Studies in Battle OPERATION KNIGHT’S MOVE Melson

OPERATION

German Airborne Raid Against Tito,

25 May 1944

Charles D. Melson

StudieS

in

Battle
ii

Studies in Battle

The Studies in Battle series from Marine Corps University Press presents cases

for analysis from across the military spectrum that have relevance for current

operations and professional military education, particularly for junior leaders.

The books also tell a good story that can be read with interest by all.

The series draws on cases from American, foreign, and nonstate/irregular militaries. Studies specifically about Marine operations are part of the U.S.

Marines in Battle series published by the U.S. Marine Corps History Division.

Published by

Marine Corps University Press

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, VA

22134

1st Printing, 2011

Text © 2011 Charles D. Melson. All rights reserved.

Aircraft illustrations © 2011 James M. Caiella. All rights reserved.
Preface and Acknowledgments

This narrative began as a staff study of the use of a Marine force reconnaissance

company as an airborne raiding force and took form as a conference paper for

the Society of Military History. Most direct quotes in this book are from wartime

Axis reporters or documents, with a resulting German viewpoint. References were in English,

German, and Serbo-Croatian with the predicaments in spelling and expression this entailed—

my usage was for clarity rather than technical accuracy. Maps and pictures are credited with

their source and the primary records are held by the institutions named. Specific

documentation is found in the articles and books cited in the notes. 

The story is the result of research over the last 35 years with obligations to individuals

and institutions to include: T. C. Charman and James S. Lucas, Imperial War Museum; James

N. Eastman Jr., Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center; Mark Evans, Naval

Historical Center; F. O. Finzel, Bund der Deustsche Fallschirmjaeger; Dr. Haupt and Herr

Meyer, Bundesarchiv; Andrew Mollo, Historical Research Unit; James E. Mrazek, Colonel,

U.S. Army (Retired); George A. Petersen, National Capital Historical Sales; Agnes F. Peterson,

Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Ruzica Popovitch, Library of Congress;

John J. Slonaker, U.S. Army History Research Collection; Paul Sofranak, Chief Warrant

Officer, U.S. Marine Corps; Dieter Stenger, U.S. Marine Corps Museum; Dianne S. Tapley,

U.S. Army Infantry School Library; H. L. Theobald, Cabinet Office Historical Section; Barbara

P. Vandegrift, George C. Marshall Research Foundation Library; Milan Vego, U.S. Naval War

College; Gene F. Wilson, Central Intelligence Agency; Robert Wolfe and William H. Cunliffe,

National Archives and Records Service; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Marine Corps University;

and the Vojni Istoriski Institut of the former Yugoslavia. The Director of Marine Corps

History, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, encouraged this project from its origins as a conference

paper. Credit for the excellent editing and layout goes to senior editor Kenneth H. Williams,

acquisitions editor Dr. Stephen S. Evans, manuscript editor James M. Caiella, and visual

information specialist W. Stephen Hill.

iii

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments iii

Introduction 1

Knight’s Move 2

Origins of the Raid 11

The Plan 14

The Airborne Raid 16

Partisan Picture 25

Execution, X-Day 27

 0700—Airborne assault wave reaches the objective 31

 0930—Drvar occupied, main attempt to capture Tito 39

 1000—Battle group moves to the southwest 44

 1200—The second wave arrives 46

 1800—Battalion withdraws to cemetery 47

 2130—Cemetery position occupied 49

Execution, X-Day plus 1 50

 0330—Enemy attacks repulsed 51

 0600—Direct air support resumes 51

 0700 to 1000—Link-up with ground forces 52

Analysis 54

Appendix: 500/600th SS–Parachute Battalion Chronology 63

Notes 65

Additional Readings 71

About the Author 73

v

Introduction

I

n Croatia troops of the Army and

Armed-SS commanded by General [Lothar] Rendulic, supported

by strong German bomber and

ground attack plane formations,

raided the center of Tito’s bandit

groups and smashed it after a heavy

struggle lasting for days. According to

preliminary reports, the enemy lost

6,240 men. In addition, numerous

weapons of all kinds and many supply

installations were captured. In this

fighting the 7th SS-Mountain

Division ‘Prinz Eugen,’ under the

command of SS-General [Otto]

Kumm, and the 500th SS-Parachute

Battalion, commanded by SS-Captain

[Kurt] Rybka, excellently proved

themselves. 

So announced the German Supreme

High Command of the Armed Forces

(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht [OKW]),

but whatever headlines this generated were

lost in the news of the Allied D-Day invasion

of France and the opening of the second

front in Europe.1

A unique operation, both for obscurity

and daring, was the effort to oust Balkan

guerrilla chief Josip Broz, “Marshal Tito.”

With Unternehmen Rösselsprung (Operation Knight’s Move), the late Yugoslav

president’s career might have been ended by

the Germans on his 52d birthday, 25 May

1944. On that day, Axis forces executed an

airborne raid on the Yugoslav Partisan

(communist-led anti-fascist resistance

movement) high command at Drvar, Bosnia,

that almost succeeded in eliminating Tito.

1

M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)

The hunted: Josip Broz “Tito” in 1944. This photograph

of the Partisan leader with his dog “Tiger” at the

Drvar, Bosnia, headquarters was taken by British

combat cameraman Sergeant M. J. Slade, who was

captured during the German raid shortly after the picture was taken.

Today, it provides an example of using light

infantry in low-intensity or special operations, with unforeseen consequences

similar to those experienced by others

against irregular opponents. 

German airborne employment after the

large-scale invasion of Crete in 1941 was

confined to small-scale actions for limited

objectives. These took place using

parachutists and gliders as reinforcements

on the island of Sicily, seizing the island of

Elba, at Monte Rotondo to capture the

Italian general headquarters, a raid at Gran

Sasso to free former Italian Prime Minister

Benito Mussolini, an airborne assault to
2

seize the island of Leros, the raid in Bosnia

to capture guerrilla leadership, and for

advance force operations behind the lines

during the Ardennes offensive. A U.S.

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

paper noted that some seven parachute and

glider combat operations were mounted

from 1943 until 1945, but only one was

greater than reinforced battalion strength.

The author concluded: “none of them had

any real significance to the course of the

war.”2 What follows is the story behind the

missed OKW headline of 6 June 1944.3

Knight’s Move

The Balkan countries of Yugoslavia and

Greece were beaten by conventional attack

that followed a stalled Italian invasion of

Greece and German leader Adolf Hitler’s

perceived betrayal of a non-aggression

agreement by Yugoslavia to secure the

flanks for the subsequent German invasion

of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was invaded

by the Axis in 1941, and occupied primarily

by Italy and other Axis partners through

1943. It was broken into various zones of

occupation and puppet states benefitting

the bordering nations of Hungary, Romania,

and Bulgaria. The province of Slovenia was

annexed by Germany, Serbia was occupied

by the Germans with a collaborationist

government, Italy annexed Dalmatia while

also occupying Albania, and an independent

Croatia existed under a fascist government.

In addition, Greece and its islands were

subjugated by both Italy and Germany. For

the Germans, the Balkans—known as the

Southeast Theater—was a backwater of

secondary importance to the conduct of war

against the major Allied powers. Their goal

was to ensure the security of rail, river, and

road routes of strategic minerals and oil

flowing to Germany and maintain access to

African and Eastern Fronts. 

Like most campaigns not handled

speedily, the Southeast became a steady

drain on military resources contributing to

the final Axis defeat. Second-rate troops,

new formations, reservists, and various

police forces were employed in the theater

with no ultimate goal except exploitation

and maintaining order. As the war

progressed, incipient revolt and internal

politics became more of a factor causing

increasing—but never enough—numbers of

Axis forces to be devoted to internal

security. This was made worse by savage

reprisals, the lack of any enlightened

occupation policy, and the need to shore up

local collaborators in Croatia and Serbia.

The danger from internal resistance was not

acknowledged until 1943, brought on by

defeats in Africa and Russia and Italy’s

defection from the Axis. By 1944, German

resident forces in the Balkans were faced

with the dual problem of Allied invasion

The cabinet and supreme command of the Partisans

included those pictured here. Front, left to right: Dr.

Ribnikar, Minister of Information; Col Kardelj, Tito.

Back, left to right: MajGen Yovanovich, Chief of Staff;

Radonja, Tito’s aide; Cholakovich, Secretary of the

Anti-Fascist Council; Kocbek, Minister of Education;

and LtGen Zujevich.

M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)
from the Eastern and Western Fronts and

full-fledged guerrilla war in the rear against

their bases and communications lines.

At the same time, the Germans were no

longer able to mount offensive antiguerrilla

operations although some six major efforts,

by communist count, had been undertaken

to date. Large-scale winter offensives were

not possible because of the shortage of

trained units and the Partisan’s skill at

evading these sweeps. Instead, the Germans

had to change their tactics from “search and

destroy” efforts to surprise “attack and

pursuit” operations.4 German antiguerrilla

doctrine had evolved from ad hoc beginnings

to a more established doctrinal structure.

3

Heer (Army) Divisions

1st Mountain Division: “The premier German

division in Yugoslavia. Part of German prewar

army, made up of Bavarians from mountain regions. Very mobile in rough terrain. It provided

the mobile force in all the anti-partisan operations.”

98th Division: “An excellent division but worn

out in Russia. Sent to Yugoslavia for rebuilding.” 

118th Light or Jaeger Division : “A division of

Austrians, originally the 718th Division, redesigned and upgraded for anti-partisan warfare

in April 1943 as the Germans became more serious about the partisan war. Served virtually the

entire war in Yugoslavia. Good quality.” 

181st Division: “A solid division. Raised in 1940.”

264th Division: “A second-class unit. Served in

Yugoslavia for most of war.”

369th Division: “Consisted mainly of Croatians

with German cadres. Successor in name but not

in quality of the 369th Croatian Infantry Regiment. Unreliable. (The original regiment was the

‘Croatian Army Legion’ consisting of Croatian

volunteers in the German army. It was attached

to the 100th Jaeger Division and was destroyed at

Stalingrad.)

373d Division: “Another division of Croatians

with German cadre. Poor performance.”

392d Division: “Yet another division of Croatians with German cadre, but this one performed

well.”

1st Cossack Division: “Composed of Russian

Cossacks. Apparently performed well. Fought

to the end. Members captured by the Soviets

and executed after the war.”

Schutzstaffel (Waffen or Armed–SS)

Divisions

7th Prinz Eugen: “A mountain division

made up of ethnic Germans from the Balkans.

Established in 1942 specifically for partisan

warfare. Fought well but committed many

atrocities.”

13th Handschar: “Composed of Croatian

and Bosnian Moslems (!). Unreliable and committed many atrocities. Transformed into a

battle group of ethnic Germans later in the war

and fought to the end.”

21st Skanderbeg: “Composed of Albanians.

Unreliable. Disbanded and folded into 7th SS.”

*

Quoted from Cancian, Parameters, Table 2, page 80:

“The higher the division number in the German army,

generally, the lower quality. High numbered divisions

were either raised late in the war when resources were

scarce or were designed for limited purposes.

One insight from this table is that observers of the current civil war should be cautious when talking about the

‘good’ Croats and Bosnians and the ‘bad’ Serbians as if

these were eternal verities. This may be today’s perspective, but World War II looks very different. (Note the

number of collaborationist Croat and Bosnian units.)

These Balkan conflicts have been going on for centuries.

Rather than characterizing the good guys and bad guys,

observers should focus on good and bad behavior.”

GERMAN DIVISIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA, MID-1944* (see map p. 4)
4

U.S. Army
Defensive efforts, or police measures,

were oriented on lines of communications—railways and rail traffic, roadways

and road traffic, waterways and water traffic;

administrative and communications

facilities; and agriculture or natural

resources. In this, all “troops must be able to

conduct actions against bands, even supply

units, technical units, and security units.”5 A

proviso from field service regulations

qualified that “no more manpower than is

absolutely necessary” was committed to the

rear areas, and particularly cited protection

against Partisan bands: “All troops, troop

billets, traffic and economic installations as

well as war important plants have to protect

themselves and to be protected against

attacks by bands through security

measures.”6 A note of caution was added:

“The securing and guarding of the land and

of all important installations . . . makes

careful reconnaissance and planning for all

guerilla actions, but does not make the

actions impossible. There is no

countermeasure . . . that cannot be rendered

useless through skillful adaption to it.”7 In

fact, a majority of the defensive effort was

involved with rear area security.8

Offensive efforts, or military

operations, needed the aggressive deployment of “hunter” units, surprise attacks

or pursuit, and encirclements by major

commands.9

a) Reconnaissance-strike operations represented the most common action engagements. Deployment of patrols against

bands: “Small, but especially effective units,

composed and armed as jagdkommandos

[hunter or combat patrols], are especially

suitable to impede the formation of bands

and to disrupt band communications.”10

Hunter patrols were formed with local assets from the army rear area, security, and

other divisions endangered by guerrillas.

These were platoon to company size. Internal structure called for four squads each

with an officer in charge, one local scout in

civilian clothes, and all armed liberally with

light machine gun, semi-automatic and automatic rifles, sniper rifles, and grenades.

Mobility was by foot, draft animals, skis, and

sledges. Provided with radios, hunter units

were intended to operate for up to two

weeks without resupply.11 A post-war German special forces officer described hunter

or ranger units as “men who knew every possible ruse and tactic of guerrilla warfare.

They had gone through the hell of combat

against the crafty partisans in the endless

swamps and forests of Russia.”12 It was a kind

of warfare that could not be rushed and required time to develop opportunities to defeat the guerrilla.

b) Attack-pursuit operations were used as

opportunity offered, specifically destruction

through surprise attack and hunt: “If forces

or time are not sufficient for encirclement

or difficult ground makes it impossible, the

bands, even without previous encirclement,

have to be attacked, defeated and hunted

until they are completely destroyed.”13 Two

approaches were used, one where reconnaissance was possible before hand allowing

the placement of blocking forces and the

other where a frontal attack had to be

launched because of a lack of time or restricted terrain.14 The goal was to surprise

the guerrillas while on the march or before

constructing base camps. A quick attack

would cause them to fight or flee and then

to be hunted down and destroyed as a splinter group (“One has to put up with the es5
cape of individual isolated groups”). The

hunt was a more elaborate version of the attack-pursuit, with the goal of overtaking the

guerrillas carried out by fast moving forces.

The primary target was guerrilla leadership.15

c) Encircle-annihilation operations were

preferred but the most demanding in terms

of material and personnel. “This is the main

battle technique and at the same time the

most efficient means for eliminating the

band menace. It requires larger forces, but

leads most decisively to success.”16 The Germans believed that this maneuver was the

most comprehensive and should be attempted in all cases, even against small

guerrilla groups: “The basic maxim of this

technique is: To cut off every escape route

and to annihilate all parts of the band.”17 According to Peter Lieb, this tactic needed first

rate units such as the 7th SS or 1st Mountain

Divisions to carry out in broken terrain.18

To accomplish this, a number of variations were analyzed to insure success.

Preparations and preliminary movements

were needed to bring forces in place. Each

had to move from assembly areas at different rates to arrive at the encirclement line at

the same time. Ground had to be occupied

and positions prepared without revealing

the intent of the maneuver to the guerrillas.

Thin lines were not sufficient, conventional

defense arrangements were needed to include advance outposts, main lines of resistance, adequate artillery, and mobile

reserves. Air support was of more limited

value because of the fleeting nature of the

target or the possibility of compromising

surprise.19

Critical to this was an accurate picture

of the “Bandit” or “Red” situation from

Wehrmacht (Unified Armed Forces) and

Shutzstaffel (SS) and police intelligence and

security agencies in the Southeast. Conflicts

within German military, police, and civilian

intelligence communities made this difficult

at times with competing resources and

priorities. “Who, what, when, where, and

Allied missions in 1944 at Drvar included visiting journalists to publicize to the outside world the little-known

Partisan effort. Interviewing the minister of information are, from right to left, Fowler, Slade, Pribichevich, and

Talbot. Note the arms and uniforms of the escort. M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)
how” were the essential elements of

information sought by these diverse

organizations through special patrols,

infiltrators, radio intercept, and air

reconnaissance. At the same time the

Yugoslav Resistance and Allies were engaged

in a similar effort to divine Axis intentions.

While lacking facts, over time the Germans

built up a picture of the ever-changing

opposition. Of the two major guerrilla

movements in Yugoslavia, the communist

Partisans were considered the major threat.

They were now seen by the Germans as the

main insurgent force with the recognition of

7

Vojnoizdavaki Zavod
8

Tito by the Allies at the Tehran Conference

the previous year. Royalist Serbian Chetniks

maintained an uneasy accord with the Axis

and Allies while the Partisans grew to a size

able to survive in large areas by themselves,

including transportation and communications facilities. German estimates of total

numbers varied (possibly 120,000 Partisans

by 1944, the majority being in Croatia, with

another 60,000–70,000 Chetniks, mainly in

Serbia), not all of which were communist

and few were armed. Partisan organization

had matured from armed small groups to

people’s liberation army units of battalion

size, and then into mixed “proletarian”

brigades with the goal of division-size

commands. Communist commissars were

paired with leaders of units down to the

company level emphasizing the political as

well as military nature of the resistance. The

SS and police minimized these developments, reporting the Partisans have “the

cheek to call a battalion a brigade, and we

fall for it straight away. A brigade? In

Heaven’s name. The military mind at once

imagines a group of six or eight thousand

men. A thousand vagabonds who have been

herded together suddenly become a

brigade. Divisions and corps are knocked to

pieces by us, and the man [Tito] forms them

up again every time.”20

By German standards, the laws of war

did not apply to guerrilla combatants or

supporters. Reprisal killings were the norm

rather than exception although treatment of

prisoners varied with the situation. Partisan

uniforms and weapons were mixed, with an

active effort being made to supply them by

the Allies by this time (although a

communist movement, no material support

arrived from the Soviet Union). Yugoslav,

Italian, German, British, or civilian clothing

was in use with Yugoslav national colors,

Soviet stars and rank stripes being reported.

All could quickly be discarded to blend in

with the local population if required.

Communist combat methods were diverse,

conforming to the principles of guerrilla

fighting faced since the war’s beginning.

Guerrilla actions were at night, with the

daytime spent hidden below ground or

under tree cover. 

The Germans experienced three main

types of combat actions: ambush by small

groups to acquire arms and ammunition,

open attacks by larger forces to wipe out

smaller Axis units for prestige and plunder,

and the occupation of remote base areas for

Tito’s cave quarters outside of Drvar. Well hidden, it

was guarded by a select Partisan bodyguard. The Germans did not have this precise location and underestimated the resistance they encountered.

M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)
political and logistical support. When

struck or surrounded by German forces, the

normal Partisan response was to break up

and disperse. Scattered, the groups returned

to hit-and-run tactics. As such, some

German estimates felt the “combat

effectiveness of the Red formations is

limited” in one-on-one encounters. Read

one report, “The masses are composed of

farmers and workers who were misled by

propaganda and or fled to the woods for fear

of reprisals and extermination measures.”21

The Supreme Commander, Southeast

intelligence staff held a more ominous view

of the situation in 1944: “The classification

of the enemy as bandits and fighting against

them as bandit warfare is entirely

incorrect.”22 A detailed look at the Partisan

movement by German Luftwaffe Kriegsberichter (war correspondent) Heinz

Schwitzke, concluded the Partisan “state

consisted of an impressive number of

minister-presidents, cabinets and marshals,

although it was not as vast as the

exaggerating enemy press would like us to

believe. These bandits, who played so

carelessly with the fate of the people, have

always excelled in making the most of

circumstances which were not clear cut.”23

This referred to Partisan efforts in exploiting

the differences within the Axis camp that

allowed them to survive despite previous

efforts to wipe them out. The communist

leadership remained a cipher to the

Germans, who did not know if Tito was an

acronym, a committee, or even a woman!

“Tito” was the cover name used by Josip

Broz, the general secretary of the Yugoslav

Communist Party. A metal worker, AustroHungarian World War veteran, and

long-time communist, he worked against

the royal Yugoslav government until the

German invasion of Russia and Stalin’s

Communist International call to arms

9

M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)

Partisans located in Drvar at the time of the German raid included anti-fascist youth congress members shown

here. Note the mix of uniforms and weapons from varied sources.
10

SIGNIFICANT PARTICIPANTS

Josip Broz “Tito”: Born in 1892 at Kumrovec,

Croatia-Slavonia. A machinist, he was drafted

into the Austro-Hungarian army in World War

I. Wounded, he was captured by the Russians,

and joined the Bolsheviks during the

revolution. Returning to Yugoslavia, he was an

active communist in the inter-war years. From

1941 until 1945 he led the Yugoslav people’s

army, the national committee of liberation, as

well as a provisional “democratic” government.

Wartime leaders with him in 1944 included

Vladimir Bakaric, Milovan Dilas, Edvard

Kardelj, Ivan Milutinovic, Aleksandar

Rankovic, and Svetozar Vukmanovic. Tito

ended the war a Marshal of Yugoslavia and was

the post-war Prime Minister, President, and

Secretary General of the Non-aligned

Movement. He held some 119 awards or

decorations from 60 countries. He died in

1980. 

Lieutenant General Ernst von Leyser: Born

in 1889 at Steglitz, Germany. An army officer

from 1909, he served in World War I, then as a

policeman. He held regimental through corpslevel assignments in the West and East. A

general officer from 1941, he commanded the

XV and XXI Mountain Corps in the Southeast

Theater from November 1943 until April 1945.

Awarded the Iron Cross I and II class, German

Cross, and Knight’s Cross. Convicted of

charges at Nuremberg, he died in 1962.

General Lothar Rendulic: Born in 1887 at

Wiener Neustadt, Austria. An AustroHungarian army officer from 1910, he served in

World War I, and earned a doctor of law

degree. A general officer from 1939, he held

division and higher postings in the West and

East. He was appointed commander of the 2d

Panzer Army from July 1943 through January

1945. He commanded forces in Finland and

Norway until 1945. Awarded the Austrian War

Merit Cross and Medal, Wound Badge, Iron

Cross I and II class, German Cross, and

Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.

Convicted of charges at Nuremberg, he died in

1971. 

SS-Captain Kurt Max Rybka: Born in 1917 at

Darmstadt, Germany. Rybka was an officer of

the Armed-SS. A second lieutenant in 1940, he

served in a motorcycle reconnaissance

replacement unit and was then assigned Battle

Group “North” in 1941. Wounded, he returned

to the reconnaissance replacement unit until

returning as a first lieutenant to SS-Division

“North” in 1942. Promoted to captain and

appointed to command the SS–parachute

battalion in 1944. Wounded severely during

Knight’s Move, his injuries kept him in training

duties thereafter. Awarded the Finnish Cross

of Liberty, Wound Badge, Iron Cross I and II

class, and Honor Roll Clasp. He died in 1959. 

Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs:

Born in 1881 at Dessau, Germany. An army

officer from 1901, he served in the cavalry and

on staff in World War I. A general officer from

1933, he distinguished himself in campaigns in

Poland, the West, the Balkans, and the East.

Promoted to field marshal, he was appointed

to command all German forces in the

Southeast Theater (Army Groups E and F)

from August 1943 until March 1945. Awarded

the Iron Cross I and II class, and the Knight’s

Cross with Oak Leaves. Too ill to stand trial at

Nuremberg, he died in 1954. 
against the Germans. With his role in the

resistance now becoming known to the Axis

and Allies, the key part he played was

recognized. He was described by SSReichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler as “a

consistent man. . . . He has really earned his

title of marshal. When we catch him we

shall kill him at once. You can be sure of

that. He is our enemy.”24

Origins of the Raid

By January 1944, the German military

structure in the Balkans was singular. As

Supreme Commander, Southeast, Field

Marshal Maximilian Baron von Weichs’

Army Group F controlled all German forces

in Yugoslavia and Albania. He also

controlled Army Group E in Greece; in effect

placing Army Group F in the position of

being the headquarters to which all German

forces in the Balkans answered. As

subordinates in Yugoslavia and Albania,

Army Group F had the 2d Panzer (Armored)

Army headquartered in Kraljevo and

Military Commander, Southeast in

Belgrade. Both commands were misnamed,

since the 2d Panzer Army had no armored

divisions and should have been more

properly titled the 2d Mountain Army.

Military Commander, Southeast was the

area commander for Serbia with the dual

role of Army Commander, Serbia. Available

tactical units included a Bulgarian corps of

4 divisions, 4 German (Heer and Waffen-SS)

corps with 11 infantry, 1 cavalry, and 2

mountain divisions as well as headquarters

troops. In support were some 50 static

garrison battalions; the Luftwaffe (Air

Force) with around 140 aircraft in Belgrade,

Zagreb, and Mostar; and the Kriegsmarine

(Navy) operating a small fleet of patrol craft

from Trieste. 

The Germans had sought to eliminate

Tito personally from January 1944 under

Hitler’s orders. Efforts were made by

Brandenburg special forces with the 2d

Panzer Army that focused on infiltrating

turncoats into Tito’s headquarters to lead in

German units or to assassinate him

themselves. Among the scenarios considered were booby-trapped documents or

supplies left on the bodies of dead “Allied”

operatives. The use of an airborne raiding

force had been brought up against locations

at Jajce and Vis in January and February.

This planning led to the prospect of seizing

Tito with an airborne coup that had

apparently been hatching at OKW for some

time, spurred by the example of the release

of Mussolini the year before. To date,

nothing had come of the schemes. These

efforts were often at odds with the internal

structure of the Abwehr (military

intelligence) that split intelligence and

special operations functions, its Brandenburg special forces now coming directly

under OKW, and the similar confused

authority within Himmler’s SS and police

special forces under then SS-Major Otto

Skorzeny who pursued parallel tasks.25

Facing well-armed and numerous

guerrillas, Army Group F remained all but

on the defensive by the opening months of

1944. Two of its German divisions had been

moved to Italy and another four had been

dispatched to Hungary. Von Weichs was

presented with the dual problem of Allied

invasion and full-fledged guerrilla attacks

against his rear areas, including strategic

lines of communications to Germany. Local

11
12

operations met with some success, but the

center of the Partisan movement in the

Knin-Jajce-Bihac-Banja Luka area was a

refuge to which these withdrew when

German pressure became too great in any

particular location. Tito’s political and

military headquarters in Bosnia had been

transformed from a secret base in liberated

territory to a rapidly expanding complex of

logistics, communications, and Allied

missions. The need for Allied support and

political recognition had overcome the

Partisan requirement for safety provided by

constant movement. 

While rugged terrain and heavy snows

gave the Partisans physical security, the Axis

intelligence effort located their elusive prey.

Both OKW-Abwehr and SS-Sicherheitsdienst (SD [security service]) intercepted

partisan communications and tentatively

located Tito at Drvar in March 1944.

Although the Wehrmacht and SS worked

separately (the Wehrmacht normally left the

policing of occupied territories to the

control of the SS and police), together a

cumulative picture of Partisan activities was

built up. Infiltration efforts by the OKWBrandenburg and SS-SD special forces

placed agents into the heart of Partisan

territory with some success in the first

quarter of the year. Conventional air

observation and strike reports located Allied

landing and drop zones being marked by

numerous small fires. Soon enough

information was available for the Axis to

attack when the weather favored movement.

Intelligence for the effort was prepared

by Army Group F and 2d Panzer Army but

was only distributed to tactical units who

had a “need to know.” This was reflected by

the fact that the enemy situation stated in

the operation orders was basically identical

below the corps level.26 As reported by

Schwitske: 

Not many comprehensive facts have

ever existed of the very proud greater

Serbian-Yugoslav-Bolshevist guerilla

republic. But it nevertheless controlled a small part of the mountain

region of the country. It is situated

away from any significant habitation

and important roads. It lies in the

middle of the unending vastness of the

. . . mountain region . . . . Therefore

these shady characters could feel safe

here, as it was not possible for any

hostile army to advance on these

valleys, without being observed. The

Vojni Istoriski Institut

Tito Reward Flyer.
13

U.S Army
14

few deep embedded roads between

rocks and impenetrable forests were

easily controlled by a handful of men.

For this reason it is possible for them

to make themselves at home here and

to gather into their depots anything

that was dropped by parachute. Here

they drilled their “armies,” entertained

politicians or entertained themselves.27

In March, the OKW operations staff

estimated there were some 11 Partisan “corps”

of 10,000 to 15,000 men each, 31 “divisions” of

2,000 to 3,000 men apiece, and 50 local

“detachments.” Supreme Commander,

Southeast reported that the Partisans “are

operationally and tactically well led,

equipped with heavy weapons and the

constantly increasing numbers of units

cannot be underestimated.” By April, Axis

troops in Dalmatia, Montenegro, and Albania

were perpetually involved in skirmishes with

local insurgents on the mainland as well as

repelling Allied and Partisan raids on offshore islands. In Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia,

the Germans had succeeded in pushing

Partisans back north and west of the Drina

River after scattered resistance. During the

recent Operation May Pole they were believed

to have taken heavy casualties. With the

increased possibility of Allied invasion in

early 1944, the Germans prepared an urgent

operation against Tito’s headquarters to finish

him as a guerrilla chief once and for all.28

The Plan

On 6 May, von Weichs ordered General

Lothar Rendulic’s 2d Panzer Army to plan

for a drive into the Knin-Jajce-Bihac-Banja

Luka “iron triangle” of Bosnia. On 9 May,

the OKW operations branch confirmed that

the time was exceptionally favorable to

strike Tito, whose Partisans had failed in an

effort to establish a foothold in Serbia. This

setback required von Weichs to assume the

initiative as soon as possible, but in a form

different from previous Balkan operations. 

It was felt that a carefully staged direct

attack on Tito’s headquarters would have

the best chance of success. If the central

control of Tito’s communications,

administration, and Allied logistical

support could be shattered or temporarily

disrupted, this would be an achievement in

itself. The aim was to eliminate the Partisan

command and then hound the leaderless

guerrilla units piecemeal to exhaustion and

destruction. Everything depended upon

good intelligence, surprise, and strong air

support.29 The execution of this task was

passed to Lieutenant General Ernst von

Leyser’s XV Mountain Corps at Knin. But

OKW needed to assign a parachute

battalion for this undertaking, as it would

be dropped on the location of Tito’s

headquarters. Reporter Schwitzke noted

this would ensure surprise as, 

At least until now, when suddenly, out

of the same sky different goods rained

down . . . . Up to this point the bandit

town might have thought the attack

tolerable, if uncomfortable. Attacks

from our side must have been

expected, though it would have been

somewhat surprised by the numbers

of planes flown from bases in Croatia.

The town must now be realizing, and

it should not come as a surprise, that

we Germans do not always show our

full capacity. But then something did
happen, which must have come as a

surprise . . . . This was unforeseen and

had never happened in Bosnia

before.30

As it was also necessary to neutralize

Allied supply landing and drop zones, the

Vth and XVth Mountain Corps would have

to divert troops from other areas, as well as

using Croat and Brandenburg special forces.

While these disrupted the Partisan

command, a number of motorized battlegroups would secure all access routes and

converge on Drvar to relieve the parachute

assault force. Once this occurred, units

would systematically clear the surrounding

countryside to destroy supply dumps and

material.31

By 13 May, von Weichs had identified

the units to conduct what was now called

Operation Knight’s Move after a chessboard

maneuver. Assigned for the operation was

the 500th SS-Fallschirmjäger (Parachute

[FSJ]) Battalion already located with

Supreme Headquarters, Southeast. Under

command of 27-year-old SS-Captain Kurt

Max Rybka, it was formed the previous year

as a national-level unit for “special security

missions.” Employed under the operational

control of OKW for administration,

training, and personnel, it was under the

Waffen-SS (Armed-SS) whose members

formed a fourth branch of the armed forces

under the conglomerate organization of SSReichsfuhrer Himmler. This thousand-man

battalion was unique in the German

military whose parachute units were

normally part of the Luftwaffe. They were

from a tough aggressive service trained by

equally tough members of the parachute

corps. While preparing for other aborted

airborne attacks, it engaged in antiguerrilla

operations in Macedonia, Albania, and

Montenegro before being tasked with

Knight’s Move, its first and only parachute

assault. This was over the objection of

Himmler, who had his own antiguerrilla

plans in mind in competition with the

Wehrmacht.

32

The battalion reflected a late war

manpower mix of older veterans and lesser

trained younger men, a mixture of tough

experience and fanatical obedience. While

the officers and non-commissioned officers

were qualified volunteers, a portion of the

men were under judicial probation

15

National Capital Historical Sales

The hunters: Germans who tried to capture Tito in

Drvar on 25 May 1944 included this paratrooper. This

SS-squad leader is identified by his sleeve stripes,

binoculars, and submachine gun, as well as bandoliers holding grenades.
16

(Bewarungs) and sought to redeem

themselves in the eyes of the SS through

daring or deadly effort with a “suicide

commando” (Himmelfahrtskommando) in

combat. A post-war Bundeswehr (Federal

Defense Force) parachute commander

observed: “The volunteers in the battalion

not only had to get on with these

probationary soldiers; they were also

supposed to arouse their enthusiasm for

special missions.” Most men were politically

naïve, believing what they were told—that

American and British troops were on the

verge of social revolution and the Russians

had tremendous numbers backed by

commissars with pistols. The Partisans were

“half naked gypsies who don’t even have

enough ammunition!” This led the battalion

to fight in the spirit of outraged

righteousness that disregarded international law in the belief, and a command

structure that demanded it, and that

Partisans were bandits subject to execution

on capture.33

The Airborne Raid

The Mission

On 19 May, reconnaissance aircraft

photographed the objective area providing

a detailed depiction of the Partisan and

Allied positions. German agent reports

continued to confirm Tito’s presence in

Drvar. The parachute battalion prepared in

secret but most men were not told the time

and place until hours before the mission’s

execution. Orders were hand-carried by

officers and there was concern about the

participation of Croat units leading to

compromise.34 Instructions issued on 20

May moved the 500th FSJ-Battalion by rail

and truck to assembly areas with the

possibility of an airborne assault.

TEN COMMANDMENTS OF THE PARACHUTIST

1. You are the chosen ones of the German

Army; you will seek combat and train

yourselves to endure any manner of test. To

you, the battle shall be fulfillment.

2. Cultivate true comradeship, for by the aid of

your comrades you will conquer or die.

3. Beware of talking. Be not corruptible. Men

act while women chatter. Chatter may bring

you to the grave.

4. Be calm and prudent, strong and resolute.

Valor and enthusiasm of an offensive spirit will

cause you to prevail in the attack.

5. The most precious thing in the presence of

the foe is ammunition. He who shoots

uselessly, merely to comfort himself, is a man

of straw who merits not the title of parachutist.

6. Never surrender. To you death or victory

must be a point of honor.

7. You can triumph only if your weapons are

good. See to it that you submit yourself to this

law—first my weapon, then myself.

8. You must grasp the purpose of every

enterprise, so that if your leader is killed you

can fulfill it.

9. Against an open foe fight with chivalry, but

to a guerrilla extend no quarter.

10. Keep your eyes wide open. Tune yourself to

the topmost pitch. Be nimble as a greyhound,

as tough as leather, as hard as Krupp steel, and

so you shall be the German warrior incarnate.
Subordinate units with five days of supplies

moved from billets in Kraljevo to staging

areas on 21 May. 

Security for the operation was intense

and methodical. Airborne equipment was

concealed and common infantry uniforms

were worn. The normal practice prior to

action was to remove jump badges, unit

insignia, and pay books that might indicate

who they were and what they might be up

to. Transport Group One under SSLieutenant Haselwanter—consisting of 314

men from the battalion staff, SS-Lieutenant

Korngiebel’s 3d Company, and one platoon

each from 2d and 4th Companies—went to

the Gross Betschkerek airfield near

Belgrade. To the Lucko and Cerklje airfield

near Zagreb went Transport Group Two

under SS-Lieutenant Witzemann. This was

made up of 340 men from SS-Lieutenant

Schmiedel’s 1st and SS-Lieutenant

Witzemann’s 4th Companies with attached

German Army or Luftwaffe personnel. From

the higher headquarters came special forces

detachments including Brandenburg and

Bosnian irregulars (Army Lieutenant

Dowe), a front reconnaissance troop (Army

Lieutenant Zawadil), and an air landing

liaison troop (Luftwaffe Captain Bentrup).

At the Zalvzani airfield near Banja Luka was

Transport Group Three under SS-Captain

Obermaier consisting of 220 men of the

Field Replacement Company and the bulk

of SS-Lieutenant Kaulitz’s 2d Company

along with additional supplies and the

battalion rear party. The German

Commander, Air Forces Croatia, provided

transport units of Junkers Ju 52/3m

transport aircraft and DFS 230 assault

17

SS insignia differentiated Luftwaffe from SS-paratroops. Shown are the collar and sleeve devices used

late in the war. These would have been absent from

probationary soldiers. National Capital Historical Sales

Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)

Waffen-SS paratroopers constituted “an elite within

an elite,” though controversial because of the use of

probationary personnel. The Drvar raid was supposed to demonstrate their worth to critical audiences. Hard fighting and constant combat proved

this, if not the rewards of victory.
18

Organization

The battalion was organized based on

existing Luftwaffe structure that

depended upon the personnel-carrying

capacity of transport aircraft and airtransportable gear. As such, one Ju 52

carried 12 parachutists (a squad plus two

extra) and four arms containers, a flight of

3 Ju 52s carried a platoon, a 12-aircraft

squadron moved a company, and a 53

aircraft group was needed for a full

battalion. Glider transport introduced

another dimension, with a single DFS 230

and tow aircraft needed to move a 10-man

squad. 

The parachute battalion had a staff

and administration company with signals,

motor transport, and parachute

maintenance platoons, a weapons

company, and three rifle companies. Rifle

companies (164 men) had a headquarters

(6 men), signals section (12 men), and

three rifle platoons (108 men). Platoons

had a headquarters (6 men) and three rifle

squads (10 men each). Supernumeraries

provided designated marksman, rifle

grenadiers, and antitank assault men

normally found at company level. The

basic squad structure included a squad

leader, second in command, 2 riflemen,

and two machine gun teams of 3 men

each. The weapons company consisted of

a headquarters, signals section, machine

gun, mortar, antitank, and assault

platoons (each with a headquarters and

two sections). The parachute rifle

companies, including the replacement

company, had some 656 officers and men,

another 200 in the weapons company,

with 267 in the battalion headquarters for

a force of 1,123 men at full strength. This

should be balanced with the reality that

organization for battle differed. The

Germans estimated some 10 percent of the

total remained behind from the battle

echelon as a rear party (baggage train,

supply troop, and parachute maintenance

platoon) and another 2 percent would be

injured on landing. 

Equipment

Battalion weapon totals included

some 72 light machine guns (MG 42s), 4

heavy machine guns (sMG 42s), 4 heavy

mortars (sGrW 34s), 4 recoilless antitank

guns (LG 40s), 4 portable flamethrowers,

and a mixture of rifles and submachine

guns. The battalion’s usual 8 heavy

machine guns were folded into both the

antitank and assault platoons described.

The parachute battalion depended heavily

on radios (very-high frequency for

internal communications, ultra-high and

high frequency sets for external use) and

was issued company- and platoon-level

radios (Tornisterfunkgerät [portable

radio] d2) and battalion and company sets

(Tornisterfunkgerät b1). Ground transportation was from 131 or so trucks,

motorcars, and motorcycles or equivalent

number of horses and mules.

BATTALION ORGANIzATION AND EqUIPMENT
19

500th SS PARACHUTE BATTALION, MAY 1944

SS

(( SS

((

SS

((

SS

((

SS

((

SS

((

SS

((

Hq

HMG

MTR

AT

ASLT

Supply + Transport

Staff+ Admin Signals

500

1

1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3

2 3 4 FLD

REP

SS

((

SS

((

SS

((

Commander SS-Capt Rybka

Deputy SS-Capt Obermaier

Adjutant SS-Lt Mertely

Medical Officers SS-2dLt Dr. Hermann

SS-Lt Dr. von Helmersen

Dental Officer SS-Lt Dr. Wagner

Staff and Administration Company

Signals Platoon

Motor Transport Platoon

Parachute Maintenance Platoon

1st Company SS-Lt Schmiedel

Headquarters Section

Signals Section

Rifle Platoons x 3

2d Company SS-Lt Kaulitz

Headquarters Section

Signals Section

Rifle Platoons x 3

3d Company SS-Lt Korngiebel

Headquarters Section

Signals Section

Rifle Platoons x 3

4th Company SS-2dLt Witzemann

Headquarters Section

Signals Section

Mortar Platoon

Heavy Machine Gun Platoon

Antitank Platoon

Assault Section

Field Replacement Company

Headquarters Section

Signals Section

Rifle Platoons x 3

Note: The battalion had 100 cars/trucks and 30 motorcycles.

BATTALION COMMAND AND STAFF
20

gliders with Henshel Hs 126 or Junkers Ju 87

Stuka tow aircraft for the operation from

Transport Wing 4 and Air Landing Wing 1.

Once at the staging areas, all were to wait for

further word from 2d Panzer Army. If

nothing was heard within 48 hours, they

were to telegraph or telephone 2d Army

Chief of Staff General Helmuth von

Grolman. Supplemental orders went into

details but did not go into the purpose or

location of the action.35

The Order

On 21 May, von Weichs submitted the

plan to OKW and it was approved by Hitler,

who required a simultaneous air attack on

Bosnia Petrovac. General Rendulic passed

subordinates the directive the same day. This

army order outlined the airborne assault and

the subsequent relief and clearing operations

in detail, allocating command to the

Luftwaffe for the attack and to the Army

ground units on link-up.36 According to

Rendulic: “The commands of the XVth

Mountain Corps with strong motorized

units, with parts of the 7th SS-Mountain

Division and SS-[500th Parachute] Battalion,

will advance with a number of task forces

concentrically in the region of PetrovacDrvar, will overcome the resistance of the

Red forces and occupy the center of the Red

command.” The 500th would “parachute at

dawn and overcome the resistance of the

enemy command, putting them out of

action.”37

Strong supporting efforts were planned

and ordered by XVth Mountain Corps on 21

May:

F The 7th SS-Mountain Division would use

a reinforced regimental battle group of the

13th SS-Mountain Regiment moving from

Jaice through Savici then on a broad front to

engage Partisan formations and seize supply

installations north and east of Drvar. It

would then serve as a blocking position to

prevent any guerrilla forces or staffs from

escaping in this direction. A subordinate

battle group reinforced by the 202d Tank

Battalion would move from Banja Luka to

occupy choke points at Kljuc used for

Partisan movement. Another tank reinforced

battle group of the 105th SS-Reconnaissance

Battalion would occupy positions in the

Livno Valley to prevent withdrawals to the

south; a third battle group from the 369th

“Devil” Division’s Reconnaissance Battalion

would move to the Glamoc Valley to stop

withdrawals to the southeast. All available

engineers would accompany these battle

groups to secure road blocks and to restore

bridges or culverts. 

F The 373d “Tiger” Division would use

reinforced regimental Battle Group Willam

moving from Srb through Trubar to Drvar to

relieve the parachute battalion. After

destroying all facilities and supplies in Drvar,

the battle group would attack toward

Petrovac. A subordinate battle group of

battalion size would occupy the Vrtoce area

choke points. These battle or combat groups

were to be heavily armed with artillery and

engineers.

F The 92d Motorized Regiment with the

54th Reconnaissance Battalion and a

regimental battle group of the Croat 2d Light

Infantry Brigade would move from Bihac to

capture Petrovac, destroying the supply

facilities and airfields located there, and

blocking enemy withdrawals in their

direction. After accomplishing this, it would

attack toward Drvar to link up with the
parachute battalion and Battle Group

Willam. 

F The 1st Brandenburg Regiment with Croat

irregulars would advance from Knin to

“conduct special operations” on the PrekajaDrvar line. This concentric concentration of

forces was consistent with anti-“bandit”

doctrine, with the added surprise of the

parachute battalion raid of the communist

headquarters aimed to kill or capture the

Partisan leadership. A limiting factor was

that these forces had to break off any current

operations, refit, begin planning, conduct

reconnaissance, issue orders, establish

communications, and move to assembly

areas in time for X-day. 

Parachute battalion orders were drawn

up the evening of 23 May to be issued to the

troops at the departure airfields the next

day. Joint briefings were held at Agram with

the air and ground units that gave precise

instructions for flight paths, altitudes, and

timings. The 2d Panzer Army provided a

detailed annotated air photograph of Drvar

to assign unit tasks. Because parachute

transports or gliders by themselves could

not carry the entire battalion in a single lift,

a concept for employment was developed

that used both aircraft types at the same

time. The battalion split into three groups

for the attack: some 314 men for a parachute

assault, another 340 to go in by glider, and

21
22

AIRCRAFT, ARMS CONTAINER, GLIDER LOADS

The Junkers Ju 52/3m was the standard

German transport aircraft. The three-engine,

all-metal monoplane was flown by a crew of

three, and had an estimated cruising range of

1,500 kilometers at 272 kilometers per hour. A

rugged aircraft, it remained in military service

well after the war in France and Spain. 

Each Ju 52 carried a stick of 12 parachutists

and four external arms containers for

simultaneous air drop. The containers, each

with its own parachute, weighed some 50- to

60-pounds empty and held loads up to 260

pounds. Each had a towing bar, lifting handles,

and wheels to provide ground mobility. Color

coded parachutes or markings identified

containers by content: green-food, white or

red-ammunition, blue-medical, yellow-petrol,

oil, or lubricants. Colored markings also

indicated units: green-headquarters, white-1st

platoon, red-2d platoon, and yellow-3d

platoon. Variations were seen in photographs—red cross for medical, lightning bolt

for radios, and different alpha-numeric

Ju 52/3m transport aircraft War Department

lettering. A separate provision “bomb” canister

existed for air delivery of supplies. 

For Knight’s Move, combat and emergency

rations were carried for the first day or so (“Five

cans of meat and of bread will be issued. Under

no circumstances will they be used prior to

take off.”), with replacement of food and water

from local sources expected. This was in part

because mandated individual equipment loads

averaged some 95 pounds per man or more for

those with crew-served weapons. Basic

ammunition allowances for planning: On

operations, parachutists took all the munitions

they could carry, independent of arms

containers.

Pistol 18 rounds

Submachine gun (9mm) 690 rounds

Rifle (7.92mm) 200 rounds

Machine gun (7.92mm) 2,500–4,500 rounds

Mortar (81mm) 150 rounds high explosive

Plus hand and rifle grenades, land mines,

demolitions charges, and antitank rockets
220 reinforcements to be dropped by

parachute as a second wave for a total of 874

troops at the objective. Parachutists would

seize the town and defend key terrain, while

glider teams attacked specified enemy

objectives. Both Luftwaffe and SS

journalists and photographers went along

to document this decisive effort.38 Attached

intelligence specialists, translators, and

communications personnel were to exploit

captured prisoners and material on the spot

to ferret out Tito, his leadership, and any

Allied personnel. Information was to be

obtained by any means and prisoners

23

The Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für

Segelflug DFS 230 was the standard German

transport glider. It was of tubular steel construction covered with linen canvas. Each DFS

230 could carry a squad of 10 parachutists sitting one behind the other on a bench, as well

as arms containers. After a high-speed dive

from altitude, a parachute in the tail was released to slow the glider for landing, or nosemounted braking rockets could be used for a

short-field touchdown. Its cruising range depended upon that of the tow aircraft such as

the Ju 52, Ju 87, or Hs 126. Glider usefulness

ended after helicopters were fully developed. 

The loading diagram of the DFS 230 shows

the location of 10 seats (1-10), rifle rack (11),

boxes of ammunition (12), and position of a

machine gun or radio set (13, 14, 15). There was

a first aid kit in the rear of the fuselage and

the last 4 seats could be removed. The

maximum useful load was 2,834 pounds or

just over 11⁄4 tons. For example, a headquarters

section was 9 men, 6 rifles, and a radio; a

machine gun section had 9 men, a heavy

machine gun, 6 rifles, and 6 boxes of

ammunition; a rifle squad consisted of 9 men,

6 rifles, a light machine gun, and 6 boxes of

ammunition. After landing, the Luftwaffe

pilot joined his passengers for their tactical

assignment.

War Department

DFS 230 transport glider
24

presenting a threat or attempting to escape

would be shot. Paratroopers were provided

pictures of Tito, to be captured alive if

possible and dead if not.39 In his final order

Rybka warned against the danger of Allied

air attack, and closed by emphasizing that

Drvar was the most important organizational and supply center of the “bandits”

and that Operation Knight’s Move would

commence at once. He concluded: “Don’t

waste ammunition, don’t stop for the

wounded. Press on to the objective.”40

Dispersion to airfields near Belgrade,

Banja Luka, and Zagreb required the task

organized battalion to be in place by noon

24 May to await the commencement of

events. At these guarded locations final

orders were given and the news that they

would be going into action—“X-day”—the

next morning, 25 May 1944. With this,

loading plans were finalized and packing of

parachutes and arms containers started at

1400. Last minute adjustments were

coordinated with the transport units and

the countdown began for H-hour. Preloading was completed of the estimated 31

transports and 34 gliders and tow aircraft

needed for the initial waves. In addition,

fighter and bombers crews were briefed and

prepared to fly escort and attack missions.

Recalled a Luftwaffe glider pilot, “In the

quarters and on the airfield there was a lot

of hustle and bustle on the eve of 25 May.

Equipment, ammunition and weapons were

checked and the tugs were lined up on the

airfield ready for takeoff the next

morning.”41

Preliminary operations were underway

Partisan formations survived by constant movement and avoiding having a fixed base that the Axis could attack.

Drvar was to be an exception. U.S. Army (National Archives and Records Administration)
from the air and the ground, unhindered or

detected by enemy air forces. On 24 May,

the 2d Panzer Army forward command post

was located at Bihac and all units were in

place with “perfect secrecy.” The parachute

battalion and air units were set at departure

airfields. The supporting combat groups

moved into attack position as well, at Knin

(65 kilometers from Drvar), Srb (25

kilometers from Drvar), and Bihac (54

kilometers from Petrovic, 29 kilometers

from Drvar). Elements of the 7th SSMountain Division were last in place early

the morning of the 25th, isolating the major

avenues of approach to Drvar.42

Partisan Picture

At this stage, a look at the other side of

the hill is in order, concealed to the

Germans by lack of access and nocturnal

observation. The objective was located in

the Unac River valley in the Dinaric Alps.

The Jasenovac Mountains rose sharply to the

north with high hills to the south. It was

surrounded by evergreen and hardwood

forests, giving way to alpine soil and karsts

at altitude. The valley floor was 800 meters

above sea level, with surrounding

mountains reaching from 1,400 to 1,950

meters in elevation. Three major roads and

a railroad led to the town, with the graded

road coming from Petrovac turning into the

town’s main street with sidewalks. Drvar was

a large village with a former population of

some 1,500 and had been a rural industrial

center with cellulose or tobacco factories

and extensive rail yards. These and the

nearby villages were gutted in previous

fighting. Houses were close together, with

red tiled roofs and white walls, but only onein-five was still intact. Though isolated by

snow in the winter, spring weather had

arrived by mid-May and it was warm and

temperate in daytime. Fields and orchards,

now green and cultivated with the coming

spring, were defined by low stone walls and

ditches.43

The dual political and military function

of Tito’s leadership saw the location in Drvar

of the Supreme Headquarters of the

National Army of Liberation and Partisan

Detachments of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist

Council for the National Liberation of

Yugoslavia, the Central Committee of the

Yugoslav Communist Party; and various

cultural and political organizations ranging

from the anti-fascist youth organization to

dancers from the Zagreb ballet. An

estimated 800 guerrillas and 200 civilians

were in the town which held Partisan

25

M.J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)

Another view of Tito’s quarters and headquarters

“cave” that would elude his attackers.
26

administrative, supply, and communications centers. Guerrilla defenses consisted

of slit trenches against air attack and light

antiaircraft machine guns. An engineer unit,

a 350-man escort battalion, and 100-person

officer’s training school were on the town’s

outskirts. Despite the small number of

Partisans at Drvar, combat units were close

at hand from the 1st and 5th Partisan Corps,

conforming closely to the German estimate

of 12,000 fighters.44

In the vicinity of Drvar were three

supporting landing fields and drops zones

for communications and supplies from

Allied bases in Italy and Egypt.45 Allied

representation was by Brigadier Fitzroy H.

R. MacLean’s British Military Mission

consisting of a number of radio operators

and liaison officers headquartered in a

ravine 3.2 kilometers south of town, with

others assigned to Partisan units. (MacLean

was in London at this time, but present were

his deputy, Colonel Vivian Street, and the

British Prime Minister’s son, Major

Randolph Churchill.) The Americans under

Colonel George Kraigher had a smaller party

just west of Drvar, an Army Air Forces

weather station, and liaison teams with

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

SS-paratroops in a Ju 52 transport enroute to Drvar, 25 May 1944. Note the cramped space and the exposed personal weapons they carry. Ammunition and supplies were carried in external arms containers dropped at the

same time.
combat units. Some 1.6 kilometers

northwest of the town was Lieutenant

General N. V. Korneyev’s Soviet mission.

The Russians operated separately from the

British and Americans, who were providing

the bulk of arms and equipment to the

Partisans as well as air and maritime support

where possible to keep German forces

deployed in the Balkans and out of Western

and Eastern Europe. Western reporters had

recently arrived the month before to provide

the first views from within the Partisan

camp to the outside world. These included

Time’s Stoyan Pribichevich, Reuters’ John

Talbot, photographers U.S. Navy Chief Petty

Officer G. E. Fowler and British Army

Sergeant M. J. Slade.46

Crucial was the lack of information to

the Germans that Tito’s living quarters were

not in Drvar, but located 1.6 kilometers to

the north on the far side of the Unac River.

In fact, he stayed daily in two different

locations (the other site being Bastasi)

rather than at the headquarters in the town.

Located some 60 feet up a ravine in a

wooded cliff, it could only be reached by a

narrow path and up three flights of stairs.

Working space was built into the mountain,

with living quarters in a small hut at its

entrance surrounded by a veranda

overlooking the valley floor. The interior

was a room lined with parachute silk, with

desks, backed by a British ordnance map of

Yugoslavia. It was well hidden, with

additional camouflage provided by

branches, and sentries stood guard over the

single approach from below. As Tito recalled

the situation, “The Allied landing in France

was just around the corner. The Soviet Army

was advancing at high speed and had

already reached Romania. The Germans

feared an Allied landing here on the

Adriatic. Our People’s Liberation Army

disturbed them greatly.”47 On the evening of

24 May, Tito, his deputy Edvard Kardelj, the

journalists, mission representatives, and

personal staff dined until late at the

lodgings near Drvar. After dinner that night,

Tito and Kardelj settled down to wait the

morrow, Tito’s 52d birthday.48

Execution, X-Day

German operations were now entirely

focused on western Bosnia for the time

being. The XVth Mountain Corps recorded

that the operation commenced on 25 May

with pre-planned air attacks on Drvar and

Petrovac, the first of some 440 sorties flown.

This was heavy aviation support by Balkan

standards. Motorized combat teams

converged, three from the west and

northwest; two from the east and southeast.49

A member of Group Witzemann

billeted near the airport at Agram recalled: 

No one was permitted to leave the

school or make any contact. We spent

one night in the school and were

awoken very early, around 0400 or

0500 hours, and the entire company

had to gather in a school room. Here

we first learned from our company

commander which mission was flown.

From two-tone glasses we could clearly

see the aerial photograph of Drvar. On

the aerial photograph we saw lines and

drawn in points and each group and

each platoon was precisely split up

over the landing points, direction of

attack, etc. . . . Tito was mentioned

separately and he was to be taken

27
28

captive either alive or dead under all

circumstances.50

Similar presentations took place for the

other two transport groups: Haselwanter at

Belgrade and Obermaier at Banja Luka.

In the early morning hours, aircraft and

gliders were inspected and the troops were

loaded to begin the necessary but tedious

marshalling for take off. German combat

reporter Walter Henisch wrote: “A long row

of transport gliders lay along the airfield, the

tow-planes are ready to start. The morning

breeze blew across the take-off runway,

where the men of an SS-paratroop unit

stood around their section leader . . . With

few words, the staff sergeant gave his orders

to the glider pilot. Every minute of the

landing operation was discussed and

considered.”51 Glider pilot Sieg recalled,

Long before the first light of day, the

men of the SS-Parachute Battalion 500

moved to our position and awaited

instructions to embark. After a short

flight and mission briefing and

synchronization of watches, the

engines were started. At 0555, the

machines towing the fully loaded

transport gliders rumbled ponderously

over the ground. After takeoff, the

gliders’ undercarriage was jettisoned at

the end of the field.52

Gliders flew off first, followed by troop

transports. From the takeoff to initial

touchdown was about an hour of flight time,

most of which was spent gaining altitude

and assembling in separate formations in

the air. The tow aircraft and gliders flew high

at 170 kilometers-per-hour, the transports

were flown lower at 185 kilometers-per-hour.

Initially the formations were loose because

of the dark, but at first light the aircraft

grouped into three- and five-aircraft flights.

The Ju 52 “Iron Annies” had excellent

navigational and flying qualities and there

was no problem in locating Drvar. As the

aircraft flew out of the dawn, the Dinaric

Alps were visible in the cold air some 80

kilometers away.53

In a transport, one journalist reported

in third person: 

Quarters in the Ju 52 were very

cramped. It was difficult for him to get

a look out of a window, but when he

did get a look what he saw most was

H-hour over Drvar, 25 May 1944. Paratroops leave a

Ju 52 transport over Drop Zones Red, Blue, and Green.

Colored parachutes indicated ammunition and supplies. Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
other Ju 52s. There were scores of

them, all traveling the same route. By

the same token, the thing he saw the

least was British planes. There were

none of them . . . our observer began

to glimpse Ju 52s flying in the other

direction. Those were planes that had

dropped their loads and were heading

home.

His thoughts turned to the old joke:

“Lieutenant Y to his squad, ‘when I give the

command to jump, push the man in front of

you!’” True to the public affairs format,

morale was high, the morning was beautiful,

the countryside hilly and green, and the

motor noisy. The engine noise prevented

conversation and left each man alone with

his own feelings.54 In his glider, Henisch

observed: “Above us fighter aircraft whiz

ahead that will provide the introduction to

the ‘Hell-dance.’ The paratroop transports

are flying in broad formation before us.

They will jump right after the attack by the

fighter aircraft.”55

First escorting, then pulling ahead, were

German and Croat Air Force aircraft tasked

with the pre-assault bombardment. Just after

daybreak at 0630, two Focke-Wulf Fw 190

Würger (Shrike) fighters flew up the Unac

River valley on strafing runs, one flying high

and the other low, with the aim of disrupting

the Partisans. These were followed by some

15 Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers that orbited the

town and proceeded to bomb and strafe it

and the immediate locale, particularly

suspected antiaircraft positions. For some 30

minutes, “very heavy low-level dive bomber

attack on predetermined objectives” took

place, reported one observer.56 A number of

fires were started that mingled smoke with

haze, hindering accurate bomb damage

assessment that was reported as good by the

flight crews. 

On board an Italian-built Caproni

29

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

Flights of Ju 52s maintained a specified flight pattern

to allow squads, platoons, and sections to land as

briefed on the objective. The goal was to overwhelm

defenders with multiple attacks by Companies 1, 2,

and 3. Weather at the time favored the airborne

forces.

At the drop zone, clearing parachute harnesses was

critical. Help was required if the jumper was injured

or tangled as shown in this photograph. Weapons

needed to be at hand to respond to enemy fire and to

recover arms containers.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
30

Ca.314 bomber, Schwitzke wrote: “finally it

was our turn as we were the last wave of dive

bombers to fly right into this dense veil of

smoke, which darkened the view from our

window, and we threw our bombs into the

narrow row of buildings along the street.

Then we circled at the crest of the

mountains, attacking the positions of the

resistance fighters, who were stationed

there.”57 Also airborne, Henisch observed:

“Below us in a mountain cauldron, smoke

rises from the rubble, the bandit nest that

has already been visited by our fighter

aircraft. There is not much recognizable

from above and there is no time for that.”58

According to SS reporter Adalbert Callewart,

“Hell is broken loose over the small city.

Between the detonation clouds of the

resistance the Stukas and ground attack

aircraft plunge, the armament rattles, the

Vojni Istoriski Institut
bombs dully rumble. The great moment

arrived.”59

0700—Airborne assault wave reaches

the objective

At 0700, as the air attacks were

completed, transports came out of the

sunrise in their three- and five-aircraft

flights strung in column. A 1,700-meter-tall

mountain had to be crossed, followed by a

descent to jump altitude, with engines

throttled back for the drop over preselected

drop zones. Transports slowed to 150

kilometers-per-hour at 120 to 150 meters

above-ground-level over Drvar and

delivered sticks of paratroopers and arms

containers. Parachutists had to clear the

aircraft, with barely seconds in the air, hit

the ground and roll, get out of their harness,

and orient themselves to find arms

containers and identify squad and platoon

rally points (at this stage in the war German

paratroopers carried their small arms on

their person). Perhaps 15 minutes were

taken up with this before proceeding with

their first task which was to secure the drop

zones and approaches outside of Drvar.

Transport aircraft, each with 12 jumpers

and their arms containers, dropped troops

into action at three separate drop zones:

Group Green (95 men) seized the northeast

of Drvar and Group Blue (100 men) seized

the southeast, with both defending the

eastern approaches to the objective. Group

Red (85 men) seized the high ground

southwest of Drvar and then linked up with

Groups Blue and Green. Rybka and his

command staff were with Group Red while

the remainder of the headquarters arrived

in the gliders. Small unit leader Peter H.

Renold, attached to Group Red, recalled:

“We jumped off without any problems . . .

The landing speed was perfect so we knew

the wind was in our favor. We landed on a

road close to the town. . . . After we got rid

of our harness and parachutes, we took our

31

P. H. Renold (National Capital Historical Sales)

Gliders followed the parachute troops with headquarters staff and Company 4. These were under tow from Ju 52s,

Ju 87s, and here by Hs 126s. The glider streams had to form up and operate in conjunction with other transport

aircraft.
32

guns and went on our way.”60

While the paratroopers were still

securing drop zones, the glider force arrived

overhead. Holding 10 men each, including

a Luftwaffe pilot, gliders landed troops on

designated objectives as complete units.

These formed a total of six battle groups,

along with the battalion’s heavy weapons

teams. Team Panther (110 men) captured

Objective Citadel, Tito’s command post at

an inn-complex; Team Daredevil (70 men)

seized Objective Western Cross, the western

exits of the town, and the radio station

located there; Team Stormer (50 men)

grabbed Objective Moscow, the Russian

mission; Team Attacker (40 men) took

Objective London, the British mission,

holding the high ground to the south; Team

Biter (20 men) held Objective Warsaw, near

London; and Team Breaker (50 men)

captured Objective America, the United

States mission. 

Gliders were released over Drvar at

about 915 meters above-ground-level and

made their approach from the northwest.

They descended in concentric spirals,

circling twice before going into a steep dive

over their designated landing zones. The

drogue parachute was deployed to brake the

descent at the last minute and allowed a

shallow landing flare close to the ground. In

one glider, Luftwaffe reporter Viktor

Schuller observed: 

The tow cables are released. They

flutter like paper streamers at the tail

end of the departing airplane, as if

wanting to wave goodbye. Good luck

to us, now there is no going back! And

the glider seems to be suspended in

air, or so it would seem. Without

making a sound, just as if someone

were jumping head first from a great

height into the unknown, menacing

space. . . . But first one has the feeling

of abandonment, as if one had been

left alone in the air. Of course this is

wrong, because to the right and left

above and below sail the other quiet

birds, with only the wind howling into

the struts, themselves howling down

into the bandit nest—below it is hell

on this early morning. So—down we

go!61

Flying a Team Panther glider, Sieg wrote: 

I decided on a nose-dive with the

brake parachute. With a barely

perceptible jolt the dive parachute

had unfolded at the tail of the

P. H. Renold (National Capital Historical Sales)

A Ju 52 tows a DFS 230 glider to Drvar, 25 May 1944.

DFS 230 gliders brought in combat teams together as

groups, while paratroopers landed dispersed. These

combat groups attacked specified objectives important to the overall effort.

P. H. Renold (National Capital Historical Sales)
fuselage. The heavily loaded glider

with its 10 occupants lost momentum

and dived at a steep angle on the

target obscured with smoke and mist.

The altimeter dropped at a fast rate,

1,500 meters, 1,000 meters, 500

meters and the target, the wall of the

Citadel of Drvar and the headquarters

building began to take on shape. I

recognized two antiaircraft guns, saw

the Partisans fleeing in panic and

concentrated on landing. As the dive

leveled out I attempted to come close

to the ground and as near as possible

to the wall. Just above the ground I

ejected the brake parachute and, as if

struck by a whip, my glider shot

forward and slid to a halt a few meters

in from of the Citadel wall . . . Fierce

rifle and machine-gun fire rained

down on us from the Citadel . . . The

paratroopers stormed over the wall

from all sides into Tito’s headquarters.62

Gliders brought compact combat teams

and battalion heavy weapons (mortars,

recoilless antitank guns, heavy machine

guns, and flame throwers), albeit with a

greater risk during descent and landing

from hostile fire or terrain. The initial

challenge was to get clear of the aircraft and

proceed to their task or to unload and

emplace their crew-served weapons. Most

immediately began shooting their way to

assigned objectives.63 Henisch recorded:

“Everyone out!” yells the squad leader.

In the shortest time the glider is left

behind. Luckily, we landed in a high

wheat field which provides us with

cover from all sides. From everywhere

screaming, zipping, and zinging is

going over our heads. The shots

smack through the abandoned

aircraft. The glider transports have

33

P. H. Renold (National Capital Historical Sales) 

A drogue parachute deployed to brake DFS 230 descent at the last minute. This occurred just prior to

landing and allowed a pinpoint, though rough, stop.

This Combat Team Panther glider landed on top of a

Partisan antiaircraft position at the edge of the walled

cemetery known as Citadel. Just visible in the background is an Hs 126 liaison aircraft and the factory

area.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
34

landed around the bandits nest. At

the edges of the village the

paratroopers are already fighting for

every house.64

A Luftwaffe pilot flying a Team

Daredevil glider landed west of town at the

crossroad known as the Western Cross. At

800 meters he prepared to dive, but: 

My brake parachute refused to work.

I pulled out of the dive, turned

through 180 degrees and came in

again. When we landed . . . the righthand wing strut was snapped off by

the force. Before the glider came to a

proper standstill, the doors were

thrown open and the SS-paratroopers

were out. While we were landing we

came under heavy fire from the

eastern mountain slope. No one was

wounded and we crept in a flat gully

towards the nearest house, where

some members of the other glider

crews had already taken shelter.65

Their objective was a communications

center which, along with Tito’s

headquarters, was considered a critical

target of the raid. Others landed to take

Objective Warsaw, despite missing one

glider en route: “We landed approximately

5 kilometers away . . . At landing we already

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

Everybody out as a glider team clears its aircraft after landing! The two light MG 42 machine guns on the left

and the assistants with spare ammunition identify them as rifle squad machine gun teams.
had to keep the initially gaping and the

resisting Partisans from our throats with

pistols and hand grenades. Those who did

not fall surrendered, hence the high

number of prisoners. This did not make the

path to the actual target any easier.” The

objective proved to be an American

metrological station rather than the

suspected command facility.66 Team

Attacker missed the British Mission, but

captured the Allied journalists who were

still there and roused out of a nearby slit

trench with their Partisan escort. According

to Time reporter Pribichevich at Objective

London: “About 30 more large low-flying

aircraft arrived and . . . sticks of brownish

parachutes flapped open no more than 200

feet above us and gliders began to steer

towards the ground 200 yards in front of us.

We look at each other and knew there was

no escape.” As one German recalled, “We

took the Yugoslavs completely by surprise.”67

By 0745, reorganization and assaults

proceeded supported by attack aircraft. The

OKW war diary reported the first wave went

in according to plan “with high casualties.”68

Paratroopers were killed in their parachute

harnesses; others were injured on landing,

and from supporting aircraft “friendly fire.”

More losses occurred with the glider force as

at least three DFS 230s crashed on landing,

35

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

As the assault proceeded, the landing and drop zones became crowded as the different waves men and material

mixed together. Reorganization was a critical task to ensure the right men and materials are sent on to their objectives.

Another view from the same location shows the exposure to fire can complicate efforts to retain control

of the battle. For the parachute battalion, there is no

going back at this point. Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
36

due to injured pilots, missed approaches, or

perhaps the high altitude. Others were hit

by fire in the air, while some were released

early—including one glider that grounded

10 kilometers away. Another landed by

chance at the base of the cliff in front of

Tito’s location, nosing over and killing its

occupants.69

Rybka’s headquarters at Objective

Citadel consisted of a command staff,

including an assistant adjutant, a number of

messengers, and radio communicators.

Present was an engineer assault force

established from spare personnel that were

the commander’s reserve with demolition

charges, flamethrowers, and antitank

weapons. Battalion adjutant SS-Lieutenant

Otto Mertely established the main battalion

command post on high ground southwest of

Drvar, that included clerks, communicators,

a graphic artist, and liaison teams from the

Luftwaffe and Army. Constant and frequent

reporting to higher commands was stressed.

Direct radio communications was both to

Commanders, XVth Corps and German

Luftwaffe Croatia. Fieseler Fi 156 Storch

(Stork) and Henshel Hs 126 liaison aircraft

were used for air observation. Air panels or

swastika flags, flares, and smoke were used

for recognition to communicate with

supporting aircraft by prearranged signals.

Doctors Hermann and Helmersen, with

their medical orderlies manned the

battalion aid station. With each company

were stretcher parties, and every platoon

had a first-aid medic and supplies. Medical

evacuation for serious cases was available

using Fi 156s. Food and ammunition

consisted of what was carried, with no

immediate resupply expected except by air.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

The built-up area of Drvar including the rail yard and

factory area seen from the air during the attack was

the focus for initial efforts of the assault. The destroyed facilities made it difficult to clear and later

proved too large to defend.

Paratroopers had to use fire and movement techniques to seize, occupy, and defend the built-up areas

and isolated farmsteads. The resistance was immediate and from surprising directions, including by

women and children.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
The battalion was on its own, to carry on

“until relieved.” 

The initial attack was toward the center

of town, supported by mortars, heavy

machine guns, and dive bombers guided by

signal flares. The Germans advanced on the

town in skirmish lines, bounding from cover

to cover, using their superior firepower.

Once in the town, fighting was house-tohouse with positions changing hands

several times. The Partisans fought back

immediately but were disorganized and

lightly armed. Resistance was by

headquarters personnel, delegates from the

youth congress, and civilians—including

women and children according to German

accounts.70 Reports were of captured Italian

light tanks being used, but these “quickly

cleared off and we never saw them again.”71

A participant commented in a later

interview: “One of the things we had not

been taught was house-to-house fighting,

that is fighting in urban areas. Although

Drvar was not a large place it did have

houses and streets—which sheltered the

bandits—and therefore qualifies for the

term ‘urban.’ The enemy fire was random

and uncoordinated. It was really the worst

sort of luck to be hit by such undirected

fire.”72 In the town center in a building

housing the District Committee of the

Communist Youth League of Yugoslavia,

Partisans fought until killed, throwing back

German grenades and refusing appeals to

surrender. Notable resistance was at the

radio station, distinguished by its telephone

lines and antenna array.73 Though bombed,

it was still violently defended, in part by the

young men and women who ran the

communications facility. It was finally

37

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

Pistols, rifles, submachine guns, and light machine

guns are shown in use as well as the variety of airborne equipment and clothing. On the far left is a

combat cameraman, one of several sent in to document the attack.

Arms containers became wheeled carts on the ground

and carried ammunition and explosives needed in the

close combat encountered. These paratroopers are

carrying machine gun ammunition for the battalion

heavy machine guns. Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)
38

reduced by explosives and the survivors

were summarily shot despite orders to

preserve them and their material for

intelligence exploitation.74 “After a short

while,” wrote Henisch, “all the groups had

landed and concentrated their attacks on

the village. Out of cellars, church towers,

and windows the enemy pulls back. Our MG

42 rattles across the street and cleans up

without mercy. After a brief time the village

is in our hands. Prisoners are brought in

from all sides.”75 The Germans broke the

resistance in the town center by 0845 but

had not found the expected Partisan senior

leadership. 

A variety of impressions were made on

the victors. In the interest of security,

German agents in place had not been

warned ahead of time and suffered the same

fate as their intended victims observed

Helmuth Kleper, who found the bodies of

two Yugoslav women “who we had trained

as spies and sent in [to Tito’s] camp with

Morse radio transmitters. We had been in

constant communications with these girls

who had done valuable work for us. They

made the whole attack possible.”76 To

Lieutenant Schuller on the ground it

seemed, 

after brief house-to-house fighting,

with the usual shots coming from

cellars, roofs and church tower

windows, the first part of the orders

had been carried out. The village, the

hidden hiding place of Tito, is

occupied. Everyone who is still alive,

and did not run into the nearby

woods when the first bombs fell, is

herded together, after coming out of

the most unusual hiding places.

Strange forms emerge. Only a few still

try to escape. Especially the women—

they act totally unreasonably. One of

them runs like mad through the

vegetable garden. She screams, whilst

swinging an Italian gun and her

bright-red dressing gown flutters

behind her like a flag. No “Halt” or

“Stoi” can stop her. She is in a rage, she

Wilhelm Baitz (OKW-PK)

Urban combat demanded close combat skill in the use

of hand weapons and aggressiveness, all hallmarks of

paratroopers. Grenades, pistols, and bayonets had to

be used with effect.
jumps and one expects her to be

riding through the air on her gun—

then she falls on her face.77

From Lieutenant Schwitzke flying overhead: 

Of course the whole operation was

not yet finished. But already the

assault troops are approaching from

all sides and are freeing the soldiers

who are cut off. But even from the

height of the dive bombers’ view, one

can see that in the town the men on

the ground have accomplished their

aim already. After a short time, on

departing, we can see the same group,

which previously had been seen

jumping from house to house,

securing their positions, walking

upright along a path between the

fields. Soon they will meet up with

comrades, who were sent to them.

And they will hear their stories.

Because a few secrets of the guerilla

town, taken by surprise in the

morning slumber, had undoubtedly

come to light.78

0930—Drvar occupied, main attempt to

capture Tito

By 0930, the battalion held the town

and had captured some 400 Yugoslavs of all

description. “In all corners of the village it

crackles, crashes, and bangs. Black smoke

hangs above the valley,” wrote Schuller. “One

ammunition store after another goes up in

flames, the flames consume the enormous

clothes and food stores. Everything, apart

from things which can be carried away, have

to be destroyed. How many nights and how

many supply flights did it take to bring all

this stuff to the place by air?”79

“Hands up, get out!” echoed through

the streets as prisoners were collected and

gathered in the rear of the two-story

administrative building, the largest in town,

while others were locked up in the now

empty gliders. Prisoners were screened by

the Brandenburg specialists and segregated

39

The inn-complex believed by the Germans to hold the

Partisan high command. Only after hard fighting and

a search was it found to be used by Central Committee

of the Communist Youth League. The attached intelligence specialists were used to continue the hunt.

National Capital Historical Sales

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

Captured Partisans were hustled to collection points

for interrogation. Once disarmed, any resistance

could result in immediate execution, but live prisoners

were needed for answers. Language experts and Croat

irregulars were used to ask “Where is Tito?”
40

as guerrillas, civilians, Croat and Italian

deserters, and special cases like the Allied

newsman and a medical doctor of FrenchRussian extraction. Also found were a

captured Chetnik district commander and

youth organizer.80 Seized from the Partisans,

according to Callewart, were “weapons of all

kinds, mass quantities of munitions, supply

arsenals, secret orders, documents, radios,

[and] many captives . . . The wasps’ nest has

burnt out.”81 Henisch concluded, “Surely the

majority of the bandit-staff fled for shelter,

but they could not prevent the capture of

irreplaceable and important material.”82 In

front of Schuller, 

SS-men carry thick paper bundles and

folders, which are collected carefully.

It is interesting to study Tito’s original

papers. One could say a lot about it

all. Unbelievable and astonishing are

the things which are coming to light.

. . . So that is what the headquarters

of a bolshevist bandit leader looks

like. Here were hatched all the

underhand attacks and numerous

pillaging attacks and murders, which

brought fear into the whole country,

and from here, via the other side of

the Adriatic Sea, spans the network of

allies, friends, patrons, and supporters. From here secret paths lead

to the vast, inscrutable forests and

mountains of the western Balkan

regions.”83

National Capital Historical Sales

Prisoners included a mixed bag of men, women, and

children with the resulting concerns of sorting out

“who was who.” Guerrillas without uniforms, insignia, or identification made this a problem for conventional German forces.

Two of the allied journalists captured and held by the

Germans at Drvar. This is U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Gene Fowler from the Office of Strategic Services

in Cairo. Behind is Sergeant Slade whose photographs

of the Partisans are in this book.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
Questioning was

brutal and to the point,

“Where is Tito?” Those

resisting or suspected of it

were killed, not always in

action. The families living

in houses occupied by

Allied missions were also

shot. This was in

accordance with existing

theater orders that

Partisans were to be killed

outright and that any active

or passive resistance by

civilians would result in

their being “shot as bandit

helpers and their dwellings

destroyed.”84

The captured Time

and Reuters reporters were

shown photographs of Tito

pulled from a paratrooper’s

jump smock. “Do you know

who this is?” the Germans

demanded. Being caught

with Yugoslavs made them

subject to a heated

discussion about whether journalists were

legitimate prisoners of war or liable to on

the spot execution as commandos. The

German-speaking Pribichevich argued that

Allied forces did not shoot captured

German officers, was it the practice of the

German Army to shoot captured American

and British officers? The unsettling reply

was, “Sorry, . . . I have orders to execute

everybody here.” Despite this, the British

and American prisoners were separated

from the Yugoslavs for treatment at a later

time. 

But still the Germans shot unarmed

civilians, booted old men and women,

looted cigarettes, food, and took whatever

struck their fancy.85 One justified it as: “We

were consumed with hate . . . If I had been

the section corporal I would have shot the

sniper. He was in civvies; not a badge nor a

cap to show he was a Partisan.”86 In an

incident witnessed by the captured Allied

reporters at the battalion command post, a

Yugoslav prisoner was taken outside of the

walled enclosure, where he was soon

questioned with the “most frightful

screams.” This went on for ten minutes, until

a German correspondent “threw himself

41

Vojni Istoriski Institut
42

half-way over the wall and emptied his

cartridge clip into the boy’s body.” It seemed

from the shouting match that took place

between an officer and the reporter that the

Germans did not need any more bad press.87

Later when German dead and wounded

were found tortured and mutilated, even the

pretense of propriety was removed. Henisch

wrote: “we found several bodies of

paratroopers that were captured while still

alive. They were branded with a glowing hot

iron . . . A corporal had his arms blown off.

We knew what would happen to us if we fell

into the hands of the animals alive.” 88

Captives were forced to move German

wounded to the cemetery half a kilometer

away from the center of town where the

battalion aid station and prisoner holding

area were established on dominating

terrain. Other working parties carried

ammunition, water, and the dead despite

continued fighting.89 “On the highest hill of

the valley a cemetery is situated,” wrote

Schuller. “It is surrounded by a kind of

fortification ditch. From here one can see

the whole battleground. The village, the

meadows and the valley, looks more like a

basin, as it is surrounded by thickly wooded

forest slopes. One would like to know how

many thousand pairs of eyes, how many

guns, ready to shoot at any moment, there

are under trees and bushes—occasionally

one can see figures on the deforested

mountain ranges.”90

While the town was being mopped-up M. J. Slade (Imperial War Museum)

This photograph by Slade indicates some of the physical difficulties faced in trying to take Tito’s position.

In place is the camouflaged hut and to the right is the

narrow path that was its only approach. Tito and his

staff escaped through the gulley seen below the hut.

The hunt for Tito was opposed throughout the day,

picking up in strength during the mid- and late-day.

Defensive efforts took on more importance to the

parachute battalion and these Germans provided

close-in security at the battalion command post at the

cemetery overlooking Drvar and the factory complex.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)
and defenses organized, Rybka and his unit

leaders had to determine from incoming

reports whether Tito was among the dead

or captured and decide what to do next.

Firing was picking up at the foot of the hills

beyond the town, particularly from

Partisans on the north side of the Unac and

from the officer’s school to the east, who

instead of withdrawing as expected, were

fighting desperately to hold their positions.

This prevented the Germans from crossing

the river and led Rybka to feel they were

defending something important, possibly

Tito himself.91

With this he pulled in the groups

allocated to capture the Allied missions to

reinforce the group assigned to capture the

Citadel. On order, Groups Red, Green, and

Team Stormer were to abandon their initial

assignment to assist Team Panther in the

effort to kill or capture Tito and his high

command. But this was in a different

location than had been briefed. According

to Renold, after leaving the Partisan

communications center he and his men

“went back and reported to Captain Rybka

on our return. We were assigned to Team

Stormer for the assault of the Citadel, the

so-called Partisan headquarters.”92 The

Germans set up heavy machine guns south

of the river and poured fire directly into the

mouth of Tito’s “hole” or “cave” and its

approaches, effectively sealing it off. With

this covering fire, two squads of

paratroopers crossed the river and moved

up the narrow trail to the cave entrance.

Heavy resistance came from Tito’s personal

staff and escort battalion. “The fighting was

hard, wounded were left and their weapons

were taken,” wrote a squad member.93

43

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

The command post included the main radios used to

contact higher headquarters and supporting aircraft.

The Luftwaffe radio station and operators are in the

foreground coordinating needed air support. In the

background are other battalion staff members, including the adjutant in discussion about ongoing efforts.

Battalion radios and operators provided contact with

higher commands and advancing ground force motorized columns. By midday the concern was about

the scheduled arrival of reinforcements and supplies.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv) 
44

Failing to make headway, the Germans

pulled back and again hit the position with

machine gun and mortar fire. If they could

not advance, then the Partisans would not

be allowed to withdraw.94

By late morning, the situation was

tense with the Germans holding Drvar and

the Western Cross area. As early as 1000,

Partisan counterattacks began from

outlying units. To avoid German air attacks

these quickly moved close on the run,

charging with hand grenades trying to find

exposed German flanks by moving across

open ground. To meet them, Rybka had to

redeploy a battle group to secure the area for

the arrival of his second wave of jumpers.

His goal was to “nail down the enemy where

he was,” and to continue the attack on Tito’s

suspected location. Fighter and bomber

aircraft provided support throughout the

day which had to be halted whenever forces

became intermingled.95

1000—Battle group moves to the southwest

After 1000, small German units moved

out of the town through the fields toward the

ridges to the southwest, getting as far as the

base of the hills. There the approaches were

held by machine-gun teams backed by

mortar and recoilless antitank fire (the LG

40 produced a notable back-blast and had to

move after firing). One weapons company

machine-gun section took an Allied

newsman with them and he wrote later: 

Fifteen parachutists started out with

two heavy machine guns across the

young wheat fields towards the

Partisan-held wooded ridge a mile off

to the west. To the right and to the left

of me similar small groups were

advancing in the same direction. . . .

After a few hundred meters we began

to duck under invisible Partisan

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

The midday reinforcement took place in clear areas

adjacent to the battalion headquarters position. The

Field Replacement Company arrived by parachute

from Ju 52s, with arms containers, while supplies

came in by DFS 230 gliders. Note the various recovered containers.

A paratrooper lands outside the cemetery position

next to a radio mast. Others were not so lucky and

subject to Partisan small arms fire while in the air and

before they could clear their parachute harnesses.

Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)
sharpshooting; the hail of bullets

gradually grew thicker and we ran

across the clear spaces, taking cover

from bush to bush, from ditch to ditch,

from fence to fence, all of the time.96

This came about because battalion

adjutant SS-Lieutenant Mertely, “a man with

a face like a death mask and a black patch

over his right eye,” felt Time reporter

Pribichevich “might like to see the war from

our firing line.” 

At 1150, a second wave of aircraft arrived

consisting of some 20 transports and a

couple of gliders carrying 220 men and two

tons supplies dropped south and west of

Drvar and the battalion command post.

These met heavier fire than the first wave

and suffered both in the air and on the

ground. Prisoners were used by the

paratroopers to clear the landing zone. As

Henisch described it: 

Dead Bolsheviks were laying

everywhere. In the cemetery we dug

in and called for fighter aircraft

support. Since the landing four hours

have past. The hard combat shows

itself in all the faces. . . . Around noon,

additional fighter aircraft charge the

mountain tops. From the planes, the

paratroopers release to allow the

delivery of supplies and material.

While the Bolsheviks are pinned to

the ground by our fighter aircraft, new

45

Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)

Reinforcements and supplies were welcome and came

at the turning point of the fighting by the parachute

battalion. Numbers of wounded and prisoners had already congregated at the battalion command post.

These paratroops exhibit a mix of Waffen-SS and

Luftwaffe weapons and field equipment.

Defending the industrial area was attempted in the

face of Partisan counterattacks. But the extended

complex proved too large for the parachute battalion

to hold despite the desperation of its situation. Heavy

machine guns, shown here, were needed for this, but

only limited numbers were in hand.

Wilhelm Baitz (OKW-PK)
46

waves of paratroopers jump from

lower altitudes, while their hard

pressed comrades celebrate.”97

These reinforcements consisted of the

Field Replacement Company under the

battalion deputy, SS-Captain Josef

Obermaier, and were committed against the

southwest ridge, advancing halfway up the

slope before being stopped by defending

Partisan forces.98

1200—The second wave arrives

As the battle group reached the base of

hills to the southwest, the second airborne

wave arrived, and moved to reinforce them

and up into the high ground. Later it was

pulled back to protect exposed flanks, while

the main body of the battalion held Drvar

and industrial area to the northeast. 

“With re-enforced strength we comb

the woods,” writes Schuller. “These forests

are indescribable.”99 Henisch felt: “We are

able to push the enemy back considerably in

order to get a little breathing room for

ourselves. We all know this is just a short

break to catch our breath for the main attack

that is coming soon. We are surrounded

with no communications to the rear. We

also know that replacement units are on

their way from all sides, so that the

surrounding bandits are surrounded just the

same.”100 At mid-day, the situation was

dangerous with the appearance of more

fighters from the 1st, 3d, and 6th Lika and

Proletarian Divisions, which moved to

surround the parachutist’s positions in the

industrial section of town, the northeast,

U.S. Army (National Archives and Records Administration) 

Aside from fighter or bomber support, the heaviest

weapon the paratroopers used were mortars, like the

one being prepared for firing in this picture. This

81mm medium mortar had a range out to 1,900 meters but supplies of ammunition were limited to what

could be carried by hand and arms containers. It was

a 4th Company weapon along with heavy machine

guns and recoilless artillery.

As fighting peaked in outlying areas to the northeast

and southwest, defensive concerns caused a withdrawal to the central cemetery position before nightfall. The concentration of men and material resulted

in a crowded but effective defense that the Partisans

could not break. The most dangerous period was at

night when air support became impractical and communication was lost.

National Capital Historical Sales
and the southwest. Firing picked up around

1400, inflicting heavy losses on both sides as

key positions changed hands several times.

Close combat continued into the afternoon

and the town was in flames with heavy

losses among the civilians. Rybka kept up

his effort on Tito’s position until he was

seriously wounded by a grenade in the

process. Those from this failed attempt felt

the position could have been taken with

more strength, even though the battle

groups engaged numbered almost a third of

the assault force. The battalion had not

seized Tito, his staff, or the Allied missions

and was losing control of the objective area.

Small arms, grenades, and mortars caused

the fight to peak again at 1600. The battalion

signaled it was “completely open to enemy

view. Injured cannot be cared for. Enemy is

amassing strong forces.”101

To the southwest, Allied reporter

Pribichevich, with a machine gun section in

a peasant house on a tree-covered elevation

at the foot of the mountains, wrote: “Now

all the Germans, except the machine-gun

crew, took cover in the plum orchard behind

the house and I followed them. The two

German machine guns were where nothing

could be seen but the quick movement of a

bush twig. Here and there from the

mysterious slope short bursts answered

each long German burst and the Partisan’s

precision fire seemed coming closer and

closer.” Once the Partisan’s got the range,

they began to pick the Germans off. In two

hours, one was killed, one mortally

wounded, and four wounded slightly. The

captive reporter, a Yugoslav father, and child

were used to carry ammunition to the

exposed machine guns. First the man, then

the son, were struck down in the cross fire,

but “that beautiful day the birds continued

to sing in the tree-tops above the machinegun fire, the Germans, and the wounded

father and mutilated boy.”102

1800—Battalion withdraws to cemetery

By 1800, the Partisans moved to

encircle the Germans and drove them from

the foothills back to Drvar and the

industrial area. A pessimistic journalist

reported, “It is clear to us that the enemy

would not leave us alone. What we were

expecting to happen happened sooner than

later. A thousand eyes watched us from the

mountains. From three sides the enemy

47

Wilhelm Baitz (OKW-PK)

By the dawn next day the Germans were low on ammunition and not in communications with the relief

forces. Additional supplies were secured from gliders

and arms containers that were nearby.
48

launched his counterattacks. The battalion

withdrew to the cemetery that commands

the high ground.”103 Recalled Renold, “My

group and I got through to the graveyard,

where our friends were fighting real close to

the enemy. From crashed transport gliders

men tried to find weapons and food.”104 One

of the glider pilots wrote he “was able to

reach the flat trench dug along the

northwestern edge of the cemetery

uninjured, where men were already

sheltering shoulder to shoulder.” He

remembered, “A few meters behind me a

radio post had been set up and on the

southwestern end of the Citadel there was a

collecting point for the wounded . . . At

times the fire simply hailed down on us.”105

By now the parachute battalion had

suffered heavy losses, including Rybka who

was evacuated by air ambulance late in the

day with other seriously wounded. The

battalion adjutant was injured and the

second-in-command was dead. Captain

Bentrup, the attached Luftwaffe paratrooper, took charge and ordered a

perimeter defense on the high ground

around the town cemetery, dug in behind an

existing five-foot concrete wall and ditch, in

an area of about 150 feet by 250 feet. 

“A serious short meeting took place

between the group leaders that left no

questions about the situation,” wrote

Henisch, “surrounded, without communications to the rear, with many wounded in

a situation that was more than serious. . . .

We removed the wounded in case of an

emergency defense and everyone would

take their spot where they are placed. It

won’t be easy for the bolsheviks to ‘cash us

in’ during the night.”

Outlying units were ordered back with

the use of signal flares. Cut off a kilometer

to the southwest was one section of

paratroopers defending a farmhouse that

does not survive the night. The ever-present

reporter continued: 

No communications have been

established with the rolling

motorized units. We have to hold out,

as long as possible. Not a single round

of ammunition can be wasted “on air”.

. . . the situation becomes more and

more critical. The over-strengthened

enemy, situated in the mountains

around us, fires on us with heavy

weapons. In one corner of the

cemetery, the doctors have set up

their aid station. More and more

fallen ranks add to the dead and

wounded. . . . A mortar bulls-eye

Wilhelm Baitz (OKW-PK) 

Air resupply is critical for dispersed airborne operations. With the limited amount of weapons and ammunition

carried into action only quick delivery could ensure survival.
knocks the radio out of service and

cuts us off completely to the rear.

Once and a while our fighters and

aerial observers can be seen circling

above, and they attack immediately to

give us some respite. A dropped

message tells us that our own

motorized units are unable to get to

us because the snake-winding road

was blown up in the mountain, and

those units are engaged in heavy

fighting with the bandits as well.

“Hold out as long as possible,” that is

what the saying is.106

During the twilight hours there was

complete quiet and stillness. Here and there

a shot slapped across the cemetery wall.

Dusk arrived as tracers criss-crossed the

valley. With night, German air support was

hampered and the Partisans advanced from

the surrounding heights for the kill. In the

dark they pursued the Germans from Drvar,

isolating them on the cemetery slopes. “The

main body of the battalion occupied new

positions around the cemetery and

established security on all four sides,”

recorded the 7th SS-Mountain Division.107

Callewart wrote: 

At the onset of dusk the bandits

advance again. They approach from all

sides. But the SS-Fallschirmjager have

prepared for defense for the night. The

bullets whistle from every direction . . .

The attack is retaliated in fierce

fighting. It is night, dark night. Nothing

can be seen of the desolate mountain

ridges that surround the valleys any

longer. Sometimes everything is calm

and no shots interrupt the silence.

Suddenly the machine guns rattle from

all sides and from every corner, and the

impact of [mortars] stir up the

defender’s position. Reports go from

man to man!108

By 2030, the Germans had

consolidated, with some confusion, to this

high ground into a “hedgehog position.”109

Captain Bentrup’s concerns were for the

battalion’s survival and Allied air attacks. 

2130—Cemetery position occupied

At 2100, Schuller stated: “Soon they will

come. And they do. Full of rage and

desperation, because they are not going to

be driven from their cozy hideouts without

a fight. The booty, which is now in our

hands, it too valuable to be given up easily.

Everyone had dug himself into a hole, as

deeply as possible. The earth feels warm and

soft and our only comforts are our arms and

our ammunition. The mortars are damned

annoying.”110 Henisch wrote: “Around 2200

the song and dance starts again. The

bolsheviks shoot at the cemetery with

phosphorous rounds. Mortars take over and

place the cemetery under fire, putting us

into one situation after another. Holding on

to tombstones, behind the wall, and behind

graves, the men press themselves behind

these for dear life. Despite the seemingly

hopeless situation, there is lots of fire

discipline. The squad leaders hand out by

whispering their orders.”111

Partisan mortar fire was particularly

devastating, killing 15 to 20 that night,

damaging battalion radios, and hitting the

first aid post. Dead, wounded, and prisoners

lay among the graves and monuments. Food

was limited to “iron” rations and what had

been looted that day, with a single standpipe for water. The Partisans used the cover

49
50

of darkness to get close on all four sides of

the position as ammunition ran low. Axis

night fighters and dive bombers were on

station, but with little measurable effect.

One veteran recalled: “We had an outer

perimeter of positions and a small inner

perimeter. After every one of the bandit

attacks was driven off, those in the outer

perimeter were relieved by a man from the

inner line. . . . That way the burden was not

too hard to carry.”112 “Then the men swear:

‘Now harder than ever!’” recorded Callewart.

“However hopeless the situation may seem,

and what it will cost, they maintain their

position. Between the fighting comrades lie

the slightly wounded, who fill the

magazines for the submachine guns and

prepare the munitions belt for the machine

guns.”113

Execution, X-Day plus 1

Fighting increased in intensity through

the night until dawn as the Partisans tried to

overrun the cemetery in a “glowing red fog

of battle” and frequent illumination flares.

A survivor wrote later, “During my whole life

I never knew such a short night.”114 At the

crisis, guerrillas entered the perimeter: 

Suddenly, without warning, the Reds

were climbing over the wall . . . A

whole mass of our flares burst—all of

them white—and in the glare the

bandits were silhouetted. We shot

them down, but they seemed immune

to rifle fire and kept coming. Then

some of them from behind cover of

the wall threw hand grenades and got

some light mortars in action. . . . In

that particular attack, the Reds

actually got inside the cemetery and

held a small bridgehead. 

As Partisans came in through this

breach, the paratroops counterattacked and

killed those inside the cemetery.115

Participant Henisch recounts: 

the enemy pushes into the cemetery

at hand grenade throwing distance. In

the meantime, white columns of

flares rise up, with burning eyes the

riflemen stare over the wall and fling

rows of machine-gun and submachine-gun fire into the rows of

crawling enemy. The firing does not

take a second, but it has its effect. A

quiet moment, then the enemy lays

another hail of fire onto our small

area costing us more casualties. Again

he tries to get to the cemetery wall,

but once again he is beaten off. There

is not thought involved, only the will

Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)

Daybreak brought relief and air support after remaining in place over night. Communication was restored

with relieving motorized forces but actions were limited

to reorganization and waiting for help. This allowed the

surrounding Partisans to withdraw unhindered except

from air attack and began a wider pursuit for the elusive Tito, his staff, and Allied missions.
to survive and to revenge our bleeding

comrades.

Added another, “The bandits attack 20

times, and 20 times they are fought off.”

Calls to surrender are answered with

weapons fire and grenades.116

0330—Enemy attacks repulsed

During all of this, the belief that Tito

was among the enemy dead in the town or at

the “cave” on its outskirts could not be

cleared up. The intelligence specialists spent

the night near the radio reviewing

documents and questioning prisoners to

solve this mystery and began a claim there

had been a Croat betrayal about the attack

rather than a German failure to accurately

locate Tito. By 0330, it was admitted that Tito

had escaped, having left his cave-quarters

around noon and moving to the plateau

overlooking the valley.117 The Partisan attacks

were finished by 0430 and they pulled out

before sunrise, as the ground offered them

no cover from renewed air attack. At this

point, a group of pistol-packing parachutists

used prisoners to recover needed

ammunition from nearby gliders. These

crawled from a corner of the graveyard

covered by a machine gun. Finding nothing

but dead, they returned in 10 minutes with

ammunition cases in the unusual quiet.

0600—Direct air support resumes

“Over the pointed tips of the

mountains, the first glimpse of morning

shines,” wrote Henisch. 

All our hope lies in the light that the

waking new day brings. . . . With first

light, suddenly there is quiet. . . . The

new day must bring a final decision,

and it does. Just as the light had

gotten a little stronger, the sound of

fighter aircraft is heard and breaks the

battle stillness. The fact that our radio

went down, and the efforts of aerial

observers, obviously made our

situation critically clear. A light goes

over the dusty and tired faces of the

warriors; an everyone watches a

German reconnaissance plane whiz

over our cemetery position. Green

flares show the fighter aircraft in

which direction the enemy is coming

from. Then the Air Force drops

bombs all around us and into the

attack positions of the enemy and

causes him heavy losses.118

At 0600, a half-dozen Axis fighterbombers arrived overhead and attacked

withdrawing Partisans, some reported

wearing captured camouflage jump smocks.

“In the east the day dawns. With the first

51

The SS-Parachute Battalion had a hollow victory that

lost even its public relations value in the face of the reality of Allied advances from the East and West that

began in June 1944. Battalion Doctors Hermann and

von Helmersen, along with their medics, were kept busy

saving survivors. Here battalion wounded and dead are

collected at the first aid station for disposition.

Adolf Kunzmann (SS-PK)
52

rays of sun the Stukas and attack aircraft

arrive again. A deafening drone hangs over

the valley and echoes a thousand times from

all mountain ridges,” observes a reporter.

One participant recalled “with the daylight

came the first German reconnaissance

aircraft; we wanted to wave and call out, to

shake off the nightmare of the night.”119 At

0700, a flight of 12 Ju 52s dropped urgently

needed supplies.120 More Stukas bombed

and machine gunned the valley area that

morning. The relieving ground forces were

stalled by Partisan defensive efforts and in

some case counterattacks. Demolished

bridges had to be spanned before the

planned link-up could take place.121 The SSparachute battalion survived the night and

was told to count their losses and be

prepared to be relieved by ground forces—

sooner or later. The battalion had only 250

effective troops and numerous dead and

wounded of the 874 men that entered the

valley the day before.122

0700 to 1000—Link-up with ground

forces

“Early in the morning numerous dead

Partisans were laying around, whose corpses

reeked terribly days later because we did not

immediately find them,” remembered one

paratrooper. Radio contact with relieving

forces was established by 0700 and from the

cemetery squads were sent out to recover

lost ground, ammunition, food, and water.

Supplies were brought in as the fight

continued, while more prisoners and booty

were secured, and the battalion expanded

its strong point.123 Outside help arrived

around 1000 in the form of reconnaissance

elements of the 7th SS-Mountain Division,

heralded by the distinctive sound of MG 42

machine-gun fire. “We are from ‘Prinz

Eugen.’ We will get you out,” they declared.124

Between 1245 and 1600, elements of the

92d Motorized Regiment, Battle Group

Willam, and the 373d Infantry Division

arrived as well. With the advent of more

ground forces, the area around Drvar was

combed, but little remained except dead

Partisans, propaganda material, and

military supplies including Tito’s American

jeep and dress uniform. 

German newspapers later reported:

“Deep cliff gorges that provided for roomy

caves sheltered the ringleaders of the

Moscow official Josip Broz, alias Tito.

Paratroopers of the Armed-SS and

motorized Army units dug the buried

‘headquarters’ up.” They then proceeded to

systematically burn houses and to destroy

anything that could not be removed.125

Captain Bentrup reorganized the

battalion and moved back into Drvar,

taking possession of the administration

building for the wounded. Prisoners were

again used to move the injured, bury the

dead, carry supplies, and to fetch water.

Other tasks included salvaging parachutes,

arms containers, weapons, ammunition,

and destroying gliders that were beyond

recovery. Allied Supermarine Spitfire

fighters made an appearance for the first

time on the afternoon of the 26th, catching

the German columns on the road. On the

same day, the Royal Air Force

Mediterranean Review reported that Boeing

B-17 Flying Fortresses and Lockheed P-38

Lightnings struck the Bihac rail yard and

airfield, followed by attacks at Rajanak,

Kutlovec, Bosanski, and Livno (more than

1,000 Allied air sorties were flown the last

week in May to counter the Axis
53

1944/Folge 26 (Illustrierter Beobachter)
54

offensive).126 “All movement had to be

carried out at night in this region because

during the day when we were marching, the

Jabos [Allied fighter-bombers] were already

there,” recalled one parachute battalion

member, “I assume the Americans were

informed of our movement from the

Partisans via radio.” Despite this, the

battalion rear party arrived with the

baggage train allowing the survivors to

depart for Petrovac on 29 May. From

Petrovac, casualties were sent to base

hospitals while the remainder of the

battalion regrouped at Laibach: “During the

transfer from Petrovac to Bihac all

companies were on high alert because until

we arrived we were in Partisan territory. . . .

Except for a few slightly wounded we had

no casualties. The motorized march

continued and around mid-June we arrived

in Laibach.” At the end of June 1944, the

parachute battalion had a total of 292 men

fit for duty (15 officers, 81 noncommissioned officers, and 196 men).127

Analysis

On 3 June, with much secrecy the Allies

moved Tito, first to Bari in Italy, then to the

more defensible island of Vis in the Adriatic

where the struggle for Yugoslav liberation

continued under the communists until final

victory. On 6 June, the German high

command announced the completion of

Operation Knight’s Move without comment

about Tito’s escape. The Allied invasion of

Western Europe was under way and news

from the Balkans was for the moment of less

than front-page interest. 

The German Armed Forces High

Command summary of Operation Knight’s

Move stated: “According to preliminary

reports, the enemy lost 6,240 men. In

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv) 

This was the image of victory that was publicized. Captured trophies included flags of the Allied Mission displayed

by these paratroopers. The rifle of the man in the middle has a grenade launcher on its muzzle.
addition, numerous weapons of all kinds

and many supply installations were

captured.”128

General Rendulic’s 2d Panzer Army

felt: “The operation against the Partisans in

Croatia enjoyed considerable success” by 1)

destroying their sanctuary area, command

and control, and supply centers; 2)

capturing Allied missions and airfields; 3)

obtaining critical documents and signals

equipment; 4) “severely battering” some five

“elite communist” formations into avoiding

further combat; and, 5) providing the Allies

a real picture of Partisan combat

capabilities. 

General von Leyser, the corps

commander for Knight’s Move, believed

that the operation was important for the

entire conduct of combat in the interior and

along the Balkan coast. All this was achieved

under difficult conditions including Allied

air attacks. The Partisan command and

control, and supply centers were seized or

disrupted. Captured at Drvar were some 161

prisoners and 35 defectors, with some 50 or

60 being transferred to Croat custody

(Fowler stated even these did not survive the

trip to the rear), leaving some 350 or more

killed on the spot. German costs for Knight’s

Move state that XVth Mountain Corps had

213 soldiers killed, 881 wounded, and 57

missing. Rybka’s battalion certainly could

not be accused of lack of perseverance in

their bid to eliminate Tito. One measure of

this is that it had lost 576 killed, with 48

wounded, including the disabled commanding officer.129

55

Other prizes included this uniform of Tito’s left with

a village tailor. It is examined by paratroopers and

soldiers from the relief force.

Lkz19 (Bundesarchiv)

National Capital Historical Sales

German troops display air-delivered “Wellbikes” from

the British Mission used for liaison and messengers.

They were airborne issue provided by supply drops to

the Partisans.
56

2d PANzER ARMY

“The operation against the Partisans in

Croatia enjoyed considerable success. It

succeeded in 1) destroying the core region of

the communist Partisans by occupying their

command and control centers and their supply

installations, thereby considerably weakening

their supply situation; 2) forcing the elite

communist formations (1st Proletarian

Division and the 3d Lika Division) to give

battle and severely battering them, forcing

them to withdraw due to the shortage of

ammunition and supplies, and avoid further

combat (the 9th, 39th, and 4th Tito Divisions

also suffered great losses); 3) capturing landing

fields used by Allied aircraft, administrative

establishments, and headquarters of foreign

military missions, forcing the Partisans to

reorganize and restructure; 4) giving [ . . . ] a

true picture of the combat capability of the

Partisans; 5) obtaining important communications equipment, code keys, radios, etc. for

our side; 6) achieving these successes under

difficult conditions that included numerous

enemy air attacks. Whenever the enemy did

fight, he seldom fought with ferocity. In spite

of the effect of the enemy air operations on the

morale of our troops, they fought bravely.” 

XV MOUNTAIN CORPS

“Communications: In spite of great efforts by

all communications personnel, communications did not meet tactical needs. The main

problems: complicated radio systems, constant

over-taxing of the communications networks,

impossibility of making tactical redeployments. On the second day of the operation an

important order did not reach the 7th SS until

much later, because its radio station was in the

process of redeploying. 

Luftwaffe: Cooperation with the

Fliegerführung Croatia [Croatian Air Force]

was good. The fighter-bomber commitment on

26 May in front of the 373d Infantry Division

was decisive in facilitating the advance of this

group. A squadron of German [. . . ] and

captured Italian aircraft with German

markings totally destroyed a supply column on

the road to Bihac during the return flight. 

Secrecy: This deserves special explanation.

Before the corps conducted its first

orientation, there were rumors concerning the

upcoming operation afloat in and around

Bihac. The limitations of Luftwaffe bombings

against Drvar and Petrovac indicated these

were the targets of the upcoming operation. In

Bihac, a rumor was evident on 23 May that Tito

was to be captured. A prisoner of war

statement indicated that Tito’s headquarters

was aware of the starting day of the operation. 

Combat Effectiveness:

373d Infantry Division: Previous experience

confirmed that Croatian personnel performed

well under strict German supervision for

combat operations of short duration. 

1st Brandenburg Regiment: There is no

doubt as to the courage and combat

preparedness of the leadership and all

members of this regiment. In spite of this, the

regiment was disappointing. This is probably

due to the fact that the designation ‘regiment’

is a misnomer. 

7th SS and elements of the V SS Army

Corps: As the only mountain troops, the SS

formations carried the heaviest burden and

enjoyed the majority of successes during the

operation. Combat readiness of the companies

and battalions was good. Clear and precise

leadership and prompt reporting are

particularly commended. 

92d Grenadier Regiment: The leadership of

SELECTED GERMAN LESSONS LEARNED132
57

the regiment did not correspond to the

situation at the front. Earlier experiences,

where the regiment was loathe to leave the

roads, was confirmed. This meant the enemy

was not fully pressured. 

2d Croatian Light Infantry Brigade: The

combat effectiveness of this brigade has not

improved. The officers are incapable. Their

refusal to deal with all Germans has increased.” 

7th SS–MOUNTAIN DIVISION

“Conduct of Operations: Basically, the

tactics of the red [Partisan] leadership had to

adjust to the German conduct of operations.

It was again confirmed that large-scale

operations will only succeed if there are

sufficient forces, particularly mountain troops,

available. The superior mountain mobility of

the Partisans must be overcome by better

leadership, training and armament. The

objective of the operation must be to destroy

the enemy. To achieve this objective, all forces

must be committed to the plan and sufficient

trucks must be available to transport the

reserves.

During Operation ‘Rosselsprung,’ the

destruction of the enemy was not achieved,

because that objective was not the basis for the

commitment of forces. The fact is that only

mountain troops are capable of destroying the

enemy. Motorized advances on the roads

leading into enemy territory lose their effect

the farther they are separated from their

departure bases. Previous experience shows

that the enemy simply withdraws into the

mountains from roads upon which the

motorized formations are advancing, in order

to reappear in the rear and disrupt their rear

area communications. Temporary destruction

of roads and bridges also limits the capability

of motorized formations.

In the future, increased activity by Allied air

forces against the commitment of motorized

formations on the narrow, barren mountain

roads can be expected in the absence of

corresponding antiaircraft troops.

The basic combat unit in Partisan warfare is

the reinforced gebirgsjäger [mountain]

battalion. Only it is able to independently

achieve the combat mission, without concern

for the flank threat. It is able to splinter the

enemy and force him to give combat. Only it

can be successful against the current

numerical superiority enjoyed by the red

troops, by taking advantage of the terrain and

employing mountain tactics.

The mission of the senior leadership

(division and regiments) is to plan the mission

and ensure the cooperation of individual units.

This is, of course, predicated on the fact that

sufficient communications are also available.

If a stronger enemy formation withdraws, an

active pursuit must be undertaken until the

enemy is exhausted and destroyed. Moreover,

the tactical reserves must be brought up so

that they can be committed on the battlefield

in the shortest amount of time possible, relieve

the former forces and continue the pursuit.

The strength of the pursuit formation is not

that important. More important is the

unswerving will of the pursuers to allow the

enemy no respite. The pursuit of the 1st

Proletarian Division would have been

facilitated, had these principles been adhered

to.

Special attention had to be paid to the

maintenance of truck transport to carry

completely equipped gebirgsjäger battalions,

including their supply convoys. Only in this

manner can the division keep pace with the

enemy. Moreover, mobility allows for the

commitment of the fully equipped

gebirgsjäger battalions at the most suitable

moment to achieve surprise at locations not

considered by the enemy.” 
58

Rybka’s replacement, SS-Major

Siegfried Milius, noted, “From the battalion

commander . . . , down to the lowest rank,

all fought with bravery and morale, doing

their best against an opponent who was far

superior.” Decisive, clever leadership and the

highest commitment of every soldier were

“the prerequisite for success” of the

operation.130 In the fall 1944, the parachute

battalion was re-numbered and grouped

with the SS-special forces to fight on as an

infantry “fire brigade.”131

The SS-parachute battalion achieved

surprise, captured Drvar, and disrupted the

Partisan supreme headquarters, but failed

to kill or capture Tito (though it was the

closest anyone had gotten to him) while

suffering heavy casualties. Operation

Knight’s Move misfired—barely—for a

variety of reasons. A number of lessons are

gleaned in the use of tactical units for

strategic objectives and the benefit of

hindsight provides points for analysis and

clarifies earlier misconceptions. Illustrated

is that there are no “silver bullets” in war and

especially in irregular warfare: direct-action

special operations have a high-risk of

failure. The significance of this operation

was its “modern” approach and elements in

common with other special operations

missions tailored for surgical precision to

accomplish daring goals—Son Tay, Entebbe,

Chimoio, Cassinga, Iran’s Desert One,

Mogadishu, and others. Like these, it was

fraught with risk and was a gamble that

failed. It is worthy of study in the hopes that

political and military leaders will appreciate

the benefits and hazards involved.133

Standard requirements for successful

airborne operations applied in this case: air

superiority, drops zones free of direct enemy

fire, and enough arms and equipment to

fight on landing. The parachute battalion

had a higher proportion of radios and

automatic weapons than general-purpose

forces, but less ammunition, water, and

food. There was also a lack of medical

supplies and organic support weapons,

being dependent for both on air delivery. For

special operations, airborne units possess

strategic and operational reach from the air,

but have more limited mobility in an

objective area—on foot in this example.

Also at that time, once committed there

were no withdrawal options in the event of

failure. Airborne special forces need

detailed intelligence of natural and manNational Capital Historical Sales

Other soldiers at Tito’s cave. He and his staff had departed the day before, which was unknown to the attackers. For the next week the Germans continued

their offensive as “open season” on Partisans. Special

operations have the chance of great achievement, but

also the risk of failure, with no middle ground or partial success.
made features in the objective, because they

are unfamiliar with the ground on arrival,

the same as with amphibious raids, and this

will still be a factor in similar efforts. 

A Marine Corps Command and Staff

College thesis examined this operation and

found: 

Despite inadequate operational

security, the assault of 500 SS

Fallschirmjager Battalion onto Drvar

achieved surprise. Unfortunately for

them, faulty intelligence caused them

to assault the wrong objective, and

poor pre-mission contingency

planning ensured they did not recover

from this error. They did not

eliminate Tito and the battalion was

virtually destroyed in the process.

Had the German intelligence

apparatus properly supported them,

or if 500 SS had an effective

contingency plan to deal with the

initial failure to locate Tito, Balkan

history could have been significantly

different. Fundamental lessons such

as these are timeless and must be

applied to similar current or future

operations to ensure success.134

The Partisans suggested that a landing

on the plateau above the town would have

59

Partisans on the move in columns through the ravaged countryside in 1944. Dependent upon Allied supplies and

air support to counter German attacks, this year witnessed their greatest test and triumph. The Yugoslav resistance was compromised and split and Tito had to withdraw to Vis. In the end, this just delayed the completion of

the war and a continued communist takeover.

U.S. Army (National Archives and Records Administration)
60

been more effective, as that was the escape

route taken by Tito, his staff, and the Allied

missions. Considered might have been the

use of “hammer and anvil” tactics that

would place stop-groups (including attack

air) along lines of communications and

sending in sweep lines of troops to flush the

enemy out as opposed to the German

approach that landed forces on the objective

itself. Alternative deployments by today’s

units would include the use of helicopters or

Osprey MV-22 short-landing and take-off

aircraft as well as parachutes.

Special forces commander Skorzeny

also dealt with the task of eliminating Tito,

without knowing of the planned Knight’s

Move attack (apparently OKW and the High

Command of the SS were not talking).

Skorzeny had arrived in May in Yugoslavia

and his subordinates immediately ran into

trouble coordinating with local commands.

As a result, his sources deduced an attack to

occur sometime in June. Signals between

Supreme Headquarters, Southeast and

Vojnoizdavaki Zavod
OKW may have been one cause of

disclosure as well as overflights of Drvar by

reconnaissance aircraft taking photographs

from 2,000 feet above-ground-level (Allied

Missions mentioned this as a reason for the

Partisans expecting an attack and for the

relocation of their detachments prior to the

assault). As Skorzeny observed, the inability

to pin down Tito’s location was critical. It

meant the 500th SS-Parachute Battalion was

unable to exploit surprise and deployed

piecemeal in the attempt to catch him. The

attackers were so shocked at not finding

Tito in Drvar that they later claimed he had

been forewarned, a charge later aimed by

the Russians at the British and Americans

for moving from Drvar days prior to the

attack. 

Miscalculation of Partisan fighting

ability was another factor going into the

operation. Germans described the fighting

at Drvar as “hard and uncompromising” on

both sides. To the Germans, the Partisans

did not operate as soldiers in dress, rank, or

responsibility but “were simply people who

openly carried weapons in violation of

international law.”135 As such, it was

impossible to distinguish those killed while

resisting or caught under arms from those

summarily executed. It was also hard to

separate incidents during the parachute

battalion’s assault from the subsequent

occupation and clearance of the area by

other German and Croat units. The

conflicting casualty figures indicate this. SSGeneral Otto Kumm, commanding the 7th

SS-Mountain Division, recalled “there was

an OKW order that proclaimed for every

German soldier murdered . . . finally 100

hostages would be shot.” He also believed

that many “thousands of innocent people

lost their lives during the fighting

(especially around the villages) but just as

many were killed through reprisals” by the

various factions (Catholic Croats, Orthodox

Serbs, and Muslims) throughout.136

Differing demands of military necessity and

humanity exist in varying forms in the

murkiness of “operations-other-than-war”

where one side is in uniform and the other

is not. Despite harsh handling of Partisans

and civilians, the Southeast Command

balked at treating captured Allied military

personnel (there were three captured

newsmen to deal with—one escaped)

according to the infamous “commando”

order that directed they not be treated as

prisoners and subject them to summary

execution. This would have put their

captured Brandenburg personnel at risk.

61

500/600th SS-PARACHUTE BATTALION

CHRONOLOGY

September 1943—500th SS-Parachute

Battalion formed by SS High Command for

special security missions. Officers and half

the enlisted strength were drawn from

existing Armed-SS elements, the remainder

came on probation. The battalion

underwent training with the Luftwaffe first

at Kraljevo, Yugoslavia, and then Papa,

Hungary. 

May 1944—Operation Knight’s Move; as

part of Army Group F and 2d Panzer Army,

the reinforced battalion parachuted onto

Marshal Tito’s headquarters at Drvar,

Yugoslavia. Tito escaped and the battalion

suffered heavy losses.

August 1944—The battalion was

reconstituted to participate in the rearguard

action in Kurland, Lithuania.

October 1944—Joined the SS-Special Forces

under SS-LtCol Skorzeny. Used as a reserve

element near Vienna, Austria, for the coup

against Admiral Miklós Horthy in Budapest,

Hungary. Redesignated 600th SS-Parachute

Battalion, with probationary troops

reinstated into the ranks of the Armed-SS.

December 1944—Participated in the

Ardennes Offensive as an element of the

“Armored Brigade 150” of Skorzeny’s

infiltrators.

January 1945—Reformed at Neustrelitz,

Germany, to serve with Army Group Vistula

at the Schwendt bridgehead on the Oder

River.

February 1945—Evacuated from Schwendt

bridgehead.

March 1945—Established bridgehead near

Zennden on the Oder, suffering heavy

losses. Reconstituted at Oderberg.

April 1945—Used as a reaction force along

the Oder at Bernau, Eberswalde, and

Finowfurt. With the rear guard at Prenzlau

and Neuruppin. Battalion surrendered at

Hagenow, Germany, to American forces.

63

Appendix

1 OKW, New York Times, 7 June 1944, 2. 

2 Chris Mason, “Falling From Grace: The German

Airborne in World War II,” Masters of Military

Studies thesis (Quantico: USMC Command and

Staff College, 2001), 38. 

3 This monograph is revised and expanded from

a conference paper; “Red Sun: A German

Airborne Raid, May 1944;” delivered at the

Society for Military History Meeting, April 2000,

Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA. 

The National Archives and Records

Administration (NARA) has relevant copies of

German armed forces documents in Records

Groups T311 (rolls 187–97, 285–86), T313 (rolls

78–221, 482–88), T315 (roll 2112) and T514 (rolls

563–65). Published primary sources include

Adolf Kunzmann and Siegfried Milius,

Fallschirmjager der Waffen–SS im Bild

(Osnabruck: Munin Verlag, 1986) written by a

former war reporter and battalion commander

from the unit scrapbook now in private hands;

also Otto Kumm, Prinz Eugen: The History of the

7th SS–Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen”

(Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1995). Previous

English language popular accounts of this

operation were by Charles Whiting, James S.

Lucas, and Antonio J. Munoz. My obligation and

disagreement with their narratives have been

noted. Of these, German 500/600th Parachute

Battalion commander Siegfried Milius

commented in a letter to Eric Queen dated 25

January 1991 that in his opinion “a writer of

fiction has written a text on the jump at Drvar as

he imagined it, and many people simply copied

him.” Other useful references include Eric Busch,

Die Fallschirmjager Chronik, 1935–45 (Frieberg:

Podzun Pallas Verlag, 1983); Bundesverband der

Soldaten der Ehemaligen Waffen–SS, Wenn Alle

Bruder Scheweigen (Osnabruck: Munin Verlag,

1973), 476–85, 538; Karl Cerf, Die Waffen–SS im

Wehrmachtbericht (Osnabruck: Munin Verlag,

1971; Lothar Rendulic, Gekampft, Gesiegt,

Geschalagen (Welsermuhl: Wels-Munchen,

1957); Petar Miskovic, Desant na Drvar

(Sarajevo: Zavod, 1974); and Otto Heilbrunn and

C. Audrey Dixon, Communist Guerilla Warfare

(New York: Praeger, 1955). 

4 U.S. Army DAPam 20-243, German AntiGuerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941–44

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army,

1954), 64–65. Harris G. Warren, Special

Operations: AAF Aid to European Resistance

Movements (HQAAF: AAF Historical Office,

1947), 194; Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front

(New York: Praeger, 1954), 165; Andrew Molnar,

et al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary,

and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC:

American University, 1963), 238.

5 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Warfare Against Bands (Berlin: 6 May 1944), edt. and

trans. by Dixon and Heilbrunn in Communist

Guerilla Warfare, 222–23.

6 OKW, Bands, 203.

7 SS-Fuhrungshauptamt, Werwolf, Winke fur

Jagdeinheiten (Berlin: January 1945), edt. and

trans. by Michael C. Fagnon, as SS Werwolf:

Combat Instruction Manual (Boulder: Paladin

Press, 1982), 59.

8 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds. and

trans., On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2001), 243.

9 OKW, Bands, 212–22; Dixon and Heilbrunn,

113–63.

10 OKW, Bands, 203.

11 Dixon and Heilbrunn, 126–28. 

65

Notes
66

12 Fagnon, Werwolf, ix. The German special

forces and reconnaissance school was a sought

after posting for North Atlantic Treaty Organization special operations personnel. 

13 OKW, Bands, 203.

14 Dixon and Heilbrunn, 122–23. 

15 OKW, Bands, 219–20.

16 OKW, Bands, 203.

17 OKW, Bands, 212–19. 

18 Peter Lieb, “A Few Carrots and a Lot of Stick:

German Anti-Partisan Warfare in World War

Two,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,

by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds.

(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 267.

19 OKW, Bands, 212–19. 

20 Fitzroy MacLean, The Heretic: The Life and

Times of Josip Broz-Tito (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1957), 240. 

21 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the

International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg:

International Military Tribunal, 1947 –1949), 42

vols., 1013.

22 Kumm, 116. 

23 Branislav Radovic, ed., Operation Drvar: SSFallschirmjager May 25, 1944 (Atglen: Schiffer

Publishing, 2008), Heinz Schwitzke, 1.

24 MacLean, Heretic, 240.

25 Division Brandenburg operation against Tito

dated 12 November 1943 (NARA); RIS Gr/Med,

The Brandenburg Regiment zbv. 800 dated 19

March 1944, Imperial War Museum (IWM); Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1950),

15 vols., 149–50, 827, 851–2; Phyllis Auty, Tito

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 234; Donald

Hamilton-Hill, SOE Assignment (London:

William Kimber, 1973), 103; Cabinet Office document, Public Records Office (PRO), 22; Walter

Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (New York: Harper,

1956), 386–87.

26 David Martin, Allied Betrayed (New York:

Prentice Hall, 1946), 238–39; Schellenberg, 387;

Hoetel, 167.

27 Radovic, Schwitzke, 2. 

28 Kumm, 116. 

29 Josip Broz Tito, Selected Military Works

(Belgrade: Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1966), 330;

DAPam 20-243, 20–30.

30 Radovic, Schwitzke, 2. 

31 Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1953), 217; DAPam 20-243, 64; Cabinet

Office document, 22–23.

32 Cabinet Office document, 23.

33 Clipping files from George A. Petersen,

National Capital Historical Sales (NCHS), to

include “Das SS-Fallschirmjager Battaillon

500/600,” Der Deutsche Fallschirmjager, 1964,

12-13; G. Klingemann, “SS-Fallschirmjager,” Der

Deutsche Fallschirmjager, n.d., 6; Peter H.

Renold, “Der Rosselsprung nach Drvar,” Der

Deutsche Fallschirmjager, August 1977, 20–23;

Peter H. Renold, “Luftlandeaktion gegen Titos

Haupquartier 1944,” Der Freiwillige, n.d., n.p.,

18–20, 14–15; “SS-Fallschirmjager springen in Tale

von Drvar,” Der Deutsche Fallschirmjager, n.d.,

n.p.; “Unsere Kameraden: Das SSFallschirmjager Battaillon 500 (600),” n.d., n.p.,

24; and Helmut Wilhelmsmeyer, “Sie Schlugen

sich bis zum Ende,” Der Deutsche

Fallschirmjager, September-October 1975, 19.

34 Cabinet Office document, 22–23; Auty, Tito,

234.

35 500th SS-Parachute Battalion movement order

dated 20 May 1944; 500th SS-Parachute

Battalion supplementary order dated 20 May

1944 (NARA).

36 Percy E. Schramm, et al., Kriegstagebuch des
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, 1940–45

(Frankfurt: Bernard und Graefe, 1961–65), 4 vols.,

661–3; Cabinet Office document, 22–23.

37 Dedijer, 217; Kumm, 117ff.

38 Axis media personnel reportage used for this

account includes Blume, Callewart, Henisch,

Schuller, and Schwitzke. Other journalists and

photographers included Brieke, Borgstaedt,

Eichler, Karnath, Kremple, and Muecke.

Contemporary coverage with photographs and

reportage include “Tito’s Haupquartier,” Die

Sudost-Illustrierte, June 1944 (Zagreb), 4;

“Banditen-Schlupfwinkel Drvar grundlich

ausgerauchert!,” Borac Der Kampfer, 15 June 1944

(Croatia), 1, 3–5; “Die ‘Residenz’ des

Zuchthaussers,” Illustrierter Beobachter, 29 June

1944 (Munich), n.p.; Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung,

6 July 1944 (Berlin), 316.

39 Auty, Tito, 234.

40 James Lucas, Kommando (London: Cassell,

1998), 115. 500th SS-Parachute Battalion

operations order dated 23 May 1944 (NARA).

41 500th SS-Parachute Battalion, Group

Obermeier, orders for group commanders, dated

24 May 1944 (NARA); Kunzman and Milius, 77.

42 Operations orders cited; John Slessor, The

Central Blue (New York: Praeger, 1957), 596–7;

Warren, 124.

43 George Kraigher, German Airborne Attack on

Drvar, dated 3 June 1944 (USAF); Louis Adamic,

The Eagle and the Roots (Garden City:

Doubleday, 1952), 504; Ronald Seth, Lion With

Blue Wings (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955), 147;

Walter Bernstein, “A Reporter in Yugoslavia,” The

New Yorker, 14 April 1945, 54–61; 28 April 1945,

48–56; Warren, 124.

44 MacLean, Heretic, 216.

45 Phyllis Auty, “Tito’s Triumph,” History of the

Second World War 88 (Paulton, UK: Purnell & Sons,

Ltd., 1974): 2439; Warren, 124; Seth, 147; Kraigher, 1.

46 Fitzroy MacLean, Escape to Adventure

(Boston: Little Brown, 1950), 250; G. E. Fowler,

Report on the Trip to Yugoslavia, n.d, n.p.,

Central Intelligence Agency; MacLean, Heretic,

217–8; Warren, 124.

47 Kumm, 145.

48 Stoyan Pribichevich, “Thrilling Escape from

Nazi’s Raid on Tito’s Headquarters,” The

Fighting Forces, XXI(3) 1944, 132–6; other

versions include “A Day in Yugoslavia,” Time, 26

June 1944, 69–72, and “Nazi Boasts Fail in Fight

with Tito,” New York Times, 19 June 1944, 1ff.

49 Royal Air Force Mediterranean Review (n.d.),

86 (IWM); Schramm, 661–3; Warren, 88, 124;

MacLean, Heretic, 219–20; DAPam 20-243, 65.

50 Rolf Michaelis, SS-Fallschirmjaeger Bataillon

500/600 (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 2008), 40. 

51 Walter Henisch, “So kam Drvar in unsre

hand!,” Borac, no. 114, 15 June 1944, 4–5.

52 Kunzmann and Milius, 78.

53 James E. Mrazek, The Glider War (New York:

St. Martin’s, 1975), 269; Fritz Morzik, German

Air Force Airlift Operations, USAF Historical

Studies 167 (Maxwell AFB: USAF Historical

Division, 1961), passim.

54 Paul W. Thompson, ed., Modern Battle

(Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1941), 133–4. 

55 Henisch, 4–5.

56 Fowler, 3; Kraigher, 1.

57 Radovic, Schwitzke, 2. 

58 Henisch, 4–5.

59 Michaelis, 39. 

60 Renold, 22. 

61 Radovic, Schuller, 1–2. 

62 Kunzmann and Milius, 78.

63 Fowler, 3; Pribichevich, 132.

67
68

64 Henisch, 4–5.

65 Kunzmann and Milius, 78.

66 Michaelis, 42.

67 Rhona Churchill, The London Daily Mail, 2

March 1945, B2. 

68 Schramm, 1280.

69 Kraigher, 2; MacLean, Heretic, 218; Escape,

350–1; Auty, Tito, 235; “Triumph,” 2439.

70 Kraigher, 2; Pribichevich, 133; Tito, Works,

331–2; MacLean, Escape, 236.

71 Michaelis, 41. 

72 Lucas, 117.

73 Dedijer, 218.

74 Renold, 20 –23; Kraigher, 2.

75 Henisch, 4–5.

76 Churchill, B2; Schellenburg, 386–7.

77 Radovic, Shuller, 3.

78 Radovic, Schwitzke, 3. 

79 Radovic, Schuller, 3–4. 

80 Milovan Djilas, Wartime (New York:

Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977), 327–8;

Document 498-PS prosecution exhibit 124(73),

Document 537-PS prosecution exhibit 166,

Trials of War Criminals, 123–6.

81 Michaelis, 39.

82 Henisch, 4–5. 

83 Radovic, Schuller, 3–4.

84 Pribichevich, 70; Supreme Commander

Southeast Order, 22 December 1943, Exhibit 379

in Trials of War Criminals, 824.

85 Pribichevich, 70, 72; Fowler, 3–4.

86 Lucas, 117–8.

87 Fowler, 4.

88 Henisch, 4–5.

89 Pribichevich, 132, 134.

90 Radovic, Schuller, 4.

91 Charles Whiting, Hunters from the Sky

(London: Leo Cooper, 1974), 113.

92 Renold, 20–23.

93 Renold, 20–23.

94 Dedijer, 218; MacLean, Heretic, 218; Escape,

351; Auty, “Triumph,” 2440.

95 Kumm, 143; Pribichevich, 70–73; Kraigher,

passim; Fowler, passim; Fitzroy MacLean,

Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape,

1949), 236; Dedijer, 219.

96 Pribichevich, 70.

97 Henisch, 4–5. 

98 Kraigher, 12; Pribichevich, 70; Renold, 20–23.

99 Radovic, Schuller, 5.

100 Henisch, 4–5.

101 Kunzmann and Milius, 78.

102 Pribichevich, 70.

103 Hensich, 4–5.

104 Renold, 20–23.

105 Stephen Clissold, Whirlwind (London:

Cresset Press, 1949), 184–5; Auty, “Triumph,”

2440; Pribichevich, 72–73.

106 Hensich, 4-5. 

107 Kumm, 121.

108 Michaelis, 39. 

109 MacLean, Heretic, 219; Escape, 351.

110 Radovic, Schuller, 5. 

111 Hensich, 4–5.

112 Antonio J. Munoz, Forgotten Legions: Obscure

Formations of the Waffen-SS (Boulder: Paladin
Press, 1991), 33.

113 Michaelis, 39.

114 Fowler, 4.

115 Munoz, 33. 

116 Henisch, 4–5; Michaelis, 39.

117 Auty, Tito, 236.

118 Henisch, 4–5.

119 Michaelis, 39; Kunzmann and Milius, 78.

120 Kraigher, 2.

121 Schramm, et al., 1282.

122 Renold, 20–23; Pribichevich, 7; Kunzmann

and Milius, 17.

123 Henisch, 4–5; Michaelis, 39.

124 Kumm, 144.

125 Fowler, 5.

126 RAF Med Review, 86–87.

127 Michaelis, 41, 54–55; Kurt-Gerhard Klieitman,

Die Waffen-SS: Eine Dokumentation (Osnabruck: Der Freiwillige, 1965), 508–9.

128 OKW, New York Times, 7 June 1944, 2.

129 Kumm, 117, 127, 144.

130 Kunzmann and Milius, 16.

131 Kleitman, 508–9; U.S. Army (MID), Order of

Battle of the German Army (Washington, DC:

War Department, 1945), 99–100.

132 Kumm, 128–38.

133 For example, renewed interest in the use of

infantry forces in low-intensity conflict is seen

in John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson,

On Infantry (Westport: Praeger, 1994) and

Robert B. Killebrew, “Deterrence With a

Vengeance,” Armed Forces Journal, October

1998, 76ff.

134 Wayne D. Eyre, “Operation Rosselsprung and

the Elimination of Tito, 25 May 1944,” Journal of

Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June

2006): 47–48 (from his Marine Corps University

Masters of Military Studies thesis, 2002).

135 Kumm, 119, 267.

136 Kumm, 268.

69

71

Ronald H. Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas

(Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1978).

Ralph Bennett, “Knight’s Move at Drvar:

Ultra and the Attempt on Tito’s Life,

25 May 1944,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1987).

Mark F. Cancian, “The Wehrmacht in

Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past?”

Parameters, Autumn (1993).

Roger Edwards, German Airborne Troops

(New York: Doubleday, 1974).

Wayne D. Eyre, “Operation Rosselsprung

and the Elimination of Tito, 25 May

1944,” Journal of Slavic Military

Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2006).

Green Devils: German Paratrooper Elite,

DVD video (Artsmagic, 2005).

Johnathan Gumz, “German Counterinsurgency Policy in Independent Croatia,

1941–1944,” Historian, Vol. 61, No. 1

(Fall 1998).

David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military

Intelligence in World War Two (New

York: Macmillan Publishing, 1978).

Michael McConville, “Knight’s Move in

Bosnia and the British Rescue of

Tito: 1944,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 142,

No. 6 (December 1997).

Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency in the Balkans: The Prinz

Eugen Division Example, 1942–1944,”

Journal of Slavic Military Studies,

Vol. 20, No. 4 (October–December

2007).

Charles D. Melson, “German Counterinsurgency Revisited,” Journal of

Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1

(January-March 2011). 

Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder:

The Second World War in Yugoslavia

(New York: Columbia University,

2008).

R. d’Arcy Ryan, The Guerilla Campaign in

Yugoslavia (Camberley: Strategic

and Combat Studies Institute, 1994).

Klaus Schmider, Partisankrieg in Jugoslawien, 1941-1944 (Hamburg: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2002).

Romedio Graf v. Thun-Hohenstein,

“Rosselsprung,” Osterreichishche

Militarzeitschrift, Vol. 1 (2007). 

Karl-Dieter Wolff, “Das Unternehmen

‘Rosselsprung,’” Vierteljahreshefte fur

Zeigeschichte, No. 4 (1970).

Additional Readings

Charles D. “Chuck” Melson is the

chief historian for the U.S.

Marine Corps, with the Marine

Corps University at Quantico, Virginia. He

is married with two children. He has been a

history lecturer, museum director, consultant, and military officer. His education

includes degrees in liberal arts from St.

John’s College, Annapolis, Maryland, and in

history and fine arts from Sonoma State

University, Rohnert Park, California. He has

previously written on this subject and other

aspects of World War II in Yugoslavia for the

Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

73

About the Author