1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM C. TOMPKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 05-311 Erie

)

v. )

)

JO ANNE BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., J.

Plaintiff, William C. Tompkins, commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security, who found that he was not entitled to supplemental security income (“SSI”)

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. Tompkins filed an

application for SSI on September 11, 1997, alleging disability due to a hearing loss and

depression (Administrative Record, hereinafter “AR”, 130-131; 150). His application was

denied, and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on January 12, 2000

(AR 85-94; 440-466). Following this hearing, the ALJ found that he was not eligible for SSI

under the Act (AR 33-40). Tompkins’ request for review by the Appeals Council was granted,

and the matter was remanded to the ALJ for further consideration of his mental impairments (AR

102-106). 

On remand, the ALJ held two additional hearings on May 5, 2004 and May 12, 2005 (AR

467-505). On May 26, 2005, the ALJ again found that Tompkins was not eligible for SSI under

the Act (AR 19-26). His request for review by the Appeals Council was denied (AR 8-11),

rendering the Commissioner’s decision final under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action

challenges the ALJ’s decision. Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant Defendant’s motion and deny

Plaintiff’s motion. 

Case 1:05-cv-00311-SJM Document 14 Filed 07/13/06 Page 1 of 16
1Our recitation is limited to the medical evidence regarding his alleged mental

impairments since Tompkins does not challenge the ALJ’s decision with respect to his alleged 

physical impairments. 

2

I. BACKGROUND1

Tompkins was born on July 7, 1965, and was thirty-nine years old on the date of the

ALJ’s decision (AR 20; 130). He has a GED and no past relevant work experience (AR 20;

197).

On May 27, 1993, while incarcerated, Tompkins underwent psychological testing

performed by A. Jacobson, Psychological Services Associate I (AR 392-393). Mr. Jacobson

reported that based upon his scores, Tompkins’ intelligence and intellectual functioning fell

within the borderline range of mental ability (AR 392). During the personality testing, Mr.

Jacobson found that Tompkins was evasive and misleading during the interview, and proved to

be a poor historian (AR 392). Test results indicated that he was a self-centered and nonconforming individual who was socially and emotionally immature (AR 392). His inner controls

were weak and impulsivity was a salient feature of his behavior pattern (AR 392). Socially, Mr.

Jacobson reported that Tompkins likely avoided extensive interpersonal interaction and

interacted on a superficial level (AR 393). He found his prognosis of institutional adjustment 

guarded, and recommended a highly structured unit with limited decision making (AR 393). 

Tompkins underwent an initial psychiatric evaluation conducted by Craig Richman, M.D.

of Community Integration on September 22, 1997 (AR 243-244). Tompkins reported an

extensive criminal history with numerous years in jail (AR 243). He complained of anxiety,

depression, isolation and poor sleep (AR 243). Dr. Richman reported that Tompkins was abused

as a child, both physically and sexually, and suffered from hearing problems due to being hit with

a bat as a child (AR 243). Tompkins was able to read lips and had no trouble communicating

(AR 243). Past substance abuse included alcohol and marijuana (AR 243). On mental status

examination, Dr. Richman reported that Tompkins admitted being anxious and depressed with

feelings of hopelessness, and that he felt he had too much time on his hands (AR 244). 

Tompkins lived alone and had no family support, but did have a girlfriend (AR 243). Dr.

Richman found his judgement was somewhat impaired (AR 244). Tompkins was diagnosed with

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2The GAF score considers psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a

hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness. Scores between 31 and 40 indicate that an

individual has “[s]ome impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times

illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school,

family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects

family, and is unable to work[.]”). See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:

DSM-IV-TR 34 (4th ed. 2000).

3

major depression, polysubstance abuse, and antisocial personality (AR 244). Dr. Richman

assigned him a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 40, and prescribed Remeron

(AR 244).2

On November 19, 1997, Manella Link, Ph.D., a state agency reviewing psychologist,

completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment form and concluded that Tompkins

was not significantly limited or only moderately limited in all areas of functioning (AR 256-259).

On May 27, 1999, while incarcerated at SCI-Albion following a second technical parole

violation, Tompkins was evaluated for parole purposes by Deborah J. Gregg, Psychologist (AR

390-391). Tompkins reported that there were times he became “a little depressed,” but he did not

feel that way anymore (AR 390). He was compliant with his medications and denied alcohol use

(AR 390). Ms. Gregg noticed no outward signs of depression, and found that his diagnosis of

depression appeared to be in “good remission” (AR 391). 

 Tompkins was again psychiatrically evaluated for parole purposes by Angela Lindemuth,

D.O., on September 3, 1999 (AR 386-389). He reported a history of physical and sexual abuse

by his parents and while in foster care (AR 386). He suffered from hearing loss in both ears as a

result of a rupture of the tympanic membrane bilaterally due to a beating from his father (AR

387). He was reportedly intoxicated on various substances on a daily basis well into his twenties

until his incarceration, and had been hospitalized on five different occasions from adolescence

through his early adulthood for suicidal attempts (AR 386). He further reported that he engaged

in self-mutilation since the age of 14, and had jumped in front of vehicles on multiple occasions

(AR 386). He was the father of five children mothered by various women (AR 386). 

Dr. Lindemuth found that Tompkins appeared to exhibit a borderline personality type

profile, and since his teenage years, had exhibited extreme mood reactivity, temper displays,

recurrent suicidal ideation, threats, and suicidal gestures (AR 387). Tompkins described a

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3Scores between 41 and 50 indicate “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe

obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or

school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). Id.

4

significantly variable self-image, transient paranoid ideation, feelings of emptiness, and

vacillated from valuing to devaluing others (AR 387). Dr. Lindemuth observed that Tompkins’

updated psychological report indicated that he had adjusted quite well to the institution, was

compliant with his medication treatment and group programming, and was looking forward to

entering the Stairways program upon release (AR 387). 

On mental status examination, Dr. Lindemuth reported that Tompkins exhibited poor

grooming and hygiene and had a level of unkemptness (AR 388). Although he had difficulty

hearing, he was able to relate in a cooperative and candid fashion, and articulated clearly and

spontaneously in an organized goal-directed thought process (AR 388). His thought content

varied depending upon the subject matter addressed, and his affect appeared somewhat blunted

but euthymic (AR 388). Dr. Lindemuth found no evidence of perceptual disturbance or

delusional ideation (AR 388). Although Dr. Lindemuth found his judgment lacking given his

persistent criminal behavior despite the consequences, he exhibited some insight with respect to

his illness since he was cognizant of the need to maintain follow up with mental health care

treatment to perpetuate mental stability (AR 388). Tompkins was diagnosed with recurrent but

currently stable major depression, polysubstance abuse, and borderline personality disorder, and

assigned a GAF score of 45 (AR 388).3 Dr. Lindemuth opined that there were no clinical

contraindications to granting parole, and recommended Tompkins for the Stairways program (AR

389). 

Pursuant to the request of the Commissioner, Tompkins underwent a consultative

psychological evaluation on February 16, 2000 performed by Byron Hillin, Ph.D. (AR 277-281). 

At the time of the evaluation, Tompkins was residing in a residential drug and alcohol program

run by Stairways Mental Health, Inc. as part of his conditions of parole (AR 277). Tompkins

reported that he had difficulty sustaining work due to his suspiciousness and paranoia, and had

been dismissed from his last job because of his paranoia (AR 278). He indicated that he had

never been married, but had six children for whom he paid no child support (AR 279). 

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4A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and

circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational,

or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). Id.

5

Tompkins recounted his prior abuse by his father, as well as his prior criminal history (AR 279). 

He reported that he did not drive, had never lived alone, and had always had other people assist

him with cooking and cleaning (AR 279). He denied any hobbies, but attended Alcoholics

Anonymous meetings on occasion (AR 279). His medications included Remeron and Risperdal

(AR 277). 

On mental status examination, Dr. Hillin found Tompkins’ hygiene and dress were

adequate, eye contact was appropriate, and he developed rapport easily (AR 279). Tompkins

claimed that at times he was depressed with feelings of hopelessness regarding his future,

became anxious around other people, suffered from paranoia which he felt contributed to his

inability to hold a job, and had difficulty sleeping (AR 280). Dr. Hillin reported that his speech

was relevant, coherent and goal-directed, his thoughts were well-organized, no psychotic

symptoms were present, and his affect was normal (AR 280). Tompkins’ attention and

concentration were adequate, his memory processes were intact, and his social judgment was

appropriate (AR 281). Dr. Hillin diagnosed him with alcohol and substance abuse in remission,

depressive disorder NOS by history, and antisocial personality disorder features (AR 281). Dr.

Hillin assigned him a GAF score of 55,4 and opined that he could follow simple directions and

was capable of independent functioning (AR 281).

Dr. Hillin also completed a residual functional capacity assessment form and opined that

Tompkins had a “fair” ability in most areas of functioning, except in his ability to understand,

remember and carry out complex job instructions, which Dr. Hillin found was “poor/none” (AR

282). 

Tompkins was evaluated by David Thomas, Ph.D. from Stairways Behavioral Health on 

February 26, 2000 (AR 307-318). He reported that he had been off his medications for the last

four days, and complained of feeling overwhelmed, hopeless, worthless, and paranoid (AR 308). 

He reported that he last worked one month earlier for a seven-month period pumping gas, and

left that job because he was not given enough hours (AR 312). On mental status examination,

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“NOS” stands for “not otherwise specified,” and includes disorders with depressive

features that do not meet the criteria for other specific categories of depression set forth in the

DSM-IV-TR. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR 381 (4th

ed. 2000). 

6

Dr. Thomas reported that Tompkins was cooperative, exhibited adequate eye contact, hygiene

and dress (AR 314). His speech was pressured, his affect appropriate, and his thought process

was organized and relevant (AR 314-315). He had above average intellect, and his long term

memory, motivation, judgment and insight were fair (AR 315). Dr. Thomas diagnosed post

traumatic stress disorder, depression NOS,5 antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality

disorder, and assigned him a GAF score of 50 (AR 315). Dr. Thomas resumed his medications

(AR 315).

Medication-check progress notes dated April 13, 2000 reflect that Tompkins complained

of poor sleep and poor concentration, although he reportedly read a lot (AR 306). Tompkins

reported that he never received his medications since he lost his prescription (AR 306). His

appearance, speech, judgement, insight and memory were all reported as normal (AR 306). On

May 10, 2000, Tompkins complained that he felt more depressed, with mood swings and anxiety

(AR 305). He further reported feelings of helplessness and anger (AR 305). Effexor was added

to his medication regime (AR 305). 

On June 2, 2000, Larry D. Smith, Ph.D., a state agency reviewing psychologist,

completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment and opined that Tompkins was not

significantly limited or only moderately limited in most areas of functioning, and there was no

evidence of any limitation in his ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed

instructions (AR 346-347). Dr. Smith further opined that despite his difficulties interacting with

people and his over-sensitivity to their behavior, Tompkins had the ability to understand,

remember and follow instructions and perform at least routine tasks (AR 348). 

On September 4, 2001, while incarcerated at SCI-Somerset, he underwent a psychiatric

evaluation for parol conducted by Pushkalai Pillai, M.D. (AR 381-383). Tompkins relayed his

prior criminal history and physical abuse history, and stated that he was unable to provide

support for his seven children (AR 381-382). On mental status examination, Dr. Pillai reported

that Tompkins was somewhat unclean and unkempt, but was cooperative, “very calm,” friendly,

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and exhibited a normal affect with no anxiety (AR 382). His speech was respective,

spontaneous, relevant, coherent and logical (AR 382). Dr. Pillai found no evidence of psychosis,

depression or suicidal thoughts (AR 382). Dr. Pillai further found that Tompkins’ judgment had

improved, but his capacity for judgment when not under supervision was questionable (AR 383). 

He was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with depressed mood and personality disorder,

mainly borderline personality disorder, which was the principle diagnosis (AR 383). Dr. Pillai

found no psychiatric contraindications for parole, but opined that he should undergo placement in

a drug and alcohol program with mental health follow up, and that he needed supervision for an

extended period of time due to his poor judgment and limited intellectual functioning (AR 383). 

Dr. Pillai conducted another clinical risk assessment for parole on March 12, 2002 (378-

380). Dr. Pillai reported that Tompkins appeared “much different” when last seen for parole

evaluation in September 2001 (AR 379). He was clean, friendly, cooperative and pleasant (AR

379). He was calmer, with no anxiety or depression, and his speech was spontaneous, relevant

and coherent (AR 379). His affect was appropriate to his thought content, and he had no suicidal

thoughts (AR 379). Dr. Pillai found that Tompkins exhibited a positive attitude regarding his life

when released from prison, and was concentrating on finding a job upon his release (AR 379). 

He was diagnosed with depression NOS and personality disorder, mainly borderline personality

and antisocial personality disorder, and assessed with a GAF score of 60 (AR 379). Dr. Pillai

found no psychiatric contraindications for parole, but opined that he should be placed in a

supervised halfway house with mental health follow up, as well as drug and alcohol testing (AR

380). 

Subsequent to his release from prison, Tompkins underwent an initial psychiatric

evaluation on July 7, 2004 conducted by Kripa S. Singh, M.D., of Safe Harbor Behavioral Health

(AR 434-436). Tompkins reported previous treatment at Stairways Behavioral Health which had

been discontinued due to logistical problems (AR 434). He complained of depression, poor

sleep, and the urge to engage in self-mutilating behavior (AR 434). On mental status

examination, Dr. Singh reported his speech was within normal limits and his thought processes

were organized, relevant, coherent, logical, rational and goal-directed (AR 435). Tompkins

claimed that he felt people were trying to “get” him, and Dr. Singh reported that he had frequent

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ideas that people talked about him or made fun of him (AR 435). Tompkins further claimed that

he often felt that there was “someone standing there who [was] not there,” and that at times he

heard someone calling his name (AR 435). He reportedly felt anxious, nervous, and jittery, and

was often sad and depressed (AR 435). Although he felt helpless and worthless, he had no active

suicidal thoughts or plans (AR 436). Dr. Singh found that he appeared to be of average

intelligence, had no difficulty understanding the concepts behind the rationale of treatment,

appeared motivated to seek treatment, and showed fairly good insight (AR 436). Tompkins was

diagnosed with major depression, recurrent, with psychotic features, generalized anxiety

disorder, and borderline personality disorder, and assigned a GAF score of 50 (AR 436). Dr.

Singh recommended a combination of antipsychotics, antidepressants and anxiety drugs, and

supportive psychotherapy (AR 436). 

Tompkins was seen by Lynn Taylor, PA-C, from Safe Harbor Behavioral Health on

March 3, 2005 for a routine medication check and reported that he had been off his medications

for six months (AR 427). Ms. Taylor noted that he had not been seen since July 2004 (AR 427). 

He complained of periods of deep depression and hyper episodes, claiming he did not sleep for

days and “took off” out of Erie (AR 427). Ms. Taylor reported that his appearance was within

normal limits with good hygiene (AR 427). His mood and cognition were within normal limits,

and he was pleasant and cooperative (AR 427). Ms. Taylor restarted his medications, and

referred him to individual therapy (AR 427). She assigned him a GAF score of 50 (AR 427). 

On April 11, 2005, Tompkins returned to Ms. Taylor and reported that he did not take his

medications since he was unable to afford them (AR 426). He complained of depression, hyper

episodes and cutting behavior, but Ms. Taylor observed no fresh scars (AR 426). He also

complained of panic attacks and post traumatic stress disorder secondary to incarceration (AR

426). Ms. Taylor reported that Tompkins was organized, with no evidence of mania or

hypomania, and his thought process and affect were normal (AR 426). She changed his

medication, and assigned him a GAF score of 50 (AR 426). 

Finally, on April 12, 2005, Ms. Taylor wrote Tompkins’ attorney stating that he had

received treatment through Safe Harbor Behavioral Health for major depression, generalized

anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder (AR 425). This letter was also signed by

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6Prior to this hearing, the ALJ held a hearing on May 4, 2004 (AR 467-473). Tompkins

did not appear and only a vocational expert testified (AR 467-473). The ALJ found that he was a

non-essential witness, and rendered an adverse decision (AR 19). However, this decision was

not issued, and the ALJ decided to hold a third hearing so Tompkins could testify (AR 19; 479). 

9

Ralph Walton, M.D. (AR 425). Ms. Taylor stated that Tompkins suffered from mood instability,

impulsivity, panic attacks and self-mutilating behavior (AR 425). With regard to his workrelated abilities, she opined that Tompkins’ ability to maintain concentration and attention was

fair, and his ability to maintain long-term regular attendance was poor (AR 425). Due to his lack

of impulse control, lack of basic coping and life skills, Ms. Taylor further opined that he was

unable to respond appropriately to supervisory criticism or interact appropriately with supervisors

or co-workers (AR 425). 

Tompkins testified at the first hearing held by the ALJ on January 12, 2000 that he was

unable to work due to his hearing problems and he did not like to be around a “whole lot of

people” (AR 458). He claimed he felt “trapped and caged” as if people were watching him (AR

458). Because he felt people were watching him, he became nervous and made mistakes on the

job (AR 458). 

At a subsequent hearing held by the ALJ on May 12, 2005 following remand for further

consideration of his mental impairments, Tompkins and a Fred Monaco, a vocational expert

testified (AR 474-505).6 Tompkins testified that he lived with a friend who was disabled due to

mental issues (AR 482). His friend performed all the household chores, but he helped with the

dishes (AR 486). He spent his days watching television or sitting on the porch, and most days

avoided people (AR 487; 497-498). Tompkins claimed he did not sleep well, suffered from

mood swings and paranoia, and had anxiety attacks every two to three days (AR 487; 495-497). 

His medication caused drowsiness, but did not help him sleep (AR 488). Tompkins further

testified that he was seen by Ms. Taylor at Safe Harbor approximately every two months, and

found the counseling sessions annoying (AR 489). He claimed he was unable to work due to

depression and an inability to focus (AR 491). 

The ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume an individual of the same age, education

and work experience as Tompkins, who was limited to simple, routine, repetitious tasks, with

one- or two-step instructions that did not impose strict production quotas, and that required no

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public contact or more than occasional contact with co-workers or supervisors (AR 502-503). 

The vocational expert opined that such an individual could perform the jobs of an unarmed

guard, janitor or cleaner, and machine feeder (AR 503). The expert further opined that the

individual would be expected to respond appropriately to supervisory criticism, behave in an

emotionally stable manner, and complete tasks in a timely fashion (AR 504-504). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision which found that Tompkins was

not eligible for SSI benefits within the meaning of the Social Security Act (AR 19-26). His 

request for a review by the Appeals Council was denied rendering the ALJ’s decision the final

decision of the Commissioner (AR 8-11). He subsequently filed this action. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the determination of the Commissioner unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Richardson v.

Parales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It has been defined as less than a preponderance of evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Jesurum v. Secretary of the

United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable

to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine when an individual meets

this definition:

In the first two steps, the claimant must establish (1) that he is not

engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and (2) that he suffers

from a severe medical impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-41 (1987). If the claimant shows a severe medical

impairment, the [Commissioner] determines (3) whether the

impairment is equivalent to an impairment listed by the

[Commissioner] as creating a presumption of disability. Bowen,

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482 U.S. at 141. If it is not, the claimant bears the burden of

showing (4) that the impairment prevents him from performing the

work that he has performed in the past. Id. If the claimant satisfies

this burden, the [Commissioner] must grant the claimant benefits

unless the [Commissioner] can demonstrate (5) that there are jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ferguson

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 117. The ALJ resolved Tompkins’ case at the fifth step. At step two, the

ALJ determined that his depression, anxiety, personality disorder, borderline intellectual

functioning, substance abuse, in remission, and hearing loss were severe impairments, but

determined at step three that he did not meet a listing (AR 20-21). At step four, the ALJ

determined that Tompkins had the residual functional capacity to perform work at any exertional

level that did not require more than simple, routine, repetitious tasks, with one- or two-step

instructions or strict production quotas; further limited by no contact with the public or more than

occasional contact with co-workers or supervisors, or greater hearing acuity than that required to

be aware of one’s surroundings (AR 23). At the final step, the ALJ determined that he could

perform the jobs cited by the vocational expert at the administrative hearing (AR 24-25). The

ALJ additionally found that Tompkins’ allegations regarding his limitations were not entirely

credible (AR 25). Again, we must affirm this determination unless it is not supported by

substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Tompkins first argues that the ALJ selectively read the medical evidence and/or ignored

certain medical evidence in violation of Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3rd Cir. 1981). 

Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to discuss all of Dr. Singh’s findings in his July 7,

2004 evaluation; failed to the 1993 psychological evaluation, Dr. Lindemuth’s evaluation on

September 27, 1999, and Dr. Pillai’s evaluation performed on September 4, 2001. 

Consideration of all the evidence does not mean that the ALJ must explicitly refer to each

and every finding contained in a report. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3rd Cir. 2001)

(ALJ not required to discuss every treatment note). Moreover, the failure of an ALJ to cite

specific evidence does not necessarily establish that such evidence was not considered. Phillips

v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 775, 777 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2004); Lozada v. Barnhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d 325,

336 (E.D.Pa. 2004). Indeed, requiring an ALJ to exhaustively address each and every finding in

the record would prove too burdensome. As long as the ALJ “articulates at some minimum level

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[his] analysis of a particular line of evidence,” a written evaluation of every piece of evidence is

not required. Phillips, 91 Fed.Appx. at 777 n.7. 

Here, we find that the ALJ’s consideration of the medical evidence was consistent with

this standard. With respect to Tompkins’ claim that the ALJ failed to explain his apparent

disregard of Dr. Singh’s diagnosis that his depression included psychotic features and that he had

multiple and frequent ideas of self reference, a review of the ALJ’s decision reveals that he was

aware of Dr. Singh’s findings since they were specifically discussed in his decision (AR 21). 

The ALJ observed that Dr. Singh diagnosed Tompkins with depression with psychotic features,

and that he reportedly heard voices and claimed that people were trying to get him (AR 21). The

ALJ noted however, that Dr. Singh found his thought processes were organized, and that the

record failed to demonstrate that his hallucinations would prevent the performance of simple,

low-stress tasks (AR 22). Moreover, we observe that although Dr. Singh found Tompkins had

ideas of self reference, he found that he was not frankly delusional and had fairly good contact

with reality around him (AR 435). 

Tompkins further claims that the ALJ erred in failing to discuss his apparent rejection of

his assessed GAF score of 50, which is indicative of serious symptoms. In essence, Tompkins

appears to argue that such score indicates an inability to work and the ALJ should have explained

why he rejected this evidence. The GAF score is used by clinicians to report an individual’s

overall level of functioning. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSMIV 32 (4th ed. 2000). It is intended to be used to make treatment decisions, and “nowhere do the

Social Security regulations or case law require an ALJ to determine the extent of an individual’s

disability based entirely on his GAF score.” Wilkins v. Barnhart, 69 Fed.Appx. 775, 780 (10th

Cir. 2003). GAF scores alone, however, do not evidence an impairment seriously interfering

with a claimant’s ability to work. See Lopez v. Barnhart, 78 Fed.Appx. 675, 678 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Moreover, “[w]hile a GAF score may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC,

it is not essential to the RFC’s accuracy.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th

Cir. 2002). While Tompkins’ score of 50 may indicate an inability to hold a job, it does not

compel that conclusion. See Hillman v. Barnhart, 48 Fed.Appx. 26, 30 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2002) (a

GAF score of 50 indicates claimant could perform some substantial gainful activity). The ALJ’s 

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decision reveals that although he did not explicitly reject Dr. Singh’s assessment of Tompkins’

GAF score, he nonetheless considered this score in connection with all of Dr. Singh’s findings

(AR 21). We also note that the ALJ observed that notwithstanding the GAF score of 50, Dr.

Singh found that Tompkins’ behavior, mood, affect and cognition were within normal limits (AR

21). 

We further reject Tompkins’ argument that the ALJ erred in failing to discuss his 1993

psychological evaluation, Dr. Lindemuth’s 1999 evaluation and Dr. Pillai’s 2001 evaluation. 

The 1993 psychological evaluation is of limited value since it occurred twelve years prior to the

administrative hearing. Likewise, any failure to specifically mention Dr. Lindemuth’s 1999

evaluation or Dr. Pillai’s 2001 evaluation does not dictate remand. Tompkins faults the ALJ for

failing to mention Dr. Lindemuth’s finding that Tompkins’ severe mood reactivity, anger

dyscontrol, impulsivity and self-mutilation were the result of his borderline personality disorder,

and Dr. Pillai’s diagnosis of borderline personality disorder with certain risk factors. Plaintiff’s

Brief pp. 18-19. However, disability is determined not by the mere presence of impairments, but

rather by the functional restrictions placed on an individual by those impairments. See Jones v.

Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3rd Cir. 1991). 

Here, Dr. Lindemuth’s evaluation and Dr. Pillai’s evaluation are of limited significance,

since both evaluations were performed in connection with Tompkins’ parole, and did not address

any work-related functional limitations. Notwithstanding their limited significance, a review of

these evaluations do not support Tompkins’ claim that he is precluded from working. Dr.

Lindemuth found that Tompkins spoke clearly and spontaneously in an organized goal-directed

thought process, and had no evidence of perceptual disturbance or delusional ideation (AR 388). 

She further found that he had adjusted “quite well” to the institution, was compliant with his

medication regime, and was looking forward to his release (AR 387). Two years later when

evaluated by Dr. Pillai in September 2001, Tompkins was “very calm,” friendly, and exhibited a

normal affect with no anxiety (AR 382). Dr. Pillai found no evidence of psychosis, depression or

suicidal thoughts, and noted that his judgment had improved (AR 382-383). We therefore find

no error in this regard. 

Tompkins also challenges the ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Taylor’s opinion of April 12, 2005. 

Case 1:05-cv-00311-SJM Document 14 Filed 07/13/06 Page 13 of 16
7Tompkins also argues that there are factual errors in some of the ALJ’s findings with

respect to the Safe Harbor Behavioral Health records. For example, the ALJ recites the date of

the first treatment record as March 2005 and Tompkins claims the date is actually February 3,

14

Ms. Taylor opined that his ability to maintain concentration and attention was fair, his ability to

maintain long-term regular attendance was poor, and he was unable to respond appropriately to

supervisory criticism or interact appropriately with supervisors or co-workers (AR 425). It is

undisputed that Ms. Taylor, as a physician’s assistant, is not an “acceptable medical source”

whose opinion is entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a); see also Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 361 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding chiropractor’s opinion not entitled to

controlling weight under treating physician rule). Nonetheless, an ALJ may consider a

physicians’ assistant’s opinions, along with other evidence, in assessing a claimant’s disability. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(e)(3). Here, the ALJ explicitly considered Ms. Taylor’s opinion

concerning Tompkins’ disability, but concluded that her opinion did not require a finding of

disability since she was not an acceptable medical source and her opinion was contradicted by

earlier and more recent treatment records (AR 21-22). 

 A review of the medical evidence reveals that Ms. Taylor’s opinion was contrary to Dr.

Hillin’s February 2000 opinion that Tompkins had a “fair” ability in most areas of functioning,

could follow simple directions, and was capable of independent functioning (AR 281). Her

opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Pillai’s findings in March 2002 that Tompkins’ mental

condition had actually improved, in that he was calmer, with no anxiety or depression, his speech

was spontaneous, relevant and coherent, he exhibited a positive attitude regarding his life upon

release from prison, and was concentrating on finding a job (AR 379). Her opinion was also at

odds with Dr. Singh’s findings in July 2004 that Tompkins’ thought processes were organized,

relevant, coherent, logical, rational and goal-directed (AR 435).

Moreover, we observe that Ms. Taylor’s opinion is inconsistent with her own treatment

notes. In March 2005, she reported that his mood and cognition were within normal limits, and

he was pleasant and cooperative (AR 427). On April 11, 2005, the day before she rendered her

opinion, Ms. Taylor reported that Tompkins was organized, with no evidence of mania or

hypomania, and his thought process and affect were normal (AR 426).7 Accordingly, we find no

Case 1:05-cv-00311-SJM Document 14 Filed 07/13/06 Page 14 of 16
2005 as evidenced by the attendance records. By way of further example, the ALJ recites that

Dr. Singh made certain findings, when in fact Ms. Taylor did. However, the ALJ did note that

the signature was not totally legible (AR 21). While Tompkins may be correct, we find that any

factual errors in this regard were de minimus and non-material. 

15

error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Taylor’s opinion. 

Finally, Tompkins claims that the ALJ erred in finding his testimony not entirely credible. 

An ALJ must consider subjective complaints by the claimant and evaluate the extent to which

those complaints are supported or contradicted by the objective medical evidence and other

evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Subjective complaints must be seriously

considered, whether or not they are fully confirmed by the objective medical evidence. See Smith

v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3rd Cir. 1981). The ALJ as the finder of fact can reject, partially or

fully, subjective complaints if he finds them not credible based on other evidence in the record. 

Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3rd Cir. 1974). The ALJ is empowered to evaluate the

credibility of witnesses and his determination is entitled to deference by this Court. See Van

Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F2d 871, 873 (3rd Cir. 1983). In his assessment of Tompkins’ credibility,

the ALJ found that his testimony regarding his functional limitations were not entirely credible

(AR 25). We have reviewed the ALJ’s assessment of credibility and find it entirely consistent

with the standard set forth above. 

IV. CONCLUSION

An appropriate Order follows.

 

Case 1:05-cv-00311-SJM Document 14 Filed 07/13/06 Page 15 of 16
16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM C. TOMPKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 05-311 Erie

)

v. )

)

JO ANNE BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2006, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

9] is DENIED, and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 12] is

GRANTED. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff, William C. Tompkins. The clerk is

directed to mark the case closed. 

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. 

 

 

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