RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1957-19T2

N.M.R.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.L.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted December 14, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Messano and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FV-14-0075-20. 

William J. Rush, attorney for appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 15, 2021
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A-1957-19T2

Defendant A.L.1appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered on 

December 4, 2019, under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.

2 Defendant contends the court erred by finding he 

committed the predicate offenses of harassment and cyber-harassment, that the 

FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff N.M.R. from future domestic violence, 

and that he was deprived of a fair trial. We affirm the FRO, limited to the 

predicate act of harassment. 

I.

Plaintiff filed a complaint under the Act on July 15, 2019, requesting a 

temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant for the predicate acts of 

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and cyber-harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1.3 An

FRO hearing was conducted on December 4, 2019. We relate the evidence from 

that hearing.

1

 We use initials to protect the identity of victims of domestic violence and to 

preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(9) to -(10).

2 N.J.R. did not file a brief. 

3 Defendant did not include a copy of the initial complaint. He included the 

amended TRO dated July 23, 2019 and as it was amended again on December 4, 

2019. 
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Plaintiff and defendant had a dating relationship that was "off and on" —

because he was married— from October 2015 to April 2019. She broke off the 

relationship after learning defendant slept with another woman. Shortly after, 

defendant sent plaintiff text messages saying, "I'm coming the fuck over . . . [s]o 

either you guys leave or call the cops." She agreed to go with him to the Short 

Hills Mall, but they argued. He took her home, driving erratically and punching 

the steering wheel, even telling her to get out of the car and then to get back in. 

He apologized and wanted to take her out again saying in a text message, "I 

won't be scary, LOL, if you want to get out."

Defendant learned in February 2019 that he suffered a reoccurrence of 

cancer. He acknowledged he was not faithful to plaintiff and that "threw her 

over the edge, honestly," but defendant claimed the medication, chemotherapy 

and radiation for cancer affected his state of mind. 

Plaintiff transferred her gym membership to avoid defendant. When he 

found out, he sent her a text message that he would reveal explicit videos of her

stating, "Fuck you . . . everyone will see all you've done, every fucking video 

. . . . Fuck you, fucking whore . . . You ruined us. Yeah. Now I moved on for 

good." 
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Plaintiff testified defendant began to email her three times a day and leave

voicemail messages on her phone. On May 10, 2019, she told him to leave her

alone. She blocked all his communications to her. However, defendant 

bypassed the blocks, using other phone applications. 

Defendant continued to call plaintiff twice a week and left messages. In 

one of those messages on May 16, 2019, defendant revealed he was driving 

around plaintiff's house when she was away on vacation. Defendant called her 

four times on May 23, 2019, using four different phone numbers and a 

pseudonym. Defendant texted her that "honestly, you deserve everything you 

get done to you and I hope Karma is nice because it's outrageous what you're 

doing and done to me." He threatened to kill himself. She received a receipt 

from her previous gym that defendant attempted to charge $3,000 on her credit 

card. He accessed her "Quizlet" account to attempt to communicate with her. 

Defendant left a voicemail on July 3, 2019, that "[s]o, I know you just keep 

blocking everything and all that, which is cool, I guess, I should probably just 

take the hint and not worry about any closure or anything. I guess I can't get 

that. I don’t know." 

Plaintiff filed a complaint under the Act on July 15, 2019, alleging 

defendant committed the predicate acts of harassment and cyber-harassment, 
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and requesting a TRO. She amended it on July 23, 2019, to add additional 

factual allegations. The complaint was not served until November 2019,

because defendant claimed he was in the hospital for cancer treatments. He 

continued to send messages to plaintiff on an application called "WhatsApp" 

saying his love for her would "never die" and he was praying they would be back 

together. 

On November 26, 2019, defendant sent plaintiff this final message: 

Yes. This will be my last message to you since the 

police have been trying to find me to hand me a 

restraining order for you. LOL. So, it's whatever. I 

guess you're happy now, and I'm blessed to be able to 

see you being happy. Even though deep down I miss 

you, and I feel you miss me, too, that feeling has to be 

washed away. I continue to wish you nothing but 

happiness and good health and hope you and your 

boyfriend live happy forever.

Plaintiff testified she was "very scared" of defendant and did not know 

what he was capable of. She was not "living a safe life" and had been "in 

hiding." Plaintiff testified she felt threatened and that messages from defendant 

were "affecting [her] daily lifestyle . . . ." 

Defendant claimed he was not aware plaintiff blocked his messages "to 

that extent." Defendant acknowledged contacting plaintiff's mother and sister. 

He testified he might have sent messages threatening to post explicit videos of 
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plaintiff but could not recall. He denied communicating with her through other 

phone numbers. He admitted going into her Quizlet account, but claimed this 

was by accident. When asked about the multiple phone numbers used to contact 

plaintiff, defendant testified he did not know he was "blocked fully." 

The trial court found plaintiff's testimony credible "in all material 

respects." She corroborated her testimony by emails which showed defendant's 

efforts to try to communicate with her.4 The court did not find credible 

defendant's claim he was unaware plaintiff did not want his communications. 

The court found this "unfathomable" because defendant had obtained false 

phone numbers to communicate with plaintiff when she did not answer him. He

was evasive in answering whether he knew his calls were blocked. 

The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff 

committed the predicate acts of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), and cyberharassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1(a)(2). For the harassment charge, the court 

found defendant's conduct met the requirement through "repeated 

communications," knowing plaintiff had blocked his communications and the 

4 Defendant did not include the emails in his appendix. Plaintiff did not file a 

brief. The emails cited here were read into the record and moved into evidence. 
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lengths he went to try to evade this. The court found the same reasons supported 

the predicate act of cyber-harassment. 

The court also found an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from 

further abuse. This was based on the prolonged period of time defendant tried

to contact plaintiff when she was clear she did not want communication. The 

court found some of the comments to plaintiff "disturbing," citing defendant's

comment about calling the police, his comment that he would not be "scary,"

and saying "LOL" when the police were trying to serve him with the TRO. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues: 

POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE MISNTERPRETED 

THE HARASSMENT STATUTE AND ISSUED A 

FINDING INCONSISTENT WITH NEW JERSEY 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW

(Raised Below: 1T58) [.]

POINT II: THE TRIAL JUDGE MISINTERPRETTED 

THE CYBER[-]HARASSMENT STATUTE AND 

ISSUED A FINDING INCONSISTENT WITH NEW 

JERSEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW (Raised 

Below:1T58) [.]

POINT III: THE TRIAL JUDGE'S OPINION FAILED 

TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION THAT THE 

FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER WAS 

NECESSSARY TO PROTECT THE PLAINTIFF 

FROM FUTURE ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

(Raised Below:1T59) [.]
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO 

QUESTION THE DEFENDANT REGARDING HIS 

USE OF MEDICATION, THE AMOUNT AND TYPE 

OF MEDICATION AND IF IT IMPACTED HIS 

ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE CHARGES 

AGAINST HIM AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A 

FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER (Not [R]aised 

[B]elow) [.]

II. 

We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part 

judges[,]" Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012), in 

recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family 

matters . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 

(2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "[F]indings by the 

trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, 

credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. 

v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Deference is especially appropriate 

'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" 

Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 

(1997)). Accordingly, "an appellate court should not disturb the 'factual findings 

and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so 

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Ibid.
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(alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484). However, "[a] trial 

court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from 

established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, 

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Defendant argues the court did not make a finding under the Act that 

defendant's contacts were likely to cause annoyance or alarm. He argues there 

was no evidence he acted with a purpose to cause fear or apprehension. At best,

this amounted to contretemps, not domestic violence.

When determining whether to grant an FRO under the Act, the trial court 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-

27 (App. Div. 2006). The trial court "must determine whether the plaintiff has 

proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the 

predicate acts set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125.

This determination is made "in light of the previous history of violence between 

the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Second, the court also 

must determine whether a restraining order is required to protect the party 

seeking restraints from future acts or threats of violence. Id. at 126-27. That 

means "there [must] be a finding that 'relief is necessary to prevent further 
10 A-1957-19T2

abuse.'" J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(b)). 

A person commits the offense of harassment if, "with purpose to harass 

another, he . . . [e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or of 

repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other 

person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). In evaluating a defendant's intent, a judge is 

entitled to use "[c]ommon sense and experience . . . ." State v. Hoffman, 149 

N.J. 564, 577 (1997). Because direct proof of intent is often absent, "purpose 

may and often must be inferred from what is said and done and the surrounding 

circumstances," and "[p]rior conduct and statements may be relevant to and 

support an inference of purpose." State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 

(App. Div. 2006); see also H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003) ("'[A] 

purpose to harass may be inferred from' . . . common sense and experience." 

(quoting Hoffman, 49 N.J. at 577)). 

In State v. Burkert, our Supreme Court held that for "constitutional 

reasons," 

we will construe the terms "any other course of 

alarming conduct" and "acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy" as repeated communications directed 

at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for 

his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with 

that person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
11 A-1957-19T2

[231 N.J. 257, 284-85 (2017).]

Burkert made clear that the standard "applies only in those cases where the 

alleged harassing conduct is based on pure expressive activity." Id. at 285. 

Burkert also made clear that even in a pure expression case, "a person who 

repeatedly makes unwanted communications to a subject, thereby intolerably 

interfering with his reasonable expectation of privacy, will not find shelter 

behind the First Amendment." Ibid. 

There was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's 

finding that defendant committed harassment. From April 2019 through 

November 2019, when he was served with the TRO that had been entered in July 

2019, defendant continued to call and text plaintiff daily. Defendant threatened 

to expose explicit videos of her. Plaintiff blocked his calls. Defendant then 

tried to contact her through special phone applications, false phone numbers and 

a pseudonym. 

The court found plaintiff's testimony was credible. We defer to this 

credibility determination. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (providing "[b]ecause a 

trial court 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them 

testify,' it has a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the 
12 A-1957-19T2

veracity of witnesses" (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) 

(alterations in original) (other citations omitted))).

Defendant's claim he did not know his communications were blocked is 

contrary to his July 3, 2019 voicemail. Defendant did not deny his behavior but 

blamed it on his cancer treatments. He did not present any expert testimony to 

connect his behavior to these treatments. All of this was sufficient for the trial 

court to conclude defendant engaged in a course of alarming conduct through 

repeated communications directed at plaintiff, which reasonably put her in fear 

of her security and certainly interfered with her reasonable expectation of 

privacy. 

Defendant contends the trial court failed to make detailed findings of fact 

that an FRO was needed to protect plaintiff from further abuse. He claims 

plaintiff did not testify that he caused her to experience fear and apprehension. 

This argument is undercut by the record. Plaintiff testified she was 

alarmed by defendant's behavior and changed her lifestyle to avoid him. She 

felt threatened. The attempt to contact her was for a "prolonged period of time 

where the plaintiff . . . made attempts to let [defendant] know she wants nothing 

to do with [him], and [he has] not taken no for an answer." Defendant's contacts 

were found by the trial court to be "disturbing." Defendant told plaintiff "either 
13 A-1957-19T2

you . . . leave or call the cops" when he said he was coming over to her house 

after the breakup. He scared her with his erratic driving and knew it, telling 

plaintiff "I won't be scary this time." His response to being served with the TRO 

was "LOL." He threatened to release explicit photos and video of plaintiff. 

Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that he was deprived of a fair 

trial because the trial judge did not ask about his ability to understand the 

charges or the implications of having an FRO entered against him. However, 

defendant gave no indication during the trial that he did not understand the 

charges or the implications of the FRO. The court explained the nature of the 

proceeding. He asked defendant if he was ready to proceed. He gave defendant 

opportunities to expand his testimony. The transcript did not show anything 

about the trial that was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . ." R.

2:10-2.

Given our decision under the harassment statute, we offer no opinion on 

whether there was a violation of the cyber-harassment statute. The harassment 

finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), and the finding there was a need to protect 

plaintiff from further harassment are all that are necessary to affirm entry of the 

FRO.

Affirmed based on the predicate act of harassment.