UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, FEBBO, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Lieutenant Colonel GREGORY S. PIEPER 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20170093 

Headquarters, Fort Bragg 

Jeffery R. Nance, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Mullee, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany M. Chapman, JA; Major Todd W. 

Simpson, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Carrier, JA (on brief); Lieutenant 

Colonel Tiffany M. Chapman, JA; Major Todd W. Simpson, JA; Lieutenant Colonel 

Christopher D. Carrier, JA (on reply brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Tania M. Martin, JA; Captain Austin Fenwick, JA; Captain 

KJ Harris, JA (on brief). 

13 June 2018 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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FEBBO, Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of violating a lawful general regulation, 

seven specifications of sexual abuse of a child, one specification of conduct 

unbecoming an officer, and three specifications of possession of child pornography, 

in violation of Articles 92, 120b, 133, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 

U.S.C. §§ 892, 920b, 933, and 934 (2012) [UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a dismissal and confinement for forty-two months. The convening 

authority approved the adjudged sentence. 

This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. In his sole 

assignment of error, appellant asserts the military judge erred in accepting his guilty 

plea to violating a general regulation requiring individuals to register privately 

owned firearms held on post because the evidence did not establish a mens rea of at 

least recklessness. After our review of the providence inquiry, we find no 

substantial basis in law or fact to question the judge’s acceptance of the plea. 
PIEPER—ARMY 20170093 

2 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant was charged, inter alia, with violating a Fort Bragg general 

regulation by failing to register his privately owned firearms that were stored at his 

on-post residence. XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Reg. 190-11-1, Military 

Police: Privately Owned Weapons, Ammunition Control, and Prohibited Weapons 

(16 Aug. 2011), directed: 

Personnel must register privately owned firearms they 

have on post. This requirement applies regardless of 

personnel category (military, Family member, guest, 

unaffiliated civilian, etc.) and regardless of which of the 

authorized locations (Family housing or unit arms room) is 

used for storage of the firearms.1

 

Appellant was a competitive shooter and stored nine firearms in a gun safe in 

his on-post quarters. He failed to register the firearms as was required by the local 

regulation. 

Appellant entered into a so-called “naked plea,” where he did not have the 

benefit of a pretrial agreement. Accordingly, there is no stipulation of fact, and we 

are left with only the providence inquiry to examine. 

During the providence inquiry, the military judge defined the elements of the 

offense. The military judge then engaged in the following guilty plea inquiry, in 

which appellant admitted that the regulation applied to him and he failed to obey it. 

ACC: I am a competitive shooter. On or about 18 

November 2013, I owned approximately nine firearms. I 

kept these firearms in my base housing in my gun safe 

when I was not using them for practice or competition. 

I’m aware that I was required to register these firearms 

with base authorities in order to have them in my housing 

unit at Fort Bragg, pursuant to paragraph 5-1 of XVIII 

Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Regulation 190-11-1, but I 

failed to do so. I should have registered my firearms. I 

failed to do so. I have no justification or excuse for my 

actions. I am guilty of this offense. . . . 

MJ: Do you believe you had any legal justification or 

excuse for what you did? 

 

1

 The regulation in question is not unique to Fort Bragg, and similar regulations exist 

for many military installations. 
PIEPER—ARMY 20170093 

3 

ACC: I do not, Your Honor. 

MJ: Could you have avoided violating this general 

regulation if you had wanted to? 

ACC: By exercising due diligence and looking into the 

regulation as I should have, I could have avoided this, 

Your Honor. 

Appellant explained to the military judge that he lived on-post for 

approximately a year without registering the firearms. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

We review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “It is an 

abuse of discretion for a military judge to accept a guilty plea . . . if the ruling is 

based on an erroneous view of the law.” United States v. Weeks, 71 M.J. 44, 46 

(C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 321-22). A guilty plea will only be 

set aside if we find a substantial basis in law or fact to question the military judge’s 

acceptance of the plea. Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 322 (citing United States v. Prater, 32 

M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991)). 

Appellant claims on appeal that he only admitted to being negligent for failing 

to register his firearms because he failed to exercise “due diligence” and “look[] into 

the regulation as [he] should have.” As such, appellant cites to Elonis v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), and United States v. Gifford, 75 M.J. 140 (C.A.A.F. 

2016), for the proposition that negligence is an insufficient mens rea to separate 

innocent from wrongful conduct under the regulation at issue. Appellant therefore 

argues the military judge should not have accepted his guilty plea to violating the 

Fort Bragg regulation, because appellant’s statements to the military judge only 

indicate that appellant was negligent as to his obligations under the regulation, and 

not that he was reckless, or had actual knowledge of his obligation to register his onpost firearms. 

Ignorance of relevant facts may, in some cases, excuse otherwise criminal 

conduct. Ignorance of the law, however, ordinarily does not. For example, in 

Gifford, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) held that a 

servicemember may not be convicted of violating a general order against providing 

alcohol to persons under the age of 21 if that servicemember was not at least 

reckless as to the age of the persons to whom he or she provided alcohol. Id. at 146-
PIEPER—ARMY 20170093 

4 

47.2 Thus, under Gifford, ignorance of certain facts may excuse otherwise criminal 

conduct. Id. at 147-48. By contrast, ignorance of the law does not, and the CAAF 

explained the long-standing principle “ignorantia juris non excusat”3 is fully 

compatible with Elonis and its progeny. Gifford, 75 M.J. at 143, n.4 (“The fact that 

actual knowledge of a general order is typically immaterial does not conflict with 

the coordinate truth that mens rea typically is an essential element of every criminal 

offense. [Gifford] involves a mistake of fact as to age, not a mistake of law . . . .”). 

While appellant raises a challenge to the providence of his guilty plea based 

on Gifford, the appellant’s claimed ignorance is not one of fact, as in Gifford, but 

one of law. On brief, the appellant contends that he was merely negligent as to 

whether he knew he was required to register his on-post firearms. Even assuming 

the appellant’s contention is true, it alleges ignorance of the law, not ignorance of 

the underlying facts. 

Appellant does not contend on appeal that he was ignorant of the fact that he 

possessed firearms, or that he stored the firearms on post. In fact, appellant 

explained that he kept his firearms in a special safe in his on-post residence and 

returned his firearms to that safe between shooting practice and competitions. Nor 

does appellant claim he negligently believed the firearms were registered. Instead, 

appellant contends that he did not articulate to the military judge that he either knew 

of or was reckless as to the requirement that he register his firearms at the time that 

he stored them on-post. In other words, he did not know the law. Ignorance of the 

law, however, neither excuses criminal conduct nor implicates an insufficient mens 

rea under Gifford.

4

 We find no substantial basis in law or fact to question the military judge’s 

acceptance of the plea. The military judge clearly explained the elements of the 

offense to appellant, and appellant explained why his conduct met each and every 

one of those elements. It is not an element of the offense that the appellant knew the 

 

2

 The holding in Gifford is limited to circumstances where the regulation or general 

order in question is silent as to mens rea. Courts will, of course, give effect to a 

culpable mental state specified in a regulation or general order. Id. at 142-43. 

 

3

 The classical Latin formulation, “ignorance of the law excuses not.” 

4

 Our analysis might be different if appellant had made statements during the Care 

inquiry that should have alerted the military judge that appellant may have been 

ignorant of a material fact underlying the offense. For example, imagine appellant 

stated he was unaware of the contents of the safe containing the firearms because the 

safe was actually the property of a deployed friend and he was storing it as a favor. 

After such a statement, further inquiry might be necessary as to whether appellant 

was at least reckless as to the contents of the gun safe.
PIEPER—ARMY 20170093 

5 

law at the time he broke it. Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record, we find 

that the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority are correct in 

law and fact. 

CONCLUSION 

 The findings and sentence as adjudged and approved by the convening 

authority are AFFIRMED. 

Senior Judge MULLIGAN and Judge WOLFE concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: