For 

each project assessment we included a description of each project’s 

objectives, information concerning the NASA center, and international 

partners involved in the project, if applicable, the project’s cost and 

schedule performance, a schedule timeline identifying key project dates, 

and a brief narrative describing the current status of the project. We also 

included budget information, including the percentage of NASA’s fiscal 

year 2019 budget for all major projects in the current portfolio that the 

project represents. The budget information is based on NASA’s fiscal 

year 2019 budget. For projects in formulation, we included the total 

funding that has been allocated to the project since formulation start 

through the end of fiscal year 2017. For projects in implementation, we 

included the funding needed to be allocated for project completion or 

launch through the project’s current life-cycle cost estimate. We also 

provided a detailed discussion of project challenges for selected projects 

as applicable.

To assess the cost and schedule changes of each project, we obtained 

data directly from NASA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer through our 

DCI. For the Commercial Crew program, we obtained data directly from 

the program on the total amount of funds obligated and the schedule. 

When applicable, we compared the level of cost and schedule reserves 

Project Profile Information 

on Each Individual Project 

Assessment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 105 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

held by the project to the level required by center policy. To determine the 

funding received to date for each of the projects in formulation we 

calculated the total funding allocated to the project since formulation 

start.3 For projects in implementation, we calculated the funding needed 

for project launch or completion through its current life-cycle cost 

estimate.

The project’s timeline is based on acquisition cycle time, which is defined 

as the number of months between the project’s start, or formulation start, 

and the projected or actual launch date. Formulation start generally refers 

to the initiation of a project; NASA refers to a project’s start as key 

decision point (KDP)-A, or the beginning of the formulation phase. The 

preliminary design review typically occurs toward the end of the 

formulation phase, followed by a review at KDP-C, known as project 

confirmation, which allows the project to move into the implementation 

phase. The critical design review is generally held during the latter half of 

the final design and fabrication phase of implementation and 

demonstrates that the maturity of the design is appropriate to support 

continuing with the final design and fabrication phase. The manifested 

launch date is the launch date which the project is working toward, and 

when a launch vehicle is available to launch the project. This date is only 

a goal launch date for the project, not a commitment that they will launch 

on this date. The committed launch readiness date is determined through 

a launch readiness review that verifies that the launch system, spacecraft, 

and payloads are ready for launch. The implementation phase includes 

the operations of the mission and concludes with project disposal.

To assess the status, risk, and challenges for each project, we submitted 

a DCI to each project office. In the DCI, we requested information on the 

maturity of critical and heritage technologies, the number of releasable 

design drawings at project milestones, and international partnerships.4

We also held interviews with representatives from all of the projects to 

discuss the information on the DCI. We then reviewed project 

documentation—including project plans, schedules, risk assessments, 

and major project review documentation—to corroborate any testimonial 

evidence we received in the interviews. These reviews led to identification 

 

3

This does not include funds for studies prior to key decision point (KDP)-A, the start of 

formulation.

4

We did not collect this information for the Commercial Crew Program. 

Project Challenges 

Discussion on Each 

Individual Project 

Assessment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 106 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

of further challenges faced by NASA projects. The second page of our 

project assessments highlights key challenges facing that project that 

have or could affect project performance. For this year’s report, we 

identified challenges across the projects we reviewed in the categories of 

launch, contractor, development partner, design, technology, schedule, 

and integration and test. These challenges do not represent an 

exhaustive or exclusive list and are based on our definitions and 

assessments, not those of NASA.

To supplement our analysis, we relied on our work over past years 

examining acquisition issues across multiple agencies. These reports 

cover such issues as contracting, program management, acquisition best 

practices, and cost estimating. We also have an extensive body of work 

related to challenges NASA has faced with specific system acquisitions, 

financial management, and cost estimating. This work provided the 

historical context and basis for large parts of the general observations we 

made about the projects we reviewed.

NASA provided preliminary estimated life-cycle cost ranges and 

associated schedules for the eight projects that had not yet entered 

implementation, which are generally established at KDP-B. NASA 

formally establishes cost and schedule baselines, committing itself to cost 

and schedule targets for a project with a specific and aligned set of 

planned mission objectives, at KDP-C, which follows a preliminary design 

review. KDP-C reflects the life-cycle point where NASA approves a 

project to leave the formulation phase and enter into the implementation 

phase. NASA explained that preliminary estimates are generated for 

internal planning and fiscal year budgeting purposes at KDP-B, which 

occurs midstream in the formulation phase, and hence, are not 

considered a formal commitment by the agency on cost and schedule for 

the mission deliverables. Due to changes that occur to a project’s scope 

and technologies between KDP-B and KDP-C, the estimates of project 

cost and schedule can be significantly altered between the two KDPs.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to May 2018 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Data Limitations
Appendix II: Major NASA Projects Assessed in 

GAO’s 2018 Report 

Page 107 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

In 2018, we assessed 26 major NASA projects. Figure 11 shows the 

preliminary launch readiness data and cost estimates for projects in the 

formulation phase, and the current launch readiness dates and cost 

estimates for projects in the implementation phase.

Figure 11: Cost and Schedule of Major NASA Projects Assessed in GAO’s 2018 Report by Phase

Note: The life cycle for NASA space flight projects consists of two phases—formulation, which takes a 

project from concept to preliminary design, and implementation, which includes building, launching, 

Appendix II: Major NASA Projects Assessed 

in GAO’s 2018 Report
Appendix II: Major NASA Projects Assessed in 

GAO’s 2018 Report 

Page 108 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

and operating the system, among other activities. For projects in implementation, the current launch 

readiness date and cost estimate are the project’s established cost and schedule baseline or the 

latest cost estimate and schedule if the project has experienced cost or schedule growth above the 

project’s baseline. 

a

In May 2017, NASA renamed the Solar Probe Plus project as the Parker Solar Probe project. 

b

NASA officials said they are revising the Orion program’s life-cycle cost estimate and expect to 

complete a new estimate in June 2018. The new cost is expected to be over the program’s cost 

baseline of $11,283.5 million. 

c

In 2016, NASA reclassified the Space Network Ground Segment Sustainment (SGSS) as a hybrid 

sustainment effort, rather than a major project. A hybrid sustainment effort still includes development 

work. As a result, we continue to include SGSS in our assessment. The SGSS project reported costs 

are up through its first operational readiness review at the end of fiscal year 2019, and its schedule is 

under review. 

d

The launch readiness date for the Commercial Crew Program is for the certification reviews for 

Boeing and SpaceX. The Commercial Crew Program is implementing a tailored version of NASA’s 

space flight project life cycle, but it is currently completing development activities typically associated 

with implementation. 
Appendix III: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in 

GAO’s Annual Assessments

Page 109 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

We have reviewed 55 major National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) projects or programs since our initial review in 

2009. See figure 12 below for a list of projects included in our 

assessments from 2009 to 2017. These projects were not included in the 

2018 review because they launched, were canceled, or launched but 

failed to reach orbit.

Figure 12: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s Annual Assessments from 2009-2017

a

In 2014, NASA adopted Orion as the common name for Orion MPCV; the project did not change. 

This Orion project stems from the original Orion project that was canceled in June 2011 when the 

Constellation program was canceled after facing significant technical and funding issues. During the 

closeout process for the Constellation program, NASA identified elements of the Ares I and Orion 

projects that would be transitioned for use on the new Space Launch System and Orion MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle programs. 

Appendix III: Major NASA Projects Reviewed 

in GAO’s Annual Assessments
Appendix III: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in 

GAO’s Annual Assessments

Page 110 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

See figure 13 below for a list of projects included in our 2018 assessment, 

including when the projects were first included in the review, and projects 

that were canceled during the review.

Figure 13: Major NASA Projects Reviewed in GAO’s 2018 Assessment

a

A bid protest was filed on September 26, 2014, after NASA awarded Commercial Crew contracts. 

GAO issued a decision on the bid protest on January 5, 2015, which was after our review of projects 

had concluded; therefore, we excluded the Commercial Crew Program from the 2015 review. 

b

In 2014, NASA adopted Orion as the common name for Orion MPCV; the project did not change. 

This Orion project stems from the original Orion project that was canceled in June 2011 when the 

Constellation program was canceled after facing significant technical and funding issues. During the 

closeout process for the Constellation program, NASA identified elements of the Ares I and Orion 

projects that would be transitioned for use on the new Space Launch System and Orion MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle programs. 

c

In May 2017, NASA renamed the Solar Probe Plus project as the Parker Solar Probe project. 
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 111 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Table 4: Characteristics of Technology Readiness Levels

Technology 

readiness level Description Hardware

Demonstration 

environment 

1. Basic principles 

observed and reported.

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific 

research begins to be translated into applied 

research and development. Examples might 

include paper studies of a technology’s basic 

properties.

None (paper studies and 

analysis). 

None. 

2. Technology concept 

and/or application 

formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic principles are 

observed, practical applications can be 

invented. The application is speculative and 

there is no proof or detailed analysis to support 

the assumption. Examples are still limited to 

paper studies.

None (paper studies and 

analysis). 

None.

3. Analytical and 

experimental critical 

function and/or 

characteristic proof of 

concept.

Active research and development is initiated. 

This includes analytical studies and laboratory 

studies to physically validate analytical 

predictions of separate elements of the 

technology. Examples include components that 

are not yet integrated or representative.

Analytic studies and 

demonstration of nonscale 

individual components (pieces 

of subsystem).

Lab.

4. Component and/or 

breadboard. 

Validation in laboratory 

environment. 

Basic technological components are integrated 

to establish that the pieces will work together. 

This is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the 

eventual system. Examples include integration 

of ad-hoc hardware in a laboratory.

Low fidelity breadboard.

Integration of nonscale 

components to show pieces 

will work together. Not fully 

functional or form or fit but 

representative of technically 

feasible approach suitable for 

flight articles.

Lab.

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation 

in relevant 

environment.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 

significantly. The basic technological 

components are integrated with reasonably 

realistic supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a simulated 

environment. Examples include high-fidelity 

laboratory integration of components.

High-fidelity breadboard.

Functionally equivalent but not 

necessarily form and/or fit 

(size, weight, materials, etc.). 

Should be approaching 

appropriate scale. May 

include integration of several 

components with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate functionality.

Lab demonstrating 

functionality but 

not form and fit. 

May include flight 

demonstrating 

breadboard in 

surrogate aircraft. 

Technology ready 

for detailed design 

studies.

6. System/subsystem 

model or prototype 

demonstration in a 

relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype system, 

which is well beyond the breadboard tested for 

technology readiness level 5, is tested in a 

relevant environment. Represents a major step 

up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. 

Examples include testing a prototype in a highfidelity laboratory environment or in simulated 

realistic environment.

Prototype. Should be very 

close to form, fit, and function. 

Probably includes the 

integration of many new 

components and realistic 

supporting 

elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate full 

functionality of the subsystem.

High-fidelity lab 

demonstration or 

limited/restricted 

flight 

demonstration for a 

relevant 

environment. 

Integration of 

technology is well 

defined.

Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels
Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 112 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Technology 

readiness level Description Hardware

Demonstration 

environment 

7. System prototype 

demonstration in a 

realistic environment.

Prototype near or at planned operational 

system. Represents a major step up from 

technology readiness level 6, requiring the 

demonstration of an actual system prototype in 

a realistic environment, such as in an aircraft, 

vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the 

prototype in a test bed aircraft.

Prototype. Should be form, fit, 

and function integrated with 

other key supporting 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate full functionality 

of subsystem.

Flight 

demonstration in 

representative 

realistic 

environment such 

as flying test bed or 

demonstrator 

aircraft. 

Technology is well 

substantiated with 

test data.

8. Actual system 

completed and “flight 

qualified” through test 

and demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its final 

form and under expected conditions. In almost 

all cases, this technology readiness level 

represents the end of true system 

development. Examples include developmental 

test and evaluation of the system in its 

intended weapon system to determine if it 

meets design specifications.

Flight qualified hardware. Developmental 

Test and 

Evaluation in the 

actual system 

application.

9. Actual system “flight -

proven” through 

successful mission 

operations. 

Actual application of the technology in its final 

form and under mission conditions, such as 

those encountered in operational test and 

evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end 

of the last “bug fixing” aspects of true system 

development. Examples include using the 

system under operational mission conditions.

Actual system in final form. Technology 

assessed as fully 

mature.

Operational Test 

and Evaluation in 

operational mission 

conditions.

Source: GAO analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data. | GAO-18-280SP
Appendix V: Elements of a Sound Business 

Case 

Page 113 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

The development and execution of a knowledge-based business case for 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) projects can 

provide early recognition of challenges, allow managers to take corrective 

action, and place needed and justifiable projects in a better position to 

succeed. Our prior work of best practice organizations shows the risks 

inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by developing a solid, 

executable business case before committing resources to a new 

product’s development.1 In its simplest form, a knowledge-based 

business case is evidence that (1) the customer’s needs are valid and 

can best be met with the chosen concept and that (2) the chosen concept 

can be developed and produced within existing resources—that is, 

proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, adequate 

time, and adequate workforce to deliver the product when needed. A 

program should not be approved to go forward into product development 

unless a sound business case can be made. If the business case 

measures up, the organization commits to the development of the 

product, including making the financial investment. The building of 

knowledge consists of information that should be gathered at these three 

critical points over the course of a program:

• When a project begins development, the customer’s needs should 

match the developer’s available resources—mature technologies, 

time, and funding. An indication of this match is the demonstrated 

maturity of the technologies required to meet customer needs—

referred to as critical technologies. If the project is relying on 

heritage—or pre-existing—technology, that technology must be in the 

appropriate form, fit, and function to address the customer’s needs 

within available resources. The project will generally enter 

development after completing the preliminary design review, at which 

time a business case should be in hand.

• Then, about midway through the project’s development, its design 

should be stable and demonstrate it is capable of meeting 

performance requirements. The critical design review takes place at 

that point in time because it generally signifies when the program is 

 

1

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to be Made on Future Combat System, 

GAO-07-376 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007); Defense Acquisitions: Improved 

Business Case Key for Future Combat System’s Success, GAO-06-564T (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006); NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 

Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2005); and NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for 

Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure Requirements Match Available Resources, GAO-05-242 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). 

Appendix V: Elements of a Sound Business 

Case 
Appendix V: Elements of a Sound Business 

Case 

Page 114 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

ready to start building production-representative prototypes. If project 

development continues without design stability, costly redesigns to 

address changes to project requirements and unforeseen challenges 

can occur.

• Finally, by the time of the production decision, the product must be 

shown to be producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets and 

have demonstrated its reliability, and the design must demonstrate 

that it performs as needed through realistic system-level testing. Lack 

of testing increases the possibility that project managers will not have 

information that could help avoid costly system failures in late stages 

of development or during system operations.
Appendix VI: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 115 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Appendix VI: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Appendix VI: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 116 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 
Appendix VI: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 117 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 118 GAO-18-280SP Assessments of Major NASA Projects 

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Molly Traci, Assistant Director; 

Andrea M. Bivens; Lorraine Ettaro; Lisa L. Fisher; Laura Greifner; Kristine 

R. Hassinger; Erin Kennedy; Joy Kim; Jose A. Ramos; Carrie Rogers; 

Daniel R. Singleton; Juli Steinhouse; Ryan Stott; Roxanna T. Sun; Alyssa 

Weir; and Kristin Van Wychen made significant contributions to this 

report.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(102016)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

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