IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

FARRAH KELLY, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JOSHUA BELL, JUSTIN SNYDER, 

and CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT, 

Defendants. 

 No. 4:22-CV-01940 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

APRIL 28, 2023 

The Williamsport Bureau of Police seized Plaintiff Farrah Kelly’s car 

pursuant to a valid warrant, but after completing the authorized search, the Bureau 

refused to give it back. For nearly nine weeks, the City of Williamsport held 

Kelly’s car without any valid justification. Accordingly, Kelly has sued the City as 

well as various police officers involved in the car’s continued detention, alleging 

violations of her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution 

of the United States. 

The Defendants now move to dismiss Kelly’s claims. But a government’s 

unjustified refusal to return personal property after a lawful initial seizure 

indisputably implicates the property owner’s constitutional rights; the only 

question is which rights. Consistent with the leading Circuit authority on the 

matter, this Court finds that constitutional challenges like Kelly’s sound in the 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 1 of 12
2 

Fifth Amendment—not the Fourth. As such, Kelly’s Fifth Amendment claim may 

proceed, but her Fourth Amendment claims cannot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On April 5, 2022, the Williamsport Bureau of Police obtained a warrant to 

search Kelly’s car.1

 The warrant indicates that the police were searching for certain 

instrumentalities and other evidence of a crime—specifically, firearms, 

ammunition, and certain clothing items.2

 Officers seized Kelly’s car that morning 

and completed the search by no later than April 7, 2022.3

 

After the police seized her car, Kelly consistently and persistently sought to 

get it back.4

 Indeed, she called the Bureau of Police daily, leaving messages for 

Defendants Joshua Bell, a Captain with the Bureau, and Justin Snyder, the 

Bureau’s Chief of Police.5

 After getting no response, she called the Office of the 

Mayor of the City of Williamsport.6

 A woman at the Mayor’s Office informed her 

there was “nothing the Mayor’s Office could do about her car,” but the woman 

promised to take Kelly’s name and telephone number “and pass it along for 

someone to call her back.”7

 

1

 Doc. 1-2, Ex. A (Search Warrant). 

2

 Id. 3

 Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 14–16. 

4

 Id. ¶¶ 17–28. 

5

 Id. ¶ 19. 

6

 Id. ¶ 20. 

7

 Id. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 2 of 12
3 

Not long after that, Bell called Kelly.8 He refused to give Kelly information 

about her car and “stated that he was getting further search warrants.”9

 But 

according to Kelly, Bell did not request or obtain any additional warrants.10 

This back-and-forth continued into May, with Kelly calling but receiving no 

response, no update.11 She called the Mayor’s Office again.12 She called the local 

District Attorney’s Office.13 But her efforts proved fruitless.14 

 Finally, on May 9, 2022, Kelly (through her attorney) sent Chief Snyder a 

letter informing him of her situation and stating that if her car was not returned by 

May 11, 2022, she would file a Motion for Return of Property with the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Pennsylvania.15 The deadline came and went, 

but the car was not returned.16 So, on May 13, 2022, Kelly filed the Motion for 

Return of Property, which was served on the Williamsport Bureau of Police five 

days later.17 The Court of Common Pleas scheduled a hearing on Kelly’s motion 

for June 6, 2022, but four days before the hearing, Kelly’s car was returned without 

explanation.18 To date, Kelly has not been compensated for the nearly nine weeks 

8

 Id. ¶ 21. 

9

 Id. ¶ 22. 

10 Id. ¶¶ 23–24. 

11 Id. ¶ 25. 

12 Id. ¶ 26. 

13 Id. ¶ 27. 

14 Id. 15 Id. ¶ 29 (citing Doc. 1-3, Ex. B (May 9, 2022, Letter to Chief Snyder)). 

16 Id. ¶ 30. 

17 Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 

18 Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 3 of 12
4 

the Williamsport Bureau of Police held her car following its execution of the April 

2022 search warrant.19 

In December 2022, Kelly initiated the instant action, naming as defendants 

Officer Bell, Chief Snyder, and the City of Williamsport.20 She brought three 

claims, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations.21 Count I 

asserts that Officer Bell and Chief Snyder unlawfully seized Kelly’s personal 

property after the expiration of a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 

the Constitution of the United States.22 Count II is a Monell claim against the City 

of Williamsport based on Officer Bell and Chief Snyder’s allegedly unlawful 

retention of Kelly’s car.23 And Count III, brought against all three Defendants, 

asserts unlawful taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.24 

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on January 3, 2023.25 That 

motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.26 

II. LAW 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a 

complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which 

19 Id. ¶ 52. 

20 Doc. 1 (Compl.). 

21 Id. 22 Id. ¶¶ 36–39. 

23 Id. ¶¶ 40–48. 

24 Id. ¶¶ 49–52. 

25 Doc. 7 (Mot. to Dismiss). 

26 Doc. 8 (Defs’ Br.); Doc. 9 (Kelly’s Opp.). 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 4 of 12
5 

relief can be granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly27 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

28 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’”29 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit has instructed that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly

and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: 

(1) “take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; 

(2) “identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth”; and (3) assume the veracity of all “wellpleaded factual allegations” and then “determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.”30

III. ANALYSIS 

Based on the City of Williamsport’s failure to return her car for nearly nine 

weeks following the initial lawful seizure, Kelly brings three constitutional claims 

concerning two separate amendments: two claims alleging violations of the Fourth 

Amendment, and one alleging a violation of the Fifth. The Fourth Amendment 

protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures,31 while the Fifth 

27 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 

28 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

29 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

30 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation 

marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

31 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 5 of 12
6 

Amendment provides recourse where “private property [is] taken for public use, 

without just compensation.”32 

The Third Circuit has not addressed the interplay between these amendments 

as it relates to the Government’s refusal to return an individual’s person property 

that was previously seized pursuant to a valid warrant. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has held that “to the extent a plaintiff may 

challenge on federal constitutional grounds the [G]overnment’s retention of 

personal property after a lawful initial seizure,” the challenge “sounds in the Fifth 

Amendment rather than in the Fourth Amendment.”33 That ruling accords with 

decisions rendered by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, 

32 U.S. Const. amend. V. 

33 Denault v. Ahern, 857 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2017), superseded on other grounds as stated in 

Gonpo v. Sonam’s Stonewalls & Art, LLC, 41 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022). 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 6 of 12
7 

Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits,34 and has been endorsed by other courts 

within this circuit.35 

For its part, the Third Circuit recently affirmed the viability of Fifth 

Amendment takings clause claims based on a government’s improper retention of 

personal property previously seized via warrant.36 Specifically, in Frein v. 

Pennsylvania State Police, the Third Circuit held that “[a]lthough police may seize 

potential evidence using a warrant, they may not keep it forever.”37 The Third 

34 See Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Central School Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 187 (2d Cir. 2004) 

(“Where, as in this case, an initial seizure of property was reasonable, defendants’ failure to 

return the items does not, by itself, state a separate Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable 

seizure.”); Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 350 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[t]he refusal 

to return the [property] here neither brought about an additional seizure nor changed the 

character of the [initial] seizure from a reasonable one to an unreasonable one because the 

seizure was already complete when the defendants refused to return [the property]”); Lee v. 

City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “a government’s decision 

regarding how and when to return once lawfully obtained property raises different issues, 

which the test, history, and judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment do not 

illuminate”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gilmore v. City of Minneapolis, 

837 F.3d 827, 838 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that because the police’s seizure of the plaintiff’s 

property was valid, he “has not presented a clearly established right preventing the destruction 

of his sign under the Fourth Amendment”); Snider v. Lincoln County Board of County 

Commissioners, 313 F. App’x 85, 92–93 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]o the extent the 

[plaintiffs] allege a procedural due process violation related to the continued retention of their 

property, as opposed to the initial seizure, the district court erred in concluding that their claim 

only raised rights explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment,” explaining that although 

“the propriety of the initial seizure by police” must be evaluated “under the Fourth 

Amendment,” the “ultimate disposition of the property had to comply with the protections of 

procedural due process [under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]”). 

35 See, e.g., Hammond v. Lancaster City Bureau of Police, 2021 WL 5987734, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 

Dec. 16, 2021) (“agreeing with those courts that have addressed the issue” in finding that “the 

failure to return [the plaintiff’s] lawfully seized property does not implicate his Fourth 

Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure”). 

36 See Frein v. Pennsylvania State Police, 47 F.4th 247, 251–53 (3d Cir. 2022) (overruling district 

court’s dismissal of Fifth Amendment takings clause claim based on the police’s refusal to 

return the plaintiffs’ firearms following a lawful seizure even though the justification for the 

seizure had long since expired). 

37 Id. at 250. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 7 of 12
8 

Circuit explained, “[i]t is well settled that the [G]overnment is permitted to seize 

evidence for use in investigation and trial, but that such property must be returned 

once criminal proceedings have concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to 

forfeiture”; absent the Government’s use of criminal or civil forfeiture, the owners 

of the property withheld despite the conclusion of criminal proceedings “have a 

takings claim” if they “were never compensated.”38 

Against this legal backdrop, the Court finds that the circumstances at issue 

here do not support a claim under the Fourth Amendment. As both parties 

acknowledge, the Complaint “does not pertain to the initial seizure of [Kelly’s] 

vehicle.”39 Kelly instead premises her claims solely on the City of Williamsport’s 

alleged “unlawful retention” of the car “despite [Kelly’s] immediate, repeated, and 

continuous requests for its return.”40 A constitutional challenge, like this one, to the 

Government’s “retention of personal property after a lawful initial seizure . . . 

sounds in the Fifth Amendment rather than in the Fourth Amendment.”41

Accordingly, neither Kelly’s § 1983 claim against Officer Bell and Chief Snyder 

(alleging unlawful seizure of property after the expiration of a warrant in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment) nor her Monell claim against the City of Williamsport 

38 Id. at 253. 

39 Doc. 9 (Kelly’s Opp.) at 14, accord Doc. 8 (Defs’ Br.) at 5 (“Simply put, [Kelly] does not 

dispute the validity of the April 5, 2022, search warrant.”). 

40 Doc. 9 (Kelly’s Opp.) at 14, accord Doc. 8 (Defs’ Br.) at 5 (“Instead, she avers that the properly 

seized property was not timely returned to her and that constitutes a constitutional violation.”). 

41 Denault, 857 F.3d at 84. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 8 of 12
9 

(premised on Officer Bell and Chief Snyder’s allegedly unlawful retention of 

property under the Fourth Amendment) may proceed.42

To be sure, Kelly disputes this. According to Kelly, the Third Circuit 

“demonstrated its approval of Fourth Amendment claims premised upon retention 

of property after lawful seizure” in two separate rulings: Frein43 and Reitz v. 

County of Bucks.

44 The Court disagrees. 

First, Kelly cites Frein for the proposition that she “has a valid Fourth 

Amendment claim” because she “immediately, continuously, and persistently 

requested the return of her vehicle and the Defendants have presented no valid 

legal justification for retaining the vehicle.”45 But, as discussed, the relevant claim 

in that case involved an alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights 

based on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s refusal to return the plaintiffs’ 

lawfully seized personal property; the plaintiffs in Frein did not bring a claim 

under the Fourth Amendment.46 Although the Third Circuit noted that “[a] new 

warrant or other proof of continued compliance with the Fourth Amendment could 

42 For the Monell claim, without an underlying constitutional violation against Officer Bell and 

Chief Snyder, Kelly cannot sustain a claim against the City of Williamsport for failing to train 

them or for adopting a policy that caused them to violate her rights. See Monell v. Dept. of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (noting that the Act “imposes liability on a 

government that, under color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s 

constitutional rights”). 

43 47 F.4th at 250–253. 

44 125 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1997). 

45 See Doc. 9 (Kelly’s Opp.) at 8–12 (cleaned up). 

46 See Frein, 47 F.4th at 250–253. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 9 of 12
10 

justify retention for collateral review, say, or a new investigation or prosecution,”47

that passage simply affirms that a new warrant authorizing continued detention of 

personal property would render the government’s retention of that property 

constitutionally permissible. It does not authorize Fourth Amendment unreasonable 

seizure claims based on the failure to return personal property that was initially 

lawfully seized. 

Second, Kelly notes that in Reitz, the Third Circuit reversed a district court 

ruling granting the defendants summary judgment on constitutional claims under 

the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments concerning the local 

government’s loss, destruction, or untimely return of personal property.48 But, as 

Kelly acknowledges, the Third Circuit in Reitz did not identify which of the 

constitutional claims at issue related to the detention of personal property or 

analyze which constitutional provisions are implicated by a government’s 

unwillingness to return personal property.49 Therefore, this Court does not deem 

Reitz—decided in 1997, twenty years before the referenced First Circuit ruling and 

at least two years before any of the relevant decisions from the Second, Sixth, 

Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits—as indicating disagreement with the legal 

authority cited here. 

47 Id. at 253. 48 Doc. 9 (Kelly’s Opp.) at 12–13 (citing Reitz, 125 F.3d at 142–44). 

49 Id. 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 10 of 12
11 

That said, Kelly’s Fifth Amendment claim may proceed. Consistent with the 

Third Circuit’s ruling in Frein, Kelly’s claim “checks all the Fifth Amendment 

boxes.”50 Her car is indisputably “private property.”51 It was “‘taken’ by the 

officials” and “pressed . . . into ‘public use’”: the Williamsport Bureau of Police 

seized Kelly’s car as part of a criminal investigation, believing that a search of the 

vehicle would reveal instrumentalities and other evidence of a crime.52 And Kelly 

“never got[] a dime, let alone ‘just compensation’” for the nearly nine weeks the 

Williamsport Bureau of Police held her car after completing the initial lawful 

search.53 Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III is denied.54 

50 Frein, 47 4th at 251. 

51 Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 

52 Id.; see also Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 11–12 (noting that Kelly’s car “was seized by the Williamsport 

Bureau of Police” pursuant to a warrant, which “indicated that the items to be searched for and 

seized included firearms, ammunition, and clothing”) (citing Doc. 1-2, Ex. A (Search 

Warrant)). 

53 Frein, 47 4th at 251 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V); see also Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 14–16, 34, 52. 

54 Separately, the Defendants ask this Court to dismiss the Complaint as to the individual 

defendants, Officer Bell and Chief Snyder, because (1) Kelly fails to allege facts demonstrating 

their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, and (2) they are qualifiedly 

immune. Doc. 8 (Defs’ Br.) at 9–12. But for Count III, neither argument has merit. First, the 

allegations in the Complaint demonstrate Officer Bell’s and Chief Snyder’s personal 

involvement in alleged constitutional violation at issue—that is, the unlawful retention of 

Kelly’s car after the initial lawful search was complete. See Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 22 (detailing 

phone call with Officer Bell in which he “refused to give [Kelly] any information about her 

vehicle” and refused to give it back because “he was getting further search warrants”), 29 

(describing notice Kelly provided Chief Snyder regarding an impending court filing if the 

Bureau of Police—which he led as Chief—did not return her car). Second, the Third Circuit’s 

ruling in Frein establishes that Officer Bell’s and Chief Snyder’s alleged actions violated 

Kelly’s rights secured by the Fifth Amendment and that the unlawfulness of their conduct was 

clearly established at the time it occurred. 47 4th at 251–53. That defeats their claim to qualified 

immunity. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018). 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 11 of 12
12 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Constitution permits police officers to seize an individual’s personal 

property if they first obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure. It does not, however, 

allow officers to retain that property indefinitely, well after the basis for the 

warrant has expired. In such circumstances, a plaintiff can raise a constitutional 

challenge to the Government’s refusal to return her personal property, though that 

challenge sounds not in the Fourth Amendment, but in the Fifth Amendment. 

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part, denied in part: 

Kelly’s Fourth Amendment claims (Counts I and II) are dismissed, but her Fifth 

Amendment claim (Count III) may proceed. 

An appropriate Order follows.

 BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

Case 4:22-cv-01940-JKM Document 10 Filed 04/28/23 Page 12 of 12