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U.S.–MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: AN

OVERVIEW OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE

2008–PRESENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 23, 2013

Serial No. 113–30

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State 6

Mr. John D. Feeley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................. 15

Ms. Elizabeth Hogan, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 

Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................................... 24

Ms. Clare R. Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 44

Mr. Steven Dudley, director, InSight Crime ......................................................... 54

Francisco E. Gonzalez, Ph.D., Riordan Roett senior associate professor, Latin 

American Studies, John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies ................................................................................................... 75

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement ............................... 8

Mr. John D. Feeley: Prepared statement ............................................................... 17

Ms. Elizabeth Hogan: Prepared statement ............................................................ 26

Ms. Clare R. Seelke: Prepared statement .............................................................. 46

Mr. Steven Dudley: Prepared statement ............................................................... 56

Francisco E. Gonzalez, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................. 77

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 88

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 89

(1)

U.S.–MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: AN 

OVERVIEW OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE 

2008–PRESENT 

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2212 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. This committee is now called to order. 

Good morning and welcome to the first of a two-part series on 

security cooperation with Mexico and Central America under the 

framework known as the Merida Initiative. 

As you all know, violence at the hands of drug cartels along our 

southern border continues to affect our own security, as well as 

cross-border commerce. Our communities are threatened by organized criminals who traffic drugs, money, weapons, and human 

beings across our border just as they continue to threaten security 

and governance in Mexico and the rest of the region. 

Mexico is our third largest trading partner and we are Mexico’s 

largest trading partner. By the way, Mexico is Arizona’s, my home 

state, number one trading partner. So it is clearly in both countries’ national interest that we cooperate to defeat these destabilizing and ruthless drug cartels. 

Since the 2007 signing of the Merida Initiative, Mexico and the 

United States have been doing just that; working together to disrupt and dismantle the drug cartels, working to improve Mexican 

and regional justice systems, and to strengthen our shared border 

to include air and maritime control. As we approach the fifth anniversary of the Merida Initiative, I wanted to take this opportunity 

to take an honest look at our efforts in cooperation with Mexico, 

evaluate the effectiveness of the full range of counter narcotics efforts, and determine how we move forward to improve and make 

better use of our taxpayer money. 

With the PRI back in power in Mexico, under recently-elected 

President Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto, there will be some changes to our 

cooperation with Mexico, so I have asked our distinguished panel 

of government witnesses to provide us with details about what 

these changes are likely to be and how they will affect our efforts. 

I would like to know whether our law enforcement and intelligence 

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agencies will be able to effectively combat drug trafficking organizations under what I understand to be a move toward centralized 

control under the Mexican interior ministry; and to what extent 

will this centralization possibly derail the productive working relationships formed over the last 5 years between our men and women 

in the field and their Mexican counterparts. 

The second panel of private-sector experts will give this subcommittee their unvarnished view of the Merida Initiative over the 

last 5 years. And we hope to learn their views on the effect of the 

changes under the new Mexican administration will have in achieving its original goals of the Merida Initiative. 

I look forward to looking closely at Pillar III of the current 

framework, building a 21st century border, and hearing their experts’ views on how we can improve border security so we can protect our citizens without hampering our vibrant trade relationship 

with Mexico. 

As chairman of the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, I 

have chosen to focus on opportunities for economic growth and energy independence throughout our region and these opportunities 

around the United States and Mexico. Unfortunately, the scourge 

of transnational drug trafficking organizations will disrupt these 

opportunities if the United States and Mexico do not cooperate to 

take down the cartels and enforce our laws. So I am doing all I can 

to make security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico as on 

solid footing as it can possibly be with our shared commitments. 

I also want to thank Secretary Brownfield of the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Mr. John Feeley, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Ms. Elizabeth Hogan, the Senior Deputy Administrator for Latin America 

and USAID. 

I would also like to thank the witnesses who will testify in our 

second panel, Ms. Clare Seelke from the Congressional Research 

Service; Mr. Steven Dudley, the director of Insight Crime; and Dr. 

Francisco Gonzalez, a Latin American expert from Johns Hopkins. 

Thank you all for being with us today for what I know will be an 

informative and very productive hearing. 

I would like to recognize the ranking member for opening statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning. Thank you 

to our witnesses who are here today. 

Today’s discussion comes at a critical time for both the U.S. and 

Mexico. For the U.S., the concept that comes on the heels of President Obama’s recent visit to Mexico and Central America earlier 

this month; a time when the threat or spillover violence by drug 

trafficking organizations in Mexico, along our southern-western 

border has escalated; and at a time when the U.S. Congress is reviewing its financial commitment in considering historic immigration reform, impacting over 11 million people. 

For Mexico, it comes nearly 6 months after that historic return 

of the PRI. 

On December 1, 2012, PRI candidate, Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto, was 

inaugurated for a 6-year term, vowing to focus more on reducing 

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ticular, President Pen ̃ a Nieto has aimed to refocus the nature of 

the U.S.-Mexico relationship to send on an economic and energy 

forum agenda by calling for a review of the current U.S.-Mexican 

security strategy. Thus far, Pen ̃ a Nieto has moved to centralize security policy, an indication that he is far more skeptical of the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico’s security than previous President Caldero ́n. 

Yet, President Pen ̃ a Nieto moved to reform the structure of Mexico security structure by placing the Federal police and intelligence 

service under the authority of the Interior Secretary could be a significant setback in cooperation between an array of U.S. and Mexican Federal agencies. 

Similarly, efforts to centralize police commands and create a 

militarized police force to replace current military forces engaged 

in public security could undermine law enforcement cooperation. 

Nonetheless, maintaining strong cooperation between the U.S. and 

Mexico is paramount for both our nations’ economies and national 

security. Our nations share common democratic values and similar 

desires of peace and economic prosperity, as well as a common border extending nearly 2000 miles. 

Additionally, the U.S. is Mexico’s largest trading partner and 

largest foreign investor. Mexico, the fourteenth largest economy in 

the world is the third largest U.S. trading partner after Canada 

and China. Combined annual trade between our two nations is 

$460 billion. In this regard and as part of the Merida Initiative, 

both countries have accepted a shared responsibility. The U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $1.9 billion for Fiscal Year 2012, 

twice the Merida Initiative. For its part, Mexico has invested nearly $10 U.S. for every $1 committed by the U.S. As of September 

2012, Mexico had invested over $10 billion toward the Merida program. 

Mexico, however, remains a major producer and supplier of illegal narcotics to the U.S. including heroin, meth, marijuana, and cocaine. More than 60,000 deaths are a result of drug-related crimes 

and violence in Mexico between 2006 and 2012. Although more possible than that, indications of progress have at times been mixed. 

For instance, we have helped to train more than 7,500 Federal and 

19,000 state justice sector personnel, 4,000 of which are Federal investigators that did not exist before. Yet, those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by authorities for up to 

80 days without access to legal counsel. Yet, many inmates await 

trials as opposed to serving out the sentences. Normally, the U.S. 

Agency of International Development has concentrated most of its 

work in support of judicial reform at the state level. In terms of 

human rights, there is concern the Mexican military has committed 

more human rights abuses since it has been tasked with carrying 

out public security. The U.S. must continue to work with Mexico 

to improve their institutions that investigate and prosecute human 

rights abuses and strengthen protection for human rights defenders. 

In conclusion, the landscape in Mexico has changed, politically, 

economically, and in terms of security. But the need to combat drug 

trafficking organizations and stem the violence from their activities 

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ists and their assessment of our individual and joint effort in regards to the Merida Initiative thus far and how both our respective 

nations can improve our efforts moving forward. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to also recognize the most 

distinguished Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much Mr. Ranking Member for holding this important hearing, one of the most critical partnerships that our nation 

enjoys, that with Mexico, our ally to the south. 

In a speech in 1984, President Ronald Reagan said,

‘‘Closer to home, there remains a struggle for survival for free 

Latin American, allies of ours. They valiantly struggle to prevent communist takeovers, fueled massively by the Soviet 

Union and Cuba. Our policy is simple. We are not going to betray our friends, reward the enemies of freedom or permit fear 

and retreat to become American policies, especially in this 

hemisphere.’’

And still many years later, we are still looking for a coherent 

strategy on how to advance U.S. interests in the region, how to promote democracy, how to better hold accountable those regimes that 

oppress their own people. And that is why I would like to thank 

my friend from New Jersey, Albio Sires, for joining me and introducing our bipartisan legislation H.R. 1687, Countering ALBA Act 

of 2013 which urges the President to sanction those persons who 

are officials or acting on behalf of ALBA governments who are responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious human 

rights abuses against citizens of ALBA countries. And I hope that 

we can move that bill forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this 

hearing. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to recognize the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, and of course, Ranking Member Sires, for convening this hearing today to discuss the 

current status of the Merida Initiative. I look forward to hearing 

from our distinguished witnesses here today, all of whom are very 

involved and very knowledgeable on the subject of the Merida Initiative and all of Latin America. 

I believe the Merida Initiative is an essential policy tool to facilitate cooperation between the United States and our southern 

neighbor, Mexico. The Merida Initiative allows the United States 

and Mexico to maximize our respective resources by coming together with the common goal to fight trans-border crime, organized 

crime and corruption. Building a capacity for rule of law, and providing technical assistance and law enforcement training are important aspects of this agreement. 

I was pleased to see the Initiative grow from a bilateral security 

agreement with Mexico into a key component of a broader regional 

security strategy. U.S.-Mexico relations do not exist in a vacuum. 

It is vital that this agreement continues to complement a broad 

U.S. regional engagement plan. Addressing the security concerns of 

Mexico does not stop at simple bilateral relations. The United 

States must address the region as a whole. The Caribbean Base Security Initiative, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, 

5

and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, along with the 

Merida Initiative, contribute to a comprehensive regional approach 

that accounts for sophisticated criminal networks and complex 

cross-border threats throughout the hemisphere. 

I look forward to hearing particularly from my good friend, Ambassador Brownfield, who could possibly speak about the importance of regional partnerships, particularly when discussing the 

work of Colombia as a regional partner for many countries including Mexico and Guatemala. 

Through my recent travels to the region, I heard first hand the 

impact of U.S. assistance in a variety of sectors. Aspects of U.S. security and assistance agreements that address the needs of vulnerable populations such as women, indigenous people, and Afro-Colombians are particularly important. These populations are routinely exploited by criminal networks and armed conflicts. They are 

all too often the unheard victims of a lack of rule of law and the 

menace to civil society. By building a U.S. engagement strategy 

that accounts for the integration of ethnic minorities and 

disenfranchised persons, the United States can work with partner 

nations to lay the foundation for a safe and secure region. 

I look forward to hearing again from our witnesses on how we 

can further advance the needs of vulnerable populations through 

these critical partnerships. The people of Mexico, the people of the 

Caribbean, the people of Central and South America can benefit 

greatly from continued U.S. support and assistance that is based 

on a broad, regional vision for shared security prosperity and between the United States and our southern neighbors. Thank you. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentlemen from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do also want 

to thank you and our ranking member for convening this important 

hearing and I certainly want to extend my warm welcome to our 

witnesses this morning. 

Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that the U.S. does have a 

significant interest in the security of our neighbor to the south. 

Statistics have shown that when Mexico is safe, our own communities in the U.S. are also safe. I applaud the efforts of the current 

administration’s supporting Mexico’s endeavors to reduce its elevated rate of crime, violence, and drug trafficking. 

I also want to note, in fact, and want to associate myself with 

the comments made earlier by my good friend and colleague from 

New York and I associate myself particularly in the interests that 

we have taken to find out what Mexico has done in its treatment 

of the indigenous populations there in Mexico. I saw this as one of 

the ironies, Mr. Chairman, that we—the celebration of the Cinco de 

Maya recently, one of the things that maybe a lot of our fellow 

Americans are not aware of. A gentleman by the name of Benito 

Juarez was a pure Indian, indigenous Indian, was often raised by 

monks and came through the ranks of becoming eventually the 

Lincoln and George Washington of Mexico, in fact, when they tried 

to get rid of French colonialism at the time. And that is the reason 

why the Cinco de Mayo is in reference to the leadership and the 

6

services of this indigenous Indian by the name of Benito Juarez 

who is revered and honored throughout Mexico. 

My question is have the indigenous peoples in Mexico been provided proper treatment by the central government for all these 

years? And I definitely will be asking more questions concerning 

this matter. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Now I would like to turn to our witnesses. First, I would like to welcome Ambassador Brownfield. It 

is a wonderful opportunity to have you again. I am very looking 

forward to what you have to say, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Normally, 

I would defer to my regional colleague to speak first and give us 

some basic orientation, but Mr. Feeley looks so fierce this morning 

I will take advantage of this opportunity and then step out of the 

line of fire before he speaks. 

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S.-Mexico security cooperation under 

the Merida Initiative. I do have a written statement which I will, 

with your permission, enter into the record and provide this brief, 

oral summary. 

Members of the subcommittee, we do not start our discussion of 

Merida today at point zero, since our two governments agreed in 

2007 that we share responsibility for the security threats affecting 

Mexico and will cooperate in solving them, the United States has 

delivered $1.2 billion in support and assistance to professionalize 

Mexico’s law enforcement and build capacity under the rule of law. 

The Mexican Government for its part has invested more than $10 

for every dollar contributed by the United States to these shared 

challenges. And we have had an impact. More than 8,500 justice 

sector officials and more than 19,000 federal, state, and local police, 

have received training under Merida. Secure Federal prisons have 

increased from 5 to 14, and their quality has increased even more. 

The U.S. Government has provided $111 million worth of inspection equipment that has resulted in more than $3 billion in elicit 

goods seized in Mexico. 

More than 50 senior members of drug trafficking organizations 

have been removed from the streets of Mexico and more than 

700,000 Mexican students have received civic education and ethics 

training under the Merida Initiative. 

Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee should take great pride in its 

support for the Merida Initiative and what it has accomplished for 

the American and Mexican people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, a new President of Mexico was inaugurated last December. As with all new governments, the Pen ̃ a Nieto 

government came to office, determined to formulate its own national security strategy and place its own stamp on the U.S.-Mexico 

bilateral relationship. The new government has sent some clear 

7

signals on the direction it wishes to go. It wants a single point of 

contact in the Mexican Government to coordinate Merida Initiative 

programs and operations, and greater focus on crime prevention 

and economic and social development. It wants greater engagement 

by Mexican state and local government and a sharper focus on 

human rights. It wants to strengthen the Mexican Attorney General’s office, professionalize the police, and build a new gendarmerie to list some of the policing burden from the Federal police 

and armed forces. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no problem with these signals. They are 

logical. They are coherent. They are good ideas. There are a number of details yet to be defined, but what we have now is fully consistent with our strategic approach to the Merida Initiative where 

we support the four Pillars, shift focus from equipment to training, 

and transition from Federal to state and local institutions. As the 

President said in Mexico City 2 weeks ago, it is the people of Mexico who decide how we will cooperate in Mexico. 

We have made an unprecedented and historic start to cooperation under the Merida Initiative during different administrations in 

both Mexico and the United States. I expect to report even more 

progress to this subcommittee in the months ahead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Feeley. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. FEELEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FEELEY. Thank you very much, Chairman Salmon, Ranking 

Member Sires, members of the committee. I hope I don’t look too 

ferocious this morning. Bill has a tendency to exaggerate. 

I also thank you for the opportunity to testify along with my colleagues on the U.S.-Mexico security relationship and the Merida 

Initiative. It has been my privilege to serve at our Embassy in 

Mexico on two occasions; first, in the days and months after 9/11 

when we were forced to reexamine how neighbors must confront 

the horrors of terrorism in democratic societies. And most recently, 

as I welcome some of you to Mexico, in 2009 to 2012, as our Charge`

d’Affaires and our DCM, when our Mexican partners and we truly 

transformed our security in commercial relationships in service of 

the American and Mexican people. 

I must thank as well the U.S. Congress for its consistent bipartisan strong support of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, in general, 

and the Merida Initiative, in particular. Merida is a success story 

and this committee’s commitment to and stewardship of this new 

paradigm and bilateral cooperation has been a cornerstone of that 

success. And I would just note that between 2007 when we began 

this and current day, there have been over 25 congressional delegations to Mexico. I look behind you and I see some of our staffer colleagues, Eddie Acevedo, Ramon Zertuche, Mark Walker, Joske 

Bautista. I also recall John Mackey in another era with whom we 

work closely. The cornerstone of our success has been our cooperation. 

Begun under the Bush-Caldero ́n administrations and reaffirmed 

and now strengthened in the Obama and Pen ̃ a Nieto administration, the United States and Mexico cooperate to vouchsafe our mutual security in ways that quite frankly were simply unimaginable 

when I reported for duty in Mexico the first time over a decade ago. 

This commitment to our shared security transcends political parties and it extends across both governments. It has enriched and 

broadened our relationship. 

As the Assistant Secretary mentioned, on May 2nd, President 

Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President Pen ̃a Nieto. The 

Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to improving the lives of 

all citizens and working with mutual respect and responsibility 

across a broad range of issues. President Obama emphasized our 

co-responsibility for the violence associated with the elicit flows of 

drugs, guns, and cash. 

The Merida Initiative is based on the recognition that our countries share responsibility for combatting the transnational criminal 

networks and protecting our citizens from the crime, corruption, 

and violence they generate. The four Pillars that the United States 

and Mexico agreed to in 2010 and the Presidents Obama and Pen ̃ a 

Nieto have reaffirmed, remain our flexible organizing construct. 

Under these Pillars, we are accelerating our efforts to support more 

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ciety organizations, to expand our border focus beyond security, to 

facilitating legitimate trade and travel, to cooperate in building 

strong communities resistant to the influence of crime in Mexico. 

Our success is due in large part to the brave efforts of the Mexican Government and people to confront transnational criminal organizations. Our assistance has provided crucial support to the 

Mexican Government in its efforts to enhance the rule of law, promote human rights, and advance justice sector reforms while enhancing the bilateral cooperation between our two governments 

through the provision of equipment, technical assistance, and training. 

As the Assistant Secretary mentioned, President Pen ̃ a Nieto and 

his team have consistently made clear to us their interest in continuing our close collaboration on security issues, most recently 

during the visit. The Pen ̃ a Nieto government has stated that it intends to give particular emphasis to crime prevention and the rule 

of law. The United States fully supports this refinement and I 

stress refinement of our strategic partnership and we continue our 

on-going transition from major equipment purchases toward training and capacity building together. 

Mr. Chairman, working together we have truly transformed the 

bilateral agenda. Our efforts to address crime and violence and enhance citizen security will continue to evolve and will reflect the 

views and priorities of both governments. Mexican authorities 

agree that our cooperation must continue and that the Merida Initiative provides a flexible framework for this partnership. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and the members of this committee 

again for your support of the Merida Initiative. Your support has 

helped make this a catalyst for dramatically-improved relationship 

beyond just security. I look forward to continuing the work with 

this Congress. And I will be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeley follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Feeley. 

We have a couple of votes that we need to take, but I would like 

to have you, Ms. Hogan, make your statement first and then we 

will recess and then we will come back after the two votes and I 

apologize for inconveniencing you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH HOGAN, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA 

AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. HOGAN. Thank you very much. Chairman Salmon, Ranking 

Member Sires, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today and I am grateful for 

the subcommittee’s interest in USAID’s contributions to the Merida 

Initiative. USAID considers insecurity related to high levels of 

crime and violence in Mexico to be a grave threat to the remarkable development advances of recent decades. 

Analysis in Latin American countries indicates that high levels 

of crime and violence are a leading constraint to economic growth 

because it discourages international investment and drains domestic resources. Since the inclusion of Pillar IV within the Merida Initiative in 2010 we have worked alongside our Mexican partners to 

prevent crime and violence in areas that have been most affected 

by narcotrafficking, with the particular focus on at-risk youth. We 

do so by helping to create safe, urban spaces for youth; provide 

them life and job skills; increase their access to educational opportunities; improve the ability of government to keep citizens safe; 

and strengthen the capacity of communities to address the root 

causes of crime and violence. Because communities along the U.S.-

Mexico order are especially vulnerable to drug trafficking, we are 

developing and testing models to reduce crime and violence in nine 

communities in the cities of Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and Tijuana. 

As we identify successful approaches, the Government of Mexico 

is poised to bring them to scale in other parts of the country facing 

similar challenges. We are tapping into the expertise of countries 

and cities that has successfully addressed gang violence and reduced crime. For instance, through an agreement signed last year 

with Los Angeles, USAID is sharing that city’s successful gang reduction and use development approaches with our partners in Mexico. We have also shared other U.S. experiences in crime prevention such as the Cease Fire models employed in Chicago and Boston. 

We are also partnering with the private sector to make our efforts more sustainable. For instance, we are working with Intel and 

Prudential in the cities of Monterrey and Tijuana to train at-risk 

youth from tough neighborhoods for productive employment in the 

technology and construction fields. Our effort to reach at-risk youth 

is already bearing fruit. In Ciudad Juarez, approximately 88 percent of the youth who took advantage of our program re-enrolled 

in middle school. In Tijuana, 70 percent of our enrollees are either 

back in school or employed 6 months after program completion. 

And the nine focus communities have all developed community 

25

master plans which will help them make the best use of local resources to reduce crime and violence. 

Because insecurity thrives in environments where corruption is 

rampant and impunity emboldens criminals, we are continuing our 

long-standing efforts through Merida to strengthen the institutions 

charged with ensuring the rule of law and the protection of human 

rights. We work closely with Mexican justice institutions as they 

transition from a closed, inquisitorial criminal justice system to a 

more open and transparent accusatorial one. 

A 2012 impact study conducted in five states implementing justice reforms indicated that they were already having the desired effect. States reported a marked decrease in pre-trial detentions and 

case backlog in large part due to an increased use of alternative 

dispute mechanisms. Victim assistance units have been strengthened and serious crimes are receiving longer sentences compared to 

states that have not yet implemented justice reforms. 

Mexico is scheduled to enact these reforms nationwide by 2016 

and we are poised to help them in that effort. 

Through Merida, we are also supporting the government’s effort 

to prevent, protect, and advocate for human rights. In 2012, we 

trained more than 150 journalists and human rights defenders on 

practices and technologies that can help protect them and their 

work. We are also supporting human rights training for Federal 

and state police offices in the government’s new victim assistance 

unit. This includes supporting master’s degrees for 300 police in 

human rights and developing training curricula that incorporate 

internationally-recognized standards. In addition, we are 

partnering with local organizations on campaigns to prevent torture and support the implementation of human rights reforms. 

Mr. Chairman, the Government of Mexico has been a full partner 

in our shared endeavor to reduce crimes, support youth, strengthen 

the judicial sector and advance human rights. Our main interlocutors, including the Under Secretary for Human Rights and the 

Under Secretary for Crime and Violence Prevention and SETEC 

which is the government agency that overseas justice sector reform 

have all expressed their interest in not only continuing, but expanding our close working relationship. 

We look forward to continuing to partner with them as they 

press ahead with their ambitious reform agenda. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hogan follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. This committee will be in recess until 

we commence our voting. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SALMON. The subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere is 

reconvened. I would like to thank the distinguished panel for their 

testimonies and the time that you have allocated to be with us here 

today. Ambassador Brownfield, as of March 13th, roughly $1.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in the Merida funding appropriated between Fiscal 

Year 2008 and Fiscal Year 2012 have been delivered. I understand 

at least $95 million in 2012, Merida funding, remains on hold. And 

there appears to be between $600 and $700 million in funds yet to 

be delivered. What is the current status of the Merida pipeline and 

should we be concerned that deliveries remain largely unchanged 

since fall of 2012? And are those funds being reprogrammed to 

align with the shift in priorities expressed by the Pen ̃a Nieto government? If so, what should we expect this reprogramming to look 

like? 

Finally, how will centralization of security cooperation under the 

Mexican Interior Ministry affect the on-the-ground efforts and relationships formed and the information and intelligence sharing that 

is necessary to get ahead of the cartels? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excellent 

questions and let me try to knock off all of them in some sort of 

order. Our own calculation is that we have delivered on $1.2 billion 

of Merida assistance funding and appropriations since Fiscal Year 

2008. And since Congress has appropriated $1.9 billion in INL 

money, simple math tells you how much therefore remains at this 

stage undelivered. That would include, of course, about $200 million of Fiscal Year 2013 which has not yet come to us at all due 

to the process. So my own figure is I am looking at about $500 million that is in play right now. 

You correctly point to an issue, not the only issue and that is 

that we are still working through the directions of the priorities of 

the vision of the new Government of Mexico and Enrique Pen ̃ a 

Nieto. I signalled for you, as did John, some of the areas that they 

have identified as priorities. We are comfortable with those areas. 

We don’t yet have a defined strategy that we can say we can program and implement against. We are continuing to work programs 

that we have had in place for the past several years. You correctly 

note that a chunk of this money, $95 million, is currently on hold 

due to the other House here in the United States Congress and we 

are working to resolve those issues together with the Government 

of Mexico. 

Finally, you mentioned one specific issue that we are also working through and that is the desire of the Government of Mexico to 

have what they call the single window or the single point of contact 

for coordination of Merida Initiative material through the Government Ministry, the Government Secretariat, Secretaria de 

Gobernacion. We are working through those issues. I have no objection to the concept, in principle, nor does anyone. It is very logical 

to have a single point of contact, a go-to person for decisions, but 

how to implement that on a multi-hundred million dollar program 

that involves dozens of different agencies and thousands of difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Jul 18, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\052313\81170 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ferent people is what we are still working through. We owe you 

great clarity on that. We are working it with the Government of 

Mexico. I would hope by the time you call us here again for another 

hearing, we would have a definitive answer. 

Mr. SALMON. Wonderful. Thank you. I would like to point out 

that for every dollar that we spend, it is my understanding Mexico 

spends $10. It is a pretty good bang for the buck. And that probably leads to the next loaded question. I know how important this 

funding is, but I would like to ask this question and any member 

of the panel can address it. Given the current U.S. budget constraints, the status of the Merida Initiative funding pipeline and 

the fact that Mexico is a middle-income country, is continued aid 

to Mexico through Merida justifiable? And if you had to pare down, 

what areas would you argue for maintaining and why? And I apologize, my time has kind of run out, so if there is anything you want 

to supplement in writing afterwards that is great, too. But I would 

love a short response on that. 

Mr. FEELEY. Mr. Chairman, I will go ahead and start. The funding for the Merida Initiative, as you note, has indeed been on a 

downward slope. The reason for that very simply is that when we 

began this we began with some big ticket items that Mexico desperately needed to improve their mobility to get non-intrusive inspection equipment to its ports, to get IT platforms, et cetera. 

As we have provided that leveraged assistance, Mexico, as you 

mentioned, has spent its own money. And that is right and that is 

just and that is the way it should be. Where we have begun to 

evolve, even before President Pen ̃ a Nieto and his team came in is 

a greater focus on training, on capacity building. This is the added 

value that we have by providing FBI agents, DEA agents, our Justice sector people. 

I will let my colleagues speak more specifically to the sectors, but 

I would say, in general, absolutely, it is still necessary and the 

partnership that this has, not bought, I do not want to use that 

term, but the partnership that this has engendered has also had 

a very positive effect across the rest of the bilateral relationship, 

not just in the security sector. And you will note that Merida is 

very much a whole of government effort and we have one of the 

perhaps unintended secondary consequences of our 5 years now of 

Merida is that it has engendered on the Mexican side a genuine 

inter-agency process, something that quite frankly, a decade ago 

didn’t exist. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if I could offer from 

the INL perspective a set of numbers to indicate that not only do 

I agree with you, but I think we are moving in that direction. As 

we learned in Colombia, when your program is successful, part of 

the price of success is the numbers, the funding made available to 

you to address it goes down. 

May I offer you three sets of numbers, just mine, I don’t speak 

for Beth from the USAID side, but the INL funding. In Fiscal Year 

2012 we received from Congress $248 million for Merida. In the 

2013 Continuing Resolution we received $199 million. For Fiscal 

Year 2014, we have requested $148 million. The number is going 

down precisely as you suggested that it should, but from my perspective it is going down in a predictable and systematic way that 

33

I can then plan against as opposed to having a surprise out there 

waiting for me at the end of each fiscal year. 

Ms. HOGAN. And from USAID’s standpoint, we are transitioning 

out of several sectors in Mexico in order to be able to focus and concentrate on Merida and global climate change. We are getting out 

of health. We have already, in fact, gotten out of the health sector 

in Mexico. We are transitioning out of higher education and private 

sector competitiveness. And so our funding requests on the development assistance account have gone down steadily from $34 million 

in Fiscal Year 2012 down to $23 million in Fiscal Year 2013 and 

we see ourselves going to $12 million in Fiscal Year 2014. So we 

are very much in sync with your observation about the Mexican 

Government being able to fill in that space and lead their own development path in those sectors. 

Mr. SALMON. You know, it is actually nice to see programs in 

government that actually go down over time. That is a good thing. 

I would like to recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow that 

for a second because I am a strong supporter of the Merida Initiative and I think it is good. But let me just ask this question because sometimes what you are trying to do is convince your colleagues that it is the right thing to do, et cetera. 

So the first question is what metrics does the State Department 

and USAID utilize to show that the program is successful, that we 

could then utilize to tell our colleagues this is a successful program 

and this is how it has been evaluated because many say oh, you 

just spend money, what good is it? You just throw money at it. 

So can you tell us what the metrics are? 

Ms. HOGAN. I would be happy to begin that discussion with you 

because that is so very important. That is such a very important 

question to be able to track progress as it takes place. 

I would say that we are very, very focused on monitoring an evaluation of our programs in Mexico as we are globally. And just to 

give you a couple of examples from the justice sector, the study 

that I referenced in my opening comments looks at the time in 

which it takes a prosecutor to resolve a case. In the states that are 

implementing the reform, we have been able to see that it is taking 

them less than half the time to prosecute a case than it does in 

states that have not yet had the reform go forward. 

We are also tracking the amount of pre-trial detention and we 

have seen a very sparing use of pre-trial detention in states that 

are doing reforms, you know, that Mexico has had a history of having too many people in pre-trial detention. Now they are only focusing on those that are at the greatest risk of fleeing. So those are 

the kind of interim indicators that we are looking at on the justice 

side. There are many more and I am happy to give you examples 

of those after my testimony. 

On the youth side, when we are talking about do we know we 

are effective in our programs with at-risk youth, as I mentioned 

again in my testimony, we see the numbers that are re-enrolling 

in school, the numbers that are going on to get licit employment. 

But we also at the end of the day want to be able to show that in 

the communities where we are working we will see a reduced level 

34

of crime and violence because that is the ultimate goal. And so we 

have done a baseline study in the nine communities where we are 

working, and by February 2014, we will be able to say definitively 

whether or not those programs have indeed achieved the goal of reducing crime and violence. 

Mr. MEEKS. And might as well stay with this real quick because 

the concerns always are as we drive crime down, especially in big 

cities, in the rural areas and other areas where there is not a lot 

of commerce, et cetera, that is where the cartels and other ones 

seem to emanate and those are primarily places where the indigenous live, et cetera. So I was wondering, could you tell, as I mentioned in my opening statement, what effect the Merida Initiative 

has in regard to helping the plight of minorities in that region or 

in Mexico, how is that working? Mr. Feeley? 

Mr. FEELEY. I would be happy to take that, Mr. Meeks, and 

thank you very much for your consistent companionment in advising how we deal with in Merida with indigenous and marginalized 

populations. 

First with regards to just one comment to add on to about monitoring. On April 16th, President Pen ̃ a Nieto in Monterrey laid out 

what was the sort of strategic chapeau for what we hope will be 

the emerging security strategy. He laid out six lines of action, he 

called them. And very importantly, one of those was monitoring 

and evaluation. So we take that as a very positive sign and we are 

going to continue to encourage it. 

With regard to Mexico and the protection of indigenous people 

and indigenous populations, it is important to note that early in 

February this year, the new government created the Commission 

for Dialogue with indigenous communities. They hope, and it is our 

encouragement, that the indigenous communities will be able to 

have their human rights protected through government attention 

to their needs, preservation of their right to autonomy, and self determination. This forum will be very important for continuing that. 

Additionally, since 2003, long before Merida started, the Mexican 

Government has had the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Communities. This is a semi-autonomous institution created in the Secretariat of Social Development. We support 

very strongly, and you should be aware that the Merida dollar that 

the American people put into Mexico very strongly supports 

through out public affairs section working with indigenous communities to empower them in Mexico. We have several programs. One 

of them is with the—it is called the Study of U.S. Institute for 

Scholars, SUSI. We have brought up 60 grantees. We continue to 

sponsor this program. We also have something and this is my 

USAID colleagues can speak in greater detail, but it is something 

called the SEED program which provides scholarships to young 

people and educators. 

When I was in Mexico, I had the privilege of presiding over several ceremonies with these people. Probably the most effective 

thing I have ever seen is to send an educator from the Tzotzils 

communities in Chiapas to the United States for a community college degree for training in English and then see that person return. 

We have created an alumni network with a special focus on indigeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Jul 18, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\052313\81170 HFA PsN: SHIRL
35

nous communities in Mexico. So it remains a very high priority for 

us, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. And I hope, begging the chairman’s indulgence, I 

just had one, first let me correct myself so I don’t get the scorn of 

Mr. Brownfield. I said Ambassador, but I had forgotten he is now 

an Assistant Secretary. 

Ambassador, let me just ask you real quick, could you speak, as 

I said in my opening statement about the importance of regional 

partnerships, particularly when discussing the work of Colombia 

and others in the area, working together to make sure that—they 

talk about the tourniquet effect, that one, we are not pushing drugs 

one way because of networks. I know that you have done this. 

Could you just tell us that very quickly? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Congressman, you may call me 

Ambassador whenever you wish. I promise not to be offended. 

You know where I am on this because you and I have had this 

conversation a number of times before and that is we must address 

the drug issue and the transnational organized crime in a regional 

and hemispheric way, otherwise, as we have been saying for the 

last 30 years, we squeeze the balloon in one place and it is just 

going to expand in some other place. 

How are we doing it? We have this, in essence, a four-part strategy that involves Colombia in the south, heavily focused on, originally Plan Colombia and then the Strategic Development Initiative; 

Mexico at the northern end through the Merida Initiative; Central 

America in the middle through CARSI; and eventually, ladies and 

gentlemen, we are going to have to pay greater attention to the 

Caribbean because the logic is as we begin to bite and take hold 

in Central America that Caribbean is going to become an issue. 

We have some good news here. Colombia clearly is by 

everybody’s account a success story. Mexico, Bill Brownfield would 

argue that we have reached the turning point and we are, in fact, 

seeing now on the ground real-life results of the joint effort under 

the Merida Initiative. Central America we are now ramping up. 

The logic that I saw in Colombia for 3 years and for a number of 

years before is that that will begin to bite. We have a partner that 

we have to make greater use of, although I acknowledge that they 

have been enormously helpful so far. That is the Government of 

Colombia which has received over $8 billion of funding provided by 

this Congress since the year 2000 and are now in a position to export much of that capability. They are doing more police training 

in Central America than we are. They are doing as much monitoring and surveillance of drug trafficking, aircraft and boats in the 

Caribbean as we are. We are getting, if you will, Dr. Meeks, a return on our investment of the last 10 years. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member for this excellent hearing and thank you to our 

panelists as well. 

Although other regions often dominate the headlines, Latin 

America remains central to our country’s security and our own 

prosperity. Mexico is a vital ally in this region. It is instrumental 

to the economic and security outlook of our country. And given the 

strong ties and the interests that bind our two nations together, it 

36

is important to reexamine the Merida Initiative to ensure that it 

is living up to its promise of bringing a greater measure of human 

rights and the rule of law in Mexico as Mexico struggles to address 

these challenges. 

According to reports, the new Mexican Government has called for 

an end to direct access by U.S. law enforcement officials with their 

Mexican counterparts on security matters. I am concerned that this 

shift by Pen ̃ a Nieto could impact our national security. It could 

hinder mutual security operations regarding narcotrafficking, regarding terrorism. And in addition, I am concerned that Mexico is 

not doing enough to protect its southern border. Just like the Colombians are training law enforcement and military personnel in 

the region, Mexican authorities should be doing the same. And 

with that in mind, we have got to reexamine our own approach to 

the violent crisis in Central America. 

Last year, joint operations with our allies in Central America 

were crucial in disrupting elicit networks, eliminating drug smuggling cells. I am concerned about the growing destabilizing threat 

of violence throughout Central America. However, these programs 

have been frozen for more than a year due to a hold from the Senate side. This undermines our national security. It lets our friends 

hanging out there to dry. 

So Mr. Feeley, can you give us a status update on the hold and 

I will ask you to respond when I finish. Also, what is the strategy 

of the administration regarding this money, given the fact that the 

reprogramming deadline for Honduras funds is in the beginning of 

June in just a few days? 

And Ambassador Brownfield, you said it was okay to call you 

that, I would like to turn our attention to Bolivia for a moment. 

As we know, in 2008, Bolivia expelled our U.S. Ambassador, expelled the DEA. And in 2011, I urged Secretary Clinton to oppose 

the framework agreement between the U.S. and Bolivia, citing that 

Morales does not want to be a partner of the U.S. He undermines 

our interest in the region. And just this month, Morales violated 

the constitution again by seeking a third term, expelling USAID officials from Bolivia. However, despite all of these expulsions, the 

State Department continues to fund counternarcotics operations in 

Bolivia. The request for Bolivia was $15 million in Fiscal Year 

2011; Fiscal Year 2012, $7.5 million; and the administration’s request for Fiscal Year 2014 is $5 million. When will the administration realize that our tax dollars can be better spent elsewhere? And 

is there a plan to change our current footprint? 

And we will begin with you, Ambassador Brownfield. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, Congresswoman. In fact, I will 

address the Bolivia question and then turn all of the others over 

to John. 

I will not talk to the larger issue. I will talk to the specific issue 

that you have asked and that is what is our plans in terms of the 

future of INL operations and programs in Bolivia. And you are correct. I have reached the same conclusion that you have. I will tell 

you that I am proud of what the INL section called the NAS down 

there has accomplished in Bolivia over the last 30 years. I think 

they have delivered great value for the American people and for 

37

that matter for the Bolivian people. That said the time has come 

for us to go. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. It is my intention to close down our 

section in a reasonable and orderly fashion and I would be stunned 

were you to see a request for Fiscal Year 2015 for additional funding to support INL activities in Bolivia. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. We will have you end 

right there. Amen and hallelujah. 

Mr. Feeley, we just have a few seconds, but the strategy about 

Honduras and the hold on the Senate site for all the region funds. 

Mr. FEELEY. Thank you, Congresswoman. You are absolutely 

right. We have had looked to Honduras as one of perhaps the 

places with most concern where institutions are weak, where we 

have very willing partners, but quite frankly capacity that needs 

to be bolstered. 

You are correct that there is a hold in the other chamber of the 

U.S. Congress. We have worked with the staff members to explain 

what we have done in terms of improving the human rights performance of Honduran military and police. What we have done 

with our own DEA and our own trainers in terms of developing 

SOPs, standard operating procedures, to be able to provide support 

to the Honduran police. We have also walked through a significant 

amount of internal review, based on what happened during Operation Anvil, earlier. And we have got not just a lot of lessons observed, but quite frankly a lot of lessons learned. We have taken 

that process very seriously. We remain engaged. It is a high priority for us to be able to continue to support the government in 

Honduras because it is one of the most critical places. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to both of you. Thank 

you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, last week, the 

OAS released a report on drug policy in the Americas which proposed the notion of legalizing production, sale and use of marijuana, and urged stability amongst the hemispheric nations to deal 

with the drug problem. It seems to me that it is counter to what 

we are trying to do. I am not shocked at the OAS to come up with 

something like that. 

But can you just talk a little bit about this, both of you? 

Mr. FEELEY. Certainly. Let me start out. I will turn over the specific details of the report to Bill. But let me just say that the 

United States Government, as you well know, advocates a holistic 

approach to drug policy. The report that came out last week was 

commissioned by the leaders in Cartagena last year in a discussion 

that President Obama had participated in. They put it into the 

CCAD and what they need—CCAD being the commission to study 

drugs in the OAS. 

We believe that we need a baseline. We recognize that our policy, 

our holistic policy that looks at the drug problem as a health problem, not just as a criminal justice problem, but also undeniably as 

a criminal justice problem, one that may have—we have dedicated 

tremendous amounts of money here, almost $10.7 billion is the request this year for greater prevention, greater education, alternate 

38

routes to be able to deal with drug problems here in the United 

States. And the request for this report we welcomed, frankly. We 

are looking at the report and I would note that the report does not 

make a recommendation. It simply lays out several scenarios that 

could occur if countries were to follow certain routes. With that, I 

will let Bill go a little bit deeper. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Let us not go into detail on the drug 

study, Congressman. It is a very long document. It is over 200 

pages in length. My simple summary would be the first part of it, 

the so-called analytical part was not bad, professionally done. The 

second part, the so-called scenarios, what might happen if the following things happened was—I found less satisfactory. At the end 

of the day, the report was not actually the resounding call for legalization that the media has suggested. And I must admit, I went on 

line and I entered in OAS Drug Study and the first 15 screens of 

what I got all had the title OAS calls for legalization of marijuana, 

which actually was not what the drug study said, but you would 

have to get to the sixteenth screen before you would realize that 

had you gone on line to read it. So you don’t have to now. I have 

saved you a vast amount of searching. 

We have gone at this and we have made three or four basic fundamental points. One, all governments of all countries of this hemisphere have signed on to the three U.N. International Drug Conventions. We all must abide by those because we have ratified 

them. Second, legalization, the so-called legalization issue, is a 

matter of national policy. One international body is not going to 

dictate legalization, certainly not to the United States of America 

and I doubt to any other nation in the world. Third, as John just 

mentioned, the approach to drugs has to be comprehensive and holistic. We have to address all the issues. You don’t just get to pick 

one and say if we solve that we have actually solved the problem. 

We have tried that in the past. It does not work. And fourth and 

finally, the United States Government through ONDCP, the Office 

of National Drug Control Policy, put out a new national drug strategy about 6 weeks ago. It is actually a good strategy. It is different. 

I recognize that you all take a look at it when you have a moment 

because it does attempt to address many of the issues that the OAS 

Drug Study identified, public health as part of the issue, looking 

at alternatives to the criminal justice system, bringing down demand. These are good ideas. We don’t disagree with them and 

these are the things we wish we could have a discussion about in 

the OAS context as opposed to a somewhat simplistic argument 

based upon a false premise. 

Mr. SIRES. Moving on to the Merida and our efforts and I know 

that some people think that it hasn’t reached the Caribbean yet. 

I would say, I would disagree with you. I think that the real drug 

movement now comes from the Caribbean. I think they have moved 

on. I think a lot of the drugs that come into this country and in 

Europe goes through the Caribbean. I was just wondering if you 

could talk a little bit about that because as we make this effort 

with Mexico and the rest of the countries, you know, I think the 

balloon has popped already in the Caribbean. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman Sires, I would never disagree with you. Of course, I acknowledge and agree that the CaribVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Jul 18, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\052313\81170 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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bean is a current problem and more to the point a growing problem 

in terms of drug movement through the region. That, in fact, is my 

operating assumption. We might differ as to precisely how much is 

moving through it right now. We do not differ on the fact that one, 

it is growing, more is moving today than a year ago. Second, many 

of the Caribbean states are vulnerable to penetration by large, 

multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise. And third, we do—we, the 

United States of America do not have the resources and assets in 

the region that we had back in the 1980s and the 1990s, the last 

time that the Caribbean was overwhelmingly the preferred point of 

entry for illicit product into the United States of America. And my 

argument is we had better think about this today when we have 

some flexibility in terms of how to prepare for this situation than 

waiting for 2 years when we will be confronting a crisis. I think 

you and I agree on that and my own guess is eventually we owe 

you a clearer vision as to what our thinking is to strengthen the 

ability and capabilities of the Caribbean states to be able to resist, 

combat, and eventually defeat this effort in the years ahead. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

calling this very important hearing. Let me just ask two questions 

first of Mr. Feeley. On Monday, I chaired a hearing. It was the 

third of a series on Jacob Ostreicher. On June 4th it will be 1 year, 

2 years I should say, that this man has been held against his will 

for 18 months in the infamous Palmasola Prison and I visited him 

there. It is a horrific gulag place run by the inmates. Sean Penn 

made a very interesting recommendation, and the feedback, or the 

backlash in Bolivia and the media by the leadership there is very 

telling and that is to poll support for the Dakar Rally and to ask 

the sponsors to reroute the Dakar Rally so that it does not include 

Bolivia. One, it would also mean that people who are part of it run 

the risk of being incarcerated themselves because businessmen and 

women need to be put on high alert that it is not safe to do business in Bolivia. So will the administration support? 

Secondly, in January, I and three other Members of Congress including Mr. Pierluisi-Pedro from Puerto Rico, wrote a letter to 

President Obama, then Secretary of State Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson, and the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, regarding the extremely troubling case of Dr. Manuel Placer. Dr. 

Placer is a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico. He has been imprisoned 

in Mexico for nearly a year. It is our understanding that upon arriving at the airport in Mexico City in June 2012, Dr. Placer was 

arrested and imprisoned by Mexican authorities. He was charged 

under Mexican law with theft, a crime Dr. Placer alleged to have 

committed during a prior visit to Mexico in January 2011. This 

seems to be nothing more than a commercial dispute and yet he 

is being treated like a criminal. We understand that the presiding 

judge in the case declined to admit into evidence documentation 

that Dr. Placer was not in Mexico at the time of the alleged crime. 

We further understand that a Federal judge asked to review the 

case found significant problems with the manner in which the presiding judge handled the matter and then remarkably he sent the 

case right back to the same judge. 

40

In our letter, my colleagues and I strongly urged U.S. Government through the Department of State to be proactive in ensuring 

that his due process and human rights are protected consistent 

with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 

all other relevant international and domestic legal obligations. We 

received a response from State in March. To describe it as perfunctory would be charitable. I also note that in February, Congressman Pierluisi and I met with Eduardo Medina-Mora, the Mexican 

Ambassador to the U.S., to express our grave concerns. The Ambassador, former AG as you know, did not know of the case, but he 

pledged to look into. Months later, nothing has changed. 

So my question to you, are you aware of the cases, of that case? 

What is the U.S. Government doing to address the serious concerns 

that we have raised? Clearly, more needs to be done. The situation 

is unacceptable. We have a U.S. citizen languishing in a Mexican 

prison on charges that are commercial in nature and he has evidently been denied the right to present evidence that shows him 

to be innocent. He wasn’t there. I met at length with his attorney. 

Met with his family. He wasn’t there. Now if that is not true, they 

are lying. But I don’t think they are. The evidence seems overwhelming. Can you pledge to me and my colleagues that you will 

look into this matter and brief us, but hopefully take some action? 

And finally, to Ms. Hogan, in your testimony you talked about 

training 150 journalists in human rights defenders. My question to 

you is does that also include your definition of human rights defenders, does it include abortion rights advocates? 

Mr. FEELEY. Mr. Smith, I will go ahead and begin. Thank you 

very much. First of all, in general, let me thank you very much for 

your very strong advocacy for American citizens detained overseas. 

You know better than anybody the case of Jacob Ostreicher, and 

the case of Manuel Placer. You also know that we face these situations all over the world and that the Department of State has as 

its absolute highest priority the protection of American citizens 

while they are overseas. We have in the case of Mr. Ostreicher, as 

you know, he was released on bail, partial house arrest last year. 

He is still there. Mr. Mehmet with whom you have met on multiple 

occasions and previously with John Kramer, continue to meet with 

him. We will remain in steady contact. Roberta Jacobson, the Assistant Secretary, is in regular contact with Miriam. We raise this 

repeatedly. We will continue to do so. 

We watched with great interest the hearing that you held the 

other day and saw what Sean Penn had to say. I will tell you that 

we are looking at that. It is under study. I don’t have an answer 

for you, but we do owe you an answer on that and I wanted to just 

reassure you that the case of Jacob Ostreicher is one that we keep 

very much—I have a small little checklist that has three or four 

names on it. Gross, Ostreicher, Dr. Manuel Placer is always on 

there. I have a personal connection to this. My wife is from Puerto 

Rico. I know Pedro Pierluisi for many years before. I have been in 

touch with him. I have been in touch with Gabriel GuerraMondrago ́n. You describe very accurately what I understand to be 

the facts of the case. Keep in mind that the American Government 

and our consular officials are not overseas able to take a position 

on merits of the case. However, ensuring that judicial transparency 

41

and a level playing field is granted to American citizens who are 

incarcerated overseas is our highest priority. 

Manuel has been visited on a number of occasions by our people. 

We stay in touch. We have followed the case being remanded back. 

I can assure you that Ambassador Wayne is aware of this case. 

Our Consul General, Susan Abeyta, in Guadelajara is aware of this 

case. And we will stay in very close touch with both Congressman 

Pierluisi’s office and with anybody who is advocating on his behalf. 

And let me just once again thank you. Mexico is the home to 

more American citizen prisoners overseas than any other country. 

When I was in Mexico on two occasions, I spent a good bit of my 

time working these types of cases. You mentioned somebody who 

will be a key player and I believe and I pledge to you that I will 

raise this with Ambassador Medina Mora. I’ll be meeting with him 

tomorrow. We do a regularly-scheduled breakfast to stay in touch. 

He absolutely is aware of the case because you raised it to him and 

we will raise it with him. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there time for Ms. Hogan? Can Ms. Hogan answer 

that question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SALMON. Absolutely. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. HOGAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Our human rights protection 

programs are aimed at those who are at most serious risk of harm 

based on their exposure of human rights violations that are occurring in Mexico. So in that group we count journalists, certainly, but 

also bloggers, human rights leaders who are exposing very serious 

issues that could come back to haunt them, if you will. Abortion advocates are not part of that group. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that clarification. I yield back. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Before I recognize the next 

distinguished congressman, I would like to just recognize that in 

our audience today we have the police director, General Jose Roberto Leon Rian ̃ o from Colombia. And I just want to say job well 

done, job well done. [Applause.] 

Proud to work with you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from America Somoa, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member again for this very substantive and important hearing concerning our bilateral relationship with the country of Mexico. I 

hope I won’t be redundant and being repetitious. Some of the most 

excellent questions and concerns that have already been expressed 

by my colleagues, but I will try in somewhat of a hopeful, some 

fashion, and try to see if you could—members of the panel will be 

helpful to me. 

We currently have a 2,000 mile border relationship with Mexico and with a trade relationship in excess of $460 billion trade. And 

in the process, we have taken the Merida Initiative having four 

basic philosophical goals and objectives in terms of how we can 

interact and work closely with the Government of Mexico as we 

have done for the last 4, 5 years. 

I am just curious. I think we have the total population in Mexico 

now is about 110 million. Am I correct on that? I had mentioned 

earlier about one of the ironies and it seems that people hardly 

42

hear the fact that Mexico’s founding father, the Abraham Lincoln 

and George Washington, was an indigenous Indian by the name of 

Benito Juarez from one of the tribes of the Yucatan area. As an orphan raised by monks and despite all the height of bigotry and discrimination that was given against indigenous Indians at that 

time, Benito Juarez rose above that and eventually became the 

leader of Mexico and it was through his leadership that caused the 

Cinco de Mayo celebrations that we often think about and the fact 

that this is how Mexico got rid of French colonialism and it was 

through the leadership of Benito Juarez. 

I say this because I am just curious, out of the population of 110 

million, how many are indigenous Indians? Do we have statistical 

data on that, Mr. Feeley? 

Mr. FEELEY. Sir, I am sure we do. I will confess I will have to 

get back to you be specific. What I will tell you is that the vast majority of the population of the 110–112 million Mexicans is Mestizo. 

The indigenous populations are primarily concentrated in the two 

southern states, Chiapas and Oaxaca. As you rightly point out, it 

is an enormously rich tradition, one that Mexicans are very proud 

of. 

I do have to get back to you. I would think that it is relatively 

small, again, because the nature of Mexico and its development in 

the 20th century and even prior has been of what they say in Spanish is Mestizaje, the mixing of indigenous with peninsulares, the 

original folks who came from Europe. 

One thing I will just add is that Mexico, my friend, Arturo 

Sarukhan, the former Mexican Ambassador here used to say, if soft 

power really mattered, Mexico would be a super power. The richness of the indigenous culture in Mexico simply cannot be overstated. And again, as I mentioned earlier with Mr. Meeks’ question, 

one of the pillars of our public diplomacy programming is to reach 

out to those indigenous communities and give them a platform for 

not just coming to the United States, but also for showing and preserving the diversity of that culture. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I note with interest you have mentioned 

that President Pen ̃ a Nieto has set up this commission in February 

to address the needs and the issues affecting the rights of indigenous peoples. Was this something that started with President Pen ̃ a 

Nieto as if this issue or this problem with indigenous Indians just 

seemed like it fell through the cracks for the last 100 years in my 

humble opinion. Am I correct on this? Or correct me if I am wrong. 

Mr. FEELEY. No, sir. I think what you will see is an evolution 

and perhaps a heightening of focus. Keep in mind that there has 

been in Mexico for quite some time a National Commission for the 

Development of the Indigenous Communities. There have been, as 

you know, as far back in the Zedillo administration and the Salinas 

administration in the early ’90s, there were serious problems with 

the indigenous in terms of their rights not being respected, land 

rights not being respected. Mexico has worked through a difficult 

time, much in the way the United States worked through its civil 

rights issues. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, unfortunately, I have about 100 more 

questions I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, but I know my time is 

running out. I will submit a series of questions in writing. 

43

Mr. SALMON. I was just going to suggest that. If you have any 

questions in writing and we are going to have a Part 2 of this hearing, too, later at a different date, but anything you would like to 

submit. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

members of the panel. 

Mr. SALMON. That concludes our opportunity to hear your testimony and our questions. Thank you so much. We are just really 

honored to be able to work with you and count on us as allies and 

it is time for us to change the guard, so thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SALMON. Okay, we are going to proceed with the second 

panel. And I am really thrilled, we have Clare Seelke. Am I saying 

that right? Seelke. Sorry. 

Clare Seelke is a specialist in Latin America affairs at the Congressional Research Service, CRS is a nonpartisan research agency 

that serves the members and committees of Congress and their 

staffs that is located in the Library of Congress. Ms. Seelke came 

to CRS in 2003 as a presidential management fellow. As part of her 

fellowship, she completed rotations with the State Department in 

the Dominican Republic and with the U.S. Agency for International 

Involvement in Washington, DC. She currently focuses on Mexico, 

Bolivia, and Central America with a special focus on security 

issues. Ms. Seelke holds a master’s of Public Affairs and a Master 

of Arts in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at 

Austin. Prior to graduate school, she obtained her undergraduate 

degree from University of Notre Dame and served as a volunteer 

in Guayaquil, Ecuador. By the way, my daughter just completed a 

mission for our church in Guayaquil, Ecuador. So that is kind of 

neat. 

Next, we have Mr. Dudley and let me see. I have got your introduction. Steven Dudley, director and head of Research Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean, InSight Crime. Dudley is a senior fellow at American University Center for Latin American and Latino 

Studies in Washington, DC, and a visiting fellow at the Woodrow 

Wilson Center for International Scholars. He is the former bureau 

chief of the Miami Herald in the Andean Region and author of 

‘‘Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia.’’ Dudley has also reported from Haiti, Brazil, Nicaragua, Cuba, and 

Miami for NPR and the Washington Post, among others. He has a 

B.A. in Latin American history from Cornell University and an 

M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of Texas at 

Austin. He was awarded the Knight Fellowship at Stanford University in 2007 and is a member of the International Consortium of 

Investigative Journalists. 

And then finally, Francisco Gonzalez. Dr. Gonzalez is associate 

professor of Latin America studies at the Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining SAIS in Washington, DC, Professor Gonzalez taught at 

the SAIS Bologna Center in Italy and he was a junior faculty member of the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations in Great Britain. Professor Gonzalez was the recipient of the British Academy of Post-Doctoral Fellowship which 

he served at Nuffield College, Oxford. And prior to that he was a 

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lecturer of politics at St. John’s, Oxford. His research interests include the politics of Mexico’s democratization process, political impacts of financial and economic crisis in Latin America and more 

recently Europe, transitions to democracy and authoritarian rule 

and the growing influence of the Hispanic community and the politics of the United States. Professor Gonzalez is author of two books, 

both published by Johns Hopkins University Press, first, ‘‘Dual 

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized Regimes in 

Chile and Mexico, 1970–2000,’’ was named Outstanding Academic 

Title of 2008 by Choice, the magazine for academic libraries. Second, in the spring of 2012, he published ‘‘Creative Destruction? 

Economic Crises and Democracy in Latin America.’’ He is a regular 

participant in commentary shows on CNN in Espanol, Voice of 

America, the Diane Rehm Show, and Al Jazeera International. Professor Gonzalez received the Excellence in Teaching Award at SAIS 

in 2006 and again in 2012. He is one of the few SAIS faculty members to have received this honor twice. Dr. Gonzalez earned his 

master’s MPhil in 1997, doctoral DPhil 2002, degrees in politics 

from the University of Oxford and his BA in Politics and Public Administration from El Colegio de Mexico, 1995. 

Ms. Seelke. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CLARE R. SEELKE, SPECIALIST IN LATIN 

AMERICAN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Ms. SEELKE. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. As you requested, my testimony focuses on 

the rationale behind the Merida Initiative and how the Initiative 

has evolved over time. 

By the mid-2000s violence perpetrated by transnational criminal 

organizations had begun to threaten citizen security in Mexico. The 

Merida Initiative was conceived in 2007 in response to then President Caldero ́n’s unprecedented request for increased U.S. support 

in helping Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized crime. 

Prior to that time, 

U.S.-Mexican drug cooperation had been plagued by mutual mistrust. As originally designed, Merida consisted mainly of U.S. 

training and equipment for Mexican security forces engaged in 

anti-drug efforts. Congress has appropriated $1.9 billion for Merida 

through Fiscal Year 2012 while the Mexican Government invested 

more than $46 billion in related efforts from 2008 to 2012. 

The United States also provided extensive intelligence sharing 

and logistical support for Mexican anti-crime operations. To complement bilateral efforts in Mexico, the U.S. also pledged to address 

drug demand, weapons trafficking, and bulk cash smuggling. 

Acknowledging that Mexico could not effectively confront organized crime with tactical victories alone in 2010, the Merida Initiative evolved to focus on the Four Pillars previously discussed: Disrupting organized crime groups, strengthening the rule of law and 

human rights protections, building a 21st century border with emphasis on the Mexican side; fostering strong and resilient communities through prevention programs; and services for at-risk youth. 

From Fiscal Year 2012 forward, the largest amount of funds requested has fallen under Pillar II for criminal justice sector reform. 

45

There has also been increasing support for justice sector reform 

and prevention programs at the state and local level. 

Weak government institutions and underlying societal problems 

have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico and many Mexican analysts welcomed the Merida Initiative shift in focus. Some 

continued to argue, however, that border modernization and community-building programs have been underfunded. In addition, 

most Mexicans continue to have reservations about the anti-organized crime efforts under Pillar I because of the perception that 

they contributed to record levels of violent crime. 

On balance, Merida dramatically increased bilateral security cooperation and efforts under Pillar I helped the Caldero ́n government arrest or kill record numbers of criminal leaders. Many of 

those leaders have been extradited to the United States to stand 

trial, but few, if any, have been successfully prosecuted in Mexico. 

At the same time, Mexico also experienced record levels of organized crime-related violence partially in response to government efforts as criminal organizations split, fought against each other and 

proliferated. As the violence increased, so too, did popular opposition to the government security strategy. On December 1st, 

Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto of the PRI took office pledging to enact bold 

structural reforms to boost Mexico’s economy and to broaden relations with the United States beyond security issues. The over-arching aim of his security strategy is to reduce violent crime in Mexico, a goal that President Obama has pledged to support. 

The Merida Initiative is now being adapted to complement President Pen ̃ a Nieto’s goal of violence reduction. Although that adaptation may be somewhat slow and difficult it could be necessary to 

ensure that U.S. and Mexican priorities complement one another 

moving forward. 

Six months after President Pen ̃ a Nieto took office, details of this 

government security strategy, particularly how it plans to combat 

crime without exacerbating violence have not been fleshed out. The 

Pen ̃ a Nieto government has asked for increased U.S. support for judicial reform and prevention efforts with the United States has already been provided through Pillars II and IV of Merida. Pillar III, 

building a 21st century border, could also dovetail well with his 

goal of increasing U.S.-Mexican trade. Some are concerned, however, that the Pen ̃ a Nieto government has limited direct U.S. involvement in some intelligence and law enforcement operations 

under Pillar I. 

So what are the implications for U.S. policy? As President Pen ̃ a 

Nieto influenced his security strategy, Congress may wish to examine how the government’s priorities align with U.S. interests. Congressional approval would be needed should the State Department 

seek to reprogram some of the $500 million in funding already in 

the pipeline for Merida or shift additional new funding toward 

Mexico’s new priorities. Should conflicts occur between Mexican 

and U.S. priorities, Congress may consider how those conflicts 

should be resolved. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Seelke follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Dudley. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN DUDLEY, DIRECTOR, INSIGHT 

CRIME 

Mr. DUDLEY. Good morning. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member, members of the 

subcommittee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before 

you on behalf of InSight Crime and the Woodrow Wilson Center to 

discuss security issues in Mexico and United States’ efforts to address these issues through the Merida Initiative. 

This testimony, I should note is an abbreviated version of the full 

testimony which I submitted for the congressional record. 

Since its beginning in 2008, the Merida Initiative has by a series 

of important programs outlined here by Clare, ranging from prevention strategies to technical assistance and equipment, opened 

the way for unprecedented cooperation between the two nations. 

The cooperation helped Mexican authorities capture 25 of 37 designated kingpins, severely debilitating several of the large criminal 

structures. The Caldero ́n government also initiated important judicial sector reforms and started to restructure the country’s security 

forces in order to deal more effectively with criminal organizations. 

At the same time, Mexico has lived through an unprecedented 

spike in violence. Homicide rates tripled during President 

Caldero ́n’s time in office. Targets included politicians, police, military personnel, and civilians. Response by military personnel, at 

least in some cases documented by human rights organizations was 

excessive and may have included extra judicial executions of suspects or civilians. 

Meanwhile, criminal gangs have fragmented. They have diversified their criminal portfolios and draw much of their income from 

local revenue sources such as drug peddling, an increasingly large 

local drug market, extortion, kidnapping, theft, and other activities. 

The most formidable of these organizations is known as the Zetas, 

a military-minded group that is focused on controlling physical territory and has a wide portfolio of activities. It has also grown exponentially during the last few years. Because its revenues come from 

local criminal activities that can be practiced anyway and by virtually anyone, the Zetas have created the ultimate democratic 

model of organized crime. It is a model that can be easily replicated 

across Mexico and is therefore inherently vulnerable to suffering 

internal splits itself. 

Perhaps the most enigmatic example of these challenges that the 

Mexican Government faces and during the last 5 years of its time 

is Ciudad Juarez. Between 2007 and 2011, this city went from 

about 300 homicides per year to over 3,500 per year. The astounding spike in violence during that period has been matched only by 

the surprisingly precipitous drop in homicides which is back down 

about one per day. There are many ways to explain this drop in 

violence. The most cited explanation is that in the war between the 

two largest criminal groups in the area, one became the winner, 

the Sinaloa Cartel. In this narrative, this criminal group is maintaining order in the underworld, something that seems like an 

oxymoron and hardly sustainable. 

55

But in Juarez, the government and Juarez citizens also took action. The government initiated a program aptly named Todos 

Somos Juarez. We are all Juarez. Multi-million dollar educational 

and violence prevention strategy of the type the U.S. Government 

already assists under Pillar IV of the Merida Initiative. Citizens, 

with the help of the Federal Government, have created roundtables 

that regularly interact with authorities demanding accountability 

and results and fostering greater trust between them and their city 

officials. These officials include the city’s police chief, Julian 

Leyzaola, who many give credit to for the drop in crime and violence. The cornerstone of his policy, however, is to arrest anyone 

who they see as a threat. Some say these mass incarcerations are 

a systematic violation of human rights and may lay the groundwork for another round of violence. 

Finally, it is worth noting increased cooperation between the 

U.S. and Mexican law enforcement that has also played an important role in the battle for Juarez. U.S. and Mexican investigators 

from both sides of the border told me that they were cooperating 

on a more regular basis since Merida began. Agents on both sides 

said this cooperation has led to real results including arrests on the 

Mexican and U.S. sides of the border. 

For his part, President Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto has said he will focus 

his efforts on reducing violence. But since taking office in December, the President has only given a broad outline of how he will 

achieve this goal. In some respects, it feels the same as the 

Caldero ́n strategy. Pen ̃ a Nieto has, for the most part, left Army 

troops and Federal police in many of the same hot spots where 

Caldero ́n used them. He has said he will continue reforms, although both police and judicial reform seem to be stalling already 

under his administration. 

There are some more subtle shifts in policy. Pen ̃ a Nieto has reduced the role of the marines by some 40 percent. The army’s role 

also appears to be moving more toward a less confrontation strategy although evidence of this shift is more anecdotal than quantitative. 

In another subtle shift under Pen ̃ a Nieto, the Attorney General’s 

Office has reduced the number of drug prosecutions to a 15-year 

low. In general, you might say while Caldero ́n tried to bully his 

way toward a more manageable security situation, Pen ̃ a Nieto appears more interested in taking a selective approach and possibly 

reducing the pressure on criminal groups involved in drug trafficking as a way to lower the temperature of this confrontation. 

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dudley follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Gonzalez. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCISCO E. GONZALEZ, PH.D., RIORDAN 

ROETT SENIOR ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LATIN AMERICAN 

STUDIES, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today. I ask that my 

whole written testimony be made available to the public and I will 

summarize my presentation into three points and look forward to 

your questions. 

Point one, focused originally on training and the sale of military 

and police equipment to help Mexico pursue the so-called war on 

drugs, the Merida Initiative had, in my view, a significant and welcomed change of focus in 2010 by emphasizing institution building, 

specifically, helping Mexico to introduce the law, the rule of law in 

the country. Many police records, think tanks, policy documents in 

Washington, DC, and Mexico City, make the mistake of saying that 

the aim is to help Mexico strengthen the rule of law. This is incorrect. The reason is there has not been a rule of law in Mexico. I 

wish that the thousands and thousands of innocent Mexicans in jail 

had such a good advocate as congressmen here, Congressman 

Smith, as we heard during the previous panel. Alas, they don’t. 

Creating the rule of law is by far the most important positive 

medium to long-term contribution that American taxpayers’ money 

can bring about in Mexico. One of the reasons why the early years 

of the Merida Initiative ended up surrounding by controversy was 

that by providing means to strengthen Mexico’s military and police 

forces and given the absence of the rule of law in Mexico, complaints of serious abuses started piling up regarding the conduct of 

Mexico’s military and police forces against innocent civilians. 

Second point, there has been a worsening general perception of 

U.S. operations in Mexico. A turning point for Mexican public opinion about U.S. helping the war on drugs occurred after a whistle 

blower uncovered the so-called Fast and Furious Operation carried 

out by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives between 2006 and 2011 which allowed more than 2000 AK–47 weapons to walk into Mexico to try to arrest kingpins. This operation 

unraveled after the tragic death due to one of these weapons of a 

U.S. Border Patrol Agent. The Mexican Attorney General has confirmed that some of these weapons have been recovered in crime 

scenes where at last 150 Mexicans were maimed or lost their lives, 

but few officials have either from the U.S. or Mexico even blinked 

an eye. 

As of February 2012, more than 1,000 of these weapons remained 

walking around Mexico. 

Another incident that acted as a significant eye opener for both 

Mexican society and the U.S. Government was the ambush of a 

U.S. vehicle with diplomatic plates carrying two CIA agents which 

came under attack by Mexican Federal police forces. In addition, 

President Caldero ́n allowed U.S. unmanned planes to operate in 

Mexican territory without even most of his close collaborators 

knowing about this. For many, Caldero ́n’s strategy had gone berVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Jul 18, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\052313\81170 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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serk and as a consequence there was a significant public opinion 

backlash against the no strings attached access given to U.S. law 

enforcement, intelligence, and military forces. 

Point three, it is my view that it is right that lowering the levels 

of violence, official impunity, and homicides has become the Mexican Government’s top priority. My own position after having heard 

many family friends, working colleagues, acquaintances scattered 

around my country from Mexico City to Morelos to Michoacan to 

Jalisco to Coahuila to Nuevo Leon, is that every day living conditions during the last 6 years have deteriorated significantly. Extortion, almost unheard of among the backbone of middle class in 

Mexico, doctors, lawyers, economists, engineers, has become endemic in the last few years. 

A case that helps to illustrate the climate of intimidation that society is under given the collusion between drug trading organizations and high-ranking members of local, state, Federal Governments, and police and military officers occurred to someone my 

family knows well. The individual in question is a prestigious heart 

surgeon, who is well known for his involvement with good causes 

in his city. A military platoon was sent to take over his house without a search warrant. His crime, his daughter’s mother-in-law was 

a State Attorney General who resigned and threatened to go public 

about systematic corruption and close links between the military 

stationed in the area and the drug trafficking organizations. The 

military ransacked, robbed, destroyed, and defecated in the doctor’s 

house. The doctor, an influential individual in the city went to see 

the General in charge of the garrison station there. He was told the 

action had been just a taste of what could happen to him and his 

family if his daughter’s mother-in-law opened her mouth. 

Mexican President Pen ̃a Nieto’s decision to recentralize law enforcement and intelligence functions under the Secreatria de 

Gobernacion is not necessarily bad. The restoration of basic oversight functions centrally is a necessary prerequisite to reign in significant fragmentation, bordering on anarchy that Mexico has experienced during recent years. For the record, I am not and have 

never been a member of any political party. Neither have I ever 

worked for any government or any public project. I am proud to be 

a teacher and my weapons are my reasoning and my independent 

voice. I think the most important action that U.S. representatives 

of taxpaying American citizens can take is to deepen their commitment to help Mexico create the rule of law. The U.S. tradition of 

open all trials, presumption of innocence, trial by a jury of peers, 

and the basic notion of equality before the law are essential if Mexico is to consolidate its democracy and prosperity in the medium to 

long term. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzalez follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

We are going to have to go vote very, very soon. We have a series 

of three votes and that is it for the day and everybody kind of 

heads off to the four winds after that. So I am going to abbreviate 

our questions and as soon as each of us gets a chance to ask a 

question, we will adjourn. But thank you so much. There are so 

many things to talk about and more questions to ask and I am sure 

we will interface with you again more at other times. 

But Mr. Dudley, I would like to address one particular issue. You 

noted there has been a major decrease in drug prosecutions by the 

Mexican Attorney General’s Office since Pen ̃ a Nieto took office. In 

your written testimony you said that Pen ̃ a Nieto’s administration 

is more interested in reducing the pressure on criminal groups involved in drug trafficking as a way to lower the temperature of this 

confrontation. 

In practical terms, are you suggesting that the new Mexican 

Government may be willing to sacrifice actual results for the perception of reduced drug-related crime? 

Mr. DUDLEY. Thank you for the question. I think that they are 

trying to change what those results look like. I think that if they 

were making the priorities if it were their priority list, their priority list may not look the same as the United States’ priority list. 

In other words, if the United States’ priority list of getting the five 

largest drug kingpins, for them, if these are not the five largest motors of violence or people who are engendering the type of disruption and violence that is occurring and described very well by Dr. 

Gonzalez, then perhaps those would be their priorities. 

So I think it is a shift in priorities. And I don’t know about the 

number of prosecutions. What I can say is the number of cases 

opened with regards to a specific type of crime which are very 

closely related to drug trafficking crimes. They call them crimes 

against health literally, but they are mostly drug trafficking 

crimes, so possession, movement, you know, purchasing, those sorts 

of things. And those are down to a 15-year low. And then simultaneously with the idea and in fact, some military personnel have 

said this in public already that there is a notion of perhaps pulling 

back a little bit, lowering the number of road blocks, not going out 

and having sort of massive sweeps any more. Maybe it is a more 

effective way. It is harder to say. Maybe it is more targeted. But 

you can certainly see those subtle shifts in the way in which they 

are approaching this. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. Thank you for being here today. Dr. Gonzalez, you don’t seem to think much of this effort to centralize the 

security. Obviously, they ruled for 71 years and they were pretty 

much centralized. So I was just wondering if you can just elaborate 

on that a little bit, why you don’t think this—why do you think this 

is going to be effective or not effective. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I think the jury is 

still out there, as Mr. Dudley said. I think this approach is less 

provocative. An analogy would be it seems like the previous administration, President Caldero ́n’s administration kicked the hornet’s 

nest, there, and everywhere. 

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This administration seems to want to target operations and as I 

said before, we reserve our judgment regarding the outcomes. 

It is very important that there are fewer windows of opportunity 

where the systematic impunity and corruption that takes place in 

the country continues to happen. An important example is the current takeover of the state of Michoacan by a general who has taken 

over the control of municipal, state, and Federal law enforcement 

authorities. During Caldero ́n’s period, each of these three levels of 

government were doing their own thing. And it is the voice in the 

street throughout Mexico that 80–90 percent of municipal police 

forces are in the paycheck of the cartels. Likewise, very high percentages of the state police forces. Centralizing it is not necessarily 

a silver bullet to solve the problem. It at least helps to close down 

some of those gates through with impunity and corruption operate 

on a daily basis and allow inexcusable things like the one I related 

to happen. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the 

panel. I apologize. We had a lot going on today, but this is an area 

of interest to mine. We traveled last year in August down to Mexico 

City and met with the Federal police, the military and Mexico City 

law enforcement. And I understand some of the training, but one 

thing that concerns me is the new President seems to have pulled 

back some of the resources from the border. And we know that is 

where Americans are concerned that we are seeing cross-border violence and we are seeing whatever the number is today of murdered Mexican citizens, murdered by the drug cartel in that border 

region. 

So Dr. Gonzalez, I would just ask you to comment a little bit 

about the perception of the President pulling his resources back to 

a more central location. Is that a positive thing? And it may be. I 

talked with Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary Robert 

Jacobson recently about this from the U.S. State Department’s perspective, but I would be curious to hear your perspective. Is that 

a strategy that may have long-term positive effects, or do we see 

some concern of pulling back resources from the border area on the 

Mexican side? 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you for your question, Congressman. The 

main aim, at least in the short term, is to be less provocative by 

the current Mexican Government. In particular, there is a keen 

sense that it is very important to restore peace along the border 

given the very significant economic relationship that the U.S. and 

Mexico have close to $1 trillion, $1⁄2 trillion, to 2011, 2012, annually, with some of these places like Nuevo Laredo, like Tijuana, like 

Juarez, like Matamoros, being the bridges that connect this incredibly vibrant exchange. The government has decided to pull back resources to concentrate first and foremost in the south, the states 

of Michocan, Guerreo, maybe start going into Sinaloa, further up 

in the Pacific and Sonora, to try to reign in, in particular, a lot of 

the gangs that have established deep social roots within the communities. They want to be able to have permanent police and military presence on their central control there to try to root that out. 

That is also the route for a lot of the methamphetamine comes 

through. 

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My sense and again, there are no results, so the jury is out there, 

my sense is that the earlier tactic of pulling back from the border 

is to be less provocative, to allow for restoration of some social 

sense of peace among society in the large cities of the border, given 

the very significant role they play in economic affairs. I don’t think 

they have abandoned the border. I don’t think this is the strategy 

that will be followed to the next 6 years. I think this is part of a 

strategy and, as I said, currently, the idea is to concentrate further 

down south where, in fact——

Mr. DUNCAN. In the essence of time, I think 40,000 people have 

been killed in the border region by the drug cartel. Is that because 

the military or the police forces had provoked the Mexican drug 

cartel? Were there a large number of that 40,000 that have been 

killed involved in law enforcement or are these random cartels 

fighting one another? And how does a pullback strategy change 

that situation where the cartels are actually fighting each other 

and will we see fewer deaths because of the pulback? I am trying 

to understand the strategy. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. It varies according to cities. Cities like Juarez, for 

example, violence became so fragmented that there was no line of 

command, no police chief of military chief could take the phone and 

call someone on the other side, the leader of a cartel and say pull 

back. Things had become so outsourced, almost on a block by block 

basis that no one could control violence. Thankfully, that was not 

the case or it didn’t get to that stage in places like Tijuana. It was 

on the brink. Places like Nuevo Laredo are still struggling with 

that. 

The idea is if you want to create cordon sanitaires and not go 

kick the hornet’s nest, many of the dead, around 80–90 percent, are 

drug trafficking cartels fighting over transportation routes and 

some officials who have fallen in the line of duty. The idea of creating the cordon sanitaires is to be less provocative, to bring the 

levels of violence down. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So part of the pullback is just to bring the forces 

in, build loyalty with the Mexican Government and do away with 

some of the corruption, kind of gather your forces, understand the 

loyalty factors and then come up with a strategy going forward is 

what I am understanding you saying. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. That is my sense, Congressman, which is a very 

significant difference from the previous approach which was, as I 

said, going out here, there, and everywhere by the Caldero ́n administration in the sense of a majority of Mexican public opinion that 

created a very negative spillover. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I really appreciate this distinguished 

panel. It has been incredibly helpful. I am sorry we didn’t get to 

ask more questions. We are going to have to go vote now so this 

subcommittee meeting is now adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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