If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re E. D. ETHRIDGE, Minor. July 18, 2024

No. 367637

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2023-000783-NA

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and PATEL and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his 

minor child, EDE, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). We affirm.

I. FACTS

In April 2023, EDE reported to Child Protective Services (CPS) that respondent had 

sexually assaulted her. Respondent is EDE’s biological father. Respondent did not have an 

ongoing relationship with EDE’s mother, however, and EDE testified that she did not meet 

respondent until she was 10 years old, and saw him only rarely. In the summer of 2022, EDE was 

15 years old and began visiting respondent approximately every week or two. EDE told CPS 

workers that in July 2022, she twice visited respondent at his girlfriend’s house, where respondent 

lived. She testified that the first visit occurred when respondent invited her to swim in the pool at 

the house and bought her a swimsuit. The second time she visited respondent in July 2022, she 

chose to watch television in an upstairs bedroom. She testified that while she was watching 

SpongeBob, respondent joined her in the room and sexually assaulted her. She testified that 

respondent took off his shorts and put his penis on her wrist. He then pulled down her shorts and 

her underwear and tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but was unable to. She reported that 

respondent spit on his penis, but still was unsuccessful in inserting his penis into her vagina. When 

respondent’s girlfriend started up the stairs, respondent hurriedly put on his shorts and told EDE 

to put on her shorts. Respondent then drove EDE home to her mother’s house. EDE testified that 

during the drive, respondent told her to “suck” his penis. She testified that she refused and said 

that he was her Dad, but that respondent replied that he did not care. He then told her not to tell 

anyone about what had occurred because he would get in a lot of trouble if she did. EDE did not 

visit with or speak to respondent again. 
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EDE testified that she was afraid to tell her mother, but after several months she disclosed 

the information to her therapist, and later to CPS. CPS filed a permanent custody petition on behalf 

of petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), requesting that the trial 

court take jurisdiction of EDE, remove EDE from respondent’s care, and enter an order terminating 

respondent’s parental rights to EDE under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (g), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). 

The petition alleged that respondent sexually abused EDE in July of 2022, and also alleged that 

respondent had abandoned EDE by not providing child support or visiting EDE since August 1, 

2022. The trial court authorized the petition.

The trial court held a bench trial concerning jurisdiction, whether a statutory basis for 

termination existed, and the best interests of the child. EDE, who was 16 years old at the time of 

trial, testified consistent with her report to CPS. The trial court found EDE’s testimony credible. 

The trial court observed that EDE appeared to have some developmental delays, but that her 

testimony regarding the abuse was clear and consistent and she did not appear to be coached, and 

in fact did not appear to be capable of following a coached narrative. The trial court found that 

there was enough evidence to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence under MCL 

712A.2(b), and that there was clear and convincing evidence that established statutory grounds for 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). The trial court found that 

respondent sexually abused EDE by attempted penetration, and that based upon respondent’s 

conduct, there was a reasonable likelihood that EDE would be harmed if returned to his care. The 

trial court also found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in EDE’s best interests. 

The trial court considered the testimony by all witnesses, the clinical evaluation, and the fact that 

EDE continued to live with her mother (a relative). The trial court reasoned that the credible 

allegations of sexual abuse combined with the clinical evaluation’s findings were enough to 

overcome EDE’s relative placement, which weighed against termination. The trial court found 

that EDE was at risk of future abuse by respondent and that she deserved to be raised in a safe 

environment. The court entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights. Respondent 

now appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. STATUTORY BASIS

Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that sufficient evidence was 

introduced to warrant termination of his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), 

and (k)(ix) because the allegations of sexual abuse were false. We disagree that the trial court 

erred. 

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that a statutory basis warranting 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re 

Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). In determining whether a statutory basis 

for termination has been established under MCL 712A.19b(3), the trial court may consider “any 

evidence that had been properly introduced and admitted at the adjudication trial . . . , along with 

any additional relevant and material evidence that is received by the court at the termination 

hearing.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 316; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). 
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We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and its determination that a 

statutory basis for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Keillor, 

325 Mich App 80, 85; 923 NW2d 617 (2018). The decision to terminate parental rights is clearly 

erroneous if “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 

209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). We afford the trial court’s dispositional orders “considerable 

deference on appellate review,” In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014), and 

will not find a trial court’s decision clearly erroneous unless it is more than possibly or probably 

incorrect, In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

In this case, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) provides, in relevant part:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * * 

(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or 

sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:

(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse 

and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer 

from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.

* * * 

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s 

parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of the 

parent. 

(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included 1 or 

more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will be 

harmed if returned to the care of the parent:

* * *

(ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, 

or assault with intent to penetrate.

* * *

(ix) Sexual abuse as that term is defined in section 2 of the child protection 

law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.622.

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), termination is warranted if the respondent parent caused 

the child to suffer sexual abuse and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury 

or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home. EDE testified that respondent 
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attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis, put his penis on her wrist, and told her to suck 

his penis while he drove her home. EDE disclosed this abuse to her therapist and later to CPS 

workers. In the clinical evaluation, EDE told interviewers that she thought respondent “might do 

it again.” The trial court found respondent’s testimony credible. The sexual abuse occurred shortly 

after respondent began visiting with EDE, supporting the conclusion that if he were to resume 

contact with EDE, there is a reasonable likelihood that she would suffer similar abuse by 

respondent in the foreseeable future. The trial court therefore did not clearly err when it found 

clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i).

For the same reasons, the trial court did not err by finding that termination was warranted 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Termination is warranted under subsection (j) if the trial court finds 

by clear and convincing evidence that based on the conduct of the parent, there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home. Termination is proper 

pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if there is a potential of physical or emotional harm to the child. 

See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). As discussed, EDE testified 

that respondent sexually abused her and the trial court found EDE’s testimony credible. In the 

clinical evaluation, EDE told interviewers that she thought respondent “might do it again.” EDE’s 

credible allegations of sexual abuse demonstrate a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent’s 

conduct, that respondent would sexually abuse EDE if she continued visiting him. The trial court 

therefore did not clearly err when it found that clear and convincing evidence supported 

termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) provides for termination of parental rights when the parent 

abused the child by criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or 

assault with intent to penetrate, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed 

if returned to the care of the parent. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ix) provides for termination of parental 

rights when the parent sexually abused the child as defined in MCL 722.622, and there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the care of the parent. MCL 

722.622 defines confirmed sexual abuse as “sexual penetration, sexual contact, attempted sexual 

penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate . . .” as defined by MCL 750.520a, which defines 

sexual penetration to mean “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other 

intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal 

openings of another person’s body . . . .” 

In this case, EDE testified that respondent attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis

and attempted to compel her to perform fellatio on him. EDE’s description of respondent’s actions 

meets the definition of sexual abuse involving attempted penetration. The trial court also reviewed 

the clinical evaluation, in which EDE told interviewers that she thought respondent “might do it 

again” if she was returned to his care. The trial court therefore did not clearly err when it found 

clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) and (k)(ix).

B. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Respondent contends that petitioner failed to offer him a service plan. Under Michigan’s 

Probate Code, the DHHS must make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking to 
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terminate a parent’s parental rights, In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), 

except in cases involving aggravated circumstances, In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 

NW2d 919 (2022). MCL 712A.19a(2) provides, in relevant part:

(2) . . . Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases 

except if any of the following apply:

(a) There is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to 

aggravated circumstances as provided in section 18(1) and (2) of the child 

protection law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.638. 

MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) refers to “criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted 

penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate.” Thus, under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), a judicial 

determination that the parent has subjected the child to criminal sexual conduct involving 

attempted penetration or assault with intent to penetrate is an aggravated circumstance. See MCL 

722.638(1)(a)(ii). In this case, the trial court found aggravated circumstances existed because 

respondent attempted to penetrate EDE and assaulted her with intent to penetrate. Because the 

trial court found that aggravated circumstances existed, petitioner was not obligated to make 

reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with EDE. 

C. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of his 

parental rights was in EDE’s best interests. Respondent argues that the trial court failed to consider 

his bond with EDE and her placement with a relative. We disagree. 

When a statutory basis for termination of parental rights has been established, the trial court 

must terminate the parent’s parental rights if a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 

236-237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). The focus of the best-interests determination is the child, not the 

parent. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). We review the trial court’s 

decision regarding a child’s best interests for clear error. In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 699; 

847 NW2d 514 (2014). 

To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the trial 

court is required to weigh all available evidence and consider a wide variety of factors, such as the 

child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, 

and finality, the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the length of time the child 

was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable 

future, and the parent’s compliance with the case service plan. See In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 

311 Mich App 49, 63-64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015). The trial court also should consider the child’s 

safety and well-being, including the risk of harm to the child if returned to the parent’s care. See 

In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). If the child is placed with a 

relative, the trial court must consider the relative placement, which generally weighs against 

termination, but is not dispositive. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347. 
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In this case, the trial court considered the evidence, including EDE’s continued placement 

with her mother, the clinical evaluation, EDE’s testimony that respondent sexually abused her, and 

EDE’s need for safety. The trial court acknowledged that EDE’s placement with her mother 

weighed against termination, but determined that the relative placement did not overcome the risk 

to EDE of future sexual abuse, her need for safety and stability, the clinical evaluation’s opinion 

that it was in EDE’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights, and EDE’s fear that 

respondent would again attempt to sexually abuse her. 

There was no evidence of a bond between EDE and respondent; the evidence suggests that

the opposite is true. Testimony indicated that respondent had no contact with EDE until she was 

10 years old, and thereafter had only occasional contact with her until the summer of 2022. At 

that point, EDE was 15 years old and respondent’s increased contact with EDE almost immediately 

resulted in respondent’s sexual abuse of EDE. The trial court observed that the clinical evaluation 

specifically noted comments by respondent after the allegations of abuse that he did not want to 

be bothered with EDE, and that it was better for him to not be in the picture. The trial court did 

not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in EDE’s best 

interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Sima G. Patel

/s/ Adrienne N. Young