SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2892-19

MICHAEL WILLIAMS, JOSEPH

GRAFFAGNINO, and DAVE

REEDINGER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX 

NEW JERSEY, THE COUNTY OF 

MIDDLESEX NEW JERSEY 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

EDMOND C. CICCHI, individually 

and in his capacity as the former 

WARDEN OF THE COUNTY OF 

MIDDLESEX NEW JERSEY 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Defendants,

and 

CFG HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued June 9, 2021 – Decided July 28, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2892-19

Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-11416-14.

Matthew A. Peluso argued the cause for appellants.

Mary J. Pedersen argued the cause for respondent 

(Wisler Pearlstine, LLP, attorneys; Mary J. Pedersen 

and Benjamin A. Andersen, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Michael Williams, Joseph Graffagnino, and Dave Reedinger 

were corrections officers at the Middlesex County Adult Correctional Facility. 

In 2015, the count alleging misconduct by defendant CFG Health Systems, LLC

(CFG)—one count of a multi-count complaint—was dismissed with prejudice. 

We dismiss the appeal of that order because we conclude that the filing was 

untimely.

CFG provided health care to correctional facility inmates during the 

relevant time period. On December 7, 2012, a prisoner suffering complications 

from diabetes began fighting with another inmate. Plaintiffs contend that as a 

result of attempting to address the situation, they were physically and 

emotionally injured, and suffered employment consequences, including 

disciplinary charges. Plaintiffs' complaint against CFG alleged that, but for 
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CFG's negligent medical treatment of the prisoner, the incident would not have 

occurred. 

CFG filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the causes of action asserted 

against them. Among other reasons, they raised the defense of statutory 

immunity pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-16(b), which shields medical providers 

from liability for violent acts committed by their patients. On April 24, 2015, 

the court dismissed the count against CFG with prejudice, despite plaintiffs' 

opposition. CFG's request for oral argument was ignored. No statement of 

reasons accompanied the order.

Plaintiffs immediately sought to file an interlocutory appeal. The request 

was denied July 16, 2015. The litigation continued against the other named 

defendants: Middlesex County, New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), 

and Edmond C. Cicchi, individually and in his capacity as the former Warden. 

On September 10, 2018, the matter was settled and dismissed by another 

judge as to all parties. He signed a preprinted form order, as did counsel. The 

form stated that the matter had been settled and dismissed after being scheduled 

for trial.
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Apparently embroiled in a dispute regarding the language, or the 

implementation of the agreement,1the non-CFG defendants filed an application 

to enforce the settlement. Plaintiffs cross-moved to reinstate the litigation. 

On March 15, 2019, the judge heard argument and denied reinstatement. 

The judge said, with reference to the non-CFG defendants who participated in 

the September 10, 2018 proceeding, "[t]here was no doubt we were dismissing 

all the claims, all of plaintiff[s'] claims." The motion to enforce the settlement 

was carried pending resolution of the dispute regarding language in the 

settlement documentation. 

On January 24, 2020, the court filed an order stating, "[i]f not already 

done, the [s]ettlement [a]greement attached hereto as Exhibit 'A' is the final 

settlement in this case and shall be executed by all [d]efendants within five . . . 

days of this [o]rder." On March 24, 2020, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal 

concerning the April 24, 2015 order dismissing CFG. CFG thereafter filed a 

motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, which was denied on June 18, 2020. 

Now on appeal, plaintiffs raise the following points:

POINT I

PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED IN THEIR 

APPEAL TO THIS COURT AND IN THE [TRIAL 

1 No specific information is included in the record.
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COURT PROCEEDINGS] BY THE [TRIAL] 

COURT’S FAILURE TO ALLOW AND CONDUCT 

ORAL ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT’S 

DISPOSITIVE MOTION.

POINT II

PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED IN THEIR 

APPEAL TO THIS COURT AND IN THE [TRIAL 

COURT PROCEEDINGS] BY THE [TRIAL] 

COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY FINDINGS 

OF FACT OR LEGAL REASONS FOR ITS 

DISPOSITIVE ORDER OF DISMISSAL AS 

REQUIRED BY [RULE] 1:7-4(a) AND [RULE] 1:6-

2(f).

POINT III

THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED 

TO APPLY THE LIBERAL AND MINIMAL 

"NOTICE-PLEADING" REQUIREMENTS OF 

[RULE] 4:5-7 TO PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WHEN DECIDING RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE PLEADINGS 

ALONE AND PRIOR TO ANY DISCOVERY.

POINT IV

PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY [PLED] A LEGALLY AND 

FACTUALLY SUFFICIENT CLAIM OF 

NEGLIGENCE AGAINST CFG AND FAIRLY 

APPRISED RESPONDENT UNDER THE 

MINIMAL[] NOTICE-PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 

OF [RULE] 4:5-7.

POINT V
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THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED SECOND 

COUNT AGAINST CFG WITH PREJUDICE AT THE 

INITIAL PLEADING STAGE UNDER THE STRICT 

STANDARD AND HIGH BURDEN OF [RULE] 4:6-

2(e).

POINT VI

THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST CFG 

WITH PREJUDICE ON THE INITIAL PLEADING 

ALONE, AND WITHOUT ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS 

TO OBTAIN ANY DISCOVERY FROM CFG 

REGARDING INFORMATION AND 

DOCUMENTATION RELEVANT TO 

PLAINTIFF[S'] CLAIMS, BUT SOLELY IN CFG'S 

POSSESSION AND UNDER ITS CONTROL.

POINT VII

SINCE CFG RELIED ON ALLEGATIONS OUTSIDE 

OF PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT IN 

SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 

[RULE] 4:6-2([e]), THAT MOTION WAS 

AUTOMATICALLY CONVERTED INTO A 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 

[RULE] 4:46 AND ITS APPLICABLE STANDARDS.

POINT VIII

CFG RELIED ON NUMEROUS FALSE, 

SPECULATIVE AND UNSUPPORTED FACTUAL 

ALLEGATIONS, AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF 

LAW, IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS 

THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED 

BY THE [TRIAL] COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE 

CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.
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Plaintiffs' eight points of error focus solely on the 2015 dismissal with 

prejudice. Since we conclude the time within which to file the appeal has long 

since passed, we do not reach any of them. 

Rule 2:4-1(a) requires appeals from final judgments to be filed within 

forty-five days. As we have previously said, in order "[f]or a judgment to be 

final and therefore appealable as of right, it 'must dispose of all claims against 

all parties.'" Smith v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 421 N.J. Super. 374, 383 

(App. Div. 2011). 

Jersey Central is enlightening, as it illuminates the distinction between a 

judgment that appears final on its face, but is not appealable of right, and the 

contrary situation here, where the judgment, although leaving the details to be 

resolved between contentious parties, left nothing for decision by the court. Id.

at 383-84. There, final judgment was entered on May 9, 2008. Id. at 383. 

Plaintiffs did not file their appeal until February 6, 2009. Ibid. We concluded 

that the appealable "final judgment was not entered until January 16, 2009, when 

the court entered an order memorializing its rulings regarding plaintiffs' 

entitlement to taxed costs." Ibid. The taxed costs—$50,000—were a significant 

issue left open for adjudication. Ibid. It was a disputed issue ultimately

determined by the trial court. Ibid. The award was opposed by the defendant, 
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and it was uncontroverted that the dispute required resolution by a judge. Ibid. 

Had the plaintiffs attempted to appeal before the resolution of taxed costs, it 

would have been dismissed as interlocutory. Id. at 384. 

In this case, the dispute that delayed the filing of the final paperwork 

against the non-CFG defendants had to do with either the manner in which 

payment was to be made, or the language of the releases. These details did not 

require court intervention other than to enforce the settlement. As the judge 

observed during the March 15, 2019 hearing on the motion to enforce settlement 

and cross-motion to reinstate the complaint:

. . . [W]e have a settled case. There is no doubt 

in my mind that the record in this case supports . . . a 

meeting of the minds and that there was a settlement. 

. . .

. . . There's no way this settlement is getting set 

aside based on these arguments because this was a 

settled case. There was no doubt we were dismissing 

all the claims, all of plaintiff[s'] claims. . . . 

But whether or not -- the fact that you are having 

difficulty finalizing these two paragraphs is not, from 

my perspective, at least not in any order that I'm going 

to order, [a] basis to reset this matter, rescind the 

settlement, and put this back on the trial calendar. This 

case is settled. There was no doubt in anybody's mind 

at the time we conducted those negotiations on the day 

in question[,] and based on even a cursory summary of 

the terms that we put on the record[,] that this case was 

settled and everybody was agreeing to dismiss all 
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claims that anybody had asserted against anybody else 

in the case.

So, now, we have to figure out what we're doing. 

So one way or the other, either you're either going to 

work this out together[,] or I'm going to issue an order 

and either I'll set the language[,] or I'm going to compel 

the parties to sign one version or the other.

Plaintiffs themselves believed the matter had been dismissed with 

finality—otherwise no motion to reinstate would have been filed. That the 

parties could not reach an agreement about form language is a very different 

matter than having a significant issue left unresolved that required a ruling by 

the court like in Jersey Central. 

When, on January 24, 2020, the court finalized the settlement, the order 

stated, "[i]f not already done, the settlement agreement attached hereto as 

Exhibit 'A' is the final settlement in this case and shall be executed by all 

[d]efendants within five . . . days of this order." That made utterly clear that the 

dispute related to details, not substance. The court was called upon to intervene 

solely for enforcement, not a decision on the merits. Thus, the matter was settled 

September 10, 2018. Plaintiffs' appeal should have been filed within forty-five 

days of that date.

Plaintiffs further contend that our prior order of June 18, 2020 refusing to 

dismiss the appeal is dispositive. We disagree. Although the order was 
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generated as a result of the non-CFG defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal 

as untimely, no explanation is given in the supplemental section. But the 

abbreviated process on a motion is significantly different from the decisional 

process on the merits after a matter is fully briefed. We now have the benefit of 

oral argument by counsel and substantial briefing. The facts and law have been 

fully illuminated. 

On September 10, 2018, the matter was reported settled while scheduled 

for trial and dismissed with prejudice. Had plaintiffs filed their appeal within 

forty-five days of that date, the appeal would have been treated as an appeal 

from a comprehensive, final disposition. Therefore, we now dismiss the appeal 

as having been untimely filed.

The appeal is dismissed.