NEXT GENERATION 

JAMMER

DOD Should Continue 

to Assess Potential 

Duplication and 

Overlap As Program 

Moves Forward

Report to Congressional Committees

August 2013

GAO-13-642

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-642, a report to 

congressional committees

August 2013

NEXT GENERATION JAMMER

DOD Should Continue to Assess Potential 

Duplication and Overlap As Program Moves Forward

Why GAO Did This Study

At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, 

the Navy’s NGJ program represents a 

significant investment in airborne

electronic attack capabilities. Jammers, 

like the planned NGJ, fly on aircraft, 

such as Navy EA-18Gs, and transmit 

electronic signals that can neutralize or 

temporarily degrade enemy air 

defenses and communications, thus 

aiding combat aircraft and ground 

forces’ freedom to maneuver and 

strike. Senate Report 112-196 

mandated GAO to review the NGJ 

program and potential duplication. This 

report examines the extent to which (1) 

DOD assessed whether there is 

duplication among NGJ, existing 

capabilities, and other acquisition 

programs, and (2) NGJ is being 

managed as a joint solution. GAO 

reviewed key NGJ requirements and 

acquisition documents and DOD and 

military service documents describing 

airborne electronic attack capabilities.

What GAO Recommends

To help ensure that DOD’s analysis of 

potential overlap and duplication is 

complete, GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense: (1) require the 

NGJ capability development document 

to discuss potential redundancies 

between NGJ and existing and 

proposed programs across all of its 

planned roles and (2) ensure that the 

Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to 

Congress includes information on 

potentially overlapping capabilities and 

why that overlap is warranted. DOD 

agreed to continue to assess 

duplication and redundancies but not 

with using the capability development 

document to do so. GAO believes the 

recommendation remains valid as 

discussed in the report. DOD agreed 

with the second recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has assessed whether the planned Next 

Generation Jammer (NGJ) program is duplicative using a variety of means, but 

none of them address all of the system’s planned roles or take into account the 

military services’ evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. DOD

analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not 

duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role—suppressing enemy air 

defenses from outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. However, 

these analyses do not address all planned NGJ roles, such as communications 

jamming in irregular warfare environments, or take into account the military 

services’ evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. According to 

GAO’s analysis, none of the systems that have emerged since DOD completed 

its NGJ analyses duplicate its planned capabilities; however there is some 

overlap in the roles they are intended to perform. Redundancy in some of these 

areas may, in fact, be desirable. However, pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to 

develop similar capabilities can result in the same capability gap being filled twice 

or more, lead to inefficient use of resources, and contribute to other warfighting 

needs going unfilled. Therefore, continued examination of potential overlap and 

duplication among these investments may be warranted.

DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for updating its 

analysis of potential overlap and duplication to address these shortcomings as 

the program moves forward. However, GAO found weaknesses in two of these

efforts as well.

• Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress: DOD could address new 

duplication issues as they emerge and, if necessary, explain the need for 

overlapping capabilities in this report. However, to date, the analysis of 

overlap and duplication in this report has been limited and did not examine 

potential overlap between capabilities or explain why overlap was warranted.

• NGJ Capability Development Document: Redundancies are required to be

considered when a capability development document—which defines the 

performance requirements for an acquisition program—is validated. The draft 

NGJ capability development document does not identify the systems the 

Navy considered when analyzing potential redundancies, so it is difficult to 

evaluate whether its analysis includes existing and proposed programs 

across all of the NGJ’s planned roles.

The NGJ is not being managed as a joint acquisition program, which is a 

distinction related to funding, but it is expected to provide the Navy with airborne 

electronic capabilities that will support all military services in both major combat 

operations and irregular warfare environments. The NGJ’s capabilities are not 

intended to meet all of the military services’ airborne electronic attack needs and 

the services are planning to make additional investments in systems that are 

tailored to meet their specific warfighting roles. The military services might be 

able to leverage the NGJ program in support of their own acquisition priorities 

because it plans to use a modular open systems approach, which allows for 

components to be added, removed, or modified without significantly impacting 

the rest of the system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ 

or its technologies into other systems in the future.

View GAO-13-642. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841, 

sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Letter 1

Background 4

DOD Analysis of Potential Duplication Does Not Address All NGJ 

Roles and Planned Acquisition Programs 9

NGJ Capabilities Are to Support the Joint Force, but the Military 

Services Are Also Developing Systems Tailored to Their Specific 

Needs 15

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 24

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables

Table 1: Key Documents and the Extent to Which They Considered 

Existing and Planned Capabilities and Assessed 

Duplication and Overlap for NGJ 10

Table 2: Existing and Planned Airborne Electronic Attack Systems 12

Figures

Figure 1: Radars Operating in Different Frequency Bands and 

Ranges 4

Figure 2: EA-18G with Three ALQ-99 Jamming Pods 5

Figure 3: Notional Depiction of Airborne Electronic Attack 

Systems Countering Enemy Air Defenses 6

Figure 4: Time Line of Key NGJ Events 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Abbreviations

AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array

DOD Department of Defense

GAO Government Accountability Office

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

MALD-J Miniature Air Launched Decoy—Jammer

NGJ Next Generation Jammer

RDT&E Research, development, test and evaluation

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Page 1 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

August 20, 2013

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Airborne electronic attack capabilities are key enablers for U.S. military 

operations ranging from irregular warfare to major combat against 

potential near-peer adversaries.1 Airborne electronic attack involves the 

use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) 

enemy air defense and communications systems, either through 

destructive or disruptive means. It helps protect aircraft, maritime, and 

ground forces from a variety of threats. For example, during major combat 

operations, airborne electronic attack helps prevent other systems, such 

as fighter jets or naval carriers, from being detected by enemy radars and 

targeted by missiles. In irregular warfare environments, it supports ground 

troops by performing functions such as jamming enemy communications. 

Weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities 

are becoming increasingly common and sophisticated. These weapons—

 1

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population(s). It favors indirect and asymmetric (dissimilar) 

approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to 

erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.

Potential near-peer adversaries include countries capable of waging large-scale 

conventional war on the United States. These nation-states can be characterized as 

having nearly comparable diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capacity to the 

United States.
Page 2 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

held by both nation-state and non-state actors—vary from advanced, 

integrated air defense systems to older surveillance radars that are being 

upgraded with advanced computers.

One of the current systems used to counter these threats is the AN/ALQ99 (ALQ-99), a jamming pod system that operates from EA-6B Prowler 

and EA-18G Growler aircraft. Jammers transmit electronic signals that 

neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses and 

communications, thus aiding combat aircraft, maritime, and ground 

forces’ freedom to maneuver and strike. According to the Department of 

Defense (DOD), the capabilities of the ALQ-99 are insufficient to keep up 

with rapidly evolving threats and the system is becoming obsolete. As a 

result, the Navy is planning to replace the ALQ-99 with a more capable 

Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) on its EA-18G aircraft. The NGJ program 

was authorized to begin technology development in July 2013, and the 

Navy expects the program to cost over $7 billion, including over $3 billion 

for research, development, test and evaluation, and over $4 billion for 

procurement.

Each of the military departments is making investments in airborne 

electronic attack capabilities. In March 2012, we found potential overlap 

among airborne electronic attack systems in development,2 particularly 

among systems used for irregular warfare that the services were 

acquiring under urgent operational needs processes.3 While some 

redundancy is often desirable, our prior work has shown that pursuing 

multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the 

same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of 

resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled.

We also found that DOD’s ability to identify department-wide needs and 

solutions and eliminate potentially unnecessary overlap may have been 

undermined by a lack of designated, joint leadership charged with 

overseeing electronic warfare acquisition activities. Senate Report 112-

196,4 which accompanied the bill for the Department of Defense 

 2

Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar 

activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries.

3

GAO, Airborne Electronic Attack: Achieving Mission Objectives Depends on Overcoming 

Acquisition Challenges, GAO-12-175 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2012).

4

S. REP. No. 112-196, at 191 (2012).
Page 3 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Appropriations Act, 2013 and was subsequently incorporated into the 

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, directed 

GAO to review the NGJ program and potential duplication.5 This report 

examines (1) the extent to which DOD has assessed whether there is 

duplication among the NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition 

programs,6 and (2) the extent to which the NGJ is being managed as a 

joint solution that supports multiple military services.

To determine the extent to which DOD assessed duplication among the 

NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed 

key NGJ and DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004 

Airborne Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009 

Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of 

Alternatives, and the DOD’s annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to 

Congress. We assessed DOD’s analysis of duplication against DOD’s 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual. 

We also analyzed information provided by the military services regarding 

the capabilities and missions of existing and planned airborne electronic 

attack systems, and interviewed DOD, military service, program, and 

Joint Staff officials. To determine the extent to which the NGJ is being 

managed as a joint solution, we reviewed key requirements and 

acquisition documents reflecting military service and Joint Staff input into 

NGJ requirements and the acquisition program.7 We also reviewed the 

NGJ Analysis of Alternatives and interviewed DOD, military service, 

program, and Joint Staff officials to determine whether the NGJ is 

intended to be used on multiple platforms.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to August

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our analysis 

was limited to information classified no higher than SECRET, but we 

 5

Pub. L. No. 113-6 (2012).

6

Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same 

activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries.

7

According to DOD Joint Publication 1-02, the term “joint” connotes activities, operations, 

organizations, etc. in which elements of two or more military departments participate.
Page 4 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The NGJ is DOD’s program to replace the ALQ-99 tactical jamming 

system. The ALQ-99 is a five-pod jamming system that is capable of 

automatically processing, and jamming radio frequency signals. It 

counters a variety of threats in low-, mid-, and high-band frequency 

ranges. Figure 1 shows the radars that operate in different frequency 

bands and ranges.

Figure 1: Radars Operating in Different Frequency Bands and Ranges

The ALQ-99 was originally flown on EA-6B aircraft, which are expected to 

be fully retired in 2019, and is transitioning to the EA-18G, an electronic 

attack variant of the Navy’s F/A-18 fighter jet. Figure 2 shows the ALQ-99 

on the EA-18G.

Background
Page 5 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Figure 2: EA-18G with Three ALQ-99 Jamming Pods

EA-6B and EA-18Gs can be based on aircraft carriers or in expeditionary 

squadrons that are deployed to land-based locations as needed. The 

ALQ-99/EA-6B combination was originally developed for use in major 

combat operations, and in 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the 

sole tactical radar support jammer for all services after the Air Force 

decided to retire its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. The role of the EA-6B has 

continued to expand over time. According to DOD officials, when 

Operation Iraqi Freedom began, EA-6Bs were used in irregular warfare 

environments along with another aircraft, the EC-130H Compass Call, 

because they provided needed jamming capabilities and there were no 

other airborne electronic attack assets available for this role. These and 

other demands have strained DOD’s airborne electronic attack capacity 

and increased the stress on systems, such as the ALQ-99.

Like the ALQ-99, the NGJ will be comprised of jamming pods that will fly 

on the Navy’s EA-18G. Its main purpose will be to counter integrated air 

defense systems in major combat operations. The EA-18G with NGJ is to 

primarily be based on aircraft carriers at sea where it is to be employed in 

U.S. Navy carrier strike groups to counter both sea- and land-based 

weapon systems. DOD also plans for it to support joint expeditionary 

warfare missions. The EA-18G with NGJ is currently planned to primarily 

serve in a modified escort role, in which it is expected to jam enemy 
Page 6 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

radars while the aircraft is outside the range of known surface-to-air 

missiles. It is also expected to be capable of conducting stand-off 

jamming missions, in which the aircraft is located outside of defended 

airspace. In both cases, the idea is to protect or “hide” other systems from 

enemy radars. The EA-18G with the NGJ is also intended to be used for

other purposes, such as communications jamming. Figure 3 shows the 

NGJ with other airborne electronic attack systems countering enemy air 

defense systems.

Figure 3: Notional Depiction of Airborne Electronic Attack Systems Countering Enemy Air Defenses

Notes: Stand-off jamming occurs outside defended airspace.

Modified escort jamming occurs outside the known surface-to-air missile range.

Penetrating escort jamming occurs within known surface-to-air missile range.

Stand-in jamming occurs within the surface-to-air missile “no escape” zone.
Page 7 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

In July 2013, DOD conducted a milestone A review for the NGJ program, 

which is a planned major defense acquisition program, and authorized it 

to enter the technology development phase.8 Subsequent to the 

milestone A review, the Navy awarded a $279.4 million contract to 

Raytheon for NGJ technology development.9 Figure 4 shows the time line 

for the milestone A review and other key NGJ events.

Figure 4: Time Line of Key NGJ Events

The NGJ program plans to use an incremental approach to development 

in which the most critical capabilities are to be delivered first. In total, the 

Navy’s acquisition strategy calls for three increments: mid-, low-, and 

high-band. The specific frequency ranges covered by these bands is 

classified.

Both federal statute and DOD policies include provisions designed to help 

prevent unnecessary duplication of investments. Section 2366a of title 10 

of the U.S. Code provides that a major defense acquisition program may 

not receive milestone A approval until the Milestone Decision Authority 

certifies, after consultation with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 

 8

Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD that require eventual 

total research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures, including all 

planned increments, of more than $365 million, or procurement expenditures, including all 

planned increments, of more than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.

9

BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc. filed a bid protest of 

the NGJ technology development contract award on July 18, 2013. 
Page 8 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

that if the program duplicates a capability already provided by an existing 

system, the duplication provided by such program is necessary and 

appropriate.10 In addition, DOD’s JCIDS Manual directs that initial 

capabilities documents, which describe capability gaps that require a 

materiel solution, identify proposed capability requirements for which 

there exists overlaps or redundancies.11 Initial capabilities documents 

should also assess whether the overlap is advisable for operational 

redundancy or whether it should be evaluated as a potential trade-off or 

alternative to satisfy identified capability gaps. The manual also states 

that, when validating key requirements documents, the chair of the group 

responsible for that capability area is also certifying that the proposed 

requirements and capabilities are not unnecessarily redundant to existing 

capabilities in the joint force. This applies to initial capabilities documents, 

capability development documents, and capability production documents, 

which helps ensure that potential redundancies are discussed at multiple 

points in the acquisition process.

However, assessing duplication among airborne electronic attack 

investments is challenging for a variety of reasons. There is a lack of 

documentation comparing all current existing and planned airborne 

electronic attack capabilities; electronic warfare investments are 

distributed among the services; systems in the electronic warfare portfolio 

are classified at multiple levels; future needs and threats and plans to 

address them change quickly; planned programs of record or upgrades 

are not always known until funding is requested; and some overlap

among systems is intentional.

 10The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and includes one senior leader from each of the military services, 

among others, validates capability gaps and the requirements for the systems that are 

planned to address them.

11Department of Defense, Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System (Jan. 19, 2012). JCIDS validates gaps in joint warfighting 

capabilities and requirements that resolve those gaps. 
Page 9 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

DOD has assessed whether the planned NGJ program is duplicative 

using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system’s 

planned roles or take into account the military services’ evolving airborne 

electronic attack investment plans. DOD’s analyses of its airborne 

electronic attack capability gaps over the last decade, as well as the NGJ 

analysis of alternatives, support its conclusion that the NGJ is not 

duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role – the joint 

suppression of enemy air defenses. However, these analyses do not 

address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ and other 

systems being developed for other roles, such as communications 

jamming in irregular warfare environments. The military services also plan 

to invest in additional airborne electronic attack systems, so new 

duplication issues could emerge. Several ongoing DOD efforts could 

provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and 

duplication related to the NGJ. However, we found weaknesses in the 

execution of some of these efforts.

According to DOD and Joint Staff officials, the NGJ addresses a clear 

capability gap and is not duplicative of other airborne electronic attack 

systems. It is a direct replacement for the Navy’s ALQ-99 tactical jamming 

system and addresses validated capability gaps. DOD analyses dating 

back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for 

service investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities, such as the 

NGJ. DOD outlined its findings in reports that included analyses of 

alternatives and initial capabilities documents.

None of these documents are specifically assessments of duplication; 

they serve other purposes. For example, the two initial capabilities 

documents – the 2004 Airborne Electronic Attack and 2009 Electronic 

Warfare Initial Capabilities Documents – identified the capability gaps that 

the NGJ is intended to address. Table 1 lists key documents and 

describes the extent to which they assessed duplication and overlap for 

NGJ.

DOD Analysis of 

Potential Duplication 

Does Not Address All 

NGJ Roles and 

Planned Acquisition 

Programs

DOD Has Cited Its 

Assessments of Capability 

Gaps As Evidence That 

NGJ Is Not Duplicative
Page 10 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Table 1: Key Documents and the Extent to Which They Considered Existing and 

Planned Capabilities and Assessed Duplication and Overlap for NGJ

Document Consideration of duplication and overlap

2004 Airborne Electronic Attack

Initial Capabilities Document

Assessed capability gaps. Does not directly address 

potential duplication and overlap.

2009 Electronic Warfare Initial 

Capabilities Document

Assessed capability gaps. Does not directly address 

potential duplication and overlap.

2011 NGJ Analysis of 

Alternatives

Considered existing and planned airborne electronic 

capabilities when determining the relative importance 

of targets that NGJ should address. Identified 

potential overlap and duplication among the targets 

that airborne electronic attack systems can address. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.

According to DOD and Joint Staff officials, the analyses contained in 

these documents provided support for the certification the department is 

required to make that the NGJ is not unnecessarily duplicative before

receiving milestone A approval to begin technology development. In 

addition, Joint Staff officials stated that they reviewed the NGJ and its 

potential capabilities for duplication before endorsing the NGJ Analysis of 

Alternatives. We were not able to review the Joint Staff’s analysis due to 

its classification level.

DOD analyses of NGJ capabilities and potential duplication do not reflect 

all of its planned roles, particularly in irregular warfare environments, or 

evolving service acquisition plans. Section 2366a of title 10 of the U.S. 

Code provides that a major defense acquisition program may not receive 

milestone A approval until the Milestone Decision Authority certifies, after 

consultation with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, that if the 

program duplicates a capability already provided by an existing system, 

the duplication provided by such program is necessary and appropriate. 

DOD’s analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ is not duplicative of 

existing capabilities in its primary role—the joint suppression of enemy air 

defenses in a modified escort setting, which includes defended airspace 

outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. In fact, the NGJ 

Analysis of Alternatives found that the planned system would complement 

other DOD investments in electronic warfare and stealth. However, these 

analyses do not address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ 

and systems being developed for other roles, such as communications 

DOD NGJ Analyses Do Not 

Reflect All of Its Planned 

Roles or Service 

Acquisition Plans
Page 11 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

jamming in irregular warfare environments—an area where we have 

found potential duplication in our prior work.12 Most of these systems have 

been developed or incorporated into military service investment plans 

since these analyses were conducted.

Since the preparation of key NGJ-related documents, DOD has focused 

on increasing its airborne electronic attack capabilities and capacity, 

resulting in several systems that were not considered in those analyses. 

When these analyses were being completed, DOD had few airborne 

electronic attack systems and programs of record, none of which were 

specifically designed for the irregular warfare environment.13 Table 2 

shows existing and planned airborne electronic attack systems and 

whether they were discussed in key NGJ-related documents.

 12GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); and GAO-12-175. 

13A program of record is a program that is included in the Future Years Defense 

Program—DOD’s 5-year investment plan.
Page 12 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Table 2: Existing and Planned Airborne Electronic Attack Systems

Systems primarily for major combat operations Primary role

Acquiring 

service Statusa

Existed or 

planned at the 

time of DOD’s 

analyses

EC-130H Stand-off, and 

communications jamming

Air Force Existing Yes

Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer Stand-in jamming Air Force Existing Yes

Electronic Attack Enabled Active Electronically 

Scanned Array (AESA) Radar

Self protection; penetrating 

escort

Multiple Planned Yes

Next Generation Jammer Stand-off, modified escort, 

and communications

jamming

Navy Planned Yes

Multi-Platform Electronic Attack Pod Upgrade Self protection/penetrating 

escort

Air Force Planned No

Systems primarily for irregular warfare

Communications Electronic Attack with 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CEASAR)

Communications jamming Army Existing No

Intrepid Tiger II Block 1 Communications jamming Marine Corps Existing No

Multi-Function Electronic Warfare Communications jamming Army Planned No

Intrepid Tiger II Block X Communications and radar 

jamming

Marine Corps Planned No

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and interviews with DOD officials.

Notes: Stand-off jamming occurs outside defended airspace.

Modified escort jamming occurs outside the known surface-to-air missile range.

Penetrating escort jamming occurs within known surface-to-air missile range.

Stand-in jamming occurs within the surface-to-air missile “no escape” zone.

a

Planned systems only include those that are in the budget.

Based on our analysis of DOD airborne electronic attack systems and 

missions, none of the systems we reviewed that have emerged since 

DOD’s NGJ analysis was completed duplicate planned capabilities; 

however, there is some overlap in the roles that the systems are intended 

to perform. For example, according to the F-35 program office, some 

aircraft with electronic attack enabled AESA radar may be able to perform 

some jamming functions in a modified escort role. However, unlike the 

NGJ, they are not designed to be dedicated jamming systems. In 

addition, NGJ is to be capable of communications jamming in an irregular 

warfare type environment, like systems such as CEASAR and Intrepid 

Tiger II, which were fielded under rapid acquisition authorities and in very 

limited quantities. Army and Marine Corps officials explained that their 

systems are a more suitable and economic alternative to the NGJ for 

these missions. For example, Army officials stated that the systems the 
Page 13 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Army is investing in, such as CEASAR and Multi-Function Electronic 

Warfare, would provide the right amount of power for their needs, be 

more readily available to units, and cost less. According to DOD, these 

systems also provide additional capacity in an area where there has been 

significant demand. However, as DOD and the military services continue

to invest in new additional airborne electronic attack capabilities, the 

potential for duplication and overlap to occur increases.

DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for 

updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication related to the 

NGJ and other airborne electronic attack investments, including its annual 

Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress, a U.S. Strategic 

Command review of DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems, and 

the NGJ capability development document. However, we found 

weaknesses in two of the three efforts.

DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if 

necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in its electronic 

warfare strategy report to Congress. Section 1053 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that for each of 

fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and secretaries of the military departments, 

submit to the congressional defense committees an annual report on 

DOD’s electronic warfare strategy.14 Each report must provide information 

on both unclassified and classified programs and projects, including 

whether or not the program or project is redundant or overlaps with the 

efforts of another military department.15 DOD has produced two reports in 

response to this requirement. In these reports, DOD assessed duplication 

of airborne electronic attack systems, including NGJ. However, the 

analysis was limited and did not examine potential overlap between 

capabilities or explain why that overlap was warranted. DOD officials 

explained that the report relied primarily on the military services to selfidentify overlap and duplication. Redundancy in some of these areas 

may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to 

develop similar capabilities can also result in the same capability gap 

being filled twice or more, which may contribute to other warfighting 

 14Pub. L. No. 111-84, §1053(a) (2009).

15Pub. L. No. 111-84, §1053(b) (2009).

Ongoing DOD Efforts 

Provide Another 

Mechanism to Address 

Potential Overlap and 

Duplication

Electronic Warfare Strategy 

Report to Congress
Page 14 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

needs going unfilled. This report is supposed to be submitted at the same 

time the President submits the budget to Congress, but DOD has not yet 

issued its report for fiscal year 2013 and could not provide a definitive 

date for when it plans to do so.

The U.S. Strategic Command also has an ongoing review that could help 

assess duplication and overlap issues related to the NGJ and other 

systems. Joint Staff officials stated that, during the course of our review, 

they began in collaboration with U.S. Strategic Command to review 

DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems at all levels of classification. 

They explained that the review will examine capability requirements in 

select approved warfighting scenarios as well as potential redundancy 

within the portfolio. According to the Joint Staff, the review should be 

completed sometime in fiscal year 2013.

Capability development documents, which define the performance 

requirements of acquisition programs, are another vehicle to discuss 

potential redundancies across proposed and existing programs. The Navy 

must produce and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council must 

validate a capability development document for the NGJ program before it 

can receive approval to enter system development—currently planned for 

fiscal year 2015. The JCIDS manual provides that, when validating 

capability development documents, the chair of the group responsible for 

that capability area is also certifying that the proposed requirements and 

capabilities are not unnecessarily redundant to existing capabilities in the 

joint force. The draft NGJ capability development document addresses 

potential redundancies by stating that the NGJ is fully synchronized with 

existing systems and will be synchronized with future systems, and that 

individual airborne electronic attack systems all concentrate on unique 

portions of the electromagnetic spectrum—frequency ranges—for 

different mission sets. However, the Navy did not identify the systems that 

it considered in its analysis, so it will be difficult for others to validate this 

conclusion or whether it applies to all of the NGJ’s planned roles.

U.S. Strategic Command 

Annual Electronic Warfare 

Assessment

NGJ Capability Development 

Document
Page 15 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

The NGJ is not a joint acquisition program, but it is planned to provide 

airborne electronic attack capabilities that will support all military services 

in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments. The 

NGJ is not intended to meet all of the military services’ airborne electronic 

attack needs, and the services are planning to make additional 

investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting 

roles. The military services may be able to leverage the NGJ program in 

support of their own acquisition priorities and programs because its 

current acquisition strategy is based on a modular open systems

approach, which allows system components to be added, removed, 

modified, replaced, or sustained by different military customers or 

manufacturers without significantly impacting the remainder of the 

system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its 

technologies into other systems in the future.

Despite its role in joint military operations, the NGJ program is led and 

funded by the Navy and is not a joint acquisition program. The definition 

of a joint acquisition program is related to whether it is funded by more 

than one DOD component, not whether other organizations have 

provided input on it. In the case of the NGJ, the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and includes one senior leader from each of the military 

services, such as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army or the Vice Chief of 

Naval Operations, has validated that the need exists for the program. The 

Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Joint Staff have provided input into 

the program as part of DOD’s requirements and acquisition processes. 

This included collaboration on requirements documents and the NGJ 

Analysis of Alternatives. The Air Force’s 2004 Airborne Electronic Attack 

Initial Capabilities Document and Strategic Command’s 2009 Electronic 

Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, which informed NGJ requirements, 

included input from senior-level oversight boards representing all the 

military services. In addition, advisors from various parts of the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and all services provided 

input into the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives through forums such as 

working groups, integrated product teams, and a high-level executive 

steering committee.

DOD plans to use Navy EA-18Gs with the NGJ to support multiple military 

services in joint operational environments. In the joint operational 

environment, each service relies on the capabilities of the others to 

maximize its own effectiveness while minimizing its vulnerabilities. For 

example, in conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at risk 

NGJ Capabilities Are 

to Support the Joint 

Force, but the Military 

Services Are Also 

Developing Systems 

Tailored to Their 

Specific Needs

NGJ Is Not a Joint 

Acquisition Program, but 

Its Capabilities Are to 

Support the Joint Force
Page 16 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

from enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles. EA-18Gs can 

use the NGJ jamming capabilities in these settings to disrupt enemy radar 

and communications and suppress enemy air defenses. Because aircraft, 

such as the EA-18G, are to protect aircraft of all services in hostile 

airspace, the joint suppression mission necessarily crosses individual 

service lines. The system the NGJ is replacing–ALQ-99–has also been 

used extensively in irregular warfare environments, including in Iraq and 

Afghanistan in response to electronic attack requests from all the military 

services.

DOD has placed an emphasis on increasing airborne electronic attack 

capacity and capabilities. While the Navy’s NGJ is expected to provide 

airborne electronic attack capabilities to support all military services in 

both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments, the 

other services are also planning to make additional investments in 

airborne electronic attack systems that are tailored to their specific 

warfighting roles. The services’ airborne electronic attack plans vary in 

part because of these roles. For example, DOD officials explained that 

the Navy is responsible for ensuring freedom of navigation in the world’s 

oceans and has a key role in force projection; the Marine Corps is a rapid 

expeditionary force; the Air Force provides long range strike and close air 

support and is responsible for establishing air superiority; and the Army is 

the primary force for land operations in war and usually enters a battle 

area after the Air Force has established air superiority. Military service 

officials characterized their airborne electronic attack plans and the role of 

the NGJ in them as follows:

• Air Force: The Air Force is focused on developing long range strike 

capabilities, enabling the electronic attack capabilities of its F-22A and 

F-35 aircraft for penetrating escort roles, and investing in 

improvements to self protection systems for its fighter aircraft, 

including the F-15 and the F-16. Air Force requirements officials 

stated that the planned capabilities of NGJ will complement the other 

systems it is developing.

• Army: Officials from the Army’s Electronic Warfare Division stated that 

although the NGJ-equipped EA-18Gs would have a role in helping to 

establish air superiority before the Army enters an area, the Army 

plans to rely on its own airborne electronic attack systems to perform 

the necessary jamming in support of its ground forces. According to 

Army officials, the service plans to invest in less expensive, less 

powerful systems that will be readily available at the brigade combat 

Military Services Are 

Planning to Develop 

Additional Systems That 

Are Tailored to Their Roles
Page 17 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

team level. The Army developed CEASAR, a jamming pod on C-12 

aircraft, and is now developing a more capable successor to CEASAR 

under the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare program, which is early in 

the acquisition process.

• Marine Corps: Officials from the Marine Corps’ Electronic Warfare 

Branch stated that each Marine Air Ground Task Force commander 

must possess its own airborne electronic attack capabilities and the 

Marine Corps does not plan to rely solely on Navy EA-18G’s with NGJ 

to support its air and ground forces. Historically, the Marines have 

relied on their own expeditionary EA-6B squadrons to meet joint

electronic warfare requirements, but the EA-6Bs will be phased out by 

2019 and the Marine Corps does not plan to acquire the EA-18G, 

which will be equipped with the NGJ. According to the Marine Corps, 

it will coordinate the use of NGJ support from the Navy when 

appropriate but it expects to rely on its own systems for its core 

missions. The Marine Corps plans to upgrade its Intrepid Tiger II 

jamming pods to support both communications and radar jamming, 

and develop a system to integrate air and ground electronic warfare 

units with other payloads designed to be used on any platform.

The current acquisition strategy for the NGJ program calls for it to be 

integrated on one aircraft—the EA-18G—however, the program is 

planning on pursuing a modular open systems approach to development 

that could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into 

other systems in the future. An open systems approach allows system 

components to be added, removed, modified, replaced, or sustained by 

the military customer or different manufacturers, in addition to the prime 

manufacturer that developed the system. It also allows independent 

suppliers to build components that can plug-in to the existing system 

through the open connections. Fundamental elements of an open 

systems approach include the following:

• Designing a system with modular components that isolate 

functionality. This makes the system easier to develop, maintain, and 

modify because components can be changed without significantly 

impacting the remainder of the system.

• Developing and using open, publicly available standards for the key 

interfaces, or connections, between the components.

Open Systems Approach 

Could Facilitate Use of 

NGJ Technologies on 

Other Systems
Page 18 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

According to NGJ program officials, a modular open systems approach 

would allow the NGJ to be designed so that it could adapt to threat and 

technology changes. It also enables future growth of the system. 

Furthermore, Navy officials stated that the approach could make it 

possible for NGJ components to be used and modified for application on 

significantly different platforms, including unmanned aerial vehicles. This 

approach is encouraged by DOD guidance, including its Better Buying 

Power initiative, as well as Navy guidance.

The NGJ Analysis of Alternatives also examined integrating the NGJ onto 

the F-35, which is being acquired by the Air Force, Marine Corp, and 

Navy, but the option was found to be too risky and costly for a near-term 

solution. Navy officials explained that, even with an open systems 

approach, integrating the NGJ with any platform is difficult. Even the 

integration associated with moving the ALQ-99 to the EA-18G was 

challenging. The cost of the effort was about $2 billion and took 5 years. 

Part of the integration challenge was adapting the operator workload 

system because the EA-6B is a four-operator aircraft while the EA-18G is 

a two-operator aircraft. The F-35 is a single-operator aircraft, which 

officials explained would cause significant integration challenges for the 

NGJ.

Airborne electronic attack is an important enabling capability for U.S. 

military forces in both major combat operations and irregular warfare 

environments. In response to rapidly evolving threats and mission needs, 

DOD is making investments to increase both its airborne electronic attack 

capacity and capabilities. At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the NGJ 

represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack 

capabilities. Investments of this size must be well-justified and are 

required by statute and DOD policy to be examined for unnecessary 

redundancy. DOD’s analysis of its airborne electronic attack capability 

gaps over the last decade, as well as the NGJ analysis of alternatives, 

supports its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not 

duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role. However, in the time 

since DOD completed some of these analyses, the investment plans of

the military services have changed, particularly in the irregular warfare 

area. The military services are quick to differentiate their airborne 

electronic attack needs and justify individual service, rather than joint or 

common, solutions to meet them. While none of the new programs 

planned duplicate NGJ capabilities, new areas of overlap and potential 

duplication could emerge as these plans continue to evolve. Redundancy 

in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple 

Conclusions
Page 19 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can also result in the 

same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of 

resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled.

DOD has mechanisms, such as the Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to 

Congress, U.S. Strategic Command Annual Electronic Warfare 

Assessment, and NGJ capability development document, that it can use 

to continue to assess overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other 

airborne electronic capabilities at key points in the acquisition process 

and communicate its evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans 

to Congress. Identifying existing and planned systems across all of the 

NGJ’s planned roles in its capability development document could help 

ensure that DOD’s analysis of potential overlap and duplication is 

complete. Moreover, providing Electronic Warfare Strategy Reports to 

Congress as required and incorporating information on potentially 

overlapping systems and why such overlap is warranted would provide 

Congress with more complete information about the relationship between 

electronic warfare programs.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two 

actions:

• To help ensure that the NGJ does not unnecessarily duplicate existing 

or planned capabilities, require the Navy, in coordination with the Joint 

Staff, to address overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other 

systems in all of its planned roles in the NGJ capability development 

document. The NGJ capability development document should identify 

the existing and planned systems that the Navy assessed for potential 

redundancies to help determine if its analysis was comprehensive.

• To provide Congress complete information about the relationship 

between electronic warfare programs, ensure that the Electronic 

Warfare Strategy Reports to Congress include information on 

potentially overlapping capabilities among systems, such as the NGJ 

and Electronically Attack Enabled AESA Radar, CEASAR, Intrepid 

Tiger II, and Multi-Function Electronic Warfare, and why that overlap 

is warranted.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, which are reprinted in full in appendix II, DOD partially 

concurred with our first recommendation and concurred with our second 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 20 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments that were 

incorporated as appropriate.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to address overlap and 

duplication between the NGJ and other systems in all of its planned roles 

in the NGJ capability development document. DOD responded that it 

concurs with the need to continue to assess unnecessary duplication and 

redundancy, but it does not concur with including the assessment in the 

capability development document. Rather DOD stated that it will address 

unnecessary duplication and redundancy in accordance with its existing 

processes, such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development 

System (JCIDS), and statutory requirements. DOD explained that 

changes it made to the JCIDS process in January 2012 address the 

concerns about potential capability overlaps and redundancies raised in 

this and other GAO reports. For example, the revised JCIDS manual 

emphasized the role of functional capabilities board in assessing potential 

unnecessary capability redundancy prior to forwarding a program’s 

requirements documents for approval. In addition, DOD stated that the 

Joint Staff is further improving these processes through a pending update 

to JCIDS that will include increased emphasis on functional area portfolio 

management. DOD also reiterated in its comments and in a classified 

enclosure that NGJ’s capabilities are not unnecessarily duplicative.

We acknowledged the existing JCIDS mechanisms that address potential 

overlap and duplication in this report and have discussed the value of 

effective portfolio management in prior reports. However, as we point out 

in our recommendation, documenting the assessments that support these 

processes is important because it allows others to determine if DOD’s 

analysis was comprehensive. We identified the NGJ capability 

development document as the appropriate vehicle to document DOD’s 

assessment of potential duplication because DOD already requires that 

potential overlap and duplication be considered before the document can 

be validated and the program can move forward in the acquisition 

process. Finally, while DOD’s current analysis indicates that none of its 

current or planned programs duplicate NGJ capabilities, new areas of 

overlap and potential duplication could emerge as military service 

investment plans continue to evolve.

DOD concurred with our second recommendation regarding providing 

complete information about the relationship between electronic warfare 

programs in its Electronic Warfare Strategy Reports to Congress. DOD 

did not provide details regarding how it plans to implement this 

recommendation. 
Page 21 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the 

Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report is available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 

assessed duplication among the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), existing 

capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed key NGJ and 

DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004 Airborne 

Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009 Electronic 

Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives 

(AOA), and the DOD Annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to 

Congress, to determine whether potential duplication was considered as 

DOD developed NGJ requirements and prepared for initiation of the NGJ 

acquisition program. We interviewed DOD, military service, and program 

officials and the Joint Staff about how these analyses were conducted. 

We assessed DOD’s analysis of duplication against DOD’s Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual.1 In 

addition, we reviewed information up to the SECRET level provided by 

the military services regarding the capabilities and missions of existing 

and planned airborne electronic attack systems. Our analysis was limited 

to non-kinetic airborne electronic attack systems as opposed to kinetic 

capabilities which focus on destroying forces through the application of 

physical effects.

To determine the extent to which the NGJ is being managed as a joint 

solution, we reviewed key requirements and acquisition documents 

reflecting military service and Joint Staff input into NGJ requirements and 

the acquisition program. We also interviewed DOD, military service, and 

program officials to determine the extent to which the military services 

provided input into NGJ requirements and the acquisition program. In 

addition, we analyzed documents, such as memorandums of agreement 

among the military services, and interviewed military service and Joint 

Staff officials to obtain an understanding of how NGJ is expected to 

operate in the joint force. We also reviewed the NGJ AOA and 

interviewed program officials to determine if the system is intended to be 

used on multiple platforms.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 to August

2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

 1

Department of Defense. Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and

Development System (Jan. 19, 2012). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our analysis 

was also limited to information classified no higher than SECRET, but we 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 24 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-13-642 Next Generation Jammer

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 

key contributions to this report: Ronald E. Schwenn, Assistant Director; 

Teakoe Coleman; Laura Greifner; John Krump; Laura Holliday; Brian 

Lepore; Anh Nguyen; Madhav Panwar; Mark Pross; and Roxanna Sun.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(121103)
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